

Empirical Consciousness in *Insight*: Is Our Conception Too Narrow?¹

This paper turns to Bernard Lonergan's *Insight* for confirmation of a position already tentatively explored, namely, that we (the community of Lonergan's students) might want to expand the standard conception of the first, or empirical, level of consciousness so as to include in empirical consciousness received meanings and values. In this way we will be able to make our own what is salutary in Martin Heidegger's notion of *Verstehen*, in Ludwig Wittgenstein's insistence on the public meaningfulness of language, and in Hans Urs von Balthasar's aesthetic 'taking to be true' (*Wahrnehmen*) the received forms expressive of God's revelation. Let me first summarize the arguments expressed in a previous paper in support of this position.² I will then turn to three sources in *Insight* that would seem to provide some justification for the position. The position, again, is that among the data that occur to the attentive subject of a consciousness that is also potentially intelligent, reasonable, and responsible are the meanings and values that are included in von Balthasar's 'seeing the form,' in Heidegger's preconceptual grasp of historical facticity, and in Wittgenstein's insistence on the public meaningfulness of ordinary language.

1 This paper was first composed for the April 2004 West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. It was published in *The Importance of Insight*, ed. John J. Liptay, Jr., and David S. Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 49-63.

2 The previous paper was entitled 'Reception and Elemental Meaning.' See on this site, under Books, Essays in Systematic Theology 13, and under Lectures, 2003 LW Reception and Elemental Meaning.

1 A Position for Exploration

These questions arose for me from being exposed to a paper by Sean McGrath at a seminar conducted in April 2003 by the Lonergan Research Institute.³ There is a link, McGrath argues, from Scotus's intuition of the singular through Husserl's categorial intuition to Heidegger's hermeneutical intuition of the preconceptual forms of meaning to be found in historical life itself. For each of these figures knowledge is primarily intuition, but for Heidegger the intuition is not without expression, without language, where 'language' must be taken, I believe, to include all the carriers of meaning, whether linguistic in the strict sense or found in art, in spontaneous intersubjectivity, in symbols, and in the incarnate meaning of persons, communities, and their deeds. Primal truth occurs for Heidegger only within such expressedness, and never as unmediated immediacy. We have no access to experience that is not permeated by language in this broad sense. Hermeneutical phenomenology must 'loosen up the primal words' in which life expresses itself, so as to open a free space for thinking. For Heidegger, as McGrath interprets him, there is an actually intelligible thing, individual, or irreplaceable occurrence grasped by *Verstehen* prior to any original cognitive processing on the part of the understanding subject. The historically singularized thing, individual, occurrence speaks a primal word to us that precedes and makes possible our own inner word issuing from our own insights. *History* is the domain of this preconceptual understandability. This emphasis on history represents Heidegger's original contribution to the effective history of Scotism. For Heidegger it is not the case that deconstructing the definitions of

³ McGrath's paper has been published in a slightly revised form: Sean J. McGrath, 'Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language,' *The Review of Metaphysics* 57:2 (2003) 339-58.

theoretical thought back to their empirically given structures leads only to mute sense data. History is the arena of actually intelligible singularity.

The position that I argued in my previous paper on this issue is that Lonergan's notions of mediated immediacy and elemental meaning refer to the same 'given intelligibility' that Heidegger is expressing in speaking of primally intelligible structures of historical facticity. I related the same notions to Lonergan's distinction of the ordinary meaningfulness of everyday language and the original meaningfulness of language that expresses new discoveries, thus attempting to link both Heidegger and Lonergan with Wittgenstein. And I argued that these links do not subvert but rather strengthen and reinforce Lonergan's intentionality analysis.

The category of elemental meaning in Lonergan's work, of course, is not limited to what he acknowledges at the first or empirical level of consciousness. For 'elemental meaning' obtains wherever subject and object are not distinct; it refers to the original knowing by identity that issues into distinction only with conceptualization, formulation, objectification, and so that obtains precisely as identity not only in sensation but also in insight. The sense in act is the sensible in act, yes, but it is also true that the intellect in act is the intelligible in act. The subject's own immanently generated insights are instances of elemental meaning, and they occur at a quite distinct level of consciousness from the empirical. 'Knowledge by identity' obtains for the preconceptual unity of knower and known, whether in sensation or in the act of insight.

