A New Divine Perfection:
An Interpretation of
Bernard Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Systematics*
from the Viewpoint of Order

by

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A Thesis submitted to The Faculty of Theology of the University of St. Michael’s College and the Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology awarded by The University of St. Michael’s College University of Toronto 2004

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1 Originally, this dissertation had the title “‘Sapientis Est Ordinare’: An Interpretation of the *Pars Systematica* of Bernard Lonergan’s *De Deo Trino* from the Viewpoint of Order.”

*De Deo trino, II: Pars systematica* has since been published as *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. In the present edition of the dissertation, the original quotes have been replaced with quotes from *The Triune God: Systematics*; and I have made the many required changes in my text. I have also made some corrections and eliminated some of *Turabian’s* fussier formatting requirements. –Leo Serroul, November 2010.
Toronto 2010
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ABSTRACT

Sapientis est ordinare. Ordering is the work of the wise. This interpretation of Bernard Lonergan's systematic theology of God pursues throughout the Pars systematica of his De Deo trino (1964) an idea he does not advert to as constitutive of his method as such, namely the idea of order.

The idea of order, I argue, does function methodically in the Pars systematica. As he moves systematically from the nature of God, from God to us, and back to God, Lonergan variously specifies the idea of order in ways integral to both the form and content of his theology, a trinitarian theology of comprehensive scope. These specific instances of order—relating to fundamentals of trinitarian theory, soteriology, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, the natural world, history, and culture—can be related intelligibly to one another. Thus the idea of order informs an emergent viewpoint that facilitates synthetic understanding of Lonergan’s complex, sometimes very difficult, systematics of the Trinity. Furthermore, I argue, the explanatory process of interpreting the Pars systematica from the single viewpoint of order can give students means, not too difficult to grasp, whereby they too might gain a synthetic understanding of Lonergan’s theology of God sufficient to affirm its comprehensiveness, unity, value, and openness to organic development.

My interpretation also aims to provide the student of Lonergan’s thought with data sufficient to answer adequately the question of meaning posed by this text from the Pars systematica:

Although all other goods of order imitate ad extra [external to God] that supreme good of order to be perceived in the Holy Trinity itself, it is nonetheless fitting that the economy of salvation, which is ordered to participation in the very beatitude of divinity, not only imitate the order of the Holy Trinity but also in some manner participate in that same order.

The centerpiece of the Augustine-Aquinas-Lonergan tradition of trinitarian theology is the psychological analogy. Drawing from the integral relationship between the intentional operations of the enquiring subject and theological method, I seek to demonstrate that in the Pars systematica and other writings to 1964, especially Insight, Lonergan provides a way to express from the viewpoint of order the intelligible unity among God quoad se (the immanent Trinity), God quoad nos (the economic Trinity), and the “everything else” comprised by the category Creation. My argument also emphasizes the relevance of Lonergan’s theology of God to Christian living, especially to the subjectivity and work of the theologian.
To the
Women
who
brought me
here
A completely genuine development of the thought of St Thomas will command in all the universities of the modern world the same admiration and respect that St Thomas himself commanded in the medieval University of Paris.

— Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Acta Apostolica Sedis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Summa contra gentiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB</td>
<td>Denzinger-Bannwart (edition 31 of Enchiridion Symbolorum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Denzinger-Schonmetzer (edition 32 of Enchiridion Symbolorum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In</td>
<td>Insight: A Study of Human Understanding</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Method in Theology</td>
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<td>ML</td>
<td>Migne's Patrologia Latina</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>The Christian Faith (Neuner and Dupuis, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 7th ed.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC</td>
<td>The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>The Triune God: Systematics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Summa theologiae</td>
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<td>TDH</td>
<td>Theology and the Dialectics of History</td>
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<td>“TU”</td>
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<td>UB</td>
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I had the good fortune in the fall term of 1999 to have audited at Regis College, Toronto, Robert M. Doran’s course on Bernard Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity. Good fortune because, as a result of intensive study of the trinitarian questions of St. Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* in the spring term (in Jerusalem), I was already captivated by the subject, especially, given my long-held interest in Bernard Lonergan’s cognitional theory and method, by the psychological analogy in trinitarian systematics. Good fortune again because Prof. Doran took us students expertly through an explanatory close-reading of the *Pars systematica* of Lonergan’s *De Deo trino* (1964), the object of this study.

Two effects of my study of the *Pars systematica* led to the present work. The first does not bear on the thesis argued herein, but I believe it worth recounting. As we made our way through the text, I was struck by the form, content, and method of a treatise that appeared after Lonergan’s *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (completed 1953) yet seemed to reflect so little of the intentionality analysis of *Insight*; indeed the treatise seemed to cling to the language of scholastic “faculty psychology” (i.e., to psychology conceived in metaphysical terms). Only a year after the publication of the *Pars systematica*, Lonergan achieved the breakthrough to functional specialization, his tying methodic functions to cognitional operations, that matured into his *Method in Theology* (1972). The relation between cognitional structure and method, in fact, was already explicit and thematic in *Insight*. I wondered why he chose to publish a work in Latin that seemed so out of date, that seemed unlikely to enhance the reputation of the author of *Method*.

Before long, closer study of the text and accumulated knowledge of its provenance imposed a different evaluation of the form, content, and method of the *Pars systematica*. A product of Lonergan’s “Roman Period” (1953-65) it grew out of the notes he wrote for his students at the Gregorian University. Many varieties of scholasticism, and interpretations of St. Thomas that Lonergan called Thomistic rather than Thomist, dominated intellectual life. Few acknowledged the critical distinction between dogmatic and systematic theologies discussed in chapter 1 below. The spirit of Vatican II (1962-65) was in the air, but the impact of the council on the form and content of theological education was yet to affect the way things were done at the “Greg.” In short, I came to the conclu-
sion that Lonergan, well aware of the poverty of the situation and its remedy, wrote the *Pars systematica* intentionally as a transitional treatise in trinitarian systematics.

As the reader will see in my argument, Lonergan continually subverts then-traditional interpretations of Thomas with their erroneous positions on science, epistemology, metaphysics, method. He especially undermines the erroneous theological conclusions they draw from their “counterpositions” on the centerpiece of trinitarian systematics, the psychological analogy. He published the *Pars systematica*, in my view, to offer Catholic theologians what he had offered his students, a theological bridge between the old order and the radically new trinitarian systematics that, as he rightly foresaw, the church would need after Vatican II.

The second effect of my study of the *Pars systematica* does bear directly on the thesis argued herein. When a few weeks into Fr. Doran’s course I read the entire *Pars systematica* in one sitting, I was thunderstruck by the recurrence from start to finish of the notion of order. At the finish of his treatment of God as God, in arguing his final assertion, he establishes order as a divine perfection equal to the traditional Thomist perfection of act. Thunderstruck, because I had long since realized from study of *Insight* and *Method* that Lonergan provides the means to attain a systematically explicable view of the unity of creation. In the *Pars systematica*, because of his explanation of the Holy Trinity *quoad se* according to his position on the psychological analogy, I realized that he had provided the means to attain a systematically explicable view of the unity of God and creation, the *ratio* for a new and scientifically sound Catholic *summa*. From that point until now, I have been captivated by the viewpoint of order, the unifying theme of this interpretation of the *Pars systematica*.

Lonergan’s most significant development of the scholasticism he inherited pertains to cognitional theory and its role in theological method. These the *Pars systematica* brings to bear on the trinitarian questions of Thomas’s *Summa theologiae*. My interpretation of the results in light of other published writings of his to 1964 is also intended as a theological bridge. The present work is meant to contribute to the transposition of Lonergan’s theology of God the Holy Trinity into the systematic restatement enabled by his *Method in Theology*. As Lonergan’s most eminent interpreter has written, “his pre-1965 theology, ... will have to be put through the crucible of his own method before it can be properly called Lonerganian.”

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I heartily thank Robert Doran, my director, for his uncommon openness to the exercise of theological imagination, and for his unfailing support and meticulous criticism of my work. I also wish to acknowledge the invaluable help of Fr. John Brezovec’s very literal translation into English of the *Pars systematica*.6

“It ought to be admitted straight away, that the lack of inclusive language in Lonergan’s work can jar on later sensibilities.”7 The same is true of some other works cited herein. I changed only a few English texts whose rhetorical force, in the context, was undermined by exclusive language.

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6 John Brezovec, “Translation of *De Deo trino II,*” TMs 1 paginated 1-67; TMs 2 paginated 54-223. The Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto.

THE TRIUNE GOD: SYSTEMATICS — INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

1. The Object of Study and the Topic

1.1 The Topic in General Terms

The topic and object of this study come under the general heading Theology of God. Theology of God is first specified herein by the mystery of Christian faith that in Jesus of Nazareth the God of Abraham and Sarah has further self-revealed as a trinity of co-equal divine persons who are numerically one God.

The object of Christian theology of God is a trinitarian reality. Understanding our self-revealing triune God does not depend upon achieving a speculative solution to a unique and daunting conceptual puzzle. First, the revelation has meaning within a concrete, historical, soteriological context. Jesus said, “And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” (Jn 17:3; NRSV, Catholic Edition. Unless noted, all scriptural quotations are from this version.) St. Thomas Aquinas quotes these words and immediately asserts that “all the knowledge imparted by faith turns about these two points, the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ ... the way by which we come to the divinity.” In regard to his humanity, I will treat of him as Son and of his human nature, but not of Christology as such. I will focus on the divinity of the Trinity in se and in relation to Christian faith and living.

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8 When first mentioned in a context that calls for its definition, a technical term has this form. Definitions of words thus highlighted, and other helpful definitions, are found in the glossary, p. 331.

Affirming that “Christ mediates between us and the Father,” Bernard Lonergan goes on to say:

And the Holy Spirit mediates between us and Christ. That Christ mediates between us and the Father we find in 1 Timothy 2.5: ‘[For there is one God; there is also one mediator between God and humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human]’; and that the Spirit mediates between us and Christ we find in 1 Corinthians 12.3: ‘[No one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says “Let Jesus be cursed!” and no one can say “Jesus is Lord” except by the Holy Spirit].’

The topic narrows further to theology of God in the Western Catholic tradition, and that drawn from reflection on the revealed truths about God imparted by Scripture and the Church of Rome’s living Tradition. The sources comprised by the Tradition include the formulae of councils and creeds, dogmatic and ordinary magisterial teaching, the liturgy, and the sensus fidelium.

The topic is further specified by a signal contribution to one of the Church of Rome’s several theological traditions, the Thomist. The object of study, finally, is the theology of the Holy Trinity communicated in Bernard Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Systematics.*

1.2 *The Topic in Specific Terms*

The Catholic sources impart the truths of faith the systematic theologian seeks to understand and communicate. The relation between these sources and the form and goal peculiar to systematics will be discussed in section 5. First, I will further specify the topic and the viewpoint of this interpretation of S.

1.2.1 *The Idea of Order*

I will interpret Lonergan’s systematic understanding of the church’s doctrine of God by pursuing throughout *The Triune God: Systematics* (hereafter S) an idea he does not advert to as constitutive of his method as such—the idea of order. I will argue that the idea of order does function methodically in S. As he moves systematically from the nature of God, from God to us, and back to God, Lonergan variously specifies the idea of

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order in ways integral to both the form and content of his theology, a trinitarian theology of comprehensive scope. These specific instances of order—relating to fundamentals of trinitarian theory, soteriology, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, the natural world, human culture—can be related intelligibly to one another. Thus the idea of order provides an interpretive viewpoint that facilitates synthetic understanding of Lonergan’s complex, sometimes very difficult, systematics of the Trinity. Furthermore, I will argue, the explanatory process of interpreting S from the single viewpoint of order can give to others means, not too difficult to grasp, whereby they might gain a synthetic understanding of Lonergan’s theology of God sufficient to affirm its comprehensiveness, unity, value, and openness to organic development.

“Might gain a synthetic understanding” implies uncertainty. While I mean the uncertainty of my interpretation of Lonergan’s thought, I also allude to the uncertainty of Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity. Most important, I mean the uncertainty proper to systematic theology as such. Lonergan argues that systematics can achieve no more than “that imperfect yet most fruitful understanding affirmed by Vatican I (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132).” (S 11; emphasis added.) Vatican I’s teaching on theological understanding is introduced in the next section. Lonergan’s arguments for the role in theology proper to systematics, and the form of the particular way systematics ministers to fides quarens intellectum, are integral to this chapter.

Understanding religious belief, the central concern of systematics, will be discussed in progressive detail below. In the present context, a simple example of the critical difference between the certainty of dogma and the uncertainty of our understanding of it will, perhaps, suffice. The Catholic is obliged to affirm that Jesus of Nazareth is one person with two natures, human and divine. That is de fide and certain. The Catholic is not obliged in obedience of faith to affirm as certain any systematic explanation of how one person can be both human and divine. In regard to theology, therefore, the dogmatic theologian asks about the facts: What does the church believe? The systematic theologian, beginning where the dogmatic theologian ends, asks the question for understanding: What do these facts mean? The answer is neither true nor false because it expresses understanding; truth is known only in judgment; the magisterium makes doctrinal judgments. Attention to this critical distinction between understanding and judgment will recur throughout my argument.

This interpretation of S aims not only to provide the student with data sufficient to understand intelligently and evidence sufficient to affirm reasonably—from the viewpoint of order—his systematics of the Trinity. One hopes the student will also understand it well enough to answer adequately the question of meaning posed by this passage:

Although the other goods of order12 externally imitate that supreme good of or-
der that we observe in the Holy Trinity, nevertheless it was appropriate that the economy of salvation, which is ordered to participation in divine beatitude itself, should not only imitate the order of the Holy Trinity but also in some manner participate in that order. (S 497.)

These pregnant words might be said to sum up Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity. However, just as he did not express the “summary” until he had written hundreds of pages of elucidation, so will I require hundreds to interpret what he means.

Lonergan writes in *Insight*, “In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way: an effort that is in principle incomplete is equivalent to a failure.”13 A widely admired interpretation of S quotes Lonergan’s pithy remark and adds:

The same is true of a theology; one can form an idea of this or that particular article of faith, but what the human mind demands in the long run is an integral view. Hence, the effort among theologians, reaching as far back as Tertullian, to think of the ‘whole’ Trinity in the light of one governing image or idea, and grasp it *per modum unius*.14

One might add that herein the desired view of the “‘whole’” Trinity includes an integral understanding of everything else in relation to the Trinity that S deems pertinent to trinitarian systematics, but understood “in the light of one governing image or idea,” the idea of order.

vided as follows: there is the good of order that is found in inanimate things, in plants, and in animals; and there is the human good of order, which is produced by people understanding and willing. Thus, there are produced domestic, technological, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and religious organizations.” S, 493. And: “The proximate end is that good of order which, according to various analogies with human goods of order, is called either the kingdom of God, or the body of Christ, or the church, or the mystical marriage of Christ with the church, or the economy of salvation, or the city of God.” Ibid., 495. Lonergan’s later thought will reflect Vatican II’s distinction between the church and the Kingdom of God; more on this point in chap. 3 below. There, statements such as this will be discussed: “In the one divine perfection there are two formalities of perfection, one that concerns act and the other that concerns order; and similarly among created things there is a twofold participation in the one divine perfection, one concerning act and the other concerning order. On this basis we distinguish particular goods, by which particular beings are perfected in themselves, and goods of order, which are certain concrete, dynamic, and ordered totalities of desirable objects, of desiring subjects, of operations, and of results.” Ibid., 491-93.


1.2.2 The Form of My Argument

My argument distinguishes the form of S from its content. The present chapter focuses on S’s form, its body. The distinction notwithstanding, it remains that the form and the content of a whole, while distinct, are not separate. Therefore, in reporting Lonergan’s argument for the proper form of a systematic argument, I will not neglect elements of content, nor will the chapters on content neglect the form. Calling attention to form is doubly important because, to achieve its goal, systematic theology relies on its form, its body; and explicating the ordering of the formal elements of a systematic treatise is integral to my argument.

This chapter has six sections. Section 2 introduces and discusses in general terms some principal notions and texts, and some elements of the technical vocabulary employed more exactly throughout the chapters (2 and 3) that interpret S. In section 3, certain categories fundamental to understanding the entire argument will be discussed in detail. Section 4 offers the first particular summary. Section 5 describes and explains the formal elements of S. The chapter ends with section 6, a general summary relating to each other the particular summary and section 5 on form. I will observe throughout my argument this method of particular and general summaries. Each general summary will sublate the one preceding it. This method is intended to keep before the reader a synthetic account, from the viewpoint of order, of the ever-increasing complexity, comprehension, and unity of Lonergan’s theology of God.

1.3 The Truth as Variously Expressed

Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of elements of S’s systematic argument, I will further specify the data of revelation the systematic theologian seeks to understand. These data are found in certain non-scriptural documents; and, in regard to truths of faith about which the church has said little or nothing definitive, the data are found in Bible: “Some great mysteries, such as the redemption, are so fully treated in the sources that there have hardly ever been disputes about them in the church. As a result, declarations of the magisterium regarding them are rare and brief.” (S 35-37.) Other mysteries of faith, on the other hand, have been disputed in the church:

There are mysteries like the Trinity that the sources treat more indirectly than directly and in scattered texts than directly and as a single whole. These have provoked surprise, doubts, arguments, which have led in turn to the church declaring them quite frequently and very clearly and exactly. (S 37.)

Of these sources Lonergan observes:

One can ask whether the theologian should go to the scriptures or to the church’s magisterium to learn of the mysteries that he or she seeks to understand.
The first thing that we can say in response is that as far as the truth and the meaning of the truth are concerned, it does not make any difference whether one goes to the scriptures or to the magisterium. For whatever the church proposes to be believed by all as divinely revealed, that same truth is contained in the sources of revelation (DB 1792, DS 3011, ND 219) and indeed with the same meaning as is defined by the church (DB 2314, DS 3886, ND 859, cf. DB 1800, DS 3020, ND 136).

Still, even granted this identity in truth and in meaning, a church declaration is likely to be much closer to the task and role of systematic theology than is a biblical statement. (§33-35.)

Systematic theologians also have another rich resource: “Divinely revealed mysteries are found not only in the sources of revelation and in the infallible declarations of the church but also in other theological sources, or loci. Systematic theologians use all of these to learn about the mystery that they want to understand.” (§37-39.) What are these loci?

There are other doctrines, both theological and ecclesial, that systematic theologians attempt to work into their synthesis besides those that directly express the mysteries of faith. In particular, there are theological doctrines from the tradition and from one’s contemporaries, perhaps even “from” oneself. They are not scriptural doctrines or church doctrines or dogmas or even nondogmatic mysteries of faith. They are, rather, theological interpretations of such doctrines. Nonetheless they are among the doctrines that one will attempt to understand in systematics. Moreover, these appropriated theological doctrines themselves have systematic implications, so that elements of other systematic syntheses are already part of the doctrinal inventory of a contemporary systematic theologian. If the expression “mysteries of faith” names the nonnegotiable elements, whether dogmatic or nondogmatic, that constitute the core of systematic theological meaning, nonetheless no systematic theology begins simply from these core meanings. A contemporary systematic theology stands within a history of other attempts to understand the Christian faith. It is also in dialogue with other contemporary efforts to understand the same faith. … These past and present theologies exhibit genuine achievements of understanding that, once they have been accepted and affirmed as such, assume for the systematic theologian a certain doctrinal status. This is the status not of a church teaching, and certainly not of a church dogma, but of theological doctrines that have passed the tests required if they are to be affirmed by a theologian.15

15 Robert M. Doran, “Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology,” Theological Studies 59, no. 4 (1998): 582. For an excellent study of scholasticism’s now largely disregarded theological notes and censures (ten categories on theological certainty, probability, and error), and an argument for their enduring value, see Harold E Ernst, “The Theological Notes
Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* provides a most notable case of “theological doctrines that have passed the tests required if they are to be affirmed by a theologian.” More on this point below.

### 2. Some Principal Elements of Lonergan’s Argument

This introduction is meant to acquaint the reader with a selection of the principal notions, categories, terms, relations, and texts of *S*’s systematic argument. Many of these elements will be described and explained in more detail according to topical context, i.e., they will recur later in this section or in the sections and chapters that follow until their meaning in relation to the whole argument is adequately expressed. In this introductory context, they structure and solidify a preliminary sketch intended to concretize in broad strokes the volume of the work to be done, to add some essential detail, to serve as reference for the reader, and—to continue the analogy from the craft of painting—to guide the process from sketch to completed work. The chapters that explicate *S*’s data will recapitulate all the technical elements introduced here.

#### 2.1 Faith and Reason

In Catholic thought there can be no conflict between faith and reason. In John Paul II’s avian image, “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.”\(^{16}\) Like the wings, faith and reason are distinct. Lonergan observes:

> Once ... acknowledged to be distinct from faith, there is issued an invitation to reason to grow in CONSCIOUSNESS of its native power, to claim its proper field of inquiry, to work out its departments of investigation, to determine its own methods, to operate on the basis of its own principles and precepts. (*In 551.*)

One might say this Catholic attitude is the condition of possibility for a credible trinitarian theory, one that does not employ mere beings of reason devised to make some sense of the mystery. Catholic trinitarian theory employs the real resources of our intellectual nature,\(^{17}\) and some of its products, to express some understanding of realities we

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judge to be certain. The products of our intellectual nature that systematic theology employs include the best achievements of culture’s art, science, philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, theology, and methodology. The trinitarian theory of Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* offers a case in point.

### 2.2 Lonergan’s Sources and Method

Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* is not only a case in point but also S’s main source and guide for trinitarian theory, method, arguments, and conclusions. Lonergan’s expressed motives for choosing Thomas as source and guide, and for theologizing within the scholastic tradition, include matters of circumstance, church teaching, and intellectual conviction. The following quotation is especially apropos, given his having written S, as Thomas had the *Summa*, for his students. It regards church teaching:

> One who aims at certitude will appeal to as many witnesses to the common faith and the common teaching as possible, but one who aims at understanding can safely ignore the multitude and attend to the most wise. Thus, holy mother church proposes as guide for our studies neither all theologians equally nor even the majority opinion of theologians, but only St. Thomas.\(^{18}\)

Distinguishing the forms whereby one seeks certitude and understanding will be integral to section 5’s account of the form of a systematic argument.

In *Humani Generis*, the papal document most often cited in S, Pius XII states: “The method of Aquinas is singularly pre-eminent both for teaching students and for bringing truth to light; his teaching is in harmony with divine revelation, and is most effective both for safeguarding the foundation of the faith, and for reaping, safely and usefully, the fruits of sound progress.”\(^{19}\) He precedes this remark with an implicit acknowledgement of the theologian’s freedom to develop scholastic philosophy, and a warning. Pius writes:

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The current Code greatly attenuates the old law: “Lectures are to be given in dogmatic theology, based always on the written word of God and on sacred Tradition; through them students are to learn to penetrate more deeply into the mysteries of salvation, with St. Thomas in particular as their teacher.” Can. 252, no. 3.

Even in ... fundamental questions, we may clothe our philosophy in a more convenient and richer dress, make it more vigorous with a more effective terminology, divest it of certain scholastic aids found less useful, prudently enrich it with the fruits of progress of the human mind. But never may we overthrow it, or contaminate it with false principles, or regard it as a great, but obsolete, relic.\(^{20}\)

Lonergan evidently knew this passage. He writes of one aim of S: “The encyclical *Humani Generis* singled out as a regrettable source of errors the opinion that Scholasticism is out of date.\(^ {21}\) If we want to demolish that opinion, I think it will help to have a brief work that illustrates the nature of theological understanding by aiming uniquely at the speculative goal, leaving out everything that might distract from that goal.” (S 121-23.)

Of his works to 1964, his *Verbum* articles record Lonergan’s most trenchant evaluation of the intellectual worth of the *Summa*. “As the reader may have gathered already,” he writes near the end of the final article, “the *via doctrinae* of the *Summa* is a masterpiece of theology as science and the apex of trinitarian speculation.” Later, he explains his judgment: “By the measure of the intellectualist concept of theology, the *via doctrinae* of the *Summa* is a masterpiece. It knows just what the human mind can attain, and it attains it.”\(^ {22}\) The terms theology as science, and *via doctrinae*, are discussed in section 5 below; intellectualist, and opposed theories of knowing, are briefly discussed in chapter 2 below.

### 2.3 Mystery and Human Subjectivity

Lonergan claims significantly more than, in the judgment of John Courtney Murray, Thomas would claim for his own trinitarian theory:

His first problem is this: Is it INTELLIGIBLE that the one God should be a Trinity? And the second is this: It is intelligible how the one God is a Trinity? To answer the questions Thomas has the data of revelation, to be analyzed, and a metaphysic *sic* of being and a psychology of the processes of the rational soul, to be applied. He knows, too, the limits within which his questions can be answered.\(^ {23}\)

\(^{20}\) Ibid., par. 30; emphasis added.

\(^{21}\) As we delve into Lonergan’s critical realist philosophy and empirical metaphysics, the reader will surmise that his thought is at once an authentic development of scholasticism and a development so radical that it merits a new name. In that sense, the scholasticism that dominated Catholic theology until Vatican II has become “a great, but obsolete, relic.”


\(^{23}\) John Courtney Murray, “The Most Holy Trinity,” in *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas*
While his remarks also apply to Lonergan, I said “significantly more” because Murray goes on to say: “[Thomas believed that] in this life, therefore, man can legitimately strive only for a negative intelligence of the Trinity—a perception that the dogma is not evidently contradictory, repugnant to reason, absurd.”24 I do not cite Murray to debate his views; his remarks on “negative intelligence of the Trinity” are congruent with Lonergan’s position: “Our present impossibility of participating God’s understanding of himself implies that any understanding that we do attain is negative, that is, a refutation of objections or a grasp of the absence of inner contradiction.”25 I cite Murray’s remarks to highlight “strive only” and reinforce a point already made. Murray does not advert to the distinction between dogmatic and systematic theologies, nor to the centrality in the Summa of understanding (the centrality Lonergan demonstrates in his Verbum articles), nor does he advert to the distinction between understanding God and understanding truths about God. Lonergan goes on to say that “though we do not understand God in any positive fashion, this does not imply that we do not understand revealed truth in any positive fashion.” (“TU” 116.)

We cannot have positive “intelligence” derived from knowing God as he is or as he knows himself (in reference to God and the divine persons, I will retain Lonergan’s masculine terms). Lonergan, following Vatican I, would claim that, when understanding is clearly distinguished from judgment—the cognitional operation whereby we affirm the truth of our understanding26—“this same mystery, accepted in faith, can be understood mediately, imperfectly, analogically, and yet in a way that is most fruitful, by reason illumined by faith (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132.).” (S 151 passim) Inquiry into the mystery of God can be rewarded with profitable understanding, yet “an understanding of the revelation cannot be adequate for the revelation is about God and God himself is not understood.” (“TU” 119.) Lonergan’s remarks about profitably understanding the mysteries of faith derive principally from a text S often refers to. Vatican I’s Dei Filius


24 Ibid..


26 “There is, then, an underlying problem and it is personal. Each one of us has [a personal] world: it is a solid structure; it is the result of our lives; it has a horizon. And this world is apt to define what I mean by the real. The philosophic point is not to correct our spontaneous attitudes or habits, but to work on the level of what we decide deliberately. We have to grasp that the real is what we know when we make a true judgment.” *Collected Works*, vol. 5, _Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on “Insight,”_ ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark S. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 184; hereafter cited in text as _UB_.

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states:

Vatican I has answered that question authoritatively. Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end. Yet reason never becomes capable of understanding the mysteries in the same way as it does truths that are its own proper object (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132).27

This teaching comprises a number of elements key to Lonergan’s trinitarian theology. They will recur in various contexts in this and succeeding chapters. In addition to the persistence, devotion, and sobriety of, in the present case, theologian and student, they are: reason, gift, profitable understanding, mystery, analogy, the interconnection of the mysteries, and their relation to humanity’s final end. There is also the cognitional theory implied in Vatican I’s reference to reason’s penetrating mysteries and truths, and to reason’s “proper object.” Lonergan observes that “the proper object, the object that moves, is, in the conditions of this present life, an intelligibility or nature that exists as embodied in corporeal matter;...”28

Thus systematics is concerned with answering the first of the two questions to which, according to Lonergan (following Aristotle), all knowledge can be reduced. Understanding asks about ESSENCE, “What is it?” Judgment asks about existence, “Is it so?” They are distinct but not separate questions. Lonergan writes at the beginning of S:

Just as essence and existence are so closely connected that one cannot be found without the other, so our minds perform two basic operations, corresponding to the two familiar questions What is it? and Is it so? and these are so closely connected that to use one and neglect the other is to labor in vain.” (S 9.)

As I asserted in the preface, Lonergan’s most significant development of the scholasticism he inherited pertains to cognitional theory and its role in theological method. Later in this chapter, and especially in chapter 2, I will further explicate Lonergan’s cognitional theory.

2.4 The Question of God and Its Implications

The systematic theologian labors with others to meet the need of the community for “imperfect and yet most profitable understanding of the faith”; in the present case, it

27 Vatican I, Dei Filius, chap. 4, par. 4. DB 1796, DS 3016; as quoted in S, 19 passim.

28 S, 10. The editors note that “it can be argued that, even prior to the publication of this work as De Deo Trino in 1964, he had shifted the priority between objects and operations to operations.” S, 13 n. 6. As we shall see, in S Lonergan does give priority to intellectual operations.
pertains to systematic understanding of God the Holy Trinity. To this end, the systematic theologian seeks to answer the first in the order of questions for understanding raised by the doctrine of God: What is it? *Quid sit Deus?* To the question for judgment raised by the revelation of the Trinity, the theologian has already answered, “Yes, it is so. *Credo.*”

Lonergan writes on the relevance to students of S of the relation between truths of faith held as most certain and understanding these truths:

It is easy … to state the point and purpose of this little treatise. We presuppose that the reader is most firm in his or her faith. We presuppose, too, that the reader is already well educated in the faith. Our aim will be merely to communicate and promote that imperfect yet most fruitful understanding affirmed by Vatican I (DB 1796 DS 3016, ND 132). Since we presuppose an educated faith, we have no intention of trying to remove doubts and refute errors by piling up authorities. Because even the most learned faith can have little or no understanding of the mysteries, we are employing those reasons that probe the root of revealed truth and enable us to understand how it is true. (S 11.)

The answer to the first question for understanding must transcend (but not abandon) the conclusions of natural theology, that is, go beyond the existence, unity and various perfections of divinity knowable in light of reason. The systematic answer must include what cannot be known or demonstrated by natural reason, namely what is understood in light of the theologian’s “Credo” to God’s self-revelation as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Of the revelation that God is both one and triune, Lonergan notes: “This is a mystery so hidden in God that from natural principles it can be neither understand nor demonstrate, even by a well trained mind.”

Recall that systematics is not directly concerned with the truth of dogma. What, then, of true understanding of dogma? “Even though our aim is understanding and not certitude, still we hardly want an understanding that is uncertain rather than certain, or false rather than true. Therefore we must accurately grasp what the act of understanding is, what its properties are, and how this act is connected with what is true and what is certain.” (S 11.) Thus, one who seeks can find true understanding of the truth about

29 Readers who would refresh their knowledge of these conclusions from reason will find a concise and limpid account in Thomas’s *Compendium*, chaps. 9-34. Chapter 19 of *Insight* offers Lonergan’s contribution to natural theology, his argument for the necessary existence of God as ground of the intelligibility of contingent being. God is unrestricted act of understanding, *Ipsum intelligere*.

30 S, 151. Cf.: “If anyone says that in divine revelation there are contained no true mysteries properly so called, but that all the dogmas of the faith can be understood and demonstrated by properly trained reason from natural principles: *Anathema sit.*” Vatican I, *Canons*, sec. 4, “On Faith and Reason,” par. 1. DB 1816, DS 3041, ND 137.
Theological understanding is true in the sense that it consists in understanding the truth that God has revealed. When anything is understood besides the truth that God has revealed, one may indeed have understanding, but not theological understanding, the understanding commended by Vatican I (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). (§33.)

Note his distinction between understanding that one can indeed have and theological understanding. Theological understanding regards only “divinely revealed truth.”

As progress in other branches of knowledge takes place gradually over the centuries through the collaboration of many persons, so it is with the growth of our knowledge, understanding, and wisdom concerning the mysteries of God. But whereas in the case of other sciences progress leads to ever new findings, progress in theological understanding occurs within the same understanding, the same meaning, the same dogma.  

Theology is not revelation, not does it add new data to revelation as such; but it can be true understanding of revelation, thus adding to the church’s continually growing body of systematic theological knowledge (scientific knowledge, thus to some degree only probable).

2.4.1 Some Elements of the Answer to the Question of God

The systematic theologian’s answer to the first question must comprise an intelligent, reasonable elucidation of divinity under three headings. In the order and language of Thomas’s *Compendium theologiae*: “Three truths must be known about the divinity: first the unity of essence, second the Trinity of persons, and third the effects wrought by the divinity.”  

In S’s order and language, the answer must comprise (1) intelligent, reasonable elucidation of the mystery in itself (God *QUOAD SE* as immanently one and three); (2) the mystery in relation to us (God *QUOAD NOS*, the economic Trinity); and (3) virtually

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32 Aquinas, The Light of Faith, 5.

33 Lonergan in S does not use the language of the later debate begun by Karl Rahner’s Grundaxiom: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the
and to an adequate degree formally it must express the relevance of trinitarian theology to Christian faith and living here and now.

God who lives in unapproachable light and God who enters our world and our very selves to redeem them is one and the same. How express this unity? God’s own life as a trinity of persons; the relationships of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to one another, to the natural world, to us; the visible and invisible missions of Son and Spirit to the world and to human persons; the Church; mission; our embodied subjectivity; the dwelling of the Trinity in us; our interpersonal relationships natural and supernatural; God’s gifts of grace; our justification; the complex artifacts, institutions, and cultures we inherit and co-create in cooperation, or not, with God and one another; the sciences, natural and human; the ravages inflicted on the natural world and everything human by ignorance and sin; our personal and communal histories of progress, decline, and redemption; our personal and common futures, and our final destination ... all these and many more elements, and the innumerable particulars they comprise, are in turn comprised formally or virtually or potentially by a comprehensive systematic theology of God. They constitute, if you will, a relational “hypercomplex” that might overwhelm even one’s religious hope for a theology of God comprising a unified account of them all, i.e., one whose unity is explicit and thematized; a theology, in short, with potential to do in our day, mutatis mutandis, what Thomas’s did when he rose to “the level of his time.”

That the terms and relations of the hypercomplex are real grounds a realistic hope. They are real, therefore intelligible (excepting sin, which is by definition irrational and disordered; see n. 37 below). Because intelligible, they present data that can be understood. If understanding fulfills the necessary conditions, the understood can be judged to be true, real. That, with the distinctions proper to systematics in regard to probable and certain, summarizes the implicit ratio of S. Although Lonergan treats some integral categories of the hypercomplex very schematically in some instances, these chapters propose to explicate how S does offer a unified account of the whole that is comprehensive

‘economic’ Trinity.” Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) 22. For Lonergan, who simply assumes they are one and the same, the distinction and difference lie in the differing questions raised when considering God quoad se (God in respect to God) or God quoad nos (God in respect to us).

34 Virtually in the sense that S provides foundations for further development of, inter alia, an integral Christology, an ecclesiology, an integral theology of grace, sacraments .... More on this point in chap. 3 below.

35 Potentially in the sense that Lonergan’s post-S thought on method and cognitional theory provides for development of elements that are implicit or undeveloped in S. More on this point in chap. 3 below.

36 “For the genius is simply the man at the level of his time, when the time is ripe for a new orientation or a sweeping reorganization ....” Insight, 444.
and intrinsically open to organic development.

“Everything that is, everything that is intelligible, has an explanation.”37 Because real, therefore intelligible, the terms of the various interrelated divine, human, natural, and cultural orders can be understood individually, in relation to one another, and in relation to the whole. They can be understood in relation to us. Not that all can be understood to the same degree (for one thing, theology depends on the ongoing findings of all the developing branches of human inquiry, including theology). Nor can all be understood in the same way. Of the two categories—God, Creation—one, God, is not a “proper object” of intellect but a mystery in the strict sense. Thus one must add to the aforementioned hypercomplexity the necessary distinction between direct and analogous understanding and knowledge of God. Although, again, we cannot in this life have direct experience of God and thus cannot know him as he is or as he knows himself, the mystery of our triune God “accepted in faith, can be understood ... analogically ... by reason illumined by faith.” (S 151.) Chapters 2 and 3 below will treat of Lonergan’s ordering the hypercomplex of elements into intelligible unity by use and development of the psychological analogy, the systematic analogy of S.

Conceiving God’s inner life according to the psychological analogy helps us understand why there are relations in God, why they follow an intelligible order of origin, why the relations are persons, why there are three persons and only two proceed, only one is begotten, only one spirated; and why the three divine persons are numerically one God. The psychological analogy continues to yield analogical understanding, and the systematic principle continues to order and inform discussion, when we make the seamless movement from God quoad se (God as God) to God quoad nos (God in relation to us) and “all other issues that may arise.” (S 173.)

2.5 Preliminary Remarks about Philosophy and Metaphysics in Systematic Theology

Apropos of explanation requiring a digression, Lonergan says that “our argument is already burdened with an overabundance of complexity.” (S 127.) Several times for this reason he refers the student to certain of his other works.38 Rather than digress on “the philosophical question” (namely “understanding of one’s mind”), he says, “Since we have already written about ... the philosophical question, it seems sufficient here to proceed according to the third way [not the philosophical or historical but the theological and speculative way].” (S 135.) He then refers the student to his Insight and its de-

37 “The Redemption,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 12. Lonergan is writing about sin. He continues, “But sin is not something that is; it is a failure. It is not something that is intelligible; it is an irrational.” Ibid.. Sin will be discussed further in chap. 3 below.

38 They include Insight; Verbum; “Theology and Understanding”; and The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ.
tailed account of the mind at work. I will therefore draw from *Insight* to handle the philosophical questions raised by the data I have called the hypercomplex of interrelationships among God and Creation both *quoad se* and *quoad nos*.

So far the discussion has introduced elements of Lonergan’s philosophy with emphasis on the cognitive operations of understanding and judgment. These philosophic elements have been an integral part of a generalized discussion, not treated in the abstract or defined in technical terms. Detailed discussion of Lonergan’s philosophy will come in chapter 2’s elucidation of the psychological analogy. Until then, I will continue to zero-in, as it were, on that discussion by giving its terms and relations increasingly definite application. Thus, when the topic of the psychological analogy is reached, the reader will have a useful degree of familiarity with the vocabulary of Lonergan’s philosophy and some of its uses in trinitarian theory.

2.6 Mind and Method

It has been noted that Lonergan emphasizes the distinction between the uncertainty of our understanding of a truth of faith and our judgment that a dogma proposed by the church is certain. Thus he wrote *S* to communicate his uncertain understanding of the certainty of faith that God is one and triune. In this subsection, I will further explain why the distinction between understanding and judgment is vital to systematics.

Systematic theologians have a specific goal: to achieve and express synthetic understanding of the truths of faith. “A synthesis is no more than the understanding of many things together.” (*S* 17.) In systematic theology of God, such synthetic understanding comprises all elements pertaining to God and everything else in relation to God. (Given the vast body of elements comprised by a comprehensive systematic theology of God, the synthesis will be expressed both formally and virtually.) Lonergan writes:

The human mind is such that it does not wonder about things just individually but, understanding individual elements, goes on to ask how they are connected with one another. And so after the individual mysteries have been considered on their own, further questions arise about how they are connected with one another and with our final end. Answering these questions provides a synthetic understanding. (*S* 17.)

To achieve a synthetic understanding of the truth, Lonergan insists that “we must accurately grasp what the act of understanding is, what its properties are, and how this act is connected with what is true and what is certain.” (*S* 11.) Why understanding understanding is necessary should become clearer as this chapter explains in progressive detail the cognitive operations whereby we come to know the truth, and how the operations relate to the method whereby Lonergan progressively orders his theological un-
derstanding into a comprehensive synthesis. The importance of philosophy as cogni-
tional theory is central: “Any philosophy, whether actual or possible, will rest upon the
dynamic structure of cognitional activity either as correctly conceived or as distorted by
oversights and by mistaken orientations.” (In 553.)

Of the integral relationship between philosophy and method, Lonergan writes:
“Method is simply reason’s explicit consciousness of the norms of its own proce-
duces.” What are the mind’s procedures and their norms? To give a general
answer meant to enable informed anticipation of topics treated later, I will comment on
five of the interrelated ways cognitional theory is integral to Lonergan’s theology of
God: (1) The soundness of the theory; (2) self-knowledge; (3) the psychological analogy;
(4) peculiarities of understanding and judgment in systematic theology; and (5) the val-
ue of theological understanding.

1. Lonergan’s cognitional theory. The leitmotif, if you will, of this chapter is the su-
preme instance of the idea of order in regard to ourselves. Always and everywhere, Lo-
nergan argues, we advance to knowing truth—being, what really is so—according to
the invariant order and recurrent pattern of our intentional operations: experiencing,
understanding, and judging. His trinitarian theory is built on the method and the sys-
tematic analogy provided by his account of humanity’s intellectual nature. Thus, achiev-
ing the goal of his systematics of the Trinity depends on the soundness of his cogni-
tional theory and the epistemology it grounds. Are we being asked to give a kind of fideist
assent to the weakest philosophical argument, the argument from authority? On what
grounds can the intelligent and reasonable student assent to the claim that Lonergan’s
epistemology is trustworthy? What can impel the student of for-
ward with sufficient
confidence that trinitarian theology built on this presupposed cognitional theory will
repay the time and effort required to understand it? As Crowe admits, “There is no way
to prove such a supposition, for the alleged proof would necessarily involve the use of
the human mind and thus suppose what it was trying to establish.” He later adds:

39 S’s method represents a stage in the development of Lonergan’s methodology that culmi-
nates in his Method in Theology. Method distinguishes two phases of four “functional specialties,”
each set of four tied directly to cognitive operations (experience, understanding, judgment, de-
cision). Second-phase Systematics, like first-phase Interpretation, is tied to understanding.

40 Lonergan will later complement this definition: “A method is a normative pattern of re-
current and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. There is a method,
then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where
the set of relations furnish a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the
job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the
fruits of such repetition are, not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive.” Method, 4.

41 Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., “Bernard Lonergan’s Thought on Ultimate Reality and Mean-
ing,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington, DC: The Catholic Uni-
“Lonergan’s position in epistemology is not therefore one that can establish its foundation in a positive way; we cannot lift ourselves by our epistemological bootstraps.”

He also points out an ineluctable fact:

Still, the position is lethal against its opponents. No one can challenge it, unless he assumes the native orientation of his mind to know and exercises his mind in intelligent grasp [understanding of experience] and reasonable affirmation [judgment]: that is, he cannot challenge it without supposing it. It is this utterly lethal weapon, lethal to one’s own doubts as well as to an opponent’s arguments, that sets this position poles apart from a mere fideism.

Crowe’s remarks indirectly raise the question of our knowing the native orientation and exercise of our minds, the question of verifying Lonergan’s cognitional theory for ourselves.

2. Self-knowledge. The “turn to the subject” in modern philosophy has profoundly affected the field of theology and especially, given its emphasis on human and divine subjectivity and intersubjectivity, trinitarian theology. Contemporary theological discourse is permeated with a variety of counterpositions on subjectivity that are sometimes explicit and thematic or, more often, implicit and performative. Thus the meaning of the turn to the subject has become a critical issue for theologian and student of theology.

Lonergan meets the critical issue head-on. His solution is not only a theory to answer the question, What is knowing? (He answers it with Insight.) His position goes

42 Ibid., 43 Ibid. Since the appearance of Insight (1957) no refutation of Lonergan’s position has been published.


45 Lonergan calls opposed positions “counterpositions” (see Insight, 413-15 passim; and the index, s.v. “Positions, vs. counterpositions”). Lonergan observes that “a basic counterposition ... contradicts one or more of the basic positions. ... Any philosophic pronouncement on any epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, or theological issue will be named a position if it is coherent with the basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity; and it will be named a counterposition if it is coherent with one or more of the basic counterpositions.” Insight, 413. Counterpositions are discussed in chap. 2 below. For an exhaustive study of possible counterpositions, see Michael Vertin, “Dialectically-Opposed Phenomenologies of Knowing: A Pedagogical Elaboration of Basic Ideal-Types,” Lonergan Workshop 4 (1983): 1-26.
beyond a theory that correctly answers questions about subjectivity, objectivity, knowledge, and reality. There is a radical difference between even expert understanding of his theory as theory and verifying the theory experientially, i.e., knowing oneself as knower. He writes in *Insight* that “the aim is not to set forth a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge but to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities.” (*In* 11.) He calls *Insight* an “essay in aid of self-appropriation.”*46* (*In* 16.) In *S* he sketches the process and affirms the aforesaid difference:

Knowledge that is properly human is attained in three steps: first, we experience externally or internally; second, through inquiring into the data of sense or the data of consciousness,*47* we understand and conceive; and third, by reflecting and pondering the evidence we affirm what is true, and through truth as through a medium we know being. But it is one thing to complete the process of knowing through these three steps and quite another to come to know by this same three-step process that our knowledge is achieved in these three steps. (*S* 317.)

Self-appropriation as knower results from knowing our own cognitional structure, its distinct operations, and their norms, i.e., we appropriate our intellectual subjectivity by experiencing, understanding, and judging our own experiencing, understanding, and judging:

To know this cognitional structure, you must identify the activities. Just as you can easily identify an act of seeing, so you must laboriously search for acts of understanding, of reflective understanding,*48* and of judgment. To know what knowing is, you have to have immediate experience of each one of the activities that occur in the structure.*49*

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*46* Later he will note that “the process of self-appropriation occurs only slowly, and, usually, only through a struggle with some such book as *Insight.*” *Method*, n. 2 p. 7. In *Method*, this self-appropriation of the procedures and norms of our intellectuality is called “intellectual conversion.” The term is mentioned once in *S* (p. 32) where Lonergan speaks of “subiecti conversione intellectuali,” the intellectual conversion of the subject in regard to the effects of sin on the human intellect. Conversion will be a topic of chap. 3 below.

*47* Note that Lonergan puts the data of sense and the data of consciousness—among them the operations of the senses and the intellect—on an equal footing, a momentous development of epistemology. In his later writings, and in the parlance of today’s Lonergan scholars, these data of consciousness are called “interiority,” a distinct realm of meaning, a higher viewpoint that sublates the realm of theory.

*48* Reflective understanding, the act whereby we weigh the evidence for judgment, will be explained with the psychological analogy in chap. 2 below.

*49* Lonergan, “Philosophical Positions in Regard to Knowing,” in *Philosophical and Theological
The process of self-appropriation enables us to affirm for ourselves Crowe’s assertion that Lonergan’s position on knowing is “lethal to one’s own doubts.” In regard to “an opponent’s arguments” as they pertain to theology, Lonergan writes:

To eradicate those errors and keep others from being deceived by them, one must seek the root whence the error is able to assume the semblance of truth, and there lay the axe. It makes no difference whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots, since here one is concerned not with the inmost mind of one or another historical figure but with the minds of people in the present and in the future. Consequently in the systematic way we should pay attention not so much to adversaries as to the roots of errors. (S 75.)

The roots of errors in expressions of theological understanding of truths are the counterpositions. The question of truth is paramount because we are seeking to understand the saving truths of faith revealed by God. Counterpositions, the good intentions of their proponents notwithstanding, can be, therefore, pernicious. They are also rife: “I should maintain that the crop of philosophies produced since the Enlightenment are not open to revealed truths because they possess no adequate account of truth.”\(^5^0\) Lonergan is not a heresy hunter; the ax he wields is his benign and creative “adequate account of truth.” As we will see later, he insists that one crucial task of the theologian today is to reverse counterpositions in other expressions of theological understanding and bring forward all that is valuable in them. “Bring them all to the test and then keep what is good in them and avoid the bad of whatever kind.” (1Thess 5:21-22; New English Bible.)

Self-knowledge that ensues from the process of verifying in ourselves Lonergan’s cognitional theory, therefore, has several practical benefits. In regard to theology, we learn the difference, for example, between a merely nominal definition of something (person, for example) and the definition that facilitates understanding by explaining why something is so (scientific knowledge). Self-knowledge helps us understand S’s method, arguments, and conclusions; it provides a means for uncovering, and a viewpoint for evaluating, the philosophical assumptions of other theologies. Most important, the process yields the understanding of understanding utterly necessary for achieving the goal of systematics; and it facilitates the transition from interpreting what others have said to taking one’s own stand in direct theological discourse.

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The reader need not be alarmed. The claim is not that one must achieve this self-knowledge before approaching Lonergan’s theology of God, although Lonergan does invite his students to begin attending to personal experiencing, understanding, and judging. Achieving the goal of systematics is the work of the theologian; thus Lonergan’s understanding of understanding enabled him to write S. Fortunately, understanding Lonergan’s explanation of how the mind works can suffice for us students of S. The fact remains, however, that understanding Lonergan’s theory as theory and verifying the theory for oneself, although integrally related, radically differ. It remains that first-hand understanding of the act of understanding is the sine qua non for appropriating the method of doing systematic theology, especially for employing in theology of God the psychological analogy to gain some understanding of God’s trinitarian life.

3. *The psychological analogy.* Our finite minds can gain understanding of the infinite mystery of God only by use of analogy. Lonergan holds with Thomas that the best analogy we have is found in certain similarities between the workings of our minds and what the church teaches about God’s trinitarian life. Church teaching, of course, does not include a dogmatic epistemology. Lonergan bridges cognitional theory and dogmatic teaching on the Trinity with the reasonable hypothesis that God, like us, is dynamically conscious:

A Philosopher would say and prove that God is conscious; but a philosopher cannot demonstrate that God is dynamically conscious, and a philosopher has no valid reason for supposing that God is dynamically conscious. As a theologian, however, one supposes that God is dynamically conscious, not because one demonstrates this, not because one clearly understands it, but only because in this one obscure element one finds the root of all the obscure things one holds in faith concerning the triune God. See *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m.\(^{51}\)

For the present, I trust it will suffice to say that the results of Lonergan’s arguing from the hypothesis square with all trinitarian dogmas. Consider Lonergan’s “fundamental

\(^{51}\)§, 49-51. Thomas says: “Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: first, as in natural science, to furnish sufficient proof of some principle …. In the second way, reason is employed not to furnish sufficient proof of a principle, but to confirm an already established principle *by showing the congruity of its results* …. This is not to say, however, that such proof is sufficient, for some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one and so on. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity as, *when assumed to be true,* such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons.” *ST*, I, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2m; emphases added. In Lonergan’s trinitarian theory, his hypothesis is “assumed to be true”; he confirms it “by showing the congruity of its results.” Theory, hypothesis, proof, and other technical terms pertaining to theology as science are discussed in sec. 5 of this chapter.
trinitarian problem” (S 127) that arises from the creedal affirmation “God from God.” It seems incoherent to affirm that the Son is, and the Spirit is, both God and from God, each from himself and not from himself. The solution, moreover, must also explain the differing ways it is true of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Lonergan claims that only the psychological analogy enables a solution to the problem. If that seems too extravagant a claim, one thing is certain: no other analogy that solves the fundamental problem has been put forth in the theological literature. (Neither Thomas nor Lonergan excludes the possibility of a better analogy being put forth in the future.52) The fruitfulness of the psychological analogy notwithstanding, it remains an analogy, a comparison that points out some similarities but even greater differences between us and God. In Lonergan’s summary words: “The psychological analogy is just the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look” (V 216) at this greatest of all mysteries.

4. Understanding and judgment in systematics. In the normal order of knowing, one first gains understanding; then, on the basis of sufficient evidence, judges whether one’s understanding is true. Things are somewhat different in systematics. Lonergan treats this topic at some length because the object to be understood is not something natural but a mystery of faith. In keeping with the generalities of an introduction, I will present basic facts but ignore Lonergan’s other points until I have presented his epistemology in greater detail.

Lonergan refers to understanding and judgment as, respectively, the first and second operations of intellect (experience, the first cognitive operation, engages the sensitive intellect and the body as one “data processor”). He says of the act by which we gain understanding of the faith, “Clearly it is an instance of the first operation of the intellect.” (S 15.) He explains:

A person who is seeking an understanding of the mysteries is not asking if there are mysteries or whether they are true. As long as that type of question is excluded, the second operation is excluded as well. And if the second operation is excluded, there remains only the first. It is this operation that one intends when one asks, ‘What is it?’ that one firmly believes exists, or ‘Why is it the way it is?’ about something that one does not in the least doubt is the way it is. The understanding of the mysteries is, then, an instance of the first operation of the intellect. (S 15.)

We assent to a truth before we understand it: “The assent of faith precedes the understanding of the mysteries, and the assent of faith is an assent to the true and so an instance of the second operation. And it is preceded by a catechetical understanding in which one grasps what the articles of faith mean.” (S 15.)

The relation of the first to the second operation in matters of faith has another as-

52 Pius VI condemned the notion that the psychological analogy has “exclusive rights.” DB 1597, DS 2698. Cf., Crowe, The Doctrine, 122.
pect critical to systematics: “Although the understanding in itself is merely a first operation, still it is an understanding of mysteries that became known as true in an antecedent assent of faith; and as soon as any understanding of the mysteries is obtained, the second operation begins to function, as one asks whether what has been grasped by understanding is also true.” (S 15.) Thus a twofold concern with truth and certainty: one’s certainty that the dogmas are true, and uncertainty whether one’s understanding of them is true. The theologian wants true understanding, i.e., theological truth. Judgment on the truth of theological understanding, however, belongs to the magisterium. Absent that judgment, the systematic theologian strives to achieve understanding which, though remaining uncertain, approaches the conditions necessary for reasonable affirmation, i.e., understanding whose certainty can be judged to have a high degree of probability.53

5. The value of systematic theology. This subsection began with the topic of seeking synthetic theological understanding. Lonergan continually reminds us that the results of such efforts, vis-à-vis the mystery of God, are modest. Yet, he assures us that “although even synthetic theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing, still it is highly fruitful.” (S 17.) He writes:

> The benefit derived by someone who seriously strives for theological understanding but attains it only in small measure is neither slight nor to be disparaged. Whoever searches for theological understanding has to attend to everything that can lead to such understanding, and that means attending to what God has revealed to us and what the church of God proposes to be believed by all. But neither slight nor to be disparaged is the benefit that is derived from a serious, lengthy, careful, exact consideration of the truths that God has revealed and we are to believe, both in themselves and in all that follows from them. And so it is a mistake to conclude that, unless each one of us arrives at an understanding of the mysteries, time is being wasted. (S 19.)

Neither is the profit just for oneself. Lonergan offers something of a peroration on the service rendered not only to self but also to others by those who seek theological understanding:

> The condition of one who understands is always better than the condition of one who does not, whether it be in apprehending truth or in teaching it to others or in

53 “The probability of a judgment, like the certainty of a judgment, is a property of its content. If that content coincides with what is grasped as virtually unconditioned, then it is a certainty. But what is grasped as virtually unconditioned may be that a given content heads towards the virtually unconditioned, and then the content is a probability.” Insight, 574. “Virtually unconditioned” will be explained below.
moving one’s inmost will or in counseling and directing others. The more theological understanding is extended to all that has been revealed, the more fully then are those revealed matters apprehended, the more effectively are they taught, and the more faithfully is the whole of human life in all its aspects directed to its final supernatural end. (S 17.)

I conclude with the famous and audacious lines from *Insight* that expand the import of understanding beyond the exigencies of systematic theology to the scope of a universal maxim:

*Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.* (In 22; Lonergan’s emphasis.)

### 2.7 Method and Control of Meaning

When the scholastics called philosophy “handmaid of theology” they meant that logic controlled its meaning. Meaning controlled by the various procedures and techniques of logic was expressed within the framework of Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics, the science of sciences. Neither logic nor metaphysics functions this way in S. (I will explain later why metaphysics remains integral to Lonergan’s trinitarian theory without maintaining the pride of place held in the scholasticism he inherited.)

Logic, a human creation, does not control meaning in S. Lonergan continues to be rigorously logical, of course, and to employ some of the devices and techniques of logic. S’s movement to the realm of subjectivity, however, sublates logic as system. The handmaid of theology becomes a theory meant to answer the question, What is knowing? In S, systematic meaning is controlled by the norms of the intentional operations of the theologian’s own mind.

What do I do when I know? Lonergan in S takes the metaphysically conceived “faculty psychology” of the scholasticism he inherited and, with the help of the psychological facts he recovered from intensive study of Thomas—*and verified in experiencing, understanding, and judging his own experiencing, understanding, and judging*—he transposes the psychological data into what will later be called “intentionality analysis.”

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54 “While logic as a science is quite well established, it owes its universality and its rigor to the simple fact that it deals with unspecified concepts and problems. Hence it differs in an essential fashion from logic as an applied technique for, as an applied technique, logic deals not with indeterminate acts and contents of conceiving and judging but with the more or less accurately determined contents of some department of human knowledge at some stage of its development. On the supposition that the knowledge of that department at that stage is both fully determinate and completely coherent [as in S], logic as a technique can be applied successfully.” *Insight*, 599.
framework of discussion is no longer metaphysical. Meaning is now controlled within
the framework articulated by the terms and relations of what we do when we know, by
the norms of the cognitive operations by which the intending subject, the theologian in
this case, experiences, understands, and judges; and by the fourth cognitive operation of
choosing and willing, the self-making activity of deciding and carrying out a course of
action in response to the truth known in judgment.

Thus the core of method in S becomes the intellectual norms of a nature common to
Lonergan the theologian and his students. Section 5 of this chapter will discuss in more
detail this development of scholasticism; chapter 2 will delve deeper into Lonergan’s
philosophy to explicate the psychological analogy. Chapter 3 will continue to employ
the analogy as it probes the meaning of the relationship between God and us. Finally, I
will speculate on development of Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity based on post-S
development of his thought on subjectivity and method.

While we have been more concerned with the first three operations of intentional
consciousness, the abovementioned intentional movement from judging the true to will-
ing the good is momentous for understanding ourselves and the psychological analogy.
I offer some preliminary comment immediately below and will return in this chapter to
the topic of the good until, with the help of metaphysics, the categories of being, know-
ing, and creating (doing and making) are brought within the single viewpoint of order.

2.8 The Will and the Good

Under this heading I will bring together a number of terms, some familiar, some
new. They include: order, good, good of order, bad, evil, will, rational self-
consciousness, value, judgment of value, the transcendentals, procession, and love.

S still employs some of the language of faculty psychology in regard to the will and
its operation. The will in Lonergan’s later thought (especially Method in Theology) be-
comes the distinct fourth level of intentional consciousness—deliberation and deci-
sion—a level still in process of emergence and articulation in Insight. Nonetheless, his
later thought on the will marks a development, not a radical change of meaning. In
chapter 2 below, the will’s function in the psychological analogy, especially in regard to
the procession of Love, the Holy Spirit, will be explicated. In chapter 3, the will is
integral to explicating the historical interrelationships of God, humanity, and culture.

55 I call it creating to emphasize the fact that the intentional operation is not complete, not
morally self-constituting, until the intended deed is done. “Unless one can carry out in deeds
what one knows and wills, then the willing already is a failure, and from failing will to bad will
to unconcern for truth there are the easy and, unfortunately, familiar steps.” Insight, 585. As folk
wisdom has it, “The road to hell ....”

56 See Insight, index, s.v. “consciousness, levels of, hint of fourth.”
Thus the treatment here will not be detailed.

The earlier discussion of understanding introduced the notion of intelligible unity; discussion of judgment introduced the notions of truth and being. Now I introduce a fourth “transcendental,” the good. Because intelligibility, truth, being, goodness are not restricted to any category of reality but are common to all, they are called transcendental. The order of the transcendentals as they emerge in knowing would place being—the real, the actual—after the true, for “we contemplate being through the true as through a medium.”

(Being as such, which is known in judgment, will be discussed together with metaphysics in the next subsection.) After being as true comes the transcendental notion of being as good. Lonergan says of the good:

As being is intelligible and one, so also it is good. But while the intelligibility and unity of being follow spontaneously from the fact that being is whatever is to be grasped intelligently [understanding] and affirmed reasonably [judgment], the goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will. (In 619.)

The will is a rational appetite. “The will is an appetite that follows the intellect, and which can be desired by the will even when the good of order produces particular goods not for the one desiring them but for others only.”

One among our many natural appetites, the will tends to a good that suits it. As a rational (intellectual, spiritual) appetite, the will tends to some reality that is good, or tends away from some reality that is bad, according to the dictates of reason. True and false are in a mind, while good and bad are in realities themselves; what is good or bad participates in the world of being outside the mind. The good is always concrete. (S 671.)

As capacity for sensitive hunger stands to sensible food, so will stands to objects presented by intellect. As a bare capacity, will extends to every intellectual object, and so both to every possible order and to every concrete object as subsumed under some possible order. But besides the bare capacity that is will, there is the habitual inclination, specialized in particular directions, that constitutes the willingness and unwillingness with which individuals antecedently are disposed to making decisions and

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57 “Ever since Aristotle, a distinction has been recognized between a first and a second operation of the intellect. In the first operation we ask, ‘What is it?’ or ‘Why is it so?’ and we grasp some reason or cause, and we conceive a definition or a hypothesis; but in the second operation we ask, ‘Is it?’ or ‘Is it so?’ and we weigh the evidence, and because of the evidence we utter a true judgment, and through the true as through a medium we contemplate being.” S, 11.

58 S, 495. Note 79 reads: “The fact that the good is said to be appropriate to itself does not stand in the way of this last point. For it is appropriate for a rational appetite to follow reason; and it follows reason when reason apprehends an objective good. On objective good or value, see Insight 624-26.”
choices of determinate kinds.\textsuperscript{59} (\textit{In 621}; emphasis added.)

Thus the sequence will, willingness, willing.

The good that is the object of the will can be thought of in three ways. There is the elemental good presented to us on the empirical level of experience:

On an elementary level, the good is the object of desire, and when it is attained it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying. But man experiences aversion no less than desire, pain no less than pleasure; and so, on this elementary, empirical level, the good is coupled with its opposite, the bad. (\textit{In 619}.)

The second way of thinking of the good regards one of the principal categories of my argument, the abovementioned “good of order” (see n. 58 p. 26). Discussing the good provides the proper context for discussing the good of order (in the next subsection, with the help of metaphysics, I will relate to knowing and being the good we will to make and do). The operation of willing also has the good of order as object. “Besides the good that is simply object of desire, there is the good of order. Such is the polity, the economy, the family as an institution.” (\textit{In 619}.)

Lonergan links the notions of good, the good of order, and value, the third way of thinking about the good that is the completion of will, willingness, and willing:

Now it is in rational, moral self-consciousness that the good as value comes to light, for the value is the good as the possible object of rational choice. Just as the objects of desire fall under schemes of recurrence\textsuperscript{60} to give rise to the good of order grasped by intelligence, so also the good of order with its concrete contents is a possible object of rational choice and so a value. (\textit{In 624}; emphasis added.)

Not every object of desire is a value, a “possible object of rational choice,” although everything we choose is chosen because it is perceived as a good, i.e., something to satisfy a desire. Lonergan writes: “Nowhere in the writings of St. Thomas will you find any other \textit{cause} for the specification of the act of the will than the apprehended object of

\textsuperscript{59} Cf.: “Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen. ... Now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that ... the sensitive appetite according to the order of nature is determinate to one particular thing; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general according to the order of nature, namely the good, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect to particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite.” \textit{ST}, I, q. 13, a. 2 c..

\textsuperscript{60} The notion of “scheme of recurrence” is part of Lonergan’s scientific theory of order in natural process, usually called “generalized emergent probability.” He does not refer to it directly in \textit{S}, but it will be discussed further in chap. 3 below. See “Schemes of Recurrence,” in \textit{Insight}, 141 ff..
Thus the bank robber, having chosen someone else’s cash as a good (not a value in Lonergan’s sense) to satisfy desire for wealth chooses robbery and carries it out. “Objects of desire are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible order, for the value is the possible object of choice, choice is an act of will, and the will is intellectual appetite that regards directly only the intelligible good.” (In 624.) From living at the level of stimulus and response we develop to rational self-conscious obedience to the moral imperative naturally operative in us, the decisive step on our journey to full human subjectivity. Lonergan states plainly the case for the necessity of human moral action:

For sensitive desires and aversions arise spontaneously; their objects cannot be willed until they are subsumed under some intelligible order; intelligible orders are linked one with another in mutual dependence, or as condition and conditioned, or as part and whole; and prior to becoming engaged of one’s own choice, one already is engaged in the process by the fact of one’s desires and aversions, by one’s intelligent grasp of the intelligible orders under which they can be satisfied, and by one’s self-consciousness of oneself as an actually rational knower and a potentially rational doer. For ‘not to choose’ is not the object of a possible choice, and while one’s choices can be reasonable or not, while they can be more reasonable or less, still one’s own rational consciousness is an accomplished fact in the field of knowing, and it demands in the name of its own consistency its extension into the field of doing. Such is the dynamic exigence, the operative moral imperative. (In 625; emphasis added.)

As a preliminary step towards articulating the relation between moral activity and the unity of order, I will interpolate into Lonergan’s comment on the good of order the elements that relate to cognition and, therefore, remotely but really to the psychological analogy, the systematic analogy that yields “most profitable understanding” of the mystery of the Holy Trinity:

The good of order is dynamic, not merely in the sense that it orders the dynam-

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61 “On the Act of Understanding,” sec. 10, trans. by Michael Shields of “De Imagine Dei in Homine.” Available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. The translator notes: “‘De Imagine Dei in Homine’ is the title of the second article of ‘De Divinis Processionibus’ which in turn is the first Quaestio of De SS. Trinitate Supplementum Quoddam.” De SS. Trinitate Supplementum Quoddam, dated 7 March 1955, comprises 50 pages of notes for Lonergan’s course on the Trinity at the Gregorian University, Rome; the notes are three articles of which the first and second are printed with slight changes as appendices I and II in Lonergan’s Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam evoluit Bernardus Lonergan, S.I. (Romae: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1957). De Deo trino, II: Pars systematica, the third, revised, edition of Divinarum personarum, is the original Lain text of The Triune God: Systematics. S’s appendix II, “The Act of Understanding,” differs considerably from “De Imagine Dei in Homine.”
ic unfolding of desires and aversions, but also in the sense that it itself is system on
the move. It possesses its own normative line of development, inasmuch as ele-
ments of the idea of order are grasped by insight into concrete situations [theses real
situations provide data to be experienced], are formulated in proposals [the data
experienced now understood and expressed], are accepted by explicit or tacit
agreements [the data experienced and understood now judged], and are put into
execution [“deliberation and decision, choice and will” in regard to the good carried
out] only to change the situation [providing new data to be experienced] and give
rise to still further insights. (In 620.)

It has already been noted that knowing entails experience, understanding, and
judgment. When we experience we are empirically conscious; when engaged in under-
standing we are empirically and intelligently conscious; and when engaged in the activ-
ity of judgment we become empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subjects.
The operation of willing entails the momentous movement from rational consciousness
to rational self-consciousness, our movement into the moral sphere of willing what we
make and do, the sphere of making ourselves the persons we are. Rational self-
consciousness is moral self-consciousness. S traces our progress towards ever fuller
consciousness:

For we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we un-
dergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our de-
lights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellect-
uality, we are the more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand,
understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in
order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act. (§ 139.)

From passive to increasingly active engagement with reality, we transcend our-
selves concretely when we move from knowing the truth, to choosing to act, to doing
the act we choose:

62 On moral self-consciousness: “We have been dealing with the question, Is there a mean-
ning to the word ‘ought’? … We grant that moral self-consciousness has a concomitant in moral
emotions and moral sentiments, and while we agree that these emotions and sentiments have a
psychoneural basis and are subject to psychoneural aberration, we contend that it is a blunder
to confuse these concomitants with moral self-consciousness itself. When Freud decided event-
ually to publish his Traumdeutung, he was overcoming emotions and sentiments and following
what he considered the only intelligent and reasonable course of action; and such following is
what we mean by obeying moral conscience.” Insight, 623-24. Lonergan later develops (espe-
cially in Method) the positive role of feeling in human knowing. Nonetheless, on the now famil-
iar distinction between a being quaod se and quaod nos, it remains that concomitant feeling and
sentiment, subject to aberration, must be distinguished from “moral self-consciousness itself.”
One can be a rational knower without an act of willing, [but] one cannot be a rational doer without an act of willing. It is the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act of will that (1) marks the shift from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness, and (2) changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing [making the judgment of truth necessitated by the grasp of sufficient evidence] into rational exigence [the necessity to act on the truth known] in the larger field of both knowing and doing. (In 638.)

This expansion of consciousness into “the larger field of both knowing and doing” the good involves making choices based on sufficient evidence; but the judgment of fact and the decision that leads to concrete doing and making differ: “Both judgment and decision are concerned with actuality; judgment merely acknowledges an actuality that already exists; while decision confers actuality upon a course of action that otherwise is merely possible.” (In 638.) The phrase “confers actuality” means that carrying out our judgments of value is creative; we participate in the world of being not simply as knowers and contemplators of the truth but as actual originators of good things by our deciding a course of action and carrying it out.

We all know from experience the difference between an act of will that is disordered and contrary to reason and one that is well ordered, honest, obligatory, holy. For a good that is grasped by the intellect, approved by reason, and imposed upon the will obliges us in such a way that either we choose what is against the dictates of right reason and so are irrational, or we yield to the dictates of reason and so are rational. Thus, what is lacking in a morally evil act but present in a morally good act is that spiritual and moral procession that effectively obligates the will in such a way that we not only ought to love the good, but actually do love it.63

This willing movement of loving the known good is a spiration. Procession (or emanation) is defined as “the origin of one from another.” (S 145.) The procession that is a spiration of love for the intelligible good—value—affords our first glimpse of how our self-knowledge relates to analogical understanding of the spiration, the relation, the person, the Love “who proceeds from the Father and the Son,” God the Holy Spirit.

“Love,” Lonergan writes, “is a principle of unity both by reason of its object and by reason of the act itself.” He explains:

63 S, 137. “Of all the acts which the will performs, the most fundamental is love. Love is a certain contented quiescence (complacentia) in what is good; all the other acts of the will are grounded in love and are different from love insofar as they are concerned with something that is connected with or opposed to the object of love. Thus, longing is concerned with a good that is absent, hope with a future good, joy with a present good, hatred with an evil that is opposed to good, sadness with a present evil, and so forth. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 1 c.” S, appendix 2b, “From the Image to the Eternal Exemplar,” 675.
Love is unitive by reason of its object because, since every good is a good for someone, love looks to two things, namely, the good which it wills and the one for whom it wills that good (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 20, a. 3). Also, *since the good of order itself is the greatest good*, a love that is good wills particular goods for those to whom those goods properly belong in accordance with the wise ordering of things. Thus order is observed in God's love for his creatures (ibid. and a. 4), and created charity itself is regulated by order (ibid. 2-2, q. 26). Love is unitive by reason of its act inasmuch as the love in the lover is in a way the beloved in the lover. This is partly like and partly different from the way in which what is known is in the knower.\(^{64}\)

The integral interrelationship of truth known in a judgment of fact, value chosen in a judgment of value, and spiration of love for the good known and done is summed up by Lonergan and Thomas: “Since by its very nature the will is a rational appetite, and since this appetite cannot be actually rational unless it actually follows upon reason, we must say that ‘it is of the nature of love to proceed only from a conception of the intellect’ [*ST*, I, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3m].” (S 137.) Knowledge comes before love in the order of intentional operations in us and, Lonergan will argue with Thomas, in the Holy Trinity. That does not mean knowledge is greater than love but that we cannot love what we do not know. Neither the divine persons nor we love blindly; we intentionally love what we truly know to be good, i.e., truly worth loving.

We must not, however, think of knowledge and love as separate acts in God. The Holy Trinity has no beginning and each person is the one God. In us, the process comprises distinct acts with a temporal order; our knowledge changes us accidentally (it does not change our nature); but in God there is no change or accident. Order of origin means their interrelationships follow an intelligible order based on the reasonable assumption that God is conscious and knows and loves; thus the *imago Dei* in us is our intellectual nature.

A further step remains to be taken in this preliminary discussion of the good. The next subsection, with the help of Lonergan's metaphysics, will treat of being, knowing, and creating (doing and making) from the viewpoint of order.

### 2.9 A Preliminary Ordering of the Data

To ease passage to detailed discussion of specific categories in sections 3 and 5, I will effect a preliminary ordering of the hypercomplex of data outlined above by interrelating in a general way God's subjectivity, human subjectivity, analogy, and metaphysics.

To help us gain some understanding of God's subjectivity, Lonergan argues with Thomas and Augustine that the *imago Dei* in us, the “image and likeness of God” *Gene-\(^{64}\) S, 675; emphases added. This and similar notions will loom large in the discussion of the Holy Trinity *quoad se* in chap. 2 below.
sis (1:27) speaks about, is found in our intellectual nature. Lonergan argues that human knowing and loving offer trinitarian theory the best possible instance of Vatican I’s “analogy from what [reason] knows naturally.” He argues that it becomes “clear why human beings are said to be in the image of the Holy Trinity precisely with respect to their minds” (S 615) when we understand the workings of our own intellectual nature, thereby understand the psychological analogy, and apply the analogy systematically when theologizing the mystery of God. The “brilliant use of the analogies of intelligence and love by the Western trinitarian theologies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan” enables the systematic theologian to conceive God’s triune subjectivity as *Dicens* (Speaker of the Word of divine understanding, God the Father), *Verbum* (the Father’s Word of understanding spoken, his proceeding Truth, God the Son), and *Amor* (their mutually spirated one proceeding Love, God the Holy Spirit).

Of all things natural, we humans can understand our common intellectual endowment best. Lonergan cites Thomas: “The human soul understands itself through its own understanding, which is its proper act, *perfectly* demonstrating its power and nature.” Commenting elsewhere on the same text, Lonergan writes that “it is through a scrutiny of acts of understanding that the nature of the human mind and all its virtualities can be demonstrated perfectly.” Understanding understanding is central to employing the psychological analogy and thus to systematics itself. Our subjectivity and God’s, Lonergan argues, when compared in regard to similarities and differences, enables a synthetic understanding of the mystery that is at once “imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing” but also “highly fruitful.” (S 17.)

Self-knowledge, it seems, is key to gathering into intelligible unity the hypercomplex of ordered realities comprised by Lonergan’s comprehensive theology of God. Knowing for oneself how the mind works is central to theological understanding of God. Nonetheless and happily, understanding another’s explanation of how the mind works can suffice for understanding Lonergan’s employment of the psychological anal-

65 S’s one mention (p. 169) of *imago Dei* reads: “We understand the infinite negatively, not positively. And even as regards our own rational and moral consciousness, we live it rather than understand it clearly and distinctly. This consciousness, if we suppose it to be the image of God, is an exceedingly deficient image through whose mediation we are able to conceive divine consciousness only analogically and imperfectly.”


67 *ST*, I, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3m; as quoted in S 133; emphasis added.

ogy. To assist the process from what another has said to taking one's stand on personal experience, understanding, and judgment of what it means to know, S's systematic explanations establish a dialectical relationship between Lonergan's trinitarian theory and the self-knowledge of us who seek to understand it. Dialectic is a dynamic, developmental process. Thus the student's persistent, devout, and sober efforts to understand S can also be a dynamic process of self-discovery and self-affirmation as a believer seeking “imperfect, analogous, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, and most profitable” understanding of God the Holy Trinity.

2.9.1 Being, Knowing, Creating, Metaphysics, and the Unity of Order

The operations by which we achieve true knowledge, and the metaphysical principles that constitute, are the elements of, being proportionate to human intellect, i.e., that constitute “the truths which form [reason’s] proper object,” are isomorphic; their structures are similar. I will have more to say about Lonergan's metaphysics in the next section. Here I want to point out, with minimal explanation, the momentous fact that the two categories—being and knowing—have isomorphic structures.

If the knowing consists of a related set of acts and the known is the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts. ...

... Every instance of knowing proportionate being consists of a unification of experiencing, understanding, and judging. It follows from the isomorphism of knowing and known that every instance of known proportionate being is a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judgment. (In 424-25; emphasis added.)

I call this fact momentous because it means that our minds by nature have the power to know the truth about everything created. While there is a practical limit to what we can come to know in a lifetime, still we can question everything with solid hope of a true answer.

Lonergan's cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics derive from answering three linked questions now conventionally worded thus: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? This discus-

69 The first and third questions are raised in Insight: “The first part [of the book] deals with the question, What is happening when we are knowing? The second part moves to the question, What is known when that is happening?” Ibid., 16. Editorial note f reads: “A neat twofold question, with a neat corresponding division in the book. But ten years later Lonergan conceived Insight as answering ‘three linked questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?’ (1974 [Method]: 37, in the 1967 paper ‘Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium’ 33-42).” Ibid., 779; my brackets.
sion has drawn directly and indirectly from the cognitional theory and epistemology derived from Lonergan's answers to the first two questions. His empirical metaphysics is derived from answering the third; empirical because grounded in the psychological facts of experience, understanding, and judgment. Thus the structural isomorphism between knowing and being can be expressed as follows:

Inquiry and understanding presuppose and complement experience; reflection and judgment presuppose and complement understanding. But what holds for the activities also holds for their contents. What is known inasmuch as one is understanding presupposes and complements what is known by experiencing; and what is known inasmuch as one is affirming presupposes and complements what is known by understanding. Finally, the contents of cognitional acts either refer to the known or are identical with the known, and so the dynamic structure of knowing is also the structure of proportionate being. (In 511 emphasis added. This text provides an excellent example of the notion of sublation.)

The isomorphism of knowing and being also has momentous consequences for retrieving and purifying the achievements of the past, for the method of critical inquiry into the meaning of contemporary thought, and for the work of developing and passing on this tradition of knowledge and understanding:

[My] procedure yields a metaphysics that brings to contemporary thought the wisdom of the Greeks and of the medieval schoolmen as reached by Aristotle and Aquinas, but purged of every trace of antiquated science, formulated to integrate not only the science of the present but also of the future, and elaborated in accord with a method that makes it possible to reduce every dispute in the field of metaphysical speculation to a question of concrete psychological fact. (In 448; emphasis added.)

To say that the structures of being and knowing are isomorphic means that every term in cognitional theory (knowing) has a corresponding term in metaphysics (proportionate being). The metaphysical terms that denote the principles constitutive of every proper object of the mind are POTENCY, FORM, and act. The isomorphic pairs are experience–potency; understanding–form; judgment–act (actuality, existence). Our minds and proportionate being are made for each other. Moreover, the invariant order of the operations by which we advance from ignorance to knowledge of truth, and the invariant order of the principles constitutive of everything true, already establish at the heart of history a natural, empirical, universal, stable, dynamic, and personal unity of order that provides the natural ground for the good ordering of the self in relation to everything and everybody else. Dynamic, because the human subject has not only the potential but also the desire to know the truth about everything. Lonergan writes in *Verbum*:

Aristotle opened his *Metaphysics* with the remark that naturally all men desire
to know. But Aquinas measured that desire, to find in the undying restlessness and absolute exigence of the human mind that intellect as intellect is infinite, that ipsum esse [being itself, God] is ipsum intelligere [understanding itself, God] and uncreated, unlimited Light, that though our intellects because potential cannot attain naturally to the vision of God, still our intellects as intellects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly. For Augustine our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and foremost our minds are restless until they rest in seeing him. (V 100.)

What is this “eros of the mind” (In 97 passim) that Insight calls “the pure desire to know”?

By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection. It is not the verbal utterance of questions. It is not the conceptual formulation of questions. It is not any insight or thought. It is not any reflective grasp or judgment. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge. The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. (In 372.)

Humanity’s “inquiring and critical spirit” will be satisfied only in humanity’s final end, the Beatific Vision enjoyed by persons who participate in “that supreme good of order that we observe in the Holy Trinity” (see above p. 3).

Metaphysics regards being quoad se, being as it is in itself. Thus there is no fourth metaphysical term constitutive of being as such that is isomorphic with the fourth cognitive activity of choosing, willing and doing the concrete good incarnating potency, form, and act. This is not a lacuna in the unity of order. There is a relation between metaphysics and the good. The good is related to potency, form, and act because the good is always concrete: “… good and being and ontological truth are convertible.” (S 671.)

As stated above, “One’s own rational consciousness is an accomplished fact in the field of knowing, and it demands in the name of its own consistency its extension into the field of doing. Such is the dynamic exigence, the operative moral imperative.” What is this “dynamic exigence”? Lonergan goes on to say: “Intelligible orders include concrete objects of desire and exclude concrete objects of aversion, and so from the dynamic exigence of rational self-consciousness, by the simple process of asking what in fact that exigence concretely is, there can be determined a body of ethical principles.” (In 625-26.)
A body of ethical principles so determined is necessarily isomorphic with the nature of being and the nature of knowing:

There follows a conclusion of fundamental importance, namely, the parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics. For just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds an ethics. Just as the universe of proportionate being is a compound of potency, form, and act, because it is to be known through experience, understanding, and judgment, so the universe of man’s proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire, intelligible orders, and values, because the good that man does intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen. (In 626.)

2.10 Concluding Remarks

This concludes my preliminary efforts to bring being, knowing, and creating within the single viewpoint of order; and concludes my introduction to elements meant to help the reader gain some preliminary understanding of the power and comprehensive scope of the dynamic, unifying centerpiece of Lonergan’s trinitarian theory: the psychological analogy.

3. Sapientis Est Ordinare

I have not yet defined “the idea of order”; rather, this introductory discussion has interwoven the idea of order and a wide selection of the elements comprised by S’s trinitarian theory. This indirect treatment of some examples of S’s various specifications of the idea of order was intended both to demystify (order is a simple idea) and to prepare one for more exacting accounts of S’s specific embodiments of the idea.

Like order, the nature of idea is simple. Nonetheless, idea must be sharply distinguished from other entities inhabiting the active mind: “An idea is the content of an act of understanding.” Therefore, the idea of order regards understanding and, on sufficient evidence, judging determinations of order in S. “Sapientis est ordinare.” (§ 22.) Lonergan’s dictum, borrowed from Thomas, is translated as “Putting things in their right

71 Lonergan continues: “As a sense datum is the content of an act of sensing, as an image is the content of an act of imagining, as a percept is the content of an act of perceiving, as a concept is the content of an act of conceiving, defining, supposing, considering, as a judgment is the content of an act of judging, so an idea is the content of an act of understanding.” Insight, 667.

72 “It is the part of the wise to order [and to judge; and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, one is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order].” ST, I, q. 1, a. 6 c.. And: “According to the Philosopher
order is the special talent of the wise person” (S 23). Putting things in order is the work of the wise. Ordering is the work of those who have and use the gift of Wisdom and the habit, virtue, of wisdom (self-appropriated philosophy).\textsuperscript{73} In the present case: Lonergan’s wise work of ordering his understanding of revelation to yield S. I will discuss the three terms of the dictum in the sequence wisdom, order, and work.

3.1 \textit{Wisdom}

Perhaps the greatest practical difficulty when analyzing a systematic text lies in its intrinsically synthetic character. Unless explicitly defined, a concept often has to be disengaged from a web of associated concepts, the expressions of understanding providing data to support the interpreter’s inferences. Lonergan does not define Wisdom or wisdom directly; yet, his many mentions throughout S of orders and ordering, and his discussion in \textit{Verbum}, comprise in some measure all the elements usually associated with a comprehensive account of wisdom, and also some fresh insights. (Lonergan notes early in his chapter one that “for brevity’s sake we have not considered theology as wisdom or as queen of the sciences.” (S 113.)

3.1.1 \textit{Aspects of Wisdom}

Traditionally, wisdom has four distinct aspects,\textsuperscript{74} all explicitly integral to S: (1) Wisdom is an acquired intellectual \textit{habitus} or virtue; (2) wisdom is sacred teaching, doctrine, dogma; (3) Wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit; (4) Wisdom is a divine attribute, identical with the \textit{divine essence} (thus common to all divine persons) but traditionally predicated through \textit{appropriation} of Jesus, the incarnate Wisdom of God. Wisdom is usually said to function in regard to two activities, ordering and judging (including discerning and de-

\footnotesize{(Metaph. i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, according to which all things should be set in order.” Ibid., II-II, q. 45, a. 1 c.\textsuperscript{.}}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{73} The virtues are a form, and an interior principle of right conduct, the gifts are not forms and are not an interior principle of right conduct, rather they ‘link us dynamically with the sole source of absolute perfection’ [Lonergan, “St. Thomas’ Thought on \textit{Gratia Operans},” \textit{Theological Studies}, 3 (1942): 72], they are a disposition to follow external guidance and direction of another. … The gifts put us at the disposition of the Spirit, to be governed according to his wisdom and love, and not simply according to the forms or virtues or patterns intrinsic to us. And in this way the Spirit continually rejuvenates the church.” Crowe, \textit{The Doctrine}, 194.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{74} Aspects of the topic also relate to some finer points of trinitarian theory introduced in chap. 2 below. In the section on wisdom in \textit{Verbum}, Lonergan writes: “The finer points of Thomist trinitarian theory cannot be grasped from the analogy of the mere mechanism of human intellect.” \textit{Verbum}, 78.}
ciding). Wisdom, finally, is usually associated with the intellectual virtues and the supernatural gifts of Understanding and Knowledge, with our intellectual love; and with supernatural love, Charity.

The nature and unity of these various dimensions and elements of wisdom are described and explained systematically most notably in the *Summa theologiae*. In fact, Levering argues that the structure of the *Summa* “is best understood within the context of Aquinas’s analogous use of wisdom.”75 His judgment is not wholly unlike my claim for S, although I would emphasize that wisdom was connatural, second nature, to the theologian. I cite as evidence Lonergan’s near-preoccupation with the idea of order and ordering; it is explicit everywhere in his trinitarian theology but largely not adverted to as such. He emphasizes the work of wisdom human and divine in trinitarian systematics itself—ordering and judging; emphasis, therefore, on exercising the intellectual *habitus* of wisdom and ordering the form of the treatise. Lonergan’s abovementioned scientific theory of generalized emergent probability, his cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and his argument for the ordering of a systematic treatise—are all effects of his intellectual wisdom. I believe his trinitarian systematics presented in chapters 2 and 3 below will convince the disinterested reader that in Lonergan we also have a case of the gift of the Holy Spirit76 informing both the personality and work of the theologian explicating, by ordering and judging, sacred teaching: “In its contact with human reason, [supernatural Wisdom] is the science of theology, which orders the data of revelation and passes judgment on all other science.” (V 101.) On the personality and work of the theologian, Sala observes:

Lonergan certainly does not intend to support a confusion between the proper task of the theologian and the theologian’s personal religious life. The two realities are undoubtedly distinct, but it is no less certain that they are connected. The result of theological inquiry is not independent of what the theologian considers human knowledge, and its relation to reality, to be. It is not independent of the theologian’s morality, i.e., of his dedication to the true and the good. It is not independent of the theologian’s faith, and consequently of his disposition to accept revealed truth, even when it exceeds the capacities of the human mind or appears implausible in a cul-


76 “In the power of this wisdom [the one] who loves God grasps the world properly no longer just through his own efforts; he now grasps it in the light of a divine movement, he feels himself ordered to the divine, and in a loving embrace he experiences the divinely willed order of all things.” *Philosophical Dictionary*, ed. and trans. Kenneth Baker (Spokane, WA: Gonzaga University Press, 1972) s.v. “wisdom,” by Josef de Vries.
The personal work of the theologian has a simple goal. The section of S’s chapter one on how the goal of systematics is attained concludes thus: “Reflecting on those words, one will see we have been speaking about what Vatican I already called ‘Christ’s saving doctrine’ (DB 1781, DS 3000).” (§ 19.) Systematics testifies to the truth of the Gospel:

Now these mysteries, affirmed as true by the community and so given the status of doctrines, are constitutive of the community that gathers in the world in the name of Christ Jesus. Systematics is a particular form of witness to the truth of the doctrines, the witness of understanding.78

“Grace perfects nature both in the sense that it adds a perfection beyond nature and in the sense that it confers on nature the effective freedom to attain its own perfection.” (In 767.) Therefore, the training of the mind in first philosophy (love of wisdom) or metaphysics,79 in philosophy expressed as cognitional theory—explaining the habits of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in regard to nature—provides what an artist might call la belle matière (the right stuff) for the creative work of the Holy Spirit. One might conceive of the supernatural gifts, therefore, as linking dynamically to its Source what nature provides, expanding our capacity to order and judge wisely to include matters theological. This might bear on the meaning of Lonergan’s statement that “St. Theresa [of Avila] considered the advice of a genuine theologian more useful than that of a saintly priest.” (§ 113.) What he might mean by grnuine theologian will be broached in chapter 3 below.

