The Unified Field Structure for Systematic Theology:
A Proposal

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1 Contexts

I wish to begin by situating what I am going to say within two broader contexts. The first is the mission and mandate of the Lonergan Research Institute, and the second is a book that is being written at the present time.

The Lonergan Research Institute has been in existence since April of 1985, and from the beginning our hopes for what we could do extended beyond the scope of what in fact we have managed to do up to the present time. Our way of expressing those hopes has gone through several phases, but constant through those changes there has been an intention to work in both of the phases of intellectual activity that are marked out so clearly and differentiated so sharply by Bernard Lonergan in his *Method in Theology*. There a first phase that investigates through research, interpretation, history, and dialectic in order to report on and evaluate what others have said and done. In our case, the ‘other’ is primarily Bernard Lonergan himself. And there is a second phase in which we stand on our own two feet and speak for ourselves (or, perhaps, stand on his shoulders, even as we stand on our own two feet and speak for ourselves). The language that I use currently in literature about the Institute in order to express these two ideals or hopes speaks of preserving, promoting, implementing, and developing the work of Bernard Lonergan. Preserving and promoting entail labor in the first phase: maintaining the archives, both papers and audio, making relevant materials available in our library collection, and publishing the Collected Works.
Implementing and developing Lonergan’s work is second-phase activity, where we stand on our own two feet and say, not what Lonergan said (though we build on that) but what we say.

Even as we gather today to celebrate and display what the Institute has done to preserve and promote Lonergan’s work, the audio restoration and the Collected Works, we begin to operate more deliberately and purposefully also in the second phase. There are many tasks that lie before the community that has been formed by the work of Bernard Lonergan. Systematic theology is but one of them. Many people, no doubt, perhaps even many of you, would be much more interested if we were choosing some other path on which to exercise our own ingenuity and insight, such as economics or the theory of human rights or the dialogue of world religions or contemporary sexual ethics. Lonergan’s work is pertinent to all of these, as various contributions from thinkers versed in his work have amply demonstrated. And all of these areas will figure in a systematic theology. Still, they are not the first or even the central items to be attended to in systematics. That is one reason we are not beginning there, and from a methodological point of view it is the decisive reason. One does not begin a systematic theology with what is ‘first for us’ but with what is first in another sense, namely, with that which, if it is understood, enables one to proceed to all the other tasks of understanding in the discipline. Systematics is about understanding. If the discipline is theology, if the specialty is systematic work in theology, then one begins with what is first in the theological realm, and what is first in the theological realm is not economic theory or human rights or the dialogue of religions or sex but, to put it bluntly, God. It is no accident that, after a fascinating opening question on
the discipline of theology itself, Thomas Aquinas devotes questions 2 through 43 of the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* to God.

My paper this evening, then, marks, I hope, the inauguration of a new project on the part of the entire Lonergan Research Institute, a project in which a number of people steeped in Lonergan’s work will collaborate in the years ahead, working to construct and develop a contemporary systematics. The collaborative effort will be obvious even in the paper, since it arises out of a prolonged discussion that has occurred on and off over the past few years at the Institute and at Regis College. And the word ‘contemporary’ is important. Such a theology, if we do it right, will stand in continuity with the Thomist *Summa theologiae* and the great trinitarian, christological, soteriological, and anthropological treatises that Lonergan himself composed when he taught systematic theology at L’Immaculée Conception in Montreal, at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto that later became Regis College, and at the Gregorian University in Rome. But, if we do it right, it will also embody a genetic development on these works, at least in certain areas. As part of this new project, we hope to sponsor every year the Bernard Lonergan Lecture in Systematic Theology. But that lecture will be only part of the new venture, and in the ideal order it will arise out of the discussions of a team of people working closely with one another to compose and develop a systematic theology. My hope is that what I have to say this evening will help to orient that ongoing work, by providing its initial and to some extent at least part of its enduring framework. But if the framework is to endure, it will do so only by continually allowing itself to be refined, nuanced, stretched to expansions and even higher viewpoints or paradigm shifts by the emergence of new questions. As Lonergan himself says, in a theological application of Kurt Gödel’s mathematical theorem that he
expresses in his Latin notes *De intellectu et methodo*, no matter how comprehensive a framework one seems to have established, one can always expect that sooner or later a question or questions will arise from within the framework that cannot be answered unless the framework itself undergoes some kind of major transposition or transformation. Still, we must begin somewhere, and that is what I am going to attempt to do this evening.