Now my question is whether we may also speak of an elemental identity of 'knower' and 'known' that, because it occurs in something like that act that Heidegger calls *Verstehen*, is not simply a matter of sense in act and sensible in act, but that, because it is also not a matter of immanently generated insight arising as a release to the tension of inquiry, not a matter of 'original meaningfulness,' but rather of meaningful data in the sense of 'ordinary meaningfulness,' is a form of empirical consciousness. Is there some kind of identity of 'intellect in act' and 'intelligible in act' in the very reception of

meaningful data on the part of a subject who is intelligent and potentially reasonable and responsible? Is this part of what is meant by the expression ‘mediated immediacy?’ In Thomist language – and this question was suggested to me by McGrath in e-mail interchanges – is there some kind of lesser *illuminatio* that occurs prior to insight into phantasm? Lonergan speaks of the elemental meaning of the smile acting as an intersubjective determinant, of the work of art prior to its being interpreted by a critic, of the dream symbol performing an office of internal communication without help from the therapist. But is something similar not true of many received data? As the dreams of the morning are the dreams of an intelligent subject and so are already invested with meaning, may we not say that many of the data received by such a subject are already invested with a meaning that is a function of their historical facticity, of personal and communal history? Is that meaning merely potential, or is there some kind of devalued or minor formal and actual intelligibility at the very level of the givenness of meaningful data? Is there an empirical givenness of intellectually structured meaning? I think there is.

Moreover, this received meaning functions effectively and constitutively even before it has been subjected to critical examination and personal and communal appropriation. This is why I am suggesting that it possesses an intelligibility that is more than the merely potential intelligibility of sense data but also less than formal and actual intelligibility in the strict sense, where the latter emerge either as concepts from our own immanently generated acts of direct understanding, or as judgments from our own immanently generated acts of reflective understanding, or from the act of faith in the fullest sense of that term. Received meaning in large part has the intelligibility of ordinary meaningfulness, of public language, but it is also the product of the original meaningfulness of the insights, judgments, and decisions of those who have preceded us, or of their biases, their failures to be intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, or of some combination of intelligence and bias working in our historical community; and our own questions arising upon its reception are what provoke our own acts of original

meaningfulness. What I am suggesting we might call ‘minor formal intelligibility’ and ‘minor actual intelligibility’ have to do with this ordinary meaningfulness of publicly sedimented expression as this expression mediates the reception of data, and what I am suggesting we might call ‘major formal intelligibility’ and ‘major actual intelligibility’ are connected with the original meaningfulness of what proceeds by intelligible emanation when the subject raises his or her own questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, answers these questions in acts of understanding and in judgments of fact and of value, and formulates the answers in inner and outer words that contribute eventually to the communal fund of ordinary meaningfulness.

I suggest, then, something of an analogy between the levels of intentional consciousness as they function in everyday living and the same levels as they function in distinct functional specialties in a discipline such as theology. In particular, I suggest an analogy between empirical consciousness as it functions in everyday living and empirical consciousness as it sets the objectives of the functional specialty ‘research.’ The common element is that all four sets of conscious operations work together as one receives data. The difference, of course, is that work in the functional specialty ‘research’ is a fully deliberate, chosen set of projects whose mediated object is a carefully isolated set of data that will be subject to rigorous and methodical interpretation. The data that emerge in research are the product of immanently generated acts of insight, judgment, and decision, as, for example, in the production of a critical text. That sort of specialized application does not occur in everyday, commonsense performance. Still, many of the data received in ordinary everyday living are already invested with a meaning that functions effectively and constitutively. They are not mere data of sense or of consciousness appearing in a state of unmediated immediacy. The world is already mediated by meaning to a subject whose empirical consciousness is the empirical consciousness of someone intelligent. There is an intellectually apprehensive component that functions at the level of reception. It is not Lonergan’s ‘insight’ as a release to the tension of inquiry. It is more like

Verstehen in Heidegger's sense of the apprehensive component of *Da-sein*. It is already invested with meaning, with an 'already given intelligibility,' with what I am suggesting we might call 'minor formal and actual intelligibility.' More precisely, we should say that the minor formal intelligibility is a function of this *Verstehen*, whereas minor actual intelligibility, the judgmental component in this apprehension, depends on the 'always with us' quality of previous judgments, or on belief, or on a suspicious suspension of belief, where 'belief' can range all the way from comfortable embeddedness in a commonsense environment to religious belonging, and is the function proximately of the personal history of the subject within the history of his or her community or network of communities (minor authenticity or inauthenticity) and remotely of the history of those communities themselves (major authenticity or inauthenticity).