Catholic tradition enumerates the gifts of the Holy Spirit from Isaiah’s prophetic words about Jesus: “The spirit of the Lord shall rest on him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding … of knowledge …. He shall not judge by what his eyes see ….” (Is 12:2-3). I have edited the passage of all elements but those directly concerned with our intellectual nature.

S variously orders the associated gifts and virtues of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. First, S follows Isaiah’s order. Wisdom comes first in the order because “sapientis est ordinare,” and ordering the treatise is critical to systematics:

Where wisdom proposes a problem for understanding, there reason illumined by

77 Giovanni B. Sala, S.J., “From Thomas Aquinas to Bernard Lonergan: Continuity and Novelty.” Available at www.lonergan.org/sala/from_thomas_aquinas_to_bernard_1.htm#ftn1; Internet; accessed 29 March 2002.


79 “First philosophy really is wisdom; only the pretensions of the Sophists led the wise to name their pursuit not wisdom itself but love of wisdom.” Verbum, 80. Lonergan’s method as wisdom is discussed in sec. 6 below.
faith and seeking persistently, reverently, and judiciously can hope that with God’s help it will indeed attain some understanding. The expectation is grounded in God’s goodness and in the prayer of Vatican I .... Moreover, where an understanding of the principle is attained, knowledge of conclusions follows of its own accord. (S 47; emphases added.)

Wisdom, understanding, knowledge; wisdom judges the principle, decides what comes first in ordering the problems or questions. This ordering is for the sake of scientific knowledge, that is, conclusions that are certain, that necessarily follow from understanding a principle assumed to be true, i.e., from the hypothesis (theology as science will be discussed in section 5’s account of the form of a systematic treatise). While the phrase from Isaiah about judging by appearances concerns moral judgment, the criterion is identical for intellectual, moral, and theological judgments: evidence sufficient to fulfill the conditions necessary to judge “it is not so” or “it is so.” The words “he shall not judge by what his eyes see” also raise indirectly a topic allied to explication of the psychological analogy in chapter 2 below: false theories of knowing which we easily fall prey to (in this case, knowing as analogous of seeing, or “naïve realism”; I see, therefore I know).

In regard to the development of theological understanding, S presents another order:

As an example of this comparison [between earlier and later stages of theological understanding], consider St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Each of them attained some understanding of one and the same dogma of the Trinity. Each of them used the same psychological analogy. But St. Augustine expounded the analogy psychologically, while St. Thomas expounded it both psychologically and metaphysically. His understanding of the principle, then, was more complete; more elements and wider perspectives could be embraced within his sapiential ordering; and his deduction of conclusions [scientific knowledge] more precise. (S 45; emphases added.)

The order is now understanding, wisdom, knowledge. Because of increased understanding of the principle, wisdom has more elements to order; with the increased understanding of the principle and the more extensive ordering, the scientific knowledge (certain conclusions from the hypothesis), while still uncertain, is more exact and thus more probable. The terms hypothesis, principle, and scientific knowledge will be further explained in section 5 below.

Thomas and Vatican I place the gifts and virtues within their ascending, hierarchically ordered, classical worldview as understanding, knowledge, and wisdom.80 Loner-
gan referred earlier to the prayer of Vatican I: “Let there be growth ... and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time (DB 1800, DS 3020, ND 136.).” (As quoted in S 19.) He will also follow this order when his topic is the natural order of cognitive operations. Understanding leads to true knowledge when understanding is correctly judged to be true. Knowledge leads to wisdom, for affirming the true spirates love of truth, and wisdom is rooted in love, love of truth and, ultimately, in the theological virtue of Charity, our loving God with God’s amour propre, the supernatural life of the soul necessary for salvation.

3.1.2 Wisdom in a Concrete Subject

To take wisdom from the abstract to the concrete, consider an example from S of wisdom as intellectual virtue in a person named Peter. Lonergan is treating of ontological constitution, of what makes something real, to aid our understanding of the created term of a divine mission, a topic of chapter 3 below; it includes philosophical elements not yet introduced. However, it is a fortuitous example because it places wisdom within a context that also provides a concrete instance of elements discussed above in more abstract terms. He ties the unity of potency, form, and act—the metaphysical elements constitutive of proportionate being—to experiencing, understanding, and judging a particular reality. I will quote Lonergan’s example, comment on its relevance to points made above, briefly note the new elements, and then discuss the term Lonergan leaves undefined, the virtue, habitus, of wisdom:

Let us suppose that it is true that ‘Peter is this wise man.’ Then, to ask about the ontological constitution of this truth is nothing else than to ask what in reality is required and is sufficient for it to be true that Peter is this wise man. Now, the following are required and are sufficient: (1) an act of existence, for it to be true that Peter is; (2) individuating matter, for it to be true that Peter is this; (3) a human substantial form, for it to be true that Peter is this man; (4) the habit of wisdom received in his possible intellect,\(^{81}\) for it to be true that Peter is wise; and (5) a being-which, a subsistent, composed of all the above, in order to have Peter with these attributes. (S 455; Lonergan’s emphases.)

Lonergan’s statement imposes the order of discussion as act, potency, and form. Act comes first because we are inquiring into a real object; first the real object must be. The principle called potency is prime matter in the abstract but as concrete it individuates selection of the terms and so the validation of both understanding and science is the work of wisdom.” “Theology and Understanding,” 125.

\(^{81}\) I believe it sufficient to say for the present that possible intellect refers to the intellect’s natural potency to receive another’s formal intelligibility.
the unique material body of this human being. The body’s form—“the substantial form of the body” in scholasticism—is the intellectual nature, the soul, that informs the individuating matter, Peter’s body, and distinguishes him from all other species of animal; the human soul is naturally united to a human body. The unity of potency, form, and act constitutes the man Peter as “a being-which, a subsistent.” We experience him, understand him, and judge that our understanding fulfills the conditions required to pass judgment on, affirm as certain, the hypothesis that this is a man.

The characteristics of his embodiment provide what is necessary for us to experience with our senses that Peter is “this” man; that he is human, that his body is informed by an intellectual soul, their union allowing our minds to understand, grasp the intelligibility, the essence, the form of Peter as this “man.” Having understood that this concrete unity of potency, form, and act has all the conditions necessary to qualify as human, we answer “the what question” with the judgment, “This man Peter exists.” He is a subsistent, this and no other, the subject possessing all these attributes who answers to the name Peter.

But what would ground the judgment, “Peter is this wise man”? To affirm that this real man named Peter is also wise requires something additional. Peter must have “received in possible intellect” the habitus of wisdom. Through repeated obedience to the norms of the pure desire to know as it directs and dynamizes his love of truth, Peter through many acts acquires a habit; he possesses as his own, as connatural, as part of the habitual fabric of his cognitive activity, the habitus, habit, virtue of wisdom. He has acquired a good habit and will keep and develop it inasmuch as he uses it in everything he does and makes.

Our wisdom is dual: “The basic duality of our wisdom is between our immanent intellectual light and the uncreated Light that is the object of its groping and its straining.” (V 100.) Thus:

Wisdom through self-knowledge is not limited to the progress from empirical\(^{82}\) through scientific\(^{83}\) to normative\(^{84}\) knowledge. Beyond the wisdom we may attain by the natural light of our intellects, there is a further wisdom attained through the

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\(^{82}\) Empirical: “There is the empirical self-knowledge, actual or habitual, based upon the soul’s presence to itself ....” Verbum, 100.

\(^{83}\) Scientific: “There is the scientific and analytic self-knowledge that proceeds from objects to acts, from acts to potencies, from potencies to essence....” Ibid.. Acts are specified, i.e., we know what they are, by the objects of acts such as understanding; we know the potencies, the powers, by the acts they make possible; we know the nature, the essence, of the intellectual soul by the potencies it exercises.

\(^{84}\) Normative: “It lies in the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence [proceeding from the act of understanding which grasps the ‘whatness’] to the affirmation of reality.” Ibid..
supernatural light of faith, when the humble surrender of our own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light makes the latter the loved law of all our assents. Rooted in this faith, supernatural wisdom has a twofold expansion. In its contact with human reason, it is the science of theology, which orders the data of revelation and passes judgment on all other science. But faith, besides involving a contact with reason, also involves a contact with God. On that side wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, making us docile to his movements, in which, even perceptibly, one may be ‘non solum discens sed et patiens divina.’

Perhaps the reader has noted Lonergan’s consistent practice, his habit, of relating known truths and speculative understanding about God to human subjectivity in general, and to Christian faith and living in particular. This fact manifests, I believe it safe to conclude, the presence in him of that “supernatural wisdom” which “orders the data of revelation” to achieve the goal of systematic theology.

Finally, let us assume for the sake of this discussion of wisdom that Peter is a systematic theologian. Lonergan would say of such a one:

It would be a mistake to say that the speculative [systematic] theologian is either devoid of wisdom or adequately wise. He could be devoid of wisdom only by complete ignorance of philosophy and a total deprivation of the donum sapientiae [gift of Wisdom] given in some measure to all along with sanctifying grace [the created term of the prior gift of God’s love, the Holy Spirit given to everyone]. He could be adequately wise only if he already enjoyed the beatific vision which alone is proportionate to the reality which theology would elucidate. In his intermediate position between wisdom and folly, he must take every precaution to arrive at the basic theoretical elements and all of them in as accurate a formulation as he can attain. But the greater his mastery of his subject, the keener will be his realization of the difficulty of this task and the profounder will be his gratitude that God has vouchsafed us not only a revelation of supernatural truth but also a divinely assisted teaching authority that is not chary in its use of the evangelical Est, Est and Non, Non [cf., Mt 5:37]. (“TU” 126.)

Further observations about wisdom and its concrete manifestations will be found passim in the following chapters, and in the general summary of this chapter.

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85 Verbum, 101; emphasis added. Notes 204 and 205 read: “Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1, a. 6 c. and ad 2m: see a. 8 c.”; and “[not only learning but receiving divine things] Super III Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2; d. 35, q. 2, a. 1; De veritate, q. 26, a. 3, ad 18m; Super librum Dionysii De divines nominibus, c. 2, lect. 4, §191; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 45, a. 2 c.”
3.2 Order

Many of us, I have reason to believe, have become accustomed to treating “order” in familiar expressions like natural order, intelligible order, moral order, supernatural order, as abstract. Order is a concrete noun. Order also implies an ordered plurality. We retain some sense of the concreteness of order in our notion of the political order; but we tend to reduce the noun to an abstract descriptor when we speak of orders like the intelligible, moral, and supernatural that are no less real for their being also spiritual; witness the mind each one of us possesses as personal property; it is real and spiritual, a concrete order. For the moment I’ll ignore the various goods of order we create—the political, economic, domestic, and so on—to consider nature and ourselves from the viewpoint of order.

Catholics are likely to have a lively sense that the supernatural order grounds all natural orders and the various goods of order and good things we create; the real unity of all existence is basic to our mindset. The noun order, again, implies an intelligible thing whose constitutive “parts” are arranged a certain way to make a unified whole. The “certain way” is common to all orders whether natural or made by us in imitation of nature. Common, because whether or not the orders in relation to one another are isomorphic, or similar, or congruent, or harmonious, all because real fall under the categories being, knowing, and creating. Given the isomorphism of being, knowing, and creating, it would not be rash to claim that the paradigm of order is the dynamic structure of our intellectual subjectivity. In short: being is ordered; knowing is ordered; creating (doing and making) is ordered; the constitutive “parts” of being, knowing, and making are isomorphic; therefore every authentic order imitates the paradigm. To recall the analogy: the concrete order of the intentional operations of our intellectual nature offers systematic trinitarian theology the best possible analogy of the divine order and “every possible order” and “every concrete object as subsumed under some possible order.” Orders are intelligible goods, therefore concrete values to be chosen.

3.2.1 Defining Order

Lonergan offers negative and positive definitions of order. The negative seems to be a virtual tautology. “Where there is order, there is no confusion, for wherever there is multiplicity without order, there is confusion.” (S 445; cf. ST 1, q. 45, a. 6, ad 2m; q. 42, a. 3, sed contra.) Lonergan is discussing a specific point of trinitarian dogma derived from the teaching of the Council of Florence (1438-45) that in God “everything is one except where there is relational opposition” (S 159). Thus:

Whatever God the Father knows, wills, and produces, the Son and the Spirit also know, will, and produce; since there is one essence, one knowledge, one will, and one power for the Three. DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325. (S 445.)
This fact, unique to the Trinity, would sow disorder in trinitarian theory or at least raise pseudo-problems (which would amount to disorder) were it not noted and explained that the three distinct persons possess one and the same essence, knowledge, volition, and power “in an ordered way.” He continues:

What is attributed equally to the three persons is to be attributed to them not confusedly but distinctly. For just as Father, the Son, and the Spirit possess the same essence according to a certain order, so likewise according to a certain order the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have the same knowledge, the same will, the same power. (S 445.)

This unique instance of order does not contribute to the generic definition of order employed in my argument. Differences between divinity and humanity will be discussed below under the headings “the eternal subject” and “the temporal subject.”

3.2.2 The Notion of Order Is Generic

Lonergan’s positive definition of order is twofold. The first concerns a fundamental category in trinitarian theory. He writes: “Note that order can be understood in two ways: first, according as relation is defined as the order of one to another.” (S 423.) This manner of speaking about order will be employed often below in the chapter on the Trinity quoad se.

The generic notion of order employed in my argument comprises the notion of relation in the sense of the order of one part to another part of a whole. (God has no parts.) Lonergan’s second definition comes closer to the generic notion of order employed throughout my argument. There is order “according as many things are ordered to one another in such a way as to constitute a unity.” (S 423.) Whereas in the first sense every relation is an order:

In the second sense, there is no order except insofar as many things compose an intelligible unity through many mutual relations. A pile of stones or of wood, for example, lack the unity of order, and yet stones and wood properly arranged make one house. (S 423.)

Besides providing one of few homely examples found in S, and the abovementioned phrase “unity of order,” this text also provides the core of my generic definition. It is essential to the gerund “ordering”—the work of the wise—that a plurality of parts be “brought into a single intelligible unity”; and essential to the notion of order as noun that “many are so ordered to one another that they constitute a single thing.”

For the purposes of my argument, I employ this generic definition of order:

Order is a state of being that is either given or brought about through the work of the wise. There is intelligible order where parts exist in a given unity, identity,
whole; and there is intelligible ordering where according to some *principle* parts are made to exist in a unity, identity, whole. In both cases the ordered reality is a *thing* to be experienced, understood, known, chosen, and loved.

The definition was formulated in light of the trinitarian theory informing Lonergan’s comprehensive theology of God. Some categories in $S$ denote existing orders (especially those perceived in the mind, in divinity on the analogy of the mind, in proportionate being, in the good) while others denote orders made to exist according to some principle (such as Lonergan’s ordering his treatise). I emphasize “thing” and “principle” because both are fundamental categories. His definitions are precise. A principle is what comes first in some order. Of thing, Lonergan writes:

Now the notion of a thing is grounded in an insight that grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in data; and this unity is grasped, not by considering data from any abstractive viewpoint, but by taking them in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects. For if the reader will turn his mind to any object he names a thing, he will find that object to be a unity to which belongs every aspect of every datum within the unity.\(^{86}\) (In 271.)

The notion of order has been defined generically, i.e., given a definition comprising the nature of specific instances of created order found in $S$. It remains to consider the idea of order as heuristic and, because of its many instances, and the fact that the Trinity is not a thing with parts, the idea of order as analogous.

### 3.2.3 The Idea of Order Is Heuristic

*Insight* has a great deal to say about heuristics (from Gk., *heuriskein*, to discover).\(^{87}\) However, I will cite only what is required to give an adequate account of the idea of order as heuristic. I have already said a great deal about “heuristic” without adverting to the fact. Consider what has already been said about metaphysics, that the structure of every “proper object” of the intellect (the whole of proportionate being) and the structure of the intellect itself are isomorphic. For this reason Lonergan bestows upon meta-
physics the formidable title “integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” 88 (In 416 passim.) Why?

**The integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.** As heuristic, metaphysics might be thought of as a defined structure, a form that anticipates a specific content, i.e., content conforming to the structure’s terms and relations. As heuristic it belongs to “the paradoxical category of the ‘known unknown.’” (In 555.) But metaphysical structure is common to every “proper object” of intellect. Therefore metaphysics as the “integral heuristic structure” allows us to know in advance something about the nature of everything yet unknown. We already know that the object of knowledge will have potency isomorphic with our power to experience it, form isomorphic with our power to understand it, and act, actuality, isomorphic with our power to judge that it is so and thereby know the self-constituting truth that it is a thing, “a unity, identity, whole.” Likewise our expression of meaning will be isomorphic with knowing and being: the explanation of the “thing” will have unified content derived from experience, from understanding, and from judgment.

It is now obvious, perhaps, that the heuristic structure *par excellence* is the mind itself, our common, dynamic, and personal endowment that intends, anticipates, the totality of being. Although there is always a practical restriction on what we can know of “the great always more,” we are not restricted in our questioning. Questions spontaneously arise until “I will know fully, even as I have been fully known” (1Cor 13:12).

Every complete expression of what is known, therefore, will have a synthetic content derived from experience-potency, from understanding-form, and from judgment-act. Conversely, every expression of meaning can be analyzed for the presence or absence of these contents. An expression of meaning might stop at description, not go beyond experience-potency. It might describe and explain but not move to judgment. Or it might express all three. (When we move beyond the true to the good, further content is possible. However, my “argument is already burdened with an overabundance of complexity”; the practical implications of the relationship between metaphysics and ethics will be discussed further in chapter 3).

Like mind and metaphysics, as heuristic the idea of order might be thought of as a defined structure, a specific form that anticipates a specific content, i.e., content which will conform to the structure’s terms and relations. What we know from the generic definition operative in my argument equips us to anticipate S’s various but still to be known specifications of the idea of order. Lonergan writes:

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88 Tad Dunne offers an admirable paraphrase of Lonergan’s definition of metaphysics: “Metaphysics is the actual, working process by which knowers wonder about, and anticipate the major features of, anything that exists or might be created.” Tad Dunne, “Method in Ethics.” Available at http://www.wowway.com/~tdunne5273/Mth-Eth.doc.
The first step in the generalization is ... that just as the mathematician begins by saying, ‘Let the required number be \( x \),' so too the empirical inquirer begins by saying, ‘Let the unknown be the nature of .... (In 61.)

Let the unknown be the nature of order as variously specified in \( S \). We already have a definition of, a statement of the nature of, order and so proceed:

Just as the mathematician follows up his naming of the unknown as \( x \) by writing down properties of \( x \), so too the empirical inquirer follows up his declaration that he seeks the ‘nature of …’ by noting that that ‘nature of …’ must be the same for all similar sets of data. (In 61.)

In the present case, all similar sets of data to be identified as species of the generic notion of order as defined. (In addition to already mentioned goods of order, the idea of order in \( S \) is also specified by such phrases as: ground/foundation of order, formality of order, unity of order, perfection of order.)

One can readily appreciate, even from the small sample provided, the methodological and pedagogical utility of Lonergan’s heuristic procedures. These procedures become available to us when the metaphysics latent in our knowing becomes explicit in our knowing.89

As it happens, Lonergan enables me to segue into discussion of the idea of order as analogous, for the last quotation from \( \text{Insight} \) ends with “all similar sets of data.”

3.2.4 The Idea of Order Is Analogous

Given that I have not yet discussed analogy as such despite the central and varied role the psychological analogy plays in both \( S \) and my argument, I will dialogue with Lonergan’s general use of analogy in \( S \). He offers only a generic definition of analogy. Of several mentions in \( S \), I have chosen one which includes definitions of other kinds of affirmation:

Univocal predicates affirm the same thing about several individuals; equivocal predicates affirm different things; analogous predicates state the same thing, which, however, is verified differently in different individuals.90 (S 337.)

89 “Cognitional activity operates within heuristic structures towards goals that are isomorphic with the structures. If this basic feature of cognitional activity is overlooked, metaphysics is latent. If this feature is noted, if the structures are determined, if the principle of isomorphism is grasped, then the latent metaphysics to which everyone subscribes without knowing he does so ceases to be latent and becomes explicit.” \( \text{Insight}, 425; \) emphasis added.

90 Thomas says that analogy “is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in the univocal, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in the equivocal; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
Why analogy at all? Because it is our only systematic device for attaining “that imperfect yet most fruitful understanding affirmed by Vatican I.” It is the only systematic device because: “A finite act of understanding bears directly on something finite; but what bears directly on something finite can be extended only analogically to what is infinite.” (§ 17)

The idea of order is analogous in two distinct manners. One manner compares similar sets of data discerned in S’s various specifications of order in natural, human, and cultural realities, and in Lonergan’s systematic argument as such; in short, it compares similar sets of data in non-divine reality. (The abovementioned isomorphic unity of cognitional theory and critical metaphysics is a case in point.) I will return to this manner after discussing the other manner in which the idea of order is analogous.

The other manner concerns understanding God quoad se according to the systematic analogy of S, the analogia entis specified as the psychological analogy. While this manner also employs the former (it compares sets of data in divinity itself), its distinction lies in its comparing the divine and the human. Here there are special problems, for as Lateran IV (1215) states:

Any similarity, however great, that is discovered between Creator and creature will always leave a greater dissimilarity to be discovered (DB 432, DS 806, ND 320). (As quoted in § 17.)

He follows with this remark: “Thus, just as from the similarity comes some light, so from the greater dissimilarity comes a still greater darkness.” (§ 17.) However, that there is similarity Lateran IV indirectly and, as we have seen, Vatican I directly affirm. While true that “analogy is valid to the extent that there is a similarity between Creator and creature,” (§ 17.) what similarity to natural order can there be in face of this statement of Lonergan’s on the relation between the supreme instance of order and the human mind:

Under its formal aspect the perfection of divine order must be said to be so great that no greater order can be thought of, especially since this perfection cannot be naturally understood by a created intellect. (§ 429.)

Again, we return to the oft-mentioned psychological analogy. To apply Lonergan’s generic definition of analogy to this specific case, one could say: The psychological analogy enables the student of S to compare our verifiable intellectual nature to the intellectual nature of God as stated in terms of Lonergan’s yet to be discussed hypothesis. The employment of the best possible analogy effects, however, a very modest penetration of the mystery. “But even mediate, imperfect, and analogical understanding is some understanding. Indeed, it is precisely the kind of understanding referred to by the First Vatican Council (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132).” (§ 167.)
Other characteristics of analogy mentioned by Lonergan, and more detailed explanation of his uses of analogy, will accompany discussion of the contexts in which they appear.

3.3 Work and “the order of wisdom”

My comments will be brief because the topic of section 5 below, the form of a systematic treatise, presents a detailed account of three principal aspects of the work of wisdom in theology in general and in the specific case of S: (1) making, bestowing form upon, concrete objects, and contributing to goods of order by making and doing; (2) the orders proper to dogmatics and systematics, the discrete parts of a complete theological work; (3) the wisdom of the form Lonergan bestows upon S. As might be expected, this later discussion seeks to enlarge our understanding of the unity of form and content in S; in sum, to keep before us a synthetic account, from the viewpoint of order, of the ever-increasing complexity, comprehension, unity, truth, and value of Lonergan’s systematic theology of God.

The primary work of wisdom is ordering. Wisdom is prior in us as habit and gift; so it helps us discern, judge, and order everything we make and do. In regard to the central work of ordering a systematic argument, wisdom directly regards the two steps of theology’s forward movement: problem and solution, or question and answer. On the work of wisdom in regard to the problem or question, S reads:

Putting things in their right order is the special talent of the wise person, and so the wise person will start with the problem that is first in the sense (1) that its solution does not presuppose the solution of other problems, (2) that solving it will expedite solving a second problem, (3) that solving the first and second problems will lead right away to solving a third, and so on through all subsequent connected problems. (S 23.)

On the work of wisdom in regard to the solution, S reads:

Understanding is about principles. A principle is defined as what is first in some order [first among the implied plurality of ordered elements]. Therefore it belongs to understanding to grasp the solution to that problem that is first in the order proposed by wisdom. Since this order is such that solving the first means that the others are expeditiously solved, the understanding should be such as virtually to contain the answers to the rest of the questions. (S 23.)

Lonergan, we should recall, inherited and appropriated the Summa’s trinitarian theology; he knew by faith that there is a divine Word; he inherited scholasticism, logic, and a treasury of first-rate scholarship. When he wrote S he had already published the Verbum articles and Insight. He did not start S from scratch. Yet, he takes his inheritance
Among advances relevant to theology: the psychological analogy, metaphysics, philosophy, science, methodology; dogmatic and systematic theologies of God. His wisdom is informed, so when “the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom” (§ 25) Lonergan’s own informed wisdom and Wisdom in partnership help him get both the order of questions and the answers to them right.

3.4 Comparing Eternal Subject and Temporal Subject

Question 21 of § asks, “What is the analogy between the temporal and the eternal subject?” (§ 399.) The question is raised in chapter five, “The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another.” Where Lonergan’s discussion of the psychological analogy in his chapter two emphasizes similarities, he intends that Question 21 help us understand God and ourselves as persons, with emphasis on differences.

To give the interested reader a foretaste of elements explicated in chapters 2 and 3 below, I have arranged the data of the answer to question 21 in tabular form and placed it for ready reference in appendix I (see below p. 301). Although it is not necessary to consult the table, it does provide a largely non-technical account of the three divine subjects—what they have in common, what is unique to each person—and compares God and us. These data not only recapitulate many elements already introduced, but they introduce new elements into what is now a familiar context. They also add richly to the variety of contexts in which the same notions continue and will continue to reappear. Because I am more concerned at this point that the reader encounter these data and obtain some useful sense of their meaning, explanation of the new terms they comprise has been delayed until chapters 2 and 3 provide the proper contexts for explaining what they mean. In the present subsection, I offer an overview of appendix I.

The table’s concentrated account of similarity and difference has the added benefit of illuminating indirectly the psychological analogy. Although it presents without prior discussion further theoretical elements needed to appreciate better the force of Lonergan’s employment of the psychological analogy, I believe the reader might concur, nonetheless, that the cells of appendix I artfully bring into relationship, illuminate the relevance of, what surely has become a somewhat tiresome repetition of abstract terms. After some of these difficulties are clarified below, the reader will appreciate in retrospect that appendix I provides an excellent précis of core elements of the immanent and economic dimensions of §’s trinitarian theory.

Divine and human persons as subjects is a constant theme in these pages. After defining numerous meanings of the word subject, Lonergan concludes:

We are dealing with a subject that is a person and, indeed, a person as conscious. Hence, the ‘subject’ is understood as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and this subject is considered in relation to his intellectual nature.

The analogy, then, about which we are inquiring is the analogy of the subject as
subject: for a temporal subject as well as an eternal subject is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, but a temporal subject and an eternal subject are related to their respective intellectual natures in different ways. (S 401; emphases added.)

Subject in the defined sense—a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature—is univocal of God and us; as applied to the realities, however, the definition is analogous, differently verified in the different instances. As for the italic, it will suffice for the present to understand that to be conscious means simply to be present to oneself. “It is one thing to be conscious, but it is quite another to know, through knowledge in the proper sense, that one is conscious. To be conscious belongs to everyone, for consciousness is simply the presence of the mind to itself.” (S 315.) It is not perceiving oneself as object but experiencing oneself as perceiver. The other italic highlights Thomas’s definition of person. To the definition of subsistent S adds these details:

[A subsistent is] a being in the strict sense; that which is. Therefore the following are not subsistents: (1) accidents, which are in something that is; (2) intrinsic principles of a being, which themselves are not but are that by which is constituted that which is; (3) possible beings, which can be but are not; and (4) conceptual beings, which are only thought of but are never truly affirmed to be. (S 327.)

The crucial categories consciousness and person/subject/self will be discussed at greater length in chapter 2 below when the topic is the psychological analogy, and the meaning of consciousness and person in regard to the Three and to us. That discussion will explain major elements of appendix I; thus the reader should not be concerned to understand the new elements of trinitarian theory that the table introduces.

4. Particular Summary of Chapter 1

I have been arguing that analysis of S reveals distinct determinations of the recurrent idea of order; that explanation of them yields insight into their unity; that these accumulating insights can inform an emergent viewpoint; that acquiring this viewpoint can enable the student to grasp the intelligible unity of Lonergan’s trinitarian systematics, and understand S’s progressive movement towards, and final achievement of, comprehensive synthesis. Thus, each chapter’s particular and general summaries mean to distill, from the ever-increasing complexification and unification of these data, the emergent viewpoint of order.

My argument, therefore, has two main strands: interpretation of Lonergan’s trinitarian theology, and explanation of how he achieved his systematic expression of it. The purpose: to enable the reader to gain some understanding of both the theology and the method. Because his method is not restricted to trinitarian theology, attaining the latter should also enlighten understanding of how one might approach the systematic treatment of any theological question. While my argument is concerned mainly with the me-
thod of S, understanding S should also prepare the reader to understand why and how Method in Theology enables organic development of S’s systematics of the Trinity, a topic briefly discussed in chapter 3 below.

S’s comprehensive theological synthesis is built on four dynamically interrelated categories: God, Creation, Revelation, and Church. They generate further categories. God is the Holy Trinity; Creation is humanity, the natural world, history, and culture (the principal categories of Creation will frame later discussion of our response to the divine missions); Revelation comprises the various categories of God’s self-communication to us; and Church comprises the universal Ecclesia, the particular Church of Rome and, within it, the community that, having assented to the truths the church proposes for its belief, seeks to understand and communicate them systematically. This communal work is intended primarily to bear witness to the saving truth of Jesus Christ in the distinct form Doran aptly calls the witness of understanding.

While not neglecting trinitarian theory, this chapter has focused on a unified understanding of Creation, especially categories pertaining to humanity and the natural world (history and culture will be highlighted in chapter 3 below). These categories regard human subjectivity and the universe of being. We learned that two determinations of the idea of order—knowing and being—form an isomorphic pair. Analyses of them yield an epistemology and a metaphysics.

Our desire to know, the fundamental dynamism of the human spirit, intends the universe of proportionate being, intellect’s proper object “defined as whatever is to be known by human experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation.”91 (In 470.) We want to know everything about everything. Striving to satisfy this desire is realistic because the power to know and the power of the known are isomorphic; at every step in knowing we give intentional existence in our minds to the thing ad extra; they differ only in their potencies. The truth is real in us, part of who we make ourselves to be. Still, we know in light of Christian faith that bestowing intentional existence upon the entire universe of created being could not satisfy our desire to know; consciously or not, our questions intend direct knowledge of God.

Lonergan’s philosophy and metaphysics provide the basic terms and relations that

91 The universe of being that is the objective of the pure desire to know can also be conceived as the objective world process. S does not discuss the two remaining foundational elements of an integrated view of world process that together ground his comprehensive theory of dynamic development, namely his abovementioned scientific theory of natural process called generalized emergent probability (n. 60, p. 27) and its complement, his theorem of finality, a theorem that significantly differs from classical teleology. “By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being.” Insight, 470. Emergent probability and finality will be discussed further in chap. 3 below.
enable an explanatory account of the unity of Creation. Moreover, they enable an ana-
logous explanation of God quoad se (the topic of chapter 2 below); and, finally, they ena-
ble an explanatory account of the relationship between God and Creation (the topic of
chapter 3 below). In brief, Lonergan employs the terms and relations of philosophy and
metaphysics to achieve the goal of S: systematic expression of his understanding of the
church’s doctrine of God and everything else in relation to God. Lonergan’s comprehen-
sive expression is virtual and to an adequate degree formal, a point further clarified be-
low in section 5’s discussion of the form of S.

Method and philosophy, we learned, are conjoined. “Philosophic evidence is within
the philosopher,” Lonergan insists. “It is his own inability to avoid experience, to re-
nounce intelligence in inquiry, to desert reasonableness in reflection. It is his own de-
tached, disinterested desire to know.” (In 454) Philosophy, thus method too, involves
self-appropriation. “Philosophy is the flowering of the individual’s rational conscious-
ness in its coming to know and take possession of itself.” (In 454) Method is self-
appropriated philosophy, or “reason’s explicit consciousness of the norms of its own
procedures” (“TU” 129). Obeying the norms of our cognitive operations leads naturally,
spontaneously to systematic expression of our understanding. Finally, I drew an impor-
tant distinction between appropriating and employing the method as theologian and, as
student of Lonergan’s thought, understanding his explanation and employment of it in
S, a task simplified when we accept his invitation to pay concomitant attention to our
own cognitional operations.

We learned that every proper object of our questions for understanding is consti-
tuted by the metaphysical elements called potency, form, and act; and that these ele-
ments are paired respectively with the cognitive operations of experiencing, under-
standing, and judging. Thus Lonergan calls metaphysics the integral heuristic structure
of proportionate being. Integral because it has potential to integrate into a single view-
point all incidents of knowing; heuristic because it anticipates everything to be known.
Given the critical importance of that claim, it would perhaps be useful to make some
further observations about metaphysics.

If one is to understand the psychological analogy and, indeed, the psychology
grounding it, do not think that the metaphysical elements are things to be imagined:

What are the metaphysical elements? Clearly, the answer has to be that the elements
do not possess any essence, any ‘What is it?’ of their own. On the contrary, they ex-
press the structure in which one knows what proportionate being is; they outline the
mold in which an understanding of proportionate being necessarily will flow; they arise
from understanding understanding, and they regard proportionate being, not as
understood, but only as to be understood. (In 521; emphasis added.)

Empirical metaphysics makes it possible to anticipate and integrate into our
worldview, thus potentially into systematic theology, every possible instance of know-
ledge. Provided consciousness obey the norms of its own procedures, the structural
isomorphism of mind and being grounds the possibility of an explanatory expression of
the unity of existence defensible against any philosophic or scientific objection. Thus the
ordering that is the work of wisdom relies upon explicit metaphysics; the structure of
CONSCIOUSNESS is itself an instance of the heuristic structure of proportionate being. Just as
the structure of knowing is the primary instance of order in regard to ourselves, meta-
physics is the primary instance of order in regard to the object of knowing, the universe
of proportionate being. With customary confidence, Lonergan writes that “there is only
one integrated view of one universe and there is only one set of directives that lead to
it.” *(ln 450.)*

Knowing truth, however, is not enough to make us fully human. It is not enough to
be empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious. Being human does not terminate
with knowing and contemplating the truth, especially the truth about God. In the
present context, it also means that it’s not enough that the theologian and the student of
theology appropriate philosophy and metaphysics. We become fully human when we
become rationally self-conscious, possess ourselves as lovers of truth who act freely and
responsibly on the truth we know. In light of Lonergan’s thought, one might translate
Irenaeus to say that the glory of God is humanity fully conscious. (Section 5 below will
elaborate an instance of intentional movement from questions of truth and falsity that
concern the mind to questions of good and bad that concern one’s creating.)

To return to the focus of this chapter, I cite Lonergan’s lapidary observation: “Phi-
losophy obtains its integrated view of a single universe, not by determining the contents
that fill heuristic structures, but by relating the heuristic structures to one another.” *(ln
451.)* The contents that fill heuristic structures pertain to the findings of all branches of
inquiry. To aid understanding, there follows a table that gathers from sections 1-3 above
both heuristic structures and concrete determinations of them. Chapter 3 below will add
fourth terms to these and other triads for, as we have learned, it is not enough to be, to
judge, to will, to ponder values. Nothing in the cosmos exists simply *quoad se;* every-
thing in the same cosmos also exists for the other. “Although subsistents are (in the strict
sense of are) on the basis of an act of existence, still in regard to operation they need one
another, in accordance with the order of the universe.” *(S 349.)*

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Table 1: Some Structures Isomorphic with the Metaphysics of Proportionate Being
I will first recap the import of Lonergan’s anthropology, then conclude this summary by reiterating the larger context of Christian efforts to understand the mystery of God. While integral to any credible theology of God, anthropology in S has certain characteristics. First, because systematic and intent to contribute to mission the witness of understanding, S’s anthropology is explicit and explained. (Appendix I below adds considerably to this explanation.) Second, because Lonergan’s, the anthropology also provides S’s method, and its methodic centerpiece for understanding the mystery of God, the psychological analogy. Not least, Lonergan’s anthropology is theological. He wrote S first for committed Christians, people studying theology of the Trinity as part of their response to Christ’s call to ministry. Later he published it to benefit a wider readership. S is intended to serve Christian response to the Gospel.

Christ is clear about authentic response to his call. Not theology but love is primary; and one is to love in a strictly ordered way. One must without condition or restriction love God first, and oneself and others equally, loving all with God’s own love, Charity. Christian discipleship, therefore, is the lifelong developmental process of establishing a holistic relationship among God, oneself, and everyone and everything else; striving in one’s life for, if you will, existential theological synthesis. The Christian who chooses the witness of understanding seeks synthesis between way of life and a comprehensive systematic theology that he or she can intelligently grasp, reasonably affirm, and communicate to others. In Lonergan’s later writings, the process of becoming an authentic Christian is expressed as a set of precepts linked to terms found in S and now very familiar: be attentive (experiencing), be intelligent (understanding), be reasonable (judging), be responsible (creating), be in love (loving as outlined above).

In the final part of the previous section, we moved from emphasis on Lonergan’s theological anthropology to a brief comparison of eternal and temporal subjects, a complex and sometimes difficult topic. While free of the crypto-profundities that too often bedevil theological expressions of the mystery of God, Lonergan’s trinitarian speculation is not free of difficulties. The reader who consulted appendix I was perhaps a little dismayed at the implicit challenge when Lonergan spoke (cell 23 p. 307) of “an exact

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<td>INTELLIGIBLE ORDER</td>
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92 Thomas says that “by its natural powers” humanity can love God more than self and everything else. ST, I-II, q. 109, a. 3 c.

93 See Method, index, s.v. “Transcendental(s), T. precepts.”
and very difficult knowledge of their own intellectual nature in all its intrinsic norms and exigencies.” Yet, we’ve learned how to decode such systematic language; the subject is none other than oneself.

The differences between us and God are such that analogy is the best device we have to make some sense of the mystery. In appendix I Lonergan talks about God in psychological terms, thus affording a foretaste of the psychological analogy at work. It remains to mine a few more levels of Lonergan’s explanation of what we do when we know and love. This must wait until chapter 2 below. Appendix I indirectly argues that humanity is creation’s most wondrous product. No natural advance beyond human subjectivity exists in our world except in science fiction. The only way “up” for human nature is the supernatural order of grace. Although intimately bound with nature, that realm as supernatural has no analogia entis on offer.

Comparison of divine and human subjects makes it plain that Lonergan’s now familiar psychological terms structure and inform a rational language of godtalk derived from concrete humanity body and soul. It anticipates detailed discussion in chapter 3 below of our development towards the future state of fully possessed embodied self-consciousness that shall be ours when God is all in all. We have quite a stretch ahead of us; but not God. That fact highlights the mystery of God’s absolute freedom from any potency to be more than God eternally is. Concrete humanity is like in this respect, and in that respect could not be more unlike, God as Jesus Christ, Scripture, and Tradition reveal God to be.

The divine persons are “distinct from one another and ordered among themselves in an order that is an order of origin and, at the same time, intellectual and personal.” (S 413.) The theory of divine origin requires some preliminary comment. The Father without origin is origin of the Word and co-origin with him of the Spirit. Origin does not denote beginning or causality. We have to order our ideas. The notion of origin in God allows us to speak of relations absolute and eternal with a starting point that is reasonable. We inspect the truths we know about God and, assuming God to be dynamically conscious, discern in them an intelligible order. The relationships of origin are not temporal but personal in persons who are their own minds. The word origin denotes the eternal relation each person has to one eternal divinity they possess eternally together and singly. (There is no fourth called “divinity” or “one” or “Godhead” existing along with the three persons who possess the one divinity.) God has no beginning as three distinct persons. This will be explained in detail in chapter 2 below.

Human subjectivity provides the best way to speak reasonably about one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Dicens, Verbum, Amor and our understanding, our words, our judgments, our love of truth, goodness, and holiness have things in common. That’s the hypothesis S is putting to the test.
5. The Form of S

“The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking,” the very compact first chapter of S, requires and rewards repeated reading. This section does not aspire to an explanatory account of the whole chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 below offer specific contexts wherein, to assist our understanding the matter at hand, I will further explain formal elements of S presented in this section. The present section is meant primarily to introduce the form Lonergan judged most suitable to a systematic treatise. It aims to explain sufficient of the elements of S’s form to enable the reader to anticipate the unity of form and content (whose principle features we are already familiar with) in the trinitarian systematics we are soon to examine closely. I will also comment on the type of language appropriate to systematics.

5.1 Creating the Form

Here we shift from form as metaphysical to consider the concrete form, the body, of the things we make. Discussing a concrete form entails paying some attention to the branch of philosophy called aesthetics. While neither Lonergan nor Thomas wrote aesthetic theories, both had much to say about such aesthetic concerns as the forms we bestow on the things we make.

The order of nature in the constitution of things is potency, form, act. In our earlier discussion of wisdom we considered them in a concrete “unity, identity, whole” called Peter who, once constituted as real, could function. Form precedes function. This is Lonergan’s position.

Contrast Lonergan’s position with a central dogma of modern aesthetics of the structuralist kind. It declares that form follows function (a dogma architecture especially has taken to heart). Although not grounded in a metaphysics that would have a thing function prior to having form, this modernist order of human making has no foundation in reality (more on this point below). This distortion in aesthetics of the order of nature constitutes a counterposition. It would be incoherent of a theologian committed to the natural unity of order among being, knowing, and creating to espouse an aesthetics with no foundation in reality.

I juxtapose position and counterposition to underscore that deciding form in our making things is far from arbitrary; the form we bestow on the thing we make has consequences. Function is a crucial consideration, but the form is conceived to accomplish a goal, not merely to function.

Thomas, following Aristotle, said that art imitates nature according to, if you will, the nature of nature, according to nature’s own way of operating. Art for Thomas and

\[94 \text{ “Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are pro-} \]
for the purpose of this discussion means simply our producing things.\footnote{The distinction of things made by human hands into practical and fine arts is a much later development. Here, art regards the making of things, both concrete objects and the equally concrete goods of order they contribute to. Thomas draws a sharper distinction than Lonergan does between doing and making: “The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect humanity in matters concerning a good life. Art, on the other hand, is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (\textit{Ethic.}, vi, 4).” \textit{ST}, I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 1m. Thomas is concerned with the end of the work, i.e., the good of the work itself and not with its relation to a good of order or to the subject who makes an object of a judgment of value, an intelligible good. Matters of created form as such I would gather under the category Craft.} We are already familiar with some of the concrete orders of nature’s way of being nature. We have also learned that the goods and the goods of order we make are possible objects of judgments of value. In Lonergan’s thought, both making and doing fall under the good of order Thomas summed up as art, our creating according to the natural isomorphic orders of the one, true, real, good, therefore lovable world in which we live and move and have our being. Doing (like serving the hungry a meal) and making (like preparing the meal) remain distinct for each has a different form; distinct, but one form is never found without the other. One can’t be a doer (e.g., engage in intense theological reflection) without also affecting, for good or ill, the making of a good of order, for one is already part of it; nor can one make a sensible thing (like a systematic treatise) without also doing and affecting, for good or ill, the making of a good of order. Everything about ourselves to some degree affects everything else.

Good actions and good things are equal objects of judgments of value. There is no hierarchy in human activity that would subordinate our good actions to the sensible things we make or vice versa. Both making and doing issue in realities created in response to the natural dynamic exigence, the operative moral imperative in us to do good work in imitation of, at the limit, what a Christian might affirm as the supreme good of order that we observe in the Holy Trinity. Every good action or thing we contribute to a good of order is to some degree of integrity and clarity (for all our works are flawed) an analogue of the divine order perceived according to the psychological analogy. It cannot be otherwise when being and knowing and creating possess isomorphic intelligibilities.

\textit{Phys.} ii, 8).” \textit{ST}, I-II, q. 21, a. 1, ad 1c.. “Nothing can exist which does not proceed from divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; in like manner do works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.” Ibid, 1, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2m.
5.1.1 *S* and the Good

Knowing that doing and making are naturally united but distinct members of the good of order I will call not art but good work, we anticipate that Lonergan made two fundamental judgments of value that issued in the one work, *S*. First, he experienced, understood and judged the need for such a treatise; he decided to write one to fill the need, and he wrote it. Writing it, he made a new intelligible good, thus an object of a judgment of value. His doing and making, his labor to create *S*, contributed good work to the ecclesial good of order and thus, because the Church sublates them all, to every other cultural good of order.

5.1.2 Creating the Form

When bestowing sensible form upon one’s inner *verbum*, the theologian has many judgments of value to make. Lonergan’s second fundamental judgment of value decided his treatise’s form. Creators of goods of order, of sensible goods (like a chair, a painting, a theological treatise), of sensible values, enjoy a creator’s autonomy; and for reasons already stated as well as others, Lonergan first and wisely bestows a general order on the concrete elements of his treatise. Putting things in order, the work of wisdom, comes first.

He knows that we naturally order ideas in two ways, sometimes called the analytic and the synthetic. Of the two ways, he knows from his study of Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* that systematics, whose goal is theological understanding, requires the synthetic order; the object of theology is understanding God and everything else in relation to God, i.e., a synthetic understanding of their unity. Lonergan chooses to express his theological understanding, give it a concrete body, according to the order Thomas calls the *via* or *ordo doctrinae*, the way or order of teaching and learning. Lonergan also calls it the systematic order. The other, opposite, way we order ideas Thomas calls the *via* or *ordo inventionis*, the way or order of discovery and formulation of facts. Lonergan also calls it the dogmatic order. In science, it is the difference, for example, between the quest for the periodic table of elements (*ordo inventionis*) and beginning with the table and drawing conclusions (*ordo doctrinae*). Lonergan offers this example:

If one compares a history of chemistry with a textbook on chemistry, one finds that the course of discovery runs from sensible data to ever more recondite theoretical elements [while the arrangement for teaching and learning begins from the theoret-

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96 For the interested reader, I have provided in appendix III p. 328 a table with a detailed comparison of the two movements. The reader will note a significant number of additional elements of trinitarian theory and, in fact, a concise and correctly ordered outline of a systematic trinitarian treatise.
ical elements\textsuperscript{b} and gradually shows how they may be constructed into explanations of all known phenomena. ("TU" 120.)

In trinitarian theology, it’s the difference between ending like dogmatics with the psychological analogy and, like Lonergan in \textit{S}, beginning with the psychological analogy.

The urgency of Lonergan’s painstaking account of the differences between dogmatics and systematics is less relevant today; no Catholic trinitarian theology published today, to the best of my knowledge, practices the kind of dogmatics that, as we will see later, Lonergan so summarily rejects. Nonetheless, confusion about the roles proper to dogmatics and systematics abounds in contemporary trinitarian theology; contrasting and clarifying the roles, therefore, is of more than historical interest. Lonergan writes:

I trust no one really wants confusion. But it is not always grasped how much confusion results from not keeping the dogmatic and systematic ways sufficiently distinct. Where the goals are different, where the formal objects are different, where the operations by which the different goals are attained are different, where the orders by which one moves toward the goals are different, where different formal concepts are employed, and different proofs and different ways of considering errors, it makes little sense to judge theological works as if they all had but one goal, one formal object, one kind of operation, one ordering of questions, one type of formal concept, one way of proving, and one way of considering errors. (\textit{S} 77.)

In regard to all the data that specify the differences between systematics and dogmatics, Crowe’s summary comment is apposite:

A simple figure will illustrate the difference between the two orders: in the historical [dogmatic] part, we are like [people] groping their way down a dark corridor, unable to turn on the light till they get to the end where the switch is; but in the systematic part, we are like [people] who have turned on the light and retrace their steps, seeing everything with a new clarity and understanding.\textsuperscript{8}

The \textit{ordo doctrinae} ends with understanding revelation. Given \textit{S}’s detailed comparison of the dogmatic and systematic movements and their effects, perhaps the reader can now appreciate better the crucial importance of the theologian’s decisions regarding the form of a systematic treatise. For what are now obvious reasons, Lonergan chose “the way whereby teachers teach and students learn.” Having wisely decided the ordering best suited to achieving the goal of systematics, the ordering of the form as it concerns the mind that will operate in expressing the argument, and the minds of his students who will learn from it, Lonergan proceeds to his next choice, one conditioned by the

\textsuperscript{b} Editorial note b informs the reader that the words I have enclosed in brackets are missing from the original (1967) edition of \textit{Collection}.

\textsuperscript{8} Crowe, \textit{The Doctrine}, 141.
first.

He next decides on a form to order the content of the order of teaching. He chooses the time-honored *quaestio*, asking questions, an inherited form familiar to him and his students. The *quaestio* is not necessarily a grammatical question; thus the dual rendering of *quaestio* as question (the interrogative form) and problem (the declarative). Thirty-two numbered questions are dispersed among eighteen numbered assertions or statements that give rise to the questions. The assertions and the questions they raise are grounded in the first question whose answer virtually contains the answers to all subsequent questions. As “An Analogical Conception of the Divine Processions,” the title of S’s chapter two, suggests: It is here, at the beginning, that the psychological analogy is invoked to answer the first question, Are there processions in God?

Later in this section, discussion of the terms science, hypothesis, and logic will add to our understanding of the nature and function of the form of Lonergan’s systematic argument. Here, we see that form follows function, or is to some extent conditioned by the foreseen function; but only in the sense that the form is chosen in view of the good of the work one has already decided to do. Function does not determine form in the ground of the work, the concept, the maker’s inner word of theological understanding, the *verbum* that would be expressed in the work. Moreover, the functionality of the *quaestio* is heuristic; it does not determine content. The question of function arises when the concrete form of the outer word, not the inner *verbum*, needs to be judged for its functional utility in achieving the goal, the outer *verbum*—S—that expresses Lonergan’s inner *verbum* of theological understanding:

One who reaches an understanding that is most fruitful is not silent but speaks, and so there proceeds from such understanding an inner and an outer word, a conceptual and verbal expression. Again, the theologian speaks about precisely what he or she earlier inquired into ‘diligently, reverently, judiciously.’ But before understanding, one would speak about the problem to be solved, while after understanding, one speaks about the problem that has been solved. (S 43.)

In the order of the *quaestio*, the first question or problem is crucial. As we will see in chapter 2 below, the answer to the first question must implicitly sublate “all consequent connected problems,” must virtually answer every question relevant to the church’s dogmatic theology of God.

Thus, the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution .... (S 25.)

Choosing the *quaestio* for its power to concretize the order of teaching immediately ligh-
tens what Lonergan calls the “penance” of doing theology.

Expression now follows the natural order imitated by the form of the *quaestio*. The question promotes us from data to understanding the data, and so on. The second question flows naturally from the first, the third from the second .... The answers—intelligible, true, good, lovable beings—follow the pattern traced by the recurring order of analogous sets whose unity we have, perhaps, already grasped, namely the isomorphic structures that naturally unify being, knowing, and creating.

5.1.3 **Theology as Science**

S first clarifies the primary difference between theology and all other sciences; the difference pertains to truth believed on the authority of the one who reveals it:

First, then, notice that theological science differs from natural or human science in that theological science begins not from data but from truths. The natural sciences seek an understanding of sensible data; they approximate to truth only by understanding sensible data; and they hope for no more than to attain greater plausibility and probability by means of successive and ever better hypotheses and theories. The human sciences, too, begin from sensible data: not from bare sensibles, it is true, but from sensibles endowed with meaning and human significance. But they do not accept this meaning as true, and so like the natural sciences, they intend to approach ever nearer to truth by means of ever more probable theories. But the meaning that is found in the word of God proceeds from God’s infallible knowledge, and so a theology that begins from revealed truths is called a knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge.

In what sense, then, is theology rightly called science? There are two more formal elements critical to a systematic treatise; they bear on the form of the *quaestio*, they make systematic theology analogously a science; and these elements yield scientific knowledge, i.e., understanding that is to some degree probable. They are the directly related terms theory and hypothesis:

A hypothesis, then, is a conceptual and also verbal expression that states a prin-

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99 “Theology, like other penitential practices, withdraws us from immersion in sensible things so that we may grow spiritually stronger.” S, 113.

100 S, 33. In Lonergan’s later *Method in Theology* theology begins with data, the fruit of Research, the first functional specialty. The seventh functional specialty, Systematics, begins with truths. On the matter of authority for belief, Vatican I declares: “We believe not because reason grasps the intrinsic truth of revelation but, with God’s grace and help, believe on the authority of the revealer, God, ‘who cannot deceive or be deceived.’” Vatican I, Dei Filius (*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith*) chap. 3, “Faith,” par. 2.
principle, that proceeds from an act of understanding, and that solves some primary problem. A hypothesis, of itself, is neither true nor false; nevertheless, it can be true. A hypothesis is more probable the more problems it has the potential of solving. And it moves closer to certitude as every other way of solving the same problems equally well or better is excluded. (S 43.)

The hypothesis is intended to solve the first problem:

Knowledge has to do with conclusions. But the questions are put in such an order that, once the first is solved, the solutions to the others follow with almost no difficulty. Therefore, because the later solutions are connected to the first as conclusions are connected to some principle, all solutions after the first seem to be the proper province of knowledge. (S 25.)

The primary data of systematics are the dogmas of faith, sensible to some degree in that they are accessible only through the sensibles of language; but dogma expresses revelation, the supernatural truth the hypothesis is based upon.

The ‘something that is unknown to us from any other source’ that is arrived at and conceived and formulated is properly called a hypothesis. Finally, something is not just a hypothesis if it is arrived at and conceived and formulated in such a way that there follow from it as from a principle items that are of faith as well as items that are concluded from faith, and if no step in the process is demonstrably contrary to reason. It is then a theory that is verified in many different ways. (S 53.)

As we will see in the following chapters, Lonergan again and again verifies his hypothesis; its results square with Scripture and church teaching, i.e., the church’s official interpretation of revelation. His conclusions square with the certain conclusions that follow necessarily from the dogmatic premises. Therefore, his hypothesis achieves the status of scientific theory. (Einstein’s initial hypothesis that $e=mc^2$ has been multiply verified and so is called a theory.)

Lonergan employs the classical definition of science as certain knowledge of things according to their causes; know the causes (and this “knowledge” pertains to understanding) and you can draw certain conclusions from that knowledge. Modern science, of course, would never claim certain knowledge of causes, the why of things. Nonetheless, modern science and systematic theology both posit hypotheses which, when assumed to be true, lead to conclusions that are certain in relation to the hypothesis. Both science and systematic theology progress by submitting their hypotheses to the stringent tests whereby each distinct discipline establishes the degree of probability to which its hypothesis and its conclusions are true.

The judgment about a theological understanding differs, then, from any and all theological conclusions. Nothing is easier than to conclude correctly: once the pre-
mises are posited, the conclusion either follows necessarily or it does not; if it does not, it is not valid; if it does, it is no less true than the premises. (S 49.)

When the classical notion of science informs the method of a dogmatic treatise, the results are meager. When the truths of faith provide premises that are certain, certain conclusions can be drawn but understanding does not advance. Lonergan inherited this procedure that “maintains (1) that theology is distinct from reason and from faith, (2) that theology has no other principles besides those it receives either from faith or from reason, (3) that theology itself is only about conclusions, and (4) that these conclusions are either ‘pure’ (both premises come from faith) or ‘mixed’ (one premise is from faith and the other from reason).” (S 53.) He wryly observes:

This view is untenable. To begin with, it seems to overlook entirely the teaching of the First Vatican Council. The Council did not decree: Reason enlightened by faith, having drawn its premises from the sources of revelation and having perhaps joined to them one or other premise from reason itself, arrives by carefully observing rules of logic at a most certain conclusion. …

… It is one thing to inquire in order to understand, and it is something else to grasp a reality so clearly that you can demonstrate conclusions from it. It is one thing to seek an analogy so that you can attain some imperfect understanding of mysteries, and it is something else to draw premises from scripture or also from reason. It is one thing to seek understanding with God’s help, and it is something else to lay hold of certitude from having accurately followed the rules of logic. Anyone can see the difference. (S 55.)

Scientist and systematic theologian propose hypotheses. Tested with the best arguments desirable according to the principles of reason that inform the science of logic, conclusions are drawn that are certain.

When theology is distinguished as dogmatic and systematic, each with its own goal and way of movement towards that goal, theology comes to life; the distinction reveals a partnership that yields a single work, like S with its two parts. But dogmatic theology without highly probable scientific knowledge of its meaning, without explanation, without theological understanding that might, indeed, be true? As Lonergan said with mock irony of the theologians’ failure to order and explain systematically the facts established by dogmatics, “They rummage through the past collecting and accumulating technically established information concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers, the theologians, but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered, intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this, they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some form of biblicism that is itself hardly secure.” (S 67.) Theology of God, therefore, is not a synonym of either dogmatics or systematics but comprises both.
Bestowing upon the systematic treatise the order of teaching; along with the form of
the *quaestio*; the hypothesis-*cum*-theory; logic and metaphysics that enable a rigorously
argued answer to the critical first question, an answer that squares with revelation; with
the systematic principle—all are formal elements of *S*—are the work of wisdom; wis-
dom orders and informs the elements of both form and content.

Some remarks about logic. Lonergan’s arguments for his position and against specific
counterpositions as he proceeds to solve the many problems require some comment on
the formal element of logic. Training in logic was integral to the classical *ratio studiorum*
that educated Lonergan and many of his Gregorian students. Few intellectuals today
command this ancient and neglected science with mastery comparable to Lonergan’s.
The power of logic will be evident below in chapter 2’s account of Lonergan's defense of
his hypothesis. Lonergan’s degree of use was a choice. Other systematic theologians
might employ logic’s devices and techniques to a greater or lesser degree. Other linguis-
tic forms of logical argument are possible; but none could be more concise and precise
than the syllogism, especially Lonergan’s favorite: If A then B; but A, therefore B.

Given what has been said of the *ordo doctinae*, the following must be kept in mind:

One misses the whole point of the *ordo doctinae* if one mistakenly expects its
syllogisms to offer not expressions of limited understanding but evidence for indis-
putable certainties. Certainty exists, but it is derived from the certainty of faith, and
the derivation is shown in the *via inventionis*. There is no additional certainty gener-
ated by understanding itself, for our understanding of the mysteries is imperfect. To
convey that imperfect understanding is the function of the *ordo doctinae* ....

("TU" 125.)

To establish the reasonableness of that imperfect understanding, to argue and test the
hypothesis, to answer objections, are among the principal uses of the syllogism in *S*; but
it makes an additional contribution:

We are seeking nothing else in this process than an ordered and pedagogically
guided growth in understanding. We are seeking that special precious quality that
Aristotle discerned in the ‘epistemonic’ or explanatory syllogism, the syllogism that
‘makes us know.’ While all syllogisms lead equally to conclusions that are certain,

101 “Syllogism fulfills a twofold function. It is obviously an instrument for exhibiting the
grounds of a judgment on the conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
But it is also an instrument of developing understanding. ... Moreover, St. Thomas was fully
aware of the significance of explanatory syllogism: he conceived reasoning as simply under-
standing in process, as moving from principles to conclusions in order to grasp both principles
and conclusions in a single view.” “Theology and Understanding.” 117-18.

277-92.
the explanatory syllogism brings forth a conclusion that is not only certain but also understood. And so, since theology is analogously a science, it uses syllogisms that are scientific in an analogous way, in order to add some imperfect understanding to a certitude that has been acquired elsewhere. (S 119.)

It remains to consider the formal element of language. There are two aspects of language to consider. The first pertains to technical terms and definitions, and the second to the overall kind of language one uses to argue according to “the way whereby teachers teach and students learn,” where the goal is understanding.

5.1.4 Defining Systematic Terms and Concepts

The next formal elements to be considered are those upon which everything hangs, so to speak, for they concern expressing the meaning of S. The following two quotations express clearly and concisely the ratio of S’s vocabulary of carefully defined technical terms and concepts, and the relation of these to the ordering of the questions, the order critical to achieving the goal of systematics. First, Lonergan says:

Besides, where both the problems and the solutions are interconnected, the concepts and even the terms that express the concepts must also be interconnected. Thus, if solving the first problem virtually solves all the others, the concepts and terms in which the first problem and the first solution are defined and expressed cannot be significantly changed if they are to serve to define and express the later problems and solutions. Clearly, then, it is not the arbitrary malice of professors but the interconnected questions and solutions themselves that demand both systematically formed concepts and a technical terminology that corresponds not to any concepts whatsoever but to SYSTEMATIC CONCEPTS. (S 25.)

“Thus,” he continues, “the problem of understanding is solved.” Not solved in the sense that, as he says, “individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately,” but solved because:

[T]he whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed for expressing the defined concepts. (S 25.)

Discussion of technical terms and concepts leads to the final formal element to be considered in this section: the language of systematic discourse.
5.1.5 The Language of Systematics

In *S*, Lonergan argues his position on the language of systematic discourse not directly but performatively. He argues it directly in “Theology and Understanding.” He calls the problem of language methodological. The method of systematic theology is for the sake of its goal; therefore the language of systematic discourse must serve the method that gets us to that goal, namely understanding the mysteries of faith.

Readers of the *Imitatio Christi* are familiar with the contrast between feeling compunction and defining it, between pleasing the Blessed Trinity and discursing learnedly upon it. But the contrast to which I wish to draw attention is not between doing and merely knowing but between two types of knowing. Knowledge is involved not only in defining compunction but also in feeling it, not only in discursing upon the Blessed Trinity but also in pleasing it. Still these two types of knowledge are quite distinct and the methodological problem is [1] to define the precise nature of each, [2] the advantages and limitations of each, and above all [3] the principles and rules that govern transpositions from one to the other. (“TU” 127. The numbers are my interpolations. Point 3 lies outside my terms of reference.)

We are already familiar with the type of knowledge involved in defining. Defining is done on the cognitive level of understanding; in fact, one cannot be said to have understood until one can define and, further, communicate to a variety of specific audiences what one has understood. In a systematic treatise, we have learned, definitions of terms and concepts must be clear, precise, and consistent. Less rationally exigent language—the language of imagery, metaphor and symbol, language meant to appeal to feeling—also has its proper place, i.e., where communication does not require precise definitions of theological terms and concepts (the Sunday homily in a typical parish, for example). Nonetheless, if other theological expressions are to contribute to systematic theology, and if systematic theology is to contribute to other forms of theological expression, transpositions must be made. Lonergan says:

The significance of such transpositions is manifold. [1] They are relevant to the implementation of speculative theology in the apostolate and especially in Catholic education. [2] Again, they are relevant to a study of Catholic tradition, for a great part of the evidence for the truths of faith, as they are formulated learnedly today, is to be found in documents not only written in a popular style but also springing from a mind that conceived and judged not in the objective categories of scholastic thought but in the more spontaneous intersubjective categories of ordinary human experience and ordinary religious experience. [3] In the third place, such transpositions are relevant within the methodology of speculative theology itself. (“TU” 128; numbers interpolated.)

I believe that one could argue—from well-known examples from today’s trinitarian
theology—that the situation Lonergan describes in point 2 is now even more pronounced. He does not disdain such works; but, I believe one can infer, he would number them among the sources whose theological understanding needs to be transposed into the kind of systematic language he is arguing for:

Such transpositions are relevant within the methodology of speculative theology itself. Just as the equations of thermodynamics make no one feel warmer or cooler and, much less, evoke the sentiments associated with the drowsy heat of the summer sun or with the refreshing coolness of evening breezes, so also speculative theology is not immediately relevant to the stimulation of religious feeling. But unless this fact is acknowledged explicitly and systematically, there arises a constant pressure in favor of theological tendencies that mistakenly reinforce the light of faith and intelligence with the warmth of less austere modes of thought. Moreover, such tendencies, pushed to the limit, give rise to the intense and attractive but narrow theologies that would puff up to the dimension of the whole some part or aspect of Catholic tradition or Catholic experience; and by a natural reaction such exaggerations lead traditional thinkers to denigrate all scientific concern with the experiential modes of thinking in living. (“TU” 128; emphasis added.)

One should not conclude, however, that Lonergan would banish from systematics all language that appeals to religious feeling, or conclude that in S he denigrates scientific attention to “the experiential modes of thinking in living.” Here and there, especially in the final chapter, S suddenly shifts into prose charged with feeling, language that seems to counter Lonergan’s position—except, these flashes of what I take to be Lonergan’s piety simply reflect understanding of the theological object gained in more contemplative modes of thought; they are never offered in lieu of explanation. The persistent, devout, and sober traveler through S could do with more of these oases; but, as S’s appendices indicate, want of space continually curtailed his desire to give his students more detailed explanation of technical elements. He wants us to understand; thus he gave very small quarter to less austere modes of thought. In sum: Lonergan holds that language less than scientific diminishes the clarity of systematic theology. The theologian, therefore, necessarily holds for the priority of science over poetry in the language of systematic discourse.

6. General Summary of Chapter 1

Lonergan’s remarks about his ordering of Insight are apropos of S and this chapter:

The intelligent reader advances in insight as he reads, and this advance of the reader may be anticipated by the writer. So the present work has been written from a moving viewpoint: earlier sections ... do not presuppose what can be treated only later; but later sections and chapters do presuppose what has been presented in the
successive, ever broadening stages that precede. (In 613.)

The moving viewpoint of this introductory chapter has ranged over many aspects of \( S \), and many of the topics comprised formally and virtually by Lonergan’s comprehensive systematic theology of God.

The path of my moving viewpoint in its forward movement has been somewhat serpentine, dealing as it has with both the inherited tradition of scholasticism as commonly understood, and with Lonergan’s significant developments of it. (Today’s student of theology, unlike those for whom \( S \) was first written, is unlikely to be educated in scholasticism’s logic, philosophy, and metaphysics.) Moreover, I have not assumed the reader’s familiarity with Lonergan’s all-important cognitional theory. To add to the complexity, I have been progressively explaining his cognitional theory in relation to the idea of order, to metaphysics, to self-appropriation, to method, and to the psychological analogy—all the while trying to avoid overwhelming the discussion with protracted explanations of theoretical and technical elements. Some elements of trinitarian theory were introduced with, here and there, explanation sufficient, I hope, to keep the reader aware of the relevance of so much discussion of philosophy and metaphysics to understanding ourselves, and understanding chapters 2 and 3 below on, respectively, God quoad se and quoad nos.

Despite the complexity of the data, to handle them systematically we have returned repeatedly to the same basic set of cognitional categories. Each instance, each new context in which they appear, shed further light on their meaning and import. While it can sometimes seem merely repetitious, this procedure can repay one’s patient efforts. It can lead to an accumulated set of insights into the meaning of Lonergan’s method, the same heuristic method latent in the minds of everyone who inquires into the meaning of anything whatever. The potential utility of understanding Lonergan’s method reaches well beyond understanding \( S \).

6.1.1 On the Historical Development of Systematics

Recall Crowe’s comment early in this chapter (p. 4) that theologians since the time of Tertullian (d. after 220) have sought “to think of the ‘whole’ Trinity in the light of one governing image or idea, and grasp it per modum unius.” I interpret him to mean that

\[ ^{103} \text{Even if one is so educated, the question arises, Whose scholasticism? “G. van Riet needed over six hundred pages to outline the various types of Thomist epistemology that have been put forward in the last century and a half.” Insight, 433. See Georges van Riet, L’épistémologie thomiste: Recherches sur le problème de la connaissance dans l’école thomiste contemporaine (Louvain: Editions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946). For Lonergan’s more detailed and pointed commentary on van Riet’s findings, see Understanding and Being, 102-03.} \]

\[ ^{104} \text{For an absorbing account of early attempts, see Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Doc-} \]
achieving a unified viewpoint enables one, other things being equal, to express as S does a mediate, imperfect, analogous, and synthetic *understanding* of God and everything else in relation to God. Thus, as I am arguing, the governing idea of order found in S informs a viewpoint enabling this explanatory account of Lonergan’s comprehensive systematics of the Trinity.

Space has not permitted even an overview of the historical development of the theological method that enables trinitarian theology to progress towards ever more systematic and comprehensive realizations of its ancient goal. (Chapter 3 below offers some explanation of Lonergan’s post-S history of the mind’s self-disclosure—humanity’s historical “differentiations of consciousness”—and the concomitant stages of meaning that enable progress in method.) It was noted, however, that Aristotle enabled Thomas to bring the theology of God he inherited forward towards the goal. The differentiation of common sense and theory achieved by the Greeks provided Thomas with the sciences of logic and metaphysics, thus a new control of meaning, and a leap forward in systematic thinking and theological method. Among Thomas’s advances on this inheritance, the most notable relevant to present concerns was his distinction between essence and existence. As we saw above, he sharply distinguishes that by which something is—the essence, form, grounding the answer to the question for understanding, What is it?—and existence, the ground of the answer to the question for judgment, Is it? (Really distinct in *contingent* being, essence and existence are one and the same in God.) Lonergan brought Thomas forward by giving his systematics of the Trinity a clear, precise, and consistent technical vocabulary of terms and concepts. With *Insight*, he takes the Greek and Medieval tradition of metaphysics, grounds it in psychological fact, and gives metaphysics back to us in a form “purged of every trace of antiquated science”; as we saw above, one effect is apparent in S’s notions of science and theology as science.

More attention was paid to Lonergan’s displacing logic and metaphysics with a control of meaning new to theological method and, indeed, to history. Even as employed at S’s stage of development, his explanatory account of the new realm of meaning we now call interiority effects a momentous leap forward in the development of method. (There remains chapter 3’s brief account of his 1966 breakthrough to functional specialization

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105 S’s chap. 1 offers a brief history of the development of theology not in relation to human development in general but from the viewpoint of divine providence always providing the church with means to overcome ever-emerging obstacles to spreading the saving truth of Christ—witness the emergence of Lonergan’s method as organon equal to overcoming a formidable contemporary obstacle, the fragmentation of knowledge. On this topic, see Crowe, *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, index, s.v. “Organon, Method as.”
wherein doing theology is conceived as communal, its specialties explicitly tied to the familiar operations of experience, understanding, judgment, and creating.) In our day, control of meaning in theology is rooted in the theologian’s explicit awareness of and obedience to the norms of cognitive operations. Thus method in theology functions intrinsically in terms of inauthentic and authentic subjectivity.

Given that the reader’s familiarity with the technical aspects of the cognition-method nexus lacks only the detail required for informed discussion of the psychological analogy, I will discuss a directly relevant example of method at work. First, to provide a foreword to that discussion, I return to the topic of wisdom.

6.2 Wisdom Revisited

Given what has been said and explained about the centrality of intellectual subjectivity in the ordering of a systematic, comprehensive treatise on God; and what has been explained about the isomorphism of being, knowing, and creating, it would seem that, if sapientis est ordinare, the primary tool of the wise in ordering a systematic treatise, one that displaces the traditional primacy of metaphysics as wisdom, is Lonergan’s method—now usually called “generalized empirical method”—as wisdom106; or, what he calls in *Insight* “a third form of wisdom,” the intellectual habit of wisdom expressed in cognitional terms:

What, then, is wisdom? In its higher form, Aquinas considered it a gift of the Holy Spirit and connected it with mystical experience. In its lower form, Aquinas identified it with Aristotle’s first philosophy defined as the knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes. Clearly enough, the problem of metaphysical method demands a third form of wisdom. For the problem is not to be solved by presupposing a religion, a theology, or mystical experience. Similarly, the problem is not to be solved by presupposing a metaphysics, for what is wanted is the wisdom that generates the principles on which the metaphysics is to rest. *(In 432; emphasis added.)*

We have learned that the principles of metaphysics rest on Lonergan’s epistemolo-

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106 I was first alerted to this issue by Crowe. He writes of “the curious history in Lonergan of the notion of wisdom. … It underwent some evolution at the time of *Insight*, but continued to play a major role well into the Roman period 1953-65. Then, very suddenly, it drops out of the foreground and almost out of the picture. Is this not a matter for curiosity, calling for research and interpretation?” Crowe, *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, 148. Research and interpretation have, indeed, been forthcoming. A recent study concludes that wisdom is now generalized empirical method not only in the individual, which I have judged to be a reasonable inference from the role of interiority in S, but in the community of collaborating specialists envisioned by Method. See Ivo Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method: The “Universal Viewpoint” in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) index, s.v. “Wisdom.”
and we discussed at some length the relation of metaphysical principles to the categories of experience, understanding, and judgment. Moreover, we learned that ethics, for it deals with the good and the good is always concrete, rests upon metaphysics. Thus, we have already learned that the isomorphic unity of being, knowing, and creating is grasped with explicit consciousness of the nature and order of the mind’s procedures, and explicit consciousness of metaphysics. Whereas, as stated above, “metaphysics is the primary instance of order in regard to the object of cognitional structure, the universe of proportionate being,” the primary instance of order in regard to ourselves, the order that enables our ordering and achieving the complete answer to every question is that of “the dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity.” (In 16.) With this notion of wisdom as the “orderer” of all ordering in human inquiry, as generalized empirical method, let us return to the topic of method and the ordering that is the work of wisdom.

6.3 Method Revisited

As the reader no doubt realized well before this summary, my argument employs Lonergan’s method, “reason’s explicit consciousness of the norms of its own procedures.” In other words, while striving to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, I have been stating relevant data (experience), then asking and explaining what they mean (understanding). In some cases I reported Lonergan’s judgment on the explained data, and in other cases I rendered my own. In the final operation, I have been either reporting Lonergan’s judgments of value, i.e., his judgments of how the facts of the explained data serve the good of the work; or I as interpreter have been making such value judgments. Repeating these operations over and over has had the effect, as Lonergan assured us it would, of “yielding cumulative and progressive results.” This repetition of operations will continue until the present work is done.

We have not been proceeding blindly. We have known from the outset that the primary data are fixed—S, and other works of Lonergan’s to 1964 that clarify and augment S. From the outset we have been pursuing in the data an idea, the content of an act of understanding, that is specifically the idea of order as defined. Along the way we learned that three specifications of the idea of order have isomorphic structures, namely being (metaphysics), knowing (philosophy), and creating (ethics). Being includes everything proportionate to our minds. Our minds are in potency to know everything; and ethics covers the entire range of human activity. Thus, these three fundamental specifications of the idea of order inform a heuristic viewpoint on the unity of Creation. Moreover, they have the potential to promote Catholic belief in the unity of Creation from pious assent to unfathomable mystery to informed judgment on a synthetic phenomenological, scientific, philosophical, metaphysical, ethical, and theological explanation of everything, an explanation coherent at every stage of its ongoing development. (As in
science so now in theology “the ideal has ceased to be definitive achievement; it has become ongoing advance.”\textsuperscript{107}

Lonergan’s position does not imply that all works not employing his method fail to attend to data, fail to understand and adequately explain the data, or fail to subject the explained data to judgments of truth and value. The difference lies in making implicit cognitive operations explicitly conscious. The terms and relations of interiority control meaning systematically only when the employer of the method commands the control that ensues when one is clearly aware of what is proper to each cognitive level, and aware of the mode of expression proper to each level; description, for example, is not offered as explanation, nor explanation as truth. As we learned above, his method’s control of meaning does not dispense with the old controls of logic and metaphysics but assigns them to their proper level, understanding. Recall that metaphysics is heuristic and regards being not as understood but as a “known unknown” to be understood.

One’s being explicitly conscious of the norms of the mind’s own procedures and S’s Thomist theology of God are so intimately related that, as Lonergan bluntly states the case, to understand the theology “one must practice introspective rational psychology; without that, one no more can know the created image of the Blessed Trinity, as Aquinas conceived it, than a blind man can know colors.”\textsuperscript{108} (V 24.) Once it was enough for the student of Thomas’s trinitarian theology to understand his psychology in metaphysical terms. “In the writings of St. Thomas, cognitional theory is expressed in metaphysical terms and established by metaphysical principles.”\textsuperscript{109} Once, not long ago, learning Thomas’s trinitarian theology did not require, as Lonergan’s interpretation of Thomas does, the engagement and commitment of the student’s whole subjectivity. Therefore, I will cite another of Lonergan’s statements on self-appropriation.


\textsuperscript{108} He argues that “although St Thomas may not have employed introspective psychology in the explicit, contemporary way, he did nonetheless resolve many questions, among them the most fundamental, from his own internal experience.” S, n. 17 p. 155.

\textsuperscript{109} Lonergan, “Insight: Preface to a Discussion,” in Collection, 142. First published, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 32 (1958): 71-81. He adds: “There are, of course, exceptions. For example, ‘[…] anyone can experience for himself that, when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve by way of examples in which, as it were, he examines what he desires to understand. It is for this reason that, when we wish to help someone understand something, we lay before him examples from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding]’ (Sum. theol., 1, q. 84, a. 7 c.).” Ibid., n. 1.
6.4 Self-appropriation Revisited

In his first two 1958 lectures on *Insight*, Lonergan speaks of his cognitional theory in a more popular idiom. Unlike many in his Halifax audience, we have the advantage of understanding the isomorphic relationship between the terms and relations of cognition and those of metaphysics. We already know how these relate to ethics, the self-constituting moral realm of carrying out the good we decide to make or do; in short, we are aware, in our minds and in following methodical arguments such as this one, of the distinctions among operations that deal with data, or understanding, or truth, or value, and the mode of expression proper to each distinct level. Lonergan, who has been focusing on understanding, says in the third lecture:

The precise meaning of the terms and relations is had by each of you in the measure that you achieve self-appropriation, that you are present to yourself as having presentations, as inquiring, as catching on and getting the point, as conceiving. The wealth of meaning, the precision, the fulness of the terms, increases in each of you with your degree of self-appropriation, and that work of self-appropriation can be done by no one else for you. …

… What we are dealing with is not just a set of static elements but a process. It is always process in us; our knowing is always dynamic; we are always moving on to the next step. The pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of an unknown. It is guided by an ideal, and the ideal changes and becomes more precise in the course of the pursuit. Consequently, what we have to do now is grasp that dynamic aspect … in a reflective fashion. We have to perform the activities and go through the routines that will bring to explicit consciousness the dynamic aspect of the process of knowing. We do not want to endow these terms simply with the static meaning they may have as a result of merely implicit definitions; … [or] the mere suggestion of their dynamic aspect that is had from an implicit consciousness of their meaning. We want to bring the dynamic aspect of these terms to explicit consciousness.¹¹⁰

Obviously, from what has been said throughout this chapter about self-appropriation and method, the ordering power possessed by one who brings “the dynamic aspect of these terms to explicit consciousness” pertains to the work of wisdom in all human endeavor.

6.5 The Idea of Order Revisited

I have been presenting determinations of the governing idea of order so that accu-

¹¹⁰ *Understanding and Being*, 59-60; original emphasis. Now that the reader is well versed in the relevant terms and concepts, I would recommend Lonergan’s overview of the process of self-appropriation, ibid., 14-21.
mulating insights into them might inform a viewpoint enabling the reader to grasp Lonergan’s trinitarian systematics *per modum unius*. Their object in the next chapter will be the “whole” Trinity *quoad se*; there, we will see that the idea of order dominates Lonergan’s analogical understanding of the mystery of God.

In addition to explicit consciousness of the isomorphic heuristic structures of fundamental natural goods (being, knowing, and creating) that can inform a viewpoint on the unity of Creation (thus rendering the familiar phrase “natural order” concrete and explicable), this chapter has considered other determinations of the idea of order. Cultural goods of order, a topic of chapter 3 below, were merely mentioned. Nonetheless, indirect light was thrown on their genesis and meaning when Lonergan’s creation of a particular good that contributes directly to cultural goods of order, namely S, was discussed in some detail. S offers an exemplary case of one person’s attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, loving contribution to culture’s good of order. The case allows the reader to anticipate the gist of the analysis in chapter 3 below of the concrete dynamics of our cooperation with the Trinity in the Christian work, in Lonergan’s later, felicitous phrase, of “healing and creating in history.”

Acquiring the viewpoint of order from insight into the various instances of order discussed in this chapter would have been possible for any 1960s student of S who also gave the necessary time and effort to the other writings of Lonergan’s cited in S (see above n. 38 p. 15); as we have seen, these, especially *Insight*, explain various key elements of S, especially interiority, metaphysics, and ethics. Yet, any student could also discern in S a different, possibly better, recurrent idea to inform an interpretive viewpoint for explaining S; indeed, one could also render a more accurate interpretation from the viewpoint of order. I raise this point to introduce the final topic of this section: the viewpoint Lonergan claims to be necessary to interpret someone else’s expression of meaning; he calls it “the universal viewpoint.”

6.6 *On Interpretation and the Universal Viewpoint*

The universal viewpoint is an appropriate topic to end this chapter because it brings the discussion down to earth, i.e., it entails a more embodied portrait of the person seeking understanding. Although the psychological analogy used in the following chapter to gain analogical understanding of the Trinity is grounded in a verifiable account of the mind at work, it takes no account of human experience as such, or of the erratic way the mind usually works in our day to day lives. The universal viewpoint arises in *Insight*’s argument for a scientific theory of interpretation or a methodical hermeneutics. Against the counterposition Lonergan argues, “If there is no possible universal viewpoint, there is no general possibility of rising above one’s personal views and reaching without bias what the personal views of another are.” (In 605.) His theory undergoes significant de-
velopment in *Method*, but I am not concerned either with that development or, because not directly relevant to my topic, with an account of the complex theory as argued in *Insight*. Rather, I will focus on some elements of the core of the theory, the truth of interpretation. First I will make some general observations on the meaning of the universal viewpoint. It is followed by a brief discussion of familiar elements of the theory relevant to our efforts to achieve a true interpretation of S. Whereas chapter 2 below on God *quoad se* will also lay the groundwork for the divine missions to the world, the more nitty-gritty examination below of the interpreter anticipates chapter 3’s historical-critical account of our existential drama—Christian engagement with God *quoad nos*.

### 6.6.1 The Universal Viewpoint as Such

Perhaps it goes without saying that the foundation of possibility for gaining the universal viewpoint is human subjectivity affirmed according to Lonergan’s philosophy. “We would argue that the particular philosophy we are offering also is the particular philosophy that can ground a universal viewpoint.” (In 591.) The universal viewpoint naturally follows from his philosophy, for “what we have named the universal viewpoint is simply a corollary of our own philosophic analysis.” (In 590.)

As I understand it, the term universal viewpoint denotes a realistic ideal. Lonergan defines the universal viewpoint as “a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints” (In 587) possessed by an interpreter. As potential, the universal viewpoint is a goal, like self-appropriation, to be striven for but, for reasons discussed below, never fully achieved in this life. As totality, the universal viewpoint “is concerned with the principal acts of meaning that lie in insights and judgments, and it reaches these principal acts by directing attention to the experience, the understanding, and the critical reflection of the interpreter.” (In 588.) As might be expected, given what we have learned from the role of interiority in method, “Prior to all … interpretation of other minds, there is the … self-knowledge of the interpreter.” (In 23.) And: “The proximate sources of every interpretation are immanent in the interpreter ….” (In 606.) And:

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111 Lonergan said the earliest academic study of this topic is “an intermediate position between what I had worked out in *Insight* and, on the other hand, the views presented in *Method in Theology*.” Lonergan, “*Insight Revisited,*” in *A Second Collection*, 276. The study is Terry J. Tekippe, “The Universal Viewpoint and the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology in the Works of Bernard Lonergan” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1972). Available at www.arc.tzo.com/padre/firstd.htm; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003. In *Method*, the term is not discussed but appears in this footnote: “See my own discussion of the truth of an interpretation in *Insight*, pp. 562-594 [585-617, in the critical edition], and observe how ideas presented there recur here in quite different functional specialties. For instance, what there is termed a universal viewpoint, here is realized by advocating a distinct functional specialty named dialectic.” *Method*, n. 1 p. 153.
“There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. There are no expressions to be interpreted without other similar unities of consciousness.” *(In 590.) Besides a kind of ultimate degree of self-appropriation, the definition implies an immense erudition. In addition to expert knowledge of a given field, the interpreter possessing the universal viewpoint will have gained accurate knowledge of the mind as such and the history of its self-disclosure, of the historical sequence of concrete modes and levels of expression of particular meanings (the genetic order); and knowledge of history’s dialectical order of position and counterposition regarding the object interpreted. Witness Lonergan and S.

I wrote above about expressions of meaning. They are related to viewpoints: “For further questions lead to further insights only to raise still further questions. So insights accumulate into viewpoints, and lower viewpoints lead to higher viewpoints.” *(In 494.) I could have written about S in the manner of a book report, describe S from a phenomenological viewpoint. Instead, I chose a higher viewpoint that sublates a descriptive account by explaining the content. I have judged that the understanding I express is true; that is a higher viewpoint still. In later chapters I will make value judgments about S when I answer the question, What’s it good for? I’ll mount to a higher viewpoint when I express not only its practical, intellectual, and ethical but also its theological value. As one can appreciate, the topic of the universal viewpoint is large and complex; but my sparse explanation of the definition does emphasize the point I will focus on, the interiority of the interpreter and its corollary, the truth of interpretation.

6.7 On Interpretation and the Interpreter

What is interpretation? “By an interpretation will be meant a second expression addressed to a different audience.” *(In 585.) S is Lonergan’s second expression of Thomas’s interpretation of the church’s then predominantly Augustinian tradition of trinitarian theology. The present work is a re-expression of aspects of S, an exercise in Interpretation, one of the functional specialties of Method. Each reader, some perhaps well versed in both the *Summa* and S, will understand and re-express the present work in a personal way to self and possibly to others. Because audiences can vary widely, levels and modes of expression vary accordingly. Fortunately the interpretations mentioned, although in each instance unique in time, place, and culture, are alike in seeking, for the sake of students of academic theology, a true interpretation of the same revealed truth of faith according to the realist epistemology assumed, not argued, here.

The always imperfect interpreter can accept for the sake of argument any other epistemology and grasp the argument in its terms. Lonergan’s method ups the ante. It not only implicitly judges all other cognitive theories while permitting the inquirer unlimited suspension of disbelief; Lonergan’s method explicitly passes judgment on every counterposition it brings to light in the interpreter’s own mind.
Saying that the mind follows the immanent order of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding to reach fully human knowing does not mean that one always moves from one operation to the next in the given order. Our minds range freely. We might consult the data many times, acquire many insights, and correct many of them, before we have marshaled evidence sufficient for judgments of fact and value. “Outer sense pounces upon significant detail. Memory tosses out immediately the contrary instance. Imagination devises at once the contrary possibility. Still, even with talent, knowledge makes a slow, if not a bloody entrance. To learn thoroughly is a vast undertaking that calls for relentless perseverance.” (In 210.)

We have already encountered several of Lonergan’s remarks about the difficulty of achieving the kind of self-knowledge his method demands. Throughout his writings he acknowledges that, even when attained, it is a constant struggle to maintain a critical-realist position on knowing. The practical unfolding of our pure desire to know is also subject to malfunction, and not only because of “the ignorance and malice of fallen, sinful humanity” (S 111); a host of other factors interfere with the functioning of the pure desire to know. Besides obedience to the precepts listed above, there is inattention, flight from understanding, bad judgment, irresponsibility, refusal to love God, self, and others. Our minds harbor myth as well as science. In terms of violating the transcendental precepts, there is absurdity instead of intelligible unity, falsehood instead of truth, evil acts, ambivalence toward and even hatred of truth and value, even of God. Moreover, we are all subject to dramatic, individual, group, and general biases; subject to ignorance, bad habits, and the deadly sins that inflict spiritual death. We can suffer interference, even malice, from others who have some personal mix of these disorders. Each interpreter is subject to desires and aversions that affect objectivity. Most educated people hold firm views on many philosophical, theological, and hermeneutical issues; these views can be mutually exclusive. As if that were not enough:

People as they are cannot avoid experience ... put off their intelligence ... renounce their reasonableness. But they may never have adverted to these concrete and factual inevitabilities. They may be unable to distinguish between them sharply, or discern the immanent order that binds them together, or find in them the dynamic structure that has generated all their scientific knowledge and all their common sense, or acknowledge in that dynamic structure a normative principle that governs the outcome of all inquiry, or discover in themselves other equally dynamic structures that can interfere with the detached and disinterested unfolding of the pure desire to know, or conclude to the polymorphism of their subjectivity and the untoward effects it can have upon their efforts to reach a unified view of the universe of proportionate being. (In 422; emphasis added.)