The second broader context for this evening’s paper locates the paper in a book that I have almost completed entitled *What Is Systematic Theology?* The paper forms the bulk of chapter 7. What occurs in the first six chapters? The first chapter proposes that there is needed a development in the notion of systematics beyond what appears in the chapter devoted to systematics in Lonergan’s *Method in Theology*, and that this development is demanded not only by the exigence of contemporary questions but also by the dynamic thrust of Lonergan’s own writings. Chapter 2 presents a definition of systematic theology and defends a fundamental thesis of Lonergan’s, even as it insists that this thesis raises questions that must be faced. The definition reads as follows: Systematic theology is the ordered, coherent, hypothetical, gradually developing, structured, synthetic, and in places analogical and obscure understanding of the realities intended in the meanings actually or ideally constitutive of the community that is the church. The fundamental thesis of Lonergan’s with which I agree is twofold: first, that the *principal* function of systematics narrows that definition to focus on the hypothetical, imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing understanding of the *mysteries of faith*, and second, that systematics must begin with, and be centered around, those mysteries of faith that have received dogmatic status in the church: principally, if Lonergan’s own practice is any indication, the mysteries of the Blessed
Trinity, of the Incarnate Word, of the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit through grace, and of eternal life and the beatific vision. Moreover, the presentation of that understanding must, as far as possible, follow the order of teaching and learning rather than the order of discovery. As chemistry textbooks begin with the periodic table and proceed to assemble or compose over 300,000 chemical compounds, but do not repeat the centuries of trial and error that led to the discovery of the periodic table, so systematics must begin with some set of fundamental conceptions that will enable it to assemble or compose the constitutive meanings of the Christian church. My hope this evening is to be able to present what that set of fundamental conceptions might be.

Chapter 3 reviews the relation between dogma and mysteries of faith, and insists that it is complex. Dogmas are a subset, twice removed, of the generic category ‘church doctrines.’ Some church doctrines propose mysteries of faith that could not be known at all without divine revelation; some church doctrines do not. And among those church doctrines that propose mysteries of faith that could not be known had they not been revealed, only some have received dogmatic status. There is no dogma regarding the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. There is no dogma regarding the redemption, the ‘pro nobis’ of the atonement. We confess both in faith whenever we say the creed, but neither has received the kind of dogmatic clarification that the *homoousion* of Nicea or the ‘one person in two natures’ of Chalcedon brings to Christian faith. Chapter 3 raises the question of the systematic understanding of these nondogmatic elements of the Christian mystery, and begins to suggest some foundational requirements around the category of ‘mystery’ in general.
Chapter 4 tries to locate within the systematic orbit the place, not of church doctrines, but of theological doctrines. Chapter 5 treats the transposition of categories from the more metaphysical contexts of most dogma and of most systematics to the interiority context established by Lonergan, as well as the integration of new categories with the categories one has transposed from the tradition. Chapter 6 is about mediation, and it insists that the mediation that Lonergan speaks of in the first sentence of Method in Theology, ‘A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix,’ must be a mutual self-mediation between the transposed tradition of faith, on the other hand, and the meanings and values constitutive of the cultural matrix, on the other hand. Mutual self-mediation is distinguished from correlation, even as it is related to dialectic. And the basis for this insistence on mutual self-mediation rather than a one-way street from the tradition to the cultural matrix is rooted in a doctrinal position on the universal mission of the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 7, which you are going to hear a summary of this evening, raises the question of the fundamental set of conceptions with which a systematics would begin, the horizon that constitutes the field within which systematics is to be done. Three further chapters follow. Chapter 8 anticipates some issues that this unified field structure will enable systematics to resolve, and principally the reconciliation and integration of Lonergan’s transcendental approach with the aesthetic and dramatic emphases of von Balthasar, on the one hand, and the social and political emphases of the best of liberation theology, on the other hand. Chapter 9, still to be written, will treat the question of foundations in the context of an anti-foundationalist milieu. Chapter 10 expands on the relationship between
system and history that is raised in the material you are going to hear this evening.

2 The Thesis

My fundamental thesis, then, is that there is at hand a unified field structure for the functional specialty or theological discipline ‘systematics.’ A subsidiary thesis is that previous attempts, including my own, to state what that structure is have not quite hit if off correctly, even as they have made contributions to its accurate presentation. In the course of the discussion I will try to summarize some of these previous attempts.

But first, we must face the question, What is meant by a unified field structure? The expression ‘unified field structure’ is not mine, but Daniel Monsour’s. However, I have developed, or at least am developing, my own way of expressing what I mean by speaking this way. The unified field structure would be some open set of conceptions that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in that discipline or functional specialty of theology whose task it is to give a synthetic understanding of the realities that are and ought to be providing the meaning constitutive of the community called the church. The unified field structure would be a statement, perhaps a quite lengthy one, perhaps even one taking up several large volumes, capable of guiding for the present and the foreseeable future the ongoing genetic development of the entire synthetic understanding of the mysteries of faith and of the other elements that enter into systematic theology. It would guide all work at bringing these elements into a synthetic unity. It would stand in continuity with the implicit unified field structure of the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas,
which marks what we might call the first great plateau in the unfolding of systematic theology, and it will leave itself open to further enrichments, differentiations, and transformations analogous to those that it itself adds to the Thomist conception.