Another way of approaching the issue is in terms of the intricate symbiosis of what Lonergan calls ordinary meaningfulness and original meaningfulness.

... the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is essentially public and only derivatively private ... what is true of the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is not true of the original meaningfulness of any language, ordinary, literary, or technical. For all language develops and, at any time, any language consists in the sedimentation of the developments that have occurred and have not become obsolete. Now developments consist in discovering new uses for existing words, in inventing new words, and in diffusing the discoveries and inventions. All three are a matter of expressed mental acts. The discovery of a new usage is a mental act expressed by the new usage. The invention of a new word is a mental act expressed by the new word ...⁴

4 Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 255-56.

Lonergan introduces the distinction of ordinary meaningfulness and original meaningfulness as a response to a Wittgensteinian objection to his position. But it is also applicable *mutatis mutandis* to questions that might be presented from a Heideggerian perspective. Heidegger's preconceptual or fore-theoretical or 'given' intelligibility of the temporal and contextual contingencies of life is a subspecies of Lonergan's category of ordinary meaningfulness. Lonergan's distinct contribution has to do not with the ordinary meaningfulness of historical facticity but with the original meaningfulness that is responsible for 'healing and creating in history.' There is no reason to set up an opposition between them. In different ways one flows into the other. If I may quote my earlier paper,

The original meaningfulness of one generation or even of one period in one's own life becomes the ordinary meaningfulness of a later generation or period, and problems with regard to ordinary meaningfulness give rise to the questions that issue in original meaningfulness. There is no reason for a philosophy or a theology to feel required to choose between them. The Scotist-inspired Heideggerian tendency and the Wittgensteinian tendency, whether Scotist-inspired or not, is to emphasize the ordinary meaningfulness of the public sedimentations as what is essential and to consider the original meaningfulness that issues from so-called mental acts as at best derivative. *That*, and not naive realism in the simple sense, would be the counterposition in these views. To appeal to Lonergan's dialectic of concept and performance, we might say that Wittgenstein and, perhaps to a greater degree, Heidegger display a great deal of original meaningfulness and ingenuity in their talk about ordinary meaningfulness. But Lonergan students should take care not so to stress the interior operations that give rise to original meaningfulness as to pass over in silence or even denial the fact that ordinarily, that is, in the ordinary

meaningfulness of everyday life, we start from publicly sedimented expressions already invested with meaning.

Another approach to the same issues is through the distinction between understanding data and understanding facts. Lonergan writes, ‘The understanding of data is expressed in hypotheses, and the verification of hypotheses leads to probable assertions. The understanding of facts is a more complicated matter, for it supposes the existence of two types or orders of knowledge, where the facts of the first type supply the data for the second type.’⁵ Thus the task of the functional specialty ‘systematics’ is not the understanding of data, except insofar as the facts established by the functional specialty ‘doctrines’ are taken as the data that systematics attempts to understand. But the truth of the doctrines, precisely as received truth accepted in faith, functions constitutively in Christian living, and not only insofar as it is expressed in propositions but also as it is carried in art and symbols and intersubjectivity and the incarnate meaning of persons and communities, irrespective of how well the propositions are understood. As functioning constitutively its truth may be likened to Heidegger’s *alētheia* or unconcealment. And unless it so functions constitutively, precisely accepted as true in faith, one is not prepared to subject it to systematic understanding. The facts of the first type of knowledge, functioning in the realm of ordinary meaningfulness in the faith community, are supplying data for a second, systematic type of knowledge, which, if it succeeds in elaborating any new synthesis, would be an instance of original meaningfulness. Through genuine communication, doctrinal truth can function as a linguistic expression of a primal truth disclosed to believers, a truth that in systematics is submitted to further scrutiny by theologians attempting to understand it in an explanatory fashion. Thus, when Aquinas spoke of procession in God, he was employing what had

⁵ Ibid. 348.

become ordinary language in his faith tradition. But when he explained procession in God as *emanatio intelligibilis*, he was exhibiting the original meaningfulness of language, where that meaningfulness is entirely a function of his own understanding of what procession in God had to be, and of course of what it could not be.