112 Bias is discussed further in chap. 3 below.
Because of the polymorphous character of consciousness, we are apt to mistake or confuse discrete patterns of experience and the proper modes of expressing them. Those intent to objectify their cognitional operations, even those who have achieved a high degree of self-appropriation, can without awareness of it slip into counterpositions on subjectivity, objectivity, and reality. Thus, because the immanent sources of interpretation are within the interpreter, the tasks of achieving true understanding and giving true second expression to another’s expression of meaning are subject to a host of variables. As we will see in chapter 3 below, the same variables and many others affect the individuals and groups who strive to enrich or diminish culture’s goods and goods of order, who do or do not cooperate with God in the “trinification” of the world.

6.8 Final Remarks on Chapter 1

I wrote above an incomplete account of the hypercomplex comprising the elements human and divine as well as “the innumerable particulars they comprise,” the data “comprised formally or virtually or potentially by a comprehensive systematic theology of God,” S being the case in point. Section 4 summarized Lonergan’s various heuristic structures, and specific contents of them that pertain to concrete orders that, for reasons explained, necessarily concretize the heuristic structures that anticipate them. Chief among the heuristic structures: the mind that anticipates the totality of created and uncreated being; that supplies theology’s method; that supplies the best analogy we know of to attain analogical knowledge, systematic theological understanding, of the mystery of uncreated Being. Again, the case in point is S. I mentioned various human creations that can issue from free and responsible subjects who undertake to become empirically, intelligently, reasonably, and existentially (morally and religiously) conscious; who engage the process of becoming fully self-conscious Christians contributing goods to goods of order in a culture such as Canada’s. Again, Lonergan and S.

We now advance to the ground of Lonergan’s reasonable affirmation that “the other goods of order externally imitate that supreme good of order perceived in the Holy Trinity” quoad se.

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113 “The ‘Trinification’ of the Human World” is the title of the last chapter of Crowe’s The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity. He explains his neologism: “The point here is that we are accustomed to speak of the deification of man and his world, and I wish to stress the fact that the only God there is is a triune God, he communicates himself to us as triune, and therefore the deification of the human world is really its ‘trinification’.” Ibid., 178.
THE LIFE OF GOD QUOAD SE\textsuperscript{114}

1. Introduction

First I will introduce this chapter as such and then its topic, Lonergan’s theology of God quoad se as presented in chapters two through five of \textit{S}.

1.1 Introduction to This Chapter

To put this chapter in perspective, I’ll recall our discussion of the primary questions for understanding and judgment, their reverse order in matters of faith, and place new emphasis on the familiar \textit{verbum}:

For, just as there are two operations of intellect, two kinds of questions, and two acts of understanding, so there are two inner words, two terms immanently produced by an act of understanding.\textsuperscript{60} Now all properly human knowledge is knowledge to the extent that it is formally true; and so the second operation of intellect, in which the true is uttered, belongs to the very constitution of properly human knowledge. But as regards this operation we have to distinguish between faith and other kinds of certain knowledge. The other kinds of knowledge proceed from evidence of an object grasped by the subject, while faith proceeds from evidence of an object grasped not by the subject but by someone else whom the subject believes. And so, since theology rests on faith, it is distinct from other certain knowledge, whether prescientific or scientific.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} “In [making statements about God] the \textit{priora quoad se} [what is first in itself] and the \textit{priora quoad nos} [what is first for us] both have to do with the causes of our knowing. The \textit{priora quoad se} are true statements about God that are causes of our knowing other truths about God, or that articulate the ground of the truth of other true statements.” Doran, “Reflections on Method in Systematic Theology,” Lonergan Workshop 17 (2002): 27 n. 12.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{S}, 105-07. Editorial note 60 reads: “Lonergan’s meaning is that the two kinds of inner words and terms that are immanently produced by the two kinds of understanding are in a relationship with the two kinds of understanding such that one kind of understanding imman-
To put in perspective the expectations this chapter seeks to fulfill, I quote Loner-gan’s expression of ideas now become almost homely:

Theology differs from the natural sciences, which begin from sensible data and proceed through understanding to the discovery of what is true. Theology does not begin from sensible data but from truths revealed by God and believed by us; and theology attains, not the kind of understanding that would suffice for discovering with certitude what is true, but that obscure, analogical, and imperfect understanding that throws some light on the truth already known from elsewhere, and enables us to possess it more fully.

Recall that systematic theology does not draw conclusions from certainties; it draws certain conclusions from an hypothesis assumed to be true. The degree of probability achieved depends on how theological understanding based on the psychological analogy squares with the truths of faith. The analogy’s fruitfulness in the hands of Thomas becomes in Lonergan’s interpretation of Thomas more fruitful still because, with Lonergan, the terms and relations of the analogy in its full amplitude are those of his method.

1.1.1 On a Current Counterposition

Quid sit Deus? Efforts to understand God apart from Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption can seem no more than academic. Some Catholic theologians claim such efforts are purely speculative, even misguided; they say interpersonal relationships in

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116 S, 107. Note 61 reads: “See above, pp. 33, note 18.” That note reads: “In the light of Method in Theology it is clear that Lonergan would later have qualified this statement. Systematics begins not from data but from truths, but systematics is but one of eight functional special-ties in theology.”

history, ours and God’s together, are all that really matter. Such emphasis on a primary theological category too often neglected contributes valuable insights to theology of God quoad nos. Yet, in my view, without grounding the interpersonal in God quoad se, such theologies tend to “puff up to the dimension of the whole a part or aspect of Catholic tradition.”

One integral part of the solution to the disagreement between some new theologies of God and the tradition that Lonergan upholds, as the reader no doubt has discerned, lies in distinguishing dogmatics from systematics. The natural sciences, as we know, seek to understand not the thing in relation to us but the thing as it is. As science, therefore, systematic theology also aims to understand analogically the intelligible object quoad se. When the goal of speculative theology is clearly distinguished as systematic search for theological understanding of concrete data, the revealed truths of faith expressed in the various sources, theologians necessarily seek reasonable grounds, a ratio, for their conclusions about God quoad nos. The Church, especially through the councils, has taught a great deal on the subject; so theological reflection on truths about the Trinity quoad se cannot justly be called “purely speculative.”

1.1.2 Lonergan’s Position

Their order in the systematic treatise—God quoad se before God quoad nos—reverses their order of emergence in trinitarian speculation. Theology of God as God seeks to establish the reasonableness of our prior belief that God is one and three, and to ground in dogma answers to our questions about the roles in our redemption—common, proper, and appropriated—of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Fides quaerens intellectum needs

Crowe observes: “We can call the two viewpoints 1) that of the functional, or economic Trinity, the Trinity of experience, or manifestation, the Trinity for us, and 2) that of the ontological, or essential, or immanent, or theological Trinity, the Trinity in itself. But it is important not to attribute a functional Trinity to the NT in the exclusive present-day sense; that sense of functional Trinity means that we can know only a Trinity of manifestation, and must resolutely turn our minds from unfruitful speculation on the eternal being of the Three. This is not the NT attitude; they were indeed concerned mainly with the Trinity for us, they did indeed show little interest in the Trinity in itself, but it was not a principle with them; they did not deliberately reject consideration of the ontological Trinity, and deliberately restrict their vision to the earthly functions of the Three.” Crowe, The Doctrine, 53; Crowe’s emphases.

118 “Theology and Understanding,” 128. In context, Lonergan refers to “theological tendencies that mistakenly reinforce the light of faith and intelligence with the warmth of less austere modes of thought.” See the second indented quote p. 68 above.
reasonable answers to the ancient, recurrent questions that arise about the personalities
of the Three, and their relations to one another. Moreover, the systematic theologian
seeks to explain, as Lonergan does in S, the intelligible unity of one and the same who is
Other and Emmanuel.

To explicate God quoad se, a necessary step towards understanding God quoad nos,
the “Western trinitarian theologies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan” (see above n.
66 p. 32) reach back to the beginning of Revelation. They claim that the imago Dei of Ge-
nesis (become imago Trinitatis) is humanity’s intellectual nature, that we are most “in the
image and likeness of God” when engaged in the activities of authentic knowing and
loving. The historical path of the psychological analogy in trinitarian theology, as we
learned in chapter 1 above, traces our still advancing systematic understanding of God,
and the interrelationships among God, ourselves, and everything else; God quoad se,
quoad nos and, if you will, God quoad cetera.

1.1.3 First Foreword to the Psychological Analogy

The first general summary (p. 69 above) concluded that the unity of Creation can be
conceived as a unity of order among the isomorphic structures of being, knowing, and
creating. In this chapter we will learn that order in God conceived according to the psy-
chological analogy is like Creation’s unity of order. Chapter 3 below will complete the
picture with an account of our fully human way of imitating the present topic, “that su-
preme good of order to be perceived in the Holy Trinity itself.”

That the order of origin is best understood on the analogy of imago Trinitatis follows
from the assumption that humanity’s intellectuality provides the best known example
of Vatican I’s analogia entis. Lonergan’s analogy of the mind at work allows us to con-
ceive God as one absolute divinity (conceived as dynamic INTELLECTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS), eter-
nally and wholly possessed in an ordered way by each of three equal divine persons.
(There is no divine fourth. There is no hierarchy. Each person singly and the persons to-
gether we call, “Most High.”)

After taking “the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look”—
peeking via the psychological analogy at the Holy Trinity’s, as it were, private life—we
will be ready to engage, as I see it, the most stimulating part of Lonergan’s treatise, the
hypercomplex of relationships and interrelationships comprised by the categories God
and Creation. There, in chapter 3 below, we will be most concerned to understand how
Christian being, knowing, and creating imitate the immanent order of trinitarian pe-
richôrêsis (recall from the beginning of chapter 1 above that the soteriological order is
Holy Spirit–Son–Father), and how they imitate the order of origin (Father-Son-Holy
Spirit) that Lonergan explains in S’s chapters 2-5, the present topic. Knowing and loving,
it seems, is a two-way street. By applying the psychological analogy to the mystery, Lo-
nergan finds a reasonable solution to virtually every apparent contradiction, conun-
drum, paradox, and puzzle that arises from comparing the eternal subject and the temporal subject.

1.1.4 **Order and Some Certainties of Faith**

Our principal focus is order in God. That God's plurality is ordered we know for certain. Order is a divine attribute. (Like the attribute of goodness, order is not appropriated. For example, each of the three is all-wise but we call Jesus “Wisdom of God.” We would not call any divine person “Order of God.”) We are certain that there are processions in God. A procession is simply the origin of one from another (we’re just not certain what processions of origin are; but some would claim to know scientifically what they’re like).

Understanding order in God requires pruning our imagery of notions that apply only to us. For instance, the sequence Father-Son-Spirit is not temporal or causal, as if first one person exists, then a second is produced, and from them a third comes into being. When we say, for example, that the Father communicates divinity to the Son there is no Son without divinity who then receives .... Thus we should exclude as best we can images of before and after, space, time, shape, form, movement, polarity, dimension, cause, effect, production, potential, becoming, change, hierarchy .... What, you ask, is left to the educated imagination to create a **phantasm** out of? To be frank, Lonergan, as I see it, takes us to the known limit of the mind’s power to abstract. Yet, he provides the educated imagination with material to form phantasms sufficient to enable our understanding the **single** absolute act of ordered Being that is God the Holy Trinity.

1.2 **Introduction to Chapters 2-5 of S**

Sections 2-5 below bear the numbers and titles of S’s chapters on God as God. The first three of the four resolve the fundamental trinitarian problem briefly discussed above (p. 21). Section 2 on the divine processions explicates the crucial first step in Lonergan’s solution to the fundamental trinitarian problem. The processions distinguished as required, we advance in section 3 to the relations they ground. Section 4 asks and answers the question of the relations as persons. Having established that divine relations are divine persons, section 5 compares the persons to one another, treats of the mutual indwelling among them, and ends with Lonergan’s “perfection of order” in God. There follows the particular summary.

This chapter ends with a general summary. The second general summary aims to bring Lonergan’s theology of God *quoad se*, and his unified view of Creation summarized at the end of chapter 1 above, within the single viewpoint of a perfection “so great
that no greater perfection can be thought of,” the order perceived to be in the Holy Trinity in se. The concluding remarks anticipate the topic of chapter 3, S’s sixth and final chapter—the divine missions, our response, and the last things.

My interpretation cannot substitute for direct study of S. It is not possible here to examine adequately all aspects of Lonergan’s four dense chapters. His arguments against objections, for example, a succession of intellectual tours de force, would, like too much metaphysics, needlessly complexify and don’t, in any case, fit within my terms of reference. We need not attend to all the assertions Lonergan makes, nor to all questions any of them inspire. In a few matters not directly relevant to my topic but important, I will simply report Lonergan’s questions and answers.

An adequate concept of divine order can be had through explaining fewer aspects of divine order in modes less austere than Lonergan’s; but that would mean settling for a concept closer to Patrick’s static shamrock than the dynamic concept Lonergan would have flow from our understanding his argument. Explaining several sets of trinitarian terms and relations (albeit some more than others) is meant to expose the order’s solid ratio, and to enable our understanding his final three assertions. Following the selected elements should help us attain the goal Lonergan created for us: to understand the divine perfection of order.

One could not, for example, understand divine order adequately and form an adequate concept of it without understanding trinitarian indwelling; but I believe one can achieve the desired end without detailed understanding of the causes, the wherefore and the why, of all of S’s scientific definitions. Understanding and explaining matters theological according to their causes makes systematics scientific; but to achieve our specific goal, in my judgment, we can limit explanation of the object to the central concern—the systematic analogy—and explanation of selected matters directly concerned with order.

Explanation herein regards two concrete instances of order, one possibly in God, one certainly in us. In a form more concentrated than called for elsewhere, I will explain the categories the orders comprise; yet, there is space to explain in some detail none but those most important to achieving our purpose. For example, grasping the difference between processions per modum operationis and per modum operati need not entail tackling what Thomas made of Aristotle’s theory of motion. Nonetheless, I believe Lonergan’s notion of divine order will be explained well enough to support and illuminate my thesis. The communal enterprise of adequately explicating S, in my view, will remain incomplete for a long time to come.

The persons are relations. Absolute and relative are antonyms. Each person is the one God. There is one God. Accordingly, trinitarian speculation stretches the mind’s power to abstract well beyond the merely mathematical and conceptual relations and

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119 From “Assertion 14”; see below p. 178.
correlations the natural scientist is required to establish. How prescient, then, of scient-
ic theology to take as its method the very thing which makes every science possible: the
mind. The method of theology and the psychological analogy together enable a scientif-
ically precise linguistic expression of current understanding (always probable) of al-
ready known supernatural data, God’s revealed truths about God. Given the centrality
of self-knowledge, and lack of space to recap what has already been explained here and
there, it is fortuitous that Lonergan has provided a précis of what we need to under-
stand not about our whole selves but about our minds.

1.2.1 A Superb Précis of Knowing

As a kind of second foreword to the psychological analogy, I present Lonergan’s su-
perb précis of the interrelationships woven into knowing:

These relations are not really distinct: the more perfect each one is, the greater is
its power; and the greater its power is, the more things there are to which its power
extends. Thus, one and the same act of understanding relates simultaneously (1) to
the agent intellect from which it exists as from its principal cause, (2) to the phan-
tasm from which it exists as from its instrumental cause, (3) to the phantasm in
which it beholds its species illumined, (4) to the acts of sensing from which the
phantasms were derived, (5) to the objects of sensation which were known through
the acts of sensing, (6) to the simple inner word which proceeds from the act of un-
derstanding, (7) to the compound inner word by which the objectivity of the simple
word is judged, (8) to the real beings that are known in the word, (9) to the goods
that are known through judgments of value, (10) to the acts of the will that are con-
sequent upon the intellect, (11) to the operations that are directed and carried out by
the intellect and will; finally (12), the more perfect the act of understanding, the
more it comprehends as a unified whole, and thereby extends to more sensible ob-
jects, more acts of sensing, more phantasms, more simple and compound words,
more goods, more acts of the will, and more operations. These relations are internal,
since they belong to the very formality of an understanding that is joined to the
body and directs the will and operations. These relations are also real, since the act
of understanding itself is real, and there can be no real thing which does not really
include whatever belong to its essence. Hence also St Thomas: ‘... it is not contrary
to the simplicity of anything for it to have a multitude of relations between other
things and itself; indeed, the more simple a reality is, the more relations accompany
it’ (De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.). (S 735-37.)

1.2.2 The Realism of the Analogy

I know for certain that one can harbor doubt that a perfectly functioning human
mind can be more than a memory of something irretrievably lost in Eden or, if ever had since, then only by Jesus. (Not a human person but a divine person with a human nature as personal property; one subject with divine and human intellects, thus too complicated to serve as systematic paradigm). Perhaps the reader holds similar reservations about the realism of the psychological analogy. For that reason, I will digress briefly from S and ask the question, Can the notion of a perfectly functioning human intellect be grounded in a historical, human person? Is the psychological analogy no more real than a being of reason with a foundation in reality?

I have found it helpful to recall that Mary had on earth the sine qua non for exemplifying the psychological analogy. (I am not suggesting this would have been the entry-point of Mary quoad se had Lonergan written a Mariology integral to S.) She was free of sin, thus no trace in her of alienation from God, herself, or from the authentic universe of proportionate being (conditions of time, culture, personality, and education do not bear on this point). In Mary alone, the Trinity indwelling sinful Christians met no resistance to their developing and perfecting what nature provides. And so on. A hidden presence in S, Mary handily disabuses us of uncertainty whether the analogy is empirically grounded. The theological anthropology of S is empirical, incarnate in a morally intact historical person, and eschatological.\[121\]

Mary’s nature and ours is the same, yet we are not morally intact. We did not begin as, nor is it natural that we be, sinners; but we are sinners even between repentance and our next need of it. But human diminishment is not a present concern. For that, we summon forth Lonergan’s explanatory account of the human mind being true to its own nature.

1.2.3 A Twofold Approach

I thought it better to integrate more detailed systematic explanation of elements of the analogy into my account in sections 2-5 of Lonergan’s use of them. To ease passage to those exigent texts, I will first discuss the psychological analogy in general terms. Bringing together two modes of expressing the same data is intended to assist the reader with elements of the analogy that, if my experience is typical, can be somewhat diffi-

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\[120\] “The reason for our inquiry into the constitution of a finite person is to enable us to determine why the human nature assumed by the divine Word is not a person.” Ontological and Psychological Constitution, 45.

\[121\] Lonergan says that the mind’s rationally conscious order, if abstracted from the imperfections of finite nature, serves to illuminate the mystery of God. The fully functioning human intellect assumed in trinitarian theory denotes our future liberation from every possible diminishment. As eschatological it points to fulfillment beyond mere retrieval of the original integrity that predates our original sin.
cult to understand. (Indeed, now would be a good time to read or reread appendix I, p. 301.) Thus my emphases do not always reflect Lonergan’s.

First, I offer an overview of Lonergan’s use of the psychological analogy in S. As stated above, I will not attend to all assertions and questions; nor will I mention some elements required to understand the whole of Lonergan’s trinitarian theory. Only the strictly spiritual dimension of our humanity applies, for in God *quoad se* nothing corresponds to the material dimension of our personhood (the Incarnation notwithstanding). The divine nature as such has no body:

What we have immediate knowledge of are the natures either of minerals or plants or animals or human beings. Minerals, plants, and animals are entirely material. God, however, is completely immaterial. Therefore, since analogy has its foundation in likeness, and since an analogy of nature has its foundation in a likeness of nature, the trinitarian analogy has to be sought not from minerals or plants or other animals, but from human beings, and specifically from the characteristics that are proper to human beings. (*S* 173; cf., appendix I, p. 301, cells 1, 8.)

The goal is to explain not the entire treatise but the viewpoint of order in Lonergan’s theology of God *quoad se*. We’ll mine the deep lode Lonergan provides to help us understand the mind well enough to affirm: No divine order can be conceived that would supersede the concept of order gained by one who applies Lonergan’s psychological analogy to the mystery of God the Holy Trinity.

To repeat a familiar refrain, Lonergan’s account of the psychological analogy rests on a theory best verified via personal experiment on oneself. Here we submit the theory to a more easily agreed upon test, that of experimental results. Do his conclusions square with church teaching? To reward our efforts, does *S* advance our understanding of the mystery in ways relevant to Christian living? Does he add value to the church’s witness of understanding?

The psychological analogy has implicit data waiting to be mined for yet more understanding of understanding. Lonergan does not claim to have the last word on the matter. Among the cognitive terms and relations explained in Lonergan’s work to 1964, I believe for our purpose we can ignore layers that, without a degree of explanation impossible here, would envelop us in technical fog. I will, of course, direct the interested reader to sources of more comprehensive explanation of certain terms. The glossary (p. 331) contains, inter alia, numerous definitions from *S*.

1.3 The Psychological Analogy

Implicit in the position on the psychological analogy interpreted here: Creation is God’s intentional analogue of God. If that is so, and if the structures of Creation (those of being, knowing, creating) are isomorphic, then it follows that these primary isomorphic orders are analogues of the Holy Trinity. Supreme among these created analogues:
human rational self-consciousness. True self-understanding should therefore enable us to gain true understanding of God.

First, we should put in perspective the much-heralded psychological analogy as it applies to trinitarian theory. Recall that Lonergan is interpreting Thomas’s trinitarian theology and following the *via doctrinae* of the *Summa theologiae*. What Lonergan calls “the Augustinian psychological analogy” is, of course, what first Thomas then he himself develop from Augustine’s original employment of “the psychological *imago Dei* in trinitarian thought.”

The procedure of the *Summa* reveals very clearly the exact point of application and the measure of significance of the psychological *imago Dei* in trinitarian thought. It reveals the exact point of application. We desire to know *quid sit Deus*, but in this life the only understanding we can attain is through analogy. Philosophy proceeds from pure perfections by the ways of affirmation, negation, and eminence. Faith adds further data. Theology employs the Augustinian psychological analogy, just as philosophy employed the naturally known pure perfections. By natural reason we know that God is absolute being, absolute understanding, absolute truth, absolute love. But natural reason cannot establish that there are in God *intelligible processions*, that the divine Word is *because of* divine understanding as uttering, that divine Love as proceeding is *because of* divine goodness and understanding and Word as spirating. Such further analogical knowledge of *quid sit Deus* pertains to the limited but most fruitful understanding that can be attained when reason operates in light of faith. Thus, the Augustinian psychological analogy makes trinitarian theology a prolongation of natural theology, a deeper insight into what God is. (V 214-15; emphases added. “Because of” is discussed in subsection 1.3.5 below.)

This intensely argued critical–realist position on human cognition informs Lonergan’s psychological analogy, one of several philosophical positions that affect today’s theological reflection. Catholic theologians also hold counterpositions on human knowing and loving.

### 1.3.1 Some Common Counterpositions

A doctrine’s meaning cannot be argued systematically without eventually revealing the foundations of the theologian’s method. Counterpositions head naturally towards their own reversal. Among those grounding current theological reflection, a few represent types. Phenomenalism claims that only phenomena are real things; thus matter, cause, form, etc., are non-existent or mere mental constructs. Positivism regards as real only the sensible, the singular, the experienced; it holds that only knowledge of
such facts is certain.\footnote{122

Among counterpositions that seem popular among Catholics, conceptualism and naïve realism stand out. (Perhaps their attraction stems from the realism permeating Catholic observance.) Scholastic conceptualism, put forth as a kind of critical realism, still infects the interpretation of Thomas that Lonergan calls “Thomistic” in contrast to Thomist.\footnote{123

But first a word about naïve realism.}

If you hold that the real world is the given as it is, that knowing something means taking a good look at it—the more you study it the more you know it; that one knows in this way the objective world “‘already out there now real,’”\footnote{124

then you are not distinguishing experiential data from facts. Knowing is answering the question, Is it? That the real is known \textit{only} in true judgment takes a while to sink in. Only after reflective understanding grasps sufficient evidence, the unconditioned, does reason oblige us to judge that the once “already out there now real” of immediate experience is real in fact. One not only understands but knows, bestows self-constituting intentional existence upon, the object; otherwise it’s just a body out there. In judgment, the mind bestows intentional existence (the intelligible in act) on what really exists outside the mind. The two modes differ only in the thing’s potency to be known, and the mind’s potency to know the potential thing.

Affirming the objective “thinghood” of things requires neither special education nor encounter with everything that is. We need only make a habit of awareness that everything that comes our way, every object of knowledge, is known only in judgment. When

\begin{itemize}
\item\footnote{122 For Lonergan’s critique of numerous counterpositional isms, see ibid., 157-60; also see below n. 128 p. 93.}
\item Lonergan writes: “I wish to employ the distinction whereby ‘Thomist’ means ‘of St Thomas’ and ‘Thomistic’ means ‘of his school.’” \textit{Verbum}, 153 n. 5; see also Index of Concepts and Names, s.v. “Thomist vs Thomistic.” To verify that conceptualism infects contemporary scholasticism one need but visit academic web sites dedicated to Thomas that offer interpretation of his work. Among them I have not found one that isn’t Thomistic. See, e.g., http://www.cts.org.au/articles.htm, and links.
\item\footnote{124 \textit{Insight}, 276. “we should not overlook what apparently misleads many in this matter, namely, that as there are two realisms, naive and critical, so also ‘real,’ ‘object,’ ‘evident,’ ‘to know,’ and similar notions have two different meanings. The first is a meaning of reality, objectivity, evidence, and knowledge according to which a kind of animal faith is carried toward a world of objects that are each already, out, there, now, and in this sense, ‘real.’ The other, quite different meaning of these very same notions is that according to which the mind, led by questions, conceives the natures of things from an understanding of what it has experienced, affirms the true from grasping an unconditioned, and apprehends being in the true as in a medium.\footnote{18}” S, 321. Editorial note 18 reads: “[See the discussion of the meaning of object in ‘Natural Knowledge of God,’ in Bernard Lonergan, \textit{A Second Collection}, ed. Bernard J. Tyrrell and William F.J. Ryan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 121–24.]”}
\end{itemize}
we know by our knowing—self-appropriation again—we discover that objectivity is the result of a subject knowing authentically. Lonergan will later say, “Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.” (M 292.)

Conceptualists hold that understanding is had from a prior word. The word of the conceptualist is given in the sense that the powers of mind and body when they encounter extramental reality unite with it to generate concepts spontaneously. To these concepts we apply the powers of the mind to gain insight, the reverse of Lonergan’s order. He contrasts critical realism and conceptualism:

For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots on itself to produce for itself another object which is the inner word as *ratio, intentio, definitio, quod quid est*. And this pivoting and production is no mere matter of some metaphysical sausage machine, at one end slicing species off phantasm, and at the other popping out concepts; it is an operation of rational consciousness. (V 47-48.)

As a result of its conceptualism, the Thomistic tradition dominating the church in the generations leading up to Vatican II taught an inadequate account of the processions, especially the place of the will in the procession of God the Holy Spirit. In the psychology of the conceptualist theologian, the will is not a rational appetite for the intelligible good. Recall that “acts of will ... are consequent upon the intellect” (see the précis of knowing, p. 87 no. 10). The Thomistic theologian makes the will a principle

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125 “Conceptualism consists precisely in the affirmation that concepts proceed not from intellectual knowledge and so intelligibly but, on the contrary, with the same natural spontaneity as images from imagination.” Verbum, 224. There is no spontaneity in God, one perfect act of absolute intellectual consciousness (more on this topic below). In light of that later discussion—“inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality” (see above p. 97)—the reader will understand better why a spontaneously generated concept cannot be analogue of the procession of the Word.

126 Normally something pivots on a pin or shaft, thus the operation has two really distinct elements. Here, the mind is the pivot on which the same mind pivots to advance from unexpressed to expressed understanding, from intelligent grasp of the form to expressing the definition to be judged, from species grasped in phantasm to produced word.

127 “Once one grasps the *processio intelligibilis* of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear, straightforward account Aquinas offered of proceeding love. Difficulty arises in interpreting Aquinas on this issue from purely subjective sources. A conceptualist is not interested enough in human intellect to know what *processio intelligibilis* means; and so he is led to take advantage of the complexity of Thomist thought and terminology to invent pseudo-metaphysical theories about *operatio* and *operatum.* [On the complexity see pages 110-48 above.] After applying these theories to the procession of the inner word, he tries to apply them to the procession of love; ....” Verbum, 212.
of divine production to redress the conceptualist error of holding philosophically that the inner word is prior to understanding, while holding theologically the Thomistic position that the Word emanates from divine intellect. Thus conceptualist method cannot synthesize because it is not isomorphic with the truth it would explain.\textsuperscript{128}

In stark contrast, systematic argument from “an adequate account of truth,” as we will see in sections 2-5 below, reveals its foundations by demonstrating their power to explain and synthesize truth. Lonergan’s foundations are self-authenticating (of theologian, method, and work). When with him we follow intellectual operations in their natural order, we not only understand understanding, thus the procession of the Word, better; we also understand why the will follows intellect (we love what we affirm to be lovable, the intelligible good); why it is not a principle of divine emanation; why the Spirit is not produced by the will but \textit{is} proceeding Love, Love proceeding intellectually by way of a spirated\textsuperscript{129} act of will; constituted, not produced, by the will. One need not read far in the literature of Thomistic trinitarian theology to find it argued that the divine intellect is principle of the Word, and the divine will principle of the Spirit. After we have grasped his development of Thomist theology of God \textit{quoad se}, I believe we will have reason to repeat Lonergan’s verdict on the \textit{Summa} to say of S: “This is all very far from the type of trinitarian theory in which the Word is generated by the divine intellect and proceeding Love is spirated by the divine will.” (V 217.)

\textbf{1.3.2 The Psychological Analogy and Interiority}

As he leads the student towards his first assertion, Lonergan offers a preliminary

\begin{quote}
“Lonergan’s solution to this confusion is extraordinarily clear and simple: St. Thomas does indeed teach that a term is produced in the will, but it is not an act in the will \textit{from the will}, or \textit{from another act in the will}; it is quite simply an act \textit{in the will from the intellect}…. The cause of the fuss was the quite un-Thomist premise that a faculty must produce its own acts; in fact, the will is passive while intellect produces the basic \textit{amor}.” Crowe, The Doctrine, 147; Crowe’s emphases.

\textsuperscript{128} Lonergan discusses conceptualism in, inter alia, “Theology and Understanding,” pp. 131-32; Verbum, index, s.v. “conceptualism”; 
\textit{Insight}, index, s.v. “intellectualist vs. conceptualist”; Understanding and Being, p. 238: “If you are a conceptualist, you hold that we can think only about concepts, thought, and you do not attend to the prior act of understanding.”

\textsuperscript{129} ‘Spirate’ is not found in the most common manual dictionaries of English, nor is ‘spirare’ found in C.T. Lewis, \textit{A Latin Dictionary for Schools}. The words had to be created for purposes of trinitarian theology. The fundamental difficulty, however, is not linguistic, nor is it theological; it is philosophical. One has only to read the article by [Maurilio T.-L. Penido, ‘Gloses sur la procession d’amour dans la Trinité,’ Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 14 (1937): 33-68] which Lonergan makes his point of departure for this study to discover the poverty of philosophical thought on what we have to call ‘spirare’; it is that poverty that Lonergan set about to remedy in this study.” Verbum, editorial note f, p. 262.
\end{quote}
explanation of the analogy and immediately links it to interiority: “If we attend even for a few moments to our own internal and properly intellectual experiences, we make three discoveries.” (S 133.) The three discoveries pertain to critical elements of trinitarian theory. He says of them: “Once we understand these three statements, the entire fundamental trinitarian problem is solved, at least virtually.” (S 135.) He explains:

First, ‘whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge. Lonergan means the twofold verbum we spontaneously utter when we understand, the word of understanding headed for judgments of truth and value (and expression ad extra). This is the noncomplex then complex inner word mentioned in the précis of knowing (p. 87, nos. 6, 7). Theology of the Trinity quoad se considers the ground of all things divine, possible, and real expressed in God’s Words of Knowledge and Love.

Second, ‘it is of the nature of love not to proceed except from a conception of the intellect.’

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130 Lonergan is not putting knowledge before understanding. When we judge our understanding to be true, it is the same understanding “known” before judgment that we judge and now know. We judge in light of having grasped sufficient evidence. Sufficient evidence is drawn from prior insight(s) to inform the reflective insight, our grasp that the object we understand is a real thing. One is not certain the prior understanding is true (thus real knowledge) until one has a reflective insight into the data that grasps evidence sufficient to judge that one’s prior understanding is true. Then knowing the truth of things becomes self-constituting not only in the realm of intelligibility understood (not, strictly speaking, knowing) but in the realms of reality affirmed, valued, and loved (the thing known and loved now existing in us intentionally; thus knowledge of self and other is permanently self-constituting).

131 ST, I, q. 27, a. 1 c.; as quoted in S 133. In a footnote Lonergan adds that the words “‘ex vi intellectiva proveniens’ ['from our intellective power’] are omitted in the edition of these questions (qq. 27-32) which B. Geyer has prepared: Florilegium Patristicum, XXXVII (Bonn, 1934) p. 6.” In his magisterial study of the verbum, Lonergan writes: “Once one understands, the proportionate cause for the inner word exists; once the proportionate cause exists, the effect follows, unless some impediment intervenes; but no impediment can intervene between understanding and its inner word. Hence, granted we understand, it necessarily follows that we utter an inner word.” Verbum, 198-99; emphasis added. Note 33 reads: “The will can prevent the occurrence of intelligere by preventing the occurrence of a corresponding phantasm. Again, the will is the cause of an act of belief, but though the latter is a verbum, it is not a verbum proceeding directly from an intelligere. But we cannot permit the occurrence of intelligere and yet prevent the procession of its immediate verbum.”

132 Ibid., a. 3 ad 3m; as quoted in S 135.
By nature love is rational, i.e., we love what we first know to be real, true, good, and therefore lovable. The order of knowing and loving that we verify in ourselves we apply analogously to God.

Third, ‘what proceeds internally by an intellectual process does not have to be different. Indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds.’

In us, the approach to unity between the source (understanding) and the intelligible procession (word) is an analogue of the perfect unity of Speaker and Word, and Spirator and Spirit, in God (see quote from Thomas, n. 133 below).

These elements of the psychological analogy enable our understanding why only two proceed, their distinctiveness, and the reasonableness of believing that Son and Spirit are both from and not from themselves, each “God from God ... true God from true God ... one in being with the Father ...”

1.3.3 **Reflective Understanding and the Psychological Analogy**

When the term reflective understanding was mentioned in chapter 1 above, I wrote that I would delay explanation. Now is the better time, for understanding reflective understanding should complete what is required to understand this critical text: “That process ... from reflective understanding to the act of judgment, is the psychological analogy.” (UB 112; emphasis added.)

We know that the question for intelligence—What is it?—is followed by the question, Is it so? The latter is answered by the judgment which alone yields knowledge. Here, we are interested in the act intervening between understanding and judging. Lonergran writes:

There is presupposed a question for reflection, Is it so? There follows a judgment, It is so. Between the two there is a marshaling and weighing of evidence. But what are the scales on which evidence is weighed? What weight must evidence have if one is to pronounce a yes or a no?

Reflective understanding is a type of insight: “As [direct and introspective insights] meet questions for intelligence, it meets questions for reflection. As they lead to definitions and formulations, it leads to judgments. As they grasp unity, or system, or ideal

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133 Ibid., a. 1 ad 2m; as quoted in S, 135. Thomas continues: “It is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely the intellectual conception is joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as divine intelligence is the supreme perfection of God, the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source He proceeds from without any kind of diversity.”

134 Insight, 304. See also, “Reflective Understanding,” in ibid., 304-40.
frequency, it grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment.”

All proper objects of knowing are conditioned. In the process of knowing a finite object, we must fulfill certain conditions. When no conditions remain to be fulfilled, reason obliges us to judge yes or no. We conclude from insight into the evidence—the intelligible data understood—that evidence is sufficient to pass judgment. “Sufficient evidence involves (1) a link of the conditioned to its conditions, and (2) the fulfilment of the conditions.” Thus in the act of reflective understanding we grasp what Lonergan’s cognitional theory calls “a virtually unconditioned.” So an unconditioned natural to us, virtual but real, provides trinitarian systematics with a true analogia entis, for God is known to be formally unconditioned. As we will see below, grasping sufficient evidence, judging, and thereby knowing and loving the real are the acts in us that we apply by analogy to gain some understanding of God quoad se.

1.3.4 Movement, Operation, and Procession per Modum Operati

The difference between movement and operation is familiar to everyone although normally we do not advert to that difference. Whether moving oneself or being moved from here to there, moving is incomplete until A, the one moving, reaches the term, B. Movement becomes over time. It is an imperfect act. An operation does not become but is always from beginning to end the same. Like the operation of experiencing, for example, operation is always what it is. Operations such as sensing, understanding, willing are perfect acts. Rational consciousness moves dynamically; but there is no movement in God. God has no “there” to make locomotion possible. Again, kinesthetic movement is an imperfect act. That aspect of being human, movement, does not figure in the analogy. There is operation of a sort in God; thus operation is applied by analogy to God. Lonergan calls it procession per modum operati.

Therefore, the analogy must be selected from a created procession in which there comes forth (1) a strictly spiritual act (2) from a strictly spiritual act (3) according to a mode of proceeding that is strictly spiritual. (§ 175.)

And:

In contrast, a theologian ought to proceed systematically, and this is especially the case if one is investigating the mode of divine procession. Therefore, one does

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135 “While the direct act of understanding generates in definition the expression of the intelligibility of a phantasm, the reflective act generates in judgment the expression of consciously possessed truth through which reality is both known and known to be known.” Verbum, 60-61.

136 For a fuller treatment of these terms, see Verbum, index, s.v. “operation.”
not begin asking about the characteristics of the divine persons but about the pro-
cessions, since it is well established that the key to the entire trinitarian question lies in
the meaning of procession and its mode.

Since this is the case, we must seek a systematic analogy whose conception of
the mode of divine procession is such that every other theoretical question concern-
ing the triune God is already virtually solved. (§ 171; emphasis added.)

Yet, in us the operation or perfect act that concerns us most, understanding, is a cause;
and there is no causality in God. If causality is as abstract as we can get when explain-
ing the dynamic INTELLECTUAL EMANATION\textsuperscript{137} of a \textit{verbum}, we would seem to be at an impasse. Happily, our understanding understanding saves the day.

1.3.5 \textbf{Cause and Because}

By revealing another aspect of our production of concepts—inner words, simple
and complex—self-appropriation of understanding teaches us that the intellectual ema-
nation of the word is not only caused, it is also “becaused.” The word that expresses
understood experience is not only caused but also proceeds because of the intrinsic rational-
ity of the consciousness that understands. Rational consciousness expresses causal
and “becausal” reality in the twofold word.

That process ... from reflective understanding to the act of judgment is the psy-
chological analogy. In other words, you can say that the act of judgment is caused
by the act that grasps sufficiency of evidence; there is an aspect of causality there.
But there is also a purely rational process, the rational dependence of judgment on
sufficiency of evidence. You have ‘cause’ there, but you also have ‘because,’ and not
‘because’ just as a word, but ‘because’ as rational consciousness, a consciousness
whose own rationality obliges it to judge. That is the rational necessity of judging.
Judging ... is the fruit of the actual rationality of consciousness, and that aspect of
judgment provides Augustinian and Thomist Trinitarian theory with its psychologi-
aply analogy: the procession of the Son from the Father is not a matter of causing; it is
a matter of the ‘because’ that occurs within a spiritual being.\textsuperscript{a} (\textit{UB} 112-13.)

Editorial note “a” reads:

The point made so briefly here is amplified in the Trinitarian theology of the
\textit{Verbum} articles. ‘There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us.
There is the productive aspect .... There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words
do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause;

\textsuperscript{137} Lonergan speaks of “emanatio intellectualis seu intelligibilis [intellectual or intelligible
emanation]” S, 136. Editorial n. 8 p. 136 reads: “[On ‘intellectual’ as ‘intelligible,’ see above, p. 67,
note 35, and below, pp. 143, 145, note 11.]”
they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient ….. The inner word of defining not only is caused by but also is because of the act of understanding’ (1967a [Verbum]: 199). And Lonergan goes on to explain that only the second aspect, because of, is applicable to the procession of the Word in God. (LIB 409-10; my brackets.)

Here, from Thomas, Lonergan brings forward, emphasizes, and develops what Crowe, interpreting Lonergan, calls “a new attribute of the divine essence: ipsum Quia,” a “new human perfection.”

We have in this perfection of rational consciousness the most enlightening aspect of the analogy. Crowe calls (tentatively) the new human perfection “because-of-ness.” By transposing “because-of-ness” from Thomas’s metaphysical into his critical-realist context, Lonergan advances the scientific expression that faith seeking understanding needs to become fides inveniens intellectum. In S, the seeker finding understanding expresses it systematically on the analogy of the human mind’s “because-of-ness” in the procession of the word that proceeds spontaneously when we understand something; then on the basis of sufficient evidence affirm its truth; then, affirming its goodness, spontaneously spirate love for it. Our intellectual acts are not only caused but also made possible because of the intrinsic rationality of the mind promoting us from experience, to understanding ….. The psychological analogy posits precisely the mind’s “because-of-ness” as the least “unlike” commonality, after the general notion of dynamic intellectual consciousness itself, that exists between God and us. There is no causality in the particular notion of “because-of-ness”; it is simply the prior condition of possibility for the mind to cause something of its own.

Now it is only to restate the basic contention of this and subsequent articles to observe that the human mind is an image, and not a mere vestige, of the Blessed Trinity. That is because its processions are intelligible in a manner essentially different from, that transcends, the passive, specific, imposed intelligibility of other natural process. Any effect has a sufficient ground in its cause; but an inner word not merely has a sufficient ground in the act of understanding it expresses; it also has knowing as sufficient ground, and that ground is operative precisely as knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient. To introduce a term that will summarize this, we may say that the inner word is rational, not indeed with the derived rationality of

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139 “[Interiority] has a ‘because of’ character; it is intrinsically in itself, and not just as seen in an object, a ‘because of’; we would call it a ‘because-of-ness,’ were not that phrase such a mouthful in English.” Ibid., 572.
discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but with the basic and essential rationality\textsuperscript{140} of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned in any judgment, with the rationality that now we have to observe in all concepts. (V 47; emphasis added.)

We now proceed to a close reading of S’s four chapters on God \textit{quoad se}.


Lonergan, following the \textit{Pars prima}, outlines in seven steps his four chapters on God \textit{quoad se}.

In the systematic way (which we have said is a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching, of learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity [see below appendix II, p. 315]), the first consideration is of the one God.\textsuperscript{34} Second, in the one God, who understands, knows, and loves, there are posited intellectual emanations.\textsuperscript{35} Third, on the emanations are based the relations.\textsuperscript{36} Fourth, supposing the emanations and the relations,\textsuperscript{37} the persons are considered all together.\textsuperscript{38} Fifth, the persons are considered individually.\textsuperscript{39} Sixth, the persons are related to each of the items considered before the persons were discussed: namely, to the divine essence,\textsuperscript{40} to the relations or properties,\textsuperscript{41} and to the notional acts or emanations.\textsuperscript{42} Seventh, the persons are related to one another\textsuperscript{43} and to us.[\textsuperscript{44}]\textsuperscript{141}

Unlike dogmatics, systematics begins with the obscure and proceeds towards clarity of understanding and expression; dogmatics ends with the psychological analogy, systematics begins with it. At the end of S’s chapter one, Lonergan reiterates the distinct goal and movement of systematics and, as a kind of foreword to his next chapter (the present topic), he explains his starting point:

Anyone seeking understanding in an orderly way begins from what can be understood without presupposing the understanding of anything else. This is why we do not begin with the divine persons, for understanding the divine persons presupposes understanding the relations. We do not begin with the relations, for understanding the relations presupposes understanding the processions. And we do not begin with the generation of the Son and the breathing forth of the Holy Spirit, for these processions, which are specifically distinct from each other, presuppose something prior, something generic in respect to both of them. Our starting point, then, is intellectual emanation, as that which is absolutely basic in the systematic ap-

\textsuperscript{140} Crowe states that “because-of-ness” means what rationality means in this context. Ibid., 569-70.

\textsuperscript{141} S, 67-69. Notes 34 to 44 read: \textsuperscript{34}ST, I, qq. 2-26; \textsuperscript{35}Q. 27; \textsuperscript{36}Q. 28; \textsuperscript{37}Q. 29, intro; \textsuperscript{38}Q. 29-32; \textsuperscript{39}Qq. 33-38; \textsuperscript{40}Q. 39; \textsuperscript{41}Q. 40; \textsuperscript{42}Q. 41; cf. q. 7; \textsuperscript{43}Q. 42; \textsuperscript{44}Q. 43.
Chapter 1 above briefly discussed the fundamental trinitarian problem and compared divine and human subjects; and we have discussed in some detail the psychological analogy. Intellectual emanation, the “principle and foundation” of Lonergan’s trinitarian theory, will be discussed throughout this chapter. The present section will gather, focus, expand, and apply these and other data to Lonergan’s answer to the first in the systematic order of the questions: Are there processions in God?

On the assumption that “some likeness exists between the divine processions and the finite emanations that occur in human intelligence” (S 131), we begin with intellectual emanation, for “it is well established that the key to the entire trinitarian question lies in the meaning of procession and its mode.” By the end of this chapter 2, we will have gathered evidence sufficient to affirm that the solution to the first problem solves formally or virtually or potentially every problem pertaining to trinitarian systematics.

2.1 The Fundamental Problem and the Solution

“The fundamental trinitarian problem lies in the following facts: (1) the Son is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself; (2) the Holy Spirit is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself; (3) the way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, is different from the way in which the Holy Spirit is not a se, not from himself.” (S 127.) The Son is not from himself because begotten of the Father. The Holy Spirit is not from himself because he “proceeds from the Father and the Son.” The Son is begotten and the Spirit is spirated. Yet, each distinct person is from himself, “not one God from another God, but the same God from the same God.” (S 129.) How can this truth be given systematic explanation worthy of one’s reasonable affirmation?

First, then, we must discuss the divine processions in order to state (1) how in general the emanation of God from God is to be conceived, (2) how two such emanations and only two are to be conceived, and (3) why the first emanation is generation properly so called, while the other is not. (S 131.)

We have already taken two steps towards Lonergan’s technical vocabulary. Beginning with chapter 1’s more general treatment, then in the introduction to this chapter, we have been homing in on the systematic analogy and its centerpiece, intellectual

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142 S, 119. Lonergan says, “My purpose has been to understand what Aquinas meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word.” Verbum, 222.

143 S, 171. Lonergan writes: “Some opinions about the ways in which the divine processions may be understood are erroneous, others are insufficient, still others are poorly propounded; then there is the opinion of St Thomas.” S, 131. He engages a number of these critically until only Thomas is left standing. See ibid., 131-33.
emanation. These prior steps should enable us to take with some ease the necessary third into Lonergan’s precisely defined technical words and phrases.

The discussion will be structured around an account of three assertions and some questions they inspire. Understanding Lonergan’s explanatory defense of the assertions will provide the ratio for the divine relations, the topic of section 3 below; but first, some preliminary explanation of intellectual emanation.

2.2 Intellectual Emanation

Our task is to understand the element central to Lonergan’s trinitarian theory and thus his theory of order in God. Lonergan’s approach is not philosophical as such nor historical but “theological and speculative; we seek to acquire such knowledge of our mind as will enable us to have some understanding of the divine processions.” (S 135.) The reader will be pleased that a number of its major points have already been discussed. Lonergan too offers consoling words:

We are therefore attempting something very easy. For we are attempting neither to grasp some philosophical synthesis nor to review and pass judgment on a whole series of opinions, but to go through a simple, brief process of reflection. Everyone who has truly reached the age of reason can go through this process. (S 135.)

Lonergan’s first point regards the origin of intellectual emanation:

Thus, we all know from experience the difference between a rash judgment and a true judgment. A rash judgment is produced without sufficient evidence. A true judgment, on the other hand, is a judgment so based on the evidence one has grasped that a certain intellectual necessity makes that judgment inescapable. Now, what is lacking in a rash judgment and found in a true judgment is said to be an intellectual or intellectual emanation.\footnote{\textsuperscript{8}} Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we grasp sufficient evidence, from that very grasp of sufficient evidence, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth a true judgment.\textsuperscript{144}

He next contrasts our memorizing and repeating someone else’s definition and one we produce “because we have grasped an idea through the act of understanding.” In the latter case, “not only can one say in differing words what one wants to express but also illustrate it with many examples. In defining as in giving examples, all that is said is directed by an act of understanding and is in some way necessitated.” Thus:

What is lacking in someone repeating things by memory but present in some-

\footnote{\textsuperscript{144} S, 135-37. Note 8 reads: “[On ‘intellectual’ as ‘intelligible,’ see above, p. 67, note 35, and below, pp. 143, 145, note 11.]”}
one who understands and displays that understanding in a variety of ways is again what we are calling an intellectual or intellectual emanation. Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we understand, from the very fact that we understand, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth definitions as well as explications and illustrations [each a *verbum*]. (§ 137.)

Lonergan now turns to intellectual emanation in the act of spiration:

“We all know from experience the difference between an act of will that is disordered and contrary to reason and one that is well ordered, right, obligatory, holy. For a good that is grasped by the intellect, approved by reason, and imposed upon the will obligates us in such a way that either we choose what is against the dictates of right reason and so are irrational, or we yield to the dictates of intellect and so are rational. Thus, what is lacking in a morally evil act but present in a morally good act is that spiritual and moral procession that effectively obligates the will in such a way that we not only ought to love the good, but actually do love it. This procession too *is an intellectual or intelliible emanation*, for it consists in the fact that a potentially rational appetite becomes actually rational because of a good grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since by its very nature the will is a rational appetite, and since this appetite cannot be actually rational unless it actually follows upon reason [recall that the intellect in act is the intelligible in act], we must say that ‘it is of the nature of love to proceed only from a conception of the intellect.’ (§ 137; emphases added.)

“If we have adverted to all of this in our own internal experience,” he continues, uttering another of those once-intimidating allusions to self-appropriation, “we can go on to a conception of intellectual emanation.” (§ 139.) We, on the other hand, will rely more on Lonergan’s crystal-clear explanations. We know from our discussion in chapter 1 above that in *Insight* Lonergan comes closer than he does in *S to Method’s* clear differentiation of the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the act of judging intelligible good (value), the act that spirates love for the lovable. Given what has been said throughout chapter 1, and 2 to this point, the reader has no doubt already discerned in these data on intellectual emanation the ratio of conceiving God as Dicens who is Speaker of divine understanding, *Verbum* who is divine understanding spoken, and *Amor*, divine Love spirated or breathed by Speaker and Word.

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145 *“The Father speaks from his understanding of God and of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and of all created things and of all possible beings, so through the Word are spoken God and Father and Son and Spirit and all created things and all possible beings.”* S, 399.
2.3 Assertion 1: On Intellectual Emanation

Chapter two makes three assertions. The first reads:

The divine processions, which are processions according to the mode of a processio operati, are understood in some measure on the basis of a likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession. (§ 145.)

If my experience is typical, of the two highlighted terms processio operati is likely to prove the more difficult to grasp. Moreover, the systematic order is such that establishing the first assertion assures correct answers to the first and virtually all relevant questions. Thus my account of Lonergan’s defense of his first assertion will be more than usually detailed and verbatim. His argument has three parts:

In the first part of the assertion we develop a technical formulation of the problem so that it may be clear what the doctrine is that we seek to understand, and also to dispose of an apparent contradiction. Thus, we maintain that a divine procession is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati and since this part of the assertion differs from the doctrine of the faith only in the words that it employs, it is theologically certain.

In the second part of the assertion, we propose hypothetically a solution. If one were to suppose that a divine procession is after the manner of an intellectual emanation, it would follow that it is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati. Although this deduction or hypothetical conclusion does not increase knowledge, it does nevertheless express some understanding.

In the third and final part of the assertion, we pass judgment on the hypothetical solution, namely, that in this life there is no other way 146 for us to come to the kind of understanding of this mystery that Vatican I mentioned. Divergent Opinions There are unbelievers who deny the mystery itself. (§ 151-53.)

We will now follow Lonergan closely. I will variously explain or paraphrase or, where his explanations do not seem to call for comment, simply quote S. The close reading continues until I am confident my intended readership understands the intelligible ground, the ratio, of divine order sufficiently to move quickly to section 5 and the dénouement, Lonergan’s Assertion 14 on perfection of order in God.

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146 He does not contradict Pius VI, who condemned the claim of exclusivity for the psychological analogy (see above n. 52 p. 22), but draws from an hypothesis a certain conclusion that he does not claim to be theologically certain.
2.3.1 “Part One: Divine procession is procession according to the mode of a processio operati.” (§ 155.)

Lonergan notes that “this part of the argument is just a strict deduction from the truths of faith using metaphysical notions and principles that everyone knows. The conclusion, therefore, is theologically certain.” His 5 points exclude every possibility but procession per modum operati.

1. **A divine procession is not a making or a creating.** “The Council of Nicea anathematizes those who say, ‘The Son was made from nothing, or from another subsistent or essence’ (DB 54, DS 126, ND 8). … The QUICUMQUE Creed … repeats this doctrine concerning the Son and extends it to the Holy Spirit (DB 39, DS 75, ND 16).” (§ 157.) Lonergan’s statement is de fide.

2. **A divine procession is not external.** In a procession there are two terms, the principle of the procession and that which proceeds. If external, “the principle is one thing and what proceeds from it is another. … But in divine procession the Son is the same God as the Father, and, again, the Holy Spirit is the same God as the Father and the Son. … Therefore, divine procession is not an external procession, not a procession into another.” (§ 157.)

3. **A divine procession is internal; but it is not of an operation (“processio operationis”149) nor of the operated (“processio operati”150).** Procession in God must be procession where-

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147 § 155. “Theological notes were brief phrases qualifying the individual theological propositions that made up the various tracts in the manuals of neo-Scholastic theology. In addition to the summary judgment represented by the theological note itself: ‘reasons were given for the note in question: for example, the definitions of popes and councils, the clear teaching of Scripture, theological reasoning, the general consent of the fathers or of the theologians.’” Ernst, “The Theological Notes and the Interpretation of Doctrine,” 814. Ernst quotes Avery Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System (New York: Crossroad, 1995) 43. The standard work is Sixtus Cartechini, De valore notarum theologicarum et de criteriis ad eas dignoscendas (Rome: Gregorian University, 1951). See also n. 15 p. 6 above.

148 “Every procession is either external or internal: if another reality is originated, the procession is external; if no other reality is originated, the procession is internal.” S, 157. Cf., ST I, q. 27, a. 1.

149 “[See Lonergan’s own careful formulation in English of ‘processio operationis’ in Verbum 107: ‘... the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected ...’]” S, editorial note 15 p. 149.

150 In S, “[The expression ‘processio operati’ has been left untranslated. It could, of course, be translated into English literally as ‘procession of the operated’; but that would hardly convey very clearly the meaning Lonergan intends to communicate by his use of the expression. In Verbum, Lonergan specifies that meaning: ‘the emergence of one thing from another’ (107); ‘... the
by one complete reality does not proceed from another complete reality, i.e., procession in God must be internal.

In a procession of an operation (processio operationis) an act arises from a potency; it is imperfect. Examples: “The act of seeing taking its origin from both the power of sight and the eye, the act of understanding taking its origin from both the possible intellect and the intelligible species, the act of will taking its origin from both the will and from a habit received in the will.” (§ 149) God is perfect, has no unrealized potency, so processio operationis is excluded.

In a processio operati, act arises from, not within, another act. Examples: “A processio operati is illustrated by the act of desiring taking its origin from the act of seeing, by the act of defining taking its origin from the act of understanding, by the act of judging taking its origin from the act of grasping sufficient evidence, by the act of choosing taking its origin from a practical judgment.” (§ 149) God is one act, therefore ...

4. A divine procession is “according to the mode of a processio operati.” It is not a procession of the operated but a procession in the mode of an act proceeding within an act. “A procession according to the mode of a processio operati is defined as an internal procession in which the originating act and the originated act are really distinct, not however on the basis of absolute existence, but only on the basis of relative existence. Every element in this definition is verified in each of the divine processions.” (§ 159)

Something is originated when it has an origin; thus the originating gives origin to the originated. We know for certain that the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from Father and Son. “The originating act and the originated act are really distinct: the Father is really distinct from the Son; the Holy Spirit is really distinct from both the Father and the Son.” (§ 159)

As noted in point 3 above, God is one infinite act; so the real distinction between originating and originated must be both infinite and relative (more on this point below). “This real distinction is not on the basis of absolute existence: there is only one God; the three divine persons are of one substance, that is, consubstantial.” (§ 159) Lonergan’s conclusion is that of the Council of Florence: “‘Everything is one except where there is relational opposition (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325).’” (§ 159)

5. A procession according to the mode of a processio operati does not denote a contradiction. First, he notes: “There seems to be a contradiction between these two assertions: (1) God is from God, and (2) there is only one God. For if there really and truly is an inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the procession is processio operati ...’ (205-206). The meaning of ‘processio operati,’ then, is best conveyed by contrasting it with what is understood by ‘processio operationis.’ A processio operati is not the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected; it is a procession from act to act, from a perfection to a perfection.]” S, editorial note 16 p. 149.
origin of God from God, it seems to follow that there are two gods. If, however, really and truly there is only one God, it seems to follow that there is no procession of God from God.” (S 159.) On this point, Lonergan simply reiterates what he established in points 1-4. That procession in God is internal eliminates the notion of two complete realities in God. However: “Note, however, that this solution is only negative. … But the reason internal generation is not excluded in God cannot be given unless one has a positive doctrine concerning the divine nature, and this doctrine is to be sought in the second part of the argument.” (S 159.)

Given that we seek similarity between the human mind as we know it to be and God’s mind as we suppose it to be, much depends on our grasping the nature of a procession according to the mode of a processio operati. The reader might feel that this notion “worked out in order to state clearly a divine mystery” (S 149) has been insufficiently explained; but, as my argument progresses, procession per modum operati recurs with further explanation.

2.3.2 “Part Two: If one supposes intellectual emanation in God, it follows that there is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati.” (S 161.)

Here, we add to our understanding of intellectual emanation as it applies to the mystery of procession in God. Moreover, Lonergan meets the most challenging of the rational arguments required to solve the fundamental trinitarian problem, namely making sense of the truth that God is from God. He makes 4 points:

We settle four things in this second part of the argument. First, from the hypothesis of a divine intellectual emanation, we conclude that divine procession is according to the mode of a processio operati. Next, we show that through this deduction we attain not an increase in knowledge but an increase in understanding. Third, we clarify what this increase in understanding consists of. Fourth, we explain that the understanding so attained is mediate, imperfect, analogical, and obscure. (S 161.)

Before proceeding to expound his four points, he offers “three reasons for proceeding in this way and not otherwise.” The first point admits that “it cannot be demonstrated that a procession according to the mode of a processio operati is an intellectual emanation; for one cannot conclude from what is less determinate to what is more determinate.” Second, principles cannot be demonstrated; in this instance, the principles are attained “at the end of an investigation by reason illumined by faith.” And:

In the third place, the present question is a question of principle. For a principle is what is first in some order, and we are now dealing with the first assertion of our systematic investigation, in a way that is similar to the way in which St Thomas’s first article concerning the Trinity in the Summa theologiae is concerned with divine
procession and intellectual emanation (1, q. 27, a. 1 c., ad 2m, ad 3m). But this principle is not naturally known: we are dealing with a mystery in the strict sense of the term. Nor is this principle divinely revealed: what is divinely revealed we believe by faith; but what is now being sought is an understanding of the faith, or an understanding of what has been revealed by God and proposed by the church for us to believe by faith. (§ 161.)

Here again and not for the last time Lonergan insists that we be clear about the goal of systematics—understanding—and our means of reaching it.

Conceiving a divine procession according to the principle of intellectual emanation is the product of Thomas’s intelligence and imagination enlightened by faith. Lonergan develops Thomas’s hypothesis of procession as intellectual emanation with his concept of the procession of the Word as distinctly in the mode of a processio operati. He conceives this procession in God to be like an act arising within an act in us (processio operati) when we grasp sufficient evidence that, because satisfying the intrinsic rationality of our minds, necessitates judgment; but, as he acknowledges, procession in the mode of a processio operati in God cannot be demonstrated. (We must judge procession in the mode of a processio operati by its reasonableness and results, i.e., according to its consonance with intellectual emanation as Thomas conceived it, our self-knowledge, and what we know to be true of the Holy Trinity.) He then proceeds to the four points that explain the reasonableness of our affirmation of faith that God is from God.

1. Intellectual emanation. “The meaning of intellectual emanation has already been discussed above. Now we want to conceive clearly and distinctly what a divine intellectual emanation would be like. And we are proposing this conception as a supposition or a hypothesis.” (§ 163.) We learned that a word proceeds in us when our intellectual consciousness is determined by an act of understanding. Here, “we have to suppose that there is consciousness in God, and indeed intellectual consciousness.” (§ 163.) As our intellectual consciousness is determined by some act, so we suppose that God’s is too. “This act can only be the infinite act. Finally, we have to suppose that this consciousness, thus determined, is dynamic, that is, that it has a conscious exigence for an emanation.” (§ 163; emphases added.) Although God’s dynamic intellectual consciousness is hypothetical, still it requires very careful and nuanced argument to maintain determination and necessity in God. (Here, necessary means the opposite of contingent.)

Employing the notions of originating and originated act (act arising within act), he draws six conclusions: “The infinite act is an originating act. In God there cannot be any real distinction between infinite act and divine consciousness.” (§ 163.) In a real distinction, one as real is not the other as real. In God all is one except where there exists an opposed relation, the only real distinction in God. “In God there cannot be any real distinction between infinite act and divine consciousness; and since they are not really distinct, they cannot be conceived as really determining and as really determined. There-
fore, the motive on account of which and in accord with which there is an exigence for the emanation is known by the infinite act. And through this knowledge and conscious exigence, the infinite act is constituted as an originating act.” (§ 163.) One infinite act is common to the three; each knows he is the one God in their one eternal act of being one tri-personed God. (Such formulae are recursive because God has no beginning or end, and potentially endless because one can always add another clause beginning “who is,” or “who are.” I intend that my formula help rid the mind of any images of a fourth really distinct subsistent in God.)

Second, it follows that an originated act really and truly comes forth within divine consciousness. One cannot suppose that an infinite act is inconsistent with itself, that it has a conscious exigence for an emanation and yet there is no emanation, or that it has an exigence for an emanation within consciousness and yet there is no emanation within consciousness. Thus, if an originating act is posited, then necessarily, by that very fact, a true and real emanation is also posited. And if there is a true and real emanation, then there is also that which emanates, that is to say, there is also an originated act. (§ 163.)

It helps when following Lonergan’s argument to recall that the abstract terms originating and originated refer to relations of origin who are persons. When the one infinite act of God is conceived as rationally and morally conscious, that act, on the analogy of our dynamic consciousness, necessarily originates intellectual operations, for it is the nature of divine intellectual consciousness (good, intelligent, reasonable, loving) that words of knowledge and love proceed within it.

Third, it follows that the originated act is infinite. For the originated act is not nothing, and therefore it is either finite or infinite. Now, it cannot be finite, for everything finite is also created, and everything created originates through external procession; but an act within consciousness and originated by virtue of consciousness is originated internally. Moreover, everything finite is contingent; but what is originated because of the exigencies of divine consciousness is originated by necessity. It remains, then, that the originated act is infinite. (§ 163.)

Lonergan resolves the apparent paradox. He demonstrates the reasonableness of conceiving one divine reality as both infinite and relative. In one act of absolute Being, the infinite exists as three relations; each is only rationally distinct from the infinite act and thus really infinite. The personal relations are really distinct from one another, and each is only rationally distinct from the infinite act in relation to which and to one another Dicens and Verbum and Amor151 are eternally constituted as from and not from

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151 Crowe’s comment is helpful in bringing together these names as they apply to us and to God: “The intelligere, verbum, and amor in us become ipsum intelligere divinum, ipsa veritas divina,
Fourth, it follows that God originates from God. Whatever is infinite is God. But the originating act is infinite; the originated act is infinite; the originated act truly and really comes forth from the originating act. Thus, on the supposition of divine intellectual emanation, God originates from God. (§ 163.)

The infinite is God. Each relation/person is the same infinite God as originating (Father), originated-originating (Son), and originated (Holy Spirit). There is no pecking order:

Fifth, it follows that the originating act and the originated act are not really distinct with respect to absolute existence. For the originating act and the originated act are infinite. But there is only one infinite act; therefore, with respect to absolute existence there cannot be a real distinction between the originating act and the originated act. (§ 163.)

Thus there is no subordination in the Trinity. The Holy Spirit is not less for being non-originating in the order of origin. Lonergan’s dynamic terms for active and passive principles solves the Thomistic problem of conceiving emanation as movement and not operation. Lonergan distinguishes not the active and passive aspects of motion (not applicable to God) but the originating and originated aspects of the divine operation of giving...
ing and receiving. Recall that an operation is always what it is, so no real distinction can
be drawn between originating and originated as infinite act; and in God everything is
eternally all at once.

Sixth, it follows that the originating act and the originated act are really distinct
with respect to relative existence. Opposed relations of originating and originated
necessarily follow upon the supposition of real emanation that we have made. And
it makes no difference to this that the same act is originating and originated. For we
are not discussing a causal emanation, which would cease to be if cause and effect
were not two really distinct absolutes. We are discussing an intellectual emanation,
according to which to love the good is right because loving proceeds from the good
truly affirmed, and affirming the good is true because affirming proceeds from a
grasp of evidence. And it cannot be demonstrated by reason that this truth and this
rightness are to be excluded because the act of grasping evidence, of affirming, of
loving is infinite, and there is only one infinite act. (§ 163-65.)

The personal acts that constitute the relations—the act of grasping is the Father, and
so on—are each infinite. Yet God is one act. So the distinction between personal act and
one act of Being cannot be absolute—there is only one God. Within absolute intellectual
consciousness three real relations possess as their personal consciousness one and the
same absolute consciousness.153

Solving the fundamental trinitarian problem depends on conceiving intellectual
emanation in God on the analogy of intellectual emanation is us. “Thus, if divine intel-
lectual emanation is supposed, all that pertains to divine procession and all that we
have already proved from the truths of faith under the heading ‘procession according to
the mode of a processio operati’ follows.” (§ 165.) As a final point, Lonergan relates his de-
duction from divine intellectual emanation to the goal of systematics: “Now, if there is a
deduction, there is also some understanding; and this understanding is not annulled
simply by the fact that a premise is only a supposition or a hypothesis. Thus, if divine
intellectual emanation is supposed, there results some understanding of the faith.”
(§ 165.)

2. On the deduction. Here Lonergan is concerned with the importance of what he has
deduced from his supposition. He distinguishes what pertains to knowledge (certainty)

153 “The three persons have the same consciousness differently: the Father is God in a man-
er analogous to the grasp of sufficient evidence that necessitates one to judge; the Son is God
in the same consciousness but now a consciousness analogous to that of the dependence of the
judgment on the grasp of sufficient evidence; the Holy Spirit is the same consciousness in a
third manner, namely, as the dependence of the act of love on the grasp of sufficient evidence
and the rational affirmation. The same consciousness is had differently by three persons.” Lon-
and what pertains to understanding (probability) in regard to conclusions from a principle: “When a deduction is performed, the conclusion is known to the extent that the principle is known, and the conclusion is understood to the extent that the principle is understood.” He continues:

Now, the knowledge gained from the deduction, and from the deduction alone, has no importance at all. For the principle is not known but supposed; so what is deduced, on the strength of the deduction itself, is equally not known but supposed. Of course, it is true that the conclusion is already known from elsewhere, for we demonstrated the conclusion from the truths of faith in the first part of the argument. Nevertheless, the truth of a conclusion is not a proof of its principle, as is well known either from minor logic or from the simple reflection that there can be some other principle from which the same conclusion follows equally well or better. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. (§ 165.)

Lonergan concludes with his judgment that the results of his supposing that intellectual emanation in the mode of a processio operati potentially fulfills the goal of systematics:

The understanding gained does have some importance. To be sure, our understanding of the infinite, rationally and morally conscious act is only mediate, imperfect, and analogical; so on the strength of our completed deduction our understanding of procession according to the mode of a processio operati can only be mediate, imperfect, and analogical. But even mediate, imperfect, and analogical understanding is some understanding. Indeed, it is precisely that kind of understanding referred to by the First Vatican Council (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). (§ 165-67.)

3. On the understanding achieved. What, precisely, is the understanding achieved? Lonergan answers first with a general evaluation:

In general, this understanding consists in reducing to a unity many elements which seem inconsistent with one another. Many elements are enumerated in the definition of a procession according to the mode of a processio operati; and their inconsistency is such that they could actually exist only in God considered as infinite. (§ 167.)

We realized in chapter 1 above the complexity of “gathering into unity” elements known to be structurally isomorphic. Lonergan’s reducing to intelligible unity many elements seemingly inconsistent and at variance with one another is, therefore, in itself an impressive intellectual feat; but his degree of understanding is more impressive still because he also draws and explains the conclusions required to enable our understanding the particulars of intellectual emanation:

It is clear from the deduction itself that some conclusions follow because God is infinite act, and others because one supposes that God is dynamically conscious.
From God’s infinity, it follows that what proceeds is infinite, and from the fact that there is but one infinite being it follows that what proceeds and the principle from which it proceeds are not distinct with respect to absolute existence. On the other hand, from the conscious exigence, which we are supposing, there follow the principle, the emanation, the originated, and the real distinction with respect to relative existence. (§ 167.)

Lonergan says that “no difficulty or objection arises” if we consider separately what follows from the formalities of the infinite and conscious exigence; but when we consider together all the elements that follow from them, “difficulties and objections keep multiplying. And this reveals the depth of the mystery.” (§ 167.) We are not left, however, on permanently shaky ground:

Still, these difficulties and objections are mitigated, not only negatively but also positively, to the extent that the multiple elements that seem to be inconsistent with one another are reduced to a single source and principle. For although we cannot reconcile directly the reality of the procession with the consubstantiality of what proceeds, at least they are reconciled indirectly and mediatelly through the common source, namely, the act that is both infinite and dynamically conscious, since consubstantiality follows from the act’s infinity, and the reality of emanation follows from the dynamic consciousness of the same act. (§ 167.)

One absolute act of dynamic intellectual consciousness tri-personalized, if you will, in emanations at once absolute and relative. Lonergan enables us to conceive consubstantiality (unicity) and the emanations (plurality) as infinites clearly distinguished in the infinite!

4. Imperfect understanding. Here Lonergan evaluates the results of his argument from the viewpoint of its imperfection: “Although all the elements that pertain to a procession according to the mode of a processio operati can be brought back to a single source and so can be understood in some measure, nevertheless they cannot be understood better than the source itself is understood.” (§ 167.) Consider the elements: a single infinite act that is rationally and morally conscious. We cannot understand the infinite positively, and “our own rational and moral consciousness we live rather than clearly and distinctly understand”; our consciousness is “an exceedingly deficient” imago Dei (see above n. 65 p. 32). Yet, Lonergan’s entire systematics rests on conceiving God as dynamically conscious. Moreover: Indeed, we do not know that there is a dynamic consciousness in God; all we arrive at is this: that, if it is supposed that divine consciousness is dynamic, then what is concluded from the truths of faith follows.” (§ 169.) He concludes:

Still, this imperfection itself confirms rather than weakens the supposition of divine intellectual emanation. For, as Vatican i taught: ‘... never, however, does it [reason illumined by faith] become capable of understanding the mysteries the way
it does truths which are its own proper object. For divine mysteries of their very na-
ture so exceed the created intellect that even when they have been given in revela-
tion and accepted by faith, that very faith still keeps them veiled in a sort of obscuri-
ty, as long as “we are exiled from the Lord” in this mortal life …’ (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). (S 169.)

Even as he brilliantly demonstrates the fruitfulness of procession according to the mode of a *processio operati*, Lonergan insists on modesty. While a deeper insight into God, his establishing the modes of Thomas’s intellectual emanation—call it theological irony—simply gives the systematic principle more power to magnify the mystery of God.

2.3.3 “Part Three: Apart from the likeness of intellectual emanation there does not seem to be any other analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession.” (S 169.)

Lonergan says “seems to be” not only because he’s unable to think of a better one, but also because nobody else has put forth a better one, i.e., a systematic analogy that solves the fundamental and virtually every other problem in trinitarian systematics.

What an adequate analogy must do, Lonergan argues, is satisfy ten requirements. (We will pay special attention to number three.)

1. The required mode. We know that relations are constituted by processions, but the concrete mode of procession exclusive to God must be specified:

   We can distinguish between the abstract definition of procession and the con-
crete mode. In the concrete, there are different modes of proceeding in different na-
tures; but the abstract definition of procession (namely, the origin of one from
another) is so brief and minimal that it prescinds from every difference of mode.
The issue, therefore, concerns not this minimal definition, which anyone can easily
arrive at, but the concrete mode of divine procession. (S 169.)

   Everything said about God is analogous. Even a simple notion like procession
cannot be applied to God without our drawing distinctions. Conceiving the concrete mode
of a divine procession therefore requires understanding something unique: we suppose
*that* it is like, and try to understand and express *how* it is like, a concrete mode of ema-
nation known to occur in us.

2. Analogously known mode. Analogous because “the concrete mode of divine proces-
sion is known either immediately or mediate. But only God and the blessed know
God mediate, and so in this life we can seek to acquire only some kind of mediate
knowledge.” (S 169-71.) We are reminded that analogy is a defective medium yielding at
best imperfect understanding of God; thus it yields understanding no more than proba-
bly true. (Yet, probability can be high; indeed, a systematic treatise can be a virtually
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3. *The systematic analogy.* I elevate the third point to a subsection because it regards the axis of Lonergan’s speculative solution. His procedure, because systematic, employs analogy explicitly and thematically. The theologian does not proceed systematically if “in relation to distinct questions, or even in relation to the same questions, one is always bringing forward new and different analogies, so that in the end one arrives simply at an accumulation of rhetorical examples.” (S 171.) The theologian needs a systematic analogy, i.e., one that meets every question:

In contrast, a theologian ought to proceed systematically, and this is especially the case if one is investigating the mode of divine procession. Therefore, one does not begin asking about the characteristics of the divine persons but about the processes, since it is well established that the key to the entire trinitarian question lies in the meaning of procession and its mode. (S 171; emphasis added.)

From the systematic principle first in the order of wisdom flows all that pertains to trinitarian systematics: “Since this is the case, we must seek a systematic analogy whose conception of the mode of divine procession is such that every other theoretical question concerning the triune God is already virtually solved.” (S 171.)

4. *From the naturally known.* We have already noted that authority to use an analogy from nature was given to theologians at Vatican I.

Vatican I taught that an understanding of mystery is to be sought ‘... from the analogy of what is naturally known ...’ (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). The reason for this is that all analogical knowledge is also mediate knowledge, and all mediate knowledge is grounded in some immediate knowledge. Therefore, since we know supernatural realities only by analogy, it follows that we know them only mediately, and so it remains that the analogy is to be drawn from natural realities. (S 171.)

It was noted above that as supernatural the realm of grace “has no *analogia entis* on offer.”

5. *From an immediately known nature.* The immediately known nature is our intellectual nature. When speaking of procession according to the mode of a *processio operati*, Lonergan means direct intellectual emanation proper to the word of understanding (indirectly from reason in the case of the Holy Spirit). He clarifies his terminology by distinguishing the general and specific notions involved:

We know things immediately and naturally in two ways: in one way, according to common notions such as being, one, true, good, the same and the diverse, act and
potency, the absolute and the relative, and other notions of this kind; in the other way, according to the generic and specific natures of things. Using the first way, we have already determined that divine procession is procession according to the mode of a *processio operati*; using the second way, we have supposed that the same procession is according to the mode of an intellectual emanation. Similarly, in natural theology it is on the basis of a common notion that God is determined to be the act of existing itself, but it is on the basis of a specific notion that God is determined to be the act of understanding itself. (S 171.)

The question cannot be answered from certain conclusions drawn from common notions and principles:

Moreover, common notions and principles are such that, when they are applied to the truths of faith, they yield conclusions that are completely certain. Still, because they are common, they are insufficient for solving the present question, which requires a systematic analogy. For the mode of divine procession must be known in such a manner as to allow us to conceive two specifically distinct divine processions, one of which is generation and the other is not. Similarly, the systematic analogy should provide solutions, at least virtually and as it were at the root, concerning not only the processions but also the relations and the persons and all other issues that may arise.

For this reason, we have to go beyond the metaphysical analogy of being ["analogiam entis"] and seek an analogy from some determinate nature known by us immediately and naturally. (S 173.)

The next four points specify with increasing exactitude the nature of a systematic analogy.

6. *From a spiritual nature.* Point 6 pertains to the unsuitability of all natural things but our spiritual nature to serve as *analogia entis*. However, this notion of nature is not specific enough. “Understanding and judging and willing not only are proper to human beings, but only extrinsically do they depend upon matter. ... Now, of course, there is nothing in God that depends intrinsically upon matter. So a likeness of nature between God and human beings can be found only in what is proper to human beings and, within that complex, *only in what is strictly spiritual.*” (S 173; emphasis added.)

7. *From a spiritual procession.* The systematic analogy must be based on a spiritual procession; thus “only strictly spiritual processions and strictly spiritual modes of proceeding” serves the purpose. However, the notion must “go beyond common notions and consider a specifically spiritual mode of proceeding. Otherwise, a likeness of nature is not attained.” (S 173-75.) He goes on to define in more specific terms the desired analogy:

Therefore, the analogy must be selected from a created procession in which there
comes forth (1) a strictly spiritual act (2) from a strictly spiritual act (3) according to a mode of proceeding that is strictly spiritual.\textsuperscript{154}

The analogy is still too general because “every strictly spiritual act is a real, natural, and conscious act,” and “every strictly spiritual act that we know is either in the intellect or in the will.” (§ 175.) Thus:

The analogy, therefore, must be selected from the CONSCIOUS ORIGINATING of a real, natural, and conscious act, from a real, natural, and conscious act, within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself. (§ 175.)

We already know, of course, that the analogy is specifically the act of judgment that necessarily arises from the act of reflective insight grasping evidence sufficient for judgment.

8. \textit{From a spiritual mode of proceeding}. Even the exigent theologian might be content with the degree of precision already achieved, but Lonergan wants to specify the mode further. So he asks, “What is meant by ‘by virtue of intellectual consciousness’”? (§ 175.)

First, he clarifies the differences between sensitive consciousness (involving the body) and intellectual consciousness in regard to spontaneity and freedom. Our freedom is limited, so there are laws. In sensitive consciousness, “conscious act originates from conscious act in accordance with the spontaneity of sensitive nature itself,” and thus it is “governed by specific laws.” That is why good dispositions and habits are critical to our becoming authentic persons. The spontaneity of intellectual consciousness, on the other hand, “is such that it is governed only by transcendental laws, laws that are bound to no particular nature but are ordered to the transcendental itself: to being (the concrete, the all, the existing), the one, the true, the good.” (§ 175; see discussion of the transcendental p. 26 above.) \textit{Insight} calls this ordering of intellectual consciousness to the totality of being our pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.\textsuperscript{155} Thus:

Intellectuality is self-governing, self-determining, autonomous. It is indeed under rule inasmuch as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire; still, it rules itself inasmuch as under God’s agency it determines itself to its own acts in accordance

\textsuperscript{154} S, 175. Lonergan adds: “But every strictly spiritual act is a real, natural, and conscious act; and every conscious act exists within consciousness; and where there originates a conscious act from a conscious act within consciousness, the originating itself is conscious, and, in a certain measure, by virtue of consciousness itself.” Editorial note 22 reads: “[Lonergan’s earlier remark on p. 143 is perhaps more precise: ‘the act that in some way proceeds consciously is because of and in accord with the act from which it proceeds.’]”

\textsuperscript{155} See \textit{Insight}, index, s.v. “desire to know,” and its sub-entry “(vs. attached and interested sensitivity).”
with the exigencies of its own intellectuality. [thus we are responsible for the persons we become]. (S 175.)

Accordingly we can understand why the analogy of imago Dei, while restricted systematically to intellectual emanation, nonetheless extends to properties that are like God’s own (“self-governing, self-determinative, autonomous”). Thus, “what proceeds ‘by virtue of intellectual consciousness’ proceeds above all else by virtue of natural desire, by virtue of an intellectual spontaneity, by virtue of a tendency that is both conscious and transcendental.” (S 175-77.) Lest this seem too abstract and not directly relevant to Christian living, Lonergan reminds us that:

We manifest this radical tendency, this spontaneity, this desire, this inclination in many ways. For we express it in questions that are practical (‘What is to be done?’ ‘Is it to be done?’), in questions that are speculative (‘What is it?’ ‘Is it so?’), in questions that are existential (‘What can I, what should I make myself to be?’ ‘Am I to make myself such and such?’). What we express in questions, we also acknowledge and consecrate in precepts: we should ask questions, we should raise doubts, we should deliberate. What we acknowledge in precepts, we also explain and defend with reasons: we should ask questions lest we pass judgment on what we do not understand; we should raise doubts lest we adhere to a false appearance of truth; we should deliberate lest we rush blindly into ruin.156

We have not yet reached the required precision because “there are different kinds of processions by virtue of intellectual consciousness.” What kind is suitable for a systematic analogy? Lonergan concludes:

Since whatever is known is known insofar as it is in act, a strictly spiritual mode of proceeding must be taken, not according to what manifests human beings as potential, but according to what is in them in act. Further, the procession from act is not spontaneous but autonomous, as is the case when a word arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of understanding, and a choice arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of judgment (that is, by a compound word). (S 177.)

So the analogy must be based on “a spiritual mode of proceeding” that is actual and autonomous. Lonergan’s next point explains what autonomy means in this context.

9. Existential autonomy. The two indented quotations that follow link the analogy directly to the discussion in chapter 1 above of moral activity (subsection 5.1.1, p. 60). Note the structural pattern of experience, understanding, judgment, decision; and the

156 S, 177. See discussion in chap. 1 above (p. 56) of the “precepts”: “be attentive (experiencing), be intelligent (understanding), be reasonable (judging), be responsible (creating), be in love ....”
In human beings, this autonomy, according to which a word comes forth from understanding and a choice from a word, is exercised in three ways. In the first way, it is exercised in practical matters insofar as one understands, judges, and chooses what is to be done and made. In the second way, it is exercised in speculative matters insofar as one asks questions regarding the universe, understands it as much as one can, passes judgment as to its origin and nature, so that, finally, one breaks through to a contemplative love of the universe. In the third and final way, it is exercised in the existential sphere insofar as one asks about oneself, understands what kind of person one ought to be, judges how one can make oneself that kind of person, and from all of this there proceeds an existential choice through which, insofar as one is able here and now to do so, one makes oneself to be that kind of person. (S 177.)

We have in us three “sources,” as it were, of a word. The one relevant to the systematic analogy is taken from humanity acting optimally, engaged here and now in the free and responsible doing and making that co-creates the self in cooperation with God’s grace. However, to the still too general notion of autonomy he adds further precision:

Accordingly, it seems that the trinitarian analogy ought to be taken from the exercise of existential autonomy. When one asks about the triune God, one is not considering God as creator or as agent, and so one is prescinding from practical autonomy. Nor is one considering God insofar as God understands and judges and loves all things, and so one is prescinding from speculative matters. But one is considering God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune, and so one takes one’s analogy from the processions that are in accordance with the exercise of existential autonomy. (S 179; emphases added.)

In us, it means processions that pertain to our existential autonomy as distinct subsistents in an intellectual nature; our existential autonomy is analogue of God’s own.

10. Conclusion.

The question, then, was whether divine procession is after the manner of intellectual emanation. Initially we responded that we can indeed acquire some understanding of the mystery in this life through such a likeness. So a second question arose, namely, whether there is any other likeness or analogy from which the mode of divine procession can be understood by us differently but either equally well or better. (S 179.)

Lonergan then proceeds to recap the foregoing points on analogous knowledge: “a theological analogy should be explicit, thematic, and systematic”; “common notions do
not suffice for a systematic trinitarian analogy”; “likeness is to be found only in a strictly spiritual nature.” (All at S 179.) Then, taking his penultimate step, he summarizes our nature’s inapt modes of procession:

The modes of proceeding in a strictly spiritual nature that are known to us in this life are either (1) conscious and autonomous, such as the intellectual emanation of a word from understanding and the intellectual emanation of a choice from the word, or (2) conscious but spontaneous, such as the procession of an act of understanding from questions, or (3) unconscious and spontaneous, such as the origin of a conscious act from a potency, from a disposition, from a habit, which in themselves are unconscious. (S 179–81.)

No single mode of ours comprises conscious intellectual emanation, procession, and origin. Finally, through elimination, he specifies the likeness of nature apt for a systematic analogy:

But God is pure act, and so unconscious origin from a potency, a disposition, or a habit is excluded. And God does not ask questions, raise doubts, or deliberate, so conscious but spontaneous procession is excluded. Therefore, there remains no likeness of nature to the mode of divine procession except the intellectual emanation through which a conscious act originates from a conscious act according to a conscious and autonomous mode. (S 181; emphasis added.)

Only the mode of intellectual emanation satisfies all the “musts” that the systematic analogy must have to solve the fundamental trinitarian problem. It seems to me impossible that trinitarian theory could more intimately link theology of God quoad se to human subjectivity and the existential core of Christian living.

2.4 Assertion 2: On the Processions

The second assertion reads:

Two and only two divine processions can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation [any kind of originating], namely, the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love from both the Speaker and the Word.\(^{157}\) (S 181.)

Lonergan states his purpose: “The second assertion continues along the way of syn-

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\(^{157}\) Lonergan adds this theological note: “That there are two divine processions is of divine and catholic faith. That these divine processions can be conceived according to some kind of intellectual and volitional emanation is the common opinion of theologians. That they are to be conceived according to the intellectual emanation of the word from the speaker and the intellectual emanation of love from both seems to be the opinion of St Thomas.” S, 183.
thesis. For having determined that divine processions are to be conceived by means of the likeness of intellectual emanation, we still have to determine how many processions of this kind can be conceived in God. And since two and only two processions are to be found, the psychological analogy is congruent with what we know from faith.”158 (S 183; emphasis added.) Thus, two known processions in us, and two known processions in God.

2.4.1 The Views of Thomas

I will present a few of the numerous texts and references that Lonergan offers as authentic Thomist cognitional theory:

“Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from its knowledge.” (ST, I, q. 27, a.1; as quoted in S 183.)

After an earlier appearance in S of this central text, Lonergan recaps the familiar recurrent pattern of cognitional operations:

Accordingly, when we understand and by the very fact that we understand, from our intellective power, which is the general light of intellectual consciousness, and from the knowledge contained in the act of understanding that adds a determination to the general light, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness a conception or definition of the reality understood. Similarly, when we grasp that the evidence is sufficient, by the very fact that we grasp it, and from the exigency of intellectual light as determined through that grasp, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness either a true affirmation or a true negative assertion. Similarly again, when we judge some good as obligatory, by the very fact that we so judge, through our intellectuality, our rationality, we spirate an act of will [love]. (S 139.)

Note that we do not will the act of spiration; rather, we spirate the act of love by willing. That this point is relevant to the intelligible procession of divine Love will be made clearer below.

Lonergan’s quotations from Thomas continue: “‘The fact that an object is actually being loved proceeds both from the lover’s power to love and from the lovable good actually understood.’” (Comp. theol., chap. 49; as quoted in S 183; emphasis added.) And: “‘Divine generation must be understood according to intellectual emanation.’” (CG, IV, 11, par. 8; as quoted in S 185.)

Finally, to draw the conclusion which grounds his position that the trinitarian anal-

158 “One can judge how difficult and how intricate these questions are from the fact that appendices 1 and 2 do nothing else except gather together in a very brief fashion what we have written elsewhere just on the mind of St Thomas regarding them.” S, 187.
ogy is strictly spiritual, Lonergan quotes Thomas’s views on what *intelligibile* includes and excludes. It excludes material reality outside the soul (cf., *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10). It includes human, angelic, and divine intellects.159 “‘The essence of God, therefore, … is simply and perfectly intelligible in itself.’” (*ST*, I, q. 87, a. 1; as quoted in S 185.)