To draw on one of Monsour’s articulations, the unified field structure would stand to a contemporary systematics as the periodic table stands to contemporary chemistry. Again, it would be a summation and integration of what Lonergan once called the dogmatic-theological context as that context stands at the present time, given both the development of theology to this point and an intelligent, faith-filled anticipation of where theology must go from here. It would stand to a contemporary systematics as the theorem of the supernatural joined to Aristotle’s metaphysics stood to the emergent systematics of the Middle Ages as it came to its first great synthesis in Aquinas, and in fact it will be a genetic development upon that unified field structure. The conjunction of the theorem of the supernatural with Aristotelian metaphysics provided perhaps the first great unified field structure for a systematic theology, and any future structure must build on that synthesis even as it shows itself capable of addressing issues which that framework could not handle. Thus, an adequate contemporary field structure would make systematics historically conscious and would place it

1 The most complete discussion of the dogmatic-theological context occurs in the 1962 lectures on ‘The Method of Theology’ delivered at Regis College, Toronto. These are presently available on compact disc from the Lonergan Research Institute. A written transcription will form part of volume 22 of Lonegan’s Collected Works, Early Works on Theological Method I.
in tune with modern scientific methods and achievements, with exegetical methods, and with historical scholarship. A contemporary systematics has to be able to address problems and relate to theological functional specialties that had not emerged at all at the time that Thomas did his work. Thomas knew nothing of scientific exegesis, nothing of critical history, nothing of modern science whether natural or human. That is not to say that he has nothing to contribute to these, but only that the methods and results of these disciplines as we know them were simply beyond his horizon. A theology that mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion within that matrix cannot simply repeat even the permanent achievements of another age but must carry them forward in the same spirit as the one Lonergan embodied when he took as a central inspiration for so much of his work Pope Leo XIII’s injunction *vetera novis augere et perficere*, to augment and complete the old with the new.

The two principal components of the structure that I will suggest are sublations of the two component of Thomas’s structure, that is, of the theorem of the supernatural and of Aristotle’s metaphysics. Thus like the medieval organizing conception, the unified field structure that I am going to suggest combines a specifically theological element with a more general set of categories. The theorem of the supernatural, discovered around the year 1230 by Philip the Chancellor of the University of Paris, grounded the specifically theological component of Thomas’s conception, and Aristotle’s metaphysics provided its general categories. The principal specifically theological element in the unified field structure now at hand is a four-point hypothesis proposed in Bernard Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity. The hypothesis differentiates the theorem of the supernatural into a set of connections between the four trinitarian relations — paternity, filiation,
active spiration, and passive spiration — and created supernatural participations in those relations: the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation is a created participation in paternity, sanctifying grace a created participation in active spiration, the habit of charity a created participation in passive spiration, and the light of glory a created participation in filiation. And so the hypothesis enables a synthetic understanding of the four mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, and the last things. The hypothesis itself is beyond anything explicit in Aquinas, even though it may be argued that the seeds of much of it are present in question 43 of the Prima pars of the Summa theologiae, where Thomas discusses the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. There is in Lonergan’s hypothesis a coordination of the divine processions with the processions of word and love in authentic human performance that, in Lonergan’s beautiful words, almost brings God too close to us. As Jeremy Wilkins, a former student at Regis College, is arguing in an important dissertation now being written at Boston College, this coordination remains potential in Aquinas’s work and is spelled out perhaps for the first time in the hypothesis from which I am taking my lead in the present paper.

The set of general categories that would represent a sublation of the Aristotelian corpus that provided Aquinas with his own general categories will be provided, I am arguing, by what Lonergan calls the ‘basic and total science’ to be found in the cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics of Insight and the existential ethics of both Insight and Method in Theology, principally as these are brought to bear on the development of a theory of history, and in the developments on that theory of history that I have proposed in Theology and the Dialectics of History.
3 The Hypothesis

The four-point hypothesis reads as follows.

... there are four real divine relations, really identical with divine being, and so four special ways of grounding an imitation or participation ad extra of God's own life. And there are four absolutely supernatural created realities. They are never found in an unformed or indeterminate state. They are: the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory.

Thus it can appropriately be maintained that the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so that it has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a [created] participation of active spiration, and so that it bears a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a [created] participation of passive spiration, and so that it has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a [created] participation of filiation that leads perfectly the children of adoption back to the Father.²

This passage explicitly embraces the doctrines of the triune God, of the Incarnate Word, of the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, and of the last things, and it does so in such a way that the mysteries affirmed in these doctrines are related systematically or synthetically to one another. Thus it presents in a systematic order some of the principal realities named by the special categories, the categories peculiar to theology.

4 Previous Discussion

Now, over the past few years there has developed a discussion at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, in some of the graduate seminars sponsored by the Institute, in some of the systematic courses at Regis College, and at the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, as to whether this four-point hypothesis is adequate to function on its own as a unified field structure for systematics. The discussion of these issues has been clearly focused in two papers by Daniel Monsour. The first is entitled ‘The Categories “Gratia Increata et Creata” and the Functional Specialty Systematics.’ It was presented for discussion at a Lonergan Research Institute Graduate Seminar, in Toronto, on 18 November 1999. It has not been published. The second, ‘The Four-point Hypothesis and the Special Theological Categories,’ was delivered at the Lonergan Workshop in 2001 and will be published in the proceedings of that Workshop. The terms of the question are adequately displayed, I believe, in these two papers. The second repeats many of the general points made in the first, but goes on to develop a much more complete argument in favor of an antecedent likelihood that the four-point hypothesis will provide the integrating principle, the unified field structure.

