

METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies, n.s.

Volume 6

Number 1

Spring 2015

Randall S. Rosenberg
Editor

Patrick H. Byrne
Editor

Thomas J. McPartland
Editor

R. J. Snell
Editor

Regina G. Knox
Managing Editor

Kerry M. Cronin
Business Editor

CONTENTS

- Paul Kidder* 1 Lonergan, Heidegger, and the Being of Question
- H. Daniel Monsour* 17 Some Reflections on Professor Wilkins's Paper, "Method and Metaphysics in Theology: Doran and Lonergan"
- Mark D. Morelli* 63 Meeting Hegel Halfway: The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan's Relationship with Hegel
- Louis Roy, O.P.* 99 The Viability of the Category of Religious Experience in Bernard Lonergan's Theology
- Jim Marsh* 119 Book Review
- Thomas J. McPartland* 127 Epistemology and the Person (Corrected article from the special issue on the work of Christian Smith, *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, n.s.*, 5, no. 1)
-

METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies
is published by the Lonergan Institute at Boston College

LONERGAN, HEIDEGGER, AND THE BEING OF QUESTION

Paul Kidder

Seattle University

Seattle, Washington

IN A HIGHLY LAUDATORY review of Emerich Coreth's *Metaphysik*, Bernard Lonergan paraphrased Coreth's view on the ontological status of questioning: "... questioning not only is about being but is itself being, being in its *Gelichtetheit* [luminosity], being in its openness to being. . . ." ¹ These words, though presenting only a gloss, one might say, of the ideas of another thinker, stand out as a rare expression of Lonergan's appreciation for a kind of ontology that some may know from Coreth but many more know from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. I have in mind the kind of ontology that identifies the phenomenon of question as a first phenomenon for its inquiry and insists on maintaining the centrality of that phenomenon throughout the whole of the philosophical project, even as that project analyzes the being of the questioner and the beings that are within the world that the questioner questions. By "question," in this context, neither Heidegger nor Lonergan (nor Coreth, for that matter) would intend merely the particular questions that are asked regarding particular things and events, but the underlying dynamism that motivates every question from within and heads toward being even as it comes from being. This underlying, primary reality Lonergan invoked with many names: "pure question," "questioning itself," "the principle of inquiry," "radical intending," or "the inner light." ² Similarly, it seems to be implied

¹Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection*, vol. 4 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 192. Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysik: Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1961).

²"Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection*, 190; Bernard Lonergan, "Theories of Inquiry" in *Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: The Westminster

in the terms by which Heidegger's writings, beginning in the 1930s, name the fundamental phenomenon of his philosophical concern: the "opening," "clearing," or "lighting" in being.³

Lonergan, who studied Heidegger's work only after his own philosophical framework and terminology were well established, rarely interprets Heidegger's thought in a manner that reaches to its theoretical core,⁴ but in his gloss of Coreth Lonergan approaches that core. Lonergan's appreciation of such central Heideggerian ideas is significant not merely as a moment of convergence between two thinkers who seem frequently to diverge, but also because this particular convergence provides an opportunity to use Heideggerian insights to emphasize the richness of Lonergan's own thinking on the question of being and the being of question. In the following pages I shall attempt to seize upon that opportunity, explaining and employing the relevant Heideggerian notions to highlight ways in which Lonergan can be found working on the same problems at an equivalent depth of thought. Although this fairly specific program of mine will not yield a general overview of the points on which Lonergan and Heidegger can be said to agree and disagree, it will nevertheless contain some of the interpretive clues that I consider keys to the success of that more general comparative project.

HEIDEGGER ON THE BEING OF QUESTION

The question of the meaning of being is the permanent focus for Heideggerian thinking. Heidegger's readers tend to be most familiar with the question as Heidegger pursued it through the "analytic of *Dasein*" in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger attempts something that we might be inclined to call a

Press, 1974), 34; Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 11; Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Praxis," in *Third Collection*, 193.

³Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings*, 2nd ed., ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1993), 229, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 325; Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *Basic Writings*, 441-43, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1988), 71-73.

⁴I have in mind here especially the treatment in the lectures published as *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). Here Lonergan works, to a large extent, from Alphonse de Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1942), the limitations of which have been noted by William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 687.