From these texts one may conclude: St Thomas used the word *intelligibilis*26 to designate whatever is strictly spiritual;27 in this sense of *intelligibilis*, the emanation of the word is said to be intelligible; the emanation is of a kind such that what proceeds is not different from the principle from which it proceeds; both the emanation of the word and the emanation of love are equally to be conceived in this way.160

Note the phrase “what proceeds is not different from the principle.” In us: Understanding and the word of understanding that spontaneously proceeds are really distinct. In God: Since there is no rational argument against one reality being at once principle and from the principle, the principle and the procession are really distinct as persons but only rationally distinct in relation to the one act of Being that *is* God the Holy Trinity. Act arising within the act of one absolute that *is* three relations is a reasonable concept. There is absolute equality among the originating and originated persons named *Dicens*, *Verbum*, and *Amor*. Our expressing knowledge in concrete words of knowledge and love is like intellectual emanation in God *quoad se* conceived according to the critical-realist psychological analogy.

2.4.2 Lonergan’s Argument

Lonergan’s argument has two parts:

1. **Likeness to intellectual emanation.** Lonergan is so clear that I simply quote (with

159 “‘The angelic essence is indeed in the order of the intelligible as act … But the human intellect is in the order of intelligible things as a being that is only in potency, just as prime matter is in the order of sensible things …’” As quoted in S, 185.

“The human intellect is only a potency in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potency with regard to sensible beings; thus it is called ‘possible.’ The essence of the human mind, therefore, is potentially understanding. Thus it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual.” *ST*, I, q. 87, a. 1. To express the same in Lonergan’s terms: To understand one’s mind is to engage in conscious and intentional appropriation of self that effects our grasping generalized empirical method. By understanding understanding, we appropriate as personal property the new wisdom (superseding metaphysics; see above chap. 1, section 6.2 p. 72), the method of the mind whose order is analogue of the Holy Trinity both *quoad se* and *quoad nos*, the two ways we understand one and the same thing.

slight editing) his brief argument that likeness to intellectual emanation allows us to conceive, as required for a systematic concept of procession based on the psychological analogy and consonant with the known truth, two and only two divine processions:

God is being by essence and the very act of understanding, truth by essence and the very act of affirming, good by essence and the very act of loving. For it is impossible that the highest being lack the perfection of intelligence, that the highest truth lack truth in the formal sense (which is the act of affirming), that the highest good lack the goodness of love itself.[30]

2. *Intellectual emanation allows two and only two processions in God.* Lonergan’s defense takes the form of a scientific syllogism (i.e., one that increases understanding).

*Major premise*: “For in God there can be conceived only one act of understanding, only one word, only one love.” (*S* 189.)

The major premise is certain both by reason of the act and by reason of the object: by reason of the act, since in God, who is absolutely simple, there is only one act; by reason of the object, because the infinite act of understanding attains the totality of being, the infinite act of affirming attains the totality of truth, the infinite act of love attains the totality of the good. (*S* 189; cf., *ST*, I, q. 14, a. 5 ff.; q. 34, a. 3; q. 19, a. 3.)

*Minor premise*: “But there is only one emanation of one love; there is only one emanation of one word; and the divine act of understanding cannot intellectually emanate from some other principle.” (*S* 189.)

The minor premise is evident inasmuch as it asserts that in a single eternal and immutable act there is one emanation of one word and one emanation of one love. In us, however, in some measure there is an intellectual emanation of the act of understanding, to the extent that when we are intellectually conscious we inquire, investigate, and reason, so that we may come to an act of understanding. But this is not the case with God, since God is not reduced from the potency to the act of understanding. (*S* 189.)

*Conclusion*: “Therefore, in terms of the likeness to intellectual emanation, one can conceive only two processions in God.” (*S* 189.)

As Lonergan conceives it, when rational consciousness is fully in act, there is a speaker of understanding, and necessarily the distinct word of understanding spoken (the emanation); and, because consciousness has reason and will—the mind’s distinct appetites for knowledge and love of being—there must be an emanation of love from

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161 S, 197. Editorial note 30 reads: “[In *Insight* (p. 681), Lonergan speaks of God not as the highest being, the highest truth, and the highest good, but as the primary being, the primary truth, and the primary good. Bearing this in mind provides a useful control for understanding accurately his use of ‘highest’ here.]”
speaker and word, one breather breathing forth the distinct emanating breath who is the Love by which they love the true, good, therefore lovable object, their triune reality. They love their proceeding love who is, if you will, “God the Love.” As Lonergan conceives them, the two processions also express the human subject’s potential (eschatological) to know and love the whole of proportionate being in one act of intellectual consciousness. Applied to God, it proves to be the best analogy we have.

2.5 **Assertion 3: On Divine Generation**

The third assertion reads:

Generation in the strict sense of the term is implied by the divine emanation of the Word, but not by the divine emanation of Love. (§ 189.)

Having determined how to conceive a divine procession, and the number and types in accord with that concept, Lonergan states the purpose of Assertion 3: “We have determined the manner in which divine procession can be conceived and the number and kinds of processions that are conceived in this manner. We now ask whether generation in the strict sense of the term applies formally either to the emanation of the Word or to the emanation of Love. And our response is to affirm the first and deny the second. In this way, a further congruence between the psychological analogy and what we know by faith comes to light.”

2.5.1 **Foreword to Lonergan’s Argument**

Lonergan first states three premises. “From these premises it is easy to conclude that the divine emanation of word implies generation in the proper sense while the divine emanation of love does not.” (§ 191.) His three premises help us form distinct con-

162 Said in the same sense that one would say “God the Knowledge” in regard to the first relation of origin who is also from a principle; originated from originating act.

163 §, 189-91. Lonergan attaches this theological note: “It is of divine and catholic faith that the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit is not begotten (DB 39, DS 75, ND 16). It is of divine and catholic faith that the same one is both Son and Word, entirely so [DB 288, DS 548]. It is the opinion of St Thomas that ‘In the name “Word” the same property is implied as in the name “Son.”’ This is also the opinion of those theologians who follow St Augustine, and their opinion, when occasion arose, received the approval of Pius VI (DB 1597, DS 2698).” §, 191. Lonergan’s notes and the editorial notes read: “Ibid. q. 34, a. 2, ad 3m. [The property is ‘being born,’ nativitas: ‘Ipsa enim nativitas Filii, quae est proprietas personalis sius ...’ Ibid.]” and “Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, ii; ML 42: 936. [This text of Augustine is quoted by Aquinas at the place referred to in the previous note: ‘Unde dicit Augustinus, Eo dicitur Verbum quo Filius’ (‘Thus Augustine says, His name is Word because his name is Son’).]”
cepts of generation and spiration.


   The following are not instances of generation in the strict sense of the term: (1) the origin of something that is not alive (for example, the origin of water from hydrogen and oxygen); (2) the origin of something alive from a principle that is not living (for example, so-called spontaneous generation); (3) the origin of something alive from a living principle, but not from a conjoined living principle (for example, the creation of living beings); (4) the origin of something alive from a conjoined but dissimilar living principle (for example, the origin of hair from the scalp); (5) the origin of something alive from a conjoined and similar living principle, but a living principle whose similarity to the originated is not in a likeness in nature (for example, the origin of Eve from Adam through a rib, for it does not pertain to the nature of a rib taken from a man that a woman comes to be from it). (§ 191-93.)

   None of the five types conforms to all elements of the definition. “the present discussion we must pay special attention to the fifth element of the definition, namely, ‘with a resulting likeness in nature’; for although it is necessary that what emanates be similar in nature to that from which it emanates, this is not sufficient. To have the formality of generation in the strict sense, this likeness in nature must result by virtue of the emanation itself.” (§ 193.) The premise that generation must be in the “likeness of nature” is carried into the second premise that follows.

2. On the nature of God. Here, Lonergan seeks to establish that God’s nature is intellectual. Generation includes likeness of nature, so we must consider the nature of God. The question, however, seems somehow insoluble. We use the noun nature in two ways, but the first way, to denote the natural world, has no place in God; the second way, God’s nature, denotes what we cannot know about God in this life. If nature is taken as essence, “if ‘nature’ is taken in the sense of essence, then nature can be acknowledged in God, but we do not know it. For in this life we do not know what God is.” (§ 193.) Neither does Aristotle’s definition of nature apply.

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164 S, 191. Editorial note 34 reads: “[The words ‘in similitudinem naturae’ are difficult to translate, but Lonergan tells us what the expression means a couple of paragraphs later: for there to be generation, a ‘likeness in nature must result by virtue of the emanation itself.’ The expression is Aquinas’s. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1. See also De potentia, q. 2, a. 4, ad 7.]”

165 “According to Aristotle, nature is defined as the principle of motion and rest in that in
Help, of course, is on the way: “According to St Thomas God’s act of understanding is God’s substance,” God’s nature is God’s very act of understanding, and intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they possess a specific likeness.

If ‘nature’ is taken in the sense of essence, then in this life we do not know what God is because we do not understand God through a species proportionate to the divine essence. Still, this in no way prevents us from knowing God analogically in this life or from ordering what we know analogically in such a way that some element of what we know analogically is first after the manner of a nature or essence. In this sense, the nature of God is God’s act of understanding, upon which follow God’s infinity and aseity and simplicity, and whatever else there is in God but unknown to us.166

I will shorten Lonergan’s argument by eliminating most of the contrasts between God’s intellect and ours, for I believe that the reader is already sufficiently aware of them. Also, we already know that “intellect in act with respect to its total object is infinite being” (S 195). And: “Infinite being cannot be from another; so intellect in act with respect to its total object is from itself [God from God].” (S 195.)

Understanding that is in act with respect to its total object is not distinct from the intellect that understands. Furthermore, the infinite itself as knowable or intelligible is not distinct from the act of understanding by which it is understood. Finally, the infinite act of understanding is true with respect to itself, not because of a likeness, as if the knowing and the known were two, but because of the absence of unlikeness.[48]168

We are already familiar with the difference between natural existence and intentional acts of existence in our finite minds. God is one act, thus: “The natural act of existence of the infinite is not different from its intentional act of existence.” (S 197.) In us the natural existence of the thing known and its intentional existence in us when we know it differ in their potencies, “for the natural act of existence of some being is the act of existence which it exists first and per se and not as an accident.” But God is absolutely simple; otherwise God would not be the first principle of all things. So there cannot be in God a real distinction between a principle of motion or of operation and the motion or operation itself. In this sense, therefore, nature cannot be posited in God.” S, 193. Editorial note 35 reads: “[‘... nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.’ The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 236.]”

166 S, 195. Lonergan’s notes read: “Ibid. q. 14, a. 4; see q. 54, aa. 1–3. Ibid. q. 18, a. 3 c. ad fin. Ibid. q. 93, aa. 2–4.”


168 S, 197. Notes 47 and 48 read: ST “q. 14, a. 4.” And ST “16, a. 5, ad 2m.”
istence by which it is; and its intentional act of existence is the medium by which it is known.”\textsuperscript{169} In God there is no potency or difference. “But in the case of the infinite, the act of understanding by which the infinite is known is the same as the intelligible which is known. Therefore, the natural act of existence of the infinite is the same as its intentional act of existence.\textsuperscript{49,170}

The infinite is absolutely simple. For a single act of understanding is simple; and an infinite act of understanding is a single act; and this single act is identical with all that the infinite knows concerning the infinite.

although we conceive the infinite only analogically inasmuch as we ascend from our finite act of understanding, nevertheless the infinite act of understanding comprehends itself perfectly. And it does not comprehend itself as different from its very act of understanding but as identical in every way. And so if the nature of God is conceived as an intellect in act with respect to its total object, then the infinity of God, the aseity of God, and the simplicity of God all follow, as does everything else in God that remains unknown to us. (S 197.)

Thus God is not an infinite Being who understands; God is God’s infinite act of understanding. “If ... ‘nature’ is taken not in the sense of essence from which all else follows, but in the sense of the intrinsic principle of operation, we can conclude again that the divine nature is intellectual.” (S 197.) Natural theology cannot admit naturally known real distinction in God. However, “as we come to know God through faith and theology, we discover real personal distinctions in God that are constituted through relations of origin.” (S 197.) Thus Lonergan concludes:

Since the origins in God are according to the emanations of intellectual consciousness, we must conclude that the divine nature is intellectual. (S 199.)

3. The difference between emanations of word and love. This point is critical to understanding order in God for, although word and love emanate, their modes of emanation differ. “Since generation results in likeness of nature, after having considered the nature of God, it remains for us to compare the emanation of a word and the emanation of love.” (S 199.) He makes 4 points of comparison. He distinguishes: “(1) a thing itself, (2) the understanding of it, (3) the word concerning it, and (4) the love for it.” (S 199.) The five indented quotations that follow are contiguous (S 199-201), but I will comment after each one:

\textsuperscript{169} S, 197. Cf.: “Since natural existence and the action of understanding are distinct in us, we should note that a word conceived in our intellect, having only intellectual existence, differs in nature from our intellect, which has natural existence. In God, however, to be and to understand are identical.” \textit{The Light of Faith [Compendium theologiae]}, chap. 41.

\textsuperscript{170} S, 197. Note 49 reads: \textit{ST} “I, q. 34, a. 2 ad 1m; cf., q. 27, a. 2 c. ad 2m.”
Intellectual consciousness is related to something in such a way that, first, it understands it, next, from that understanding it utters a true word concerning it, third, from that understanding and word it spirates a love for it, and fourth, by virtue of that very love it is borne toward what is loved.

Lonergan is talking about the complete cognitive process in us (prescinding, of course, from experience because there is nothing like that in God as God). Note the fourth point about consciousness being borne toward the beloved. The reader has no doubt already discerned it to be relevant to the procession of the Holy Spirit. First, the procession of the Word.

There is a true word concerning something to the extent that a perfect likeness of it is formed within the intellect. So this emanation, by which the word comes forth, results in the formation of a likeness of the thing.

Thus the word is generated. While true of our knowing, a difference remains in us between the thing known and the word formed within intellect; but in God’s intellect, as we learned above, natural and intentional existence are identical; the understanding and the word expressing the thing known differ only in their opposed relations to each other.

There is love for something to the extent that the one loving is inclined, borne, impelled toward what is loved, and is united with and adheres to it. So this emanation, by which loves comes forth, involves the constitution of an inclination, an impulse, an adhesion.

Love is real inasmuch as it is united dynamically to the beloved; in other words, just as we bestow intentional existence upon the thing by knowing it, so we bestow intentional love upon the known thing loved. Thus the beloved is in the lover. (Consequently, by knowing and loving ourselves, by self-appropriation, we bestow intentional existence upon ourselves.)

Indeed, to some extent these two emanations are opposed to each other. Since the object of intellect is truth, and since truth is found within the intellect, the intellect is so engrossed in the formation within itself of a true likeness of something that those who devote themselves to the sciences seem rather cold and aloof, since they are not much inclined, attracted, or given to things themselves for their own sake. But since the object of will is the good, and since the good exists not within the will but externally and in things themselves, the one loving is so absorbed with what is loved that those who cultivate the affections more than the sciences are said to be blind.

But if the intellect avoids blindness, and the will aloofness, then a perfect circle of consciousness is complete. For one begins from some thing itself in order to
grasp it intellectually; once it is so grasped, it is represented by a true word; and once it is so represented, it is loved with a love that returns one to the thing as it is in itself.\textsuperscript{171}

Perhaps the reader is struck by the image of consciousness returning to itself in love to close a perfect circle. Systematics “freeze-frames” the “circular” intelligible order of the Holy Trinity, inspects an intelligible order of origin in what one knows to be “a perfect circle” whose every “point” is both alpha and omega of tri-personal divine consciousness. Lonergan concludes the foreword to his argument thus:

This makes clear the difference between the emanation of the word and the emanation of love. For truth and falsity are in the mind; but good and evil are in things. Therefore, because the intellect tends toward an interior truth, the intrinsic formality of the emanation of a word tends to the formation within of a true likeness of a thing. But because the will tends toward an exterior good, the intrinsic formality of the emanation of love is the actuation of an inclination toward the object loved [\textit{De Ver.}, q. 4, a. 2 ad 7m]. (S 201.)

The real good that will has a rational appetite for is God’s goodness known and expressed as triune. The Holy Spirit, therefore, is the Word of Love proceeding passively, the love actively spirated by Father and Son, an intellectual emanation by way of God’s will-willingness-willing to love by God’s own rational love. The Holy Spirit is God’s proceeding Love. As the Word of Truth proceeds as divine affirmation, the Word of Love proceeds as divine loving; the first is like act arising within act (affirmation arising from grasp of truth and value spoken, generated as Word of Knowledge), the second is like an act arising from act (from their judgment of truth and value, Speaker and Word actively spirate the same who is passively the proceeding Spirit, the Word of Love). The only intelligible good that can satisfy the divine will’s rational appetite is God understood and spoken. Thus “the intrinsic nature of the emanation of love involves actuation of an inclination to the reality itself.” The Holy Spirit is the actuality of God’s inclination to love God’s triune unicity by spirating an act of will, an emanation at once inclined towards the same reality it eternally is as proceeding Love, three loving one God they know themselves to be personally and communally.

2.5.2 \textbf{Lonergan’s Argument}

The argument concluding chapter two of S comprises four questions:

\footnote{171 Editorial note 52 reads: “[That is, if in one consciousness intellect and the affections and will all function properly together, the unbalanced emphases are avoided and the circle of consciousness is complete.]”}
Question 1: “Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word?”

Loner gan’s answer adds further detail to elements of cognition already explained. “Since an act takes its species from its object, if one discovers different specific objects, one must distinguish different acts.”

There are 5 objects:

Now, in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true), the object that moves the intellect toward its second operation (sufficient evidence), the object that is the term of the first operation of intellect (a definition, a hypothesis), and the object that moves the intellect toward its first operation (the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter).

Furthermore, being and the true are convertible; whatever are convertible are not different in species; so being is also attained by the same act by which the true is attained. For this reason, the true is said to be the medium in which being is known.

Truth and sufficient evidence differ; “we are able to affirm the true because we have grasped evidence as sufficient.” Therefore, the answer to the question for judgment—Does understanding differ from inner word?—is yes because “one must distinguish very carefully between the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of evidence is grasped and the act of affirming the true, which is a word uttered within.”

Affirmation constitutes the Father-Son relationship; without affirmation there is no self-constituting knowledge expressed in God.

Question 2: “Can the existence of a Word in God be demonstrated by the natural light of reason?”

After rehearsing the several ways in which a word is necessary in us, Loner gan concludes: “Now the necessity of the word in God cannot be of this kind. For the divine intellect is not moved by something else, nor does it tend toward something else as toward a goal, but being infinite in perfection, it exists eternally, perfectly comprehending itself and perfectly understanding and knowing everything else in itself.” The answer is no.

Question 3: “Does the Word proceed from the understanding of creatures?”

Loner gan writes: “The answer seems to be no, for the divine Word is necessary and eternal, while creatures are contingent and temporal.” But Thomas teaches other-

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173 S, 203. Editorial note 55 reads: “[Loner gan’s discussion of agent object, terminal object, and transcendent object on pp. 149–51 of Verbum is a helpful supplement to this discussion.]”

174 S, 203. Note 56 reads: “I have explained precisely what evidence is sufficient in chapter 10 of Insight.”
In one act God understands himself and creatures, and that in a single Word God utters himself and creatures. Again, as divine understanding in regard to self is knowledge of that self but in regard to creatures is both divine knowledge of them and productive of them, so the divine Word is expressive of God and also both expressive and productive of creatures.\[64]175

To explain at the beginning of chapter 3 below the intelligible continuity between our conceiving God quoad se and conceiving God’s relation to everything actual and possible ad extra, I will draw from Lonergan’s answer to the present question. I believe his concluding remarks should suffice for the present:

Because divine understanding grasps with perfect clarity that the divine Word and divine Love are not dependent upon the conceptual relation, because divine understanding grasps with perfect clarity that all actual realities and possibles are utterly dependent upon divine understanding, upon the divine Word, and upon divine Love, it follows that the divine Word proceeds from the understanding of creatures in such a manner that creatures are truly and eternally being uttered as dependent upon the Word, and the divine Love proceeds from the understanding [Father] and affirmation [Son] of creatures in such a manner that creatures are rightly and eternally loved in dependence upon this Love [Spirit]. (S 217.)

We and everything created proceed ad extra from the processions of Word and Love ad intra.

Question 4: “Is the ‘beloved in the lover’ constituted by love or produced by love?” (S 219.) Of the four, I believe this to be the most challenging question. It would seem from the evidence—personal, from other students, in the literature—that the second procession is the most difficult element of the psychological analogy to understand. (Lonergan’s Thomist answer is also longer and more documented than the others.) He opens with these two passages from Thomas:

“In God there is procession only according to action that does not tend toward something extrinsic but remains within the agent itself. But such action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect and that of the will. The procession of the word is considered in connection with the action of the intellect. However, another procession is found in us in connection with the operation of the will, namely, the procession of love, whereby the beloved is in the one who loves, just as the reality spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the

\[175\] S, 213. Note 64 reads: ST “q. 34, a. 3. [In one of his own copies of the text, Lonergan added by hand, ‘Cf. q. 37, a. 2.’]”
word. Hence, in addition to the procession of the Word, another procession is to be posited in God, namely, the procession of Love.” (*ST*, I, q. 27, a. 3 c.; as quoted in *S* 219.)

And:

> “Just as from the fact that someone understands something, there comes forth in the one who understands some intellectual conception of the reality understood, which is called the word; so from the fact that someone loves something, there comes forth in the affection of the lover some impression, so to speak, of the reality loved, whereby the beloved is said to be in the one who loves, just as what is understood is in the one who understands. So it is that, when one understands and loves oneself, one is in oneself not only by an entitative identity, but also as what is understood is in the one who understands, and as the beloved is in the one who loves.”[66]

Lonergan raises the relevant question, then refers to the two quotations from Thomas:

Regarding that reality which is named ‘the beloved in the lover’ we are asking whether it is really the same as love, the act of loving, or whether perhaps it is really distinct from love and proceeds from love. If you say the former is the case, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love; if you say the latter is the case, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love. (*S* 221; emphases added.)

Recall that the Thomistic, conceptualist position makes of the will a principle of production.

In favor of the former opinion is the first passage cited above: according to that passage, the beloved is said to be in the one who loves in accordance with the procession of love, just as the thing spoken or understood is in the one who understands it through the conception of the word. For ‘the reality spoken or understood’ is constituted in the one who understands through the word itself; in like manner, therefore, the ‘beloved’ is constituted in the lover through proceeding love itself.

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[66] *ST*, I, q. 37, a. 1 c.; as quoted in *S*, 219. Editorial note 66 reads: “[The material in this question differs from the earlier version in *Divinarum personarum* [I. For the earlier material, see below, part 4 of appendix 4. The first two paragraphs of that part of the appendix state clearly the significance and importance of this question for trinitarian theology.]” Editorial note 1 p. 743 reads: “[Sections 3 and 4 of the first chapter of *Divinarum Personarum* were significantly changed in *De Deo Trino*, sections 4 and 5. There is nothing in *Divinarum Personarum* corresponding to section 3 of the first chapter of *De Deo Trino*, Pars systematica (above, pp. 20–31). Sections 3 and 4 of *Divinarum Personarum* are provided here.]” “The first of Lonergan’s own texts on the Trinity was *Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam evolvit Bernardus Lonergan, S.I.*, which was published *ad usum auditorum* (for the use of his students) by Gregorian University Press, Rome, in 1957.” General Editors’ Preface, *S*, xvii.
In favor of the latter opinion is the second passage cited above: there, from the fact that someone understands, there issues forth in the one understanding a conception of the thing understood, and similarly from the fact that someone loves, there issues forth in the affection of the lover a kind of impression of the thing loved. For the word is produced by the act of understanding, and so, in like manner, ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by the act of loving.177

To establish his position (the first) and, if not too strong a term, demolish indirectly what had become (and still largely remains) the traditional interpretation of the procession of love (Thomistic, not Thomist), Lonergan offers texts in which: “We answer by citing texts in which (1) ‘the beloved’ is present ‘in the lover’ because love is present and not because something is produced by the act of love, (2) the analogy is explicitly posited in the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word just as love proceeds in us from our mental word, (3) the Holy Spirit is called proceeding Love, and (4) a procession after the manner of a thing operated is excluded from the will.” (S 223.)

“What is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in the lover’s will, yet not in the same way in the two instances. What is loved is in the intellect by reason of a likeness of its species; but what is loved is in the will of the lover as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle through the suitability and proportion that the principle has to the term. Just so, a higher level is, in a way, in a flame by reason of the lightness according to which it possesses the proportion and suitability to such a level; but the generated flame is in the generating flame through the likeness of its form.” (CG, IV, 19, par. 4; as quoted in S 223.)

(Recall that Lonergan emphasizes intellectual consciousness which knows and loves; so Thomas’s emphases on faculties of intellect and will need to be considered in light of what we know about intellectual consciousness and its dynamisms.) Lonergan comments: “From this, one will conclude: just as the higher level is in a flame by reason of lightness, which is the principle of motion toward the higher level, so the beloved is in the lover by reason of love, which is the principle of motion toward the beloved. Nowhere in the text is anything said concerning a term immanently produced, either by love or by the lightness of the flame.” (S 223.)

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177 S, 221; emphases added. “We take the trinitarian analogy from the fact that we experience in ourselves two processions, the first of which is within intellect, while the second is from intellect toward will. In the first procession, we judge because and according as we grasp the sufficiency of evidence. And in the second, we choose because and according as we judge. ... Thus, we do not follow the opinion of Thomists in this matter, both because it prescinds from our internal experience in its conception of the psychological trinitarian analogy, and because it prescinds from our internal experience in its interpretation of the texts of St Thomas on psychological reality.” Ibid..
"It has been shown that it is necessary that the beloved be in some way in the will of the lover. But God loves himself. It is necessary, then, that God himself be in God’s own will as the beloved in the lover. But what is loved is in the lover inasmuch as it is loved; an act of love is a kind of act of will; God’s act of willing is God’s own act of existence … Hence, it must be that God, inasmuch as he is considered as existing within his own will, is truly and substantially God." (CG, IV, 19, par. 7; as quoted in S 223.)

In regard to this passage, Lonergan notes: “The beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is loved, not inasmuch as something is produced in the will by love; the argument would not be valid if the act of willing were one thing and ‘the beloved in the lover’ produced from the act of willing were another.” (S 223.)

“Love is said to transform the lover into the beloved inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very object that is loved.” (De Malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 13m; as quoted in S 223.)

Lonergan comments: “Therefore, ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love inasmuch as the lover is moved toward the beloved, and not inasmuch as something is produced within the will by love.” (S 223.)

“What is loved is in the lover inasmuch as it is actually being loved. But the fact that something is actually being loved proceeds both from the lover’s power to love and from actually understanding the lovable good. Therefore, the “beloved in the lover” proceeds from two principles: namely, from the amative principle, and from an intelligible apprehension which is a word conceived with respect to the lovable.” (Comp. Theol., c. 49; as quoted in S 223.)

Lonergan comments: “This passage determines both what constitutes ‘the beloved in the lover’ and that from which ‘the beloved in the lover’ proceeds; and, indeed, it cannot be so twisted as to assert that ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love, not by the word, and is different from love itself. Rather, in other passages St Thomas quite frequently teaches that the Spirit proceeds from the Word as love proceeds from a mental word.” (S 225.) The Son is lovable Word of Truth, the Spirit is truthful Word of Love.

Of sixteen passages from Thomas that Lonergan marshals to support his interpretation, I will present five: (1) “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word” [In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4m]. (2) “… proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.” [CG, IV, 24, par. 12]. (3) “But that something is in the will as what is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it and to the thing itself whose conception by the intellect is called the word: for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known …. It is necessary, therefore, that the love by which God is in the divine will as the beloved in the lover proceed both from
the Word of God and from God [the Father] whose Word he is.’’ [Ibid., IV, 19, par. 8]. (4)

“Nothing can be loved whose word is not first conceived in the intellect; hence, the one who proceeds by way of the will must be from the one who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently is distinguished from that one.’’ [De Pot., q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2nd ser.); see ibid., q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c.]” And 5:

“It is clear that we are able to love nothing with an intellectual and holy [see above n. 144 p. 101] love that we do not actually conceive by means of the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is the word; hence, it is necessary that love come forth from the word. Now, we say that the Word of God is the Son; it is clear, then, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son” [De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos et Arménos ad Cantorem Antiochiae, c. 4]. (All five as quoted in S 225-27.)

Lonergan comments: “Therefore, just as love proceeds from the word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word. It is no wonder, then, that St Thomas taught that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love itself and not something different that is produced by proceeding Love.” (S 227.)

On the Spirit as proceeding Love, he quotes the following: “’Insofar as we use these words (amore, dilectione) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by “love” proceeding love is understood …, and so Love is the name of a person’’” [ST, I, q. 37, a. 1 c.; see ibid., ad 3m; ad 4m.] ‘The Father and the Son are said to be loving through the Holy Spirit or through proceeding Love.’ [Ibid., a. 2 c.: cf., ibid., ad 3m; ad 4m.] ‘Partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love.’ [Ibid., q. 38, a. 1 c.] ‘Since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love.’ [Ibid., a. 2 c.] ‘The Holy Spirit because he proceeds as Love from the Father.’ [Ibid., ad 1m].” (All as quoted in S 227; emphasis added.)

Lonergan comments: “As regards this comparison between the procession of the word and the procession of love, Aquinas taught the following and never retracted it.” (S 227.) This clinches his argument:

“There is this difference between intellect and will: the operation of the will terminates at things, in which there is good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which there is the true and the false, as is said in Metaphysics VI [lect. 4, § 1240]. Consequently, the will does not have anything going forth from itself, except what is in it after the manner of an operation; but the intellect has in itself something that goes forth from itself, not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation.’” (De Ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 7m; as quoted in S 227.)

Lonergan comments: “Thus one may conclude: if nothing proceeds within the will after the manner of a term of an operation, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love and not produced by love.” (S 227.) (“The only procession in the will is the proces-
Lonergan’s argument ends with two responses to those who would argue that Thomas’s thought on the procession of love underwent development that supports their interpretation. I have reversed the order. I first quote his second, withering response to the Thomistic claim:

This internally consistent doctrine would have evolved to the extreme if in some later stage it could be proved beyond doubt (1) that the second procession is not the procession of love from the word, but ‘of the beloved in the lover’ from love, (2) that the Holy Spirit is ‘the beloved in the lover’ but is not proceeding Love, (3) that there is a procession in the will after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation, (4) that the beloved is in the lover, not because the beloved is being loved, but because something really distinct proceeds from this love, which is named ‘the beloved in the lover.’ (S 229.)

His first response will serve to summarize his elucidation of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and bring my account of Lonergan’s argument in S’s chapter 2 to closure:

A hypothesis concerning development is superfluous when one attends to St Thomas’s explicit doctrine. St Thomas taught explicitly (1) that the second procession is the procession of love from the word; (2) that the Holy Spirit is both ‘the beloved in the lover’ and proceeding Love; (3) that the only procession in the will is the procession after the manner of an operation; and (4) that the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is being loved.178 (S 229.)

With Lonergan’s development of Thomas’s systematic principle of intellectual emanation—conceiving the procession of the Word as a distinct mode of intellectual emanation, and the procession of Spirit as a distinct mode of intellectual emanation—long-held Catholic misunderstanding of Logos and Pneuma are purified of their Thomistic distortions. The critical issue raised by long-defective Catholic pneumatology at long last has been resolved, and by the only means that can resolve such issues when the psychological analogy is employed in trinitarian systematics: by a verifiable critical realism.

3. On Chapter Three: “The Real Divine Relations”

Now that we understand the ratio of our quarry—the supreme incident of the idea

178 Cf.: “What Aquinas held is quite clear. In us there is a procession of love from the will, but that is processio operationis and irrelevant to trinitarian theory.91 [91De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.] In us there is a procession of one act of love from another, but that also is irrelevant to trinitarian theory.92 [92Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3m.] In us there is a procession of love from the inner word and, as Aquinas very frequently repeated, that is the procession that is relevant to trinitarian theory.” Verbum, 212.
of order, God as *Dicens, Verbum,* and *Amor*—in sections 3-5 we will focus principally on intelligible orders. Of attendant assertions and questions, I’ll report only those most relevant to gaining a more theologically informed understanding of order in God.

The reader will appreciate that Lonergan argues the divine relations from the systematic principle established in section 2 above. We understand him because he argues from now familiar concepts. Most new technical terms, because they structure a new perspective on God’s inner life, are indeed new but also virtual synonyms of terms already explained. Moreover, because he has already explained them systematically, he can now speak of the same technical terms and relations according to “less austere modes of thought.” While not easy sailing, his argument hereafter does not entail notions difficult to understand.

3.1 **Lonergan’s Introduction to the Divine Relations**

In his brief treatment of Assertion 4, Lonergan makes four points that in turn conclude to, establish, prove, and explain the meaning of the assertion:

Now that we have conceived the two specifically distinct divine processions, we must ask what reality is to be attributed to them. First, we conclude that there are in God four real relations and that these are really identical with the processions. Next, we establish that these relations are subsistent. Third, we show that three of these subsistent relations are really distinct from one another. And fourth, we explain that the real divine relations are really identical with the divine substance but conceptually distinct from that same substance. (S 231.)

Chapter 1 above (n. 15 p. 6) spoke of the sources used by the systematic theologian, specifically the category of “theological doctrines.” Lonergan speaks instead of “classical assertions” which, in the present case, date from medieval times. It is commonly held that “in God there is a trinity and not a quaternity, that in God everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition, that in God what is essential and what is notional are conceptually distinct but really identical, and that concerning God it is illegitimate in a syllogism to argue from what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term.” (S 231; see DISTINCTION, RATIONAL; and DISTINCTION, REAL.)

Lonergan then attaches theological notes to indicate the degree of probability that his assertions are true. I quote in full because the notes provide a résumé of many trinitarian dogmas:

The four assertions presented in this chapter are theologically certain. From the very names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ we conclude with certainty that there are real relations in God. With equal certainty we conclude from the two processions that there are four real divine relations (DB 54, DS 125–26, ND 7–8; DB 691, DS 1300, ND 322). It is likewise a certain conclusion from the Trinity of persons that three real divine relations
are really distinct from one another, whether with the Fathers we argue that consubstantial persons cannot be really distinct from one another except by relations of origin (DB 280, DS 530, ND 314) or, more succinctly, we adopt the axiom of the Council of Florence that in God ‘everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition’ (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325). We can also conclude with certainty that there is no real distinction between the real relations and the divine substance, since ‘in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity’ (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318); and therefore it is equally certain that the real relations are subsistent (DB 389, DS 745). Finally, it is a certain conclusion that there is at least a conceptual distinction between the real relations and the divine substance, because the substance neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, and yet the Father generates, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318). (S 233; Lonergan’s emphases.)

Note that the truth being so painstakingly protected is the consubstantiality of the persons. Later we will discuss from another perspective the related topic of section 2 above, the relative and infinite in God.

3.2 Assertion 4: On Divine Relations

Assertion 4 reads:

Four real relations follow upon the divine processions: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. (S 235.)

Lonergan argues in 5 steps (note the recurrence in yet another context, and not the last, of the same terms and relations of Lonergan’s cognitional theory):

1. A relation is simply the order of one to another. From the real procession of the Word from the principle he concludes to a real relation of word to speaker. We know the procession of the word is generation in the proper sense, thus “this real relation of the word to its principle is filiation.” (S 235; emphasis added.) He continues:

2. From the real procession of love, there follows a real relation of love to the principle that spirates love; and since this procession is not generation in the proper sense, this real relation is not filiation, and can fittingly be termed passive spiration. (S 235; emphasis added.)

The procession of love is not generation for generation is directly from intellect while spiration is indirectly from intellect by way of the will.

3. The intellectually conscious procession of the word is from the grasp of the intelligibility of whatever is to be uttered; moreover, from this grasp of intelligibility there emerges in the intellect that grasps it an intellectual necessity to speak the word. Since this necessity to speak the word really exists in the intellect, it is a real relation to the word to be spoken, and, once this word is uttered, a real relation to
the word spoken. Finally, since in God to speak the word is to generate the Son, the real relation to the eternally spoken Word, the eternally generated Son, is the real relation of paternity. (S 235; emphasis added.)

In God, then, a relation is not simply the order of one to another but that which is ordered to another; and, according to Lonergan’s hypothesis, God’s consciousness necessarily speaks.

4. The intellectually conscious procession of love is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of whatever is to be loved; moreover, from this grasp and affirmation of goodness there emerges in the one who grasps and affirms it an intellectual or moral necessity to spirate love; since this necessity really exists in the one who has grasped and affirmed goodness, it is a real relation to the love that is to be spirated and, once this love has arisen, a real relation to the love spirated; finally, this real relation of the spirator to what is spirated is fittingly termed active spiration. [Father and Son unopposed to each other as lovers; thus one Spirator of a single Love]. (S 237; emphasis added.)

Note the language of before and after (e.g., “once spirated”). While unavoidable in systematic explanation, we should be careful not to reinforce such potentially misleading temporal imagery.

5. Once these matters are grasped, we conclude from the real divine processions that there are four real relations in God, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.

We are regarding the same God from different perspectives. Processions/emanations, relations, subsistents, persons, and the notional acts are conceptually distinct sets of categories that refer to the one reality we worship as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father is paternity, and so on. Understanding conceptually distinct sets of terms requires differing sets of concepts: “The processions and relations are conceptually distinct, for to conceive the origin of one from another is not the same as to conceive the order of one to another; a father, for example, does not originate from his son, but he does have an order to his son.” (S 237-39.)

3.3 Assertion 5: On Divine Subsistents

Assertion 5 reads:

These four relations are subsistent. (S 239.)

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179 S, 237. For Lonergan’s reply to the objection that the relations of paternity and active spiration are not real; and for his explanation of why the “processions are conceptually distinct from, but really identical with, the relations,” see ibid..
We have discussed beings of reason, possibles, accidents, and the constitutive principles of being, but “there are those things that are first and foremost said to be – minerals, plants, animals, humans, angels, God, the Father, the Son, the Spirit. Since all of these simply are and truly are, they are rightly given the special designation ‘subsistent.’ A subsistent, then, is whatever simply is that which is. It is distinguished from conceptual beings, possibles, accidents, and the constitutive principles of being.” (§ 241.) The term subsistent was discussed in chapter 1 above (subsection 3.1.2 p. 42) in regard to a real human subject, Peter. Recall that the abstract definition is univocal of divine and human subsistents. As applied concretely, however, divine and human subsistents differ because of their differing intellectual natures:

We are dealing rather with a subject that is a person and, indeed, a person as conscious. Hence ‘subject’ is understood as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and this subject is considered in relation to his intellectual nature.

The analogy, then, about which we are inquiring is the analogy of the subject as subject; for a temporal subject as well as an eternal subject is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, but a temporal subject and an eternal subject are related to their respective intellectual natures in different ways. (§ 401.)

We began with two processions and from them concluded to four real relations: “We now continue along the way of synthesis to argue from the relations to subsistent subjects – that is to say, from paternity to the Father, from filiation to the Son, from active spiration to the Spirator, and from passive spiration to the Spirit.” (§ 239-41.) Lonergan’s argument again takes the form of a scientific syllogism. Rather than give a direct account of the syllogism, I will first state Lonergan’s conclusion and then draw from his excursus to explain it. Lonergan concludes that “divine paternity is God the Father, divine filiation is God the Son, divine active spiration is God the Spirator [Father and Son as one principle], and divine passive spiration is God the Spirit.” (§ 245.)

His explanation of the conclusion draws from notions we have already discussed, and he makes an important distinction between the theological certainty that the relations are subsistents, and the way the meaning is expressed; in that respect “as far as its content is concerned, this assertion is theologically certain. But in its mode of expression it is a common and certain opinion.” (§ 241; Lonergan’s emphases.) He also makes an important distinction between what something is and that whereby something is. “In creatures, the subsistent which is differs from the essence or form or relation by which it is.” (§ 245.) Essence and existence are really distinct in us, but:

In regard to God, however, ‘God’ and ‘divinity,’ ‘Father’ and ‘paternity,’ ‘Son’ and ‘filiation,’ ‘Spirator’ and ‘active spiration,’ ‘Spirit’ and ‘passive spiration’ differ in the way they signify but not in what they signify. (§ 247.)

In us and all created things a relation is distinct from what is related; but in God,
“the subject that is related and the relation by which it is related are the same”; thus “when paternity is posited, by the same token the Father is posited, and likewise in the case of the other divine relations.” (§ 247.)

Lonergan ends by noting that his explanation of Assertion 5 is meant to clarify the meaning of he distinction between a relation as a relation and a relation as a subsistent. He continues:

The relations as relations are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, whereas the relations as subsistent are Father, Son, Spirator, and Spirit.10 The respective pairs differ in the way they signify but are the same in what they signify. (§ 247.)

We now move on to distinguish among the four real relations three that are really distinct.

3.4 Assertion 6: On Really Distinct Divine Relations

Assertion 6 reads:

Three real relations in God are really distinct from one another, on the basis of mutual opposition. (§ 247.)

This assertion is of particular interest to us because it regards order and is argued on the basis of order. It comprises six technical terms. The really distinct relations are paternity, filiation, and passive spiration (these are virtual synonyms of speaker, word, and love). A relation, we know, is simply the order of one to another and, in God, also that which is ordered. Each of the three relations is real, i.e., it exists. Each is really distinct, i.e., one as real is not another as real. (Recall that there are four real relations but only three are really distinct.) Finally, three relations are mutually opposed. Relations are mutually opposed if each is the term of the other; thus, father is the term to which son is referred, and son is the term to which father is referred. (§ 247.) Thus there cannot be father without son and vice versa; likewise for love and lover.

In the preliminaries to his argument (pp. 247-53), the part of his treatment of Assertion 6 that concerns us most, Lonergan makes six points to establish the ratio of there being in God a common nature and three real relations “related to one another in a single system of relations.” (§ 251.) Because it summarizes the intent of the first five, I will focus on the sixth point. It reads: “Inasmuch as speaker, word, and love regard the same object, each one is really related to the other by a single real relation.” (§ 251.) In other words, the single real relation of one-to-two is a single order, and there are three that regard a single object. The single object that speaker, word, and love regard is “some good.” It might seem that we have lost contact with the psychological analogy; but to understand the three relations to the good (really, the ground of consubstantiality), Lonergan expresses again the elements of knowing and loving supposed to be in God
quoad se:

Let us say that the one object of speaker, word, and love is some good. In that case the speaker grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming in a true word the goodness of that object and therefore loving it with a right and proper love. Next, because of the evidence grasped, the goodness because of which the object is to be loved is expressed in a true word. Third, because of the evident goodness grasped by the speaker and affirmed in the true word, love is spirated. (§ 251.) Thus he expresses in psychological terms what was called above “a common nature and three real relations ‘related to one another in a single system of relations.’” The reader can easily construct the possible orders of speaker to word and love, word to speaker and love, and love to speaker and word.

Lonergan follows his preliminary argument with comment on the four real relations (paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration), and the fact that only three are really distinct, opposed relations because Father and Son as one Spirator are not distinguished from paternity and filiation (the relations that constitute them as Father and Son), i.e., they are opposed as speaker and word—but not as lovers—of divine goodness.180

3.5 Assertion 7: On Divine Relations and Essence

Assertion 7 reads:

The real divine relations are rationally distinct from but really identical with the divine essence. (§ 257.)

This final assertion of chapter three requires the longest and most complex of Lonergan’s arguments. The formal argument is brief, but the total explanation of Lonergan.

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180 The conceptual complexity affecting the procession of love (active and passive spirations) and the misunderstanding it engenders can, perhaps, be overcome. Crowe offers “a new answer to the question: How many real relations are there in God?” The Doctrine, 152. After explaining, in terms of Lonergan’s cognitional theory, the ratio of his conclusion (pp. 151-52), he writes: “It is said that there are four real relations but only three of them are really distinct, active spiration being not distinguished in the Father from paternity or in the Son from filiation. However, it seems to me simpler and more accurate to say there are simply three real relations in God, one in each person towards the other two, the one ground of relation determining the relation as one in each case despite the multiplication of terms. This also seems to me more concrete, for ‘paternity’ is a kind of abstraction, regarding the ground of the Father’s relation to the Son, but prescinding from the ground of his relation to the Spirit. This last consideration shows how you can speak of either three or four real relations in God and be correct, for you can count four by prescinding from aspects that are one in the concrete, or count three if you take a more concrete view.” Ibid., 152. The six possible relations are explained and reduced to four real and three really distinct relations in ibid., 125.
gan’s argument for Assertion 7 comprises four notes that further explain technical elements, and five questions (nos. 5-9). We will first consider the argument, then three of the four notes and, finally, Question 7.

We already know that the only real distinction in God is a personal relation; and, since there is one God and each personal relation is God, we know that a personal relation must be only rationally distinct but really identical with the divine essence. But we are intent to understand why (know the causes; gain scientific knowledge) so we might benefit ourselves and teach others the various ways the one divine order can be conceived. Lonergan argues in three steps: “First, that the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept; second, that they are the same in reality; third, that therefore it remains that they are not the same in concept.” (S 257.)

1. “The divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept.” (S 257.) According to the principle of contradiction, contraries cannot be predicated of what is the same both really and rationally. We rightly predicate contraries—essence and relation—of God, so divine essence and divine relation cannot be the same both really and conceptually: “‘The Father is not the Son’ and ‘God is the Son’; but ‘Son’ and ‘not Son’ are contradictory terms; therefore, the Father and God are not the same both in reality and in concept. The same argument holds in comparing the other real relations with the divine essence.” (S 257.) Whereas we rightly affirm “the Son is God,” can we also rightly affirm that God is the Son? Yes, logically, because when the terms of an affirmation are singular they are convertible; yes, theologically, because Lateran IV (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318) declares that there is: “… one supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: three persons taken together, and each of them taken individually.” (As quoted in S 259.)

2. “[The divine essence and a real divine relation] are the same in reality.” (S 259.) Lonergan offers three approaches to affirming the statement. First, from divine simplicity: “Divinity and paternity are either (1) really different and not a composite, or (2) really different and a composite, or (3) really the same.” Number 1 denies the Father’s divinity; 2 denies God’s simplicity. Only 3 is possible because consonant with faith; “and the real identity between the divine essence and the other real divine relations is proven in the same way.” (S 259.) The second argument is from the now familiar principle of Anselm, adopted by the Council of Florence, that “in God all things are one where there is no relational opposition.” The Father is not opposed to divinity, the divine essence, and so for the other persons. The basis of the third argument has also been mentioned, namely Lateran IV’s declaration: “In God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity.” (As quoted in S 259.) There would be a divine fourth were the opposed relations really distinct from the divine essence.

3. “It remains that [the divine essence and a real divine relation] are not the same in
Lonergan’s main argument is from a distinction of reason whereby, by definition, concepts differ (the concept of one is not the concept of the other). “The concept of paternity is not the concept of divinity. Therefore, paternity and divinity are conceptually distinct. And a similar conclusion is had by comparing the divine essence with the other real divine relations.” (§ 261.)

Lonergan follows with four notes that further explain aspects of his succinct formal argument, and then the five questions which do the same and draw out implications. For our purposes we will attend to the first three notes¹⁸¹ and then to Question 7.¹⁸²

3.5.1 Notes on Assertion 7

The notes add brief explanation to familiar matter with emphasis on usefulness in systematic argument. The first note returns to the Lateran IV teaching that in God there is only a Trinity and no divine fourth. We have already examined the ratio of why three really distinct divine relations are identical with the divine essence; so we already understand why we cannot add a fourth really distinct element to the three relations. This knowledge is useful: “If this principle of the council is assumed, it is very easy to prove that the three real divine relations really distinct from one another cannot be really distinct either from the divine essence or, by extension, from the fourth real relation, active spiration.”¹⁵¹⁸³

The second note concerns the familiar teaching of Florence that all is one where an opposed relation does not stand in the way. Lonergan writes: “Note also that if this principle of the council is assumed it is very easy to prove both that the really distinct divine persons are distinct only by reason of their mutually opposed real relations, and that, since the divine essence is not a relation, and much less a relation opposed to a re-

¹⁸¹ The interested reader will find the logic of Lonergan’s argument further elaborated in the fourth note: “It is illegitimate in a syllogism to argue from what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term.” S, 265.

¹⁸² The interested reader will find further detailed explanation of the relation-substance distinction in questions 5, 6, pp. 267-89; and question 8, pp. 295-99, on the issue of the nature of the distinction. Question 8 reads: “Is it by a major or a minor conceptual distinction that the divine substance is distinguished from the divine relations and, conversely, that the divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance?” Lonergan notes (p. 295): “Note that this is an open question, lacking any theological note.” The answers depend on viewpoint. Lonergan takes the via media.

¹⁸³ S, 261. Editorial note 15 reads in part: “[There is something of a slip here, it would seem. …]” I don’t agree, but space does not permit a full explanation of why except to say that Lonergan’s albeit awkward formulation, in upholding that there are only three really distinct relations, implies that active spiration (included in the three really distinct relations) is not distinguished in the Father from paternity or in the Son from filiation.
lation, the divine essence is really identical both with the real divine relations and with all the essential attributes.” (S 263.) Again, no divine fourth.

I find the third note particularly useful. In its technical formulation it reads: “In God the essential and the notional are conceptually distinct but really identical.” (S 263.) Lonergan reminds us that the essential attributes (further discussed below) are “predicated of each person and of all – for example, that they are, they live, they understand, they love, they create, they govern, and so on.” (S 263.) The “notionals,” discussed further in sections 4 and 5 below, “imply one or other real relation and therefore cannot be predicated of all the persons but only of that person whose relation it is . . . .” (S 263-65.) We know from our earlier discussion of the relations of origin that only the Father begets, the begotten Son does not beget, the spirated Spirit does not beget or spirate. “Since the relations and the essence are conceptually distinct and really identical, clearly what is essential and what is notional are also conceptually distinct and really identical.” (S 265.)

Once again, Lonergan returns to the familiar absolute-relative distinction but now conceived according to essential and notional attributes.

3.5.2 Question 7: What is the value of the distinction between ‘being in’ and ‘being to’?

“This distinction, based on reduplication, is valuable in two ways, and has one danger.” Lonergan says. (S 291.) Unlike other categories (subsistents, qualities, the predicaments) a relation can be distinguished as real and as a being of reason. A real relation as a relation is named “to be to,” while a real relation as real is named “to be in.” Lonergan explains: “Just as it is proper to a substance to be through itself, and just as it is proper to an accident in the strict sense to be in another, so it is proper to a relation as a relation to be to another. Hence, a real relation as a relation is said ‘to be to.’ Furthermore, since in general all relations are accidents, they have that reality that is proper to accidents, namely, ‘to be in,’ and therefore a real relation as real is said ‘to be in.’” (S 289-91.) The two elements of the distinction do not form a composite but are “two aspects of one real relation.” (S 291.) He concludes:

The same distinction between the relations would not be real but only conceptual if there were only the ‘being to’ without a real ‘being in’; for if they are not real, then mutually opposed relations are not really distinct from one another. (S 291.)

What is the twofold value and the single danger of this distinction? Our concern throughout this chapter has been, and will continue to be, gaining concepts of how God can be at once one divinity and three distinct divine subjects. Our goal is to attain a scientific concept of divine order, i.e., a concept whose ratio is understood, therefore known scientifically (i.e., with a degree of probability). The twofold value of the distinc-
tion, therefore, regards a more precise understanding of the ontology of divine unity.

It is valuable, first, because the real distinctions among the divine persons arise, not from the affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same formality, but in the single real affirmation of mutually opposed relations. In other words, the real distinction of the persons arises proximately from one ‘being-to’ opposing another ‘being-to.’ (S 291.)

The second value of the distinction lies in its clarification of the well-known statement that a divine person is everything the others are except, concretely, the Father is not the Son and the Spirit, and so for each person.

The Son has all that the Father has, except paternity. The Son is not really distinct from God; God is not really distinct from the Father; yet the Son is really distinct from the Father, because the distinction of persons is by reason of the mutual opposition of one ‘being-to’ and another ‘being-to.’ (S 291.)

Thus it becomes clearer that the ground of distinction among the persons is not through positing real contradictories “but on the mutual opposition of one ‘being-to’ and another ‘being-to.’”¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, “the one danger is that one may lose sight of the fact that ‘being to’ is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation,” i.e., ‘being to’ belongs to the nature of a real relation.

There would be no mystery of the Trinity at all if three merely conceptual beings were attributed to one pure infinite act. This seems sometimes to be supposed, when difficulties and problems are solved too neatly and efficiently.¹⁸⁵

The issue is not whether it is true that in one and the same absolute real relations are identical with the divine essence; we already know “there is only a conceptual distinction between the absolute and the relative aspects of God.” (S 291.) Lonergan, rather, is intent to shed more light on the unity, the consubstantiality, the essence. He is saying that the distinction cannot be used to illuminate both the distinction of persons and the unity of essence, it does not cover the whole truth:

Since truth is one thing and the whole truth is another, it is one thing to throw more

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¹⁸⁴ S, 291. Lonergan continues: “The same value is clear from the fact that ‘… God … is not less in each one [of the persons] nor greater in all three [together]; for there is no less reality when any one of the persons is individually called God, nor is there more when all three persons are declared to be one God’ (DB 279, DS 529, ND 312). That is to say, the distinction of the persons is grounded not on real contradictory affirmations but on the mutual opposition of one ‘being-to’ and another ‘being-to.’”

¹⁸⁵ S, 291. Lonergan seems to allude to published works that do solve theoretical difficulties and problems by making “being to” a distinction of reason, thus “solving” the conceptual difficulty of conceiving a consubstantial triune reality.
light on the divine unity and quite another to throw more light simultaneously on both the divine unity and the divine trinity. The former is what this distinction does, and therefore it has a very great value. But no short and simple distinction can achieve the latter, since we are dealing with a mystery hidden in God. Therefore, since we confess both trinity in unity and unity in trinity, we may by no means argue on the basis of this distinction between ‘being to’ and ‘being in’ as if the whole doctrine of the Trinity were contained in this distinction alone. Although this distinction is true, although it is most useful, and although there is no danger in it as long as abuse is avoided, still abuse creeps in as soon as one supposes, even implicitly, that any partial truth is the whole truth. (S 293.)

First, in section 2, we studied the processions. In the present section, we distinguished the processions as relations and subsistents, a topic which in turn prepares us for the topic of section 4 immediately following these final remarks, namely the relations as persons. Then follow the attributes, the personal properties, and the notional acts. Always we are talking about the same realities from differing perspectives that arise from answering the systematically ordered questions. One answer provides the ground of the next as we move from processions to relations to persons and so on. Always our purpose is the same: to progressively understand how, without there being a real distinct divine fourth, God is both absolute and relative, one and plural. To gain systematic understanding of what in the end is only Father, Son, and Holy Spirit we continue to consider systematically the order of emergence of what will become, by the time we reach Assertion 14 in section 5 below, Lonergan’s total systematic ratio of order in God quoad se.


Way back in his chapter two, Lonergan wrote:

In the fourth chapter we must determine whether, both ontologically and psychologically, the divine subsistent relations are persons in the true sense of the word. Once this question is solved, the fundamental trinitarian problem is solved, so that without contradiction and with some understanding the three really distinct persons in one and the same divine nature may be conceived and truly affirmed. (S 129-31.)

Lonergan’s chapter four is intended to prepare the reader for the final three assertions, the topic of section 5 below. We will not discuss the content of chapter four’s especially comprehensive, dense, and complex argument with the amplitude of a Roman seminary course in the early 1960s; rather, we will concentrate on the principle topics of chapter four’s two sections, namely “we will investigate the essential meaning or definition of person and apply it to the divine persons,” and then “we will examine the attributes of the divine persons, their properties, and the notional acts.” (S 307.) Al-
though all his categories are familiar and to some extent understood, here Lonergan adds considerably more explanation for the sake of, as I see it, as clear and theologically informed an understanding as possible of perfection of order in God.

We began in section 2 above with processions, then in section 3 established them as relations. Now we come to the third set of categories for the same realities and consider the persons first “as they are in themselves, next, the persons with respect to one another, and third, the persons in their relation to us.” (S 307.) Consideration of the persons in themselves is divided into, respectively, the meaning of person and “the attributes of the divine persons, their properties, and the notional acts.”

Lonergan’s argument comprises four assertions (8-11) and nine questions (10-18). We will pay particular attention to Assertion 8 on the relations as persons, and Assertion 9 on the notional acts, “the foundation of order in God.” (S 369.) Of the questions, we will pay particular attention to the one that leads to Assertion 8, namely Question 10.

4.1 Question 10: The Notion of Person

Lonergan asks, “What should be understood by the word ‘person’?” (S 309.) We have already considered all the principal and some of the secondary elements of his answer. “From what we have said, it is clear that there are in God three real relations that are subsistent and really distinct from one another, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Now we ask whether these relations are truly persons in the proper sense.” (S 309.)

The interested reader will find a concise history in which Lonergan distinguishes five types of answer to the same question. Each contributes an element to his answer (summarized below). “We will call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit persons: persons in name, persons by definition, persons by reason of metaphysical constitution, persons by reason of consciousness, and persons by reason of relations both among themselves and to us.” (S 313.) Related to one another from the perspective of history, “it is clear that besides the multitude of opinions about what a person is, there exists a single heuristic structure that has been developing over the course of time” (S 313.) and continues to develop. The incipient heuristic structure was Augustine’s question, Three what? (“Here we have already a heuristic structure, but there was apparently no answer yet, only perplexity.” (S 313.)) In chapter 1 above we discussed Thomas’s answer to Augustine’s question for understanding, Thomas’s definition of person as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. All we need to affirm the divine three as persons can be deduced from Thomas’s definition. Much, however, has happened since Thomas, and “since we ought neither to be ignorant of nor to disregard more recent notions,”186 (S 319.) we must sift position from counterposition in contemporary understanding of per-

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186 Lonergan is alluding to *Humani Generis* (see above n. 19 p. 8).
We will examine many elements that enter (the positions) and do not enter (the counterpositions) true understanding of the name person. Theologians today seem especially interested in consciousness, intersubjectivity, and interpersonal relations.

The elements that most concern our effort to attain analogical understanding of a divine person are positions on matters still hotly contested among philosophers and theologians: subjectivity (introduced early in chapter 1 above and continually explained); objectivity (see above subsection 1.3.1 p. 90), consciousness (continually explained; consciousness is the topic of subsection 5.1 below); the intersubjective (discussed as a counterposition in subsection 1.1.1 p. 82 above); and, herein, the interpersonal.

Of the prime categories involved in knowing and loving, consciousness and intersubjectivity were not much discussed by the “medievals.” While it is true that “verification of the definition [Thomas’s] alone suffices for rightly calling them [Father, Son, Spirit] persons,” (S 325) we must take account of contemporary concerns. Most of all, we want an answer to Question 10 that can be applied by analogy to a divine person.

Although we speak of objectivity and object in many different ways in keeping with the various steps in which human knowledge is achieved, all other meanings are reducible to this principal one, that objectivity is simply truth, and ‘object’ denotes only that which is known through the medium of the true. No one who has grasped that the supreme perfection of a person consists in the intellectual emanations in the realms of truth and goodness can reject this meaning. Nor is any other meaning of objectivity or of object required either in order to accept the meaning of faith according to the First Vatican Council or in order to acknowledge the soundness and depth of traditional theology. (S 319-21; emphases added.)

After a highly condensed discussion of counterpositions incapable of accounting for consciousness, he concludes that if consciousness is understood and explained according to his critical-realist analysis of truth and being, “then at one and the same time there are preserved the meaning and nature of consciousness, the method of traditional theology that treats truths and beings, and Catholic dogma, which through the true attains God as triune.” (S 323.)

Lonergan summarizes his long and complex argument. Perhaps the reader will indulge my saying that, in my estimate, the following ranks among the most brilliant passages in his chapters on God quoad se; brilliant because of the understanding required to be the first to say it:

We must discuss the consciousness of a divine person as being known through the

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187 The interested reader will find Lonergan’s very informative overview of still current philosophical and theological counterpositions on person, consciousness, subjectivity, objectivity, and intersubjectivity, ibid., 319-23.
true. If this is done, there will hardly be any difficulty in dealing with any of these
questions. For ‘unconscious understanding’ makes no sense; similarly, ‘understand-
ing unconsciously’ makes no sense. But the divine act of existence is the divine act
of understanding; the divine act of existence, therefore, is conscious and consciously
is. Moreover, the divine processions, the divine subsistent relations, and whatever
else is said to be really in God are also really identical with the divine act of exist-
ence; they are therefore likewise conscious and consciously are. Hence, if the real,
subsistent divine relations really distinct from one another are persons, those per-
sons are conscious and are consciously distinguished from one another. (S 323.)

Given that consciousness is a major category of contemporary theology of God, one
cannot imagine a clearer nor more solid ratio than the foregoing for integrating into sys-
tematics the attendant major categories of person, intersubjectivity, and interpersonal
relations. Lonergan then summarizes the five elements accumulated over time (men-
tioned at the beginning of this subsection on Question 10):

What does it seem should be understood by the word ‘person’? The answer is that
we understand five things. To begin with, ‘person’ is a common word that answers
the question, Three what? Next, a person is, according to St Thomas’s definition, ‘a
distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.’ Third, a divine person is a subsistent re-
lation, or a subsistent that is distinct by reason of a relation. Fourth, a divine person
is a distinct subject and is conscious of himself both as subject and as distinct. Fifth,
by reason of their interpersonal relations the divine persons are not only related to
one another but are also constituted as persons. (S 323-25.)

These five points on the divine persons considered in themselves will be further elabo-
rated below to prepare us for the final topic on God quoad se, S’s chapter five on the di-
vine persons compared to one another. Then we will be in a position to grasp perfection
of order in God.

Lonergan’s final remarks provide one of those glimpses of his personal piety re-
ferred to above (p. 69). His, shall we say, relentless insistence on the category of con-
sciousness is tied both to servicing the needs of contemporary theology and to the theo-
logian’s authenticity:

Although medieval theologians usually did not expressly discuss consciousness, it is
quite clear that neither Catholic theologians nor even the Catholic faithful ever
adored an unconscious God or unconscious divine persons. Who would ever ask for
mercy from an unconscious being, and who does not think it must be asked for? But
if it belongs to the sensus fidelium that the divine persons are conscious, it belongs to
theologians to look for a way to provide a clear and distinct explanation regarding
this consciousness, lest they incur the reproach of being useless servants who have
buried the talent they have received from the Lord [Matthew 25.14–30]. (S 325.)
We now turn to the first of the remaining four assertions that will give an explanatory account of the relations as persons, the divine attributes, the personal properties, and the notional acts.

4.2 Assertion 8: On the Relations as Persons

Assertion 8 reads:

The real, subsistent divine relations, really distinct from one another, are properly called and are persons. (S 325.)

Here we presuppose the truths of faith and what has already been explained about processions and relations. “The one small element of understanding that must now be added is simply to grasp the connection expressed in this assertion, namely, that if there are divine relations that are real, subsistent, and really distinct from one another, they are persons in the true sense of the word.” (S 327.) Lonergan asks and answers questions meant to specify further the meaning of person as the term is applied to God. I have selected from eight questions (11-18) numbers 11, 13, 16, 17.

4.2.1 Question 11: “In what sense is God a person?” (S 329.)

This point contributes to Jewish-Christian dialogue on God. Lonergan writes: “God in the Old Testament is identical with God the Father in the New Testament: that is the principle of continuity between the Old Testament and the New.” Before the revelation of the Holy Trinity, the Father was known as a person and, indeed, Jews still relate to YHWH as a divine person who is to them, of course, the only divine person. Each person is the one God, thus it can be affirmed that Jews and Christians worship the God of Moses; but we differently understand YHWH as a person. Christians know YHWH the Father as a distinct divine person. “Therefore, one who knows God but does not know the Trinity knows ‘a subsistent in an intellectual nature’ and does not know that ‘a subsistent in an intellectual nature’ does not satisfy the definition of person. In other words, one who is ignorant of both the Trinity and the definition of person thinks of God as a person.” (S 331.)

4.2.2 Question 13: “What does the word ‘person’ mean in regard to God?” (S 333.)

The answer is that “in God, ‘person’ signifies an individual in an indeterminate sense, an individuum vagum [ST, 1, q. 30, a. 4].” Person is a category comprising more than

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188 Namely, conclusions from the doctrines of faith as expounded in The Triune God: Doctrines.

one individual. “There is this difference between a determinate individual and an individual in an indeterminate sense, that ‘person’ is predicated of Socrates or of Plato or of Aristotle, but ‘Socrates’ is said only of Socrates.” Similarly, “in God, ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Spirit’ name determinate individuals, while ‘person’ names an individual indeterminately.” Yet, nothing indeterminate really exists, “the common element that ‘person’ signifies is what is common according to a formality, namely, the formality of a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.” (All quotes from S 331.) Yet, since nothing at all can be applied univocally to God and us:

The common element that ‘person’ signifies is what is common according to a formality, namely, the formality of a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. Still, there is this difference between the word ‘person’ as applied to God and as applied to humans, that it is applied to the latter as a universal, since it is predicated of many who differ in their acts of existence, whereas it is applied to the divine Three who nevertheless have but one act of existence. (S 335.)

4.2.3 Question 16: “What is the meaning of person as divine?” (S 339.)

Here we are seeking not a definition concerned with analogy, with similarity, but a definition proper to the divine. “When we ask about the essential meaning of a divine person, the answer can and ought to be given in two different ways, in order that it may be clearly seen how far our concepts fall short of the sublime perfection of God.” (S 341.) A divine person can be conceived as a subsistent relation, and as an essence distinct through a relation:

We have two meanings because we form many concepts of what is in itself simple. Essence and relation and subsistence come together to form the meaning of divine person; and since in God essence and relation equally subsist, divine person is equally conceived whether there is affirmed an essence that subsists as distinct by reason of relation or a relation that subsists by reason of the absolutely simple divine reality. (S 341.)

Lonergan quotes Thomas:

‘... this word “person” directly signifies a relation and indirectly an essence; yet not a relation as a relation [paternity, for example], but as signified in the form of a hypostasis [Father]. Similarly, “person” directly signifies essence and indirectly relation, since the essence is the same as the hypostasis [that is, not divinity but God]. But a hypostasis in God is signified as being distinct by a relation, and thus relation, signified in the form of a relation [for example, paternity], indirectly enters into the
definition of person.\textsuperscript{[30]}\textsuperscript{190}

Again, the plurality of relations and unicity of essence in God require regarding the reality from two viewpoints. The name person indirectly names the notional acts—paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration—but directly names the hypostases (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) and the essence, divinity, the single act. So we name the persons properly as God the Father, and so forth.

There is not space to report Lonergan’s answers to questions regarding preference for one or the other response, but the interested reader will find that his answers comprise explanations that ease the effort required to understand the personhood of the divine three.

4.2.4 Question 17: “How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication?” (§ 345.)

Lonergan begins with the notion of unity or oneness. Of three ways of employing the notion of oneness, only the third applies to God. First, the persons are not counted one, two, three as if they were discrete quantities like three apples; God is immaterial. The second way of employing the notion of oneness concerns the formal or natural unity of parts—“a pile of stones is one \textit{per accidens} but a man is one \textit{per se}.” (§ 345.) Christ, however, is a unity of divine and human; God is one nature but three persons. Their oneness is not a natural unity of parts. To speak of God’s unity or oneness, we need a third notion. “Third, ‘one’ is used in an actual sense”; the notion of actual oneness is of “that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. What this means is simply that everything whatever is subject to the principle of identity (‘undivided in itself’) and to the principle of noncontradiction (‘divided from everything else’).\textsuperscript{36}\textsuperscript{191} This definition, however, is insufficient:

actual unity adds only negations to being; for ‘undivided in itself’ negates internal division, and ‘divided from everything else’ negates commingling with anything else. Therefore, since negations add nothing to things, something is one in the same

\textsuperscript{190} ST, I “q. 29, a. 4; see q. 40, a. 1.” As quoted in S, 341. The editorial comment reads: “[What is within the brackets in this paragraph is Lonergan’s own clarifying addition to the text of Thomas.]”

\textsuperscript{191} S, 345-47. Editorial note 36 reads: “[See the discussion of the meanings of ‘one’ in Lonergan, \textit{The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ} 30–33. Also helpful is ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ in \textit{A Third Collection} 91: ‘Thirdly, there is one in the sense of one and the same. It is the one that presupposes the intelligible unity ... but adds to it an application of the principles of identity and contradiction. So it is one in the sense of the old definition: \textit{indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio’}. See also ‘The Origins of Christian Realism,’ in \textit{A Second Collection}, at 258.]”
way and with the same perfection as it is being. But being is predicated analogously. Therefore, actual unity is also predicated by analogy, so that the same notion is verified differently in different things. (S 347.)

Oneness in God and the analogy of being. The analogy of being “implies especially three divisions among beings.” (S 347.) 1. Some do not subsist (e.g., intrinsic causes, accidents, possibles, beings of reason). 2. Others “are beings in the strict sense, because they themselves subsist even though not all that belongs to them subsists” (e.g., minerals, plants, animals, people, angels). 3. “Finally, there is the act of existence itself that not only subsists but also is absolutely simple, so that everything that is really identical with it also subsists; such is God, and God alone.” (S 347.)

Oneness in God and the analogy of actual unity. “The analogy of actual unity is consequent upon this analogy of being.” The non-subsistents of 1 above “are actually one in a lesser sense.” Their constitutive principles, “although they are undivided in themselves ... are not simply divided from one another.” The subsistents of 2 subsist “although subsistents are (in the strict sense of are) on the basis of an act of existence, still in regard to operation they need one another, in accordance with the order of the universe.” God’s unity is unique. As the utterly simple, unrestricted subsistent act of existence of 3 is perfect being, “so it is most perfectly one.” (S 347-49.)

The final point leading to the topic of Question 17 concerns relations. We already know that relations, except in God, “have no greater being or unity than that which is found at the lowest ontological level of the nonsubsistents.” In God, the subsistent relations are God, “nor do they subsist by participation” as non-divine subsistents do. “They subsist by essence, since their existence is divine existence and their subsistence is divine subsistence.” (S 349.) Therefore:

The real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence. But ‘one’ adds only negations to being, so that all perfection of unity is both had and measured from the perfection of being. Therefore, just as the real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence, so also they possess the most perfect unity. (S 349.)

Now we come to the heart of Lonergan’s answer to Question 17. “We must now consider how the divine persons and created persons are with respect to incommunicability and communication.” (S 349.) The previously discussed perfections of being, subsistence, relations, and unity bear on incommunicability and communication in God. To simplify and provide a convenient reference, I present Lonergan’s seven-pointed answer to Question 17 in tabular form.

Table 2: Incommunicability and Communication in God and in Us
1. By incommunicability we mean just that real distinction by which one that is real is not another that is real.

2. This incommunicability is not only not opposed to communication but in fact is necessarily presupposed by it. For there is no real relation except between things that are really distinct.

3. The divine persons are both incommunicable and in communication. For through the real relations they are really distinct from one another and therefore incommunicable, and through the same relations they are in communication with one another, both because one relation includes another in its meaning and because the relations are really identical with the processions by which the Father communicates his essence to the Son, and the Father and the Son communicate the same essence to the Holy Spirit.

4. The divine persons are not really distinct from one another on the basis of substance or of existence or of essential operation, since in God everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition.

5. Created persons are really distinct from one another on the basis of substance, and consequently also on the basis of existence and operation. For the substance of Socrates is not the substance of Plato, and likewise the existence and operation of one of them is not the existence and operation of the other. Created persons, therefore, are incommunicable by reason of substance, existence, and operation.

6. In the case of created persons, communication results from their intellectual nature. As for communication present in natures below the intellectual, unless it is informed by intelligence, reason, and will, such communication is more fittingly called animal or biological or bodily than personal.

… On the other hand, since intellectual nature is that which regards the totality of being, truth, and goodness, once there is an intellectual nature, interpersonal relationships and communications follow.
### IN GOD

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<th>7. Divine persons differ from created persons as the simple differs from the composite. …</th>
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<td>… For it is through the same that a divine person is being and one and subsistent and distinct and intellectual and in communication. …</td>
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<td>… A created person, on the other hand, is composed of intrinsic causes, so that it subsists through causes that are not subsistent. Hence, although intellectual nature denotes a relation to the totality of being and therefore to all persons, and although this relation is identical with intellectual nature itself, nevertheless a finite person that exists is not the same as the nature by which it exists, and therefore a created person subsists, whereas that relation by which it is radically related to other persons does not subsist. Otherwise, if a created person were constituted through its own intellectual nature, Christ would have assumed not only a human nature but also a human person; but this is contrary to Christian faith. (All quotes S 349-51.)</td>
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This topic of incommunicability and communication in God, as the reader will have occasion to verify later, bears on the final three assertions of S’s final chapter on God quoad se, the topic of section 5 below.

#### 4.3 Assertion 9: On the Divine Attributes

Assertion 9 reads:

The attributes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are divided into common, proper, and appropriated. (S 351.)

We have already discussed some key elements of a topic that will be especially important in chapter 3 below on the divine missions to Creation and our response. When we say that in God all is one where an opposed relation does not stand in the way, the oneness refers to common attributes like essence, nature, substance. Proper or notional attributes (the real relations of paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration) refer to what is not had by all; so these attributes distinguish the persons from one another. Appropriated refers to what is attributed to one person without excluding the others.

Lonergan says that “we really should go through all the attributes of the divine persons,” but he singles out for discussion nineteen “that can cause some difficulty.” (S 353.)
Space does not allow an account of all nineteen, so I will report his definitions of the
attributes most likely to cause some difficulty for those trying to understand S from the
viewpoint of order.

**Unbegotten.** Only the Son is begotten; both Father and Spirit are unbegotten. But the
Spirit is originated. So only the Father is unbegotten in the sense that he is without ori-
gin. Lonergan notes: “The importance of this negative notion is evident in reference to
the divine monarchy, ‘which is the most august proclamation of the church of God’ (DB
48, DS 112, ND 301). For the unbegotten Father is the source, origin, and principle of the
entire Trinity.” (§ 353.) Divine monarchy is not to be conceived hierarchically. The only
real distinctions in God are relations who are equal persons.

**Father and Son:** Proper names of two divine persons. I have included these much-
discussed terms to reiterate Lonergan’s point on distinction and constitution: “These are
proper names of persons, names derived from the relations which as relations distin-
guish these persons and as subsistent constitute them.” (§ 353.)

**The Word:** “This is a proper name of the Son, because it implies a relation to the act of
understanding from which the Word emanates intellectually. Similarly, to be spoken im-
plies the same relation, and to speak implies the opposed relation; and the same holds
for to be conceived and to conceive.” (§ 353; Lonergan’s emphases.) Important to note here: Lo-
nergan’s term to designate the absolute aspect of the act of being spoken, “and for that
we have used the expression to affirm.” (§ 353; Lonergan’s emphasis.) Generation of the
Word is the Father’s infinite act of affirmation (one judgment of truth and value, thus of
lovability) of divine understanding spoken in the Word.

**Holy Spirit:** “This is the usual proper name of the third divine person. It can be under-
stood as proper with respect to holiness inasmuch as the intellectual emanation of love is
that in which voluntary holiness consists (being careful to distinguish ‘voluntary’ from
‘free’),[42]192 so that the Father and the Son are holy as the principle of holy love, while
the Holy Spirit is the love itself that proceeds in a holy manner.” (§ 355.)

**Love and to love:** Like the true and truth, the four terms imply a simple relation to the
object loved, not a relation of origin; so these words are essential names. “Still, just as all
formal truth proceeds from a grasp of evidence, so also all intellectual love proceeds
from a judgment of value; and therefore if one attends more to the reality than to the
words, these terms are easily seen as proper terms.” We love but are not our love; ra-
ther, we are the “intrinsic principle” of our love. In like manner, “the Father and the Son

192 Editorial note 42 reads: “[See below, p. 373.]” There we find this observation: “These [no-
tional] acts are not voluntary as if proceeding from a will or from a volition as from a really dis-
tinct principle. For the Word proceeds from an act of understanding as speaking, and Love pro-
ceeds from the act of understanding and the Word as both spirating.”
are properly called ‘notionally loving’ inasmuch as they are the principle from which
divine love proceeds. And the Holy Spirit likewise is properly named when spoken of
as ‘proceeding love’ or ‘notional love,’ because these terms imply a relation of origin [ST,
I, q. 37, a.1].” (S 355-57.) Do “Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit”?
Here we have a very nuanced answer: “When ... we ask whether the Father and the Son
love each other ‘by the Holy Spirit’ (Spiritu sancto), the answer depends upon the force
of the ablative. If the ablative is taken to mean the principle of love, the answer is nega-
tive; but if the ablative is taken to mean that which proceeds, as a tree blossoms with
flowers, we must further distinguish: if essential love is understood, the answer is again
negative, but if notional love is understood, the answer is affirmative [ST, I, 1, q. 37, a. 1].”
(S 357.) (Notional love will be very important in the final assertions discussed in section 5
below.)

**Truth and the true:** Truth as “the correspondence of the mind to reality,” since it does
not imply a relation of origin, is an essential or common attribute. Truth is also a proper
attribute. “If one considers the true or truth according to the criterion of grasping the
sufficiency of the evidence, a relation of origin is implied, and on this consideration we
have a name that is proper to the Son [ST, I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m].” He is Truth. “Similarly, if
one considers the intellectual emanation from the evidence grasped to the word, the
true is implied according to the criterion of truth, and therefore the first divine proces-
sion can properly be called an emanation by way of truth.” (S 357.)

**Image:** “Since an image is the expression of a likeness, it cannot be said of God the Fa-
ther. According to St Augustine, it is said of the Son alone, but in the Greek Fathers the
Spirit is called the image of the Son. St Thomas [ST, I, q. 35, a. 2] solved this ambiguity in
the same way that he proved that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not a generation,
namely, that an image is not only an expression of a likeness, but one that has likeness
in virtue of origin. Thus ‘image’ is a proper name of the Son.” (S 355.)

**Gift:** “If a gratuitous act of giving that proceeds from the benevolence of the one who
gives is implied, there is a relation of origin. Since the first gift by virtue of which all
other gifts are given is the love that flows from benevolence, this term ‘gift’ is a proper
name of the Holy Spirit, since this first gift is proceeding love [ST, I, q. 38, a. 2].” (S 357.) In
chapter 3 below, “the first Gift whereby all other gifts are given” will be discussed fur-
ther.

**Father, Son, and Spirit are one God, one creator, but three existing and three creating:**
“What is predicated of the persons is stated in the singular or in the plural, according to
whether the predicate is a substantive or an adjective; for substantives have number in
themselves, according to the form signified, whereas adjectives have number from the
suppositos of which they are predicated. Therefore, we say that there is ‘one God’ be-
cause there is one divine essence, ‘one creator’ because there is one principle of creating,
but ‘three existing’ and ‘three creating’ because there are three who exist and create \([ST, I, q. 39, a. 3].\)” (S 363.) It is by appropriation that the Father is called Creator.

4.4 **Assertion 10: On Personal Properties**

Assertion 10 reads:

The real divine relations constitute the divine persons and distinguish the persons constituted, and therefore are personal properties. (S 363.)

Lonergan writes: “It will be easier to begin with the proof itself, which quite clearly states the intent of this assertion.” (S 363.) I present the proof but not the full explanation (we are most interested in the ratio of relations as persons, in “constituted,” and “personal properties”). Lonergan’s favorite syllogism, mentioned above (n. 102 p. 66), is the form of his proof:

If A: “The real divine relations constitute the divine persons if by the very fact that the relations are posited the persons are posited.”

But A: “But by the very fact that the relations are posited the persons are posited.”

Therefore B: “Therefore, the real divine relations constitute the divine persons.”

Lonergan reminds us again not to separate into two the concepts of relation and person. A relation is an order toward some other, but: “a divine relation is not only an order to another but also someone ordered to another, so that paternity is the Father, filiation is the Son, passive spiration is the Spirit, and generally a relation is a subsistent relation or a person” (S 365); so, “the real divine relations distinguish the persons constituted.” (S 367.)

Gaining scientific knowledge, however, requires knowing the causes, the reasons why. He surveys the elements that can distinguish one thing from another to arrive at the only real distinction in God:

The divine persons are distinct insofar as each person has something distinctive. If that distinctive feature is a conceptual being, it yields a conceptual distinction; but if it is real, it is either a substance or an accident or a relation. Now, the divine persons are really distinct, and therefore the distinctive feature is not a conceptual being. Again, the divine persons are consubstantial, having one and the same substance, and therefore the real distinctive feature is not a substance. Furthermore, in God there is no accident, and therefore the real distinctive feature is not an accident. It remains, therefore, that the real divine relations distinguish the persons they consti-

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193 S, 363-65. “This is very easily proven from authority. For in God ‘all things are one except where there is relational opposition’ (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325). But the persons are not one person, but three who are distinct from one another. Therefore, they are distinguished from one another through relational opposition.” S, 367.
Finally, Lonergan’s proof of the last element of the assertion, that the real divine relations are personal properties, flows from his conclusion that real divine relations distinguish the constituted persons. He defines personal property to conclude his argument for Assertion 10:

The definition of a personal property is added by way of a corollary. In God, a personal property is that proper attribute which constitutes and distinguishes a person. But, as we have shown above, the real divine relations constitute the persons and distinguish the persons constituted. Therefore, the real divine relations as constitutive and distinctive of the persons are personal properties. (S 367.)

We now advance to the final assertion of chapter four.

4.5 Assertion 11: On the Notional Acts

Assertion 11 reads:

The notional acts are natural, conscious, intellectual, rational, necessary, autonomous, eternal, the foundation of order in God, but not voluntary except in a diminished sense. (S 369.)

Lonergan applies to the notional acts no fewer than nine descriptors, nine adjectival analogies of the notional acts, all familiar. An important part of his pedagogical method is to repeat the same technical terms in new contexts, repetitions that not only recall but always, for the contexts differ, add explanatory content.

As technical terms, the notional acts are infinitives:

The notional acts are the proper divine attributes expressed not by nouns or adjectives but by verbs: for example, to generate, to be generated, to speak, to be spoken, to spirate, to be spirated, to love notionally, and to proceed as love. (S 369.)

I will comment briefly on each of the nine copulas of the assertion, then relate the assertion to Lonergan’s main argument. As mentioned earlier, all sets of terms (intellectual emanations, relations, etc.) refer to the same reality, thus all are reducible to the terms that specify God’s perfection of order, i.e., to one God who is God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit; one God the Holy Trinity. Lonergan reminds us that the elements of the assertion are distinguished, “not in reality, but according to our manner of understanding and conceiving.” (S 369.)

Lonergan first comments on “forming concepts”:

From the viewpoint of the genesis of our concepts, we distinguish: (1) the intellectual emanations, which presuppose only the concept of God understanding, affirming, and loving; (2) the relations as relations, which are grounded in the emana-
tions; (3) the same relations as subsisting on account of God’s simplicity; (4) the persons who are constituted by the subsistent relations; (5) the properties by which the persons are distinguished; and (6) the notional acts that are the emanations inasmuch as they presuppose the persons and are predicated of the persons. (S 369; emphases added.)

From first to sixth, he mentions in the order of their emergence in the systematic argument: emanations, relations, subsisting, persons, properties, notional acts; six sets of distinct terms for one reality. They complexify the concept of divine order; yet we know the concept, the word, the verbum expresses the simple unity of three divine relations who are one absolute act of supreme Being. He comments further on Word:

Note … that ‘to be spoken’ can be taken in two ways: first, as predicated of the Word who proceeds as spoken by the Father, and second, as predicated of everything that is understood by God and spoken [the Father speaks divine understanding] through the Word. In the first way, a notional [to speak] act is predicated of a divine person; and in the second way, objects are signified [everything divine, possible, and real] which are attained by a notional act. The same distinction is to be made between the principle of love [the Spirator], proceeding love itself [the Holy Spirit], and the objects that are loved [the “Understander” and the “Understood,” Dicens and Verbum, Speaker and Word, loved by their proceeding Amor who possesses divine consciousness as the personal relation opposed to understanding and knowing]. (S 369; my interpolations.)

Each person understands, knows, and loves; but to understand, to speak, to generate, to spirate, to love notionally belong to the Speaker; to know, to be spoken, to be generated, to spirate, to love notionally belong to the Word; to be spirated, to be proceeding love belong to the Spirit. The Spirit might be said to personalize the divine will.

Now to the nine aspects of the notional acts:

1. Natural. Aristotle’s definition of nature was mentioned above (n. 165 p. 124). “a nature is a principle of movement and of rest in that in which it is. Movement in the broad sense includes the act of what is complete (actus perfecti), such as the act of understanding and the act of willing; this kind of act remains in the subject, because a nature is an intrinsic principle of the act itself (‘in that in which it is’).” (S 369.)

Lonergan relates nature to the processions discussed above: “If the nature itself is a potency, the procession of the act is a processio operationis, and on this basis a perfection is received in the perfectible. But if the nature is an act, the procession of the act is a processio operati, and on this basis an act proceeds from an act. Finally, if the proceeding act is identical with the act from which it proceeds, the procession is said to be per modum operati.” (S 369.) That procession is natural to God.

“Now the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit are from an in-
tristic principle that is not perfectible but is infinite in perfection; likewise, what proceeds is infinite in perfection; and since there is but one infinite, the procession is per modum operati. Therefore, all that are required to constitute the acts as natural are verified.” (S 371.) Both processions are per modum operati, but one is constituted by reasonable affirmation [judgment], and the other by the will actuated by reason’s presenting to the will the intelligible good, the lovable objects [spiratio]. The Spirit loves both Dicens and Verbum as distinct persons; but there is one object, the known.

2. Eternal. Because eternal, the divine order cannot be based on temporal succession. Also, the notional acts are natural, not caused. “Rather, the order within God is based on origin and on the divine intellectual nature.” (S 373.) This we have been doing.

3. Foundation of divine order. The complexity of sets of terms for divine order reduces to the simple divine order that “consists in the fact that the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit is from the Father and the Son [ST, I, q. 42, a. 3].” There are distinctions: “But the order of the Son from the Father is by way of generation, the order of the Spirit from Father and Son is by way of spiration, and these two orders are ordered because the love that is spirated on the basis of holiness is from the Word that is generated on the basis of truth [ST, I, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m] ... Order within God is based on origin and on the divine intellectual nature.” (S 371-73; emphasis added.)

4 Voluntary in a diminished sense. Each of us can be said to will ourselves concomitantly; we implicitly will the fact that we are human by being human willingly. The notional acts are voluntary partly in this sense, but God’s acts are not free intentionally; they are not something God does. The notional acts are the persons considered as active relations, as verbs; there is no real distinction between God’s natural existence and God’s voluntary (intentional) existence. “Just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit know they are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, so also they will to be the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.” (S 373.) Yet these acts are not voluntary in the sense that the will is a really distinct principle (recall that the will is not a principle of divine procession). Again Lonergan reminds us: “The Word proceeds from an act of understanding as speaking, and Love proceeds from the act of understanding and the Word as both spirating. However, when we conceive divine love as an act of divine will, love can be said to be voluntary, so long as voluntary and necessary are not confused with free, and the divine will is not incorrectly thought to be a principle really distinct from divine love.” (S 373.)

With the notional acts thus elaborated, we add more precise content to an intrinsically unified systematic concept of divine order, a concept continually becoming more informed theologically. We will find that the remaining steps towards Lonergan’s final assertion regarding God quoad se are not too difficult or steep (in our movement forward we also ascend).
5. On Chapter Five: “The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another”

Assertions 12-14 of S’s chapter five are the final elements of the systematic argument meant to enable our gaining theological understanding of God quoad se from the viewpoint of order. The concept of God’s trinitarian order in se, the result of an act of understanding, grounds the sought-after single concept that expresses our grasping per modum unius the intelligible unity of God and Creation, the categories that comprise everything divine, possible, and real.

The principle ratio of the concept, as we know, is that all other intelligible orders imitate the perfection of order perceived to be in God the Holy Trinity assumed to be dynamically conscious. To help us attain the desired concept, we have followed Lonergan’s systematic explanations of the intelligible unity of diverse realities. He has already enabled our grasping the intelligible unity of being, knowing, and creating by uncovering their isomorphic structures.