The first paper frames the question in terms of a problem raised by Henri Rondet in his book The Grace of Christ. Rondet states that Western Catholic thought on grace has been one-sided. The questions of grace and freedom, grace and merit, justification and predestination are divorced from the emphases of the Greek Fathers on divinization, adoption, union with Christ, and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit. There is in Western Catholic theology a split between the tract on grace and the treatise on the Trinity,
which discusses the mission of the Holy Spirit. Created grace has been in
the foreground of Western Scholastic theology, while the gift of the Holy
Spirit has been severely underemphasized. But the final chapter of De Deo
trino, Pars systematica, overcomes this trend, Monsour claims. Some
earlier attempts to overcome the ‘error in perspective’ in the dominant trend,
notably those of M.J. Scheeben in the nineteenth century and Karl Rahner in
the twentieth, despite their grasp of the problem, proved inadequate because
of their use of formal causality or quasi-formal causality as a way of
understanding God’s self-communication and so the relation between the
gift of the uncreated Holy Spirit and the created grace on which the Western
paradigm placed its emphasis. The integration of the two emphases is
achieved in principle, it would seem, in Lonergan’s treatment of the divine
missions, and perhaps to date — this is my addition — only there.

But Monsour’s question goes further than simply seeking a more
satisfactory theory on this precise issue. He asks whether there can be found
in Lonergan’s writings and especially in his theology of the divine missions
‘a more comprehensive perspective … that would not only successfully
overcome the split … but … also weigh against any such split or
disconnection and systematically favor and promote … the systematic
understanding of the mysteries of faith’ (p. 3). If there is such a conception
to be found or developed, he says, ‘it would be the conception that expresses
an understanding of the organizing and integrating principle that is virtually
sufficient for the resolution of all questions in the functional specialty
Systematics,’ that is, in every tract in systematic theology (pp. 5-6), not
because of some logical deduction but rather in the way in which the
periodic table is virtually sufficient for the resolution of the major questions
currently being asked or anticipated in chemistry. Like the periodic table for
chemistry, the unified field structure would mediate the relation of *every* less comprehensive conception in the whole of systematics to *every other* less comprehensive conception in the whole of systematics. But as the periodic table is open to further development and even transposition, even while what it has enabled chemists to understand will remain permanently valid, so the unified field structure of a systematic theology would be open to further development and transposition, even while some of its achievements must be regarded as permanent. It will be the secure basis of an ongoing genetic sequence of ever more comprehensive systematic syntheses, even as it is itself transposed in the light of new questions and exigences to something that may look as different from the conception being proposed here as that conception looks compared to the medieval structure that combined Philip the Chancellor’s theorem of the supernatural with Aristotle’s metaphysics. The present conception is in continuity with the medieval structure, even as it goes far beyond it, and any development on the present conception will be in continuity with it even as it extends the parameters of the field structure to limits that presently belong at best to the known unknown that comes within our horizon only as a set of questions, and at worst to the unknown unknown that has not even begun to emerge as a question.

Monsour argues that an appropriate name for such an organizing conception would be a ‘unified field structure’ for systematics. He chooses this name in preference to ‘axiom,’ as in Karl Rahner’s term *Grundaxiom*, and again in preference to ‘unified field theory,’ the term used in physics. ‘Axiom’ suggests, he says, something self-evident, or perhaps a fundamental proposition from which one can draw conclusions logically; and neither of these characterizations applies to the four-point hypothesis. And the unified field theory that physicists desire to achieve would bring classical theoretical
physics, at least in its present phase, to a close, whereas the four-point hypothesis or for that matter any unified field structure, if accepted, would do anything but bring systematics to a close; in a sense, it would enable it to begin, by providing its fundamental organizing and integrating principle. It would enable the construction of a systematics that to date remains, for all practical purposes, not yet assembled. Again, ‘just as metaphysics is the whole in knowledge, but not the whole of knowledge, so,’ suggests Monsour, ‘the hypothesis [or any other unified field structure] might be considered the whole in Systematics but not the whole of Systematics.’ Thus the question is whether the four-point hypothesis may be ‘virtually sufficient for the resolution of all questions in the functional specialty Systematics,’ (p. 8) where ‘virtually sufficient’ does not have a logical meaning but a heuristic one. Still, a caveat is added: ‘... though it would certainly function heuristically in Systematics, the hypothesis is not purely heuristic, for it contains theological content’ (p. 8).3 That, however, implies no contradiction, since the periodic table may be said to function heuristically for chemistry, and differential calculus for classical physics.