Another application has to do with revelation and the theology of reception. God's revelation is a matter of meaning, God's entering into the world of human meaning. But this means God's entry into human *reality* as constituted by meaning. Meaning *is*, it is real. Acts of meaning as cognitive are instances of reality intending reality. As constitutive, meaning 'constitutes part of the reality of the one that means': one's horizon, one's assimilative powers, one's knowledge, one's values, one's character. As communicative, meaning 'induces in the hearer some share in the cognitive, constitutive, or effective meaning of the speaker.' And as effective, meaning 'persuades or commands others or it directs [our] control over nature.'⁶ These ontological aspects pertain to meaning at any stage of cultural development, in any of the differentiations of consciousness, and in the presence and absence of conversion. And they pertain to meaning no matter what its carrier might be: intersubjectivity, art, symbol, personal conduct, everyday or literary or technical language..

Moreover, the relative dominance of the dialectics of community and culture vis-à-vis the dialectic of the subject means that the horizon of the subject in the world, and the world correlative to that horizon are, prior to critical reflection on the part of the subject, largely a function of what Heidegger calls temporal and historical facticity, 'being thrown' into existence in the world at this particular time and with these particular people, with their own horizons similarly determined and limited for them by historical dialectics over which at the outset they have no control. These dialectics are what give rise to the situations that stimulate our neural demands for psychic representation and

⁶ Ibid. 356.

conscious integration and that mold the orientation of the intelligence and imagination that spontaneously exercise a censorship with respect to what is going to be allowed into consciousness. Thus the very reception of data invested with meaning is itself constitutive of the subject's horizon. It is precisely at this level of primordial receptivity that God's entrance into the world of human reality and meaning takes place. A theology of revelation, of God's entry into the world of human meaning, must ponder especially the level of elemental meaning, of the already given intelligibility of received data. God's entry into the world of human meaning is God's effecting transformations in that already given intelligibility of the world that is correlative to our horizons, and doing so through the cognitive, constitutive, communicative, and effective functions of God's own meaning, God's own original meaningfulness, and ultimately God's incarnate meaning, incarnate Logos, incarnate Word, the Son of the eternal Father, crucified, dead, and risen from the dead.

The formal constituent of the community, whose dialectic exerts a relative dominance over the dialectic of the subject, is common meaning. That common meaning is constitutive of the individual as a member of this community, and it is constitutive of the community itself. Its genesis occurs through an ongoing process of communication, where people share the same cognitive, constitutive, and effective meanings. The really serious divisions in the community are those that arise from the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, religious, and (I would add) psychic conversion. For then radical dialectical opposition can affect the community and its actions and the situations that arise from these actions. And these situations are precisely what stimulate neural demands in subjects, so that if the situation is not some intelligible whole but a set of 'misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments,'⁷ this will have an effect on the subject's own emergence into selfhood. The state of the community affects the

7 Ibid. 358.

receptivity of both individuals and groups to God's entry into the world of human meaning through God's symbolic self-communication. The state of grace is an intersubjective and social situation, a communion of the three divine subjects with a community of human subjects. The dominance of the dialectic of community over the dialectic of the subject means that the relations of the present of the subject to the past are relations not only to the subject's own past but also to the past of his or her community or network of communities. These relations decisively affect the orientation or habitual context within which the reception of data occurs. They decisively affect the 'ordinary meaningfulness' of the subject's everyday life, an ordinary meaningfulness that may be more or less sinful, more or less under the influence of grace. Revelation as God's entrance into the human world of meaning shifts the probabilities in favor of graced ordinary meaningfulness, and that shift in probabilities affects the potential of subjects in community to receive the divine meaning intended by God when God enters our world of meaning.