In chapter 2 we have been following his step-by-step systematic explanation of emanations-relations-subsistents-persons-properties-attributes-notional acts in a divinity at once plural and singular, relative and absolute. We now have, in my view, explanation sufficient to grasp the divine order in relation to the isomorphic orders of created being, for relations of origin have been conceived psychologically. Lonergan’s explanations of intellectual emanation in an intellectual consciousness that must speak a word comprise terms and relations we can verify in ourselves. The concept now possible, however, is insufficiently dynamic to enable our grasping the personal and interpersonal perfection of divine order. Thus the final three assertions are especially important. Before proceeding to the final three assertions, I will try to bring into sharper focus notions already mentioned that are meant to enable our understanding Lonergan’s last three assertions about God quoad se. I will also anticipate discussion of the assertions by introducing from them new terms derived from notions already explained, but I will use them more freely here. Most important: that we return to a topic briefly mentioned in chapter 1 above, namely consciousness.

Consciousness is central to the whole of Lonergan’s thought. Earlier it was said that “being conscious is not the same as knowing (in the strict sense) that one is conscious. Consciousness belongs to every person, for it is simply the presence of the mind to itself.” We have already learned that Lonergan conceives God as one consciousness had by three relations who are persons. It remains to explain consciousness and apply it analogously to the Holy Trinity.

5.1 The Meaning of Consciousness

Lonergan defines consciousness “as that awareness that is had on the side of the subject and that regards not the object but the subject of an act, and the act itself, or even an
action of that subject.” (S 373; emphasis added.) Thus consciousness is a distinct kind of knowledge (note in the following quotation the pattern of intentional operations from experience to love):

Our consciousness, therefore, is not of what we see but of ourselves seeing, not of what we hear but of ourselves hearing, not of what we understand but of ourselves understanding, not of what we define but of ourselves defining, not of what we affirm but of ourselves affirming, not of what we choose but of ourselves choosing, not of what we desire or fear but of ourselves desiring or fearing. Besides, although we can understand, define, affirm, and love ourselves, even here a distinction must be made between what we know or desire on the side of the object and what we are aware of on the side of the subject, so that the latter belongs to consciousness but the former belongs to another species of knowledge or to appetition. (S 379.)

The kind of introspection that self-appropriation entails must be distinguished from consciousness, “For whether we are reflecting upon ourselves or are concerned with entirely other things that we are apprehending or desiring, we are present to ourselves in either case; and it is inasmuch as we are thus present to ourselves, and not inasmuch as we know ourselves as objects, that we have consciousness in the true sense of the word.”194 (S 379; emphasis added.) I believe grasping the distinction between our knowing ourselves as object and being present to ourselves as subject will suffice for our understanding the following five points about divine consciousness.

5.1.1 Divine Consciousness and Essential Act

We are familiar with God’s one act of being God, a notion that prescinds from God’s plurality. (We are “abstracting methodically and for the moment from the mutual consciousness of the Three.” (S 381.) We say that God understands, knows, and wills God and everything else. God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore through their one essential act of divine consciousness each person is conscious of self, present to self, as a subject who understands, knows, and wills. Thus:

Just as through essential act as such the same divinity is possessed in the same way by the Three, so that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are God, each of them equally, so also through essential act as such the same divine consciousness is possessed in the same way by the three persons, so that each of them is equally conscious both of himself and of his essential act. (S 383.)

194 Note 2 reads: “For a fuller treatment of the nature of consciousness [Latin: ‘Fusius rationem conscientiae exposuimus ...’], see Lonergan, Insight, chapter 11, and The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, parts 5 and 6. [See also ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ in Collection 162–79.]”
We can affirm similarity between divine consciousness and ours, so we must also affirm their greater difference. In the divine consciousness of each subject “there is no real distinction between the subject as divine and the object as divine,” (§ 381) no real distinction between the subject who knows himself and the self known in the essential act; and “in the Trinity each person through essential act comprehends the three persons on the side of the object.” (§ 381-83.) Each is consciously a divine person who understands, knows, and wills the Trinity; each conscious that God is three divine persons with one understanding, knowledge, and love of divine goodness. (Goodness and being are convertible terms.)

5.1.2 The Notional Acts

We are familiar with the notions to generate or beget, to be generated or begotten, to spirate, to be spirated. “By way of clarifying these according to the psychological analogy, the following are applied to them, respectively: to speak, word, to love notionally, and proceeding love.” These notions are only rationally distinct from the relations who are the persons Dicens, Verbum, and Amor.

To build towards acquiring a complete concept of the notional acts requires the very steps we have taken in this chapter 2 from conceiving processions in one God who understands, knows, and wills to emanations, to relations, to section 4 above on the notional acts considered in relation to the divine persons as such; and to the present topic, the notional acts in relation to divine consciousness. We can appreciate the importance of the concept of notional act from these words: “The complete conception of these acts involves almost all the elements of trinitarian theology.” (§ 385.) He continues:

(1) In order for the formality of act to be present, the infinite act itself is required; (2) for the specific distinction to be present, the processions, that is, generation and spiration, are required; (3) to distinguish the active and the passive aspects of the processions, the four real relations are required, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration; and (4) since acts are acts of supposit, these relations are to be considered as subsistents, that is, as Father and Son, Spirator and Spirit. (§ 385.)

Once this is grasped, Lonergan notes, we understand why Thomas “dealt with the processions in question 27 but with the notional acts only in question 41. For the only presupposition needed to conceive the processions is the one God understanding, knowing, and willing; but to conceive the notional acts there are further required the real relations that are really distinct from one another, subsistent, and really identical with di-

195 S, 385. Editorial note 4 reads: “That is to say, by psychological analogy the same notional acts are: to speak, word spoken, notionally to love, and proceeding love.”
vine substance.” (S 385.) We have taken all these steps towards the notional acts.

Again we return, and will return right to the end of Lonergan’s theology of God quoad se, to the core of the ratio of trinitarian theory and the concept of divine order: the intelligibility of a plural absolute, of an essential act and three who are each that essential act. We have learned that there is only a conceptual distinction in God between relations as subsistents and relations as relations, and between the relations as such and the processions. Thus: “It suffices to say that notional acts add to essential divine act real divine relation, which, of course, is only conceptually distinct from essential act.” (S 385.)

5.1.3 Divine Consciousness and the Notional Acts

Lonergan assures us that “the existence of this divine consciousness is easily demonstrated”; but it is not so easily understood. When we recall that the only real distinctions in God are relations who are persons; that all is one in God where no opposed relation stands in the way; that the two processions and the four subsistent relations are identical; that “the subject that is related by a relation and the relation itself by which it is related are really the same”; well, unless very careful about identity and distinction, we can be confused by the apparent conceptual complexity of trinitarian consciousness. Moreover, “the processions themselves are intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations, and therefore whatever are really identified with the processions are likewise intellectual and intellectually conscious.” (All quotes at S 385.)

The present topic is very important for understanding the last three assertions about God quoad se, so the reader will be glad that Lonergan greatly simplifies the relation between divine consciousness and the notional acts. He first summarizes what pertains to the persons, and then to the one essential act. As usual, our concern is understanding plurality and consubstantiality in God. Of the consciousness of the divine persons he writes: “(1) the subjects that are related to one another by relations and (2) the relations themselves by which the subjects are related to one another are intellectual and intellectually conscious.” (S 387.) Keep in mind that the subjects are intellectual and intellectually conscious, so it follows that:

Thus, on the basis of this consciousness, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are, each of them, conscious both of himself and of each of the others, since it is impossible for anyone to be consciously related to another without by that very fact being conscious both of oneself and of the other to whom one is related. (S 387.)

Next, as mentioned, Lonergan turns to the single act and consubstantiality:

This divine consciousness on the basis of the notional acts is one consciousness. There is necessarily only one consciousness when from a single act of understanding a single word is once and eternally spoken, when from a single act of understanding and a single word a single act of love is once and eternally spirated, and when the act
of understanding, the word, and the act of love are consubstantial. (§ 387.)

Now we come to the heart of Lonergan’s hypothesis that God is dynamic intellectual consciousness. The emphases on plurality and singularity are brought together in one concept that, again, will prove invaluable for our understanding assertions 12-14. That there is one consciousness and three conscious subjects returns us to the fact already mentioned more than once that each subject possesses the one consciousness personally. In the present case, however, we are in a position to explain the fact in more detail:

The intellectually conscious Father generates the Son by intellectual consciousness; the intellectually conscious Son is generated into intellectual consciousness by the Father; the intellectually conscious Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by intellectual consciousness; and the intellectually conscious Spirit is spirated into intellectual consciousness by the Father and the Son. But to generate and to be generated are really distinct from each other, and similarly to spirate and to be spirated are really distinct from each other; and to generate consciously, to be generated consciously, and to be spirated consciously are no less distinct from one another. (§ 387.)

Lonergan’s summary statement, as the reader will have occasion to verify later, greatly assists our gaining insight sufficient to form an adequate concept of divine order:

We must, then, most certainly conclude that the one divine consciousness, considered on the basis of the notional acts, is possessed by the Three in three distinct ways. This is surely necessary, if indeed the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are, each of them, conscious both of himself and of each of the others, since they could not be conscious of the others by one consciousness unless each of them possessed the same consciousness in a distinct way. (§ 387.)

We are not, however, quit of this critical topic of consciousness. Before advancing to the last three assertions, we will consider two more points about consciousness and the Holy Trinity.

5.1.4 Consciousness in the True Sense

“It is most important to acknowledge that this is consciousness in the true sense of the term.” (§ 387.) That means attending to the persons as object and subject, distinct terms not wholly unlike quoad se and quoad nos. On the side of the object, the persons know the notional acts equally, know that “the Father consciously generates the Son, and that the Son is consciously generated by the Father, and that the Father and the Son consciously spirate the Spirit, and that the Spirit is consciously spirated by the Father and the Son.” (§ 387-89.) The theologian concludes to this divine knowledge on the side of the object, but it is not mere theory. What the divine persons know and what is “concluded to from faith by theologians is not only known or concluded to, but also exists.”
He continues:

And as to existence, it is on the side of the subject, namely, on the side of the subject that is the Father in consciously generating the Son, on the side of the subject that is the Son in being consciously generated by the Father, on the side of the subject that is the Father and the Son in consciously spirating the Spirit, and on the side of the subject that is the Spirit in being consciously spirated by the Father and the Son. (§ 389.)

Now Lonergan gathers together many strands of his almost-complete explanatory account of God the Holy Trinity quoad se. He establishes the relevance of so much abstract exposition by bringing his argument back to the psychological analogy and to us as subjects of the analogy. We are to be imago Trinitatis not in some sense of sharing an analogous structure-cum-order but as knowers and lovers of truth and goodness. (Chapter 3 below will advance the argument to include the Creator Trinity and our being imago of that.) First he compares our consciousness and God’s:

Just as the psychological analogy itself is taken solely from intellectual consciousness in the most proper sense, so divine consciousness, which is conceived on the basis of the notional acts by way of this analogy, is surely intellectual consciousness not only in the most proper sense but also in the most perfect reality. (§ 389.)

Lonergan ends with two rhetorical questions that implicitly affirm his position and challenge any who would answer otherwise to explain themselves:

For what else do we mean by the intellectually conscious emanation of a word than that ordering to the uttering of a word which as conscious and consciously compelling arises from the grasp of manifest intelligibility? What else do we understand by the intellectually conscious emanation of love than that ordering to loving which as conscious and consciously obligating arises from the grasp and affirmation of goodness? … In God there is but one infinite act at once of understanding and knowing and willing, and since there is no subject really distinct from this act, three subjects really distinct from one another are constituted by the subsistent relations that are really identical with the intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations. (§ 389.)

5.1.5 Divine Consciousness Is One Reality

Lonergan begins: “For the sake of clarity we have distinguished between divine consciousness as had through essential act and divine consciousness as had through the notional acts” (the distinction regards the familiar theme of absolute and relative in God), and “these are not in any way two consciousnesses really distinct from each other.” (§ 389.) We already understand that the “essential act and the notional acts are dis-
tinct not in reality but in concept,” (§ 389-91.) and that “only one consciousness can be had through one conscious act.” (§ 391.) He concludes with the clearest yet of his formulations of the unity of consciousness in God:

The fact that it is one thing for the Father to be conscious of both the Son and the Spirit, another for the Son to be conscious of both the Spirit and the Father, and still another for the Spirit to be conscious of both the Father and the Son does not militate against this. For although it is quite true that there are three conscious divine subjects, it does not in the least follow that there are three consciousnesses really distinct from one another. Rather, as we have said above, where there is a single act there is a single consciousness; but because there are several subjects, there are also several conscious subjects; and therefore it remains that the three subjects are conscious of one another through one consciousness, which the Three possess in distinct ways. (§ 391.)

5.2 Prelude to the Final Assertions about God Quoad Se

To acquire the desired concept, there remains, in “excavating” the ratio of Lonergan’s concept of divine order, our understanding the meaning of assertions 12-14.

What is perfection of order? We already understand enough to grasp divine order according to personal relations, but Lonergan wants to dynamize the concept with more penetrating insights into God’s interpersonal life. Understanding God’s interpersonal life will ground discussion in chapter 3 below of their dwelling in us, and us in them, all in one another, and all in all. Assertion 12 regards their communal consciousness, their knowing one another as the divine person each is conscious of being. Assertion 13, the penultimate, speaks of how they are present to one another. Assertion 14 is the peak where Lonergan brings into intelligible unity the distinct divine perfections of the one divine act of triune divine order.

A degree of intimacy among a community of three persons greater than that perceived to be in the Holy Trinity cannot be imagined for, as we learned above, the only real distinction is relation; to order one to another is the least possible metaphysical distinction between things. The order of one to another, a relation, is the least distinction between subsistent that nature and reason allow. The three distinct relations are in everything else but relation identical. In God a single intelligible order of distinct persons is constituted by the order of one to another, by relations. Although the Word proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, they possess a single intelligible order; order is a divine perfection.

The scientific theologian’s counterpart to mathematics as medium of expression is metaphysics, the interrelations of its defined terms and its formulae controlled not by mathematics but logic and, in the case of S, the whole enterprise of finding meaning controlled by the prime categories of all scientific methods, the terms and relations of
interiority. Lonergan continues to employ the psychological analogy. Understanding trinitarian indwelling transforms the adequate concept into the one Lonergan wants us to have of each person being wholly in the others or, from another perspective, the Trinity being wholly in each person. One and the same is Father and wholly in the Son and wholly in the Spirit; and so for the other two persons.

The only real distinctions in God are the personal relations, everything else is one. So their being in one another does not entail the emanation of new opposed relations. The relation is the person who is from himself; their being wholly in one another is God. One subsistent cannot be in the other as a relation of origin belonging to the other. Rather, the persons mutually indwell as the known dwells in the knower and the loved in the lover; and, as in us, it is the same that God understands, knows, and loves.

In God, unlike in us, intentional existence and natural existence are identical. The three dwell in one another intentionally and naturally for in God they are one and the same. The three persons really are wholly in one another as real and as known to be real. Each personal relation understands, knows, and loves personally and interpersonally in their one act of being the Holy Trinity they understand, know, and love. (It is fairly easy when speaking in this mode to spin off such formulae endlessly because we already know God is one and triune, and that the principle of divine unity is certain: the only real distinction in divinity’s infinite existence, order, goodness, intellect, will, understanding, truth, love, because-of-ness, omnipotence and so on is an opposed relation who possesses that attribute properly (like the divine love proper to the relation opposed to divine knowledge, the Holy Spirit), possess it in common, or as appropriated (appropriation is a being of reason with foundation in reality, a theological “thinglet”196 the church allows).

A nonsystematic trinitarian analogy well known to Lonergan and his Jesuit students can help us form a single image of a being at once absolutely one, and a triune order of three divine persons. When St. Ignatius of Loyola tried to explain his famous vision of the Holy Trinity, he spoke of three distinct musical notes heard as a perfectly harmonious single chord; not four distinct sounds, but a single chord composed of three notes that remain distinct in hearing the one chord. It is like potency, form, and act structuring one being; three distinct operations constituting one knowing; Dicens, Verbum, Amor being one God.

196 I borrow this witty translation of “entitatulae” from Ontological and Psychological Constitution (p. 53 passim). In that context, “thinglet” denotes any so-called real metaphysical entity claimed to be really distinct from the intrinsic causes of being (as if there could be a real middle between nothing and being). See ibid., index, s.v. “mode.”
5.3 *Assertion 12: On Divine Consciousness*

Assertion 12 reads:

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through one real consciousness are three subjects conscious both of themselves and of each of the others, as well as of their own act both notional and essential. (§ 377.)

There is a single consciousness but three who know and love as subjects. Subjects who know and love have each a mind that understands, knows, and loves. God who understands, knows, and loves is a trinity of subjects; Speaker, Word, and Love in God’s one consciousness. So the Word that indwells the Father is the same the Father speaks, and so on. The persons are in one another not only psychologically but ontologically (the subject of Assertion 13), that is, as the relations of origin that constitute them. The object is not already-out-there-now real. They mutually indwell as known in knower and loved in lover where the knowers and lovers of the object, and the object known and loved, are one and the same triune God. The perfectly knowable and lovable is and are perfectly known and loved.

Because so often neglected, let the example of the Holy Spirit suffice to speak of the mutual indwelling. Knowledge is had from understanding and word as one principle of spiration. Spirit must proceed from Father and Son if the Holy Spirit is to possess divine knowledge expressed rationally as well as affectively. The Spirit needs to know the intelligible order of Creation in the Word to proceed *ad extra* from God.

The Wisdom common to the three is had distinctly by each person. Their personal and personalized properties constitute each person’s distinct “personality.” The Holy Spirit is the common divine Wisdom as had by the divine relation called passive spiration. Like Speaker of Wisdom and Word of Wisdom, the Spirit of Wisdom does the work of wisdom distinctly. Knowing and loving what the Holy Trinity knows and loves, the Holy Spirit orders Creation and its salvation history according to the rational pattern it knows in God’s spoken Word. The intellectual emanation of the Word of Love perfects the order that Assertion 14 proclaims. There can be no really distinct fourth in God. So, if we “unfreeze” the image of divine order, we see more clearly the “perfect circle of consciousness” where Love returns us to the Father who is first in the order of origin. In the order of salvation, Love returns us to the Word we emanate from, and the Word returns us in the Holy Spirit to our common Originator.

197 “‘What therefore … is lacking to the Spirit to prevent him from being the Son? For unless something is lacking, he would be the Son. I answer that nothing is lacking …. But the difference of character and of their mutual relations justify their different names.’” St. Gregory Nazianzus, *Oratio 31*, 9; as quoted in Crowe, *The Doctrine*, 97; emphasis added. Crowe comments: “It seems to me that there might be a rewarding line of investigation in the ‘characters’ assigned the Three in their earthly and salvific functions ….“ Ibid., 186; cf., ibid., 93.
5.4 Assertion 13: On Divine Mutual Indwelling

Assertion 13 reads:

The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit dwell within one another both ontologically and psychologically. (§ 413.)

I hope the reader will find as I did that circumincession, perichôrêsis, real mutual indwelling, is a snap to understand and conceive after absolute/relative relative/absolute trinitarian unity. Lonergan begins by noting that divine mutual indwelling, circumincession (circumincessio, circuminsessio, perichôrêsis), “is taught in Scripture, in the Fathers, and in the Council of Florence.” (§ 413; circuminsessio denotes the static ontology and is not mentioned again in §.) Among his several quotes from Scripture’s numerous possibilities, these should suffice for our gaining a preliminary notion of circumincession: “‘Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’” (Jn 14:10); “‘… the Spirit scrutinizes all matters, even the deep things of God. Who, for example, knows a man’s innermost self but the man’s own spirit within him? Similarly no one knows what lies at the depths of God but the Spirit of God.’” (1Cor 2:10 f.). (As quoted in § 415.) A clearer scriptural endorsement of the psychological analogy could hardly be desired. Next Lonergan unites in one example the teaching of the Fathers and the Council, for the Council of Florence cites St. Fulgentius198 to express the Church’s understanding of circumincession: “‘Because of this unity the Father is entire in the Son, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entire in the Father, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, entire in the Son’” (DB 704, DS 1331, ND 326).” (As quoted in § 415.) This unity of divine mutual indwelling, Lonergan asserts, is both psychological and ontological. We will follow Lonergan’s interpretation and development of Thomas’s argument from the divine essence, the personal relations, and the origins (cf., ST, I, q. 42, a. 5). (§ 415.) Then Lonergan adds two more viewpoints. The argument depends upon notions already explained.

5.4.1 Circumincession and the Divine Essence

We learned above that there is one divine essence, and each person is only rationally distinct from it:

The Father is in the Son, because the Father is his essence, and his essence is really identified with the essence of the Son, and the essence of the Son is in the Son. And similarly, the Son is in the Father, the Father and the Son are in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is in the Father [and in the Son]. (§ 415.)

The essential divine act of consciousness by which each person is conscious is within the consciousness of each person, each person is the essential divine act, so the per-

198 St. Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, I, 4. ML 65, 674.
sons are really within one another. “For whoever is really within the consciousness of another is really in that other.” (§ 415.) While this explanation is extremely abstract, it does reiterate the essential elements of the desired phantasm of divine order: consciousness possessed by three circuminceeding realities without their common consciousness being a really distinct fourth. The reality is somewhat like our having a single consciousness that remains one in the three operations of knowing and loving.

5.4.2 Circumincecession and the Divine Relations

We return to the once paradoxical but now clearly explained and easily understood rational notions of three infinite relatives who are one infinite being, and of a reality at once from itself and not from itself:

It belongs to an absolute to be per se and in itself, because it has its total meaning through its proper reality and encloses it within its own reality. It belongs to what is relative, on the other hand, that its existence or meaning is to be related to another, because the very meaning of the relative includes within itself the meaning of another, and its very reality is just a relation to another. (§ 417.)

Lonergan concludes that because the identity of each person intrinsically refers to another—“the Father is Father because he has a Son, and conversely the Son is Son because he has a Father” (§ 417.)—each person is included in both the formality and the relative reality of the others. “Therefore, as ‘Father’ is included in the meaning of ‘Son,’ consequently the Father is in some way included in the relational reality of the Son, and similarly the Son is in some way included in the relational reality of the Father. And the same reasoning applies to the Holy Spirit.” (§ 417.)

Sensing, no doubt, that his comparing circuminceeding identities according to the formal and relative, that “the mutual inclusion of the divine persons in the real relation of each to each of the others known on the side of the object by each of the persons (as it is also known by us)” is difficult to grasp, he writes: “This is more clearly seen when we further consider that the real divine relations are intellectually conscious.” (§ 417.) He returns to the divine order with a unified view of emanations, personal relations, and notional acts as intellectually conscious:

Paternity is the intellectually conscious ordering from grasped evidence to the Word to be spoken and to the Word spoken; and this paternity is the Father himself. Filiation is likewise the intellectually conscious ordering of the Word spoken to the grasp of infinite evidence from which it is spoken; and this filiation is the Son himself. Passive spiration, finally, is the intellectually conscious ordering to the infinite good grasped by intellect and affirmed in an eminently true judgment; and this passive spiration is the Holy Spirit himself. (§ 417.)
Thomas said that “one of the relatively opposed is in the other on the basis of intellect” (ST, I, q. 42, a. 5). Thus we can explain the divine relations not only inasmuch as they are like our intellect, i.e., explain them from the side of the object, “but also from the perspective of the divine intellect inasmuch as the divine persons comprehend the divine relations,” i.e., from the side of the divine subject. Furthermore, we can explain circumincession “not only in accordance with the divine intellect inasmuch as these relations are understood on the side of the object, but also inasmuch as, on the side of the intellectually conscious subject, each person is conscious of the other two.” (§ 417.) Each person, of course, is not conscious of the other two as this consciousness is had by each of the other two on the side of the subjects. Nonetheless, the only difference among them as equally conscious is self-conscious personal identity as Dicens and Verbum and Amor.

5.4.3 Circumincession and the Divine Origins

Although the psychological analogy continues to function in our understanding of circumincession from the viewpoint of origin, we should recall to mind that “although in our case each of us is but one person and one conscious subject, in God there are three persons and three conscious subjects.” (§ 419.) I believe the following passage will help one gain a unified understanding of circumincession in relation to trinitarian origins:

Only the Father as the principle of the Son, and the Father and the Son as the principle of the Holy Spirit, have another person within their consciousness and their reality as the one proceeding from them, but also the Son as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son, have, respectively, the Father, and the Father and the Son, within their own consciousness and reality. (§ 419; emphasis added.)

By way of development of his foregoing interpretation of Thomas, and to bring explication of Assertion 13 to a close, Lonergan offers two more ways of understanding the psychological and ontological circumincession of the Three.

5.4.4 Circumincession from Two Other Viewpoints

The following passage from Lonergan’s explication of the first viewpoint will, perhaps, help further clarify one’s understanding of the central notion of God’s being three real relations who possess one and the same divine reality in the distinct ways that constitute them as persons:

God is being by essence and the very act of understanding, is true by essence and the very act of affirming, is good by essence and the very act of loving. These
three are distinguished from one another only conceptually, so that the divine reality is an intelligible actually understood, and by identity divine truth actually affirmed, and by identity divine goodness actually loved. But the Father is God understanding as the principle of the Word, and the Word is God affirming as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit is God loving as proceeding from the Father and the Son. (S 419.)

I wrote above that the Trinity is in each person (without, of course, each person being the Trinity). This passage explains the ratio of what I meant: “Therefore, each person is in another inasmuch as that person is being and understanding, and so in the Father; inasmuch as he is true and affirming, and therefore in the Son; and inasmuch as he is good and loving, and therefore in the Spirit.” (S 419.) Thus each is wholly in the other psychologically and ontologically according to distinct identity.

The second way draws upon the familiar notions of natural and intentional acts of existence, and concludes to another way of conceiving divine consubstantiality, through identity in love. I believe it worthwhile to quote Lonergan’s rather long paragraph in full:

Since in God intentional existence and natural existence are one and the same, the Word is God not only on the basis of intentional existence but also on the basis of natural existence; therefore, the other persons are in the Word, since their natural existence is also intentional existence. And according to this, God is said to be in the divine understood intention of God, that is, in the Word [CG, IV, 11]. Besides, although in us love effects only a quasi identification between the lover and the beloved, whereby a friend is said by the poet to be dimidium animae meae, ‘half of my soul’ [Horace, Odes I, 3, l. 8], in God love involves a true and full identity between the lover and beloved, and according to this, God as loved is most truly said to be in God as loving [CG, IV, 19]. Therefore, inasmuch as the Father and the Son are loved by proceeding Love, which is the Holy Spirit, they are in this very love. Again, although the Father and the Son are consubstantial by reason of divine generation, they are also consubstantial by reason of the love that joins the two into one; and it is according to this that the Holy Spirit is said to be the bond between the Father and the Son, not as a go-between by way of a procession, but because those whom nature has made consubstantial, infinite love also makes one from eternity on other grounds [ST, 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3m].[36]

So circumincession is not simply the persons being in one another as we might imagine interpenetrating realities to be, or as we might imagine the known and loved to be in a

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[36] S, 419-21. Editorial note 36 reads in part: “[Aquinas distinguishes ‘secundum originem,’ where the Holy Spirit is not a ‘medium’ and ‘secundum praedictam habitudinem,’ which is the mutual Love by which the Father and the Son love each other, where the Spirit is a ‘medium.’]”
human knower and lover; since all three love and all three are loved with the same love, there is “true and full identity” in Love.

5.5 Assertion 14: On the Perfection of Divine Order

Assertion 14 reads:

Perfection has two formalities. The first is grounded upon act, while the second is derived from the unity of order. The first perfection is infinite as found in the divine substance. The second is verified in the divine relations taken together as so great that no greater perfection can be thought of. Although the two concepts of perfection are conceptually distinct, in God they refer to one undivided real perfection. (S 421.)

Lonergan’s final step towards explicating divine perfection, as the reader has likely surmised from the wording of the assertion, will not introduce new theoretical elements but recapitulate principal elements already established. Chief among them: that God is conscious in God’s one act of being, and this one act of consciousness is possessed in three distinct ways by three distinct subsistents in an intellectual nature, thus by three who are by definition persons. His defense of Assertion 14 also comprises other familiar elements.

Lonergan wrote earlier in S that with Assertion 14 “we explain how the dogma of the Trinity more clearly manifests to us the divine perfection.” (S 377.) The threefold assertion regards “a single question, namely, the nature of divine perfection, which, since we cannot come to know it by the natural light of reason, is revealed through the dogma of the Trinity.” (S 421.) He answers by establishing three points: “(1) by the term ‘perfection’ not one but two concepts are understood, (2) one of which is verified in the divine substance and the other in the divine relations taken together, and this in such a way that (3) there is really a single divine perfection.” (S 421.)

Lonergan first surveys opinions past and contemporary on the matter of divine perfection through consubstantiality and through relations. Although there are agreements with parts of his position here and there, none puts forth two concepts of one divine perfection. He concludes:

Since it is impossible to agree with all of these disparate opinions, we opt to defend the following view, that just as the divine substance and the divine relations are one reality, so also is there one real perfection, and that similarly, just as the formality of substance and the formality of relations are different, so also the formality of perfection attributable to the substance is different from the formality of perfection attributable to the relations. (S 421.)

Again we draw from the difficult but meticulously argued concept of infinite and relative in one absolute.
Lonergan’s argument in defense of Assertion 14 draws from data already explained to make six points. Some require little or no comment.

1. “Act denotes perfection.” This point regards the familiar categories potency and act. “Being is divided into potency and act in such a way that it is limited by potency and perfected by act; therefore, each individual being is lacking in perfection to the extent that it is limited by potency, and is endowed with perfection to the extent that it is in act.” (S 423.) (These aspects of authenticity are discussed in chapter 3 below.)

2. “There is also a second notion of perfection derived from the unity of order.” We discussed above that “order can be understood in two ways: first, according as relation is defined as the order of one to another; second, according as many things are ordered to one another in such a way as to constitute a unity.” Every relation is an order, but “in the second sense, there is no order except insofar as many things compose an intelligible unity through many mutual relations.” The second is the order in the Holy Trinity.

   All entities have the formalities of end and perfection, so “For the end is the final perfection of each thing, and therefore each and every thing, inasmuch as it exists, is a being in the strict sense, but inasmuch as it attains its end, it is good in the strict sense and perfect in the strict sense [ST, 1, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1m].” Beings also have ultimate end and perfection, and they belong “not only to individual things as individual but also to many individual things as many. For every agent acts because of an end, and so if there occur many, they occur because of an end.” The end of something multiple cannot be the multiple, “for a multitude as material lacks a definite term. For example, if it is thought better to make two things than one, it follows that it is much better still to make three than two, and so on to infinity. But this infinity is contrary to the formality of end [ST, I. q. 47, a. 3, ad 2m].” Nor can the end be that the many become one, “since that would mean the destruction rather than the perfection of the many.” If the individuals are perfected, “for this leaves the many, precisely as many, without an end.” (All quotes at S 425.)

   He concludes:

   We must conclude, then, that the end and final perfection of the many consists in the unity of order. This unity does not do away with the multitude or multiply it indefinitely or leave it unstructured, but perfects it precisely as a multitude. This is confirmed by a number of examples. (S 425; emphasis added.)

   By way of examples, Lonergan first speaks of the universe. He quotes and paraphr-
rases Thomas:

In the first place, “The total universe participates in and represents the divine
goodness more perfectly than does any other creature.”\textsuperscript{25} But the universe is not a
total unity save through a unity of order.\textsuperscript{26} This order is the intrinsic goal of the un-
iverse: “The goal of the universe is a good that exists in the very universe, namely,
the order of the universe itself.”\textsuperscript{27}\textsuperscript{201}

Next, he relates the perfection of individuals to particular goods and unities of or-
der (which are goods of order) created by many. “human beings in this life are per-
fected, not only through the particular goods that each one desires and seeks to obtain,
but also through the unity of order, whether domestic or economic or political or social,
that the many as many desire all the more eagerly the more clearly they perceive the
causes of things [understand them scientifically] and move away from the error of ex-
aggerated individualism.” (S 425-27.) Then there are the goods of body and soul. Health
of body, for example, “which is the well-ordered disposition of the parts both among
themselves and for the person as a whole.” (S 427.) First among the goods of the soul:
“that interior justice at which supernatural justification terminates, which is a certain
rightness of order according to which the highest element of a person is subordinated to
God and the lower powers of the soul are subordinated to the highest, namely, to rea-
son.” [ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 1]. (S 427.) From the foregoing examples taken from the orders of the
universe, culture, and the person body and soul, he concludes:

From all this it seems we must without doubt conclude that perfection has two for-
malities, since individual beings as individuals attain their end and perfection
through act, and these same many beings as many are perfected through the unity
of order. (S 427.)

The following points 3 and 4 consider in turn each term of the twofold notion of
perfection, perfection through act and through unity of order. It is already clear, per-
haps, that our perfection lies beyond mere personal perfection; we are but parts of a
whole natural and supernatural perfection of order.

3. “\textit{From the standpoint of the formality of perfection that is grounded upon act, the
divine substance is infinite in perfection.}” (S 427.) I wrote above (p. 57.) of “God’s abso-
lute freedom from any potency to be more than God eternally is.” We have already
learned that “divine substance is pure act without any admixture of potency.” Whatever
has potency lacks ultimate perfection. “Therefore, the divine substance, because of act,
is perfect, and because of the denial of potency is infinite in perfection.” (S 427.)

4. “\textit{The formality of perfection derived from the unity of order is verified in the divine

\textsuperscript{201} S, 425. Notes 25-27 read: \textsuperscript{25}ST, I, q. 47, a. 1; \textsuperscript{26}Ibid., I, q. 47, a. 3; \textsuperscript{27}Ibid., I, q. 103, a. 2 ad 3m.
relations taken together.” (§ 427.) Here, Lonergan employs a scientific syllogism:

Major premise: “The formality of perfection that is derived from the unity of order consists in the fact that many things are so ordered among themselves as to constitute an ordered unity.”

Minor: But in the divine relations there is verified that mutual ordering that produces an ordered unity.

Conclusion: “Therefore, in the divine relations taken together there is verified the notion of perfection derived from unity of order.”

Lonergan comments on the terms of the syllogism: “The major premise of this syllogism is the definition of unity of order.” We already understand the minor. “Divine paternity is an ordering to the Word that is to be spoken and is spoken; filiation is an ordering of the Word to the Speaker; active spiration is an ordering to Love that is to be spirated and is spirated; passive spiration is an ordering of Love to the Spirator; and since active spiration is the same in reality as paternity and filiation, from these four real relations there is constituted an ordered unity.” (All quotes at § 427.)

5. “So great is this perfection based on the unity of order that no greater can be thought of.” (§ 429.) Whether considered formally as a kind of unity, or materially “as the many that are to be ordered,” Lonergan says that “under both aspects the perfection of order in God is supremely great. Therefore, this perfection is so great that no greater can be thought of.” He is intent to rid us of all notions of order save those that apply to divine order (although all notions of order bear on the topic of chapter 3 below). So we will now examine in more detail the formal and material aspects of order established in points 4 and 5.

There are three degrees of perfection in unity of order taken formally. They regard material pluralities, human society, and intellectual consciousness. In the first, one imposes order on, say, materials to make a house. Second, in regard to society, “where the good of order is constituted by what is understood, evaluated, and chosen by several persons.” Third, there is “the perfection of order that is found within intellectual consciousness per se and consists in the fact that the good of a well-ordered consciousness is attained because it is understood and therefore affirmed as good and hence responsibly chosen.” Lonergan compares the three degrees:

The second degree is more perfect than the first, both because the first is imposed from without while the second emerges from the ordered individuals themselves as intellectual, and because the first exists dividedly in each individual while the second is found intentionally in its entirety in each one. The third degree is more perfect than the second because not only does it emerge from within and exist intentionally in its entirety in what is ordered, but also this total perfection that is intended is achieved in reality by the very fact that, having been understood, it is justly affirmed, and having been affirmed, it is responsibly chosen.
I have divided Lonergan’s next paragraph to highlight the contrast between perfection of order in human consciousness and in God’s:

Besides, among intellectual creatures the perfection of order as it occurs between such persons is found only in the second and less perfect way; and the third way is attained only inasmuch as accidental acts within a finite consciousness are ordered among themselves on the side of the rational subject.

Culturally, we can achieve the second mode of perfect order; this notion will be further explained in chapter 3 below. Within ourselves, we attain the third mode of perfection inasmuch as, to use language from an earlier context, we obey the transcendental precepts. The third mode of perfection in God again pertains to the immanence of divine unicity and plurality:

In God, however, the persons are ordered among themselves in the third and most perfect way, so that the divine society of the three persons is not only understood, affirmed, and loved on the side of the object, but is also, on the side of the subject, and according to the intellectual emanations through the truth of the Word and the holiness of proceeding Love, constituted as that understood, affirmed, and loved society of three. Consequently, under its formal aspect the perfection of the divine order must be said to be so great that no greater can be thought of, especially since this perfection cannot be naturally understood by a created intellect. (All quotes at S 429; emphases added.)

But that is not all, for we are considering the reality under both its formal and material aspects. Materially, there is “a many” to be ordered. Lonergan draws on notions already explained:

Under the material aspect, insofar as there are several to be ordered among themselves, this perfection is again so great that no greater can be thought of. For these individuals are not constituted as several individuals inasmuch as the same note of perfection is affirmed of one and denied to another, but inasmuch as they are mutually opposed relations; nor are some of them these relations while others are subjects that are ordered by the relations, but these relations themselves are subsistent. There are not many accidental acts of understanding, of affirmation, and of love, but one and the same infinite act. What is understood is not some being by participation but being by essence, what is affirmed is not something true by participation but what is true by essence, and what is loved is not some good by participation but the good by essence. There is no real distinction between being and truth and goodness and understanding and affirmation and love. Accordingly, there is a most perfect unity of the one consciousness that is so ordered that three persons are each in their own way conscious through the same consciousness. (S 429-31.)
After that magnificent summary argument, there remains only Lonergan’s drawing into unity the two distinct concepts of divine perfection.

6. “The divine perfection grounded upon act and the divine perfection found in order are conceptually distinct but really identical.” (§ 431.) Lonergan’s final argument is a brief scientific syllogism:

The perfection grounded upon act is the divine substance, and the perfection found in order is the divine relations taken together. But the divine substance and the divine relations are conceptually distinct and really identical. Therefore, we apprehend one and the same divine perfection through distinct concepts. (§ 431.)

5.6 Concluding Remarks on Assertion 14

There we have it, Lonergan’s systematic theology of God quoad se. Not with all its detail, but edited to emphasize what I have good reason to call S’s leitmotif, the idea of order; S is saturated with the idea. We have traveled from a mere generic definition of order, through its many, sometimes difficult, specifications in God quoad se—all explained scientifically—to our destination, the concept of divine order. Given Lonergan’s meticulously explained ratio of the two concepts of divine perfection, because they regard “the same divine perfection,” we can make of them a single concept that regards the “mystery in the strict sense” that infinitely transcends our concepts. Yet God exists, and God is ordered. Thus we achieve “the imperfect and yet most profitable understanding of the faith that Vatican I speaks about.”

The final section of Lonergan’s argument for Assertion 14 is called “Difficulties.” The interested reader will find therein a dialogue labeled Objection and Reply. I said above (p. 86) that his defense comprises a series of intellectual tours de force, and these final ones are especially brilliant. The final exchange does not end with a bravura reply to his most brilliant objection (remember, he is author of the objections); rather, Lonergan ends his chapter five with a simple and amusing truth:

Objection: At least this matter is easier to understand when the only ground of perfection recognized in God is act.

That last objection having conceded the argument, Lonergan ends gracefully:

Reply: Our reply to this is that when one is dealing with mystery, an easier understanding can hardly be a truer one. (§ 435.)

6. Particular Summary of Chapters Two to Five of S

Our goal in chapter 2 has been understanding God quoad se from the viewpoint of the human imago Trinitatis as an order analogous to God’s. We have been aiming to at-
tain the concept of God’s perfection of order as Lonergan conceives it by understanding its *ratio*. Mentioned early in the present chapter (but the topic of chapter 3 below): everything created is *imago Trinitatis* inasmuch as it participates in proportionate being. Humanity is the creature who participates most, who is most *imago Trinitatis*. The intervening pages have argued that we are reasonable who agree with Lonergan’s position.

You have followed a guide and interpreter who chose not to point out everything Lonergan’s guidebook calls attention to. We have traveled from a simple first question, through a very complex argument, to find at the end a simple answer to virtually every question pertaining to trinitarian systematics. We have traveled from processions to perfection of order and, beyond that, to the *ratio* of a single concept that unifies God’s perfect conscious existence and God’s perfect order. Ours is one of many possible itineraries. Our journey specifically pursues the idea of order. The Trinity *quoad se* is known to understand, know, and love in an ordered way. Orders are plural, yet there is one God. To help us understand the mystery, we applied to God the analogy of our strictly spiritual nature and the order of its strictly spiritual operations.

Applying the psychological analogy led to true conclusions. Because intellectual, divine consciousness necessarily knows and loves; it is God’s nature to know and love intentionally. Knowing and loving are equally necessary for divine consciousness to be fully self-conscious in the ones who circumincede. *Dicens, Verbum,* and *Amor* are ordered according to their personal possession of the *ousia*\(^{202}\), the, if you will, absolute “dynamo-conscious” act of God’s own existence as *Dicens, Verbum,* and *Amor*. As I judge the evidence, Lonergan rightly affirms that the psychological analogy provides a deeper insight into who God is.

6.1 *The Procession of Ideas*

Let us imagine a different kind of procession. Lonergan presents his ideas in a strict order that is, in a sense, self-assembling; the ideas proceed from a principle first not in some order but in a natural order of emergence that regards a specific object to be understood. When the object is no less than the greatest possible mystery, the first principle must be revealed. We know for certain there are processions in God. The first systematic principle proceeds from asking the question, What kind of processions are they? To answer the question, one supposes that processions in us and in God are alike in some respect. With Thomas, Lonergan supposes that they are intellectual emanations.

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\(^{202}\) “One will say that *ousia* means the reality mediated by meaning when one speaks of God the Father. Again, one will say that realities are consubstantial when what is true of one also is true of the other, except that one is not the other.” Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism,” in *A Second Collection*, 253. The phrase “mediated by meaning” will be discussed further in chap. 3 below.
Since there are two, they must differ. Enter Lonergan’s distinguishing in critical-realist terms the two processions per modum operati, one by way of intellect’s reason, one by way of intellect’s will. Since the will is a rational as well as affective appetite for the lovable, both processions are intellectual emanations. Thomas is verified and advanced. The procession of ideas from God’s self-revelation to perfection of order continues as one idea becomes the immediate principle of the one following, each raising a question for understanding answered by the next.

Let us take a closer look at the procession of ideas that arose as Lonergan found, and we gained insight into, answers to his systematically ordered questions. The members of Lonergan’s systematic procession are ideas, contents of acts of understanding. Because my immediate purpose is not to explain but illustrate, the procession of ideas can be personified without violating the rigors of systematic argument. Imagine it stately, austere, elegant, clear, each member related to all the others, all but the last originating a new member (there is no systematic idea beyond that of perfect divine order). The ideas: God is one. God is a trinity of distinct divine persons. God the Holy Trinity’s one act is dynamically conscious, thus God understands, speaks a word, and spirates love. Our imago Dei is generally our intellectual consciousness, and the image and likeness is specifically imago Trinitatis in its operations of understanding, knowing, and loving. That’s the personified idea whose imagined sash bears the word hypothesis. Then, intellectual emanation. Procession per modum operati originated two ideas that process side by side, the questions they raise answered by a single idea. The processions are relations. Relations are persons. Persons are notional acts. They communicate. They mutually indwell. God is one perfection of intellectually conscious existence and order. We also noted that Lonergan contributes a fundamentum to the procession of ideas in Jewish-Christian dialogue.

The procession begins from God known in faith and ends with God understood systematically with some estimable degree of probability that one’s understanding is true. Lonergan’s hypothesis becomes trinitarian theory multiply verified.

6.2 Solving the Fundamental Trinitarian Problem

In the process of solving the fundamental trinitarian problem to the satisfaction of faith seeking understanding, Lonergan demonstrably advances the psychological analogy, logic, philosophy, metaphysics, and theological method; he achieves new and penetrating systematic understanding of God quoad se. For the first time in the Catholic tradition, a theologian unites the consubstantiality, the common nature of the Three, and their distinct personal relations in one critical-realist concept consonant with infallible teaching—all based on the not farfetched supposition that God’s one act of being God is dynamic intellectual consciousness (thus implicitly ordered). Thomas said that divine intelligence is the supreme perfection of God (see n. 133 p. 95 above). Besides advancing
our understanding of the divine perfection of intelligence, Lonergan adds to systematics of the Trinity the distinct perfection of divine order. God is dynamically conscious De-
cens, Verbum, and Amor. So Lonergan enables us to grasp as one the distinct divine per-
fec tions of intelligent existence and conscious order. Again, a Thomist advance that Lo-
ersgan does not advert to as such.

6.2.1 Procession per Modum Operati

To make sense of the truth that God is God from God, we followed Lonergan’s elu-
cidation of divine order according to the psychological analogy. Our knowing is like God’s (general notion) in one respect (the particular notion): processio operati, a distinct mode of emanation supposed to be like the procession of God the Word (when God is assumed to be dynamic intellectual consciousness analogously like our own). The Word expresses divine understanding. In distinguishing procession per modum operati, Loner-
gan also throws into relief the distinct emanation of Love, the proceeding Holy Spirit.

6.3 Concluding Remarks

Systematics is an autonomous genre that expresses theological understanding scient-
ifically. Intricate, complex, subtle, uncompromisingly plainspoken, technical, abstract, scientifically precise, Lonergan’s language is systematic; and a dissertation restricts poe-
try even more. To the nonbeliever, absurd; to the uneducated, puzzling; and to academ-
ics with eclectic common sense,203 rational nonsense. No matter. In one who under-
stands Lonergan’s highly complex argument, a simple concept will form, a word will arise, to express the perfection of order that is the general systematic—therefore synthe-
sizing—concept enabling us to unify the data of systematic theology. Thus I confidently assert in chapter 3 below that, united to generalized empirical method, to interiority made self-conscious, the concept of divine order, other things being equal, can spireate enough healing light and power to reverse personal, communal, and cultural decline.

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203 See “Commonsense Eclecticism,” in Insight, 441-45. “Commonsense eclecticism brushes aside the aim of philosophy. For that aim is the integrated unfolding of the detached, disinter-
ested, and unrestricted desire to know. That aim can be pursued only by the exercise of theoretical understanding, and indeed only by the subtle exercise that understands both science and common sense in their differences and in their complementarity. But commonsense eclecticism deprecates the effort to understand. For it, problems are immutable features of the mental land-
scape, and syntheses are to be effected by somebody else who, when he has finished his system, will provide a name for merely another viewpoint.” Ibid., 443.
7. General Summary of Chapter 2

Here, I consider the content of the present chapter in relation to the “General Summary of Chapter 1.” This chapter interpreted Lonergan’s scientifically explained concept of divine order. His hypothesis amounts to little more than shifting the Thomist emphasis from God’s being to God’s consciousness conceived as dynamic like ours. Scientific because empirically grounded in the fact of human consciousness; scientific methodically; and scientific by his explaining the object's intelligibility, its ratio.

We aimed to understand Lonergan’s scientific hypothesis-cum-theory sufficiently to form a concept expressing one’s understanding of both the abstract heuristic structure, the order that Creation imitates, and the theological content so convincingly argued in S. Grasping only the abstract heuristic, while valuable, would not reach the goal of systematics: to express understanding of the Good News for the sake of mission. Since understanding is also of the heart, and systematics must forego all explanation aimed first at affectivity, one might say that S’s systematic understanding serves the Church’s mission to make the truth about God understood. We have experienced how intellectually exigent contributing to that mission can be.

Witness to truth regards both the majority who do not know Christ, and the need of the church to understand the truths professed entre nous. Systematics does not directly preach the Good News, and systematic theology is not a genre of apologetics. Systematics is for believers who want to understand their religious beliefs. The systematic theologian means to teach the teachers. The Jesuit missionary principle of the magis regards not only greater effort, choosing the more difficult, but also greater results.

7.1 Lonerganian and Thomist Notions of Order

Lonergan’s notion of divine order and the various analogues called isomorphic structures concern far more than systematic theology. There is incongruity between the classicist notions of perfection of order in nature and the order it perceives to be in God the Holy Trinity. The classicist conceives Creation as hierarchically ordered, but clearly conceives order in the Trinity as non-hierarchical. Lonergan provides systematic explanation sufficient to enable our forming one unified concept of natural and divine orders. Again, he brings Thomas forward. He demonstrates that the order of nature is not hierarchical but a dynamic unity of order equally intelligible in both directions (all natural orders have first and last elements; but only intellectual orders are dynamically reversible; the last shall be first and the first last). To achieve his magnificent advance, to give humanity a new paradigm of natural order, Lonergan does not overturn Thomas’s analogous understanding of the trinitarian order; rather, he uncovers the empirical structure of nature and demonstrates it to be analogue of order in God as Thomas conceived it—but expressed in the dynamic, historical, critical-realist terms of intentionality analysis.
or interiority. Lonergan advances Thomas’s concept along the authentic Thomist path by transposing Thomas’s psychology from metaphysical into intentional categories, by converting Thomas’s trinitarian worldview from classical to critical, by purging Thomism of “every trace of antiquated science” (see p. 34 above). Most important for systematic theology, Lonergan takes methodic priority away from metaphysics and, for the first time in its history, provides Christian theology with a new form of wisdom, a generalized empirical method that—other things being equal to the task, there being good ideas to order—guarantees good results for theology and the theologian, thus for Church and world.

7.2 Natural and Supernatural Unity from the Viewpoint of Order

The order perceived to be God’s transcends the order of nature and is only analogously a structure. The analogue of divine order is isomorphic with the structures of proportionate being, so in that sense we seek a systematic concept that unifies the structure of one, plural, infinite yet relative, absolute God—in whom there is no structure. Lonergan did not intend to have the last word: it is up to us to clarify more the phantasm required to have the insight that generates the concept or word that gets spelled out in systematic treatises. Today “the ideal has ceased to be definitive achievement; it has become ongoing advance.” (See above p. 74). As Lonergan demonstrated before our minds, theology can advance by leaps and bounds.

We saw at the end of chapter 1 that wisdom whose work is ordering systematic theology takes the form of method. There is no created order greater than the order that best illuminates divine order; method imitates the natural order of the mind’s intentional operations isomorphic and analogously isomorphic with all that the mind intends, the whole of proportionate and transcendent being, God and everything else in God.

7.2.1 Concluding Remarks on Lonergan’s Theology of God Quoad Se

Had he explained Thomas’s intellectual emanation as Thomas understood it, Lonergan would have given the systematic theologian a fruitful gift. That he includes that gift in the same interpretation that transposes Thomas into the terms and relations of interiority, into theological method itself! He gives systematic theologians new understanding of the two divine processions. Lonergan clarifies the ground for fresh delineations of the distinct personalities of the Holy Trinity.

Moreover, that gift was enclosed in a further advance of trinitarian systematics. Clarifying divine emanation served to expose the ratio of conceiving a new divine perfection only rationally distinct from the other distinct supreme divine perfection, God’s being; the divine order conceived according to the psychological analogy; God interchangeably Supreme Being and Supreme Order, being and order equal and, indeed, really
identical divine “ultimatae.” Logically, ultima cannot be plural; but the divine order is such that three really distinct persons are only rationally distinct from the infinite perfection of God’s one ordered act of intellectually conscious existence. The ratio of the Trinity transcends human reason’s capacity to understand because it transcends even the transcendental laws of our existential (empirical, intellectual, moral, religious) autonomy. God the Holy Trinity is strictly Mystery. While we don’t have to see God to believe, we have to experience God directly to understand and know, in some measure, what it’s really like to be God.

We can now grasp in a single phantasm the unity between natural structures of being, knowing, creating, and the analogous structure of our dynamically conscious triune God. The psychological analogy enables a unified concept of the unity of Creation and perfection of order in God quoad se. That concept needs completion in God quoad nos (and quoad cetera), the topic of the following chapter, our final step in achieving the desired viewpoint of order.
CHAPTER 3

GOD QUOAD NOS—
THE DIVINE MISSIONS AND OUR RESPONSE

1. Introduction to This Chapter

First I will offer a brief overview of what this chapter aims to accomplish and then introduce the sixth and final chapter of S, “The Divine Missions.” In the preceding chapter on the Holy Trinity quoad se, we learned why it is reasonable to affirm that in God, to quote another of Lonergan’s elegant formulae, “the three Persons are the perfect community … three subjects of a single, dynamic, existential consciousness.”\(^{204}\) His explanation of divine unity and plurality provided not only an intellectually and spiritually satisfying vindication of the explanatory power of the psychological analogy in trinitarian systematics; his systematic explanation of God quoad se also gave us the perfect instance of our topic, that good of order than which none greater can be thought, the single eternal order among three absolutely equal divine subjects who are personally and communally one God. Lonergan’s systematic explanation deepened our insight into, increased our scientific knowledge of, even as it magnified, the mystery of the Holy Trinity.

The good of order of the divine missions extends the eternal order of origin in God quoad se; thus our focus in this chapter will not be order in God quoad nos in regard to the missions as such. We will seek, rather, some understanding of (1) the distinct missions as such, i.e., their nature (according to familiar categories like common, proper, and appropriated); (2) the way the Three engage our subjectivity; (3) our response to God; and (4) how this theological understanding can be unified. Since “the good of order itself is the greatest good” (see above n. 64 p. 31); and since we have already explicated that greatest good in uncreated reality, our pursuit of the idea of order will now focus more on its analogue, the supreme created good of order, Creation, the ordered universe of our everyday experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

Our primary purpose, of course, is to unify from the viewpoint of order, to grasp per modum unius, our understanding of the two irreducible categories of trinitarian sys-

\(^{204}\) Lonergan, “The Dehellenization of Dogma,” in A Second Collection, 24.
tematics, God (quoad se and quoad nos) and Creation. While sections 1 to 4 aim to provide an adequate account of Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions, the longer part of this chapter, sections 5 to 7, offers a comprehensive sketch and summary of order in creation. Section 8’s general summary of this chapter relates to each other order in God and order in Creation. The final section, 9, summarizes the whole of this interpretation of Lonergan’s systematic theology of God.

1.1 Introduction to Chapter Six: “On the Divine Missions”

The most daunting elements of trinitarian theory are now behind us. It is also consoling that there remains just one technical problem in regard to a divine mission as such, namely the entitative status of its created term. Lonergan’s solution to this longstanding, once-thorny problem is clear and simple.

In regard to the divine missions to and in us, we will pay special attention to a new contribution to trinitarian theory related to the problem of a divine mission’s created term ad extra. Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions specifies what I called in point 3 above “the way the Three engage our subjectivity.” He states that we participate in the life of the Holy Trinity via four absolutely supernatural but created forms of a familiar set of categories, namely the four real relations in God: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration; but he does not relate them directly to the psychological analogy. We will pay special attention to this captivating and potentially very fruitful development of Catholic theology of God.

2. God’s Initiative Towards Us: The Divine Missions

In his chapter six Lonergan maintains his custom of not straying from his topic; but at the beginning, he does call our attention to the relevance of theology of God quoad nos to the other treatises of theology:

After considering the divine persons in themselves and in their relations to one another, we must now treat their missions to us. Since the missions enter into other theological treatises, for example, on the incarnate Word, on grace, on the church, and on revelation, they neither need to be investigated in all thoroughness here nor too quickly or too easily dismissed. But they ought to be investigated to the extent that their basis in trinitarian doctrine may be clearly revealed and, in addition, that sufficient indication may be given of how much light the other treatises can derive from this. (S 437.)

Chief among his several indications of how theology of the missions illuminates other treatises: his abovementioned contribution to unifying trinitarian theology and the treatise on Grace, “the way the Three engage our subjectivity,” the divine inhabitation of the just discussed in section 3 below. In section 5 below on our response to God, further
light will be shed on how Lonergan’s theology of the Trinity affects and effects the content and unity of the various treatises of a comprehensive systematic theology of God.

Lonergan’s argument comprises four assertions (15-18) and eleven questions (22-32). His outline of the core of his argument comprises the first three assertions and the first four questions:

Since, however, we are addressing a question that contains many disputed points, we begin with a fundamental principle that regards both the external works of God and the external divine missions (assertion 15). We apply this principle immediately to the external works of God (assertion 16), but do not extend it to the divine missions (assertion 17) until we have established several points concerning the fact of the missions (questions 22–25). (§ 437.)

He then offers the reader a clear and very important point to orient our thinking about the missions:

The principle in all of this is that contingent truths, whether predicated of the divine persons commonly or properly, have their constitution in God but their term in creatures. Therefore, although the external works of God are necessarily common to the three persons, the missions in the strict sense are necessarily proper, since a divine person operates by reason of the divine essence but is not really and truly sent except by reason of a relation of origin. Accordingly, the entire question is reduced to a question of fact, namely, whether not only the Son but also the Holy Spirit has really and truly been sent. (§ 439.)

We will follow Lonergan’s itinerary, attend to the remaining questions (especially Question 32), but pay considerable attention to Question 26 on the four terms of divine habitation, and Assertion 18 on the subject of Grace. Our principal concern remains the idea of order and how the new material complements and completes the theologically informed concept of divine order achieved at the end of chapter 2 above. As we proceed, the reader will appreciate how one’s prior understanding of God quoad se and the psychological analogy makes it almost effortless to understand Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions.

2.1 Assertion 15: On a Fundamental Principle

Assertion 15 reads:

What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent condition in an appropriate external term.205 (§ 439.)

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205 Lonergan precisely defines the assertion’s technical terms and, since they will recur, it
To help us grasp the central notion, I quote Crowe’s lucid definition of an appropriate external term:

An extrinsic denominator [external term] is the created reality needed for the truth of a contingent statement on God. To say “God created” is to make a contingent statement about God; if it is true there has to be a corresponding reality; that reality cannot be in God, in whom nothing is contingent; it is in creation existing as an extrinsic denominator of that contingent truth about God. See … [The Triune God: Systematics] … where is it called “conveniens terminus ad extra” [appropriate external term].

We learned that anything affirmed of the divine persons, because God is absolutely perfect and absolutely simple, must be of God. Thus the first line of the assertion: “Contingents truly spoken of the divine persons are constituted through the divine perfection itself.” The contingents are the required created terms of the missions; thus, for example, there would not be a divine incarnation unless “an appropriate external term” exist to make incarnation a fact, namely the created human nature assumed by the Word.

Lonergan’s explanation of Assertion 15 comprises three points. The first, a scientific syllogism, goes to the heart of the matter:

Where there is present a formality constitutive of infinite perfection, any other formality is superfluous. But each divine person as well as all together are infinite in perfection. Therefore, any constitutive formality other than the divine perfection it-

seems best to offer them here at the outset (all are from S, 439-41.) Truly predicated denotes “what has been revealed, either explicitly or implicitly.” Contingent, antonym of necessary, denotes “what can be or not be; for example, creation, the present economy of salvation.” Of the divine persons means “of one, of two, or of three, either properly or by appropriation; for a general theorem is being established.” Constituted “is said by analogy to the constitution of a finite being; for just as a finite being is composed of and constituted by intrinsic principles, so infinite being is said to be constituted by its infinite and absolutely simple perfection.” (Assertion 16 will be specific in regard to constitution). Divine perfection is “the divine reality itself as identical with one or two or three relations that are subsistent and really distinct from one another, as determined by the particular question.” Condition denotes “that which is necessary for constituting or producing something else, though it is not the constitutive or effective cause.” Consequent: “a condition is either prior or simultaneous or consequent according as the necessity for it precedes or accompanies or follows the constitution or production of something else.” Appropriate term means “suited, that is, to the particular truth under discussion; for example, if God as the creator of light is being discussed, the appropriate term is not air or water or earth but created light.” External means external to God.

self is superfluous for constituting whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons. (§ 439.)

The second point concerns correspondence of truth. If in regard to the divine persons we speak truly of contingents, what we say cannot be true unless there really is a contingent reality outside God. Everything external to God is contingent or, conversely, nothing *ad extra* is necessary in the sense of causative or constitutive of a mission. We are speaking about a divine mission, so by definition there cannot be a mission unless there is an external term. The term is necessary even though contingent; but not necessary in the sense of antonym of contingent. Thus: “What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons has no correspondence of truth without an appropriate external term.” (§ 439.) And:

The correspondence of truth is lacking where a truth is contingent but the corresponding reality is absolutely necessary. But our inquiry is explicitly about contingent truths, and the divine perfection is absolutely necessary; therefore, if there is no external term, there is no correspondence of truth. (§ 439.)

The third point concerns the term of an operation or relation *ad extra*. It is not constitutive because, as we learned above, the contingent said of the divine persons is constituted only through divine perfection. There can be no external *cause* of divine activity. Therefore “the necessary external term is not a constitutive cause but only a condition, and indeed a condition that is not prior or simultaneous but consequent.” (§ 439.) It is not a constitutive cause for two reasons: because it is superfluous as a constitutive cause when infinite perfection is present, and because every reality has its constitution not through some other’s reality but through its own. It is a mere condition, not a cause; and yet it is necessary for the correspondence of truth.

When explicating God *quoad se* we were almost completely free of the element of confusion present when we try to conceive a reality that combines the before and after of history with the eternal now of God whose Word *eternally* expresses all that is divine, possible, and real. In God’s one act of being God, God decides the missions *ad intra* and knows their terms to be *ad extra*. In other words, God does not decide a mission because God knows in the Word an historical situation that requires the remedial action of a divine mission. The missions are grounded in the prior relations of origin that are the Three. Thus the term, the condition, of a divine mission “is not an antecedent or a simultaneous but a consequent condition, because the divine persons are absolutely independent with respect to all created things.” (§ 443.)

This matter of consequent condition will be taken up again in Assertion 17’s account of the ontological constitution of a mission.
2.2 Assertion 16: On the Divine Works ad Extra

 Assertion 16 reads:

Whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons as regards divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which, and therefore is attributed distinctly and equally to each divine person.\(^{207}\) (S 443.)

Whereas Assertion 15 established a general theorem, here “the question is about three kinds of such truths, namely, those concerning the divine persons knowing, willing, and producing contingent things through the divine nature.” (S 443.) Recall that “the three distinct persons possess one and the same essence, knowledge, volition, and power ‘in an ordered way.’” Given Lonergan’s meticulous explanation of what might have seemed impossible to conceive, namely the unity of relative and absolute in God, we can now without difficulty conceive that, in regard to divine knowing, willing, and producing, what is proper to each person is also common to all. “Whatever a divine person knows, wills, and produces, that person knows, wills, and produces by that person’s own knowledge, will, and power,” (S 443) and these, while distinct, are really the same as the person. And: “whatever a divine person knows, wills, and produces, that person knows, wills, and produces by the divine perfection common to the three persons equally as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which.” (S 445.) The principle is that each person possesses the one absolute act that is “a single, dynamic, existential consciousness,” but distinctly. All divine operations are constituted through one principle. A principle is an absolute, and there is but one absolute. “Whatever God the Father knows, wills, and produces, the Son and the Spirit also know, will, and produce, since there is one essence, one knowledge, one will, and one power for the Three. DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325.” (S 445.) As our discussion moves forward, we will understand more clearly why the missions are attributed to the divine persons equally but distinctly.

2.3 Question 22: “Did God the Father send his Son to redeem the human race?” (S 445.)

The answer is not in doubt. Lonergan’s concern is not dogmatic but systematic. He is concerned “lest the question regarding the missions of the divine persons seem to be about concepts rather than realities,” (S 445) so he cites Scripture to delineate the con-

\(^{207}\) “This opinion is common and certain and, as regards what are produced, has been given this special approval: ‘And besides, this most certain truth must be firmly borne in mind, that in these matters all things are to be held as being common to the Holy Trinity, inasmuch as these same things are related to God as their supreme efficient cause’ (DB 2290, DS 3814, ND 1996).” S, 443.
crete features of the Son’s mission: “But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children” (Gal 4:4-5). Our adoption as God’s children will be recalled in discussion below of the four created relations ad extra.

There is not space to report Lonergan’s six paragraphs of well-chosen scriptural texts, but he summarizes as follows the facts revealed in Scripture:

It is clear, therefore, (1) that a divine person is the one sending, (2) that another divine person is sent, (3) that the divine person who is sent lives because of the one sending, teaches the doctrine of the one sending, wills the aim of the one sending, and performs the works of the one sending, (4) that the divine person is sent to human persons in order that they may live, believe, know, love, and perform greater works (John 14.12; see 9.3–4, 10.32, 10.37, 14.10–11, 15.24, 17.4), and (5) that through the mediation of others this mission extends to other human persons. (§ 449; emphases added.)

Note the dynamic pairing of the facts of the mission as such and their effects in us who cooperate with them, our imitation of God quoad nos: The Person sent lives for us; we live for the Person sent. The Person teaches us; we believe and proclaim the Person’s teaching. The Person wills the objective of his mission; we will (therefore love) the Person’s objective. The Person accomplishes works; we are enabled to accomplish greater works. We know that willing is loving, that we spirate love for what we judge to be true and good. Thus accomplishment is the doing and making that I have called creating. Finally, the mediation to us of the Good News through people who live, believe, teach, love, and create makes us people who live, believe, teach, love, and create for others.

2.4 Question 23: “Do the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit?” (§ 449.)

Again, the question is important not because the answer is in doubt but because it clarifies systematic understanding of the mission of the Holy Spirit (and anticipates the answer to our next question, for the mission of the Holy Spirit is the extension into history of the Spirit’s relation of origin). Scripture affirms the order of origin, for “sacred scripture clearly and with certitude teaches the sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, although there are fewer texts concerning this mission.” (§ 449; cf., Gal 4:6, Jn 14:26.) Lonergan cites Scripture (pp. 449-51) to establish that the Father sends the Spirit of his Son into our hearts; the Spirit teaches and brings to remembrance all that Jesus taught; he bears witness to Jesus, is given, received, had; the Spirit inhabits, is poured out, supplied, guarantees our inheritance, and seals us; he is Advocate and Counselor.

Note as we move through these questions and assertions that—now indirectly, now explicitly, but continually—Lonergan delineates the individuality of the persons sent and emphasizes the nexus between their missions (and indirectly illuminates the role of
the Father). Here he makes two more points in regard to the sending of the Spirit: “as the doctrine of the Son who is sent is not his own but that of the Father, so also the Spirit who is sent does not teach his own doctrine; John 16.13: ‘When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears …’” (S 449.)

“Furthermore,” Lonergan says in his final point, “as the Son who is sent is not alone (John 8.16, 29), so also the Spirit who is sent and indwelling is not alone. For after John tells about the Advocate who is to be sent ‘to be with you forever’ and says that ‘he abides with you, and he will be in you’ (John 14.16-17), he soon adds, ‘We will come to them and make our home with them’ (John 14.23). (S 451.)

2.5 **Question 24: “Is a divine person sent by the one or those from whom he proceeds?”**

Lonergan does not define a divine mission until Question 29, but in these preceding questions he establishes the elements of that definition. Our understanding of God *quoad se* enables us to anticipate that he will link mission to relation of origin, that the answer to Question 24 is yes. Note in the following quotation that Son and Spirit do what they are missioned to do by the person or persons from whom they proceed:

In the New Testament (1) the Father alone among the divine persons is not sent; (2) the Son is sent to the world by the Father to teach not his own doctrine but that of the Father, to seek not his own will but that of the Father, to perform not his own works but those of the Father; (3) the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, not to speak on his own but to teach what he has heard; (4) St Paul in the very same text (Galatians 4.4–6) uses the word *(ἐξαποστέλλω, exapostello)* twice, first too designate the mission of the Son and then to designate the mission of the Spirit of the Son; and (5) in the New Testament the words the words *apostello, apostelos, exapostello, and pepo* [ἀποστέλλω, ἀπόστολος, Ἐξαποστέλλω, πέμπω] generally have a somewhat technical meaning, namely, that the person sent receives authority from the one sending to fulfil some duty towards others.[5]208

Clearly a distinction must be made between the notion of the work of redemption (common to the three persons) and the notion of the missions proper to Son and Spirit. Finally, to link mission to relation of origin, Lonergan writes:

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208 S, 451. Note 5 reads: “These words are also used in the sense of expelling demons [Matthew 8.31], releasing the [donkey and] colt [Matthew 21.3], wielding a sickle [Mark 4.29; Revelation 14.15, 18]; but they are almost always used in an interpersonal sense, as in the text, ‘As the Father has sent me, so I send you’ ( John 20.21; see 17.18). See the concordance to the Greek NT, or G. Kittel, ed., *Theologisches Wörterbuch zumo Neuen Testament* 1, 397–448 (K.H. Rengstorf).”
When the sense is that a divine person is really and truly sent by a divine person, as is the case in the New Testament, a real relation ‘who from another’ is included in the very formality of mission; and since this sort of real relation in God is not really distinct from the relation of origin, it necessarily follows that a divine person is not sent except by the one or by those from whom that person proceeds. (§ 453.)

When, however, the meaning of mission is not what is proper to Son or Spirit, “the sense is that any finite effect is produced externally, ‘mission’ is broadly understood as production, and in reality the three divine persons equally produce this effect, even though by appropriation it is predicated of only one or of two.” (§ 453.) (This question regards what is proper to the persons sent; the next question regards appropriation.) He states here that “unless some other meaning is clear, ‘mission’ is always understood in the technical sense, as in John 20.21, ‘As the Father has sent me, so I send you.’” (§ 453.) (Our part in the missions, our being sent, will be discussed in section 5 below.)

2.6 Question 25: “Is it by appropriation that the Father and the Son are said to send the Holy Spirit?” (§ 453.)

Lonergan’s answer further clarifies the distinctions among common, proper, and appropriated. The sending of the Spirit can be understood in three ways:

First, that a finite spiritual effect is produced in a creature; second, that the third divine person himself comes into a creature; third, that the third divine person himself is really and truly sent by the other two.209

In both first and second cases, the sending is understood as appropriation because divine works *ad extra* are common; and a divine person coming to a creature “‘in itself does not imply a relation of origin.” (§ 455.) Recall the oft-repeated teaching that when an opposed relation of origin does not stand in the way, all is common to the Three. The third way of understanding the sending of the Spirit is not as appropriated but as proper to the Spirit:

In the third sense, there can be no appropriation. For if the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the others, there is in the Holy Spirit himself a true and real relation according to which he is ordered to the ones who send as to those from whom. This real relation of the Holy Spirit can only be passive spiration, which is wholly proper to the Holy Spirit. (§ 455.)

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209 § 453-55. Editorial note 7 reads: “[In the NRSV this is translated, ‘And now the Lord God has sent me and his spirit.’ But the New International Version has, ‘And now the Sovereign Lord has sent me with his Spirit,’ which could be understood as saying what the text Lonergan uses says.]”
“Thus,” Lonergan concludes, “this third sense seems to be more in keeping with the teaching of the New Testament, as presented above [in Questions 22-24].” (§ 455.)

2.7 Assertion 17: On the Consequent Condition of a Divine Mission

Assertion 17 reads:

The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition. (§ 455.)

It is in the present context that Lonergan uses the example cited in chapter 1 above of “what in reality is required and is sufficient for it to be true that Peter is this wise man.” Thus, “since it is clear from the foregoing that the Son is sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son,” (§ 455) the present assertion concerns the ontological constitution of a mission.

The greater part of Lonergan’s argument confronts what was then a lively controversy about the entitative status of the term of a divine mission; but our concern is to understand Lonergan’s position. He outlines his argument thus:

It is argued, first, that the mission of a divine person is not constituted without a divine relation of origin; second, that nothing more is required for a mission to be constituted than a relation of origin; third, that a mission as contingent and temporal requires an appropriate external term, not as a constitutive but only as a consequent condition. (§ 463.)

We will closely follow the three brief steps of Lonergan’s argument.

Step 1: His argument employs the syllogism that increases understanding, the scientific. The first premise establishes that, since it is true that the Father sends the Son, then the opposition of sender and sent makes it clear that the mission of the Son is “predicated according to relations of origin,” the only opposites in God. “The major premise is clear and certain from the principle that everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325). … The minor is clear from sacred scripture, as has been already established.” (§ 465.) The same argument holds for the mission of the Holy Spirit. There is the opposition of sender and sent; and this opposition, as we have learned, is the relation of origin of Spirator (paternity and filiation) and Spirit.

Step 2: We have already learned that when there is an infinitely perfect constitutive

cause or *ratio*, “every other cause or constitutive reason is superfluous.” But to constitute the divine missions there is an infinitely perfect cause or *ratio*, “namely, a real relation of origin, which is really identical with the divine essence.” (§ 465.) Any other cause or rational ground (*ratio*), therefore, is superfluous. He concludes:

Just as a divine person is and knows and wills and operates by the divine essence, and is distinguished as generating or generated, or as spirating or spirated, by a divine relation of origin, so also a divine person is constituted as sending or as sent by a divine relation of origin. (§ 465.)

**Step 3:** God’s omnipotence cannot do the impossible; the correspondence of truth of a contingent reality cannot be established “through a reality that is simple and necessary and this alone.” (§ 465.) The contingent must be real. That “a divine person sends or is sent is contingently true.” Divine created works *ad extra* are such as they are because of free divine choice; “absolutely speaking, creation, incarnation, and sanctification could have not been.” This being so, a divine person sending or being sent “cannot have the correspondence of truth through the divine perfection alone, and therefore requires an appropriate external term.” For a mission to exist, the created term *ad extra* is required as a consequent condition. It must be consequent, because “the person sending and also the person sent in no way depend upon a creature and therefore, although the term is a condition because it is necessary, still it cannot be either a prior or a simultaneous condition.” (All quotes at § 467.) It must be consequent.

The fundamental *ratio* of the divine missions having been successfully argued, there follow seven questions (26-32) whose answers specify their ontology, their similarities and differences, our part in the missions, its effects, and the culmination of Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions in Assertion 18.

3. **Question 26 and the Four Created Relations *ad Extra***

When we speak of our union with the indwelling Trinity according to the terms and relations of interiority, we are not talking about mere beings of reason. “The natural and supernatural are really distinct, as distinct as matter and form, soul and body, but in the concrete order of divine providence they are united dynamically.” (Topics 70.) In Question 26, the relation between the analogy of the subject and the mystery of the Holy Trinity becomes existential in the most immediate sense. Lonergan does not directly relate the order of our return to God—Spirit, Son, Father—to intentional operations, but he does provide the *ratio* for our doing so. In answering Question 32, he says that “the divine persons are sent in accordance with their eternal processions, to encounter us and dwell in us in accordance with *similar processions* produced in us through grace. Those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father, to whom be all glory through the Son in the Spirit.” (§ 513; emphasis added.)
3.1 Question 26: “In what ways is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted mission?” (S 467.)

When explaining Assertion 17, Lonergan noted: “For the present we are not determining the nature of the appropriate term of the missions but will leave that for later questions.” (S 457.) This question and answer are meant, therefore, to help us better understand the nature of the term of the missions. In fact, I highlighted Question 26 because it provides the ratio for what might be called a general solution to the theological problem of gaining systematic understanding in critical-realist terms of the union in history of the distinct persons of the Holy Trinity with the human subject. Moreover, given post-S development by Lonergan and his interpreters of our understanding of the human subject and theological method, ongoing collaborative interpretation of Question 26 promises significant advance in the whole of theology.211

Maintaining one’s intellectual foothold throughout Lonergan’s various meticulous arguments for the nature of the term of the missions (in this and some subsequent questions) is greatly helped by keeping in mind the truth expressed and repeated in chapter 2 above that everything divine, possible, and real the Father speaks in the Word who is God; thus it is not possible that anything ad extra could be constitutive of a mission; it must be a consequent condition. “By the very fact that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit conceive25 and will the sending of a divine person, the constituted mission itself and the appropriate created external term are already present.26”212 This does not eliminate the perennial problem of trying to combine in one concept God’s eternal now and historical time with its before and after; but there is the fact that our experience of time is always now, and the added help of keeping in mind that God does not know things because they exist; rather, things exist because God knows them in the eternal Word. Thus, if one recalls what was said above about the divine intellect, it becomes clear that the “constitution is present because God is being by intellect and therefore what God understands about God is God. There is the creation because God is agent by intellect and therefore what God understands to be outside God is outside God.” (S 467.)


212 S, 467. Editorial notes 25 and 26 read: “[Lonergan’s word is ‘concipiunt,’ ‘conceive.’ But he quickly moves to variations on ‘intelligere,’ ‘to understand.’]” And: “[‘... are already present,’ that is, sub specie aeternitatis. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 345-46: ‘All other predication (predication other than substantial predications) with respect to God involves extrinsic denomination and presupposes its term as actually existing sub specie aeternitatis ... Since any predication with respect to God ad extra presupposes the actual existence (sub specie aeternitatis) of the term ...’]”
Now we advance to Lonergan’s carefully constructed argument regarding constitution and production of the divine missions. (In this and subsequent questions, we will make much use of our prior understanding of common, proper, and appropriated attributes.) He first makes four distinctions: “If the following are distinguished, (1) constitution in the active sense, (2) constitution in the passive sense, (3) creation in the active sense, and (4) creation in the passive sense, then” (§ 467) there follow eight (numbered) points. It is impossible, in my view, to paraphrase Lonergan’s clear, precise, and spare explanations; however, while self-explanatory, here and in subsequent questions he will add further explanation, and draw out their implications according to context.

(1) Constitution in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will both that the Father send the Son and that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit;

(2) constitution in the passive sense is proper to the one sending and to the one sent, since the Three conceive and will, not that three send and that three be sent, but that the Father send the Son and the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit;

(3) creation in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will that the appropriate external term be created, and since the very conceiving, together with the will, is the omnipotent act of creating;

(4) [Here Lonergan introduces the familiar notion of order.] although constitution in the active sense and creation in the active sense are common to the three persons, still they are common to the Three not confusedly but distinctly; for the fact itself that the Son understands and wills that he be sent by the Father he has from the Father, just as he has his substance from the Father; and the fact itself that the Holy Spirit understands and wills that he be sent by the Father and the Son he has from the Father and the Son, just as he has his substance from them; and the same must be said concerning creation in the active sense;

(5) creation in the passive sense is the appropriate external term itself as dependent upon its first efficient cause [God];

(6) nothing real and intrinsic is added to the intrinsically immutable divine persons, whether by constitution in the active sense or by constitution in the passive sense or by creation in the active sense;

(7) and yet through their infinite and unlimited divine perfection, either common or proper according to the case, the Three really and truly constitute, are really and truly constituted as sending and sent, respectively,27 and the three persons really and truly equally create the appropriate terms;

(8) for just as divine immutability makes impossible a real, intrinsic addition, so also divine infinity renders such an addition superfluous.213

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213 S, 467-69. Editorial note 27 reads: “[That is, when ‘constitution’ is taken in the passive
Now we apply these facts to the actual missions, and highlight the distinctions between the missions of Son and Spirit. “The above eight statements are verified in each; but as to what is constituted and created, they are in many respects entirely different.” (S 469.) The Son becomes incarnate (assumes another nature), while the Spirit is given. The created external term of the Son’s mission “is the nonsubsistent human nature, since the union is in the person,” (S 469) not in the natures which remain distinct in him. In the giving of the Spirit, “the material external term is a subsistent human nature, since the union of grace is between persons.” (S 469-71.)

As mentioned above, Jesus Christ is not a human person. While he lacks nothing proper to human nature, his human nature is not a subsistent because, unlike ours, “it lacks a proper proportionate act of existence.” (S 471.) Jesus is not a human person who became God (as the absurd adoptionist heresy has it).

The next point concerns relation and proportion between natures. “In the incarnation the Son is both God and man through his own divine act of existence.” (S 471; emphasis added.) The appropriate and consequent created term of this contingent truth, what establishes the “correspondence of truth,” is “a secondary act of existence by which the nonsubsistent nature is assumed.” Verbum caro factum est. As the act through which the assumption happens “exceeds the proportion of nature,” (ibid.1449) so also the secondary act of existence of the humanity of Christ, “exceeds the proportion of the assumed nature.” In regard to the mission of the Spirit, again there are similarity and difference. It is not through assuming another nature but “through his own proper perfection that the Holy Spirit is gift and is given to the just.” The appropriate and consequent created term of this contingent truth, what establishes its “correspondence of truth,” is “sanctifying grace whereby a subsistent nature is rendered holy and pleasing to God [the ‘gratia gratum faciens’]. and since both the uncreated gift and the created holiness exceed the proportion of this nature [ours], sanctifying grace also exceeds the proportion of nature.” (All quotes at S 471.)

Before getting to the heart of the matter, Lonergan makes several more points, conclusions from the foregoing, in regard to the differences that distinguish the consequent terms of the missions of Son and Spirit. “In the incarnation, therefore, the formal external term is a secondary act of existence that is reduced [see REDUCTION] to the category of substance; but in the giving of the Spirit the formal external term is sanctifying grace, which is in the category of QUALITY.” (S 471.)

Furthermore, although the incarnate Son is not alone (Father and Spirit dwell in him), only he is incarnate. The Spirit, on the other hand, through his own perfection is
the very gift given. “Since to give one’s entire love is the same as to give oneself, and since the Father and the Son give their entire proceeding Love, [in giving the Spirit] they also give themselves and therefore are said to come and dwell in the just.” (S 471.) Before moving on to the created terms *ad extra* by which the Trinity inhabits the just, the terms whose *ratio* the foregoing has established, Lonergan says that, from having grasped his explanation to this point, it should be clear to us “that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit understand, will, constitute, and accomplish different things in the incarnation and in the giving of the Spirit.” (S 471.) One rightly anticipates that, by the time we reach Assertion 18, he will add much more to our understanding of the distinct and complementary missions.

“If one asks about the supernatural character of the formal terms, it is pertinent to note the following.” (S 471.) To understand “the following,” we will draw from understanding gained in chapter 2 above. First, recall that there are four real divine relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Three are really distinct because active spiration is not really distinct from paternity and filiation; Father and Son are not opposed as lovers, they are one Spirator of the Holy Spirit. Each of the four real relations is identical to the divine substance. “First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance.” (S 471.) These modes are four created relations *ad extra*. They imitate the divine substance and the relations of origin that distinguish the persons who each and together are identical to the divine substance. Second, “there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, specifically, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory.” (S 471-73.) They are:

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214 Editorial note 29 reads: “‘Only love is meritorious *per se*; the other virtues or their acts can be informed or uninformed. They are informed by sanctifying grace and love, and when grace departs they become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. For this reason it seems worth while to distinguish between acts that are formally supernatural and acts that are virtually supernatural. The former attain God as God is in se, while the latter do not attain God as God is in se but only in some respect, as in the case of faith and hope.’ Lonergan, ‘De ente supernaturali’ (to be published in CWL 19), thesis 3, § 55. The point of Lonergan’s remark in the present text is that the four absolutely supernatural realities are formally supernatural, and necessarily so. For the created correlate of divine communication or divine self-giving is that the creature should attain God as God is in se, and these are the created realities whereby we attain God as God is in se.”

To the objection that God operates *ad extra* “not according to the relations but according to the common nature” (with the result that we cannot participate in the four real relations), “we must answer with a distinction. The objection implicitly challenges the fact of divine omnipotence. If God were “a natural agent” and could produce only what is similar in nature, “as fire always produces heat and water always causes moisture,” the objection would be true. “But the
1. Paternity. The secondary act of existence ("esse secundarium") of the Incarnation. The human nature of Jesus, "is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son," the relation opposed to paternity. We are related to the Father by relating to Jesus through his humanity.

2. Active spiration. "Sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit," the relation opposed to active spiration. The appropriate term of the Spirit's mission is the sanctifying grace whereby a subsistent nature is rendered holy and pleasing to God.

3. Passive spiration. "The habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son," the Spirator, the relation opposed to passive spiration, and not really distinct from paternity and filiation. It is in the Holy Spirit that we love Father and Son.

4. Filiation. "The light of glory ['lumen gloriae'] is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father," the relation opposed to filiation. (All quotes S 473.)

Lonergan offers no further direct comment on these four modes of our participation in the life of the Holy Trinity. The ensuing questions and Assertion 18 do, however, illuminate our understanding of them; but these elements are scattered (I will call the reader's attention to some of them). Needed, obviously, is a separate study. Absent that, I believe the deductions that follow are valid.

Recall from chapter 2 above that "the human mind is an image, and not a mere vestige, of the Blessed Trinity. That is because its processions are intelligible in a manner essentially different from, that transcends, the passive, specific, imposed intelligibility of other natural process." (V 47; see above p. 98.) The purely spiritual aspects of this image of the Trinity, of our minds, provided the best known analogia entis for gaining systematic understanding of the divine relations of origin. It would seem to follow that our intellectual operations also provide the best means for understanding the created imitation of the relations of origin. Moreover, the participation of the just in the life of the Holy Trinity via these four created relations ad extra is real, existential. I am confident Lonergan uses the psychological analogy consistently, so the graces tied to the relations of pa-

divine nature common to the Three is intellectual, and just as God by the divine intellect knows the four real relations, so also by the divine intellect, together with the divine will, God can produce beings that are finite yet similar [to the four real relations] and absolutely supernatural." S, 473.

Lonergan suggests that the light of glory by which the Blessed know God—God's essence informing the mind as the soul does the body (see ST, Supplement, q. 92, a. 1)—begins with our justification. Perhaps there is a clue worth pursuing in the fact that the light of our intellect is created participation in uncreated Light; but this issue requires much further study, especially of the relation (if any) between lumen gloriae and uncreated Light.
ternity, filiation, and spiration ought to be particular to our particular operations. To repeat my earlier quotation from Question 32 below, “For the divine persons are sent in accordance with their eternal processions, to encounter us and dwell in us in accordance with similar processions produced in us through grace.” It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, the our participation in Dicens, Verbum, and Amor is through our uttering an interior word of understanding, grasping evidence sufficient to affirm its truth, spirating love of the truth affirmed, and expressing it ad extra by creating an intelligible good, contributing to the human good of order (discussed in detail below). Given that we come to the Father through the humanity, the esse secundarium, of Christ (this will be explained in more detail in the ensuing questions), the psychological analogy in its full amplitude (i.e., including experience and the movement to insight) would seem to apply to our understanding the actual way we participate in paternity. In like manner we should be able to relate the operations of our embodied intellectuality to filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.

We also noted above that our intellectuality operates in both directions, that the order of justification is Spirit, Son, Father. Assuming, reasonably I believe, that the order Amor, Verbum, Dicens is also intelligible (not, of course, as the order of origin), the psychological analogy taken as spiration, affirmation, understanding, and experience should shed further light on our participation in the life of the Trinity.

3.2 Question 27: “Is the Holy Spirit sent as notional love?” (S 473.)

We learned that a real divine mission simply adds a consequent term ad extra to the relation of origin, so clearly the answer is yes. The Holy Spirit is notional or proceeding love. “For a fuller understanding of this, it will help to note the following” (S 473.)

Recall that in God there is no real distinction between essential and notional love; there is no divine fourth. There is a distinction of reason between them because essential love is identical to the divine essence common to the persons; notional love is this essential love with a relation of origin understood. On the basis of their common essential love, “the Father and the Son and the Spirit love all that they love.” (S 475.) I trust it will not irritate the reader if I repeat that notional love “is the Holy Spirit proceeding, whose principle is the Spirator, that is, the Father and the Son breathing love, and it is according to this [active] spiration that the Father and the Son love themselves and us by [passive spiration] the Holy Spirit” [ST, I, q. 37, a.2].” (S 475.) Based on this point, Lonergan next throws additional light on the similarity between God’s inner life and the psychological analogy (it is another of the points mentioned in the account of Question 26 that illuminate the four created terms ad extra). We do not love through our essence; a creature loves “by an act received in its will” (S 475); thus we are the principles of our acts of love. As we learned in chapter 2 above, love proceeds in us, we spirate an act of love, in response to an intelligible good, a lovable object (which can be the truth known ad intra).
The next points concern the active and passive aspects of the mission of the Holy Spirit. Recall that a mission is the same as the relation of origin with the consequent term added; taken actively the three constitute the mission, “whereas in the passive sense it is proper to certain ones.” Therefore, taken actively, it follows that “in accord with the constitution of this mission in the active sense there is a special divine love that is common to the Three and essential.” The Holy Trinity intend by this love to communicate to the just their infinite goodness. “It exists as a divine self-giving, by way of which the three divine persons give themselves to the just person” [ST, I, q. 43, a. 4 ad 1m; q. 38, a. 1 ad 1m]. If taken passively, then the constitution of the mission is like the relation of origin; the Father and Son together, the active Spirator, “are loving and sending and giving” the Holy Spirit. Passively, according to the order of origin, the Holy Spirit “is proceeding Love and the person sent and the gift given.” By this special love, “the Father and the Son love the just and give to them by the Holy Spirit” [ST, I, q. 37, a. 2; q. 38, a. 1 ad 4m; a. 2 ad 3m]. (All quotes at S 475)

The final point of Lonergan’s answer to Question 27 concerns the terms of the common essential love (“the grace that is God’s favor towards someone”) and the special notional divine love. The appropriate external term of the love who is the Holy Spirit is the “gratia gratum faciens, grace that renders one pleasing to God,“ which is a quality and an accident received in the soul of the just person.” Thus God loves all people, but not all respond to the special love that establishes the process of justification, the friendship that makes a human subject pleasing to God. (Lonergan goes on to raise and answer an informative series of objections the interested reader will find on pp. 475-79.)