3 I believe Monsour is clearer on the heuristic role of these systematic conceptions than Lonergan himself was when he wrote the first chapter of De Deo trino, Pars systematica, from which Monsour is drawing the notion. In the section of that chapter where he discusses these notions Lonergan is very attracted by a logical ideal. In my interpretation of that chapter he is still coming to grips with the logical ideals that he scrutinized in preparation for his 1957 lectures on mathematic logic at Boston College, now published as Part 1 of Phenomenology and Logic.
Heuristic structures are not some permanent feature of the human mind. They develop in the course of history, and they are modified and transformed by accumulated discoveries and by corrections of mistakes.

After discussing some of the difficulties presented by the hypothesis and relating them in a very creative way to what Lonergan says in the third part of *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* about the classification and resolution of the truths we know about God, Monsour proposes in the first of his two papers a test of the viability of the four-point hypothesis as a unified field structure for systematics: ‘Take some or all of the five sets of special theological categories enumerated by Lonergan in Foundations and actually attempt to work out tentatively the categories belonging to each set. Then transfer whatever categories one has derived in Foundations into Systematics and try to map them onto the proposed unified field structure … If it is truly a unified field structure for Systematics, it would … provide the organizing principle integrating all the categories of all the five sets. To the extent that one continues to succeed in mapping the categories onto the hypothesis, to that extent one continues to confirm the hypothesis as indeed a unified field structure for Systematics’ (p. 16). In this regard, Monsour speaks of some categories being ‘mapped onto the structure through their connection with the four absolutely supernatural [realities] understood as participations in the four real subsistent relations’ (p. 17). Furthermore, ‘if one supposes that the categories in each of the five sets are intrinsically irreducible to the categories of any of the other sets, then not only will there be a permanent diversity in Systematics, that no proposed unified field structure will abolish, but also with each successful transfer and mapping of categories onto the unified field structure, the structure itself,'
while retaining its identity as an organizing and integrating principle, will be
enriched and rendered more complex’ (p. 17).

So much for the initial framing of the question. In his second paper, Monsour begins the test. He begins to attempt mapping the five sets of
categories onto the four-point hypothesis. He insists that he has ‘no
intention of adopting a definitive position as to whether it is possible and
theologically sound and fruitful to bring together Lonergan’s four-point
hypothesis and the set of five special theological categories.’ ‘... all I
propose to offer here,’ he says, ‘is a set of inchoate considerations that
perhaps may incline one to regard the attempt to bring the four-point
hypothesis and the special theological categories together as a worthwhile
and promising line for subsequent investigation’ (19).

Those considerations, however inchoate they may be, are nonetheless
quite complex. I will not summarize his arguments here. It is sufficient for
my present purposes to say that Monsour begins by asserting an antecedent
likelihood that the four-point hypothesis will provide the integrating
principle for the five sets of special categories, and that the rest of his points
build on this initial assertion.

5 A Proposal

I propose here that, however synthetic the four-point hypothesis may be, it
does not stand on its own; it is not enough to unify a synthetic contemporary
theological understanding. There are several reasons for this.

First, while the four-point hypothesis does provide a specifically
theological element in the unified field structure, still there are other
specifically theological realities, and so other special theological categories,
that a unified field structure must integrate, and they cannot be mapped adequately onto the four-point hypothesis. I have in mind categories regarding creation, revelation, redemption, the church, sacraments, and Christian praxis in the world. While all of these are intimately related to the elements expressed in the four-point hypothesis, still they are not organized by that hypothesis alone.

Second, while the integration of these further theological realities will not involve adding something completely extraneous to the four-point hypothesis, still that integration will locate the divine missions, which are at the heart of the four-point hypothesis, in creation and especially in the history whose dynamics of progress and decline are part of the focus of the missions in the first place. If possible, the missions must be located in creation and in history, not vaguely but precisely. And I believe this can be done through the scale of values, which, as a key to the theory of history, will form an additional component in the unified field structure. But this means that these theological realities must be integrated not only with one another but with the heuristic account of the order of the universe (what Lonergan calls emergent probability) and with other realities constitutive of human history, that is to say, with realities that are known by sciences and scholarly disciplines other than theology. An additional set of sets of categories beyond those rooted in the four-point hypothesis is required for such a theological synthesis to take place. General theological categories are required even for the adequate theological understanding of specifically theological realities. As the medieval theorem of the supernatural needed a metaphysical system, in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, if it was to mediate religion and the cultural matrix influenced by Aristotle, so the four-point hypothesis requires general categories shared with other disciplines if
the divine missions that are at the core of the hypothesis are to be located in relation to their historical occasions and effects. More precisely, a mission is for a purpose, and the divine missions are for the purpose of establishing and confirming interpersonal relations; and interpersonal relations are the core element in the structure of the human good that is coincident with the immanent intelligibility of history. Thus understanding the divine missions entails understanding the history that the Word was sent to redeem from the alternating cycles of progress and decline and that the Holy Spirit is sent to renew with the outpouring of self-sacrificing love.