The question of truth, then, becomes by and large the question of the validity or objectivity of the system of meanings and values by which the community, and individuals within the community, structure their lives. In particular, '... how can one tell whether one's appropriation of religion is genuine or unauthentic and, more radically, how can one tell one is not appropriating a religious tradition that has become unauthentic?'⁸ That is a question that must be asked, I believe, by every Catholic at the present time, when there has been such an overlay of ecclesiastical baggage heaped upon the message of the gospel that many official authorities of the religion no longer carry genuine authority but are more concerned with their own influence and power than with the gospel's message of unconditional love. The question can be generalized, to extend to the other components of one's historically and culturally inherited symbol system. There

⁸ Bernard Lonergan, 'Religious Knowledge,' in *A Third Collection* 130.

may be no more significant question in the whole of human life than this: how can I tell whether the convictions that I have been taught to live by are a function of a tradition or set of traditions that have become unauthentic? Or to use language that we found useful earlier, how can I judge whether the ordinary meaningfulness that constitutes my present horizon, historically and culturally conditioned as it is, is a function of an unauthentic or an authentic tradition? And the answer can be discovered only by the release of the original meaningfulness by which we submit our beliefs and convictions to an immanent critique, in order to ascertain their genuineness. The answer is found in the self-transcendence that is the criterion of authenticity or genuineness, a self-transcendence that in the stage of cultural development that is advanced by Lonergan, can be submitted to self-appropriation. Once again, Heidegger is speaking mainly about the ordinary meaningfulness that constitutes present horizons, and Lonergan about the original meaningfulness that submits ordinary meaningfulness to critique and, probably, to transformation: to 'healing and creating.' The operations that constitute original meaningfulness, then, alone are able to pass judgment on the truth of the ordinary meaningfulness of present horizons. The immanently generated affirmation that emanates from the grasp of the virtually unconditioned is alone capable of ascertaining the truth of the unconcealedness of the mediated immediacy with which the process toward original meaningfulness begins. Heidegger's unconcealedness alone will not do, nor will von Balthasar's *Wahrnehmen*. Both must be confirmed by some sort of process that leads either to immanently generated knowledge or to the reflective understanding that grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe. If they cannot be so confirmed, they must be subjected to the process of transformation that is best succinctly summed up in the wonderful expression 'healing and creating in history.' The 'minor formal or actual intelligibility' of mediated immediacy must either be confirmed or corrected by the 'major formal or actual intelligibility' attained by the operations that Lonergan has clarified. It is not the case, in the last analysis, that the truth of judgment is

merely a derivative of a primal unconcealedness. It is rather the case that the truth of the primal unconcealedness of mediated immediacy is a function of the major authenticity of the cultural and religious traditions that have bequeathed us this heritage. If that is lacking, then our responsibility is to correct the major unauthenticity of the received tradition; and the only way we can do that is by exercising the original meaningfulness that, under God's gift of grace, is the sole source and guarantee of such healing and creating in history: inquiry, insight, conceptualization and formulation, reflection, reflective understanding, judgment, questions for evaluation and deliberation, judgments of value, decision.

Still, Heidegger's notion of truth as unconcealment is about something essential to this exercise. It is about the first transcendental precept, 'Be attentive,' or in other words, 'Focus.' Insights are only as good as the images in which they grasp intelligibility. Forgetfulness of the images reduces and in the limit eliminates the probability that we will have the insights we need, not only to get on with our individual lives, but also to fulfill our historical responsibilities. Insight into image is infallible, but if the images are distorted, so too will be the insights. And until the forgetfulness of the data is overcome, the marshaling of the evidence for a reasonable judgment will be lacking essential components. This is what psychic conversion is all about. Whether it is defined from 'below,' as it were, as the transformation of the censorship over neural demands from a repressive to a constructive functioning, or explained from 'above' in language that appeals to a healing of what Heidegger calls the forgetfulness of Being, it is a transformation that effects a renewed link between the creative, inquiring human spirit and the materials, the elemental meaning, the mediated immediacy that at any given time constitute the starting point of the creative process.

2 Sources in *Insight*

Having summarized the position that I would like the Lonergan community to explore, let me now mention some possible corroborating material in *Insight* for this ‘take’ on the meaning of ‘empirical consciousness.’

2.1 ‘Experience’ in ‘Patterns of Experience’

The first such source lies in the meaning of the word ‘experience’ as this word functions in the expression ‘patterns of experience.’ Lonergan writes, ‘The notion of the pattern of experience may best be approached by remarking how abstract it is to speak of a sensation.’ Acts of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling ‘never occur in isolation both from one another and from all other events.’ What is the meaning of ‘all other events?’ Well, acts of sensation ‘have a bodily basis; they are functionally related to bodily movements; and they occur in some dynamic context that somehow unifies a manifold of sensed contents and of acts of sensing.’ It is in the dynamic context that we find our first clue. A few lines later it is spoken of as ‘an organizing control,’ and it is described as follows: ‘Besides the systematic links between senses and sense organs, there is, immanent in experience, a factor variously named conation, interest, attention, purpose. We speak of consciousness as a stream, but the stream involves not only the temporal succession of different contents but also direction, striving, effort. Moreover, this direction of the stream is variable ... There are ... different dynamic patterns of experience,’ and the patterns organize the ‘various elements in the experience.’⁹ Those

⁹ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, latest printing, 2000) 204-205.