3.3 Question 28: “Are the divine missions ordered to each other?” (S 479)

Again Lonergan indirectly illustrates a familiar fact. When the theologian begins with a truth that is first in some order, with understanding that does not require the prior understanding of something else, true conclusions follow. So he continues to draw out implications of the fact that the relations of origin constitute the missions and that, as missions, to have the correspondence of truth that they are real missions, they require an appropriate external term as their consequent condition. In reply to Question 28, the divine missions are indeed ordered to each other “as regards both constitution

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216 S, 475. Note 34 reads: ST “1-2, q. 110, a. 1. [See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 35–37.]” “Whatever is pleasing to God in a human subject is caused by the divine love ....” ST, I-II, q. 110, a. 1. And: “Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul not after the manner of an efficient cause but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice makes it just. ... Because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. What is substantially in God becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness.” ST I-II, q. 110, a. 2.
and consequent terms.” (§ 479.)

In regard to constitution: We learned in chapter 2 above that the procession of the Holy Spirit is rational, that “there is no procession of love except in an order to the procession of the Word [ST, I q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m]” of truth. Affirmation of a true word of understanding spirates love of truth; thus, as Lonergan says, “the Son is not any kind of Word, but the Word breathing forth or spirating Love [ST, I q. 43, a. 5, ad 2m].” From the intelligible order of the divine processions and relations that constitute the missions, “it is clear that as to their constitution the missions have an order to each other.” (All quotes at § 479-81.)

Lonergan’s explanation of the consequent terms illuminates the Spirit-Son-Father order of justification, and the nature and dynamics of the four created terms *ad extra* of Question 26. Order in the terms of the missions is evident from Paul: “God sent his Son … so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, ‘Abba! Father!’” (Gal 4:4-6.) The Father sends the Son so we might become his children by adoption; “the mission of the Holy Spirit is in accord with this adoption. But precisely what this connection [“nexus”] is needs further consideration.” (§ 481.)

To specify further the “nexus” between the missions of Son and Spirit, Lonergan brings together two truths of faith. First, he notes the abovementioned special notional love by which the just are loved, the love of the Holy Spirit that orders us to divine goodness; second, he notes that “God does everything in accord with the order of his justice” (ST, I, q. 21, a. 1). He concludes that the special love must have a special reason, and “this special reason cannot be other than God’s own Son, who is both mediator and redeemer.” (§ 481.) In other words, the mission of the special love who is the Holy Spirit is ordered to the Son’s mission, his work of mediating between us and the Father, and justifying, redeeming, us sinners. Again, an instance of the Spirit-Son-Father order of justification.

Because he is a divine person with a human nature, the Son is mediator (ST, 3, q. 26, a. 2). Lonergan notes that it is through the Holy Spirit that the Father loves and gives his Son both as divine and human. “This is manifested to us in the baptismal epiphany.” (§ 481.) The Father says, “This is my Son, the beloved, with whom I am well pleased,” and Jesus sees “the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him” (Mt 3: 17, 16). This epiphany has two aspects: there is the affirmation of the Father’s love (the Holy Spirit himself) and an instance of the visible mission of the “Holy Spirit himself coming and alighting on Jesus.” (§ 481.)

In keeping with Lonergan’s assertion mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that understanding the missions also illuminates the other treatises of theology (in this instance, sacramental theology), he says that “the baptism of Christ is exemplar of our baptism.” (§ 481.) His explanation indirectly gathers into the unity of love the purpose of the created supernatural order of our redemption, the four terms *ad extra* of the divine
missions. Because of the redemptive work of Jesus the mediator, “God the Father also loves the just as he loves his own Son.” (S 481.) (In John 17:23, Jesus says to his Father that “you … have loved them even as you have loved me.”) Because he loves the just as he loves Jesus, “he of course loves and gives to us through the Holy Spirit.” (S 483.) Consequent to the Father’s loving us as children: our adoption. In the Holy Spirit, as sisters and brothers of the Son, we are brought to our Father. Lonergan concludes: “From all this, we gain some understanding of the order of the divine missions.” (S 483.) Our Father sent his Son so he might love us as he loves him; the Father’s love for his Son is the Holy Spirit, so Father and Son send the Holy Spirit to us; through the mission of the Holy Spirit, “the Father does love us as he loves his own Son. Indeed, this love, which is, as it were, proper to the divine persons, is what implies and grounds the absolutely supernatural order,” the order, specified in Question 26, that we enter through baptism and live when in the state of grace (the topic of Assertion 18 below).

3.4 **Question 29: “What is the formality of divine mission?”** (S 483.)

“Since we cannot conceive the formality of a divine mission except by analogy to a human mission, we must begin from the latter in order that by way of affirmation, negation, and eminence we may to some extent be able to arrive at conceiving a divine mission.” To specify the analogy, Lonergan lists and then explains seven characteristics of a human mission while noting similarity and difference between it and a divine mission: *First*, in a human mission one might move from one place to another, but it is not always necessary; and we know there is no locomotion in God; God is omnipresent; so movement is not an element of the analogy. As a result of being sent, there occur the second and third points. *Second*, “some particular operation” occurs. But the missions of Son and Spirit are comprehensive. “The Son was sent to unite [‘to gather up all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth’ (Eph 1:10)] and ‘to reconcile all things’ [Col 1:20], so that ‘God may be all in all’ [1Cor 15:28].” Neither does the element of particular operation apply to the mission of the Spirit “sent to preside over the whole of Christian living in every one of the just.” *Third*, again as a result of being sent, there might occur “a whole new series of operations.” While particular operation is not an element of the analogy, operation is; yet, as might be expected, “the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to their respective operations in different ways.” Because he assumed human nature, the Son can through his humanity accomplish works proper to himself (it is the incarnate divine person who acts). Lonergan lists functions—mediator, redeemer, reconciler, head of the Church, king, judge—“requiring works that are proper to the Son.” Since the Spirit has only one nature, “he does no works that the Father and the Son do not

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217 S, 483. Editorial note 48 reads: “[That is, the order is supernatural because the love in which we are caught up is the divine love that is really proper to the divine persons.]”
likewise do, and from this we conclude that the Holy Spirit is not sent in such a way as to do anything by himself alone, without the other divine persons.” The series of operations of point three regards the fourth and fifth points. Fourth, as we know from salvation history and personal experience, “the end of a mission involves cooperation on the part of others.” Therefore, he concludes, “a mission is carried out not so much that works be done as that new personal relations be initiated and strengthened.” He quotes Augustine: “He who has created you without you will not justify you without you.” Given this mutuality, understanding a divine mission requires considering “not only the works proper to the person sent but also the personal relations that that person initiates or strengthens in order that the end of the mission may be attained through the cooperation of others.” (All quotes at S 483-85.)

Lonergan begins to concentrate his pedagogical technique of repeating the same points in different contexts while continually adding to our understanding of them. He begins to emphasis the interpersonal, the unity and distinction of the missions, their goals both proximate and ultimate (and their relation to the Father who loves and sends), and our part in achieving the missions. Thus, when we reach the culmination of his theology of God, Assertion 18, we will have gained a unified and comprehensive understanding of the relation between, on our side, Christian living and beatitude; and, on the side of the Holy Trinity, the circumincession so carefully explained in Assertion 13 (see above p. 171).

The fourth point continues. The mission of the Son pertains to friendship: “As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love” (Jn 15:9-10). The Holy Spirit’s work has a different character. “Similarly, there pertain to the mission of the Holy Spirit those intimate relations whereby we are not our own: ‘Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God? You are not your own’” (1Cor 6:19). Gift is a proper name of the Spirit. He adds in note 57: “As the just are not their own but the Spirit’s (‘you are not your own’), so the Spirit himself is the Spirit of the just, since he has been given to them. See Romans 5.5.” (All quotes at S 487.)

“Fifth, all anthropomorphism must be excluded from a divine mission, and therefore in God both the mind of the sender and the revelation of that mind are nothing other than what we said concerning the constitution of a divine mission.” (S 487.)

Sixth, “Since the divine missions are ordered to each other, there is a single, total end to both missions.” The Father sent the Son to mediate, redeem, reconcile and thereby initiate “new interpersonal relations between God the Father and all human persons.” The consequent mission of the Spirit guarantees our inheritance (Eph 1:14), which is the Father’s having “saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had

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\(^{218}\) St. Augustine, *Sermon 169*, chap. 11; ML 38, 923; as quoted in S, 485.
done, but according to his mercy, by the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit. This Spirit he poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life” (Tit 3:5-8). (All quotes at S 487.)

Having established that the missions of Son and Spirit have one total goal attained with our cooperation, Lonergan’s seventh point notes that “the different terms of the missions can be distinguished on the basis of the different stages whereby the end of the missions is brought about.” (S 487.) The first stage “begins with the incarnation, not because the Son is sent in order to assume a human nature,62 but because through the incarnation the Son is constituted as the mediator sent to us.”219 The Son of Man spends his life establishing interpersonal relations of various kinds. “A principal objective of his mission was accomplished when in dying on the cross he became ‘the source of eternal salvation for all who obey him’” (Heb 5:9). His earthly life over, his mission continues through his apostles and their successors. “As the Father has sent me, so I send you” (Jn 20:21; cf., 17:18); “Whoever welcomes you welcomes me, and whoever welcomes me welcomes the one who sent me” (Mt 10:40; cf., 18:18); “Whoever listens to you listens to me, and whoever rejects you rejects me, and whoever rejects me rejects the one who sent me” (Lk 10:16); “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?” (Acts 9:4). (All quotes at S 489.)

The extension of the earthly mission of the Son through the lives of his followers “is accomplished whenever one who is unjust is justified and a just person is further justified; for ‘I came that they may have life and have it abundantly’” (Jn 10:10). What Christ began with his Incarnation reaches its ultimate term “in the beatific vision of the citizens of heaven, ‘when he hands over the kingdom to God the Father’” (1Cor 15:24). He notes that whatever the Son accomplished on earth or now accomplishes from heaven “is part of the visible mission of the Son,” a topic of Question 30. (All quotes at S 489.)

I will not reproduce all the scriptural texts Lonergan marshals to establish his next point on the unity of the missions and their common goal. Jesus was sent to all and died for all, and so “the consequent mission of the Spirit is to each one of the just, who have been reconciled [Gal 4:6-7]. ‘God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us’” (Rom 5:5). (S 489.) Given what was said above, that “the consequent mission of the Holy Spirit guarantees our inheritance” from the work of the Son, the Spirit “is given with an ordination to eternal life, so that the mission of the Spirit tends to the same ultimate end as the mission of the Son.” (S 491.)

It is perhaps not yet evident that we are headed towards a definition of a divine mission, but at last we come to Lonergan’s direct answer to Question 29. He gathers to-

219 S, 487. Note 62 reads: “Since a mission is to a subsistent, whereas the nature to be assumed is not subsistent except in the Nestorian heresy, the Son is not said to be sent to the nature that he assumed. Billot, De Deo Uno et Trino 652. [A mission is of a person, from a person, to a person or to persons.]”
gether the points already made and, first, recalls that the missions prolong into time the relations of origin. The Son is sent by the Father, but Father and Son send the Spirit, so “there is not one formality of divine mission.” Although the missions have the same ultimate goal, “the first mission is that of the Son for the reconciliation of all human persons to God the Father, and the consequent mission of the Spirit is to each one of the just, who have been reconciled.” Each mission has the purpose of initiating and strengthening new interpersonal relationships between God and humanity, but each in its own way. Because he has a human nature, “the Son, having assumed another nature beside the divine, not only enters into new personal relationships but also through the nature he assumed, and then through those whom he has sent, performs works that are proper to himself.” The Holy Spirit, on the other hand, has only a divine nature and “does not do anything proper to himself”; but he complements the work of the Son by providing “the foundation for cooperation,” and “it is through the Spirit’s self-donation that the new personal relationships are strengthened.” Lonergan concludes that “since the divine persons are sent to accomplish such a great task throughout the world by themselves or through others, the [external] term of the missions is assigned not in a brief statement, but rather by distinguishing the successive stages of this, the greatest of all works.” (All quotes at S 491.) These stages will be specified and explained in the remaining questions and the final assertion.

3.5 Question 30: “Is it appropriate that the divine persons be sent, the Son visibly and the Spirit invisibly?” (S 491.)

As we learned in chapter 1 above, an action is good if ordered to a good that is not simply something to satisfy a desire but intelligible. Lonergan returns to the notion of the good to explain the goal of the missions and the means of attaining the goal.

We have now arrived at the context of a point mentioned much earlier (see above n. 12 p. 3), namely our participation in God’s life according to order. This “good through participation” has two aspects. The first brings us back to the culmination of chapter 2 above, Assertion 14 and its explanation of the twofold formality of perfection in the single divine perfection, one according to act and the other according to order. As well as the now familiar similarity between us and God in regard to certain of our intellectual operations, there is similarity even in regard to the twofold formality of the single divine perfection. Lonergan continues:

In the one divine perfection there are two formalities of perfection, one that concerns act and the other that concerns order; and similarly among created things there is a twofold participation in the one divine perfection, one concerning act and the other concerning order. On this basis we distinguish particular goods, by which particular beings are perfected in themselves, and goods of order, which are certain concrete, dynamic, and ordered totalities of desirable objects, of desir-
ing subjects, of operations, and of results. So, for example, there is a distinction between the particular economic goods of a certain region and, on the other hand, the economic order of the region as a whole. It is quite clear that this order is a supreme good, since particular economic goods are greatly increased or diminished according to whether the overall economy is becoming better ordered or is deteriorating. (S 491-93.)

Our twofold participation in God’s single perfection regards our making of ourselves, and our healing and creating in history. Our twofold existential participation in the Holy Trinity will be discussed in greater detail in section 5 below where, to enhance the clarity of the viewpoint of order, we will draw from the later Lonergan’s integral scale of values—the heuristic structure whose categories are isomorphic with the categories of interiority—to explicate in relation to the psychological analogy the data addressed by the five elements of a human good of order mentioned immediately below. Here we note its main divisions of the created good of order, that of the natural world, and “the human good of order, which is produced by people understanding and willing.” (S 493.)

Of the human good of order, Lonergan says: “Five elements come together to constitute the human good of order: (1) a certain number of persons, (2) cognitive and appetitive habits, (3) many coordinated operations among many persons, (4) a succession and series of particular goods, and (5) interpersonal relationships.” (S 493.) In his explanation, he wants to emphasize the elements of human cooperation and participation in what amounts to the making of one’s Christian self in history, and the making of a culture worthy of God’s adopted children—through cooperation with, and participation in, the Holy Trinity. Since the data addressed by these points will be discussed in detail in section 5 below, let us for the present have Lonergan’s brief commentary on the general elements of a human good of order:

Since every individual needs many things in a more or less steady stream, a succession and series of particular goods are required for living well. Since each person alone is hardly self-sufficient, many coordinated operations on the part of many individuals are required to produce a series of particular goods. Since human beings are potential and, by nature, indeterminate [ST, I-II, q. 49], cognitive and appetitive habits are required in order to have many coordinated operations involving many persons. Lastly, since persons who know and will acquire habits, perform coordinated operations, and distribute among themselves the particular goods being produced, they will the good of order itself both for themselves and for others; but to will good to someone is to love [ST, I, q. 20, a. 1 ad 3m], and the effect of love is that union and mutual intimacy [ST, I-II, q. 28, aa. 1-2] which is the most excellent of personal relationships, and so the human good of order leads to interpersonal relationships. (S 493.)

While both particular goods and goods of order are intelligible, i.e., products of
people’s being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, a good of order is not a tangible thing that we come to know, as we do an apple, through the senses; “and since human beings are rather slow to understand, it cannot be thought strange that we only gradually arrive at understanding and willing the good of order.” (S 493.) He traces this development from infancy through childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood to a mature, altruistic understanding of the good of order: “Finally, philosophers reach the point where, besides recognizing particular goods that are appropriate for particular persons, they also recognize the good of order, which is good on account of its own intelligibility and its participation in the divine good, which is desired by the will because the will is an appetite that follows the intellect, and which can be desired by the will even when the good of order produces particular goods not for the one desiring them but for others only.” (S 495; emphasis added.)

While the five elements form an organic unity, Lonergan gives priority to interpersonal relations because “we want to communicate what is good to those whom we love.” Goods occur because of cooperation; efficacious cooperation requires that we cultivate virtues and avoid their opposites. “Supposing the union of love, all the other things follow that make for the good of order, as is most plainly seen in marriage.” He concludes that we are naturally disposed to interpersonal relationships; “there is in our very sensibility an intersubjectivity that disposes us to interpersonal relationships, as is clearly evident from the phenomena of presence, sympathy, transference, and the like.” (All quotes at S 495.)

We now advance to the goal of the divine missions. I present overleaf in tabular form two sets of data. The first (“Analogies”) illustrates analogous relationships between human goods of order and the effects of the divine missions. The second set (“Direct Relationships”) clarifies the relationships between the five elements of a human good of order and the divine missions. In section 5 below, under Mission, we will return to these data and relate them to the “everything else” comprised by a comprehensive systematic theology of God.
### THE HUMAN GOOD OF ORDER | THE GOAL OF THE DIVINE MISSIONS

#### ANALOGIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The political good of order</th>
<th>The Kingdom of God</th>
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<tr>
<td>The good of order obtaining in the organs of a simple body</td>
<td>The Body of Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social good of order</td>
<td>The Church, the City of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The domestic good of order</td>
<td>The mystical marriage of Christ with the Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The good of order manifested in discovering, producing, and administering material realities</td>
<td>The economy of salvation</td>
</tr>
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#### DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Many persons. Christ died for everyone.

2. Apprehensive and appetitive habits. From sanctifying grace there flow the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

3. Many interrelated operations. With grace Christians put off the old self, live a new life, and love one another.

4. A succession and series of particular goods. These result from the fruits which the new life in Christ perpetually bears; from the ministry of the Word whereby the gospel is preached to every creature; from the ministry of life discerned in sacrifice, in the priesthood, and in the sacraments; and from the hierarchy that orders and perfects the Church.

5. Interpersonal relationships. Christians love one another as Christ has loved them [cf., Jn 15:12; 13:34.]; in loving one another they love Christ [cf., Mt 25:31-46]; loving Christ, they are loved by the Father [cf., Jn 14:21; 16:27]; and the Holy Spirit is sent to them by the Father through Christ [cf., Jn 14:15 ff.].

Table 3: The Human Good of Order in Relation to the Goal of the Divine Missions

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220 The data of the table are combined discursively in S, 497.
“It is appropriate that the divine persons are sent to constitute and develop this good of order.” (S 497.) Now we have the context in S of my declaration early in chapter 1 that a principal goal of this interpretation of S is to understand Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity “well enough to answer adequately the question of meaning posed by this text” that I quote again:

Although the other goods of order externally imitate that supreme good of order that we observe in the Holy Trinity, nevertheless it was appropriate that the economy of salvation, which is ordered to participation in divine beatitude itself, should not only imitate the order of the Holy Trinity but also in some manner participate in that order. (S 497.)

Given what has been said from Question 26 to this point, perhaps it is already clear what the “some manner” of participation really is. The Son and Spirit who proceed from him “are also in time sent by the Father to initiate and strengthen new personal relations of reconciliation and love with human persons.” (S 497.) In addition to these effects, “through the missions the divine persons are more clearly revealed, and each more ardently loved.” (S 497.)

“Is it appropriate that the Son be sent visibly and the Spirit invisibly?” We finally arrive at Lonergan’s direct answer to Question 30. The goal of the divine persons sent is twofold, “so that a certain good might be accomplished and so that new personal relations might be initiated or strengthened.” (S 497.) Recall that a divine person as divine cannot accomplish works proper to himself; “since cooperation among the divine persons is so perfect that there is one simple common operation of the Three, it follows that a divine person as divine can indeed enter into new personal relations but cannot perform works that are proper to himself.” (S 497.) As we have already learned, the Son assumed visible, tangible human nature so he could accomplish as human his proper works as mediator and redeemer. The uncreated Gift, the Holy Spirit, has the advantage of not being limited to time and place in his mission. Because he is sent and given “to confirm by uncreated gift the new relations initiated by the Son and to be a pledge of eternal life, it is appropriate that he dwells invisibly in our inmost hearts.” (S 497.)

Lonergan’s final points on the appropriateness of the divine missions relate to a topic of section 5 below, namely the human situation he calls the Law of the Cross, God’s solution to the problem of evil, and our responding by *imitatio Jesu*. “It was appropriate for the Mediator that a divine person be in a human nature to teach human beings as a human being, to give them an example of the new life, and to lead them to reconciliation and love and eternal life.” (S 499.) Jesus wants people to die to themselves and live for God, so “it was appropriate for the Redeemer that he was able to die.” (S 499.) Finally, to relate again the visible mission of the Son to the invisible mission of the Spirit, Lonergan writes:
It was appropriate for the Mediator and Redeemer to be the Son, who proceeds as truth from the Father and breathes as holiness that Love which is the Holy Spirit. It was appropriate for the one who proceeds from the Word spirating Love to be sent to us because of the Son. It was appropriate for the one who from Eternity is Gift to be given to us as a guest and a pledge. It was likewise appropriate for us that we be drawn to the Father through the visible Son, and that we be drawn away from the realm of the senses, and that in the invisible Spirit we should desire and hope for everlasting life. (S 499.)

The import of our being drawn away from the sensible will be clarified in his answer to Question 32 below.

3.6 Question 31: “Is the Son also sent invisibly and the Holy Spirit visibly?” (S 499.)

Lonergan’s brief affirmative answer further illuminates our understanding of the relation between the psychological analogy and the four created relations of Question 26 that distinguish our participation in God’s trinitarian life. He writes: “Some effects of grace regard more the intellect and others more the will.” He does not say anything about the generation of the Word of knowledge from the Father who speaks divine understanding and sends the Son (in another context discussed below, he will remind us that “those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father”); his present concern is the invisible mission of the Son “who in God is the Word spirating Love [ST, I, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2m].” Thus, effects of grace “that regard the intellect express a certain likeness to the Son.” As we know from chapter 2 above, the Holy Spirit is the Love who proceeds by way of the will. Thus, effects of grace “that regard the will bear a likeness to the Holy Spirit, who in God is proceeding Love.” The effects are attributed to Son and Spirit by appropriation (ST, I, q. 43, a. 5 ad 1m, ad 3m); this means, you will recall, that each effect is attributed to one person without excluding the others (all three persons produce the effects of grace). Thus it is by appropriation that “the Son is said to be sent invisibly.”

The mission of the Holy Spirit is visible in signs. The Holy Spirit dwelling in us presides invisibly over Christian lives that Paul says are “hidden with Christ in God” (Col 3:3); thus “it was appropriate for the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit to be manifested sensibly by certain exterior signs” [ST, I, q. 43, a. 7]. The outwards signs include “the form of a dove, of a bright cloud, of wind, and of tongues of fire.” These visible signs, he concludes, “in which the Holy Spirit is symbolized in a sign [ibid. ad 3m], are said to be visible missions” [ibid. ad 5m]. (All quotes at S 499.)

Lonergan does not draw this conclusion, but it does seem reasonable to conclude from the answer to Question 31 that our invisible work of affirming and loving truth

\[\text{Note 87 reads: “This appropriation refers to the Son as God.”}\]
that finds existential completion in our spirating love by visible making and doing, these effects of grace in us, pertain to the matter of Question 26.

3.7 Question 32: “Is it on the basis of charity that the divine persons inhabit and remain in the just?” (S 501.)

The lengthy answer to this final question prepares the ground for the conclusion in Assertion 18 of Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions. As the reader will see, his explanation of the intimacy between God and the authentic Christian subject leads naturally to the ensuing systematic explanation in section 5 of the unity between God and “everything else” comprised by the category Creation. Again, the reader will note how these final increments of his argument further illuminate our participation in God’s trinitarian life via the four created relations ad extra that imitate the relations of origin that ground the missions.

Lonergan first establishes from Scripture the fact of divine inhabitation of the just on the basis of charity. Early in chapter 1 above I wrote of love and “the theological virtue of Charity, love of God, loving God with God’s *amour propre*, the supernatural life of the soul necessary for salvation.” In the meantime, we have learned much about God’s *amour propre*, the Holy Spirit who is the proceeding love by which Father and Son love each other and love us. Of Lonergan’s lengthy quotations from Scripture (pp. 501-03), I repeat the following: “God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them” (1Jn 4:16). And: “Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love” (1Jn 4:8). And, finally, a clearly trinitarian text: “If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you forever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, because he abides with you; and will be in you. … On that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you.” (Jn 14:15-20.)

Lonergan concludes that “from these and almost countless other texts, there is clearly a mutual ‘being in’ that implies not only the uncreated gift of God but also our acts, by which we habitually keep Christ’s commandments through love.” You will recall from the answer to Question 27 that the “appropriate external term of the love who is the Holy Spirit is ‘the *gratia gratum faciens*, grace that renders one pleasing to

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God.’’ To retrieve another familiar notion relevant to understanding divine inhabitation, Lonergan says that, based on this grace, Thomas interprets the “indwelling, gift, possessing, and enjoying” to mean that “God is in the just as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover [ST, I, q. 43, a. 3].” (S 501.) We already have some understanding of what mutual indwelling means in regard to God quod se. Determining what it means in regard to God’s indwelling us, Lonergan says, means “beginning from objects of sense and gradually proceeding to higher realities.” (S 501.)

First, he explores types of mutual presence from inanimate objects, to animals, to what is proper to human subjects. He concludes:

Although other animals apparently form only those phantasms that are grounded in immediate sense experience, humans, since they proceed by intellect to the whole of being as the to-be-known, employ the utmost freedom of imagination. Therefore, even apart from the proximity of an object, they can be and generally are greatly moved merely by remembering the past or by imagining some future possibility. Hence, if presence consists in a certain psychic adaptation, we must distinguish two kinds of presence in humans, one that results from spatial proximity and another that is based upon the very freedom of human sensibility.

Many elements of his explanation are already familiar to us. The kind of presence relevant to divine inhabitation is personal presence. It is not our sensitivity but our intellectual nature that distinguishes us from other animals. We had several occasions in chapters 1 and 2 above to note that what we know really exists in us in the mode of intentionality; the “known is in the knower with an intentional existence.” Likewise, “what is loved is joined and united to the lover, as the poet says about his friend being ‘half of my soul.’” These are cases of presence, and “since these operations of knowing and loving, insofar as they are performed in the intellectual part of our being, are proper to persons, this presence can be called personal presence. (All quotes at S 505.)

Of the pedagogical techniques Lonergan employs in S, perhaps the one potentially most valuable for us students is again apparent. I mean the movement from the general to the ever more specific. The image of a continually narrowing upward spiral comes to mind. Through a number of steps he established the notion of personal presence, and from the present place in our movement we gradually arrive at the tip, the exact nature of the unsurpassable intimacy that exists between and among the just and the three persons of God. In chapter 1 above we discussed the acquisition of habits or virtues through repetition. We know from experience that “only through many acts do we ar-

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rivate at true knowledge of a person." (S 505.) Thus the kind of personal presence where the person known is in the knower depends upon habit. The same is true of the presence of the beloved in the lover. “Although one or other act of the will can constitute an impulse towards union, still without a habit of love there will not be those acts of love that manifest the union of the lovers; and so it is a habit that provides the foundation of that love by which a person who is loved is in the lover as another self." (S 505.)

The Christian’s interpersonal relationships of knowing and loving might seem to imply the onerous burden of continuous attention to the other. That degree of attention would amount to obsession. Personal presence, Lonergan assures us, “requires not continuous acts but only that frequency that generally results from habits. Just as someone who lives in a house does not stay in the house all the time, so someone who has another person present to himself or herself still thinks about and wills and does many different things.” (S 505.) He proceeds to relate personal presence to the five elements of a human good of order illustrated above in table 3, p 212. He notes: “Since these are the same elements that constitute personal presence, it must be said that the degree of perfection by which the good of order is achieved is the same as that by which personal presence is achieved, and similarly, that the degree of perfection by which personal presence is achieved is the same as that by which the good of order is achieved.” (S 505.) He goes on to recap the many meanings of presence to reiterate the one that concerns us, the “personal presence whereby persons, pursuing a common good of order, are mutually in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover.” (S 507.)

As the reader has no doubt discerned from previously acquired understanding of divine circumincession, Lonergan has brought us to this point so we might “ascend to consider the triune God in order from there to strive for some understanding of the economy of salvation.” (S 507.) Many elements of his argument are repeated from his explication of God quoad se in chapter 2 above. We gained from that discussion some understanding of the fact that God himself is present within himself in the mode of the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. He reminds us that the knowledge God has of God is not some additional entity in God’s mind (as knowledge is with us):

For every mental word is, in the order of intelligible existence, the very thing that is known through that word. Now, God expresses himself through a word, and therefore that word is God in the order of intelligible existence. But in God to be is the same as to understand, and therefore God’s natural existence is the same as God’s intelligible existence. Hence, what is in God, in the way God the known is in God the knower, is God, not only in the order of intelligible existence but also in the order of natural existence. Thus, the Word of God is God. (S 507.)

Recall from chapter 2 above that Lonergan argued divine consubstantiality not only according to consciousness but also love. Loving a friend brings about “a quasi-
identification of the friend with the lover.” In the kind of friendship Lonergan is talking about, the friends “pursue a common good of order, work together in an orderly way, and enjoy a succession of particular goods, are so far from living each one for himself or herself that they may rather be said to have one life in common.” God’s self-love is like this human friendship; but God’s own love “implies not only a quasi-identification, but even a total identity. For divine willing is God himself, and therefore the Holy Spirit, who proceeds in God as Love, is God.” (All quotes at S 507.)

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as we learned in chapter 2 above, are wholly present in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. “Those whose being and understanding and knowing and loving are one and the same and are indeed that which they themselves are, are in one another in the most perfect way.” In addition, God knows and loves everything else that exists, and these too exist in God as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover; but not, of course, in a single natural act of existence (that would make them consubstantial, a logical absurdity). All that God knows and loves ad extra exists in God “according to intentional existence and the quasi-identification of those in love.” (All quotes at S 507.) What does this mean?

“God knows and loves others in accordance with what suits the perfection of their nature.” (S 507-09.) So, the authenticity of Christian subjects and God’s knowledge and love of them are directly related. Others “‘he foreknew [and] predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers and sisters’” (Rom 8:29). (S 509.) It is said of those “who are known and loved in this special way” that in “a special way they are in the divine Word in which God the Father utters himself and all other things” (ST, I, q. 34, a. 3); and “in a special way they are in the divine proceeding Love in which God the Father and God the Son love both themselves and all other things as well” (ST, I, q. 37, a.2). (S 509.)

As the preceding point implies, there are sheep and goats. The Word became human for a reason. “We must be converted to the Lord and Mediator. Indeed, he does not know all who cry ‘Lord! Lord!’” (Mt 7:23). Lonergan goes on to quote a number of scriptural texts to ground his point. Among them: “‘I am the good shepherd. I know my own and my own know me’ (Jn 10:14). Neither does he know his own without loving them: ‘As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you’ (Jn 15:9); and, ‘No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends’ (Jn 15:13). Nor do the sheep know the shepherd without loving him, as the shepherd himself knew: ‘And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself’” (Jn 12:32). He chooses for his final quote one of those sweeping, visionary texts from Paul: “For the love of Christ urges us on, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, so that those who live might live no longer for themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them. From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way. So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything
old has passed away; see, everything has become new!’” (2Cor 5:14-17). Lonergan concludes that this relationship between Christ who knows, loves, and lives for us; and those who know, love, and live for Christ, means that people converted to him “are mutually present and dwelling in him and in one another as the known is in the knower and the beloved in the lover.” (All quotes at S 509-11.) His final point on the mutual indwelling in knowledge and love between God and us emphasizes Christ’s humanity:

Those, therefore, whom Christ the man knows and loves and who believe in Christ the man and love him, live not for themselves but for him, and Christ and they surely live and dwell in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. (S 511.)

He then brings our union in Christ into a trinitarian context. As the Mediator taught what he learned from his Father, did not do his own will but his Father’s, so by making us members of his body Christ unites us “to God the Father who first loved us (1Jn 4:10, 19). He was in Christ ‘reconciling the world to himself’ (2Cor 5:19 f.). ‘Those who love me will be loved by my Father’ (Jn 14:21; 16:27). ‘If you love me … he will give you another Advocate … he abides with you, and he will be in you’ (Jn 14:15 ff.). All this taken together denotes: ‘As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us’ (Jn 17:21).” (As quoted in S 511.) He concludes by reminding us that we cannot achieve this goal unless we obey Christ’s commandments and imitate him by loving one another. Paraphrasing the great judgment scene of Matthew 25:31-46, he reminds us that to love or not love our neighbor is to love or not love Christ himself.

Lonergan now proceeds to draw conclusions from his lengthy answer to the critically important question of divine inhabitation of the just according to Charity. They are compressed and complex, yet their unity is not difficult to grasp because they flow from his initial conclusion: “The divine persons themselves and the blessed in heaven and the just on this earth are in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them.” (S 511.) This mutual knowing and loving, therefore, has ultimate and proximate goals: the divine essential goodness known and loved in the Beatific Vision, and “the general good of order, the kingdom of God, the body of Christ, the church.” (S 511.)

Neither the heavenly or the earthly is homogenous. “This consequent mutual ‘being in,’ however, differs according to each one’s nature and status.” (S 511.) The divine persons mutually indwell according to their consubstantiality. As we learned above, the just are present in God and one another according to intentional act of existence and the quasi-identification of love. “We are in the Word, however, as known and loved through both his divine and his human nature; and the Word is in us in order that in knowing and loving a visible human being we may arrive at knowing and loving God, who dwells in unapproachable light” (1Tim 6:16). (S 513.) We are engaged in a process from more to ever less sensible union with God in knowledge and love. “This prior know-
ledge and love is easier for us, since it includes our sense memory of the past and our imagination of the future, we are led through it to that higher knowledge and love in which we no longer know Christ from a human point of view.” (§ 513.)

As we learned above, God’s special love for his creatures is directly related to a given nature’s state of perfection or, in the language of the later Lonergan in regard to us, to the just subject’s authenticity. (Note the relevance of Lonergan’s final remarks to our understanding the four relations ad extra of Question 26.) In the more advanced stage of our ascent to God, “our inner word of the divine Word is spoken in us intelligently according to the emanation of truth, and our love of divine Love is spirated according to the emanation of holiness. For the divine persons are sent in accordance with their eternal processions, to encounter us and dwell in us in accordance with similar processions produced in us through grace.” (§ 513.) Finally, bringing discussion back to its trinitarian context, he concludes: “Those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father, to whom be all glory through the Son in the Spirit.” (§ 513.)

3.8 Assertion 18: On Inhabitation and the State of Grace

Assertion 18 reads:

Although the indwelling of the divine persons exists more in acts and is better known in acts, still it is constituted through the state of grace.[119][224]

Lonergan’s explanation of his final assertion comprises seven points. He intends that we understand the nature of and difference between the habit of grace and the state of grace.

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224 S, 513. Editorial note 119 reads: “[Two points are worth mentioning here. First, Lonergan has a meaning for the phrase ‘the state of grace’ that is different from common usage. Except in one instance (see p. 515), he does not speak here of individual persons, as individuals, being in a state of grace. Rather, the ‘state’ or ‘situation’ of grace refers to many different subjects together. See below, under Sixth, where a distinction is made between a habit of grace and the state of grace. Second, Lonergan is not saying that the state of grace is somehow the cause of the divine indwelling; to translate ‘per statum ... gratiae’ as ‘by the state of grace’ might imply such a misunderstanding more than does the translation ‘through the state of grace.’ What is constituted through this state is a divine-human interpersonal situation; and here Lonergan is using ‘constitution’ in a less precise sense than earlier. He had said that ‘constituted’ is used by analogy to the constitution of a finite being: just as a finite being is composed of and constituted by intrinsic principles, so infinite being is constituted by the infinite and absolutely simple perfection. The state of grace, in Lonergan’s sense, is neither a finite being nor infinite being, but a divine-human interpersonal situation, the divine indwelling. He does not say that it is constituted by infinite and absolutely simple divine perfection. Rather, if there is the Father’s love because of the Son, if there is the Spirit as sent, if there are the consequent terms sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and the other virtues and gifts that flow from sanctifying grace, then there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation.]” See also n. 227 below.
of grace. To understand inhabitation as, *first*, a state of being, we need only recall what we have learned, especially in chapter 2 above, about the kind of presence meant when it is said that the Holy Trinity and the just “are in one another as the known are in those who know them and the beloved are in those who love them. We are not speaking here about the presence of a stone to stones but of a person to persons.” (S 513-15.)

Mutual presence is of degree. We are in the process of justification, of divinization; cooperation with grace incorporates us into, conforms us to, the life of the Trinity. From our side, therefore, Christian life is the daily work of remaining present in and to (i.e., present ontologically and intentionally) the Three who are always wholly present in and to us—until we know and love as we are known and loved. This point will be amplified as Lonergan’s explanation progresses.

As noted above: “Acts are specified, i.e., we know what they are, by the objects of acts such as understanding; we know the potencies, the powers, by the acts they make possible; we know the nature of the intellectual soul by the potencies it exercises.” Thus:

Second, this indwelling exists more in acts and is better known in acts. The reason it exists more in acts is that the formality of knowledge and of love is verified more in act than in potency or habit. The indwelling is better known in acts, for each thing is known insofar as it is in act. (S 515.)

In the answer to Question 32, we learned that being in God in knowledge and love does not depend upon our being constantly present intentionally to God; we can go about our daily tasks and attend to many things. Lonergan’s *third* point reminds us that “the discontinuity of acts does not automatically terminate or interrupt the indwelling. There is more than enough emphasis on this point from such words in scripture as ‘abide,’ ‘live,’ ‘dwell in,’ ‘being in Christ,’ ‘being in the Spirit.’ And there has never been any doubt about this on the part of theologians.” (S 515.) To grasp the notion of inhabitation, he argues, it is best to consider the ideal case.

Fourth, as a potency or a habit is known through act, so it is known in the very best way through the very best act. … Hence, the nature of the indwelling can better be understood in each person the more he or she lives not for himself or herself but for Christ, abides in Christ, and is in the Spirit. (S 515.)

Inhabitation is not visible; so we cannot judge whether or not it is a fact in a given human subject, “because introspective analysis is very difficult, because there is no science in the strict sense about the interior supernatural life, and because it is not for its subject or for other persons to judge it, but for the Lord.” (S 515.)

Lonergan’s *fifth* point, drawn from Thomas (ST, I-II, q. 110, aa. 1-3; q. 113, a. 1), distinguishes three aspects of grace. He relates them to the actual relation between the Trinity and the human subject. For convenient reference I have put these data in tabular form (his ensuing explanation refers to them by number).
### Table 4: Aspects of Grace in Theory and Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN THEORY</th>
<th>IN PRACTICE</th>
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| Grace is:  
1. One person’s favor toward another.                                 | 1. The Father loves and gives to the just by the Holy Spirit because of his incarnate Son.                                                |
| 2. A gift given by the former to the latter.                              | 2. There follows upon this love and giving sanctifying grace, which is an absolutely supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of the soul. |
| 3. The gratitude felt by the latter.                                     | 3. From this habit there flow, naturally as it were, virtues and gifts whereby the lower part of the soul is subordinated to reason and reason is subordinated to God, whereupon there results that inner rectitude and justice by which the just are readily moved by God towards eternal life, to which they are oriented. (All quotes at S 515.) |

The three aspects—"love and uncreated gift, the habit of sanctifying grace, and the orientation of the justified soul"—form a dynamic unity. The three "are linked to one another in a single intelligible order." (S 517.) Everything flows from God’s initiative. Sanctifying grace, as the reader will recall, is the required consequent condition for the contingent loving and giving; so 2 follows from 1. “Since the virtues and the gifts flow from sanctifying grace as potencies flow from the essence of the soul, from the very fact that there is sanctifying grace there is also both the orientation of the justified soul and its readiness to act under divine influence.” (S 517.) Thus 3 follows from 2; but 3 also follows from 1 because God’s loving and giving enable our performing meritorious acts.226

In this regard, recall the distinction between virtues and gifts:

The virtues are a form, and an interior principle of right conduct, the gifts are not forms and are not an interior principle of right conduct, rather they ‘link us dynam-

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225 Note 120 reads: ST “1-2, q. 110, a. 1. [This distinction may work for the Latin gratia, but it does not hold for the English ‘grace.’]”

226 Scholastic theology of grace (often characterized as the debate between Jesuits and Dominicans) was for centuries beset by a host of pseudo-problems. The interested reader will find Lonergan’s solution in his Grace and Freedom (both sides were wrong); with Lonergan, the older multiplication of terms is reduced to four principal categories: operative and cooperative graces as habitual and actual.
ically with the sole source of absolute perfection,’ they are a disposition to follow external guidance and direction of another. … The gifts put us at the disposition of the Spirit, to be governed according to his wisdom and love, and not simply according to the forms or virtues or patterns intrinsic to us. And in this way the Spirit continually rejuvenates the church. (See above n. 73 p. 37.)

The sixth point on grace further distinguishes habit and state. “The habit of grace is a physical accident received in the soul of the just” (§ 517) that enables our being habitually reasonable and responsible in the intermittent acts of daily living. He distinguishes this habit of grace possessed by the individual subject from the state that “concerns many distinct subjects at once,” (§ 517) the community of the just. Here we return to elements explained when establishing that the divine persons inhabit and remain in the just according to charity (they also relate remotely but really to the four relations ad extra of Question 26 above). The state of grace constituted in us has four terms, an integral three related to a fourth term ad extra (a recurrent pattern discussed in detail in section 5 below). The four terms are, of course, the three persons of the Holy Trinity and those who cooperate with them, the graced community of the just:

To constitute the state of grace there are required (1) the Father who loves, (2) the Son because of whom the Father loves, (3) the Holy Spirit by whom the Father loves and gives, and (4) the just, whom, because of the Son, the Father loves by the Holy Spirit, and to whom the Father gives by the Holy Spirit, and who consequently are endowed with sanctifying grace, whence flow the virtues and gifts, and who are thereby just and upright and ready to receive and elicit acts ordered towards eternal life [Rom 8:32]. (§ 517.)

Seventh, this state of grace constitutes “a divine-human interpersonal situation” in which, to repeat the familiar formula, “the divine persons and the just are in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them.” The quality of this state or interpersonal situation that, as stated above, consists more in acts and is known more in acts, “what the nature of this state or situation is will emerge ever more clearly the more perfect the habits and acts are that are examined.” (§ 517.) Thus there is unity in the subject between habitual ways

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227 S, 517. Note 124 reads: “[In the previous paragraph, Lonergan said that the state or situation of grace is constituted by the interconnected realities (1) to (4). Then here he says that through this state there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation. This ‘divine-human interpersonal situation’ is simply the interconnected fact of (1) to (4). So too, the indwelling spoken of here is another way of stating what is more exhaustively specified by the interconnected (1) to (4), and affirming that the interconnected (1) to (4) obtain. The state or situation of grace, the divine-human interpersonal situation, the mutual indwelling, are nothing over and above the interconnected (1) to (4)].”
of doing and making (our obeying the transcendental precepts for love of God) and their ground, the state of grace, our abiding in cooperative relationship with God in love, our loving God with God’s *amour propre*, the supernatural life of the soul necessary for salvation.

Finally, and in two steps, Lonergan proceeds to draw together the principal elements of his painstaking elucidation of the interpersonal goal of the divine missions. In the first step he says, “In this state we are not our own, for we are temples of the Holy Spirit [1Cor 6:19]. In this state the Holy Spirit also is not his own, since he has been given to us [Rom 5:5]. Similarly, in this state Christians live not for themselves but for him who died and was raised for them [2Cor 5:15]; therefore their lives are hidden with Christ in God [Col 3:3]. And who will separate them from the love of Christ?” [Rom 8:35]. (S 519.)

Such charity, based on faith in Christ dwelling in people’s hearts, is not “some blind psychic impulse,” for “they are not like those who have zeal for God but without sound knowledge.” (S 519); cf., Rom 10:2: “They have a zeal for God, but it is not enlightened.” Then Lonergan comes close to saying what he says plainly in *Method*. In S, he says that Christians know the state of mutual indwelling, of sanctifying grace, “not because of their own charity but by the gift of the Spirit. 134 For they did not first love God the Father, but he loved them first.” 228 In *Method*, he states that sanctifying grace is a consequent theological category for prior religious experience of what he has been calling in S the state of grace. That advance, as the footnote 229 makes clear, pertains to differentiations of consciousness, a topic of section 5 below.

In the second step before his brief “Epilogue,” Lonergan distinguishes first act from second act in regard to mutual indwelling in knowledge and love. This is a slightly tricky distinction. First act in the order of existence is being, so God’s first act is God. Thus “on the part of the divine persons this state is always in second act,” (S 519) i.e., it is a created perfection added to a being, to us human subjects who already possess first act in the order of existence. “On the part of the just it is always in first act so that under

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228 S, 519. Note 134 reads: “1 John 4.13; see Romans 8.15. [They know this mutual abiding not by any elicited love independent of the gift of the Spirit; none can claim charity as ‘their own,’ for it is an absolutely supernatural virtue beyond the natural proportion of any human being; it is the gift of the Spirit.]”

229 “This gift [of the Holy Spirit] we have been describing really is sanctifying grace but notionally differs from it. The notional difference arises from different stages of meaning. To speak of sanctifying grace pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of theory and the world of common sense are distinct but, as yet, have not been explicitly distinguished from and grounded in the world of interiority. To speak of the dynamic state of being in love with God pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority has been made the explicit ground of the worlds of theory and of common sense. It follows that in this stage of meaning the gift of God’s love first is described as an experience and only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories.” *Method*, 107.
divine influence it may readily issue into second act, according to the degree of perfection of the just person.\footnote{S, 519. Editorial note 136 reads: “[On first and second act, in the sense of form and operation, see Lonergan, *Insight* 459, note 1. See also below, appendix 1, § 2, p. 537.]”} In this latter context, first act refers not to the existence of the human subject (there are several first acts depending on what order one is talking about—existence, or essence, or potency) but to making something potential actual; it is the process of *theosis*, of ever more perfect mutual indwelling or, more dynamically, our continual incorporation into the very life of the Holy Trinity. “Thus ‘let one who is just be justified still,’\footnote{S, 519. Note 137 reads: “DB 803, DS 1535, ND 1937. [The reference is to Revelation 22.11, translated in *NRSV* as ‘Let ... the righteous still do right.’]”} that is to say, “according to the abundance of the life which that person lives in the Spirit through the Son to the glory of God the Father.”\footnote{S, 519-21.}

Lonergan’s final remarks in his chapter six pinpoint (albeit indirectly and, alas, do not further explain) the relation between the divine persons and the created terms of our participation in their life:

For the glory of the Father is this, that just as he eternally speaks the Word in truth and through the Word breathes forth Love in holiness, so also in the fullness of time he sent his incarnate Son in truth so that by believing the Word we might speak and understand true inner words; and through the Word he sent the Spirit of the Word in holiness so that joined to the Spirit in love and made living members of the body of Christ we might cry out, ‘Abba, Father!’ (§ 519-21.)

### 3.8.1 Final Remarks on Chapter Six

I said early in chapter 1 above: “I will interpret Lonergan’s systematic understanding of the church’s doctrine of God by pursuing throughout *The Triune God: Systematics* an idea he does not advert to as constitutive of his method as such, the idea of order.” His “Epilogue” does advert to the idea of order:

If we would grasp the whole of our work from the unity of a single perspective, if we wish now to view the work as a unified whole (“per modum unius”), we discover that there is one fundamental notion in virtually all of it. Just as in the material objects of sense perception there is a discernible order, so also there is an order within our intellectual and rational consciousness. After abstracting from it the imperfections of a finite nature and transferring it by analogy to God, this consciously rational order, in which volitional acts are ordered through intellectual judgments and these intellectual judgments are ordered through grasping the evidence for things, produces some understanding of the two processions in God and the four real relations, three of which are really distinct from one another. (§ 523-25.)
From there, and grounding them in the four relations, we considered the order and nature of the missions, and “the perfection they communicate to us in that good of order which is the kingdom of God, the body of Christ, the church, and the economy of salvation.” (S 525.)

Our understanding the missions and their ground in God quoad se “however imperfect, analogical, and obscure, is the principal fruit of the way of synthesis.” He goes on to say that this understanding enables us “to hold the Catholic doctrine on the divine persons so firmly that we speak about these persons with alacrity, ease, and delight. It enables us also to bring what we know about the Holy Trinity into an intelligible unity both with philosophical conclusions about God and with other theological treatises.”

The final words of Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Systematics* invite the very discussion that follows the first particular summary of this chapter. He concludes by saying that the understanding we have gained from S enables us “in judging contemporary intellectual movements, to detect more quickly what is false and apprehend more easily what is true.” (All quotes at S 525.) Beginning with section 5 below, my argument will gather into unity what we have learned about the Holy Trinity, our philosophical conclusions about God, and other treatises of theology with “everything else” (including contemporary intellectual movements), using the means Lonergan provides.

4. First Particular Summary of Chapter 3

Lonergan’s single chapter on the divine missions manages to take the student through an explanatory account that ranges from his highly abstract solution to the problem of the created ontology of the missions to the concrete union of the Holy Trinity and the just effected by the missions of Son and Spirit. From the wealth of insights and developments comprised by Lonergan’s systematic theology of the divine missions, I have chosen four that seem to be of special importance.

The first concerns the concrete union of the Holy Trinity and the just, our being mutually present in one another in knowledge and love, present as known in the knower and beloved in the lover in this life and the next. By transposing this fact from the metaphysical framework of Thomas’s theology of mutual indwelling into his critical-realist psychology, Lonergan opens theology in general to a host of new developments (its potential impact on spiritual theology and thus on practical spirituality comes immediately to mind). The next point specifies one advance that is already certain.

As we followed the order of assertions and questions, we paid special attention, given our topic, to Question 26 and the relationship between the way the missions initiate, sustain, and accomplish their goal in our subjectivity, and the psychological analogy which, in its full amplitude, exemplifies, is the dynamic Urparadigm of, the viewpoint of order. I briefly argued a possible line of development towards clarifying that relationship. Any authentic development of our understanding the four created rela-
tions *ad extra* will further increase the effective explanatory power of the psychological analogy in trinitarian systematics.

I took issue in chapter 2 above with some contemporary trinitarian theologies that reject the necessary foundations that systematic explication of God *quoad se* contributes to theology of God *quoad nos*. The problem is not with their central concern—interpersonal relationships in history between and among God and human persons—but with the poverty of their ability to answer the questions that arise from faith seeking understanding of the *ratio* of the missions, their inability to explain clearly how the missions have their foundation in the doctrine of the Trinity, and their failure to provide systematic understanding of “how much light for the other treatises can be derived from the doctrine on the missions.” We have seen that, before Vatican II emphasized the People of God and contemporary theologians emphasized the personal and interpersonal, Lonergan was already teaching that the purpose of the missions of Son and Spirit was and remains to initiate and sustain new interpersonal relationships between “God the Father and *all* human persons.” These new relationships are not only between God and individual persons but also between and among human persons in the historical process of God’s drawing into the unity of order one family of God in a redeemed universe. Lonergan enables us to grasp this radically inclusive vision *per modum unius*.

In light of the present state of the whole of theology (a future generation’s theological problems might occasion a different judgment), I would judge that Lonergan’s most important development of theology of God *quoad nos* is latent in his statement that through the missions the divine persons are more clearly revealed and more ardently loved as individuals. Latent because it is Lonergan’s own explanatory delineations of missionary Son and Spirit that provide the required foundations for new systematic understanding of their individual personalities, as well as the equality and complementarity of their work in the economy of salvation. This development of the theology of the missions addresses a situation that, as Crowe says, leaves “a third of the trinitarian work force unemployed.”232 Helminiak calls this situation “watered-down trinitarianism” and diagnoses it as follows:

> The present juncture in history calls us to more accuracy in our treatment of human salvation. Such accuracy, though present at times in Christian history, has been generally obscured. An excessive christocentrism overshadows the trinitarian core of Christianity. Devotion to Christ becomes but a variant way of relating to God. And

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the Holy Spirit tends to fall completely out of the picture. So in practice, Christians often follow only a complex and confusing form of monotheism, devoid of any real trinitarian sensitivity. This state of affairs is no longer tolerable.

The potential of Lonergan’s theology of God *quoad nos* to redress this situation can hardly be overstated. The communal task of developing his theology of the missions is well begun (especially in Crowe’s work) but still far from affecting the mainstream of Catholic theology or, indeed, theological education.

Our study of Lonergan’s theology of the divine missions completed, we now move forward to an explanatory account of the other comprehensive category of theology of the missions, Creation. We will pay a great deal of attention to the unity of creation, and to our personal and communal parts in the historical drama of God’s realizing the divine plan for its redemption.

5. **Our Response to the Divine Missions**

Having completed the theoretical part of our quest for a theologically informed understanding of the idea of order as it pertains to God and the divine missions as such (in light of his thought to 1964), we can now, more than a generation after *S* and Vatican II, heed Lonergan’s admonition quoted above that “we are not permitted to remain ignorant or neglectful of contemporary views.” Accordingly, this section will also draw from Lonergan’s post-*S* thought and that of some of his present-day interpreters.

Our having completed the explanatory account of what pertains to God as such also allows us to turn to the other of the two irreducible categories comprised by a meaningful theology of God, namely Creation. Creation denotes the “everything else” that a comprehensive trinitarian systematics must relate potentially, virtually, and formally to God. This part of my interpretation of Lonergan’s theology of God, therefore, will make explicit and thematic some of the principal means he provides to draw everything else into what continues to be an emergent viewpoint of order.

I stated above that my argument “has two main strands: interpretation of Lonergan’s trinitarian theology, and explanation of how he achieved his systematic expression of it. The purpose: to enable the reader to gain some understanding of both the theology and the method.” I also stated above that “Lonergan’s comprehensive expression is virtual and to an adequate degree formal.” Recall that the ideal of theology today is not definitive achievement but ongoing advance, so the rest of my argument will emphasize

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233 Daniel A. Helminiak, “Colloquy: A Response to Sister Kathleen McDonagh,” *Spirituality Today* 41, no. 2 (1989): 164. He continues: “Of course, the extreme version of watered-down trinitarianism that I just sketched is rare among thoughtful Christians. But the tendency toward it, the emphasis, may be there. Please note that this is a matter of unconsidered emphasis, not of deliberate judgment.” Helminiak’s emphases.
expansion of the formal comprehensiveness of Lonergan’s theology of God and its intrinsic openness to ongoing organic development.

As we did in our attempts to understand God quoad se and quoad nos, we will continue to rely upon the explanatory and unifying power of the psychological analogy. In fact, understanding the category Creation will employ the psychological analogy in its full amplitude. Thus we will consider not only the intellectual dimension of human nature but also what is unique to us, namely our embodiment. For that reason, we will now consider the person who is a distinct embodied subsistent in an intellectual nature, but not according to that metaphysical definition of person; our concern here is “the analogy of the subject,” the person as conscious and engaged in the self-transcending process of living the transcendental precepts. The analogy of the subject takes account of all four of the fully conscious and embodied Christian subject’s “recurrent and related operations” of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding in their relation to the material, intelligible, reasonable, moral, and religious dimensions of the created world.

Space does not allow explanation of Lonergan’s method in Method in Theology; but I will, as in chapter 1 above, call your attention, but more directly this time, to my actual exercise of some of method’s fundamental elements. We learned enough in the first two chapters about cognitional theory and method’s direct relation to self-appropriation through intellectual conversion to understand Lonergan’s definition of method:

A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations furnish a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of such repetition are, not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive. (M 4.)

In addition to the notion of method bringing the normative operations of interiority to bear on a determinate object (such as interpreting Lonergan’s theology of God), there is the key notion of sublation. We learned in chapter 1 above that knowing thoroughly the created universe of proportionate being consists of a process of sublation whereby one achieves a synthesis of contents from each of the four levels of intentional consciousness. Sublation consists of the following:

What sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context. (M 241.)
Thus we can complement our understanding cognitive operations as heuristic with the heuristic notion of sublation. Before explaining Creation, therefore, we know that when explained it will synthesize by sublating four contents. No datum specific to Creation falls outside the four distinct contents we anticipate. Moreover, we can name the four contents in advance. We already know how to distinguish what pertains to data, to explanation, to fact, to value; we can generate from the categories of interiority four categories specific to Creation and thereby create a working model to structure our answer to the question, What is Creation?234

As the reader has no doubt come to anticipate, the answer to the question includes the questioner. The process of explaining Creation will shed some light on the workings of sublation in the actual practice of method. Explanatory data from the yet unnamed category corresponding to experience will be brought forward into a richer context when explaining the category corresponding to understanding, and so on. Given want of space and the focus on order, we will attend mostly to general theories and heuristic structures, try to create a sketch sufficiently detailed to enable the reader to verify that certain principal elements of the process of explaining Creation conform to Lonergan’s definitions of method and sublation. I will direct the interested reader to some of the many primary and excellent secondary sources of more detailed explanation.

In some cases new material will merely add later, now standard, terms for elements already explained; e.g., while continuing to speak of the good, the good of order, and value, we will also draw from the later Lonergan’s “scale of values” (M 33 passim). His most important post-S development of interiority fully differentiates the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the much discussed operation of decision that we exercise to constitute ourselves, and to heal and create in history. Fourth-level activity, the existential level “on which consciousness becomes conscience” (M 268), includes moral and religious judgments of value.

Always and everywhere our concern is order, and how the various specifications of order relate to the analogy of the subject, thus implicitly to aspects of the psychological analogy that have provided the hermeneutical key to our understanding God quoad se and quoad nos. Our goal is “to think of the ‘whole’ Trinity in the light of one governing image or idea, and grasp it per modum unius” in its relation to “the Christian’s need of a coherent image of himself in his world” (see below n. 235). Together they provide evidence sufficient to affirm that “the other goods of order externally imitate that supreme good of order that we observe in the Holy Trinity.” Moreover, the desired viewpoint of order is not meant, as eclectic common sense would have it, to “provide a name for merely another [synthetic] viewpoint” (see above n. 203 p. 183), but evidence sufficient to gain systematic understanding of, and affirm, that the all-inclusive, concrete econo-

234 On generating categories and the utility of models in that process, a concern of the functional specialty or special category Foundations, see Method, 281-93.
my of salvation not only imitates the order of the Holy Trinity but really participates in that same order.

6. Creation and Its Categories

Naming the four categories that Creation comprises is subject, to some degree of trial and error, to ongoing refinement; but naming is not hit and miss, because we already know that the first category pertains to the experiential, the given; the second to intelligibility, to understanding, formulating, explaining the experienced, and so on. Naming the categories is subject to refinement because a better, more accurate name for a category can be found as one gains better understanding of the content it denotes.

To effect a preliminary ordering of the data on everything else that is not God, I will name the categories Cosmology, History, Culture, and Mission. They have been chosen in light of our attempt to understand Creation within a theological horizon, and to structure my argument that Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity is comprehensive and open to organic development. Cosmology denotes the order of the universe of our experience explained by natural science and theology (in light, for example, of “Teilhard de Chardin’s identification of cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and christogenesis”\(^{235}\) in the theological cosmology he built mainly upon Pauline foundations).

History denotes not the general category or functional specialty of Method, nor the theory of history discussed below, but the intelligible order of the entire human story explained by historiography, and by theology in light of the divine missions.

Culture sublates the generalities of the human story discussed under History. It denotes order in “the set of meanings and values that informs a way of life.” (M xii.) That “theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix” (ibid.) establishes the theological horizon.

To correspond to decision, I have chosen the name Mission, the topic of this chapter. Interpreters of S have made significant advances in theological understanding of the divine and human dimensions of mission. In short, mission is another name for authentic Christian life; thus Mission will focus on order in the subject who is sent.

As an instance of my abovementioned intent to treat the substance of Method for the most part indirectly, consider the foregoing activity of generating categories. Our brief discussion should also add some weight to my earlier conclusion that generalized empirical method is the new wisdom, the “orderer” of all ordering in systematic inquiry. The reader can readily appreciate that following the procedure (such as generating four

\(^{235}\) Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” in A Second Collection, 7. Lonergan also wrote: “It has been the great merit of Teilhard de Chardin to have recognized the Christian’s need of a coherent image of himself in his world and to have contributed not a little towards meeting that need.” Method, 315.
categories from Creation) produces a geometric multiplication that heads towards ever more comprehensive explanation of the originating category. Continuing the process would require giving categorical names to the four contents that must be synthesized to explain what Cosmology means, and so for each of the other three categories which in turn .... From the single topical category Creation, therefore, one has the four already named categories and, if one continued to the second generation, four categories for each of these or sixteen more. Thus the scholar, other things being equal to the task, can generate from immanent knowledge a preliminary ordered outline of a systematic communication, even if some categories bear tentative names or even question marks. Heuristically, therefore, the student, the scholar, the questioner, asks: What are the data? What do they mean? What are the facts? What are they for?236

To help name the categories, one also has the heuristic procedures from Insight (see above p. 48). Insight set out to teach us how “to grasp within a single view how the totality of views on knowledge, objectivity, and reality proceed from the empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness of the concrete subject” (ln 92). Method fully differentiates and explains rational self-consciousness. Thus interiority provides the “ur-categories” for the generation of all other categories of the theology I will call “methodic,” i.e., according to Method. The systematic principle relevant to present concerns means that the categories first in the order of explaining Creation raise questions whose correct answers comprise virtually whatever else there is that pertains to this subject matter, because every possible datum (even the unintelligible, the irrational, the surd) must be one of the four types of content synthesized in every complete answer.

6.1 Cosmology

I wrote at the end of chapter 2 above that Lonergan has rendered obsolete in trinitarian systematics the classical paradigm of world order. His critical-realist psychological analogy provides deeper insight into the actual structure of the cosmos, and resolves the disharmony between Thomas's trinitarian theology and hierarchical worldview.

Under Cosmology, we will shift from the isomorphism between cognition and things that exist to consider the isomorphism between the dynamic process of cognition and the dynamic process whereby things come to exist. On one hand, we can affirm that with Lonergan's cosmology systematics catches up with science, for modernity’s “Scientific Revolution ... destroyed the Greek idea of the cosmos and ... its hierarchical order”237; on the other hand, Lonergan gives theological cosmology a verifiable explanato-

236 I have placed in appendix III p. 329 the annotated graphic “On the Generation of Categories in Theology.”

ry theory of cosmic process that prevailing cosmological and evolutionary theories have yet to catch up with.

6.1.1 The Theological Horizon

There was occasion in chapter 2 above to quote Thomas: “The total universe participates in and represents the divine goodness more perfectly than does any other creature.” Lonergan writes: “We must not forget that what God wants, the world God foreknew from all eternity in all its details and freely chose according to his infinite wisdom and infinite goodness, is precisely the world in which we live, with all its details and all its aspects.”

Within this theological horizon, I will briefly sketch Lonergan’s cosmology, his theory of the actual order of cosmic process (part of a comprehensive theory of development). Our principal concern: to relate in general terms the centerpiece of Lonergan’s scientific cosmology—generalized emergent probability—to the terms and relations of interiority, and thereby to the viewpoint of order.

First, let us expand our theological horizon to include ourselves operating in harmony with divine intentionality as expressed ad extra (note the mention of emergence):

The actual order of the universe is a good and value chosen by God for the manifestation of the perfection of God. Moreover, it grounds the emergence, and includes the excellence, of every other good within the universe, so that to will any other good is to will the order of the universe. But good will follows intellect, and so, as intellect apprehends, so it wills, every other good because of the order of the universe, and the order of the universe because of God. (In 721.)

Living in harmony with the orders of God and the universe will be the focus of Mission.

The brief account possible here will not do justice to the grandeur of Lonergan’s theory of development; but we will consider elements of emergent probability, and Lonergan’s development of classical teleology, his theory of finality. Together, they will...

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238 Topics in Education, 29-30. Recall what we learned above about temporal imagery of before and after in such conventional theological phrases as “God foreknew” and “from all eternity.” The being of things in time proceeds from God’s knowing and loving them, or the Holy Trinity’s expressing them ad extra in the always now of the eternal Word of Knowledge and the eternal Word of Love. Thus my being foreknown from all eternity is my existing now.

239 For a more detailed discussion, see Byrne, “The Thomist Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic World-view.” Although not arguing explicitly from the viewpoint of order, Byrne roots in Thomas’s thought, and offers a unified understanding of, Lonergan’s worldview of emergent probability, finality, his trinitarian theory, cognitional theory, metaphysics, and the statistical element in world process, human understanding, and grace—as well as a critique of Thomistic counterpositions on various of these matters.
provide a meaningful sketch of the empirical, intelligible, actual, moral, and religious dimensions of real things as they are, as they become what they are, and as they contribute to the yet unrealized final state of Creation.

6.1.2 Generalized Emergent Probability

Emergent probability “does not denote any sort of efficient cause; it refers to the immanent intelligibility of the design or order in which things exist and events occur.” *(In 720.)* The theory is scientific, but philosophy, not science, provides the critical ground of Lonergan’s theory of a cosmic process governed by complementary classical and statistical laws.*

“What world view is involved by our affirmation of both classical and statistical laws?” *(In 138.)* Lonergan’s answer brings us to the dynamic, developmental heart of his theory. “Our account … will rest not on the results of scientific investigations but simply and solely upon the dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence.” *(In 139.)* Given the isomorphism of knowing and known, the reader might expect that Lonergan would “argue in strictly deductive fashion from the complementary structure of the knowing to the corresponding complementarity of the known.” While possible, such a procedure

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*240* See *Insight*, index, s.vv. “emergence,” “emergent probability.” For a very enlightening, accessible study in dialogue with contemporary scientific positions and counterpositions, see Philip McShane, *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970).

*241* “The law of nature, then, is one thing. The event of its illustration is another. And such events are subject to laws of a different type, which is named statistical.” *Insight*, 105. Classical law (like the law of falling bodies) is abstract and regards events that do not diverge systematically from ideal frequencies. Other things being equal, in the actual event the body will fall as the law predicts. Statistical law regards concrete events and the probability of their occurring. According to classical law, light always travels at 186,000 miles per second; but in the actual event, the speed varies according to the medium light passes through. The speed, however, never varies systematically from ideal frequencies (such systematic variance would constitute a law). As the reader has no doubt inferred, there must also be unintelligibility, a surd, a residue, in actual events (and so in history, culture, and mission).

The best explanation of probability for our purposes in found in *Understanding and Being*, pp. 76-80, where Lonergan uses the example of a coin toss. After a sufficient number of tosses, the incidence of heads and tails, as predicted, hovers around half for each. If some law favoured one outcome over another, there would not be probability.

*242* *Insight*, 140. To explain emergence, Lonergan distinguishes central and conjugate metaphysics; they provide two viewpoints on the same data. The familiar constitutive principles of potency, form, and act are central in regard to data in their individuality; conjugate (or accidental) potency, form, and act regard types of data and are distinguished to explain the emergence...
would require excessive elaboration. (In 140.) As we discovered when attempting to understand his trinitarian theory, the key is to understand understanding. “Accordingly, our appeal will be to insight.243 We shall begin from the problem of showing how both classical and statistical law can coalesce into a single unified intelligibility commensurate with the universe of our experience.” (In 141.) Therefore, like metaphysics, the theory of emergent probability arises from analysis of the emergence of insight. The theory emerges from attending to what the scientist (Lonergan) does as he does the science.244 With that central notion in mind, we turn to the dynamic element of Lonergan’s theory of emergence in the cosmos, the scheme of recurrence.

6.1.3 Schemes and Conditioned Schemes of Recurrence

Even educated people think it a matter of common sense that when all classical laws of science “are known exactly and completely, there also will be known a systematic unification commensurate with world process in its concrete historical unfolding.” (In 115.) Lonergan continues:

But strangely enough, world process in its concrete historical unfolding rather conspicuously makes a large and generous use of the statistical techniques of large numbers and long intervals of time; it exhibits not a rigid but a fluid stability; it brings forth novelty and development; it makes false starts and suffers breakdowns. It would seem, then, that an understanding of the concrete unfolding of world

of particular things as they come to be—not only in the cosmic process studied by natural science but also, and principally, in cognition. For example: Mary is human by her central form and accidental changes do not change Mary; considered from the viewpoint of conjugate form, accidental change signifies real change in Mary. See Insight, index, s.v. “conjugate(s); potency-form-act”; and Understanding and Being, 204.

243 “At the core of emergent probability is the distinction between the direct insight which grasps a unified intelligibility which … is constitutive of reality, and the inverse insight which grasps the absence of such an intelligibility. … The inverse insight can function not simply as the silent partner to the direct insight; rather it can function on its own to understand the presence of randomness, the absence of systematically recurring pattern in successions of clusters of systematic processes. It is the presence of randomness which opens the possibility for a statistical science to contribute towards a real explanation of world process.” Kenneth R. Melchin, “History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability,” Lonergan Workshop 7 (1988): 273.

244 On this critical point, on the integral relationship between the cognitional operations of the observing scientist and the emergence of the science, see “The Conclusions and the Method,” in McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, 248-60. “The conclusions reached here about randomness, statistics and emergence are conclusions regarding both human knowing and the real world, but these conclusions were reached uniquely through self-attention in the process of doing the relevant sciences.” Ibid., 257.
process will not be based exclusively on classical laws, however exactly and completely known, but in a fundamental manner will appeal to statistical laws. (In 115.)

I believe we can understand cosmic process well enough for our purposes if we first consider the scheme of recurrence; then draw from Insight a preliminary explanation of conditioned scheme of recurrence; and, finally, from general knowledge delineate, in a less austere mode of explanation, the general sweep of the emergence of the cosmos from “Let there be light!” until now. The scheme of recurrence is a simple notion. For a good example from common knowledge, consider the cycle of water. It evaporates, forms clouds; the clouds disperse and return the water over the earth in rain and snow; the cycle repeats over and over. We also know from general knowledge that this aquatic scheme of recurrence is the condition of possibility for the emergence of ecosystems, so there are also conditioned schemes of recurrence.

In a conditioned scheme of recurrence, “a series of events $A$, $B$, $C$, … would be so related that the fulfilment of the conditions for each would be the occurrence of the others. Schematically, then, the scheme might be represented by the series of conditionals: If $A$ occurs, $B$ will occur; if $B$ occurs, $C$ will occur; if $C$ occurs, … $A$ will recur. Such a circular arrangement may involve any number of terms, the possibility of alternative routes, and in general any degree of complexity.”245

With this preliminary understanding of schemes and conditioned schemes of recurrence operating according to classical and statistical laws, let us imagine the cosmos evolving over 13-14 billion years from the “Big Bang” into the (almost) unimaginable complexity of the ordered universe of our experience. Think of the initial state as “‘prime potency.’”246 Three minutes after the big bang,247 conditions are such that stable atomic nuclei take form; over long periods of time and after countless events, many survive. There are false starts and breakdowns. Environments change to enhance or di-

245 Insight, 141; Lonergan’s ellipses; emphasis added. “Two instances of greater complexity may be noted. On the one hand, a scheme might consist of a set of almost complete circular arrangements of which none could function alone yet all would function if conjoined in an interdependent combination. On the other hand, schemes might be complemented by defensive circles, so that if some event $F$ tended to upset the scheme, there would be some such sequence of conditions as ‘If $F$ occurs, then $G$ occurs; if $G$ occurs, then $H$ occurs; if $H$ occurs, then $F$ is eliminated.’” Ibid..

246 “It will be convenient to introduce the name ‘prime potency’ to denote the potency of the lowest level that provides the principle of limitation for the whole range of proportionate being.” Insight, 468. “Might one not say that the quantity of energy is the concrete prime potency that is informed mechanically or thermally or electrically as the case may be?” Ibid..

minish probabilities of emergence and survival of this or that scheme. Imagine conditions that allow atoms of gases to form and survive, then molecules, then compounds, then bodies that coalesce and evolve into stars that generate many elements of the periodic table. Here, A occurs but B does not; A remains. There, because of A, B occurs. B survives, and C occurs, so A recurs. In this region of space a complex scheme survives, in that region it does not. Systems of suns and planets acquire stable form. Earth evolves until conditions favor the emergence of living things, the biochemical evolves into the biological, the sensitive, the psychic, the conscious, the intelligent, the self-conscious. Every step of the way to the present “fluid stability” of the world of our experience, cosmic process is characterized by schemes of recurrence governed by classical and statistical laws. Note the process of sublation in these material and nonmaterial processes:

Chemical elements and compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of subatomic events; organisms are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness is a higher integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural tissues; and accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of images or of data.\(^{248}\)

The final quotation from Lonergan affords a glimpse of how the foregoing fits within his overarching theory of development and, especially, my efforts to understand S, your efforts to understand my explanation of S, and our common efforts to acquire the viewpoint of order.

The principal illustration of the notion of development is, of course, human intelligence. An otherwise coincidental manifold of data or images is integrated by insights; the effort to formulate systematically what is grasped by insight, or alternatively the effort to act upon it, gives rise to further questions, directs attention to further data, leads to the emergence of further insights, and so the cycle of development begins another turn. For if one gives free rein to the detached and disinterested desire to know, further questions keep arising. Insights accumulate into viewpoints, and lower viewpoints yield to higher viewpoints. (In 483.)

From the account of cognition in chapters 1 and 2 above, and the present brief account of emergent probability, one can discern parallel dynamisms in cognitive and cosmic processes.\(^{249}\) The dynamisms are directed upward towards every fuller realizza-

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\(^{248}\) *Insight*, 477. For an excellent explanatory account of emergent probability in the workings of the mind, see Melchin, “History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability” (see above n. 243 p. 235).

\(^{249}\) “If images are the sole basis of the movement, there develops logic; if images serially related to facts form the basis, the development is mathematical; if data in their bearing on human
tion of knowing and being. That fact raises the question of purpose, and brings us to Lonergan’s complementary theory of finality.

6.1.4 Finality

In regard to the theological context: We believe in light of our faith that “the actual order of the universe is a good and value chosen by God for the manifestation of the perfection of God,” (see above p. 233) and that Creation proceeds towards eschatological completion in Christ.

The notion of finality is heuristic. “It is not only our notion of being that is heuristic, that heads for an objective that can be defined only in terms of the process of knowing it, but also the reality of proportionate being itself exhibits a similar incompleteness and a similar dynamic orientation towards a completeness that becomes determinate only in the process of completion.” (In 470.)

Finality is “the direction immanent in the dynamism of the real.” Byrne observes: “One thing that is truly remarkable about Lonergan’s metaphysics is his affirmation of the finality, not just of organic development or human existence or even limited instances of evolutionary process, but of the universe as a whole.” He also argues that “Lonergan’s work has removed the objection that ‘in principle’ teleological assertions of [the universe’s organic directedness] are not compatible with scientific insistence on empirical verification.”

We will assume that the cosmos has divinely ordained pur-

living determine the circle, there develops common sense; if data in their relations to one another are one’s concern, there develops empirical science; finally, if one attends to the circle of development itself and to the structure of what can be known of proportionate being, the development is philosophic.” Insight, 483.

On the various aspects of finality, see Insight, index, s.v. “finality.” See also Gordon Ambrose Rixon, S.J., “Bernard Lonergan’s Notion of Vertical Finality in his Early Writings” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College and Andover Newton Theological School, 1995).

Patrick H. Byrne, “Teleology, Modern Science and Verification,” Lonergan Workshop 10 (1994): 38. In regard to metaphysics and finality, Lonergan writes: “The directed dynamism of finality is an effectively probable realization of possibilities. For potency is an objective possibility of form; form is an objective possibility of act; acts are an objective possibility of higher forms and higher acts. The realization of these possibilities is effectively probable, for on the supposition of sufficient numbers and sufficiently long intervals of time, the realization of any possibility can be assured.” Insight, 473. And: “If metaphysics is concerned with being qua being, and being is the all-inclusive, then metaphysics has to say something about the all-inclusive. Metaphysics is not merely analysis of particular beings; it is a view of the whole.” Understanding and Being, 215-16.

Byrne, ibid., 29.
pose, that Lonergan’s theory of emergence is good science, and turn our attention to finality and “the fulfillment of the finality of the universe.”

Space does not allow me to address the full complexity of Lonergan’s “theorem” of finality. Again, our focus will be heuristic notions and generalities. However, the sketch possible here will be sufficiently detailed, I believe, to allow one to grasp the unity of Lonergan’s theory of finality with previously established components of our still-emergent viewpoint of order. Lonergan writes:

By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being. It affirms that the objective universe is not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid. As it regards present reality in its dynamic aspect, so it affirms this dynamism to be open. As what is to be known becomes determinate only through knowing, so what is to be becomes determinate only through its own becoming. But as present knowing is not just present knowing but also a moment in process towards fuller knowing, so also present reality is not just present reality but also a moment in process to fuller reality.” (In 470-71.)

It is clear, therefore, that finality “refers, not to extrinsic causality such as final causality, but to the immanent constituents of proportionate being, an upward but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.” In classical teleology, the future exerts a kind of pull on the present. Mighty oaks from little acorns always grow, for the seed has the potential within it to achieve future perfection by replicating its parents; the finality of the seed is in that sense determined. Science, however, verifies that, for example, adaptations to changed environmental conditions and sudden mutations occur in the interactive development of living things. “Thus the idea that each thing has its own nature has little or no predictive value, and cannot therefore be used to guide expectations about natural perfections of entities.”

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254 Ibid., 33.

255 “If appetite responds because motive moves, if process is orientated because an intelligent agent envisages and intends a term, there is causality indeed; but it is efficient and not final. No doubt, in the concrete, such efficiency is connected intimately with finality. But rigorously one must maintain that there is final causality if, and only if, appetite responds because the motive is good; if, and only if, process is orientated because the term is good.” Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” in Collection, 19. First published, Theological Studies 4 (1943): 477-510.


257 Byrne, “Teleology,” 37.
not realization of determined ends either in individual cases or in the final outcome of
the whole. Like the notion of being, the notion of objective cosmic process is heuristic:
“Just as cognitional activity does not know in advance what being is and so has to de-
fine it heuristically as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable af-
firmation, so objective process is not the realization of some blueprint but the cumula-
tion of a conditioned series of things and schemes of recurrence in accord with succes-
sive schedules of probabilities.” (In 470.) Thus the theorem of finality is intimately linked
to our foregoing discussion of emergent probability and schemes of recurrence.

Lonergan distinguishes three types of finality: vertical, horizontal, and “the abso-
lute finality of all things to God in his intrinsic goodness.”258 We will return to the abso-
lute finality under Mission. Vertical and horizontal finalities suggest to imagination a
cross raised over history. “Vertical and horizontal finalities are not alternatives, but the
vertical emerges all the more strongly as the horizontal is realized the more fully.”259 We
could say the forward, horizontal movement of intelligent and non-intelligent processes
to their terms, and of human appetites and motives to their terms, are at the same time
upward, vertical movements that constitute the “third type of finality, that of any lower
level of appetition and process to any higher level.”260

Concretely, consider how in our general overview of the process from initial prime
potency to the universe of our experience we discerned that a horizontal movement of
particles to the formation of stable atomic nuclei was simultaneously serving the emer-
gence of higher levels of integration; and the movements of these schemes towards their
own horizontal finalities served still higher integrations until, at last, humanity
emerges. Consider the horizontal finalities of masons and carpenters and others whose
activities of bringing limited processes to terms simultaneously contribute to the emer-
gence of an integrated building (which might itself serve a higher integration261). If, as
we have seen, natural development is a linked sequence of higher integrations, consider
the isomorphic process of human development. The self-transcending subject’s exercise
of the pure desire to know serves the vertical finality that “emerges all the more strong-
ly as the horizontal is realized the more fully,” as our quotidian horizontal activities—

259 Ibid., 46.
260 Ibid., 20. Lonergan’s worldview at this point in his intellectual development is explicitly
hierarchical. Although his published writings on cosmic and cognitive processes never become
completely free of hierarchical imagery, his explanations clearly reveal that he grasps the dy-
namic, organic unity of the cosmos.
261 “One must avoid the mistake of saying any particular, finite emergent proportionate be-
ing is the purpose for that line of emergence. (This is especially important in human affairs,
where religious people often seem all too ready to declare that some particular outcome was
God’s purpose.)” Byrne, “Teleology,” 44; Byrne’s emphases.
inasmuch as they are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, loving—serve the vertical finality of authentic subjectivity.262

We will now turn to Lonergan’s own summary of his theorem of finality. The reader will note that, in a single view, he unites finality with familiar elements of the viewpoint of order. First, he relates the finality of cosmic process to the isomorphic heuristic structures of cognition and metaphysics: “We have worked out a notion of finality that attributes to the universe of proportionate being a directed dynamism that parallels the heuristic structure of inquiry and reflection. It is a view that squares with our conception of metaphysics. For if we have appealed to the three levels of our knowing to distinguish potency, form, and act, … we also must recognize in heuristic structure itself a clue to the nature of the universe proportionate to our capacities to know.” (In 475.) Next, he relates finality to humanity’s “detached and disinterested desire” to know and sharpens its isomorphism with cosmic process:

The pure desire heads for an objective that becomes known only through its own unfolding in understanding and judgment, and so the dynamism of universal process is directed, not to a generically, specifically, or individually determinate goal, but to whatever becomes determinate through the process itself in its effectively probable realization of its possibilities. Finally, as our notion of metaphysics involves not only a major premise affirming an isomorphism between knowing and known and a principal minor premise affirming the structure of knowing but also subsidiary minor premises supplied by empirical science and common sense, so our affirmation of finality rests not simply on an a priori parallel but on that parallel as supported by vast ranges of fact. For our knowing might be much as it is, though the universe were otherwise inert, static, finished, complete, or dynamic but undirected, or dynamic and directed by deductivist necessity, or dynamic and directed naturally or artificially to some determinate goal. But the fact is that this universe is not static but dynamic, not undirected but directed, not deductivist nor inflexible but the effectively probable realization of its own possibilities. (In 475.)

Lonergan’s explanation of finality while scientific is also poetic, for it suggests affect-laden, dynamic images of the profound linkage between the realizations of our potential and the potential of what we normally regard as an “out there” cosmic process. We and the cosmos together are striving “isomorphically” to realize a certain but not predetermined form of mutual completion.

We will now carry these general notions of emergence and finality in the cosmos forward to the richer context of human history.

262 The interested reader will profit from Lonergan’s analysis of and solution to “the problem of inserting the vertical tendency of love from sex to divine charity into the horizontal process from fecundity to offspring ....” “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 18-19.
6.2 History

Under Cosmology we learned that understanding development in the phenomenal world studied by the natural sciences is linked directly to the specific kind of self-knowledge acquired through intellectual conversion, our making conscious the terms and relations that order interiority, the intentional operations that differentiate our desire to know and love. Here, we advance from the immanent intelligibility of natural world process to the immanent intelligibility of historical process, the human story. As the reader has no doubt come to anticipate, to understand history we will follow the same generalized method, sublate in a richer context the theories of emergence and finality, and apply to human history various heuristic structures.

What is the role of history in Lonergan’s thinking? I would claim that the need to understand history, basic history, the history that happens, is the chief dynamic element in all his academic work. From start to finish history is the pervasive theme: not insight, not method, not economics, not emergent probability, but history.

Our concern is not the general category or functional specialty of Method in Theology, not written history but the history that happens, the whole story of human development. “Now history has to be understood in the twofold sense of history that is written and history that is written about—the latter having to do with historical process, the totality of human action or human actions, and historicity. (‘Historicity’ is a rather difficult concept. The word is an attempt to translate the German Geschichtlichkeit, understood as a dimension of human reality.)” Thus we will consider Lonergan’s ideal types, heuristic structures, and generalities rather than events to explicate History according to the familiar order of intentional operations.

Recall that we are intent to synthesize four distinct contents of one category, to sketch from the viewpoint of order a complete answer to the question, What is Creation? Thus we will carry the heuristic structures of history forward and fill them with content specific to culture. Finally, we will by sublation carry elements correlated with Cosmology, History, and Culture forward to a fuller realization within the most inclu-


265 “The ideal-type ... is not a description of reality or a hypothesis about reality. It is a theoretical construct in which possible events are intelligibly related to constitute an internally coherent system. Its utility is both heuristic and expository, that is, it can be useful inasmuch as it suggests and helps formulate hypotheses and, again, when a concrete situation approximates to the theoretical construct, it can guide an analysis of the situation and promote a clear understanding of it.” Method, 227.
sive human context, the divine-human partnership of Mission.

6.2.1 The Theological Context

Of the theological ground of the intelligibility of history, Lonergan writes: "Human history is the realization of a divine idea; it is the exact realization of just what God intends and permits. It is free. That this intelligibility should be realized is a product of human freedom." (Topics 257.) He categorizes the product of the historical dialectic between grace and freedom as progress, decline, and redemption; they structure history. These structural categories do not denote discrete stages of world history but the dynamics ever-present in the perennial drama of historical subjects being or failing to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving in relation to self, other people, culture, the world, and God.

6.2.2 Historical Consciousness

McPartland gathers into an excellent overview many of the notions we have discussed from the beginning of my argument, and some to be further explicated below:

Historical existence, we can say, following the lead of Lonergan, is the drama of the search for meaning and the quest for value. It is a journey with both movement and countermovement. The drama extends from the unconscious depths of matter to the spiritual heights of the cloud of unknowing. It includes the bright prominence, sinking into unfathomable depths, of the spiritual, moral, and intellectual drama of each person: as actor and critic, performing and interpreting; as limited by biological, psychic, geographical, social, and historical conditions, while, simultaneously, self-transcending, responding to the challenges of the environment and of the past; as living the tension of limitation and transcendence faithfully or unfaithfully, accepting or fleeing the call of the desire to know and the intention of the good; as performing the drama before the self, others, and the Wholly Other. There is, then, to this drama the movement of authenticity and the countermovement of inauthenticity: the gaining and the losing of the direction of life. ... Hence, extrapolating from Lonergan's writings, we can fashion an ontological philosophy, a systematic reflection on the intrinsically historical character of being human.\(^{266}\)

Unlike most generations who have gone before, we are conscious of history and evolution; and many educated people, especially in the West, have achieved historical consciousness, even if relatively few can say what it is with the clarity and precision of Lonergan's definition:

\(^{266}\) McPartland, "Meaning, Mystery, and the History of Consciousness," 204-05.
Historical consciousness emerges when there is grasped the relevance of human intelligence and wisdom to the whole of human life. Then the entire fabric of human existence appears as a historical product, as the result of man’s apprehension, judgment, choice, action. Moreover, what has been made by man can be changed and improved by man. (Topics 76.)

Near the end of his life, Lonergan remarked to a friend, “All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology.” Of his many approaches over some fifty years of writing on the topic, our concern will be what McPartland calls Lonergan’s “speculative philosophy of history.”

A properly validated philosophical theory—one, that is, rooted in self-appropriation and expressed as critical realism—can even broaden historical knowledge and facilitate its development. Indeed a philosophical theory about the course of actual historical events can possess at least the utility of a grand-scale ideal type [M 228-29].

Lonergan’s speculative philosophy of history regards the history of human intelligence, of the mind’s historical self-disclosure, the ongoing history of consciousness.