Where, then, are the general categories are to be located, or at least grounded? My thesis is that the set of sets of general categories will be based in the cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics of Insight, in the existential ethics of Insight and Method in Theology, and in the theory of history proposed by Lonergan over the span of his writings and complemented by the contributions that I have tried to offer in Theology and the Dialectics of History. My thesis, then, is that, taken together, these two elements — a four-point theological hypothesis and what Lonergan calls the basic and total science, the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft, especially as the latter issues in a theory of history — provide the basic framework, the set of terms and relations, of a unified field structure for systematic theology. The combination of the four-point hypothesis with the grounding base of the general categories will be sufficient even for the discussion of the other special theological realities: creation, revelation, redemption, church, sacraments, and Christian praxis. With the four-point hypothesis and the philosophical positions that are for the most part already in place in Insight and that are complemented where necessary by later developments, we have everything we need to begin constructing a systematic theology. And that
‘everything we need to begin constructing a systematic theology’ is precisely what is meant by a unified field structure. It is true that no systematic theology will ever be complete until we enjoy the systematic theology that is coincident with the beatific vision. There is no possibility of a closed system in theology any more than there is in mathematic or empirical science. Eventually, every system will give rise to questions that cannot be answered on the basis of the resources provided by that system. Every system is an open system, that is, one in which it is anticipated that questions will arise from within the system itself that the system is not able to answer, that will demand the move to a higher viewpoint, perhaps a paradigm shift, before satisfactory hypotheses can be provided. Any system that claims not to be open in this way is an idol. Still, we must begin somewhere, and we must begin with that statement which allows us to anticipate that the further categories that emerge will be validated by their connection with the categories that frame this unified field structure.

Lonergan says as much, I believe, in section 3.121 of his response to a ‘Questionnaire on Philosophy’ sent to him in preparation for a symposium on philosophical studies for Jesuits. In brief, ‘… the Christian religion as lived is the sublation of the whole of human living. It follows at once that to thematize the sublation of the whole of human living is a task beyond the competence of theology as a particular science or particular discipline, that theology can perform that task only by broadening its horizon by uniting itself with philosophy as the basic and total science.’ Moreover, ‘theology is the sublation of philosophy. For philosophy is the basic and total science of human living. The Christian religion as lived is the sublation of the whole of
human living. Hence the Christian religion as thematized is the sublation of the basic and total science of human living. At one point that sublation yields a theologically transformed theory of history, and here is where the principal though not the sole general categories of systematics will be applied.

6 History and the Special Categories

If I am going to back up my proposal with an argument that meets the exigences of the conversation in which the proposal arose, I must turn to Monsour’s test and appeal to Lonergan’s five sets of special theological categories, but now to argue that the four-point hypothesis will not be able to integrate the second, fourth, and fifth of these sets into an overall systematic exposition unless there is added to it the theory of history that issues from the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft, the basic and total science, of Insight and Method in Theology.

The first set of special categories, then, is derived from religious experience. These categories will emerge from ‘studies of religious interiority: historical, phenomenological, psychological, sociological. There is needed in the theologian the spiritual development that will enable [one] both to enter into the experience of others and to frame the terms and relations that will express that experience.’

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5 Lonergan, Method in Theology 290.
A second set has to do, not with the subject but with ‘subjects, their togetherness in community, service, and witness, *the history of the salvation that is rooted in a being-in-love*, and the *function of this history* in promoting’ the reign of God in the world.⁶

A third set ‘moves from our loving to the loving source of our love. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.’⁷

A fourth set differentiates authentic and inauthentic humanity and authentic and inauthentic Christianity. ‘... to the unauthentic [person] or Christian, what appears authentic is the unauthentic. Here, then, is the root of division, opposition, controversy, denunciation, bitterness, hatred, violence.’⁸

And a fifth set ‘regards progress, decline, and redemption. As human authenticity promotes progress, and human unauthenticity generates decline, so Christian authenticity — which is a love of others that does not shrink from self-sacrifice and suffering — is the sovereign means for overcoming evil. Christians bring about the kingdom of God in the world not only by doing good but also by overcoming evil with good ... Not only is there the progress of [humankind] but also there is development and progress within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and

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⁶ Ibid. 291, emphasis added.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
as there is decline, there also is the problem of undoing it, of overcoming evil with good not only in the world but also in the church.”