‘various elements’ are spoken of as ‘sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements,’¹⁰ but such sequences can exhibit not only biological purposiveness, as when they ‘converge upon terminal activities of intussusception or reproduction, or, when negative in scope, self-preservation,’¹¹ but also ‘ever novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of aesthetic experience.’¹² While it is true that the discovery of such forms and their establishment in the artistic deed are spoken of as acts of insight in Lonergan’s sense of that term, still the artistic deed itself serves to show forth a ‘deep-set wonder ... in its elemental sweep’ and to ‘exhibit the reality of the primary object for that wonder,’ namely, the wonderer, *Da-sein*, as a question to itself. ‘Art may offer attractive or repellent answers to these questions, but in its subtler forms it is content to communicate any of the moods in which such questions arise, to convey any of the tones in which they may be answered or ignored.’¹³ And as those moods and tones as communicated and conveyed are Heidegger’s *Befindlichkeit*, so the apprehensive component in the reception of the artistic forms is the equiprimordial *Verstehen*, which, while it is not Lonergan’s ‘insight’ as a release to the tension of inquiry, has to be accounted more than merely sensitive receptivity.

Again, the pattern may be governed by the spirit of inquiry itself, and then it is what Lonergan calls the intellectual pattern of experience. Here intelligence so governs sensitive process that this process is said to contract ‘to an unruffled sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images.’ The pattern controls what will appear in consciousness in the first place as ‘the suggestive images of clues and missing links, of patterns and perspectives, that evoke the desiderated insight and the delighted cry

10 Ibid. 206.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid. 208.

13 Ibid. 209.

“Eureka!”¹⁴ Now, while that cry is, of course, the cry of insight as a release to the tension of inquiry, the clues, links, patterns, and perspectives that are organized experientially in such a way as to evoke the cry are themselves already under the governing and organizing control of intellectual purposiveness, and so they emerge into consciousness already mediated by meaning. And that is all that I desire to maintain at the present: experience, the first level of consciousness, when organized by the intellectual pattern, is already constituted by meaningful expectations and anticipations.

The point I wish to make is probably clearest in Lonergan’s discussion of the dramatic pattern, which, I think, is also the pattern that most occupies Heidegger in *Being and Time*. We, the characters in the drama of living, ‘are molded by the drama itself.’ While it is true that each of us discovers and develops by insight the possible roles we might play and selects and adapts those roles with some deliberation, still prior to reflection and criticism, evaluation and decision, ‘our imaginations and intelligence must collaborate in representing the projected course of action that is to be submitted to reflection and criticism, to evaluation and decision,’ and the dramatic pattern is operative in that prior collaboration, ‘outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity.’¹⁵ Some of that ‘outlining’ and affective ‘charging’ (*Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit*) are under the influence not only of our own past behavior, which is what is emphasized in this precise discussion in chapter 6 of *Insight*, but also, as becomes clear in chapter 7, of the dialectic of the community, which ‘gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands, and ... molds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship’ over these demands and how they will find their

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. 211-12.

way into consciousness.¹⁶ Thus, even in chapter 6 Lonergan writes, ‘in ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the pattern, nor first the role and then the feelings. On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively.’¹⁷ Moreover, the emotional and conative ‘charging’ may introduce a ‘dramatic bias’ into the pattern, and so exclude precisely those meaningful presentations that could release the process of inquiry toward the ‘original meaningfulness’ by which the subject finds his or her own way to truth and value. ‘... the dramatic pattern of experience penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise its own domination and control, and to effect, prior to conscious discrimination, its own selections and arrangements.’ Those selections and arrangements that are prior to our own conscious discrimination are precisely the sort of ‘meaningful data’ that I am trying to call to our attention.

2.2 *Free Images and Utterances*

A second source is found in the following schematic representation:

I. Data. Perceptual Images.	Free Images.	Utterances.
II. Questions for Intelligence.	Insights.	Formulations.
III. Questions for Reflection.	Reflection.	Judgment.