6.2.3 Lonergan’s Epochal History of Consciousness

“As the early Lonergan remarked, and the later Lonergan reaffirmed, the only fully satisfying context in which to situate the development of human intelligence is the total sweep of history.” Recall that we are not concerned here with history that is written, with historiography. How does Lonergan’s speculative philosophy of history relate to written history? McPartland observes:


268 McPartland, “Meaning, Mystery,” 204. “How can we unite the seemingly antithetical: philosophical ‘speculation’ and empirical historical enquiry? It is the contention of this paper that the methodology of Bernard Lonergan offers the most substantive philosophical foundation for such an endeavor.” Ibid.

269 Ibid., 208.

270 For a more substantial and richly textured account than possible here, see Method, 81-99; and McPartland, “Meaning, Mystery.”

Lonergan proffers a modified speculative philosophy of history in the form of the *epochal* differentiations of consciousness. Lonergan would not have the investigation of the history of consciousness be dogmatically a priori. Indeed, a philosophy of consciousness can supply explanatory tools in the endeavor, but these tools are grand-scale ideal-types (not constructs of a universal history), and they can be employed, enriched, tested, and revised in an ongoing fashion by the various specialized historical disciplines.\(^{272}\)

Before advancing to the “*epochal* differentiations of consciousness,” let us first relate human activity in history to emergent probability. The reader can easily apply the theoretical elements discussed under Cosmology to the activities of oneself and others in our constituting the kind of events historians write about:

As in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology, so in the field of human events and relationships there are classical and statistical laws that combine concretely in cumulating sets of schemes of recurrence. For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations that yields conclusions of the type: If an X occurs, then an X will recur. (In 234-35.)

In regard to finality, we now shift attention from the movement of processes to terms, and of appetites to objects in the nonhuman world, to their meaning in human history. That the whole of history is the product of subjects freely cooperating or not with grace enables a preliminary ordering of human activity from the beginning of history until now. We will classify humanity’s “patterned set of relations” according to various heuristic structures isomorphic with the terms and relations of interiority. We will employ the “analogy of the subject,” assume that humanity has always experienced, understood, judged, and decided.

First, consider Lonergan’s abovementioned heuristic scale of values. The values are isomorphic with cognitional activities and levels of consciousness, so he distinguishes vital, social, cultural, and personal values. We also discussed above the genetic sequence of modes of expression. Meanings can be correlated to the levels of cognition they issue from, so we considered the descriptive, the explanatory, the factual, the ethical; these expressions of meaning can be classified as commonsense, scientific, philosophical, existential (ethical and theological). Considered together with the theories of emergence and finality, these isomorphic heuristic structures, all generated from interiority, can help us effect a preliminary ordering of the uncountable instances of individual and group activity that constitute the total sweep of history.

Our preliminary ordering, however, tells us very little about actual development in the history that happens, even if historical consciousness entails a sense that meanings and values have developed over the millennia. We must go further. Humanity has not always differentiated the categories experience, understanding, judgment, and decision; or meaning, or value. From his study of history that is written, Lonergan discerned and named historical differentiations of consciousness, moments that mark epochs, distinct ages in the development of human self-knowledge.

The key to the developmental theory is the notion of differentiation of consciousness …. The orientation of the stream of consciousness specifies the objects of consciousness, with different orientations constituting diverse patterns of experience,273 corresponding realms of meaning, and parallel modes of expression. All the while, however, the intentionality of consciousness also specifies the total range of meaningful objects (the world) and the horizon of a person or of a community; thus a radical alteration in the orientation of consciousness inaugurates a profound change in the understanding of the world and in the horizon or perspective through which a person or community apprehends reality. ... Now such horizon shifts revolve around differentiations of consciousness, watershed marks in the differentiation of patterns of experience attended by differentiations of correlative realms of meaning and modes of expression.274

To complete this sketch of a complete answer to the question of History, we will briefly discuss the differentiations of consciousness in the order of their historical emergence.

6.2.4 The Age of Myth

People in the age of myth possessed undifferentiated consciousness, “where neither self and community, nor subject and object, nor discrete modes of understanding (subjective pole), nor various elements of reality (objective pole), nor forms of expression tend to be distinguished.”275 They apprehend their world as “laden with symbols ‘expressed in myth, saga, legend, magic, cosmogony, apocalypse, typology’ [M 306]. Ideas are principally communicated through ‘rituals, narrative forms, titles, parables, metaphors’ [ibid. 276].”276 The survival of the species testifies that archaic humanity operated

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273 Experience is patterned, and patterns correspond to realms of meaning, modes of expression, and the other heuristic sets of terms and relations generated from interiority. Patterns of experience will be discussed under Mission.


275 Ibid., 215.

276 Ibid., 220-21.
successfully on the level of practicality and common sense, but mythic consciousness does not distinguish common sense as a distinct realm of meaning or, in other words, it considers all meaning to be commonsense.

The age of myth possessed the very thing we seek, a unified view of existence. “Myth represents the unity of reality—of man, society, world, and transcendent mystery. Hence undifferentiated consciousness is present to the full range of human experience ....”²⁷⁷ We, however, seek a unified view of existence through the very thing undifferentiated consciousness lacks, namely adequate self-knowledge. “Inadequate self-knowledge generates, in turn, naïve bewilderment about the criteria of truth, reality, objectivity, and causality ....”²⁷⁸ Lonergan observes: “For the primitive not only lacks examples of successful implementation of the explanatory viewpoint but also lacks the techniques of mastery and control that the study of grammar imparts to the use of words, the study of rhetoric to the use of metaphor, the study of logic to the communication of thought.” (In 565.) People in the age of myth experienced, understood, judged, and decided; but they did not differentiate things quoad se from things quoad nos. “The primitive cannot begin to distinguish accurately between what he knows by experience and what he knows inasmuch as he understands.” (In 565.) If imagined as corporate person, we could say that humanity in the age of myth was like a child growing towards mature self-knowledge, that our first major rite of passage into young adulthood, into the second stage of meaning, came with “the Greek discovery of mind.” (M 90.)

6.2.5 The Age of Theory

Lonergan contrasts mind in the age of myth, mind “uncontrolled by any reflexive technique,” with the first breakthrough in the history of humanity’s control of meaning:

Just as the earth, left to itself, can put forth creepers and shrubs, bushes and trees with such excessive abundance that there results an impenetrable jungle, so too the human mind, led by imagination and affect and uncontrolled by any reflexive technique, luxuriates in a world of myth with its glories to be achieved and its evils banished by the charms of magic. So it is that in western culture, for the past twenty-four centuries, the movement associated with the name of Socrates and the achievement of fourth-century Athens have been regarded as a high point, as a line

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 221.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 222. “Myth does not cease to have a legitimate truth function after the advent of science and philosophy, for it is a representation of the paradoxical known unknown. Thus it is imperative for scholars to ascertain the exact status of myth and symbolic consciousness throughout the history of consciousness.” Ibid., 221.
of cleavage, as the breaking through of a radically new era in the history of man.\textsuperscript{279}

On the Greek discovery of mind, Lonergan remarks:

The discovery of mind marks the transition from the first stage of meaning to the second. In the first stage the world mediated by meaning is just the world of common sense. In the second stage the world mediated by meaning splits into the realm of common sense and the realm of theory. Corresponding to this division and grounding it, there is a differentiation of consciousness. (\textit{M} 93.)

The realm of theoretical meaning corresponds to the cognitional level of understanding. Lonergan’s favorite example regards Eddington’s tables. “There was one table that was brown, six feet by four by three, and so on. And the other table was mostly a vacuum. There are two entirely different views of exactly the same table. There is an opposition between the objects in the world of theory and the objects in the world of common sense. They are the same objects, but the mode of consideration is opposed.”\textsuperscript{280} He continues:

In the world of theory, intelligence is dominant; anything that occurs, that is permitted to occur, regards a purely intellectual end, an aim of understanding, an aim to arrive at truth. One wills to exclude other considerations which would be irrelevant to the purpose. The theorist is not the whole man functioning, but the rest of the man subordinated to his intelligence …. That is not the way in which the man of common sense lives; he is intelligent, he is rational, he means to be both, but he does not live for \textit{them}; they are just a part of him, one part of total living.\textsuperscript{281}

This differentiation, like the next one, had a long preparatory history:

Lonergan traces the actual Greek discovery of mind through a number of milestones [\textit{M} 90-92]. Hesiod discerned false myths. Xenophanes and Hecataeus presented a bold critique of myths as such. Herodotus, the physicians, and the physicists displayed an empirical bent. Heraclitus explored the \textit{logos}. Parmenides distinguished between sensation and understanding …. The process of discovery reached its culmination and climax in the towering efforts of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In contrast to the compact mode of expression found in the Age of Myth, a specialized technical language had now entered the cultural horizon, the language of theoreti-


\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., 114; Lonergan’s emphasis.
cally differentiated consciousness.\textsuperscript{282}

The effects on people and subsequently on culture are dramatic:

The autonomy of the human spirit emerges. There is a development of argument, definition, science, the critique of Gods, of myths, of magic, of taboos, of institutions and manners, of aims and values. … The individual asserts his freedom to be himself. He liberates aesthetic, intellectual, scientific, moral, and religious activity from traditionally restricted functions within the collectivity. (\textit{Topics 76})

The great achievements of classical culture and the fruitful resurgence of its ideals in the Renaissance are well known; but the cultural achievements of the age of theory became normative and static,\textsuperscript{283} remaining until the recent past the fixed standards to measure civilization and distinguish it from barbarism. While the leading developmental edge of the age of theory did demythologize myth and magic, it nonetheless lacked a technique for a similar kind of self-criticism. People who appropriate the second stage of meaning know they experience, understand, and judge, but they lack a reflexive technique to control theoretical meaning. It was noted in chapter 1 above that, in the age dominated by theory, meaning in systematic theology was controlled by logic and metaphysics.\textsuperscript{284}

We will add more data on the age of theory in the following subsection by way of Lonergan’s contrasting it to the third stage of meaning, the age now developing towards cultural appropriation and transformation, our dawning age of interiorly differentiated consciousness.

6.2.6 \textbf{The Age of Interiority}

“Now just as the second stage comes out of developments occurring in the first, so the third stage comes out of developments occurring in the second.” (\textit{M 94}) McPartland observes: “If the Age of Theory centered upon the ‘discovery of mind,’ the Age of Inte-
riority revolves around the ‘discovery of the subject.’”  

What is interiority? We have examined interiority in progressive detail since the beginning of chapter 1 above, but I have not tried to satisfy the desire of our theoretical consciousness for a definition. Moreover, we are not talking about theory as such; interiority is a distinct differentiation:

What can one know? What are the operations that are performed when one does know? It is a turn from the world of theory to its basis in the world of interiority. Again, the questions raised by the existentialists are questions that regard interiority: Do you know what that means? Do you know what it means to have a mind of your own? Is that just a phrase? Do you know what it means to respect others? or to be in love with them? Do you know what it is to suffer? Do you really know? Do you know what it is to pray? Do you know what it is to die? Do you know what it is to live in the presence of God? These are questions about interiority.

Interiority is not something you can talk about in ordinary commonsense conversation. It is not something that you can handle adequately by any amount of theory. It regards immediate internal experience. And that interiority forms a third field in which developments occur. Those developments—while they are related to, and important for, and connected with developments in the world of community or developments in the world of theory—are, as it were, a distinct world of their own.  

Lonergan writes that “it will help clarify what is proper to the second stage if at once we characterize the third.” (M 94.) Recall discussion early in chapter 1 above of the critical distinction between understanding and judgment, probability and certainty, hypothesis and verified theory; and truth:

In the third stage, then, the sciences have become ongoing processes. Instead of stating the truth about this or that kind of reality, their aim is an ever better approximation towards the truth, and this is attained by an ever fuller and exacter under-

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286 Lonergan, “Time and Meaning,” 114; emphasis added. Religious consciousness is found throughout the history of consciousness, but its import changes with self-knowledge. “In undifferentiated consciousness it will express its reference to the transcendent both through sacred objects, places, times, and actions, and through the sacred offices of the shaman, the prophet, the lawgiver, the apostle, the priest, the preacher, the monk, the teacher. As consciousness differentiates into the two realms of common sense and theory, it will give rise to special theoretical questions concerning divinity, the order of the universe, the destiny of mankind, and the lot of each individual. When these three realms of common sense, theory, and interiority are differentiated, the self-appropriation of the subject leads not only to the objectification of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, but also of religious experience.” Method, 265-66.
standing of all relevant data. In the second stage, theory was a specialty for the attainment of truth; in the third stage scientific theory has become a specialty for the advance of understanding. Further, the sciences are autonomous. They consider questions scientific if and only if they can be settled by an appeal to sensible data. (M 94.)

Like the other sciences, so systematic theology in the third stage of meaning seeks not definitive achievement but ongoing advance toward every more complete explanation. And: “Since [the sciences] are ongoing processes, their unification has to be an ongoing process; it cannot be some single well-ordered formulation; it has to be a succession of different formulations; in other words, unification will be the achievement not of logic [the control of meaning in the second stage] but of method.” (M 94.) Likewise, the unification of the various treatises comprised by a comprehensive systematic theology will be the achievement of method.

All along we have discussed philosophy in the third stage of meaning, i.e., as self-appropriated cognitional theory:

Philosophy is neither a theory in the manner of science nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to Presocratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification. (M 95.)

Lonergan goes on to contrast metaphysical conceptions of psychology, of “object,” and of physics in the age of theory with their new ground in interiority. He concludes that the former “continuity of philosophy and science has often been the object of nostalgic admiration. But if it had the merit of meeting the systematic exigence and habituating the human mind to theoretical pursuits, it could be no more than a transitional phase.” When science achieved its autonomy by developing its own method and concepts, “it gave a new form to the opposition between the world of theory and the world of common sense. This new form, in turn, evoked a series of new philosophies.” Beginning with Descartes, he goes on to trace the line of philosophical development that culminates in the moment when “intentionality analysis routed faculty psychology,” when, in fact (but he is too modest to say so), Insight appeared, a defeat of faculty psychology followed by the coup de grâce of Method in Theology. Although the majority at the leading edge of Western developments in the sciences and humanities are manifestly unaware of it, “the second stage of meaning is vanishing, and a third is about to take its place.” (All quotes at M 96.)

Interiority as a generalized empirical method seems simple and obvious. Yet, it took millennia of cultural development in the form of differentiations of consciousness be-
fore a great genius bent on rising to the level of his time could realize the differentiation of interiority in himself, demonstrate and explain it, and thereby facilitate our appropriation and implementation of interiority for the beneficial advance of history.

Proof of history’s passing into a new age is not wanting. We have, for example, witnessed in trinitarian systematics the remarkable new power the psychological analogy gains once freed from the older control of meaning; how differentiating interiority methodically liberates Thomas’s sublime theology and, by implication, enables the transposition of the whole inherited treasury of Catholic theology into a rich new mode of expression. Moreover, the method, while subject to development and refinement, cannot be superseded as long as humanity fully expresses its nature through experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

Now, having extended the analogy of the subject to the full sweep of history, and having grasped the unity of that analogical understanding of history with the above-mentioned heuristic structures of emergence, finality, meaning, value, and modes of expression, we will bring it all forward “to a fuller realization within a richer context,” that of Culture.

6.3 Culture

We saw demonstrated when the object was S that employing method effects a simultaneous complexification and unification of data. In our forward movement from Cosmology, to History, to Culture (and later to Mission), the immediate object as such (culture in the present case) becomes more determinate; yet, because we are also carrying previous objects forward into progressively richer contexts, the immediate object also becomes de facto more comprehensive (History sublates Cosmology, Culture sublates History, Mission sublates Culture). Because no datum falls outside the four contents that, when synthesized, answer every question for intelligence, at the end of the process we will virtually, potentially, and to an adequate degree formally achieve, in the present case, a complete answer to the question, What is Creation?

Theologically, as Lonergan said above of the distinct but not separate category of History, it can be said that Culture is a more specific determination of “a divine idea; it is the exact realization of just what God intends and permits. It is free. That this intelligibility should be realized is a product of human freedom.” (Topics 257.) Culture is the historical realization of humanity’s personal and communal actions in cooperation—or not—with God’s grace. Human culture “does not come into being or survive without deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, without the exercise of freedom and responsibility. It is a world of existential subjects and it objectifies the values that they originate in their creativity and their freedom.”

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I cited above McPartland’s observation that the Scientific Revolution destroyed the still widely accepted Greek idea that the cosmos is hierarchically ordered. He continues, “Nor did men observe any more a hierarchy of qualitative distinctions in the cosmos as an analogue for a hierarchy in the social world.”\textsuperscript{288} The classical mindset of religious people holds that hierarchical socio-cultural order imitates nature, obeys natural law, indeed fulfills the will of God (in western history, the most extreme cultural realization was perhaps feudal Europe). Lonergan’s historical-critical realism, on the other hand, demonstrates and enables us to verify in and for ourselves that Creation is organic, its fundamental structures isomorphic, dynamic unities of mutually dependent terms and relations. This dynamic worldview evokes the scriptural metaphor of the Church as an organic body of mutually dependent parts. “The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘I have no need of you,’ nor again the head to the feet, ‘I have no need of you’” (1 Cor 12:21). Yet, the classical values are not to be rejected but transposed into a socio-cultural order that also imitates nature, obeys natural law, and fulfills God’s will; into an order that also concretizes in its ways and mores, its art, science, philosophy, ethics, and theology humanity’s new self-knowledge.

History has yet to realize a socio-cultural age of interiority, but we can anticipate some of its chief characteristics. For Lonergan, “A culture is simply the set of meanings and values that inform the way of life of a community.”\textsuperscript{289} We contrasted above the normative and empirical, or classical and critical-realism, notions of culture; and we contrasted their respective ideals of static, definitive achievement and dynamic, ongoing advance. From the perspective of interiorly differentiated consciousness, culture is always at some stage of development. As we saw when the total sweep of history is conceived as the story of the mind’s self-disclosure, each differentiation brings about cultural transformation. Our concern here is contemporary culture in the third stage of meaning. This new stage is advanced culturally when people achieve and implement self-appropriation (through the series of conversions discussed under Mission). “Cultures can decline rapidly, but they develop slowly, for development is a matter of coming to understand new meanings and coming to accept higher values.”\textsuperscript{290} Long in preparation, the effects of this gradual cultural “leavening,” this development, long underway in the economically, politically, and scientifically advanced cultures of the West, is discernible in officially multicultural Canada.\textsuperscript{291}

\textsuperscript{288} McPartland, “Meaning, Mystery,” 240; McPartland’s emphasis. Hierarchical structure (symbolized by the pyramid) is no longer the best model nature offers for human collaboration to achieve humanizing ends.

\textsuperscript{289} Lonergan, “Revolution in Catholic Theology,” 232.

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{291} Many countries have Lonergan centres; there are Lonergan institutes and colleges; his major works have been translated into several languages. There are many university courses,
Most human lives are imbedded within familial, institutional, local, regional, and national cultures. All can be analyzed and understood generally according to the isomorphic orders of subjectivity, realms of meaning, the scale of values, schemes and conditioned schemes of recurrence, the vertical and horizontal finalities of processes and appetites to their terms, modes of expression, and differentiations of consciousness. Our concern here is not to analyze a particular culture but to gain some general understanding of how any culture can be analyzed and understood according to the way individuals and groups fill these and other isomorphic heuristic structures.

Having learned that history can be understood according to the order of differentiations of consciousness, that we recapitulate the history of consciousness by differentiating our own cognitional operations, let us first bring the notion of differentiated consciousness forward into the richer context of historical Culture:

In a first approximation to the notion of culture, we will maintain that culture is a function of a given structure of differentiations of consciousness: a function, that is, of interaction, collaboration, and conflict among persons of variously differentiated consciousness. Cultural meanings and values, the constitutive meanings of societies in history, are established and modified as a result of such interaction, collaboration, and conflict.

The notion of culture toward which we are moving is not normative but empirical. That is, a culture is a de facto operative set of meanings and values informing a given way of life. ... This set of meanings and values is a function of prevailing differentiations of consciousness. No empirically given culture as such is normative for genuine humanity. On the contrary, the constituents of genuine humanity are normative for the genuineness and maturity of a culture.292

One can easily imagine the boggling hypercomplexity when “interaction, collaboration, and conflict” among people who create culture are related to their variously differentiated consciousness. We can effect a general ordering of the data that Culture comprises by relating them to the various isomorphic orders discussed above; and to the differentiations of consciousness, namely common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence (the religious differentiation).293

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hundreds of dissertations and theses, journals, thousands of books and articles, and interest in his thought continually increases and broadens (as a web search on “Lonergan” will confirm). Moreover, there are compelling signs that we are passing from the stage of studying and interpreting Lonergan’s writings to the stage of implementation. On this topic, see Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3 (2003), available for download at http://www.mun.ca/jmda/.

292 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 536; emphasis added; hereafter cited in text as TDH.

293 Besides the differentiations of consciousness that demark ages of history, individuals
Doran’s emphasis on the new way of conceiving the relation between personal and cultural authenticity brings us back to S and our discussion in chapter 1 above of the good. Recall that there are “three levels of the good: the good as the object of appetite [particular goods], the good of order, and value.” (UB 225.) This chapter spoke of a scale of values isomorphic with the order of intentionality. Discussion of the good in relation to culture (recall that the good is always concrete) will complete the elements required to advance to the final topic of this section, the subject in the cosmos, in history, in culture who experiences, understands, knows, creates, and loves the good—particular goods, goods of order, and values for the sake of Mission.

We will now return to S’s theme of the concrete ways culture imitates and participates in the perfections of actuality and order, the single perfection belonging to God the Holy Trinity.

6.3.1 Cultural Goods and Values

Explaining Culture will be limited to a further exploration of the good. Our discussion will simply gather familiar notions—the transcendentals, goods, goods of order, value—refine some of them, and aim to provide means to understand Culture from the viewpoint of order. With the understanding we have gained of the one divine perfection of actuality and order, we can return to a text to relate Culture to trinitarian theory:

In the one divine perfection there are two formalities of perfection, one that concerns act and the other that concerns order; and similarly among created things there is a twofold participation in the one divine perfection, one concerning act and the other concerning order. On this basis we distinguish particular goods, by which particular beings are perfected in themselves, and goods of order, which are certain concrete, dynamic, and ordered totalities of desirable objects, of desiring subjects, of operations, and of results. (S 491-93.)

The good, you will recall, is a transcendental. For Lonergan, the transcendentals are heuristic notions that promote us cognitively towards ever fuller natural and supernatural self-realization. We naturally intend being, its intelligible unity, truth, value, and transcendence.294 Let us first reconsider the transcendental notion of value, the intelligi-

who differentiate interiority have “a standpoint from which all the differentiations of consciousness can be explored.” Method, 305. “Any realm [like the aesthetic, the scientific, the scholarly] becomes differentiated from the others when it develops its own language, its own distinct mode of apprehension, and its own cultural, social, or professional group speaking in that fashion and apprehending in that manner.” Ibid., 272. Transcendence will be a special concern of Mission.

294 The beauty of the universe of being is experienced immediately by the senses, especially sight and hearing. Lonergan speaks often of beauty and aesthetics. He relates them to the level
ble good:

What, then, is value? ... It is a transcendental notion like the notion of being. Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value. Again, as the notion of being is the dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worth while.  

Thus parallel to our ever fuller realization of being as we advance from sense experience to, finally, spirating love of Being, we advance from the empirical level of material goods, vital values, to affirming in our choices and ensuing lifestyles the religious values of Jesus of Nazareth.

You will recall that Lonergan distinguishes the good as object of desire and the good as intelligible, the good he calls value, the object of attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible choice. God affirmed Creation to be “very good” (Gen 1:31), affirmed its intelligible goodness, its value. In regard to goods we inherit and those we create, we discriminate:

I am suggesting that the transcendental notion of the good regards value. It is distinct from the particular good that satisfies individual appetite, such as the appetite for food and drink, the appetite for union and communion, the appetite for knowledge, or virtue, or pleasure. Again, it is distinct from the good of order, the objective arrangement or institution that ensures for a group of people the regular recurrence of particular goods. As appetite wants breakfast, so an economic system is to ensure breakfast every morning. As appetite wants union, so marriage is to ensure life-long union. As appetite wants knowledge, so an educational system ensures the imparting of knowledge to each successive generation. But beyond the particular good and the good of order, there is the good of value. It is by appealing to value or values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others, that we praise or blame human persons as good or evil and their actions as right or wrong.  

Culture as such is a good of order, but the particular goods and goods of order of a cul-

of experience, but he does not call beauty a transcendental notion.


296 Lonergan, “The Subject,” 81-82.
ture are subsumed by the scale of vital, social, cultural, and personal values only when intelligible.

Surely nobody objects on reasonable grounds to the critical-realist ideal that all people at all times be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving; that the culture we create be beautiful, unified, true, good, lovable, and holy. Yet, cultures contradict these ideals. Ambiguity often clouds our best efforts to be authentic. Sometimes good intentions lead to bad results. Affectivity and appetite can be unruly. We are subject to personal and communal bias and sin. Some goods of order we create, participate in, support, and sustain are “sinful social structures.” Some people work for the common good, others only for personal gain, and so on. We will return to these points when the topic is the historical-critical context of Mission.

Note Lonergan’s definition of a good of order as “the objective arrangement or institution that ensures for a group of people the regular recurrence of particular goods.” Thus concrete goods of order range from the smallest group (friendship, partnership, family) to the most encompassing goods of order that structure, stabilize, and facilitate the functioning of national cultures: “The human good of order brought about by subjects who understand and who choose. ... Domestic, technological, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and religious groups are all examples of human goods of order.” (S 245.) One can easily add others: the ecclesial, judicial, financial, educational, industrial, commercial, medical, recreational, informational; myriads of clubs, unions, organizations, lobby groups, NGOs, and so on; these distinct goods of order encompass many more arrangements and institutions, and all supply tangible and intangible goods.

Again we applied the analogy of the subject to gain an invariantly ordered understanding of a determinate being. Recall that the order is intelligible in both directions; there is culture as gift and inheritance, culture as achievement and legacy. The analogy of the subject in its full amplitude also sublates that purely spiritual part of our nature, our dicens, verbum, and amor that participate in the nature and work of the Dicens, Verbum, and Amor who indwell us. All goods of order are “brought about by subjects who understand and who choose.” On that note, we advance to decision and consider how the “particular goods whereby particular beings are perfected,” goods of order, and values apply to our personal and corporate responses to God.

Before advancing to Mission, for economy of presentation, and to provide the reader with convenient references, I have consolidated in two tables elements, most of them familiar, that bear on categories sublated by Mission (especially those related to the good) and the viewpoint of order. The first, found in appendix IV (p. 329), recasts and annotates Lonergan’s schematic structure of the human good (M 48). Given our accumulated understanding of the good, it should not be difficult to concur with Lonergan that his “account of the structure of the human good is compatible with any stage of technological, economic, political, cultural, religious development.” (M 52)

The second table follows overleaf. It consolidates various specifications of order. As
stated above in regard to “Some Structures Isomorphic with the Metaphysics of Proportionate Being” (table 1, p. 55): “Chapter 3 below will add fourth terms to these and other triads for, as we have learned, it is not enough to be, to judge, to will, to ponder values. Nothing in the cosmos exists simply *quoad se*; everything in the same cosmos also exists for the other.” Table 5 comprises two sets of data: the integral three categories of things in themselves related to a fourth term *ad extra*; and the eight categories of Lonergan’s method, two sets of four that correspond to the levels of intentional consciousness.
Table 5: The “Triune” Self-Transcending Subject in Relation to Being Ad Extra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POTENCY</th>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>FINALITY²⁹⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Prime Matter</td>
<td>Substantial Form</td>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>Acting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Body</td>
<td>Soul</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Existential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Be Attentive</td>
<td>Be Intelligent</td>
<td>Be Reasonable</td>
<td>Be Responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sensible Order</td>
<td>Intelligible Order</td>
<td>Rational Order</td>
<td>Transcendent Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sensibles</td>
<td>Intelligibles</td>
<td>Knowables</td>
<td>Choosables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Common Sense</td>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Interiority</td>
<td>Transcendence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vital Value</td>
<td>Social Value</td>
<td>Cultural Value</td>
<td>Personal Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Willingness</td>
<td>Willing</td>
<td>Willed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Beautiful</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>Good/Lovable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>Theology²⁹⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>Speculative</td>
<td>Dogmatic</td>
<td>Fundamental²⁹⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES/CATEGORIES OF METHOD IN THEOLOGY³⁰⁰</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Research → Interpretation → History → Dialectic ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>↑ Communication ← Systematics ← Doctrines ← Foundations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁹⁷ There would seem to be no better term than “Finality” to denote the relation of the thing quoad se to the rest of the universe of being. Finality refers to the integral horizontal and vertical dimensions of all processes and appetites to their immanent and transcendent terms. Every authentic good and good of order serves creation's goal. “Subsistents exist in the strict sense according to their act of existence; nonetheless, with respect to their operation they stand in need of some other in accord with the order of the universe.” S, 349.

²⁹⁸ In a systematics employing Lonergan’s method, as we have seen, the theological sublates the ethical. This point will be developed in discussions below of conversion, Dialectic, and Foundations.

²⁹⁹ On these categories of theology Lonergan notes: “The need for some division is clear enough from the divisions that already exist and are recognized. Thus, our divisions of the second phase—foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications—correspond roughly to the already familiar distinctions between fundamental, dogmatic, speculative, and pastoral or practical theology.” Method, 161.

³⁰⁰ “I have spoken of foundations selecting doctrines, of doctrines setting the problems of systematics, of systematics fixing the kernel of the message to be communicated in many different ways. But there is not to be overlooked the fact of dependence in the opposite direction. Questions for systematics can arise from communications. Systematic modes of conceptualization can be employed in doctrines.” Ibid., 142.
6.4 **Mission**

I will first sketch an inclusive ideal type of Christian subjectivity, of the missionary, the person Christ sends. Then, given our concern with the witness of understanding, and my aforementioned intent to broach in this chapter what Lonergan might mean by true theologian, I will focus on order as it pertains to the person who would serve the church’s mission today as systematic theologian.

6.4.1 **The Theological Context**

What is Creation? Here our perspective shifts to more detailed understanding of the one who asks. Authentic answers will relate unique subjects personally to Creation according to some category of human purpose; but the Catholic’s decision will be some personal version of the *Baltimore Catechism*’s classic answer to the question of purpose: “God made me to know him, to love him, and to serve him in this world, and to be happy with him forever in heaven.” The category of our freely chosen response to the third element of God’s reason for creating us, I have named Mission. It corresponds to the level of decision, to personal value, to “the originating values that do the choosing; they are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices.” (M 51.) The theological context also becomes more specific, for all that was, and is, and is to be stands in some relation to the mystical body of Christ. Later, that doctrine will be related to history, systematic theology, the theologian’s work, and to the intensely personal matter of the theologian’s subjectivity. The theological context, finally, is today’s world situation as the Holy Trinity and other critical realists find it. The situation demands of theology, according to Lonergan, “a treatise on the concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel.” (In 764.)

To further specify the theological context, I have recast another, early (1943) schema of Lonergan’s. While it illustrates his thought before it developed into the unified view of the universe expressed in *Insight*, the view ordered by the intentionality analysis and metaphysics ordering my entire argument, still the table is cogent and informative. Moreover, the table provides data for a rewarding exercise in transposition. The reader who has acquired the crit-

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301 In regard to authentic subjectivity as such, all are equal. Moreover: “What distinguishes the Christian … is not God’s grace, which he shares with others, but the mediation of God’s grace through Jesus Christ our Lord. … In the Christian, accordingly, God’s gift of his love is a love that is in Christ Jesus. From this fact flow the social, historical, doctrinal aspects of Christianity.” Lonergan, “The Future of Christianity,” in *A Second Collection*, 156.

ical perspective of the four-dimensional viewpoint of order can enjoy assigning the table’s categories to the wealth of isomorphic heuristic structures that enable one’s unified understanding of God and Creation. The exercise can yield a first approximation of a transposed theology of the mystical body of Christ.

Table 6: “The Three Contrasting Types of Activity and Their Three Essentially Correlated Ends”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIFE</th>
<th>THE GOOD LIFE</th>
<th>ETERNAL LIFE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▲ Emergence and maintenance of knowledge and virtue.</td>
<td>▲ Attainment of the historically unfolding good life.</td>
<td>▲ Triumphant mystical body in heaven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▲ The actuation of such spontaneity.</td>
<td>▲ Advance in knowledge and virtue.</td>
<td>▲ Further communication of sanctifying grace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▲ Physical, vital, sensitive spontaneity.</td>
<td>▲ The life of knowledge and virtue.</td>
<td>▲ Mystical body on earth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▲ NATURE</td>
<td>▲ REASON</td>
<td>▲ GRACE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lonergan explains his schema:

Now the correspondence of these three levels of contrasting activity with the three ends of man is only essential. Nature sets its goal in the repetitive emergence and maintenance of life; reason supervenes to set up the historically cumulative and so, on the whole, ever varying pursuit of the good life; grace finally takes over both nature and reason to redirect both repetitive spontaneity and historical development to the supernatural end of eternal life.

Earlier, a preliminary order was imposed on the hypercomplexity of actual history and culture principally by, as it were, sorting them according to the four comprehensive categories of value. Then, we saw that subjects are originating values who originate the four categories of value. Table 5 on various heuristic structures that relate the subject to being ad extra, and to the functional specialties of doing theology, further orders the ideal type of subject whose activities, as we saw in table 6, are related to ends, especially the mystical body of Christ on earth (“the good life”) and in heaven (“eternal life”). We also learned that we must choose among existing goods and goods of order and, as noted, “we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, … we approve some systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others, … we praise or blame human persons as good or evil and their actions

303 All elements of the table are from “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 40-41.
304 Ibid., 39-40.
as right or wrong” (see above n. 296 p. 256). Therefore, given the critical importance to Mission of our making authentic judgments of value, let us examine the process more closely. To do so, we turn to Vertin’s succinct account. First, he notes:

From *Insight* into *Method*, the role of the subject not simply as a knower but also as a valuer, a chooser, becomes more explicit as an extension of the earlier work and a complement to it. In that context, then, one is in a position to talk about the subject not just as one who encounters the real and affirms it, but as one who goes on to extend the real, to originate new realities, to live as a moral chooser, to elaborate positively the artwork that is one’s life.306

Next, he draws our attention to the fact that “within reality, one can distinguish between realities that are actual and those that are merely possible. And analogously, within real value, one can distinguish between real values that are actual and those that are merely possible—able to be actualized by me but not yet actual until I have chosen to actualize them and successfully implemented that choice.” He explains the process from possible to actual value:

You deliberate on the diverse values of the various real possibilities that lay before you, and you narrow them down to one by making a value judgment. “I could do X or Y or Z. All three are real possibilities; but because of my experience in these matters, I judge that Z would work best.” That’s the judgment of value, the evaluation that real possibility Z is preferable to real possibilities X and Y. …

In this sequence, then, you’re moving in the line not of encountering reality but of originating it. You get a notion of something that is conceivably possible. Then you make a fact

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305 The actual context of choosing to make and do is sometimes very complex. Melchin’s “History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability” (see above n. 243 p. 235) orders and unifies the eponymous elements according to the terms and relations of interiority. His account of emergent probability in value judgments is especially enlightening. Melchin tackles two sets of vital questions. The first “concerns the relationship between practical, responsible action of individual human subjects and the social, psychological, economic, political, and historical determinants which seem to shape and condition individual acts of intelligence and responsibility.” Ibid., 271. The second “concerns the relationship between individual originating acts of meaning and the wider sets of social, political, and economic schemes which seem to arise apart from any person’s originating act of meaning, and which seem to have a shape and structure of their own.” Ibid.


307 Ibid.
judgment that it is really possible. Then you make a value judgment that it would be really good. Then you make a decision to bring it about; and if you are successful in executing that decision, you actualize something that up to that point was merely a possibility.\textsuperscript{308}

Is there also something that is first in the order of making judgments of value, some interior systematic principle? Answering the question brings us to the topic of the converted subject, and of feeling\textsuperscript{309}, what Lonergan calls “intentional responses to values” (M 38). Before discussing affectivity and conversion, however, I will say more about the historical situation of the incarnate subject.

6.4.2 The Situation

Space has not allowed a fuller account of the later Lonergan’s analysis of meaning.\textsuperscript{310} We have discussed aspects of meaning indirectly, but direct discussion would require explaining new terms and relations. Thus, to simplify analysis of the situation, I will first distinguish the world of immediacy, the familiar already-out-there-now real world of bodies,\textsuperscript{311} from the world of the critical-realist, “the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value” where “objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility.” (M 265.)

Meaning is also constitutive. “Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components.” (M 78.) The intrinsic constituents of the situation include the goods and goods of order that result from acts of meaning. Lonergan comments:

It [the constitutive role of meaning] is the fact that acts of meaning inform human living, that such acts proceed from a free and responsible incarnate subject, that meanings differ from nation to nation, from culture to culture, and that, over time, they develop and go astray. Besides the meanings by which man apprehends nature and the meanings by which he transforms it, there are the meanings by which man thinks out the possibilities of his own living and makes his choice among them. In this realm of freedom and creativity, of solidarity and responsibility, of dazzling achievement and pitiable madness,

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.; emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{309} The interested reader will profit from Mark J. Doorley, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan’s Ethics: The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality Analysis of Bernard Lonergan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).

\textsuperscript{310} See “Meaning,” in Method, 57-99.

\textsuperscript{311} “By a ‘body’ is meant primarily a focal point of extroverted biological anticipation and attention. It is an ‘already out there now real,’ where these terms have their meaning fixed solely by elements within sensitive experience and so without any use of intelligent and reasonable questions and answers.” Insight, 279.
there ever occurs man’s making of man.312

Our acts of meaning that constitute the situation are at the same time the acts that constitute ourselves. From the perspective of the Christian sent to heal and create in history, the global situation constituted by meaning is, as quoted above, “the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel.” Lonergan continues: “And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal [humanity] lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery.” (In 763.)

To make this complex topic manageable, we will assume that Lonergan’s theory of development addresses the general global situation, and focus on the specific situation of western civilization today. To manage the data on that complex mission field, I will discuss only the mission of the systematic theologian. First, I will address a situation characterized as a crisis of meaning. Second, I will speak of a new systematic theology. Third, I will link certain notions together as a preface to the fourth and final topic, the authentic theologian doing authentic theology.

Situations change, sometimes rapidly and for the worse. Doran contrasts Lonergan’s situation and today’s. In doing so, he brings together several themes of the present discussion of Mission:

What was for him the specter of nihilism looming on the horizon and calling for a foundation of thought at once empirical, critical, dialectical, and normative, is for us an increasingly dominant characteristic of our situation.313 In other words, while the threat of nihilism could, in Lonergan’s view, be met by transposing rigorous theological discourse, such as is found in the writings of Aquinas, from its original metaphysical framework into a fully historical mind set [sic] grounded in the originating activity of the authentic theologian, for us the task is one of meeting the reality of nihilism by elaborating a new

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313 “As a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is nihilism. As a philosophy of nothingness, it has a certain attraction for people of our time. Its adherents claim that the search is an end in itself, without any hope or possibility of ever attaining the goal of truth. In the nihilist interpretation, life is no more than an occasion for sensations and experiences in which the ephemeral has pride of place. Nihilism is at the root of the widespread mentality which claims that a definitive commitment should no longer be made, because everything is fleeting and provisional.” Fides et Ratio, par. 46c. “Quite apart from the fact that it conflicts with the demands and the content of the word of God, nihilism is a denial of the humanity and of the very identity of the human being. ... Once the truth is denied to human beings, it is pure illusion to try to set them free. Truth and freedom either go together hand in hand or together they perish in misery.” Ibid., par. 90. For a Lonerganian perspective on the encyclical, see Giovanni Sala, “The Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio: A Service to Truth,” Lonergan Workshop 17 (2002): 197-208.
Doran acknowledges, of course, our need to do both; but the work of transposition, such as Lonergan’s of Thomas’s trinitarian theology, and the present contribution to the transposition of S into an explicitly methodic theology of the Holy Trinity, becomes a step in a developmental process toward a much more radical goal. Theology and the Dialectics of History argues for a new theological expression of the church’s constitutive meaning that would enable the teaching and missionary church to counteract the nihilism now dominating western civilization (recall that the theological sublates ethical, metaphysical, philosophical, scientific, and commonsense viewpoints; and it reverses their counterpositions). The influence of western culture on globalization also threatens to make the reality of nihilism a global situation.

The new systematics that Lonergan’s method enables, that Doran would have theologians develop and implement, requires our taking another step. His massive (732 pages) and richly textured argument for it is too complex to summarize here, but I believe it will suffice for present purposes to pursue two central and related elements of Doran’s position that bear directly on the present topic. The first concerns his analysis of the situation’s vital, social, cultural, and personal (ethical and religious) dimensions to articulate his argument, inspired by certain statements of Lonergan’s, that the new systematics must draw its foundational categories from a theory of history:

Culture, the meaning constitutive of the worlds in which we live, is today confronted with a postmodern option, an option whose only serious alternatives are (1) deconstructive normlessness, (2) an educated and sincere but misguided return to classicism and dogmatism, and (3) the discovery of norms of human genuineness that fully respect modern insights into historicity. … In its foundations theology must establish precisely these norms of social, cultural, personal, and religious authenticity in history, and it can do so most persuasively if in the very derivation of the categories of its systematic discourse it generates a theory of history.314

The data, therefore, of the new systematics will be provided by both doctrine and the historical situation, what liberation theologians call social analysis. The situation changes, and understanding of doctrine develops; but the theory of history informing the emergent new systematics, although also subject to development, is based on invariant heuristic structures, es-

pecially the scale of values (one assumes, of course, the underlying heuristic structure of Lonergan’s method). Thus Doran’s developing theory of history, as I understand it, aims to provide systematic theology with a new, complementary, methodically structured, stable, open, and historical-critical control of meaning.

The second and related element regards the incarnate historical subject. Doran’s primary hermeneutic of history is the scale of values. The heuristic scale of values, you will recall, relates the subject dialectically to the vital, social, cultural, and personal dimensions of the concrete situation. Through personally uniting orthopraxis and orthodoxy, the Christian subject either succeeds or fails to incarnate a life “of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility” (M 265) both moral and religious. The historical dialectic of the subject—the analogy of the subject conceived dynamically, if you will—for our purposes, is personal and communal healing and creating in history, our intentionally transforming the situation. Central to the self-appropriation of the subject as agent of transformation, the condition of possibility of our putting ourselves fully at the service of the Gospel, of being useful servants, of our “letting the whole of intellect and consequently the whole of culture be captive to Christ,” (S 113) is conversion. To Lonergan’s notion of self-appropriation through intellectual, moral, and religious conversions, Doran adds the fourth conversion he calls psychic (it will be discussed below).

I believe it wise to choose the integral scale of values as the, as it were, hermeneutical lens on history. By placing the moral subject at the centre of his theory of history, and basing moral subjectivity on verifiable intentionality analysis, Doran does not exclude the nonreligious nor favor any religion. Although he is developing an explicitly Roman Catholic systematics of history, Doran’s theory of history as such also contributes to ecumenical and interfaith dialogues by offering, along with Lonergan’s method, means for other churches and faith traditions to transpose their own theologies into more historical-critical forms. These are crucial elements of the transcultural and transreligious collaboration required of Catholic theology today.

315 Giovanni Rota traces four stages in Lonergan’s development of his notion of the human being. He characterizes them as 1) “from essence to ideal” (Topics in Education, 79); 2) “from substance to subject” (ibid., 81); 3) “from faculty psychology to flow of consciousness” (ibid., 82); and 4) the notion adopted by Doran of the human being “constituted in his humanity by historicity, by this historical dimension of his reality” (“Philosophy of History,” 72). The second and third dominate S. Giovanni Rota, “From the Historicity of Consciousness to the Ontology of the Person,” Lonergan Workshop 17 (2002): 180-81.

316 Doran significantly develops Lonergan’s notion of dialectic. While too complex for discussion here, aspects of his position will enter into the account below of his notion of psychic conversion. See “The Notion of Dialectic,” in Theology and the Dialectics of History, 64-92; especially sec. 4, The Basic Dialectic of the Subject, 71-77.
6.4.3 Preface to the Mission of the Theologian

Before proceeding to the final topic of this chapter—self-appropriation through the four conversions, and the authentic theologian doing authentic theology—I will link together development, history, the mystical body of Christ, and the foreseen new systematic theology. This brief preface to the final increment of my argument will aim to establish the divin-human context of the analogous and dialectical subject intent on conversion for the sake of serving the church's witness of understanding.

First, let us return to S and review the various human goods of order that provide familiar analogies of what Lonergan calls the proximate goal of the divine missions:

With these considerations about the nature of the good well understood, we must now go on to consider the end of the divine missions. The ultimate end is of course the divine good itself communicated immediately in the beatific vision, while the proximate end is that good of order which, according to various analogies with human goods of order, is called either the kingdom of God, or the body of Christ, or the church, or the mystical marriage of Christ with the church, or the economy of salvation, or the city of God. The proximate end is called a kingdom because of its similarity to a good political order, a body because of its similarity to the good of order that obtains among the organs of a single body, a church and a city because of its similarity to a social good of order, a marriage because of its similarity to a domestic good of order, and an economy because of its similarity to the good of order in acquiring, producing, and managing material things. (S 495.)

Elsewhere he also speaks of the “good of order that is the mystical body of Christ and his church” (UB 237). At first it seems curious that, given his interest in the doctrine (see above n. 302 p. 260), S’s list does not include the mystical body. The reason, I believe, is that the mystical body of Christ and his Church is the proximate goal of the divine missions in its present stage of eschatological realization.317 This single good of order318 sublates all the analogies

317 Lest this seem too Christocentric: In Mystici Corporis Christi (see above n. 302 p. 260), which is rich in pneumatology, Pius XII reminds us that the vital principle of all the meritorious actions of the members of the Body and the principle of its unity is the Holy Spirit (pars. 56-58); and he quotes (par. 57) Leo XIII’s statement that “as Christ is the head of the Church, so is the Holy Spirit her soul.” See Pope Leo XIII, Divinum Illud Munus, par. 6. Encyclical letter of 9 May 1897. AAS 29 (1897). English translation: On the Holy Spirit.

318 “[The Church] and the Mystical Body of Christ are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly and the spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with heavenly things. Rather they form one interlocked reality which is comprised of a divine and a human element. For this reason, by an excellent analogy, the reality is compared to the mystery of the incarnate Word. Just as the assumed nature inseparably united to the divine Word served Him as a living instrument of salvation, so, in a similar way, does the communal structure of the Church serve Christ’s Spirit, who vivifies it by way of building up the body (cf. Eph. 4:16).” “Dogmatic Consti-
that he lists. That is why I said above that “all that was, and is, and is to be stands in some relation to the mystical body of Christ”; some relation, because not all are friends of God; and history is the process of God’s implementing in partnership with us his solution to the problem of evil.

Yet, while history and the mystical body are not synonyms, systematics addresses the total situation that I call Creation. In the “Epilogue” of Insight, Lonergan links to the doctrine his theory of historical development (whose structural categories are progress, decline, and redemption): “It may be asked in what department of theology the historical aspect of development might be treated, and I would like to suggest that it may possess peculiar relevance to a treatise on the mystical body of Christ.” (In 763.) He continues, linking the doctrine to Doran’s project: “Now while the scriptural, patristic, and dogmatic materials for a treatise on the mystical body have been assembled [the material element], I would incline to the opinion that its formal element remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history.” (In M, p. 319, he remarks that “the intelligibility proper to developing doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process.”) It seems reasonable to conclude that the theory of history would in the process of development enable the transposition of the doctrine of the mystical body into a distinct treatise; after one on the Holy Trinity, perhaps the most important among those needed to realize the larger, collaborative goal.

It is also possible that the theologian could transpose the doctrine of the mystical body into integral methodic categories in the very process of developing the theory of history into a single, comprehensive, systematic restatement of the church’s constitutive meaning. Clearly all requisite material elements are being assembled for comprehensive restatements of the church’s constitutive meaning, for new summae. In my view, the primary elements are four. Together they address the total divine-human situation signified by the categories God and Creation: (1) The methodic transposition of Lonergan’s theology of God quoad se and quoad nos; (2) the doctrine of the “good of order that is the mystical body of Christ and his church” transposed into methodic categories; (3) a methodic explication of the four created terms ad

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319 “For in any theological treatise a distinction may be drawn between a material and a formal element: the material element is supplied by scriptural and patristic texts and by dogmatic pronouncements; the formal element, that makes a treatise a treatise, consists in the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single coherent view. Thus, the formal element in the treatise on … the Blessed Trinity consists in theorems on the notions of procession, relation, and person.” Insight, 763-64.

320 Insight, 764. Doran speaks of “the theory of history that, for Lonergan, probably reaches its most nuanced articulation in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ [in A Third Collection, pp. 169-83] and that, I believe, is given a few further refinements in the treatment of the scale of values in my book Theology and the Dialectics of History.” Doran, “Implementation in Systematics,” 267.
extra by which the just participate in an ordered way in the life of the Holy Trinity; and (4),
Doran’s still-developing theology of history with its inclusion of all branches of human in-
quiry, of culture with its goods and goods of order; and its centerpiece, his explanatory ac-
count of the historical dialectic of the fully conscious subject cooperating or not with God and
others to heal and create in history. When sufficiently mature, they will provide the main in-
gredients for the new systematics, but not a recipe. (Besides necessary ingredients, a good
recipe prescribes carefully measured proportions and a method; but even the right method is
no surety of good results.\textsuperscript{321}) All four elements can be explained and synthesized using the
analogy of the subject.

The new systematic \textit{summae} would therefore not be normative, not definitive, but, like S,
timely achievements intrinsically open to ongoing organic development. Collaborative effort
to achieve the formal element of such restatements is realistic because the transposed treatis-
es on the Holy Trinity, the mystical body of Christ and his Church, on incarnation, redemp-
tion, grace, sacraments, mariology, eschatology, and so on, would share with Doran’s theolo-
gy of history common sets of heuristic structures and categories. Together they would supply
“the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single
coherent view.” That single coherent view, I have been arguing, can be acquired by making
explicit in one’s thinking the viewpoint of order latent in Lonergan’s thought.

6.4.4 The Theologian and the Mission of Theology

Whereas we gained some understanding of the mystery of the Holy Trinity \textit{quoad se} using
the analogy of the strictly spiritual aspects of our nature, with the incarnation of the Word
our understanding of God becomes more certain. He is human and he is Truth, incarnating
the analogy of the subject in its full divine-human amplitude. As dialectical subject, to make
his life among us a work of art, Jesus of Nazareth experienced, understood, judged, and de-
cided according to the scale of values. He is a divine person who shares our humanity; we are
human persons who share his divinity. In the process of divinization in Christ, according to
the formula of the Orthodox doctrine of \textit{theosis}, we become by grace who God is by nature.
Moreover, our conceiving the psychological analogy dynamically, as the historical dialectic of
the subject, also enables systematics to illuminate the supernatural dimension of the total sit-
tuation because, as we will see below, we help effect God’s solution to the problem of evil in
ourselves and the world through \textit{imitatio Jesu}.

To complete the sketch of the elements Lonergan provides for a formally comprehensive

\textsuperscript{321} “The one great delusion, to my mind, is the belief that there is an island of safety called
‘method.’ If you follow the method, then you will be all right. In the sense that there is some algo-
rithm, some set of rules, some objective solution, independent of each man’s personal authenticity,
honesty, genuineness. All that does not exist. The only solution lies in ‘the good man.’” Lonergan,
trinitarian systematics, I will frame his thought on the most complex element of Creation, the human subject, with four of Christ’s imperatives: “Be converted” (Mt 4:17); “Follow me” (Mt 4:19); “Learn from me” (Mt 11:29); and, “Go teach” (Mt 28:19); and emphasize their contemporary relevance to what Crowe calls “the Lonergan enterprise,” and “appropriating the Lonergan idea,” and to Lonergan’s position on theologians and their task.

6.4.5 “Be converted.”

The ideal type of Lonergan’s theological anthropology; the integral, fully conscious subject of critical-realist personalism, the theologian in this case, attains self-realization, appropriates selfhood, through a succession of conversions. To place discussion in the context of the authentic theologian serving the witness of understanding, I will briefly explain the relation of conversion to some categories of Lonergan’s method. As illustrated in table 5 above, the specialties/categories of Method are tied directly to interiority. Here we are most interested in the categories tied to the fourth level of intentional consciousness, decision, and their relation to conversion. These fourth-level categories of Method are Dialectic and Foundations.

“Dialectic … deals with conflicts.” (M 235.) The last specialty of the mediating phase of theology, Dialectic establishes what others have said. Our interest is not what the functional specialist does per se but explicit conversion in the theologian who must choose among conflicting positions uncovered by Dialectic.

While dialectic does reveal the polymorphism of human consciousness—the deep and unreconcilable oppositions on religious, moral, and intellectual issues—still it does no more: it does not take sides. It is the person that takes sides, and the side that he takes will depend on the fact that he has or has not been converted. (M 268.)

Foundations, the first category of the mediated phase of theology, concerns choosing the winning side. Here, attention shifts from what others have said to taking a stand in direct theological discourse. “[Theological reflection] has to pronounce which doctrines [revealed by Dialectic] were true [Foundations], how they could be reconciled with one another and with the conclusions of science, philosophy, history [Systematics], and how they [Doctrines] could be communicated appropriately to the members of each class in every culture [Communication].” (M 267.)

Now the radical advance of Lonergan’s method becomes clear. Foundations are not, as foundationalism would have it, self-evident principles from which certain conclusions are drawn; Foundations, according to Lonergan, are but the reality of the converted theologian:


323 Taken in this sense, “foundations for one person are not foundations for another .... When our first principles differ, we have lost objectively valid foundations; it all depends on subjective positions and dispositions that vary with religion, culture, education, whatever.” Crowe, “Rhyme and Reason:
Foundational reality, as distinct from its expression, is conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. Normally it is intellectual conversion as the fruit of both religious and moral conversion; it is moral conversion as the fruit of religious conversion; and it is religious conversion as the fruit of God’s gift of his grace. (M 267-68.)

The reader will recall from our discussion of Interpretation in chapter 1 above that “the proximate sources of every interpretation are immanent in the interpreter . . .” (In 606.) In like manner, the theologian’s foundations regard immanent sources:

At its real root, then, foundations occurs on the fourth level of human consciousness, on the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It is a decision about whom and what you are for and, again, whom and what you are against. It is a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities exhibited in dialectic. It is a fully conscious decision about one’s horizon, one’s outlook, one’s world-view. It deliberately selects the framework, in which doctrines have their meaning, in which systematics reconciles, in which communications are effective.

Such a deliberate decision is anything but arbitrary. Arbitrariness is just unauthenticity, while conversion is from unauthenticity to authenticity. It is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love. (M 268.)

While it is only now that conversion becomes thematic, much has been said indirectly about intellectual, moral, and religious conversions; discussion of them, therefore, will be brief. Doran’s theory of psychic conversion, on the other hand, requires more explanation. On conversion as such, Lonergan writes:

By conversion is understood a transformation of the subject and his world. Normally it is a prolonged process though its explicit acknowledgment may be concentrated in a few momentous judgments and decisions. Still it is not just a development or even a series of developments. Rather it is a resultant change of course and direction. It is as if one’s eyes were opened and one’s former world faded and fell away. (M 130.)

The effects are first personal; but the subject’s conversion also effects communal and cultural development. “There emerges something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments on all levels and in all departments of human living.” (M 130.) Lonergan continues, naming effects that will enter our later discussion of the four conversions:

Conversion, as lived, affects all of a man’s conscious and intentional operations. It directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths

On Lonergan’s Foundations for Works of the Spirit,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 17 (1999): 29. There are self-evident first principles, “but there are those who subjectively do not see them. And what does the subject need in order to see them? Thomas’s answer [ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 3 c.] is that the subject needs wisdom! The wise will see what the unwise will not see.” Ibid..
The conversions will be discussed in the order: intellectual, religious, moral, and psychic.

**Intellectual conversion.** We began early in chapter 1 above to discuss the elements of intellectual conversion and have continually returned to the topic, so I will simply restate its import. With Lonergan, the ancient philosophy-theology-method complex takes new and definitive form. Appropriated, his philosophy gives theology a method. While not necessary for salvation or holiness of life, intellectual conversion would be transformative of any subject who achieved it. Intellectual conversion is necessary, however, for appropriating and employing the only method that can enable the theologian to reverse nihilist and other counterpositions, and to express the systematic theology our time in history requires. That is Lonergan's position.

Intellectual conversion, you will recall from chapter 1 above, is usually from some form of naïve realism. “Philosophic issues are universal in scope, and some form of naïve realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to very many. As soon as they begin to speak of knowing, of objectivity, of reality, there crops up the assumption that all knowing must be something like looking.” That blunder is especially detrimental to theology. Therefore:

To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments.

**Religious conversion.** “Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations. ... It is the gift of grace [operative and cooperative]. ... Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh .... Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions.” I said in chapter 1 above that “Christ is clear about authentic response to his call,” that “one is to love in a strictly ordered way. One must without condition or restriction love God first, and oneself

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324 Recall that the whole of *Insight* is “essay in aid of self-appropriation.” *Insight*, 16. See also *Method*, index, s.v. “Conversion, Intellectual.”

325 *Method*, s.v. “Conversion, Religious.”

326 Ibid., 240; emphasis added. Lonergan identifies this being-in-love with sanctifying grace.
and others equally, loving all with God’s own love, Charity.” We return to him “God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us (Rom. 5, 5).” (M 105.) Christian love also entails obedience to “a new commandment …. Just as I have loved you, you also should love one another” (Jn 13:34). Moreover, Jesus tells his followers, “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you” (Lk 6:27-28). Religious conversion, therefore, entails imitatio Jesu.

Vertin’s comments relate religious conversion to the four-level structure of Lonergan’s cognitional theory and, as well, raise an issue in Lonergan studies:

On my reading (and hearing) of Lonergan, mystical encounter, grace, being in love with God—this event and its consequences are the ultimate contents of our four-level structure. They are its most ample complement, its most satisfying perfection, its most complete fulfillment. They are not on some further level on top of that four-level structure.327 Lonergan comments on the fulfilment achieved through the mutual being-in-love of God and the religiously converted subject. It is nothing less than self-authenticating change in one’s interiority:

That fulfilment is not the product of our knowledge and choice. On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing. (M 106.)

Our natural powers to experience, understand, know, originate values, and love are transformed by grace. Besides transforming these natural powers, religious conversion can and sometimes does lead to “withdrawing the subject from the realm of common sense, theory, and other interiority into a ‘cloud of unknowing’ and then of intensifying, purifying, clarifying, the objectifications referring to the transcendent whether in the realm of common sense, or of theory, or of other interiority.”328 Objectifications of religious experience, religious understanding, religious judgments of fact and value, and religious loving, whether derived from ordinary waking consciousness or from the mystical, are the stuff of theology.


Moral conversion. I ended discussion of making judgments of value by asking if it involved a systematic principle. It does. “Moral conversion changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from satisfactions to values.” (M 240.) Again, from the beginning our discussion of the good (goods, goods of order, values) has been progressively more detailed. Normally, as Lonergan stated above, moral follows religious conversion. The morally converted Christian decides to imitate Jesus of Nazareth, to make a habit of carrying out judgments of value even when they entail suffering. The scale of values also includes a scale of preferences, so one’s choices among values can also conform more materially to imitatio Jesu, even him poor, chaste, and obedient; even him martyred. Paraphrasing Method (p. 240), Doran summarizes moral conversion:

The process of moral conversion involves uncovering and rooting out individual, group, and general bias; developing one’s knowledge of human reality and potentiality in the concrete situations of one’s life; keeping distinct the elements of progress and those of decline; continuing to scrutinize one’s intentional responses to values and their implicit scales of preference; listening to criticism and protest; and remaining ready to learn from others. (TDH 36.)

Bias and decline will be discussed below when the topic is God’s solution to the problem of evil.

Psychic conversion. In commonsense terms, the immediate goal of psychic conversion is mental health. Immediate, for the viewpoint of Doran’s theory is holistic. Psychic conversion, to invoke but adapt S’s metaphysical definition of person, regards the subject as a distinct embodied subsistent in an intellectual nature; and not primarily the subject engaged in the intellectual pattern of experience (our primary focus to this point), but the dramatic subject, the integral spiritual and physical subject living fully in the dramatic pattern of experience, “in

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329 See Method, index, s.v. “Conversion, Moral.”


331 Insight (pp. 204-27) speaks of various patterns of experience—biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic. The dramatic pattern is central to psychic conversion. Lonergan writes: “Already we have noticed, in treating the intellectual pattern of experience, how the detached spirit of inquiry cuts off the interference of emotion and conation, how it penetrates observation with the abstruse classifications of science, how it puts the unconscious to work to have it bring forth the suggestions, the clues, the perspectives, that emerge at unexpected moments to release insight and call forth a delighted ‘Eureka!’ In similar fashion, the dramatic pattern of experience penetrates below the surface of con-
which we are oriented to making of our world, of our relations with others, and of our very own selves, works of art.” (TDH 54.) Lonergan says of the dramatic subject:

The dramatic subject, as practical, originates and develops capital and technology, the economy and the state. By his intelligence he progresses, and by his bias he declines. Still, this whole unfolding of practicality constitutes no more than the setting and the incidents of the drama. Delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humor stand, not within practicality but above it. Man can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart. (In 261.)

Our exploration of human interiority has been emphasizing waking consciousness and its intentional operations and states, especially our striving to understand and know the truth, and be creative in relation to the universe of being ad extra. Yet, as we strive to make artworks of our lives, we also flee from understanding and responsibility; our strivings to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible are sometimes adversely affected by forces originating from a hidden dimension of the self that eludes intentional control. As there is a “cloud of unknowing,” a state of subjectivity “above” the fourth level of intentional consciousness, so there is a mysterious non-intentional state of subjectivity “below” our waking consciousness.332 Psychic conversion seeks to liberate and integrate the vital, creative energies of this region of our subjectivity; and enable us to maintain the balanced relationship between spirit and embodiment necessary to, as it were, maximize our capacity to cooperate with grace and fulfill our mission to heal and create in history.

Doran’s theory of psychic conversion builds on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. “Lonergan has established the basic terms and relations that obtain in the realm of human interiority, and it is within this context that we must examine and understand that dimension of interiority that is the human psyche.” (TDH 44.) He argues that “the science of depth psychology can be reoriented on the basis of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis,” and that “Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can be complemented by this reoriented depth psychology.” (TDH 64.) Doran’s work to reorient depth psychology begins with a question: “How are we to relate what Lonergan has uncovered of human interiority with the discoveries of the great architects of the science of depth psychology?” He continues:

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My answer is that the data to be understood in depth psychology—images, emotions, conations, spontaneous sensitive responses to persons and situations, and especially all sensitive inclinations hidden in the obscurity of the undifferentiated movement of psychic process and requiring such techniques as the interpretation of dreams if they are adequately to be understood—can be accurately understood only in relation to one’s understanding of other data of interiority, namely, precisely those that Lonergan has uncovered: the data on human insight and judgment, on moral deliberation and choice, on the love of intimacy, love in community, and the love of God. *(TDH 44.)*

Thus the theory of psychic conversion is very complex, for it regards not only our intentional operations. As a distinct conversion, it also and primarily regards the object of depth psychology, the psyche, the data of the unconscious, the meaning of dream and symbol, and the relation of the unconscious to conscious, intentional living; and it especially attends to affectivity and its relation to values.

Lonergan explicitly links affective responses with one’s orientation in the world motivated by values. Feelings as intentional responses mediate between elemental symbolic representations and value-orientation. Thus the various techniques of symbolic communication employed by depth psychology, beginning with dream interpretation, are reconceived as processes by which one either explicitly acknowledges or establishes in oneself a determinate orientation to the world of values.

Moreover, Doran significantly develops Lonergan’s theories of dialectic and consciousness. Given available space, therefore, my account of psychic conversion will be more descriptive than explanatory. I will attempt no more than a sketch sufficiently detailed to make clear

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333 “A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling.” And: “Feelings are related to objects, to one another, and to their subject.” *Method in Theology*, 64. “The same objects need not evoke the same feelings in different subjects and, inversely, the same feelings need not evoke the same symbolic images.” Ibid., 65.

334 Doran, “Duality and Dialectic,” 79.

335 “Clarity on the meaning of dialectic … is a necessary condition for understanding *Insight*, and, because *Insight* is an essay in aid of self-appropriation, for understanding oneself in the dimensions of the self to which dialectic is applicable—the relations of consciousness to the unconscious, to other conscious subjects, and to the social environment.” Ibid., 60. “On my reading of *Insight*, an essential element in breaking the duality in one’s knowing, and so in affirming that understanding correctly is fully human knowing, and in drawing the implications of that affirmation, lies not in breaking but in affirming, maintaining, and strengthening consciousness as duality of sensitive psyche and the pure desire to know.” Ibid., 67.

336 The interested reader will find a very informative introduction to psychic conversion in “Duality and Dialectic.” See also “The Notion of Psychic Conversion,” in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 42-63.
why psychic conversion adds an essential element to theological foundations; how Doran’s search for understanding of the human psyche, because he employs Lonergan’s method, also reintegrates psychology, philosophy, and theology (within his more encompassing theory-cum-theology of history); and, finally, a sketch sufficiently detailed to make clear the harmony of psychic conversion with the still-emergent viewpoint of order. As the reader has no doubt discerned, that harmony is established primarily by the theory’s being structured by the terms and relations of interiority and the isomorphic structure of the scale of values.

Because it attends to the unconscious and to liberating the creativity of the dialectical subject, the originator of meaning and value, it will be immediately clear to the reader why psychic conversion is central to Doran’s theory of history. Besides the intentional operations of the individual subject, psychic conversion also attends to a “‘deeper and more comprehensive principle’ [of meaning in history] … ‘a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find rest beyond all these,’ in ‘being-in-love.’”

Doran goes on to note that Lonergan calls this tidal movement the “‘passionateness of being’”; it is “an operator that presides over the transition from the neural to the psychic, the unconscious to the conscious. As accompanying intentional consciousness it is the mass and momentum, the color and tone and power, of feeling …. In its totality it is a series of operators that I propose to call aesthetic-dramatic. These join the intentional operators (questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and questions for deliberation) to yield the normative source of meaning in history. What I have … called psychic conversion is the link between the two sets of operators; it is a turning of intentional consciousness to its aesthetic-dramatic counterpart.”

We learned that appropriating generalized empirical method requires attending to the data of one’s own consciousness. “However, generalized method has to be able to deal, at least comprehensively, not only with the data within a single consciousness but also with the relations between different conscious subjects, between conscious subjects and their milieu or environment, and between consciousness and its neural basis.” (In 268; emphasis added.) By attending to consciousness and its neural basis, the theory of psychic conversion significantly expands the notion we have acquired thus far of self-appropriation. Of the two distinct but integrally related realms of interiority—intentional consciousness, the psyche—Doran writes:

The constitution of human interiority is twofold. We may distinguish the operations of intentional consciousness, disengaged most sharply by Lonergan, from the dispositional states constitutive of the human sensitive psyche. To distinguish is not to separate: while there might be psychic states without intentional operations, there are no intentional opera-

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337 Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 175 (see above n. 320 p. 268); as quoted in Doran, “Reflections on Method in Systematic Theology,” 36.
338 Lonergan, “Mission and the Spirit,” in A Third Collection, 29; as quoted in Doran, ibid..
339 Doran, ibid., 36-37.
tions without concomitant psychic states. Nonetheless, intentionality and the psyche are two distinct dimensions of human interiority. Interiorly differentiated consciousness, then, would be the fruit of a twofold self-appropriation. There is the self-appropriation of cognitive and existential intentionality, and there is the self-appropriation of the psyche. There is intellectual conversion, and there is psychic conversion. (TDH 508; emphases added.)

What is the place of the psyche in human subjectivity? “The sensitive psyche occupies, as it were, a middle ground between the organism and the spirit. It participates in both, since it is both a higher integration of neural manifolds and the sensorium of self-transcendence through which we feel our participation in the intelligibility, truth, and goodness of being as these are reached in our acts of meaning and love. Affective integrity is an abiding in the creative tension of matter and spirit.” (TDH 55; Doran’s emphasis.) We live our lives in tension between these poles of limitation and transcendence. Psychic conversion regards our acquiring the habitus of living successfully in the movement of life, maintaining existential balance between the poles. Doran writes: “What the Christian tradition has called discernment is the search for direction in the movement of life. The experience of the movement provides data that, if we know how to interpret them, are indications as to whether or not we are finding or missing the direction.” (TDH 43.) Finding and maintaining the right direction in the movement of life, integrating intentionality and psyche, is the process of psychic conversion. Doran defines it thus:

[Psychic conversion is] the transformation of the psychic component of the censorship exercised by our orientation as dramatic subjects—a censorship over images for insight and over concomitant feelings—from a repressive to a constructive role, thus enabling simultaneously the participation of the psyche in the operations of intentionality, and the embodiment of intentionality through the mass and momentum of feeling. (TDH 63.)

By explaining the unity of intentional and affective self-transcendence Doran, in my view, resolves philosophy’s perennial “mind-body problem” by reintegrating philosophy and psychology—and resolves it within a theological horizon where grace is the ultimate integrator of subjectivity. Thus, within the theological horizon of Mission, Doran’s theory of psychic conversion becomes a liberation theology par excellence.

Imitating the strategy of Jesus who began his work of liberating history by calling for personal conversion, we begin our work of healing and creating in history by attending to the liberation of our dramatic artistry through conversion. Doran is certainly not suggesting that one must first complete a kind of psychotherapeutic boot camp before engaging creatively in the dramatic pattern of experience; intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic conversions are interlinked in a holistic process. Intentionally pursuing truth, choosing value over satisfaction, our “being grasped by ultimate concern” and “other-worldly falling in love,” affect the psyche and vice versa. Yet, engaging the process of psychic conversion does require that we begin attending as much to the dynamics of feeling as we do to the dynamics of inquiry. Do-
ran contrasts the oppressive and liberating forces involved in the mutuality of intentional and affective self-transcendence:

The process of liberation from oppressive patterns of experience is ineffectual unless feelings are touched and stirred by the movement that brings healing insight. For the psyche is the locus of the embodiment of inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, deliberation, and decision, just as it is the place of the embodiment of the oppressive forces which can be released by such intentional operations. As the psyche is oriented to participation in the life of the intentional spirit, so intentionality is oriented to embodiment through the mass and momentum of feelings. Patterns of experience are either the distorted and alienated, or the integral and creative, embodiment of the human spirit. To the extent that our psychic sensitivity is victimized by oppression, the embodiment of the spirit is confined to an animal habitat, fastened on survival, intent on the satisfaction of its own deprivation of the humanum. (TDH 61-62.)

In contrast to the oppressive results of flight from understanding and responsibility, and from God, there are the liberating results of psychic conversion:

To the extent that the psyche is released from oppressive patterns, the embodiment of the spirit is released into a human world, and indeed ultimately into the universe of being. A true healing of the psyche would dissolve the affective wounds that block sustained self-transcendence; it would give the freedom required to engage in the constitution of a human world; but it would render the psyche the medium of the embodiment of intentionality in the constitution of the person. As psychic conversion allows access to one’s own symbolic system, and through that system to one’s affective habits, one’s spontaneous apprehension of possible values, so it makes of the psyche a medium of the embodiment of intentionality in the constitution of the human person. As the movement of consciousness ‘from below’ allows us to affirm the vertical finality of the psyche to participate in the life of the spirit, so the movement ‘from above’ enables us to affirm an orientation of the human spirit to embodiment in the constitution of the person. (TDH 62.)

This completes the sketch of a contemporary response to Jesus of Nazareth’s “Be converted” made possible by centuries of development in human self-understanding. Explanation of the distinct but dynamically interlinked conversions further clarifies how a comprehensive trinitarian systematics expands from its centre by integrating, synthesizing, new data according to the Urparadigm of human interiority.

6.4.6 “Follow me.”

Perhaps enough has already been said to make it clear that, to follow Lonergan, the theologian simply accepts an invitation to imitate him in one respect: to attend deliberately to the quotidian process of one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding; to objectify
these distinct operations of one’s knowing, to gain a clear understanding of their norms, and to understand how the repetition of these operations constitutes a generalized empirical method. One need affirm no more than the truth one discovers about oneself and the world; and one can judge personally whether knowing truth is self-affirming and self-constituting. When undertaken as integral part of one’s relationship with him whose proper name is Truth, it might be expected that imitating Lonergan’s pursuit will yield personal versions of the positive effects he promises, the effects of nature and grace that constitute the theologian’s personal and professional foundations.

6.4.7 “Learn from me.”

The theme of learning permeates most of Crowe’s writings on Lonergan’s thought. He usually means the crucial importance of our learning Lonergan’s thought per se; but he also means with Lonergan our passage from ignorance to knowledge in all fields of enquiry. In regard to the present topic, the theologian and theology, he means learning in the church:

When a university excludes a branch of science, Newman held, not only is there a gap in its program but the sciences that remain are distorted. Something parallel, I would say, has happened in regard to the learning and teaching functions of the Church: we have so neglected the one and so stressed the other that we have become like a bird with one wing overdeveloped and the other atrophied. … If Lonergan has anything to say … on teaching it is that if we would teach we must first be willing to learn.  

In another article Crowe goes further and “affirms an absolute priority of learning over teaching in the Church, even with regard to the sources, divinely created and divinely given, of our faith. The sources are sources that have learned. I don’t deny the divine prerogative of using the seer as musicians use their instruments, but I don’t think God made us with human minds and human hearts in order to treat us like dumb materials.” Later, he links the priority of learning to what I have been calling imitatio Jesu:

To affirm then that we are a learning Church is simply to affirm our Christian discipleship, a pattern of life that in this as in other matters is modeled on Jesus of Nazareth. We do indeed belong to a learning Church, and our learning Church has a learning founder. There

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341 Crowe, “The Church as Learner: Two Crises, One Kairos,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 371-72. “Early tradition is our teacher, granted; and that teacher has priority for us. But did early tradition first have to learn? If so, how? Scripture also is our teacher, as it has been through many centuries. But did Scripture first have to learn? If so, how? Creeds and councils teach; do they also learn? Similarly the magisterium interprets and teaches; does it first need to learn? And again, and always, if so, how?” Ibid., 371.
should be no more than a momentary hesitation is making so simple an affirmation.\textsuperscript{342}

The implications of the simple affirmation that Jesus first learned before he set out to teach has not yet become connatural to many who carry out the varied intellectual apostolate of the church. Where Doran speaks of the general situation as a crisis of meaning produced by nihilism, Crowe speaks of the particular situation in the church as a twofold crisis produced by wrongly ordered priorities. Failure to reverse the long practice of giving priority to teaching over learning, Crowe argues, has brought about in the Church of Rome crises of scholarship and aggiornamento. Yet, they need not occasion any hand wringing. Lonergan’s method, he argues, can resolve both crises:

I will suggest then that his two phases of theology meet the two crises quite directly in a one-to-one correspondence: the phase of mediating theology meeting the crisis of scholarship, and the phase of mediated theology meeting the crisis of aggiornamento.\textsuperscript{343}

The specialties of the mediating phase apply to every branch of enquiry, and theologians must be in dialogue with all of them.\textsuperscript{344} Our immediate concern is meeting with the mediated phase of theology the crisis of aggiornamento. This crisis “began about a hundred years ago, it emerged as a distinct problem in the sixties of [the twentieth] century, in my view it has not yet peaked, and it constitutes the really serious crisis today.”\textsuperscript{345} The intervening years, I believe, have not made irrelevant Crowe’s diagnosis of the situation or his prescription. To see in action “the phase of mediated theology meeting the crisis of aggiornamento,” to implement the massive reconstruction of theology our times require, teachers of theology must learn.

What needs to be learned is Lonergan’s theological method; and learning method, establishing the foundations that generate the categories, as we have learned, requires religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic conversions. Let us return to the topic of conversion and note that what can begin as a theologian’s solitary undertaking can develop into a self-perpetuating cultural movement:

Conversion is existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate. But it is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. Finally, what can become communal, can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances, confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or epoch. (M 130-31.)

\textsuperscript{342} Ibid., 373.

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid., 375.

\textsuperscript{344} On the church as learner in dialogue with the world of inquiry, see Crowe, “The Responsibility of the Theologian, and the Learning Church,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 172-92.

\textsuperscript{345} Crowe, “The Church as Learner,” 375.
The mutuality of the community of the converted entails mutual teaching and learning; but it also entails the next topic, public teaching.

6.4.8 “Go teach.”

If in regard to the twofold crisis of learning in the church Crowe’s diagnosis and prescription remain apropos, significant advancements in both phases of theology have made the prognosis brighter than it might have seemed two decades ago. That advancement is mainly due to the impressive number of learners who have also become teachers and implementers of Lonergan’s remedies for the crises. The reader has been witnessing how teachers in theological and non-theological fields are contributing to my interpretation of $S$, a modest example but applicable mutatis mutandis wherever interpretations of Lonergan’s thought are being written. In my efforts towards transposing $S$ into the methodic categories of the later Lonergan, to understand and explain numerous aspects of his thought, I also had to learn from Lonergan scholars and employers of method (many not cited herein, for their teaching over the years has informed my habitual understanding of Lonergan’s thought). This large and continuously growing body of theological transposition and scholarship accounts for my sanguine view that the crises of scholarship and aggiornamento are slowly but surely being met through teaching in academic classrooms and publications. Yet, it must be acknowledged that the scale of teaching and implementing Lonergan’s thought is still too modest and confined to constitute the communal-cum-cultural movement of healing and creating that our time in history requires. About this challenging situation, I will make two distinct but related points, one general and one particular.

The general point returns to the viewpoint of order with its four-dimensional Urparadigm. The work that needs to be, and can be, done in regard to general teaching and implementation is implied in the realistic idealism informing Crowe’s expression of hope for the future:

My hope is that by the end of this century the basic idea of the four levels will be part of our general culture; so much so that to explain them, and still more to prove them, will be quite boring. Pupils leaving primary school will be as familiar with this structure as they are with, say, the golden rule.  

Should “the basic idea of the four levels” become part of our culture’s common sense, if it structures and informs education from primary school, one can infer some effects. Systematic thinking will be connatural to those who enter university to become theologians. Theology students will already know, for example, how to recognize the roots of and reverse counterpositions; know how heuristic structures help distinguish and order systematically the data of any field of learning; know how to recognize where an expression of meaning belongs in

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the genetic sequence from description, to explanation, and so on. That metaphysics is the
integral structure of proportionate being will inform their habits of thought. Having long
since experienced that discovering truth for oneself is intrinsically delightful, the process of
establishing their foundations as developing theologians, the liberating effects of appropriat-
ing one's subjectivity as students of divine revelation, would immediately motivate them to
learn more. That this movement of education from below upwards will first require move-
ment from above suggests a particular but related point on teaching.

It was said in chapter 1 above that “the systematic theologian means to teach the teach-
ers”; Lonergan wrote $S$ for students who would later in various ways teach the meaning of
Catholic belief. After Method in Theology, teachers of systematic theology who employ Loner-
gan’s method are in a position to teach not only the content but also the method of expressing
systematic understanding of religious belief. As we have seen in the present interpretation of
$S$, once the basic idea of the four levels is grasped, and grasping it is not difficult, systematic
understanding of sometimes very difficult concepts gradually becomes easier; and, as the ba-
sic idea of the four levels takes hold, one learns to anticipate the structure, perhaps even the
content, of future explanations, and to recognize in personal efforts to understand one's own
differentiated interiority.

I wrote in chapter 1 above that “the explanatory process of interpreting $S$ from the single
viewpoint of order can give students means, not too difficult to grasp, whereby they too
might gain a synthetic understanding of Lonergan’s theology of God sufficient to affirm its
comprehensiveness, unity, value, and openness to organic development.” I would now gene-
ralize and argue that systematic or methodic thinking can be taught; that pedagogic strate-
gies, courses, exercises, textbooks, and workbooks can be developed to teach first-year theol-
ogy students how to appropriate oneself as one appropriates the theological curriculum. De-
veloping pedagogic strategies and materials to teach Lonergan’s method, in my view, must
become a priority in Catholic schools of theology. That his method is a providential gift to the
Church for the good of the whole world seems to me too obvious for debate. Trusting in the
adage “by their fruits you will know them,” those who believe in Lonergan’s method can be
morally certain that, if it structures and informs theological education, before long other cen-
tres of learning would take notice and desire similar results.

6.4.9 Final Remarks on Mission

I noted above that “our operating in harmony with the orders of God and the universe
will be the focus of Mission.” That meant sketching an ideal type. The ground of possibility,
the foundations, of authentic theology is the authentic theologian. One gains that authentic-
ity, the liberation of the true self, through distinct but interrelated intellectual, moral, reli-
gious, and psychic conversions. These conversions become incarnate through living day to
day in obedience to the transcendental precepts. It was assumed that the theologian is well
educated; that the encompassing dynamic of the process of self-appropriation is an imitatio
Jesu that includes his dedication to mission; that the context of mission is membership in Christ’s body, the essentially missionary Church; and specifically membership in the Church of Rome with its norms in regard to church teaching, creedral confession, worship, sacraments, personal prayer, and piety—the ideal type of Catholic theologian, women and men living in harmony with the orders of God and the universe.

In the real world of our experience, achieving authenticity is not only lifelong process but lifelong struggle. That each of us is *imago Trinitatis* does not preclude the fact that our lives, like history, are structured by progress, decline, and redemption. The analogy of the subject must also accommodate the fact that we are wounded and sinners. Thus the final topic of this account of Creation, the actual human condition.

**Evil and redemption.** I have been imitating Lonergan’s practice in *S* with continual reminders that we are sinners, and will also imitate him here by treating this complex subject briefly.

We are free, but we choose to sin; and God permits it. 347 Throughout *S*, *Insight*, and *Method*, and in many other writings, Lonergan continually reminds us that human nature is wounded, and that sin—our own and that of others; the sin we originate and the sin we inherit—is irrational. 348 There are our biases; the evils of suffering and death; our flight from understanding and responsibility. All create a persistent situation we cannot redeem on our own, for “redemption lies not in what is possible to nature but in what is effected by the grace of Christ.” 349 Without God’s grace, we have no hope of defeating evil in ourselves and the world.

Lonergan links grace, God’s self-communication, to evil and its defeat:

Just as there is a human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent deforming knowledge and perverting will, so also there is a divine solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ; as evil performance confirms us in evil, so good edifies us in our building unto eternal life; and as private rationalization finds support in fact, in common teaching, in public approval, so also the ascent of the soul towards God is not a merely private affair but rather a personal function of an objective common movement in that body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life. 350

Having treated of the God of natural theology in the penultimate chapter of *Insight*, in the

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347 “St Augustine made perhaps one of the most profound remarks in all his writings, and for that matter in the whole of theology, when he said that God could have created a world without any evil whatever, but thought it better to permit evil and draw good out of the evil.” *Topics in Education*, 29.

348 “It would be easier to find an explanatory relation between the number of bald heads in Siam and the number of Aztec monuments in Peru than to find an explanatory relation between divine permission and sin, for in the latter case there is certainly none at all: sin is unintelligible and cannot be explained.” *Grace and Freedom*, 347-48.


final chapter, “Special Transcendent Knowledge,” Lonergan prolongs the questions of natural theology by making their object the God of Christian revelation. In a masterpiece of theological rhetoric, he expresses an intellectually and spiritually exhilarating synthesis of *Insight* within the horizon of God’s solution to the problem of evil in Creation, and Creation’s eschatological fulfilment in God. Read from the viewpoint of order, i.e., the viewpoint informed by the isomorphic heuristic structures we have been examining, and their analogous relation to God the Holy Trinity, chapter twenty of *Insight* provides a way to explain and integrate the intrinsically disordered and irrational into trinitarian systematics. (We have already learned how Lonergan’s “turn to the subject” and the four conversions reintegrate moral theology into systematic theology of God.) Especially illuminating: his linkage of the operations of interiority to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

In briefest form, God’s solution to the problem of evil is the redemptive life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the ongoing missions of Son and Spirit in history, and our expressing cooperation with their mediation of redemption by *imitatio Jesu*. Lonergan calls this soteriological situation “the law of the cross.” It implies that, without moral conversion, cultivating religion might earn a place in the crowd shouting “Lord, Lord,” but not merit a place in the Kingdom of God. “Faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead” (James 2:17). The Christian’s primary good work is making an artwork of one’s life through *imitatio Jesu*.

I have found it impossible to summarize in available space *Insight*’s remarkable chapter twenty; so, in addition to recommending it most highly, I will instead draw from both Lonergan and some interpreters to highlight salient aspects of this topic, choosing texts that relate the law of the cross to elements already explained. We will begin with the structure of history (and our lives), relate it to the theological virtues and Scripture, then to less general categories. Consider the heuristic structure of the situation. Crowe observes:

> I would say … that the tripartite structure of progress, decline, and redemption, will remain: progress, because no tyrant can forever suppress our questions; decline, because of our recurring flight from understanding and the precarious nature of our achievements; redemption, because God’s love is stronger than our biases and failures. It’s part of our human condition under God, and the only question is whether we will recognize it as such and cooperate.\(^352\)

If true, Lonergan writes, that “human historical process is such a compound of progress and

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\(^{351}\) “The supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity are named theological because they orientate man to God as he is in himself.” Lonergan, “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World,” in *Collection*, 112. Editorial note I reads: “There is a useful analogy here with the ontological and economic Trinity: as we may think of the Three in their eternal being, but also of the Three in their dynamic entry into the created world, so faith, hope, and charity are in themselves a relation to God, but also they profoundly influence our living in this world.” *Collection*, 278.

decline, then its redemption would be effected by faith, hope, and charity. ...” Citing a number of texts, he demonstrates that “this analysis fits in with scriptural doctrine, which understands suffering and death as the result of sin yet inculcates the transforming power of Christ, who in himself and in us changes suffering and death into the means for attaining resurrection and glory.” Faith, hope, and charity “profoundly influence our living in this world” (see above n. 351); and their effects are not only personal but social:

[The theological virtues] possess a profound social significance. Against the perpetuation of explosive tensions that would result from the strict application of retributive justice, there is the power of charity to wipe out old grievances and make a fresh start possible. Against the economic determinism that would result were egoistic practicality given free rein, there is the liberating power of hope that seeks first the kingdom of God. Against the dialectic discernible in the history of philosophy and in the development-and- decline of civil and cultural communities, there is the liberation of human reason through divine faith; for men of faith are not shifted about with every wind of doctrine.

We can enrich these notions with another text in which Lonergan unifies in a single view an astonishing number of our concerns: God’s solution to the problem of evil, the theological virtues, the order of the universe, conjugate metaphysics and development (see above n. 242 p. 234), emergent probability, the pure desire, finality, our struggle to achieve authentic subjectivity and community by living in harmony with divinely chosen universal order (which, as we have learned, imitates and participates the trinitarian order):

It is not to be forgotten that the solution is a harmonious continuation of the present order of the universe, that it is constituted through conjugate forms that develop, and that its realization and development occur through acts of human acknowledgment and consent that accord with probability schedules. The assent of faith is the starting point for an ever fuller understanding of its meaning, its implications, and its applications. The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference either with intellect’s unrestricted finality or with its essential detachment and disinterestedness. The antecedent willingness of charity has to mount from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God’s concept and choice. Accordingly, even in those in whom the solution is realized, there are endless gradations in the measure in which it is realized, and by a necessary

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353 Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” 8. An address given at a Canon Law Society of America meeting in 1966, the article ends with two questions: “Is the proper Christian ethic the law of the cross, i.e., the transformation of evil into good? Does law ‘use good to defeat evil’ (Rom. 12:21)?” Ibid., 9.

354 Ibid., 8.

consequence there are endless degrees in which those that profess to know and embrace
the solution can fail to bring forth the fruits it promises in their individual lives and in
the human situations of which those lives are part. (In 747-48; emphasis added.)

To avoid failure, we must of course cooperate with grace “through acts of human acknow-
ledgment and consent” to help redeem the situation, to overcome evil in societies and in our-
selves in ways, already discussed, that Lonergan summarizes thus:

For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies,
to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential
good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as
to love all men with a self-sacrificing love. (In 721-22; emphasis added.)