In my view only the third set of special categories can be adequately mapped onto the four-point hypothesis. The mapping of the third set will resolve the initial problem with which Monsour began, namely, the divorce between Trinitarian theology and the theology of grace and the imbalance and loss of perspective in the relations between the theological conceptions of uncreated and created grace. But, I propose, any attempt to map the other sets onto the four-point hypothesis is really an attempt to reduce the other sets to the third set. And if the other sets cannot be mapped without remainder onto the four-point hypothesis, then clearly more is needed if we are to arrive at a unified field structure for the functional specialty ‘systematics,’ and this on Monsour’s test itself. Not even all the special categories can be adequately mapped onto the four-point hypothesis. Now, obviously the third set matches the four-point hypothesis almost point by point, so that it can safely be said that this set can be mapped without remainder onto the hypothesis. Moreover, I believe the hypothesis provides a key to clarifying religious experience, and so is relevant to elements of the first set of special categories. But mapping the other three sets onto the hypothesis is not only more difficult; in the last analysis, it is, I believe, impossible. One can relate the other three sets to the third set, and so to the hypothesis, but any attempt to go further would be an attempt to reduce the other three sets to the third. The other three sets demand a framework that locates within, or in relation to, the dialectical dynamics of history the four created supernatural realities that are the created consequent conditions

9 Ibid.
either of the divine missions (the *esse secundarium* of the Incarnation, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity) or of the beatific vision (the light of glory). The categories that detail the relation of these created supernatural realities to history are required if we are to have a systematics of creation, revelation (which, as Lonergan says, introduces a new meaning into history), redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis.

The four-point hypothesis, then, has to be placed in history. Speaking as it does of the divine missions certainly does locate it in history, but it has to function within a conception of history that will enable the integration of the second, fourth, and fifth sets of special categories into the overall systematic conception. The created contingent external terms that make possible that there are divine missions are not enough to allow for this integration. The divine missions have to be related in a thematic and explicit manner to the dynamics of history. That can be done only by developing a theological theory of history. The four-point hypothesis does not in itself tell us anything about what the Incarnation and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit have to do with historical progress and decline, whereas creation, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis cannot be understood theologically apart from historical progress and decline.\(^{10}\) As Lonergan himself wrote at the time of his breakthrough to the

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10 In a discussion period at the 1962 Institute at Regis College, Toronto, on ‘The Method of Theology,’ Lonergan expressed a conviction that the sacraments and the church are two areas in systematic theology in which an enormous amount of work needs to be done. In fact, he said, there is needed even doctrinal development in these areas. ‘The fundamental developments are: the trinitarian doctrine in which the
notion of functional specialization, a contemporary systematic theology in its entirety must be a theological theory of history; or again, the mediated object of systematics is Geschichete. We may conclude, then, that the basic organizing systematic conception must contain, in addition to the four-point hypothesis, the fundamental elements of a theological theory of history. And I would propose that those fundamental elements are provided at least in an incipient fashion in Lonergan’s analysis of the dialectic of history in terms of progress, decline, and redemption and in the complementary suggestions that I offer in Theology and the Dialectics of History. While there is no doubt that further work (for example, in social theory and economics) will uncover other elements and so other categories, these give us enough to get started and provide the basic map or grid for locating the elements that further work will discover, just as the periodic table provides the basic grid for locating further atomic elements.

7 A Distinction

I would like to support my contention with an important distinction, one that explicitly introduces another element into the discussion. It is one thing to integrate the special categories, and it is something further to integrate the key element is the consubstantial; christological doctrine: one person and two natures; the idea of the supernatural, habit and act. There is then the field in which the categories are not yet fully developed. For example, categories as to the instrumental causality of the sacraments; they have to be developed more fully. There is also everything regarding history and the mystical body, and the church; all these need further development.’ (Emphasis added)
functional specialty ‘systematics.’ Systematics is more than the special categories, however integrated and synthetic may be their presentation. Let me elaborate.

Lonergan’s method and the emphases that I have highlighted in several articles on the method of systematic theology\(^\text{11}\) (some of which are repeated in earlier chapters of this book) impose on our use of the four-point hypothesis a twofold requirement. First, the objects intended in this statement must be spoken of in categories based in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. The categories employed to frame the hypothesis itself are derived, not basic. In Lonergan’s words, ‘... general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states ... For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.’\(^\text{12}\) More

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12 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 343. Two comments must be made on this passage. First, it does not mention ‘special basic relations.’ I have searched related texts in the Lonergan archives, to see whether perhaps something was omitted by mistake in the typing of the manuscript for publication, but I have found nothing to indicate this.
specifically, since the four-point hypothesis speaks of realities that are named in special categories, the base of these categories in religiously differentiated consciousness must be specified as carefully as possible. But general categories will be important even in unpacking the hypothesis in its own terms, since (1) the divine relations are based in the divine processions, (2) the processions are understood by analogy with intelligible emanations of word and love in human consciousness, and (3) the categories that express such emanations are not peculiar to theology but are fundamental to the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft whose fundamental components Lonergan has put forth in Insight. But a differentiation in terms of religious

So I would like to raise the question whether the four-point hypothesis itself might provide us with the hint as to where we might find special basic relations. I have in mind especially the relation between sanctifying grace and charity as created participations, respectively, of active and passive spiration. If there is anything to this suggestion, then the religiously differentiated consciousness that would enable us to grasp what is meant by distinguishing sanctifying grace and the habit of charity might be the source of special basic relations.