Lonergan says, ‘The second level presupposes and complements the first. The third level presupposes and complements the second. The exception lies in free images and utterances, *which commonly are under the influence of the higher levels before they*

¹⁶ Ibid. 243.

¹⁷ Ibid. 212.

provide a basis for inquiry and reflection.'¹⁸ This quotation alone is probably all that is needed for me to make my point. There are presentations that occur to the conscious subject on the empirical level of consciousness that are already infused with intelligence and rationality and, we may add, with ethical overtones. These occur, I want to say, to a *Verstehen* that is empirical, that receives meaningful data before these data provide a basis for one's own inquiry and reflection. May it not be said that the basis for a potential and fruitful dialogue with both Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian strands in philosophy and with von Balthasar in theology is already contained in this brief selection? In many ways, we need little or nothing more than this to establish the point that I am trying to make.

2.3 The Contextual Aspect of Judgment

The final source that I would like to call upon in this paper is found in the same chapter of *Insight*. It has to do with the contextual aspect of judgment. It was an important part of my earlier paper on this same material, and I am doing little more here than quoting once again what I said there.

The contextual aspect of judgment exhibits something of the temporality that is to the fore in *Being and Time* – not Heidegger's radical temporalizing, which will remain always problematic for anyone schooled in Lonergan's thought, but at least the dimensions of memory, presence, and anticipation. The contextual aspect of judgment is discussed in terms of 'the relation of the present to the past,' 'the relations within the present,' and 'the relations of the present to the future.' It is principally, though not exclusively, the relation of the present to the past that affects the point I am trying to make. Lonergan writes:

18 Ibid. 299.

... past judgments remain with us. They form a habitual orientation, present and operative but only from behind the scenes. They govern the direction of attention, evaluate insights, guide formulations, and influence the acceptance or rejection of new judgments. Previous insights remain with us. They facilitate the occurrence of fresh insights, exert their influence on new formulations, provide presuppositions that underlie new judgments whether in the same or in connected or in merely analogous fields of inquiry. Hence, when a new judgment is made, there is within us a habitual context of insights and other judgments, and it stands ready to elucidate the judgment just made, to complement it, to balance it, to draw distinctions, to add qualifications, to provide defence, to offer evidence or proof, to attempt persuasion.¹⁹

I would like to adopt and adapt some of Heidegger's language at this point, and affirm that the habitual orientation formed by previous judgments and the habitual context of insights and other judgments help to constitute the intelligent and dispositional components of *Dasein* that constitute the horizon that functions in the very reception of data. And I want to emphasize that the judgments and insights that function in this way may be, not our own, but handed on to us, in the movement from above, by the community. At the same time, I would suggest that Heidegger can benefit from Lonergan's contribution especially to the discussion of the relations within the present and of the relations of the present to the future. The relations of the present to the past have to do by and large with what has become what Lonergan calls 'ordinary meaningfulness,' or what Wittgenstein would call the public meaningfulness of language, while the relations within the present and the relations of the present to the future may release the processes that exhibit original meaningfulness. Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in quite different ways, illuminate the realm of ordinary meaningfulness, and Lonergan the

¹⁹ Ibid. 302.

realm of original meaningfulness, and all three exhibit a great deal of original meaningfulness no matter what it is that they are illuminating. Moreover, it may be that original meaningfulness may be the set of elements needed to transcend the radical temporalizing in accord with which Heidegger places Being 'within' time rather than time 'within' Being.

The relations within the present, then, may be such as to show either mutual dependence and other connections or even conflicts among existing judgments. The connections stimulate logical efforts for 'organized coherence,' while conflicts 'release the dialectical process.' Again, the relations of the present to the future call attention to the dynamic structure of knowledge, something on which, it may safely be argued, Heidegger, at times associating or correlating Being with the transcendental imagination, does not lay sufficient stress. In brief, Lonergan says, 'All we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing; but it lurks behind the scenes, and it reveals itself only in the exactitude with which each minor increment to our knowing is effected.'²⁰ But the same is true of all that we have received in the order of meaning and value. And I am asking whether all we know and all we have received reveals itself in the further reception of data, and whether those data include meanings and values. Is this not part of what is meant by the expression 'mediated immediacy'?

²⁰ Ibid. 303.