Second — and this is related to the first point — the ‘corresponding element’ that identifies the basic term or relation may be found either in intentional consciousness, as Lonergan says — and this is most often the case — or in nonintentional consciousness, as is the case in what St Ignatius Loyola calls ‘consolation without a cause’ as interpreted by Karl Rahner and Lonergan as consolation with a content but without an apprehended object. Any conscious state that is not a response to an apprehended object is nonintentional.
experience is also required, and this is particularly true for the second and third points of the hypothesis, those having to do with sanctifying grace and the habit of charity as created participations, respectively, of active and passive spiration.

The second requirement builds on an argument that I have offered elsewhere, which is in harmony with elements that appear in Lonergan’s papers at the time of his breakthrough to functional specialization. The argument was to the effect that systematics is to assume the general form of a theology of history. And building on it means that the primary general categories must be those that enable us to formulate a theory of the complex dialectical process of human history. These categories include preeminently those that Lonergan has employed to speak of progress, decline, and redemption as constituting the basic structure of history, and the structure of the human good that he has proposed most clearly in Method in Theology. But complementing these are other categories that can be found in Lonergan’s work and added to his analysis of history: principally, the scale of values as explaining the intelligible ongoing relations among three complex dialectical processes — in the subject, culture, and community — and so as providing further details of the dynamics of progress and decline in history. This mediation of general and special categories in a theology of history is required if we are to relate the doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation, grace, and eschatology concretely to the processes of history and to add to the core systematic spheres of Trinity, Incarnation, grace, and eschatology the understanding of doctrines regarding creation, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and the praxis of religious persons, of Christians, of Catholics, and of the Christian churches. The doctrines of creation, revelation, redemption, church, sacraments, and praxis are not explicitly
included in the core ‘focal meanings’ contained in the four-point hypothesis, but positions in their regard are obviously demanded in a systematic theology. And those positions cannot be developed without a theory of history. Even the four-point hypothesis contains a demand for expansion into a theory of history, since at the core of the hypothesis is the theology, not only of the immanent Trinity — there are four real divine relations, really identical with divine being — but also and especially of the divine missions; and the divine missions are the Trinity in history, for the missions are identical with the divine processions linked to created external terms that are the consequent created conditions of the fact that the processions are also missions.

8 Glimpsing Some Implications

Perhaps we can already glimpse the enormous theological implications of the twofold methodological insistence on basing everything in interiority and on locating everything in relation to history. It is one thing to transpose, for example, trinitarian theology into categories dictated by interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. We are already familiar with the historical antecedents of such a transposition in the psychological analogies first of Augustine and then of Aquinas. Lonergan in *Divinarum personarum* and then in *De Deo trino* transposes the psychological analogy into categories explicitly derived from interiorly differentiated consciousness. But to add to this requirement the additional demand that all of this material must be formulated in terms of a theory of history adds a new dimension. The direct impact, of course, is on that portion of trinitarian theology that
treats the divine missions, and particularly the mission of the Holy Spirit. But the implications are more far-reaching.

The theory of history based on the interrelations of the levels of value — from above, religious, personal, cultural, social, vital — proposes that the recurrent intelligent emanation of the word of authentic value judgments and of acts of love in human consciousness (personal value) is due to the grace of the mission of the Holy Spirit (religious value) and is also the source of the making of history, of historical progress through schemes of recurrence in the realms of cultural, social, and vital values. But the mission of the Holy Spirit is the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit joined to a created, contingent external term that is the consequent condition of the procession being also a mission, or of the proceeding Holy Spirit also being sent. Thus the intelligent emanation in God of the Holy Spirit, the eternal procession in God of the Holy Spirit, joined to the created, contingent, consequent external terms that are sanctifying grace and the habit of charity (as well as to the operative movements that are known as auxilium divinum or actual grace), the eternal intelligent emanation of the Spirit in God as also Gift in history, is the ultimate condition of possibility of any consistent or recurrent intelligent emanation of authentic judgments of value and schemes of recurrence rooted in acts of love in human beings. This collaboration of intelligent processions, divine and human, is, then, the condition of the possibility of the consistent authentic performance of what Lonergan calls the normative source of meaning in history.\textsuperscript{13} And if such personal value

\textsuperscript{13} See Bernard Lonergan, 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,' \textit{A Third Collection}, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 169-83.
conditions the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the realms of cultural, and then social, and then vital values, if that normative source, functioning communally, is the origin of progress in history, then the mission of the Holy Spirit, which is identical with the eternal procession of the Spirit joined to the created, contingent, consequent term of charity, and so the Spirit as Gift, is the very source of progress in history. Conversely, wherever genuine progress (measured by fidelity to the scale of values) takes place, the Spirit is present and active. The combination of the four-point hypothesis with the theory of history thus enables us to relate trinitarian theology, and even the theology of the immanent Trinity, directly to the processes not only of individual sanctification but also of human historical unfolding. The discernment of the mission of the Holy Spirit thus becomes the most important ingredient in humankind’s taking responsibility for the guidance of history.