Since we have already discussed imitatio Jesu in some detail, let us return to some familiar
elements of the actual human condition. “The life of man on earth lies under the shadow of a
problem of evil; the evil invades his mind; and as it distorts his immanently generated know-
ledge, so also it distorts his beliefs.” (In 736.) Given our particular concern with the intellectual
apostolate of the church, especially the contribution of systematic theology that Doran calls
the witness of understanding, I first quote a summary statement from Insight's treatment of
error and mistaken belief:

Already there has been carried through a general critique of error, and, as error in gener-
al, so mistaken beliefs have their roots in the scotosis of the dramatic subject, in the indi-
vidual, group, and general bias356 of the practical subject, in the counterpositions of phi-
losophy, and in their ethical implications and consequences. In belief as in personal
thought and judgment, men go wrong when they have to understand and to judge either
themselves or other things in relation to themselves. (In 735.)

There follow texts from interpreters of Lonergan that synthesize elements of this dialectic
of nature and grace with now familiar categories of Creation. Byrne relates emergent proba-
bility to the law of the cross:

What is distinctive in Lonergan’s own treatment of grace and redemption is his way of
situating them in relation to emergent probability. In Insight, he raises the question of God’s

356 “In using the term ‘bias’ Lonergan characterizes the accumulating devastation in terms of its
relation of opposition to the self-correcting potential of intelligence, inquiry, and insight. But as a
Christian theologian, Lonergan was clear that the same pattern of decline is a pattern of sin in its rela-
tion of opposition to God. Lonergan is in fundamental agreement with St. Augustine’s characteriza-
tion: ‘evil is nothing but the removal of good until finally no good remains.’ And as a Christian theo-
llogian, he affirmed that the reversal of sin and its devastating social consequences is by God’s grace.”
Patrick H. Byrne, “Ecology, Economy and Redemption as Dynamic: The Contributions of Jane Jacobs
and Bernard Lonergan.” Available at http://www.nd.edu/~ecoltheo/textbyrne.htm; Internet, accessed
solution to the problem of sin, evil, and social decline, and argues that the solution is the emergence of the theological virtues of “faith, hope and love” ([*Insight*] 718-25, 741). There he reflects upon redemption as occurring within this universe of emergent probability—“When in the fullness of time” the Redeemer came, as Christian theology has put it.357

Byrne also relates the element of emergent probability in the situation to an explanatory account of bias and decline. His remarks also touch on issues raised in our earlier discussion of conversion:

Lonergan’s account of emergent probability in the human order incorporates the fact of human failure to consider questions raised by their endeavors, failures to seek answers even to all the questions they do raise, and refusals to act according to what they come to understand as the best courses of action. He identifies four fundamental forms of bias that distort human collaborative efforts into dysfunctional constellations: psychological aberrations (“dramatic bias”), selfish disregard (“individual bias”), ethnic, racial, class and gender discrimination (“group bias”), and the narrow-minded disregard for non-immediate consequences, such as long-term environmental impacts (“general bias”). Instances of bias are legion. They all operate by ignoring the reflective processes of asking and answering all the questions that are raised by complex situations. According to Lonergan, biased courses of action that evade intelligent self-correction initiate downward spirals of decline, degradation and destruction not only of natural but also of cultural environments. Biases and decline have their own “logic”—the logic of vicious cycles that lead to great destruction, unless something acts to reverse their downward trends ([*Insight*], 214-23, 242-63).358

We will end this sketch of principle elements of Lonergan’s soteriology on the hopeful note heard in Byrne’s “unless something acts to reverse their downward trends.”

Vicious cycles of decline are destructive “unless something” or someone acts to reverse them. Our discussion has emphasized personal *imitatio Jesu*. While each of us indeed has a mission, a unique religious raison d’être, since Vatican II the church has taught that our common mission of *imitatio Jesu* in the world, our praxis, should demonstrate our Lord’s “preferential option for the poor.” Poverty has many forms, and Christian responses to its vicious cycles and victims vary accordingly. We will consider only one response.

In regard to material poverty and its causes, consider Lonergan’s praxis. He had a lifelong interest in economics.359 Commenting on this and Lonergan’s pastoral ministry, Crowe

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357 Ibid.. See also Byrne’s “The Thomist Sources of Lonergan’s Dynamic World-view,” wherein he explores the statistical element in the grace-nature relationship in history.

358 Byrne, “Ecology, Economy and Redemption as Dynamic” (see above n. 356).

writes:

It is extraordinarily fascinating, this lifelong concern with the realities of economics, and it demonstrates perfectly the mode of Lonergan’s pastoral involvement: concern for the poor and oppressed, but action at the very roots of the problem.\textsuperscript{360}

Crowe’s last point recalls a statement from S quoted above:

To eradicate those errors and keep others from being deceived by them, one must seek the root whence the error is able to assume the semblance of truth, and there lay the axe. One aiming to extirpate errors so others will not be deceived should expose the root whereby the error assumes the guise of truth and there apply the ax. (§75.)

We have seen that Lonergan made this a rule of life, taking action at the very roots of the problem, responding to various forms of poverty in the natural and social sciences, philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, methodology, and theology by applying the ax to error and mistaken belief; and offering creative—attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, loving—systematic solutions to them; overcoming evil with good; obeying, through a self-sacrificing love that “embraces the order of the universe,” the law of the cross.

We will now proceed to my summaries of sections 5 and 6 on Creation.

7. Second Particular Summary of Chapter 3

We have been taking a penetrating look at Creation and the development Teilhard calls “maturing”:

It is part of the essentially Catholic vision to look upon the world as maturing—not only in each individual or in each nation, but in the whole human race—a specific power of knowing and loving whose transfigured term is charity, but whose roots and elemental sap lie in the discovery and the love of everything that is true and beautiful in creation.\textsuperscript{361}

To inform further the still-emergent viewpoint of order, we traveled Creation from the immediate aftermath of the Big Bang to the interior object of depth psychology, then beyond nature into the supernatural realm of grace. En route we explored some principal categories of the “everything else” that a comprehensive trinitarian systematics relates to God, and saw demonstrated how, when employed from the single viewpoint of order, Lonergan’s method enables one to grasp per modum unius the principal heuristic orders of Creation and potential-


\textsuperscript{360} Crowe, “Lonergan as Pastoral Theologian,” 130.

ly complete answers to every intelligent question they inspire.

Our single viewpoint is grounded in the dynamic four-level Urparadigm of intentional consciousness that, when generalized (as illustrated in table 5 above), repeats a dynamic pattern of an integral triad (like experience, understanding, and judgment by which we know the truth of being) related to a fourth term _ad extra_ (like decision by which we originate value). We also saw how particular goods, goods of order, and values, indeed how the entire Creation, can be understood; saw how that understanding can be judged for truth, value and, moreover, synthesized employing the analogy of the dialectical subject, the psychological analogy in its full dynamic amplitude. We now have a more informed appreciation of the wonderful truth that the analogy of the subject, our common possession, provides the very method whereby the analogy itself is explained and employed. Appropriating and employing method, in short, leads naturally to synthetic, systematic and, dare I say it, the authentic theology of authentic theologians; authentic because true to revelation and human experience, understanding, and affirmation of self, other, and God.

In keeping with the practice of combining explanations of data and method, we saw demonstrated how one generates categories systematically, and how sublation functions as we mount from viewpoint to higher, more encompassing viewpoint—from Cosmology to History to Culture to Mission, a process that “far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.” (M 241.) Yet another reason to abandon the commonsense notion that nature’s fundamental structure is hierarchical.

With Lonergan’s achievement, explaining the old truism that self-knowledge and knowledge of God are mutually revelatory gains unprecedented comprehension, clarity, and scientific exactitude. Comprehension, for self-knowledge is now revelatory of the entire universe of being. The deposed queen of the sciences reclaim her sovereignty. While putting them in their place, methodic theology in a grand gesture of noblesse oblige also rewards all usurpers, pretenders, even declared regicides by reversing their counterpositions, purifying their methods, enhancing their theories, ennobling their personal and professional horizons; she obliges every other science to be true to itself. Would the reasonable and responsible theologian aim to do less in a civilization that in reason’s name ranks understanding the quark above understanding God?

The third general summary that follows will sublate the previous general summary and express a unified viewpoint on the three elements: the Holy Trinity _quoad se_, _quoad nos_, and Creation.

8. General Summary of Chapter 3

The particular summaries of the distinct explanatory accounts of God _quoad nos_ and Creation concluded on the common ground of human interiority. The former summarized the da-
ta whereby Lonergan completed his theology of God by seamlessly developing systematic explanation of God quoad se into theology of the divine missions. The latter summarized data that emphasized the meaning in a theological context of the ethical, philosophical, psychological, and scientific dimensions of the object of the divine missions, Creation, and our part in God’s plan to redeem it.

Both particular summaries concluded on the common ground of interpersonal relations of knowledge and love between and among the persons of God and human persons. One hardly need mention that one achieves unified understanding of the two sets of data on God and Creation by employing the method provided by the terms and relations of the same human knowing and loving. Father and Son send the supernatural Gift according to which the Three inhabit and, with its cooperation, justify humanity. The Holy Spirit enables those whose faith in Christ motivates them to do so to know and love God and one another with God’s own love, Charity. The later Lonergan will call faith “the knowledge born of religious love.” (M 115.) By the gift of Charity, the Father loves the just as he loves his own Son. In the Holy Spirit, through his Son, he draws us to himself, adopts us, makes us really and, if at death Charity is in us, eternally sisters and brothers of Christ and one another in God’s own family.

The long explanatory accounts of the divine missions and human response summarized above made plain that the divine-human community of the Justifier and the justified, the mystical body of Christ, exists to achieve a greater goal, the future realization of a divine plan for the whole of history. We who belong to what the liturgy call’s God’s “pilgrim church on earth,” live between the poles, if you will, of the divine missions to Creation and “the ultimate end of this mission, however, is attained in the beatific vision of the citizens of heaven, ‘when he hands over the kingdom to God the Father’” (1Cor 15:24). (S 489.) The pilgrim church is also commissioned to make all people its members. The justified are sent to help convert the unjustified. It was said above (p. 193) that “the mediation to us of the Good News through people who live, believe, teach, love, and create makes us people who live, believe, teach, love, and create.” Becoming that kind of missionary is not easy. We must continually ask ourselves: How are we living? What do we really believe? What are we teaching others? Whom and what do we love and how? Is our doing and making really valuable? Are we doing God’s will?

We learned that the justified who cooperate with the indwelling Trinity are further justified, that life in the Spirit is developmental. Under Creation, we also learned that the ongoing advance of history has revealed with ever-increasing clarity the intrinsic norms of human interiority. In step with each advance of these good resources, Lonergan says, there is “the opportunity for, and the amount and influence of, confusion, ignorance, and error,” obstacles in our developmental path; and added to these: “a less than upright will.” (S 409)

Normally we live in human environments that are a mix of darkness and light, confusion and order. In the section of S from which I took the material of appendix I (comparing divine and temporal subjects), Lonergan offers a detailed account of human development from the
level of stimulus and response to the stage where we take responsibility for ourselves until, as he says in a different context, “we speak our own inner word about the divine Word by way of an emanation of truth, and we spirate our own love for the divine Love by way of an emanation of holiness.” Near the end of his account of the temporal subject, he paints what at first seems a fairly bleak existential portrait of the relation between God and Creation at the nitty-gritty level of our personal and interpersonal struggles to know the truth, do the good, and love the lovable. He writes of the ambivalence of belief and friendship that “frequently draw temporal subjects away from intelligible truth and true good and lead them into an all too human mediocrity” (S 409.) The general situation that most of us find themselves part of, at least sometimes, he analyzes thus:

Those who are in the prior phase not only perceive the excellence of the subsequent phase less clearly, but also will their conversion to it less effectively. Those who could believe the teachers who teach what is true prefer to listen to others who urge them to choose what is easier. Those who could have more upright friends nevertheless go along with those who live a life of enjoyment and pleasure. Thus the greater part of humanity, bypassing the narrow gate, take the broad road instead [Mat 7:13-14]. They have little knowledge of what a human being ought to be, and they do not want to put into practice the little they know. As their intellect falls short of intelligible truth, so also their will shies away from knowledge that is intelligible and true. The consequences of this deficiency and avoidance do not remain within single individuals, not only because people believe those who are in error and friends consent to the sins of their friends, but also because human actions that are contrary to reason create human situations that are absurd, and the very absurdity of these situations is seen by the thoughtless to be empirical evidence that proves the ineptitude of those who wish to follow reason. (S 409.)

These and other obstacles “create a persistent situation we cannot redeem on our own, for ‘redemption lies not in what is possible to nature but in what is effected by the grace of Christ.’” (See above n. 349 p. 284.) The situation is the one described and explained in chapter twenty of Insight; and here he draws a similar conclusion: “We must take refuge in the eternal divine subjects.” (S 409.) Lonergan continues:

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362 S does not directly relate the presence in the world of Dicens, Verbum, and Amor to the general impact of humanity’s wilful banishment of understanding, truth, and love from the human world. In “The ‘Trinification’ of the Human World,” the superb final chapter of The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, Crowe speaks of the psychological and social effects of “the annihilation of the imago Dei” in our world. “Philosophers have been asking at least since Leibniz: Why is there something and not nothing? The answer is: because of the creative understanding of the Father expressed in Truth from which Love of the universe can follow. The complete nihilist would have to destroy not only the form and meaning and goodness of things, but destroy as well the understanding, truth, and love of the imago Dei, and then impotently rage against the Father of Understanding, the Son of Truth, the Spirit of Love.” Ibid., 183.
Let our belief, then, be in the eternal Word made flesh, let our friendship be in the Holy Spirit; and in the Spirit through the Son let us dare to cry out, ‘Abba, Father’; so that being by God’s intention created in the divine image we may by our own intention live according to that image, and hope that we may become faithful citizens of the city of God in this life and blessed in the life to come. (S 409; emphasis added.)

We now advance to the final section, wherein I will briefly summarize from the viewpoint of order the whole of this long and complex interpretation of Lonergan’s systematic theology of God the Holy Trinity.

9. Final General Summary

The three chapters of this interpretation of Bernard Lonergan’s The Triune God: Systematics provided four particular and three general summaries. I said that “each general summary will sublate the one preceding it,” and that the summaries had as goal “to keep before the reader a synthetic account, from the viewpoint of order, of the ever-increasing complexity, comprehension, and unity of Lonergan’s theology of God.” (See above p. 5.) Chapters 1-3 above explained the theological content and method Lonergan provides to attain the primary goal, namely that we students of his gain “imperfect, analogous, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, yet most profitable” theological understanding of the mystery of the Holy Trinity quoad se and quoad nos.

The “governing image or idea,” the leitmotif throughout this interpretation of S, will be the principal topic of this concluding summary. First we review certain theoretical elements of Lonergan’s thought fundamental to my argument for the unifying viewpoint of order. The purpose: to draw from specifications of order already explained some conclusions that chiefly regard method in general and, in particular, method in systematic theology. Then we return to what traditionally has been called the psychological analogy in trinitarian systematics and, in light of Lonergan’s achievement, ask whether this terminology remains adequate. Finally, I make a summary statement about development of Lonergan’s theology of God.

9.1 Fundamental Notions: Review and Summary

Sapientis est ordinare. Putting things in order is the work of the wise. The reader, I trust, will profit from my final review of the theoretical elements fundamental to my argument for the viewpoint of order (in my efforts to understand Lonergan, I have found very helpful his habit of repeating key notions in different contexts). So, let us review the primary instances of order in nature, the two established by Lonergan’s cognitional theory and his metaphysics of proportionate being: knowing and being; or the knower and the known; or the attentive, intelligent, reasonable subject, and all that is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable understanding, the universe of being. Thus, “every statement [metaphysics] makes about re-
ality can be validated by a corresponding cognitional operation that is verifiable.” In the clearest single statement on this matter that I know of, Lonergan consolidates a number of elements “fundamental to my argument for the unifying viewpoint of order”:

To know is to know being, but knowing is structured. Knowing is a matter of experience, understanding, and judgment. Consequently, knowing being involves a structure by identity. Insofar as knowing develops on three stages, it is inevitable that the known involves a combination of three contents. If knowing is experiencing and understanding and judging, and if all three are required to have the known, then the known will involve a content from the experiencing, a content from the understanding, and a content from the judging, all combined into a single object.

This combination of all three contents in a single object is what is classically termed the proportionate object of our intellect—potency, form, and act. Potency, form, and act are constituents of a single concrete being in the same way as experiencing, understanding, and judging are constituents of a single increment in knowing. Because the knowing involves three acts, and each act has its own content, there will be in the proportionate known three different types of content corresponding to the differences in the three types of act. (UB 154; Lonergan’s emphases.)

The three types of content are the data, the data understood, and the understood data judged; they yield unified knowledge of being quoad se. This self-transcending process of knowing culminates in the fourth operation “of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It is a decision about whom and what you are for and, again, whom and what you are against,” (M 264) in regard either to existing values or values we decide to originate. The seeker of knowledge explicitly aware of the cognitional theory and the metaphysics, who objectifies the four operations of his or her own self-transcending process of human knowing, who learns their norms, possesses a generalized empirical method whose results are explicitly systematic. The four operations and their relations also provide in various ways an analogy for understanding God quoad se, quoad nos, and the unity of everything else in itself and in relation to God. Thus, if sapientis est ordinare, the wise would choose this supreme “orderer” in all their pursuits of true and complete answers to their questions. The medium is the method.

In chapter 1 above we learned that the image called phantasm is essential to understand-

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364 “We have arrived at a notion of being that is unrestricted, that includes everything about everything, that is not within any genus. It underpins, goes before, penetrates, runs into, coincides with, and goes beyond any particular act of knowing and any particular content of knowing which we may have. It is the core of all meaning, and it is a structured notion.” Understanding and Being, 155. And: “One’s choice of the notion of being is going to determine everything else. So we have to have the right notion of being to acquire wisdom, but also we have to have wisdom to settle what the right notion of being is.” Ibid..
We also learned when discussing psychic conversion that the symbol, “an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling,” (see above n. 333 p. 276) is essential to achieving affective liberation. Although we have been obliged to discuss interiority scientifically, it remains that “even adequate self-knowledge and explicit metaphysics ... cannot issue into a control of human living without being transposed into dynamic images which make sensible to human sensitivity what human intelligence reaches for or grasps.” (In 571.) Moreover:

Formal comprehension ... cannot take place without a construct of some sort. In this life we are able to understand something only by turning towards phantasm; but in larger and more complex questions it is impossible to have a suitable phantasm unless the imagination is aided by some sort of diagram. Thus, if we want to have a comprehensive grasp of everything in a unified whole, we shall have to construct a diagram in which are symbolically represented all the various elements of the question as well as all the connections between them. (OPCC 151.)

In keeping with this attention to assisting imagination with images and diagrams, we will now turn to the topic of “the necessity of dynamic images” in the control of human living relevant to those pursuing systematic understanding, especially those who do methodic theology.

9.1.1 Paradigm, Pattern, and the Image

We have become well aware that the structure of intentional consciousness “outlines the steps to be taken if one is to proceed from the initial intending of the question to the eventual knowing of what has been intended all along.” (M 22.) We learned in chapter 1 above, and confirmed on many occasions, that “within method the use of heuristic devices is fundamental.” (Ibid.) The notion of heuristic structure, while suggesting to imagination a kind of image, is highly abstract. Imagining the Urparadigm, the heuristic structure of four-level intentional consciousness, is difficult because “levels” suggest mounting a hierarchy; so it does not facilitate our forming an organic, dynamic image of a process that is more like a series of expansions and includes the concomitant heuristic structure of sublation. When to these limitations—extreme abstraction, suggestions of stasis, separation, hierarchy—we add that, because coherent in both directions, the Urparadigm can be variously conceived, the need of those doing methodic theology for “dynamic images which make sensible to human sensitivity what human intelligence reaches for or grasps” becomes a matter of some import.

There follow overleaf graphic representations of the Urparadigm and its basic patterns. They are offered as one possible way of providing imagination with dynamic images of the elements of method.
Fig. 1 “Subsistents exist in the strict sense according to their act of existence; nonetheless, with respect to their operation they stand in need of some other in accord with the order of the universe.” This is the recurrent pattern of the isomorphic structures of table 5, p. 259 above; the pattern of the Urparadigm, the origin of all categories of proportionate being, including those of metaphysics. The Urparadigm is the four-level structure of intentional consciousness: the integral triad of the knower’s experience, understanding, and judgment; and the fourth operation of decision. The content of one’s full knowing is of the integral 1-2-3 (being quoad se) in relation to 4, being ad extra. The recurrent pattern abstracted from the Urparadigm I call the Urpattern.

Fig. 2 We can imagine the Urparadigm, Urpattern, God, Creation or anything else as 1 thing.

Fig. 3 We can imagine anything according to the 3 elements of its being quoad se.

Fig. 4 We can relate anything (e.g., God) as 1 to anything else as 1 (e.g., Creation).

Fig. 5 We can relate anything as 1 to the 3 elements of itself or anything else quoad se.

Fig. 6 We can relate the 3 elements (cognitional, metaphysical, categorical) of anything quoad se to the 3 elements (cognitional, metaphysical, categorical) of anything else quoad se.

Lonergan says that “in the procedures of the human mind we shall discern ... a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise”; method is “a normative pattern,” and “the set of relations furnish a pattern,” and “the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job,” and “operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely” (M 4); and “the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts” (In 424). To help form images of the basic configurations of the Urpattern (in practice any element can be related to any other), I chose circles to suggest wholeness, integrity, mobility; their uniformity suggests equal importance. Arrows suggest the dynamism of the relations between and among the elements; they also suggest the bidirectional coherence of the movement between and among the elements. Making such images of the Urpattern habitual in my thinking has been key to my understanding method and acquiring the viewpoint of order.
9.1.2 On the Trinitarian Analogy

We began with discussion of the traditional Augustinian-Thomist psychological analogy, “the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look” (V 216) at the Holy Trinity quoad se. Little by little as we moved forward we saw the analogy converge with the terms and relations of interiority and, therefore, the very method of explaining everything. So, we began discussing the analogy of the subject and, later, the dynamic analogy of the dialectical subject. En route, we saw that gaining understanding of God as God employed just part of a comprehensive analogy that enabled unified explanation of God as God, God for us, ourselves, and everything else in the universe of proportionate being, including its natural and human histories. Clearly, therefore, Lonergan’s achievement calls for a transposition of the terminology of trinitarian systematics in the Augustinian-Thomist tradition from psychological analogy to analogy of the subject, or analogy of the dialectical subject, or analogy of the methodic subject, or the methodic analogy, or a term similarly holistic. Such a change of terminology would shift what has been traditional emphasis on God quoad se in trinitarian systematics to emphasis on the historical partnership in mission of God and humanity.

9.2 The Way Forward

“When you think about it, what can the Gospel accomplish all by itself? How can one preach goodness and love to people without at the same time offering them an interpretation of the world that justifies this goodness and this love?”

Lonergan acknowledged that Teilhard “contributed not a little towards meeting that need” for an interpretation of Creation and humanity’s place in it consonant with the Good News (see above n. 235 p. 231). A similar tribute to Lonergan’s own contribution, however, calls for somewhat more than a litotes, even one on the order of “not unbreathtaking.”

I will speak of two contributions. The first regards Lonergan’s method. I wrote earlier that in S Lonergan discusses history from the viewpoint of “divine providence always providing the church with means to overcome ever-emerging obstacles to spreading the saving truth of Christ,” and of “the emergence of Lonergan’s method as organon equal to overcoming a formidable contemporary obstacle, the fragmentation of knowledge.” (See above n. 105 p. 71.) Crowe calls Lonergan’s method “a new organon for our time, somewhat on the analogy of Aristotelian logic and the Baconian novum organum for natural science,” the “instrument” he “labored all his life to create and put into the hands of his fellow-theologians.”

We have already witnessed the power of method in establishing the viewpoint of order,


366 Crowe, “Bernard Lonergan’s Thought on Ultimate Reality and Meaning,” 73; Crowe’s emphasis.
an instrument grounded in the ground of method, the terms and relations of interiority. That is but one of its uses. To express the grandeur of the radical development that method makes a realistic hope for our future, to pay tribute to Lonergan’s achievement, I quote his own words:

In harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind that operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each. Through the self-knowledge, the self-appropriation, the self-possession that result from making explicit the basic normative pattern of the recurrent and related operations of human cognitional process, it becomes possible to envisage a future in which all workers in all fields can find in [generalized empirical method] common norms, foundations, systematics, and common critical, dialectical, and heuristic procedures. (M 24.)

Crowe is right, I believe, to claim that it is in the context of method that Lonergan’s “contribution is to be evaluated. Not primarily on the basis of his pre-1965 theology, which will have to be put through the crucible of his own method before it can be properly called Lonerganian.” Crowe’s remark about Lonergan’s pre-1965 theology suggests Lonergan’s second contribution.

The second contribution is not separate from the first. Method “is not the intrusion into theology of alien matter from an alien source. Its function is to advert to the fact that theologies are produced by theologians, that theologians have minds and use them, that their doing so should not be ignored or passed over but explicitly acknowledged in itself and in its implications.” (M 24-25.) Nor is such concern with method alien to the theologian’s faith:

One can affirm that just as reason is illuminated by faith so also method may be illuminated by faith; indeed, since method is simply reason’s explicit consciousness of the norms of its own procedures, the illumination of reason by faith implies an illumination of method by faith. (“TU” 138.)

Method has enabled this first step towards putting “through the crucible of his own method” Lonergan’s The Triune God: Systematics, one of several pre-1965 theological works. Method will carry the process forward to the complete transposition of S into a purely methodic trinitarian systematics that makes widely accessible Lonergan’s sublime theology of God.

I will not try to judge what value the present work might have for others who would put S “through the crucible” of Lonergan’s method. Order is not the only possible interpretive viewpoint on Lonergan’s trinitarian systematics. As I wrote in the general summary of chapter 1 above, “any student could also discern in S a different, possibly better, recurrent idea to inform an interpretive viewpoint for explaining S; indeed, one could also render a more accurate interpretation from the viewpoint of order.” Nonetheless, I would argue, some such interpretative step is necessary for the transposition of S into a methodic form. I would also argue that the theologian who would transpose S into a purely methodic form has a choice be-
tween doing it in one more step or in two.

One could advance in one step from an interpretation of S such as the present one to a purely methodic (Lonerganian) systematics of the Trinity, take one’s stand in direct theological discourse. On the other hand, one might choose to attempt that here-I-stand restatement of S after an intermediary step that would more directly serve the witness of understanding by explaining what one is doing methodically in effecting the transposition. Thus, while an interpretation similar to the present one, it would not attend to the issues and controversies of the scholasticism and Thomistic theology Lonergan inherited,\textsuperscript{367} and eschew altogether the vocabulary of faculty psychology. Building on the present work, its explanations and its conclusions, it would draw freely from the later Lonergan’s science, philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and theology; it would immediately bring the viewpoint of order, and the analogy of the subject, to bear on exercising the functional specialties of Method in Theology.

Moreover, method enables a plethora of choices in regard to form. As a comprehensive restatement of the Church’s constitutive meaning, the treatise as stated above (p. 268) would have four primary elements: Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity, the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ, the four created terms of divine inhabitation of the just, and history. One possible form of the intermediary step between the present work and the goal of a here-I-stand methodic restatement of S would not begin with God as one or triune, as immanent or economic, but with the intellectually, morally, religiously, and psychically converted self-transcending existential subject trying to understand personal and communal religious experience in light of church doctrines already believed. Then, as I have done herein, I would employ the analogy of the subject to establish in purely methodic categories the unity of self-transcending subject and sitzimleben, Creation. When the central question arose—Quid sit Deus?—from inability to explain the intelligibility of contingent Creation without affirmation of ipsum intelligere, I would employ the psychological analogy to explain God quoad se and the ground of the divine missions. These are possibilities, but further deliberation might result in better choices. Before a systematics of the Trinity “from below” could be attempted, important questions would have to be answered, such as: Is it still necessary to divide the treatise on God into dogmatic and systematic? Is it still necessary to treat separately God quoad se and quoad nos? Does the fact that the Word is eternally human, that he has a body and sense experience, require new understanding of trinitarian perichôrêsis and their indwelling us? How would that impact the analogy of the subject? Then there is S’s Question 26 and our need for a serious study of the relation between the analogy of the subject and the four created terms of the divine missions. The bi-directionality of the analogy of the subject needs further eluci-\textsuperscript{367} Lonergan detested the prevailing scholasticism of his day. His works are liberally sprinkled with remarks about decadent scholasticism and “conclusions theology.” He came late to Thomas. Augustine and Plato were his first intellectual loves. I highly recommend his intellectual biography: Richard M. Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993).
dation. There are other important questions, some are theological, others regard the functional specialties of method as such (Systematics, for example, is perhaps the least understood of the eight).

9.3 Concluding Remarks

“Theology stands to religion, as economics does to business, as biology to health … theology pertains to the cultural superstructure, while religion pertains to its day-to-day substance.” Surely what might have seemed an enthusiast’s assertion at the beginning of my argument is now “as plain as a pikestaff” (Lonergan): Lonergan’s theology of God and his method promise revolutionary advance in theology and religion; and, given its heuristic nature, method also promises the transformation of the cultural superstructure.

In regard to our primary concern, theology, implementation of Lonergan’s achievement would seed the world with open-ended *summae* that express their central concern within an explicitly unified view of existence. In genres old and new, each *summa* would answer one or some or all of today’s fundamental questions for understanding; and be relevant for a time. The goal is not permanent achievement but ongoing advance. Yet, some achievements can be permanent. A work like *S* can be permanently among the systematic theologian’s best resources; be, like the once-revolutionary works of Augustine and Thomas, saints and doctors of the Church, always in print and continually interpreted for new answers.

Lonergan’s transformation of the Thomist tradition, and the power of his theology of God to give new, unified, clear and comprehensive expression to the church’s constitutive meaning, in my judgment, heralds the founding of a new tradition. As Thomas’s interpretation of the tradition he inherited placed his name before Augustine’s in history’s procession of great theologians, so should we abridge the order of Aquinas and Lonergan from Thomist and speak henceforth of the Lonergan tradition of Catholic theology.

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*368 Lonergan, “Belief: Today’s Issue,” in A Second Collection, 97.*
APPENDIX I: THE ETERNAL AND TEMPORAL SUBJECTS

The elements Lonergan compares in response to Question 21 of S are from pp. 196-204; I have numbered these data. However, the following table is headed by a general comparison from his earlier discussion in S of the psychological analogy. Data from pages other than those specified and from other works of Lonergan’s are noted. My comments and additions are in italic.

Similarities and Differences Between God and Humanity

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<td>THE SUBJECT</td>
<td>We are dealing … with a subject that is a person and, indeed, a person as conscious. Hence “subject” is understood as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and this subject is considered in relation to his intellectual nature. (401.)</td>
<td>The analogy, then, about which we are inquiring is the analogy of the subject as subject; for a temporal subject as well as an internal subject is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, but a temporal subject and an eternal subject are related to their respective intellectual natures in different ways. (401.)</td>
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<td>MATERIALITY MUTABILITY and TEMPORALITY</td>
<td>1. “There is nothing in God that depends intrinsically upon matter. So a likeness of nature between God and human beings can be found only in what is proper to human beings and, within that complex, only in what is strictly spiritual.” (173.)</td>
<td>2. “The characteristics that are proper to human beings are divided into those that are found to be strictly spiritual and those that depend intrinsically upon the body, or upon vegetative life, or upon sentient life. Thus, understanding and judging and willing not only are proper to human beings, but only extrinsically do they depend upon matter. On the other hand, speech is also proper to human beings; but it cannot be exercised without the mouth and tongue and throat, from which it immediately proceeds.” (173; emphases</td>
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369 To suit the format, in some cases the original order of texts has been changed; and, while most are verbatim, others have been edited, some partly paraphrased.
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<td>3. An eternal subject is one that is intrinsically immutable. (401.)</td>
<td>4. A temporal subject is one that is not only mutable but also material. (401.)</td>
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<td>5. Consequently, the <em>now</em> of an eternal subject is always the same ...</td>
<td>... while the <em>now</em> of a temporal subject changes.</td>
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<td>6. For <em>now</em> is to a subject as time is to the motion of a subject ...</td>
<td>7. Note that temporal subjects really and truly change and yet remain the same in their subsistent identity through both substantial changes (death, resurrection) and accidental changes. For a subject is a distinct subsistent, that is, a being in the strict sense, that which is, that which has a substantial essence and other constitutive principles. Therefore, since the subsistent is really and truly constituted by its own intrinsic principles, when they change the subsistent itself really and truly changes; and yet since the subsistent is not adequately the same as its constitutive principles, it remains the same in its subsistent identity even though, within certain limits, its principles may change. (401.)</td>
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<td>... and therefore the <em>now</em> of an immutable subject is always the same ...</td>
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<td>... while the <em>now</em> of a mutable and material subject is continuously flowing. (401)</td>
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<td>SUBSISTENT BEING</td>
<td>God is utterly simple. God has no accidents to change. God is God’s own principle of divinity. No substantial change is possible. By definition one single absolute act of existence, God has no potency to be more than God eternally is.</td>
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8. With these observations in mind, we will relate, first temporal and then eternal subjects, to what they are subjects of in their respective intellectual natures. (403.)

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<td>NATURE</td>
<td>9. First and foremost, eternal subjects as such, since they are immaterial, have no nature other than the intellectual. (411.)</td>
<td>10. Temporal subjects are subjects of another nature besides the intellectual. For an intellectual nature as such is immaterial, and therefore a subject lacking another and material nature would not be a temporal subject. (403.)</td>
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<td>POTENTIAL</td>
<td>12. Nor is it as a potency that they are in the genus of intellectual being: their intellect is the infinite act of all being. (411.)</td>
<td>11. The intellectual nature of a temporal subject is potential, and that in two ways. First, temporal subjects are said to be in the genus of intellectual beings only as potency, since initially our intellect is a tabula rasa, a slate upon which nothing has been written. Second, the actuation of our intellectual nature is, in a sense, only a form and an act presupposing sentient life. It is in a sense a form, in accordance with the first operation of the intellect, that is, insofar as we inquire about sensible data, understand causes in these data, and conceive the causes understood, together with abstract common matter. And it is in a sense an act, in accordance with the second operation of the intellect and the consequent operation of the will, that is, insofar as by reflecting on concepts we ask whether something is so, weigh the evidence, make speculative or practical judgment, and make choices in accord with our judg-</td>
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Apropos of “the infinite act of the totality of being” as it relates to created being, Thomas quotes Augustine (De Trinitate xv): “God does not know all creatures spiritual and temporal because they exist; rather, they exist because God knows them.” ST, I, q. 14, a. 8 c.
CATEGORIES and COMMENT

THE ETERNAL SUBJECT

THE TEMPORAL SUBJECT

ments. This intellectual informing and actuation of sentient life presupposes that sentient life; for unless we are rendered conscious through the operation of our senses, we cannot operate at all by intellect or will, since in this life we actually understand absolutely nothing except in a PHANTASM. (403.)

13. Thus, there is the greatest possible difference between eternal subjects and temporal subjects. (411.)

There is this small similarity, in that both are subjects of an intellectual nature. (411.)

14. Temporal subjects are per accidens the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated before they are per se the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated.

Anything whatever is said to be per se or per accidens depending upon whether it comes to by the intention of the agent or apart from the intention of the agent. Now, if one considers the intention of that agent who created and conserves the nature of a temporal subject and who applies it to its action, it is quite clear that the intellectual nature of a temporal subject is actuated per se. But if one considers the intention of temporal subjects themselves, it is also clear that the actuation of their intellectual nature cannot be intended before they know that they have an intellectual nature; nor is it any less evident that temporal subjects cannot know

SUBJECTIVITY and DEVELOPMENT

15. For them there is not one phase after another, so that they are per accidens subjects of an actuated intellectual nature in an earlier phase, and per se in a later phase, since the infinite act of understanding comprehends from eternity what understanding is and what the norms intrinsic to intelligence are. (411.)
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<td>that they have an intellectual nature before this nature has been actuated. [See POTENCY, OBEDIENTIAL.] (403.)</td>
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<td>16. The eternal subjects are subjects from eternity inasmuch as the infinite intellectual nature understands itself and manifests itself to itself by the Word, and by infinite Love loves itself as understood and manifested. (411.)</td>
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<td>... so the eternal subjects are subjects, one inasmuch as from understanding he speaks the Word, another inasmuch as he is the Word spoken from understanding, and the third in as much as he is Love proceeding from understanding speaking and the Word spoken. (411.)</td>
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<td>... so also the eternal subjects are</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. We become subjects per se, subjects of the second phase, inasmuch as we understand our intellectual nature and manifest it to ourselves by conceiving and judging, and so love it as understood and manifested that we will to follow it in all things ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Just as we attain the perfection of the second phase either more by way of understanding or more by way of belief or more by way of love ...</td>
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<td>so ordered among themselves that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is from the Father by way of intellectual generation, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of holiness. (413.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Just as the divine intellect is as act with respect to all being...</td>
<td>... so the human intellect is as potency with respect to all being. For our intellect asks with regard to everything, ‘What is it?’ and ‘Is it?’ and this natural desire, manifested in questions, does not rest until it knows God by essence. (411.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>The eternal subjects are so ordered among themselves that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is from the Father by way of intellectual generation, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of holiness. (411-13.)</td>
<td>20. We become subjects of an actuated intellectual nature inasmuch as we rise above sensible realities through inquiry, make judgments in accordance with truth through understanding, and spirate an act of will through judging in accordance with goodness, so also eternal subjects are subjects inasmuch as a Word is spoken in accordance with truth, and Love is spirated in accordance with goodness. (411.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>The eternal subjects are subjects, one inasmuch as from understanding he speaks the Word, another inasmuch as he is the Word spoken from understanding, and the third inasmuch as he is Love proceeding from understanding speaking and the Word</td>
<td>22. We depend upon one another both for our very existence through carnal generation and for becoming persons of the second phase through teaching and faith and love. (411.)</td>
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<td>CATEGORIES and COMMENT</td>
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<td>spoken. (411.)</td>
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<td>23. Just as temporal subjects become actually inquiring, understanding, judging, and willing not buy their own intention but by a natural spontaneity, so also the same temporal subjects conduct their intellectual operations spontaneously before they learn how to direct them in accordance with their own understood and approved and chosen intention. For this fully conscious and deliberate self-direction presupposes an exact and very difficult knowledge of their own intellectual nature in all its intrinsic norms and exigencies, and this exact and difficult knowledge can be had only through their intellectual operations. Consequently, until this knowledge is acquired, the intellectual operations of temporal subjects must necessarily be conducted in accord with the spontaneity of that intellectual light which in us is a created participation in …</td>
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<td>... uncreated light. (405.)</td>
<td>24. “In this active intellectual consciousness we can distinguish a general fundamental light and further determinations of the same light. The fundamental and utterly general light is our created participation in uncreated light, the source in us that gives rise to all our wonder, all our inquiry, all our reflection. Again, we attribute</td>
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<td>to this light those most general principles that contain no determination drawn from experience; for example, the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and sufficient reason, or the precept that good must be done and evil must be avoided. Still, what is consciously and intellectually operative in us not only consists in this general light, but is further determined by our own conscious acts. Sensible data determines us after the manner of matter; acts of understanding determine us after the manner of form; grasping evidence, judging, and deliberating further determine us after the manner of second act as intellectually, rationally, and morally conscious and as consciously active and functioning.” (139.)</td>
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<td>25. From this it is clear that there are two phases of a temporal subject: the first is a prior phase, when by one’s natural spontaneity one is the subject of one’s actuated intellectual nature; the second is a subsequent phase, when, as knowing and willing, one is by one’s own intention the subject of one’s intellectual nature both as actuated and as to be actuated further. (405.)</td>
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<td>26. The condition of a temporal subject is such that one can hardly make the transition from the first</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>phase to the second apart from the influence of other temporal subjects.</td>
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<td>Temporal subjects intellectually inform and actuate their sense life by their own intention to the extent that they experience a true self-revelation and a genuine self-acceptance. This revelation takes place either concretely and symbolically or technically and exactly: concretely and symbolically, as a particular human culture or way of life develops as delineated and expressed in its mores, customs, precepts, and stories; technically and exactly, as human nature is studied in science and philosophy. But it is obvious that both objectifications of human nature presuppose collaboration on the part of many; and it is also clear that all temporal subjects are greatly helped through the influence of others to come to a willing acceptance of this revelation of their human nature. (405.)</td>
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<td>27. The eternal subjects are subjects inasmuch as the first speaks the Word of understanding, inasmuch as the second subject is a Word that is spoken from understanding and, finally, inasmuch as the third subject is the Love that proceeds both from the understanding that speaks and from the Word spoken. (411.)</td>
<td>28. There are three ways in which this transition from the prior to the subsequent phase of a temporal subject can be made. First, it is possible for temporal subjects, whether through symbolic representation or technically, to understand their intellectual nature along with that nature’s intrinsic norms, and because they understand it, to affirm and approve of it, and because they ap-</td>
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### Categories and Comment

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<td>prove of it, to embrace it by their own will and to intend to follow its norms. In the second way, temporal subjects, although they may themselves have little understanding of their own nature, can nevertheless hear and believe the words of another who does understand, and by their own will and intention live according to what they believe, and finally even arrive at an understanding of it, in accordance with the dictum, ‘Believe in order to understand.’ In the third way, temporal subjects can be so intimately one with another through love that this loving union leads to oneness in believe, and oneness in believe in turn leads to understanding. Hence, if we look at the ways by which temporal subjects become persons of the subsequent phase, we see that some come to it more by way of understanding, others more by way of the true word, and still others by way of genuine love. (405-07.)</td>
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### Divine Relations of Origin and Human Origen

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<tr>
<td>29. Just as we depend upon one another both for our very existence through carnal generation and for becoming persons of the second phase through teaching and faith and love …,</td>
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30. … so also the eternal subjects are so ordered among themselves that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is from the Father by way of
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<td>intellectual generation, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of holiness. (411-13.)</td>
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30. In all these there is a similarity, but in each of them the dissimilarity is much greater.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTELLECTUAL POTENCY and INTELLECTUAL ACT</th>
<th>31. There is an infinite distance between an intellect that is to all being as potency …</th>
<th>32. … and an intellect that is to all being as act. (413.)</th>
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<td>33. One who understands by an infinite act is not moved to understanding by inquiring about sensible data. (413.)</td>
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<td>We are moved to know created being’s two dimensions via the senses (the sensible qualities of things) and the intellect (the intelligibility of these sensible data).</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>34. “Just as God by simple divine knowledge knows also beings that are composite so …</td>
<td>… we through a knowledge that is composite know also simple realities.” (OPCC, 83.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIMITATION and TRANSCENDENCE</td>
<td>35. An eternal subject is never caught in a tension between the poles of liberation from animal limitations and the understanding of intellectual nature. (413.)</td>
<td>A temporal subject always stands between the poles of liberation from animal limitations and the intelligence of intellectual nature. We live and develop towards authenticity “in the tension between limitation and transcendence.” (In, 478.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SELF-KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>36. Nor is he first conscious of himself by way of a preliminary</td>
<td>As stated (nos. 14, 16), we develop from being a subject per accidens to</td>
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370 For an interpretation of “the law of limitation and transcendence,” see Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) index, s.v. “Limitation and transcendence.”
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<td>and unstructured awareness in order later clearly and distinctly to manifest himself to himself in a word. (413.)</td>
<td>being a subject per se.</td>
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<tr>
<td>37. He does not proceed through intermediate acts to more perfect acts of understanding, or speak many words, or love in many acts, nor he is capable of failing in his procession by way of truth or in his procession by way of holiness, but the selfsame eternal and infinite act is an act of understanding and of affirming and of loving. (413.)</td>
<td>To make of ourselves authentic subjects, we must through many acts strive in cooperation with God's grace to understand, know, will, and love the true and good, and become holy, i.e., have Charity in us.</td>
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<tr>
<td>38. Infinite act is not specified by finite objects but rather by that which is being by essence and true by essence and good by essence. Nor is there here a real distinction between substance and accident, or between existing and operating, or between subject and act. (413.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>39. Nor is there one constitution of the subject's existence and another constitution for a person of the second phase to exist by his own intention in accordance with his intellectual nature. (413.)</td>
<td>[22. We depend upon one another both for our very existence through carnal generation and for becoming persons of the second phase through teaching and faith and love.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. The Speaker is not understanding without being at the same time infinite affirmation and infinite love; and the Word is not the spoken truth without be-</td>
<td>Keep in mind that there is no before and after in God. God is eternally one and three. We distinguish an order of origin in what is nonetheless eternal-ly a triune God who by nature cannot</td>
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<td>ing at the same time infinite understanding and infinite love; and proceeding Love is not love without being at the same time infinite understanding and infinite affirmation. (413.)</td>
<td>change. Notions of “a greater absolute” or “a diminished absolute” are irrational, and change to be change must add or take away.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

41. The eternal subjects are from eternity one and the same infinite act; and through those very emanations by way of truth and of holiness they are subjects and distinct from one another and ordered among themselves in an order that is an order of origin and, at the same time, intellectual and personal. (413.)

In God there is but one act; the persons are distinguished by relations to one another; the distinct relations are the persons who relate each in his own way to the “one dynamic consciousness” each possesses in his own way. Lonergan conceives the one divine essence as dynamic consciousness. This is the hypothesis from which he draws conclusions that are certain, theological knowledge that squares with church teaching.

It is through the analogy of our operations of knowing and loving that we can gain “an imperfect, analogous, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, and most profitable theological understanding” (3) of the mystery of the Holy Trinity.

42. “Having established these [similarities and] differences, there immediately arise a host of objections and difficulties that at first may seem to be but the expression of a rather vague and almost unconscious intellectual dissatisfaction. But if fully adverted to, clearly expressed, and systematically solved, they ultimately lead us to the point where we apprehend as an intelligible unity all those [similarities and] differences and systematic solutions to all those difficulties.”

371 Lonergan is discussing the possibility of our gaining a positive understanding of the term infinite, even though we are finite and cannot apprehend the infinite as infinite. The quoted remarks, however, along with my interpolations, are apropos of the table’s entire range of comparisons between us and God as it relates to systematic theology of God, and to Lonerg-
One can in due course verify in light of chapters 2 and 3 above that the table re-
wards repeated readings. In them the same data appear in specific contexts wherein fur-
ther explanation enriches the reader’s understanding of technical terms and concepts,
especially the central activity of the psychological analogy, understanding understand-
ing. The analogy is not some abstract entity serving as a template of rational argument;
the analogy is our own subjectivity. Thus the inquiring Christian can consciously verify
and thereby self-appropriate the analogy’s continual fruitfulness in systematic reflection
on the mystery of God.
APPENDIX II: DOGMATICS AND SYSTEMATICS COMPARED

The Two Movements whereby One Proceeds to the Goals of Theology

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DOGMATICS</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Since we have distinguished two goals, namely, certitude and understanding, we have to distinguish as well two movements. We call one dogmatic, the other systematic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. We call one dogmatic …</td>
<td>3. … the other systematic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. How these two movements are related to each other can be clarified from the very notion of science. Science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes; but before things are known through their causes, the causes have to be discovered; and as long as the causes have not yet been discovered we rely on the ordinary prescientific knowledge which we apprehend things and describe them even before knowing their causes.</td>
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<td>5. So the first movement toward acquiring science begins from an ordinary prescientific description of things and ends in the knowledge of their causes. This first movement has been called:</td>
<td>6. The other movement starts from the causes that have been discovered and ends by understanding things in their causes. This movement is called:</td>
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<td>7. (1) analysis, because it starts from what is apprehended in a confused sort of way and moves to well-defined causes</td>
<td>8. (1) synthesis, because fundamental reasons are employed both to define things and to deduce their properties.</td>
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372 The primary data come from sections six and seven of S’s chap. one (pp. 59-77). S makes 5 general points of comparison of the two ways and follows with comment specific to theology. I have interwoven these two treatments and, to avoid visual confusion, have placed the latter comments in italic.

373 Despite the classical definition of science, its meaning in Lonergan’s systematics is congruent with the modern notion of science.

374 Editorial Note 32 reads: “[In (1) under the first movement, Lonergan had spoken of ‘well-defined causes or reasons.’ Here we have only ‘reasons,’ but that is not to exclude causes. With regard to God, of course, there are no causes, only reasons, but here ‘reasons’ can be taken to include anything that is arrived at when the analysis conducted in the first movement terminates successfully.]”
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<th>DOGMATICS</th>
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<td>or reasons.</td>
<td>10. The systematic part of theology can be conceived as similar to the way of synthesis. … It is, moreover, a way of synthesis in that, starting from one principle or another, it lays out all the rest in an orderly fashion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. The dogmatic way can be conceived as similar to the analytic way. … it is a way of analysis in that it moves from historical Hebraic particularity to generally known and well-defined reasons.</td>
<td>11. (2) the way of composition, because causes are employed to produce things or to constitute them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. (2) the way of resolution, because it resolves things into their causes.</td>
<td>12. (2) the way of composition, because causes are employed to produce things or to constitute them.</td>
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<td>13. It is a way of resolution in that it discerns the divine mysteries in the multiplicity of what has been revealed, and gives expression to those mysteries.</td>
<td>14. It is a way of composition in that it composes the whole of a divine mystery from a series of aspects and a multiplicity of reasons.</td>
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<td>15. (3) the way of discovery, because previously unknown causes are discovered.</td>
<td>16. (3) the way of teaching or of learning, because it begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science.</td>
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<td>17. It is a temporal way because a universal expression of the mysteries is attained only in the course of time.</td>
<td>18. It is the way in which teachers teach and students learn, at least if it is true that for something truly to be learned it must be understood and that the only way to reach understanding is to start with that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else.</td>
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<td>19. (4) the way of certitude, because the ordinary prescientific knowledge of things is most obvious to us, and so the arguments we find most certain begin from such knowledge and go on to demonstrate matters that are more re-</td>
<td>20. (4) the way of probability, partly because it often attains no more than probability, but also because people frequently have no clear discernment of just where or when they have reached certitude.</td>
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<tr>
<td>mote and more obscure to us.</td>
<td>21. <em>It is a way of certitude in that it expresses the same truth with the same meaning as what was revealed by God.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>22. <em>It is a way of probability because, rather than deducing certainties from what has been revealed, it derives what has been revealed from some prior hypothetical supposition.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>23. <em>(5) the temporal way, because causes are not usually discovered instantaneously, any more than they are discovered by just anyone or without a certain amount of good luck.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>24. <em>(5) the way of logical simultaneity, because, once the principles have been clearly laid down, all the rest takes comparatively little time; it can be accomplished in a few short deductions and applications.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>25. <em>It is a temporal way because a universal expression of the mysteries is attained only in the course of time.</em></td>
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<td>26. <em>It is a way of logical simultaneity in that, once in one’s wisdom one discovers the order of the questions, and once in one’s understanding one grasps a principle, then the conclusions and the applications follow of their own accord. This derivation of conclusions may be deficient in terms of logical rigor, since it proceeds from a principle that is only imperfectly and obscurely understood; but that does not mean that the process of arriving at conclusions from a systematic principle is the kind of thing that proceeds one step at a time over a long stretch of years, with a certain amount of luck.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>27. For examples of the two ways, compare the history of a science like physics or chemistry with the textbooks from which these sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sensible data. But when one goes to a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from which three hundred thousand compounds are derived, or, in physics, Newton’s laws, Riemannian geometry, or those remarkable quantum operators. The reason for this difference is, of course, that … inquiring, investig-</td>
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gating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements. …

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<td>28. … inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, …</td>
<td>29. … while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. While we have acknowledged in the dogmatic way something of the process of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and of a temporal way …</td>
<td>31. … and in the systematic way something of the process of synthesis, of composition, of teaching and learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity …</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. … we cannot ignore the fact that these terms are used analogously. Analysis and synthesis are understood in one way in physics and in another way in chemistry; they are understood in one way in the natural sciences, in another way in the human sciences, and in another way in theological disciplines. The way we understand the nature of material things is different from the way we understand the words of Plato; and when we understand Plato, we next judge whether what Plato held is true. But …</td>
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<td>33. … we believe that the word of God is true even before we investigate what it teaches.</td>
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<td>34. Therefore the dogmatic way has its own mode of being a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way …</td>
<td>35. … and the systematic way has likewise its own mode of being a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching or learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>36. How intimately these two ways are linked must be particularly stressed because there never seem to be lacking those whose diminished wisdom is ready and eager to take a part for the whole and to pass it on as such to others. Analysis and synthesis, resolution and composition, discovery and teaching, certitude and the understanding of what is certain, lengthy investigation and a brief compendium of results – these constitute a single whole. Those who choose but one part and neglect the other not only lose the whole but also spoil even the part that they have chosen.</td>
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<td>37. Those who neglect the dogmatic part</td>
<td>38. … in order to cultivate the systematic more profoundly are in fact neglecting</td>
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<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>what they are seeking to understand. Soon pseudo-problems emerge and pseudo-systems start to sprout, systems that dispute ever so subtly about everything while overlooking the understanding of the mysteries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>39. But those who neglect the systematic part ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. ... in order to hold faithfully and exactly to the dogmatic so resolve the one divine revelation into many different mysteries that no move can be made back from this multiplicity to unity; from what God has revealed for all to understand, they devise in the course of time a technical expression of that revelation, but they do not grasp how these technical matters are to be taught and learned. They know with certainty many technical matters ...</td>
<td>41. ... but choose to overlook the understanding of what they are certain of.</td>
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<td>42. They rummage through the past collecting and accumulating technically established information concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers, the theologians ...</td>
<td>43. ... but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered, intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this ...</td>
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<td>44. ... they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some form of biblicism that is itself hardly secure.</td>
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<td>45. We have stated that the dogmatic way and the systematic way are distinct yet con-</td>
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<td>connected. Now we will state in greater detail how they are compared to each other. And for concrete examples, we will draw on the brief basic outlines of trinitarian theology.</td>
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<td>46. In Dogmatics, one considers ...</td>
<td>47. In Systematics, one considers ...</td>
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| 48. (1) the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit narrated in the New Testament. | 49. (1) consideration is of the one God [ST, 1, qq. 2–26.].
   “If one aims at generating in pupils the limited understanding of mystery that can be attained in this life, one directs one’s attention not to demonstrations of existence but to the synthetic or constructive procedure in which human intelligence forms and develops concepts. First, one works out in detail the notion of God without asking any trinitarian questions.” (“TU” 122.) |
| 50. (2) there is the trinitarian dogma, which affirms, simultaneously, against the Sabellians three who are really distinct and against the subordinationists one sole God (DB 48–51, DS 112–15, ND 301–303). | 51. (2) in the one God, who understands, knows, and loves, there are posited intellectual emanations. |
| 52. (3) there is the consubstantiality of the three (DB 54, 86; DS 125, 150; ND 7, 305) “Anyone who has attempted to find rigorous proofs for trinitarian theses will agree, I think, that the most effective procedure is to begin from the dogmatic affirmation of three consubstantial persons ....” (“TU” 122.) | 53. (3) on the emanations are based the relations [ST, 1, q. 28]. |
| 54. (4) there are the real personal properties, which were worked out by the Cappadocians. | 55. (4) supposing the emanations and the relations [ST, 1, q. 29], the persons are considered all together [ibid., qq. 29-32]. |
60. (7) the persons are related to one another [ST, 1, q. 42] and to us [ibid., q. 43].

61. That said, let us proceed to the comparison.

62. (1) It is clear that the dogmatic and the systematic ways are concerned with the same realities.

63. The missions of the Son and of the Spirit narrated in the New Testament ... 64. ... are identical with the missions discussed by St Thomas in question 43 of the Prima pars of the Summa.

65. (2) Although each movement treats the same realities, still each posits the realities in a different order.

66. What is prior in one ... 67. ... is subsequent in the other.

“A concrete instance of this order is offered by the questions in the Summa theologiae on the Blessed Trinity, for they open with the preliminary remark that in the ordo doctrinae [of teaching] one begins from the processions, goes on to the relations, and in the third place treats of the divine persons.” (“TU,” 121.)
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<th>DOGMATICS</th>
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<tr>
<td>68. Thus, Aquinas ends with the missions …</td>
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<td>69. … while the New Testament starts with them.</td>
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<td>70. The patristic inquiry ends with the psychological analogy ...</td>
<td>71. … while Aquinas starts with it.</td>
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<td>72. The reason for this inversion is completely universal: anyone who inquires or removes doubts starts from what is most obvious in order to conclude to what is more remote and more obscure ...</td>
<td>73. … but anyone who is teaching starts with those notions that can be understood without presupposing the understanding of other notions, so that, by gradually increasing the complexity, one might arrive at an understanding of the concrete.</td>
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<td>74. (3) Although the same realities are treated in each movement, they are conceived differently in each.</td>
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<td>75. included in the way of synthesis is the entire explanatory element toward which ...</td>
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<td>76. … the way of analysis proceeds one step at a time. This is behind the common distinction in the manuals between ‘the fact,’ which they prove from authorities ...</td>
<td>77. … and ‘the understanding of the fact,’ in regard to which more often than not they show theologians arguing with one another.</td>
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<td>78. (4) This formal difference of concepts increases as we compare the elements that are prior in the dogmatic way with the elements that are subsequent in the systematic.</td>
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<td>79. The later an element is posited in the systematic movement, the more it presupposes and includes the whole previous cumulative understanding, ...</td>
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<td>80. … But the earlier an element is posited in the dogmatic movement, the more it expresses a simple narration of fact and the more it avoids any controversial understanding.</td>
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<td>81. (5) The same formal difference of concepts diminishes as we compare the elements that are subsequent in the dogmatic way with the elements that are prior in the systematic.</td>
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<td>82. For the dogmatic way moves toward the attainment of understanding, and once it has attained understanding it holds onto it and adds it to previous achievements ...</td>
<td>83. ... and the systematic way does not immediately express all of this understanding at the very beginning.</td>
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<td>84. Thus, there is no great difference between ...</td>
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<td>85. ... the psychological analogy at which the dogmatic way concludes ...</td>
<td>86. ... and the same psychological analogy from which the systematic way begins.</td>
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<td>87. (6) The proofs of the two ways differ, partly because of the formally different concepts, but also because of the different goals intended.</td>
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<td>88. The dogmatic way proves that relations certainly exist in God, arguing from the names of ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ from the necessity that any distinctions in God be purely relative, and from the notional acts. But the dogmatic way is not aware of the relations insofar as they are somehow known prior to the persons [ST, 1, q. 29, Introduction; see q. 27, Introduction; also Bernard Lonergan, ‘Theology and Understanding,’ Gregoriana num 35 (1954) 637 (now in Collection at 121–22)]; nor does it begin to think about the basis of the relations until it has es-</td>
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<td>89. The systematic way, in contrast, proceeds from the foundation of the processions to posit the relations, and since it has not yet formed a systematic conception of the persons, it is only by an inappropriate anticipation that it would argue from the names, properties, and notional acts of the persons.</td>
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<td>established the fact that relations do exist.</td>
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<td>90. The difference is completely universal: every argument proceeds from something prior and moves to something subsequent; but ...</td>
<td>91. ... what are prior in the systematic way ...</td>
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<td>92. ... are subsequent in the dogmatic ...</td>
<td>93. ... and what are subsequent in the systematic way ...</td>
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<td>94. ... are prior in the dogmatic.</td>
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<td>95. Thus, anyone who tries to use a blend of the two at the same time will be compelled to run through practically the entire treatise in every individual thesis.</td>
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<td>96. (7) Theological notes or censures belong properly to the dogmatic way [On theological notes, see the entry ‘Theological Notes’ by William Henn, in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, de: Michael Glazier, 1987) 1009-11.]. The dogmatic way is the same as the way of certitude, beginning from what is most obvious and moving to a demonstration of what is more remote and obscure. Theological notes or censures are intended to characterize the degree of certitude or probability proper to individual propositions. Such characterizations belong in dogmatic theology as in their proper home.</td>
<td>97. Is there anything in the systematic way that corresponds to the role of theological notes or censures in the dogmatic? Let me suggest that an answer lies in discovering the conditions of understanding. In the systematic way the understanding of some points is more necessary than the understanding of others: some points are such that, unless they are understood, nothing else in the entire treatise can be understood; neglecting to understand other points may deprive us only of part of the understanding of the entire treatise; and finally, some points are included just so that others may be more easily understood or that the connections with other questions may be clearer or that we may proceed more promptly to the applications. These distinctions belong to the</td>
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<td>general art of pedagogy and have long been employed by good teachers. But mentioning them here perhaps illustrates how inappropriate it is to pay much attention in systematic theology to theological notes. The proper goal of the systematic way is not certitude but understanding those things that are certain. And not in everyone is the desire to understand so strong that this proper goal draws their minds away from other considerations. The value of the systematic way is not perceived at the beginning, nor can it be fully appreciated even when the goal is attained unless concrete comparisons are made to show the vast gulf that separates a mind full of certitudes but empty of anything scientific from a mind in which the synthetic grasp of all the issues gives form, order, and direction to its certitudes. Finally, the security and solidity of the systematic way cannot be measured by ordinary criteria.</td>
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<td>98. One who aims at certitude will appeal to as many witnesses of the common faith and the common teaching as possible …</td>
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<td>99. … but one who aims at understanding can safely ignore the multitude and attend to the most wise. Thus, holy mother church proposes as guide for our studies neither all theologians equally nor even the majority opinion of theologians, but only St Thomas.</td>
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<td>100. (8) The opinions of one’s opponents play a different role in the dogmatic way from their role in the systematic. To refute adversaries, obviously one must attend to their teaching in the sense in which they intend it; otherwise one earns the reputation of easily defeating straw men.</td>
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<td>101. And so in the dogmatic way, where all doubts are to be removed and where</td>
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<td>102. But to eradicate those errors and keep others from being deceived by</td>
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<td><strong>DOGMATICS</strong></td>
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<td>perfect certitude is sought, the opinions of one’s opponents have to be set forth in their full historical background.</td>
<td>them, one must seek the root whence the error is able to assume the semblance of truth, and there lay the axe. It makes no difference whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots, since here one is concerned not with the inmost mind of one or other historical figure but with the minds of people in the present and in the future. Consequently in the systematic way we should pay attention not so much to adversaries as to the roots of errors [In the introduction to the dogmatic part of this treatise on the Trinity, written later than this systematic part, Lonergan distinguishes ‘dogmatic’ from ‘positive,’ and assigns to the positive theologian this concern for the accurate representation of the minds of individual figures of history. In the dogmatic part, then, Lonergan treats historical figures and movements in the way he here describes as ‘systematic.’ He uses a review of history to perform the ‘dialectic’ function of going to the roots of error, without a profound concern ‘whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots.’].</td>
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103. We have distinguished two ways, the dogmatic and the systematic. While they investigate the same realities, they proceed in contrary and opposed orders, they use formally distinct concepts, they employ different methods of proof, they have different relations to theological notes and censures, and they consider opponents and errors in different ways.

104. “Though it generates neither new certitude nor perfect understanding, the *ordo doctrinae* is most fruitful. With some approximation to a single view it gives rise to an apprehension of the exact con-
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<td>tent and the exact implications of the many mysteries in their many aspects. That single view both simplifies and enriches one’s own spiritual life and it bestows upon one’s teaching the enviable combination of sureness of doctrine with versatility of expression. Finally, the single view remains, for it is fixed upon one’s intellectual memory.” (“TU” 125.)</td>
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<td>105. “In conclusion, two ... relations between the teaching authority of the church and speculative theology may be mentioned.</td>
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<td>106. On the one hand, the dogmatic pronouncements of the church draw upon the previous formulations of theologians, as might be illustrated ever more abundantly by running through the councils from Nicea to the Vatican. On the other hand, with each new dogmatic pronouncement the basis of the via inventionis receives an increment in clarity and precision that is passed on to its conclusions ...</td>
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<td>107. ... to result in a corresponding increment in the exactitude of the ordo doctrinae and in the understanding of revelation.” (“TU” 127.)</td>
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Keep in mind that each of the four derived categories is related to the topical category, and that the approach is not only scientific and philosophical but also ethical and theological, all inclusive.

1 What are the data? Corresponding to the cognitive level of experience, the metaphysical element of potency, the methodic categories Research and Communication, and description in the genetic sequence of expression, this category denotes the relevant data.

2 What do the data mean? Corresponding to the cognitive level of understanding, the metaphysical element of form, the methodic categories Interpretation and Systematics, and explanation in the genetic sequence of expression, this category denotes the scientifically explained meaning of the data.

3 What are the facts? Corresponding to the cognitive level of judgment of truth, the metaphysical element of act, and the methodic categories History and Doctrines, and fact in the genetic sequence of expression, this category denotes what is so. This concludes the account quoad se.

4 What are they for? Corresponding to the level of decision, the methodic categories Dialectic and Foundations, and value in the genetic sequence of expression, the name of this category will denote immanent and transcendent finality, the meaning of the category quoad nos and quoad cetera.

Were the topical category Cosmology as such (as illustrated below) and the approach again theological, one would proceed in the same way to generate four categories to describe and explain Cosmology. One could divide the topic of cosmology into four sciences that study the total natural environment; or into four categories of enquiry into the phenomenal world: aesthetics, science, philosophy, theology. There is no recipe, only the heuristic anticipation (indeed, certitude) that a complete account of the originating category will synthesize four distinct contents whose features we also anticipate.
## APPENDIX IV: THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN GOOD

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<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
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<th>ENDS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Potentiality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actuation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ends</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Individuals ... have capacities for operating.” (M, 48.)</td>
<td>“By operating [people] procure themselves instances of the particular good.” (M 48.)</td>
<td>“To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It follows some settled pattern ... fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional frame-work.” (M 48.) “Individuals do not just operate to meet their needs but cooperate to meet one another’s needs.” (M 52.)</td>
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<td>“The capacities of individuals, for the performance of operations, because they are plastic and perfectible ...”</td>
<td>“Institutional roles and tasks. Besides the institutional basis of cooperation, there is also the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out.” (M 48-49.)</td>
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<td>“... admit development and skills and, indeed, of the very skills demanded by ...”</td>
<td>“... admit development and skills and, indeed, of the very skills demanded by ...”</td>
<td>“This concrete manner, in which cooperation actually is working out, is what is meant by a good of order.” (M 49.)</td>
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<th>9. <strong>Liberty.</strong> “Liberty means … not indeterminism but self-determination. … The process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it.” (<em>M</em> 50.)</th>
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<td>10. <strong>Orientation. Conversion.</strong> (<em>M</em>, 48.) Orientation is to value. “As orientation is, so to speak, the direction of development, so conversion is a change of direction and, indeed, a change for the better. One frees oneself from the unauthentic. One grows in authenticity.” (<em>M</em> 52.)</td>
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<td>11. <strong>Personal relations.</strong> “Personal relations vary from intimacy to ignorance, from love to exploitation, from respect to contempt, from friendliness to enmity. They bind a community together, or divide it into factions, or tear it apart.” (<em>M</em> 51.)</td>
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<td>12. <strong>Terminal value.</strong> “[They] are the values that are chosen; true instances of the particular good, a true good of order, a true scale of preferences regarding values and satisfactions. Correlative … are the originating values that do the choosing; they are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices.” (<em>M</em> 51.)</td>
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Act: This is not to be defined through genus and species, but its meaning is to be stated by means of a familiar proportion, namely:

\[
\text{ACT} : \text{FORM} : \text{POTENCY} :: \\
\text{SEEING} : \text{SIGHT} : \text{EYE} :: \\
\text{HEARING} : \text{SOUND} : \text{EAR} :: \\
\text{UNDERSTANDING} : \text{INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES} : \text{POSSIBLE INTELLECT} :: \\
\text{WILLING} : \text{HABIT OF WILLINGNESS} : \text{WILL} :: \\
\text{EXISTING} : \text{SUBSTANTIAL FORM} : \text{PRIME MATTER}
\]

In Scholasticism: 1. Perfection or a perfection; what is fully real, finished, or fulfilling; an actuality. 2. Thought of as influencing potency in some way. A determining principle; the intrinsic principle which confers a definite perfection on a being; hence, a form. 3. The perfection resulting from an action. 4. Activity, operation, action, or second act of a power. Opposite of potency.

\textit{Act of the imperfect}. A real change; the gaining of a new act and the privation of an old form.

\textit{Act of the perfect}. 1. An immanent activity, living action. 2. Especially, an intentional change.

\textit{First act}. 1. The intrinsic fundamental perfection of a being in any order. 2. The first actuality (in a series) that determines any passive potency to be or to be something specific. Hence, the same being may have several first acts, but each in different orders; existence will be first act in the order of being, substantial form will be first in the order of essence or nature, the power will be first in the order of activity.

\textit{Second act}. A determination or perfection added to a being which already possesses the first act, whether of existence or of form or of a particular power; e.g., intellect and will with respect to the soul itself; acts of the will with respect to the will itself; accidents of a substance. Hence, a second act presupposes and perfects another act, and is usually an accident.

Action: According to Aristotle, action is defined as the act of this one inasmuch as it is in this one, that is to say, the act which belongs to the patient inasmuch as it is received in the patient. Since the same act both proceeds from the agent and is received in the patient, it follows that both action and passion are really the same as motion. AND: Action is the act of this as proceeding from this, i.e., the act of the mover as from the mover, while passion is the act of this as being in this, i.e., the act of the moved as present in the moved.

Accident: A being whose essence requires naturally that it exist in another.

Agent: An efficient cause.

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Agent intellect: The immediate principle of the intellect that makes sensible things actually intelligible. It has the power to abstract from the material and singular, of illuminating the PHANTASM and making the potentially intelligible actually intelligible. This produces the intelligible SPECIES in the POSSIBLE INTELLECT.

Amor, Dilectio, Amare, Diligere: Of themselves these terms imply a relation merely to the object loved; and since this relation is not one of origin, these names are essential, as was said above with respect to the true and truth. Nonetheless, just as every formal truth proceeds from a grasp of evidence, so, too, every intellectual love proceeds from a judgment of value. Thus, if one attends more to the reality than to the name, it is easy to discern proper names. For just as we love, not because we are our own very love, but because we are the intrinsic principles of our love, so, too, the Father and the Son are properly called “those who love notionally” inasmuch as they are the principle whence proceeds the divine love. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is properly named “proceeding love” or “notional love”, for these terms imply a relation of origin. Therefore, when one asks whether the Father and the Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit, if “through the Holy Spirit” is taken in the sense as principle of love, the answer is negative; if “through the Holy Spirit” is taken in the sense of that which proceeds, as the tree blossoms through its blossoms, one must further distinguish; if essential love is understood, the answer is again negative; if notional love is being understood, then the answer is positive.

Analogy: A type of comparison in which the same is differently verified in the different cases. Resemblance without identity. A false analogy ignores significant differences in the different cases.

Appetite: A form and especially a power that has an inclination toward an object suitable to itself or away from an unsuitable object. The will is an appetite that follows reason, so its object is value, i.e., intelligible good.

Appropriation: What is common to the Three is attributed to one person without excluding the others. In trinitarian theology we speak of the different persons by attributing certain names, qualities, or operations to one of the persons; not, however, to the exclusion of the others but in preference to the others. The qualities and names thus appropriated belong essentially to all the persons. Thus we consider the Father to be particularly characterized by omnipotence, the Son by wisdom, and the Holy Spirit by love, though we know that by nature the three have equal omnipotence, wisdom, and love. In discussions of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the Father is spoken of as the one who created us, the Holy Spirit the one who sanctifies us. This cannot be so, since all actions which terminate outside of God must be attributed to God’s nature which is one and common equally to the three divine persons. Hence, it is not true that the Father created us any more than the Son or the Holy Spirit. This way of speaking is permitted by the Church and is called appropriation.

Being: In the general sense, that which in any way is (whether in the state of existence, in potency, in the power of its cause, in the mind, in the imagination, or in mere statement). 2. Logic. The affirmation in a proposition; the being that belongs to the copula “is” or “are.” 3. Metaphysics. The real; that to which existence belongs; that whose act is existence; an existing thing or
some real principle or state in an existing thing. Lonergan defines being as whatever can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed; the object of the pure desire to know, thus everything that is.

Cause: General definition applying to all causes: a principle from which something originates with dependence; a being which in some way directly influences the being or change of something else; that which in some way gives existence to another; the reason for the existence of another being. The principle of causality: Every contingent being requires a cause distinct from itself to explain its existence.

Change: The actualization of a being in potency inasmuch as it is in potency; the movement of a movable being inasmuch as it is movable; the passing from potency to act. In the proper sense, change is always from something and into something, and so requires a term from which and a term to which; and it involves the gaining of a new form and the privation of an old form. 2. *Improper and extended sense.* Any newness in a being; any origin of a difference.

Change, substantial: Change in the *substance* of a thing because of change of its substantial form; the actualization of a new substantial form in a subject and the perishing of the previous substantial form or its return to the potency of matter. See *form, substantial*.

Concept: The inner expression of what is intended by inquiry (heuristic concept) or of what is grasped by an act of understanding (proper concept). Conception, concept, conceived are used in referring to what arises from the act of understanding. “It is of the nature of a mental concept to proceed from something else, namely from the knowledge of the person conceiving.” *ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1 c.. “Conception is an effect of the act of understanding ... something expressed by intellectual knowledge.” *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2. “A word does not arise from our intellect except in so far as it is in act; but as soon as it is in act, a word is conceived in it.” *CG*, IV, 14, par. 3. “For this intelligible reality (God) is identical with the understanding intellect, whose emanation is the conceived Word.” Ibid., IV, 11, par. 14, etc..

Condition: A c. is necessary to constitute or bring about some reality even though not itself a constitutive or effective cause. A c. is either antecedent or simultaneous or consequent inasmuch as its necessity either precedes or accompanies or is consequent to the constitution or production of some other.

Conscious: Present to the subject.

Conscious originating: Within consciousness act has origin from act; real, natural, and conscious act arises from real, natural, and conscious act. Thus, when one sees some huge and ferocious dog on the loose, one immediately experiences fear. Just as seeing, so also fearing is a real, natural, and conscious act; and there is present a relationship between these two acts: one fears the dog because one sees it.

Consciousness: In every sensitive and intellective act, be it apprehensive or appetitive, there simultaneously occur: (1) the fact that an object is intended; (2) the fact that the subject who does the intending is rendered present to self; and (3) the fact that the subject’s act is rendered present to the subject. These latter two presences are to be sharply distinguished
from the presence of an object. The object is present as what is being intended; the act as present is that whereby the object is being intended by the intending subject; and the subject is present as the one who does the intending. Likewise, this presence of the subject through consciousness is to be distinguished from the presence of this same subject through reflection or introspection: for by means of reflection or introspection the subject is rendered present to an object, as that which is being intended; and this would be unable to happen were the subject not already present to self through consciousness, present to self as a subject, present to self as the one who does the intending.

Consciousness, intellectual: This is constituted by acts both of intellect and of will, and it prescinds from sensitive acts. It is true that a single person has just one consciousness; and yet this consciousness is not homogeneous, for it is differentiated in accord with its acts.

Consciousness, in virtue of: When conscious act arises from conscious act, then consciousness itself plays the role as mediator with the result that: (1) the conscious subject as conscious is the *principium-quod* (the principle which) of the procession; (2) the conscious act as conscious is the *principium-quo* (the principle by which) of the procession; (3) the procession itself has a certain intrinsic modality which is lacking in an unconscious (e.g., a chemical) procession; and (4) the act that proceeds is in a certain way consciously because of and in accord with the *PRINCIPIATING ACT*. Thus there is excluded that phenomenalism of consciousness that would deny causality or a proper mode of causality to consciousness.

Consciousness, in virtue of intellectual: When act consciously arises from act, sensitive consciousness mediates differently from intellectual consciousness. From sensitive act there arises a different sensitive act in accord with some particular natural law; but from intellectual act there arises a different intellectual act in accord with conscious and transcendental exigencies of intellect itself. These exigencies are not bound to some particular nature, but they are related to the totality of the intelligible, of the true, of being, and of the good.

Consciousness, within: That is to say, within a reality on the basis of a consideration that is not metaphysical but psychological. What from the metaphysical point of view is an accident that inheres in a subject or an act that is received in a potency is, from a psychological point of view, a conscious event within the field of consciousness. Nonetheless, let the reader note that a psychological consideration is not distinct from a metaphysical consideration in such a way that the “conscious” is an addition to “being”; for “being” is not a genus, and what is thought to be above, outside, or beyond “being” is quite simply nothing. The “conscious,” therefore, merely denotes a being in a certain degree of perfection.

Contingent: That which can either be or not be; for example, creation, the actual economy of salvation.

Distinct: Elements are distinct if one is not the other.

Distinction: A distinction denotes the lack of identity between things, parts, concepts, or terms; difference. Opposite: identity, sameness.

Distinction, major real: It is made between two separate or complete wholes.

Distinction, minor real: It is made between parts, between whole and part, or between substance
and its accidents.

Distinction, rational: Distinction of reason, or logical distinction, whether purely mental or virtual. A virtual distinction is made between different aspects of only one essence or perfection where the being is actually one and indivisible but is rich enough to present various aspects of its reality to the mind; e.g., the distinction between the divine attributes. It is sometimes called a metaphysical distinction or, again, a logical distinction with a foundation in reality.

Distinction, real. A true lack of identity between things, or between their parts and principles. One as real is not the other as real.

Divine essence: Deitas, divinity: Since there is no real composition in God, this deitas is God; and so, with respect to what is meant, the divine essence denotes God inasmuch as God is common to three persons, or it denotes God inasmuch as God is Father, Son, and Spirit.

Efficient cause: What by its activity or exercise of power produces existence or change in another.

Emanation: Any type of origin.

Emanation, intelligible: The conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within one and the same intellectual consciousness and in virtue of that intellectual consciousness itself precisely inasmuch as it has been determined by the principiating act. Here the determination of the mode of origin is internal and natural.

Essence: That which is known through the first intellectual operation in answering the question, “What is it?” Signifies “to be such” as opposed to “to be” and is then called “whatness.” Just as existence answers the question “whether” something is, so also “to be such” answers the question “what” (quidditas) something is. In this connection the individual, determined essence or the substantial core of the existent in its concrete individualization is meant (e.g., “this” man Peter), since the universal as such cannot exist. The essence of a finite existent, because finite, lacks the fulness of existence; it includes only a small part of the possibilities of existence while the essence of God embraces the infinite fulness of existence—in fact, it is existence itself (ipse esse). Thus God’s existence excludes any distinction whatsoever from existence; the finite existent, however, is characterized precisely by such distinction, and so the essence as subjective potency and existence as act (both as principles of being) constitute the finite existent. See also divine essence.

Eternity: “How infirm, how impotent are all assistances, if they be put to express this Eternity.” (John Donne, LXXX Sermons, sermon 26.) Boethius in his Consolations of Philosophy calls eternal life “the simultaneous possession in all its perfection of endless life” (“Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio”). To paraphrase Donne: Our minds lack the power to imagine an absolute, so it would be wiser to speak first of what eternity is not. Eternity is not the mere absence of time; eternity is now that never passes. God is ipsum aeternitas; and in the Beatific Vision the Blessed participate in God’s eternity. Eternity is a divine attribute. In trinitarian theory, therefore, one should not settle for an understanding of God quoad se that comprises any temporal imagery. We humans, on the other hand, can-
not avoid ordering our ideas, so we speak of order of origin in the Eternal and accept the attendant hints of temporality. We can, nonetheless, understand the concepts of simultaneity, equality, and unity. Likewise does the circle help us to conceive something without beginning or end; but, unlike any circle or sphere, God is not bounded, so we must also eliminate from our concept of eternity any hint of limit. God is at once, now, first and last, Alpha and Omega.

Existence: What is known through the second intellectual operation in answering the question, “Is it?” What has reality of its own and not merely in potency nor in the power of its causes; the fundamental actuality of any being insofar as it is being; the act of existence by which a substance or essence is; esse.

Existential autonomy: A person exercises in three ways that autonomy on whose basis there arises a word from understanding and a choice from the word. First, there are practical affairs, and here we understand, judge, and choose what is to be done and made. Second, there are speculative matters; and here we ask about the universe, understand it as much as we can, pass judgment on its origin and nature, and the result is that we are finally drawn into a type of contemplative love for the universe. Third, there is the sphere of the existential; and here we ask about ourselves, understand who we ought to be, judge the manner through which we can make ourselves be who we ought to be, and from all of this there proceeds an existential choice through which we make ourselves who we ought to be to the extent that we here and now can do so.

Filiation: The relation of the one who is begotten to the one who begets, of Son to Father.

Form: “Aquinas’s idea of form is the same as Aristotle’s ‘entelechy’—that is, a structural principle in things. Entelechy does not signify an object which has a structure, but is rather what combines with matter to produce an object. Form in this sense, then, means the actuality, perfection, or determinacy of a thing, although the thing consists also of matter, and matter is not reducible to form. At the same time, the form, albeit not identical with matter, cannot subsist nor have any reality if it is not individuated in matter. A somewhat different meaning of the word *form* in Aquinas is that of ‘shape,’ or *morphē* (*figura*). Form in this sense is a property, namely the quantitative boundary of a body, an external feature which can be empirically experienced. ... However, it is well known that Aquinas used the word in yet another and broader sense, in which it means, not the structural principle of beings, but rather those very structured beings. By form, in this sense, he means ‘essence.’ And essence means substance conceived of as an object of understanding and of definition.” Umberto Eco, *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas*, tr. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 69.

Form, substantial: The first (ultimate), actual (real), intrinsic, proper (specific) principle by which a natural substance is what it is; in other words, the formal cause. The intrinsic incomplete constituent principle in a substance which actualizes the potencies of matter and together with the matter composes a definite material substance or natural body; the first or formal act in the order of essence or substance, especially of material substance; the specific differentiating factor in diverse kinds of essences; that by reason of which matter is a defi-
nite thing, a “such” rather than a “this,” and by which it has its own specific powers and properties. In us, the soul is the substantial form of the body.

Free: (Note the difference between free will and free choice.) “There are four reasons why the will is said to be free. First, because the means to the end is not a necessary but an optional means. Second, because the practical judgment is contingent. Third, because the [apprehended good] does not efficaciously move the will. Fourth, because the will may or may not move itself to its free act.” Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 320. “If, however, one should ask which of the four reasons for freedom is the essential reason, it would seem that the last is at once necessary and sufficient. The first three are [causes of knowing], and they may be present as in the case of the demons with respect to the choice between good and evil without the will being, here and now, free. But the last, the will’s ability to move or not move itself, is the [cause of being]: it is the *primum quod se* [first in itself] from which the other three can be deduced as conditions; it solves the ultimate problem in the *via inventionis* [dogmatic theology] and so is the first proposition in the *via doctrinae* [systematic theology]; it defines, not the *liberum arbitrium* [free choice], which is the global difference between rational and irrational creatures, but free will, which is the central process of free self-determination.” Ibid., 321.

Genus: The sum of the constituent notes common to two or more species, abstracting from the specific difference.

Good: Spoken about in two manners: First, there is that which is the good through its essence, and this is the divine perfection itself which we can know in this life only analogously. Second, there is the good through participation, and this has a twofold division. There is a twofold formality of perfection in the single divine perfection, one on the basis of act and the other on the basis of order. Similarly, in the created order there is a twofold participation of the single divine perfection, in one way on the basis of act and in another way on the basis of order. Therefore, there are to be distinguished the particular goods whereby particular beings are perfected with respect to themselves, and goods of order which are concrete, dynamic, and ordered totalities of desirable objects, desiring subjects, operations, and enjoyments.

Good of order: Five elements conspire to constitute a human good of order: (1) there are many persons; (2) there are apprehensive and appetitive habits; (3) there are the many coordinated operations of the many persons; (4) there is a succession and series of particular goods; and (5) there are interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, it is proper to divide the good of order itself: for the good of order that is to be discerned in the inanimate, in plants, and in animals is different from the human good of order which is brought about by subjects who understand and who choose; for example, domestic, technological, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and religious societies are all human goods of order.

Habit: A permanent quality according to which a subject is well or badly disposed in regard to either its being or its operations. A relatively stable disposition of a living nature or power, inclining it rightly or wrongly to some perfection or end of its own being or of another being. An acquired habit is obtained by one’s own activity or by divine gift in the course of
life; it modifies one’s nature or natural powers. An entitative habit is a permanent quality added to nature and natural potencies; it directly modifies its being rather than its operations. A virtue is any good habit, especially any moral or theological virtue needed to lead a morally good life. An infused habit is supernaturally given, not acquired by our own efforts; e.g., the virtues of faith, hope, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Hypothesis: A conditional or provisional explanation of observed facts or of their connection with each other, a tentative explanation suggestive of further experiment and verification.

Image: A representation or likeness of another. A specific likeness to another in its characteristic being or operations. In this sense, image is opposed to vestige and correlative of exemplar. The sensitive impression in one of the internal senses; or more narrowly, the PHANTASM. Since an image is an express likeness, it cannot be said of God the Father. According to St. Augustine it is to be said of the Son alone, but according to the Greek Fathers the Spirit is said to be the image of the Son. St. Thomas resolves this ambiguity in the same manner in which he proves that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not a generation, namely, an image is not merely an express likeness but that which has likeness in virtue of origin. Thus, Image is a name proper to the Son.

Intelligible: Knowable by the intellect; able to be received in the POSSIBLE INTELLECT.

Intelligible emanation: See Emanation, intelligible.

Love: The fundamental act of will. Although this love is received not in the intellect but in the will, it is, of course, within intellectual consciousness; for will is the appetite that follows intellect, that is to say, will is an intellectual appetite. Therefore, as the word is the immanent term of an intelligible emanation from the one who speaks, so, too, love is the immanent term of an intelligible emanation from the one who spirates. On the intellectuality of the will in St. Thomas, consider the argument in which he proves that the will of God is the cause of what is: “For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, insofar as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is his own intellect, effects pre-exist in him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from him after the mode of will, for his inclination to put in act what his intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.” ST, I, q. 19, a. 4. Cf., q. 32, a. 1 ad 3m; q. 45, a. 6.

Mission: In a human mission the following are to be found: (1) there is the movement from one place to another such that there occurs either (2) some particular operation, or (3) some new series of operations both (4) solely on the part of the person who has been sent, and (5) on the part of those to whom the person has been sent, and indeed (6) on the basis of the plan or command of the one who sends, (7) which plan or command has been revealed and confided to or imposed upon the person sent.

Motion: Passage from one place to another. Any passage of something from potency to act; any CHANGE; any reception of a PERFECTION.

Mystery: “Though the field of mystery is contracted by the advance of knowledge, it cannot be
eliminated from human living. There always is the further question. Though metaphysics can grasp the structure of possible science and the ultimate contours of proportionate being, this concentration only serves to put more clearly and distinctly the question of transcendent being. And if that question meets with answers, will not the answers give rise to further questions?” Insight, 570. In the strict sense: Mystery is a truth so far exceeding the capacities of the human intellect that its full meaning cannot be comprehended, nor can a natural proof of its truth be discovered even after God has revealed the truth. The Holy Trinity is the supreme example.

Nature: The principle of motion and rest in that in which the motion or rest is present primarily and of itself and not merely in some sense. The intrinsic first principle of the specific operations of a thing; therefore substantial form. In the human subject, the substantial form is the intellectual soul.

Originated act: The act that has an origin.

Originating act: The act that originates.

Passion: 1. The PREDICAMENT or category of being, any kind of reception of a perfection or of a privation; being, considered as acted on by another; the reception of change in the being acted upon; any passing from potency to act. 2. A type of quality. A transitory sensible quality which moves or is moved by the sensitive appetite. 3. A passive power that must be moved to act by another agent. 4. An act of a passive power. 5. An immanent act that has been preceded by the reception of influence or change from another being. 6. An intense movement of the sensitive appetite accompanied by noticeable organic change, as in anger or fear. 7. An inordinate affection or movement of the sensitive appetite connoting moral danger or the result of moral fault; e.g., uncontrolled sexual desire. 8. The experience of the loss of a suitable form and enduring the presence of an unsuitable form; as the passion of Christ or the suffering of injustice. 9. A property of something or an attribute that can be predicated of something, as the transcendental attributes are occasionally called passions of being. Principal passions: those movements of sensitive appetites which precede others and lead to other acts known as consequent passions. The principal or basic passions are love and hate, hope and fear.

Passive: That which is in potency to be perfected or determined by some other agent or form.

Patient: The subject of change; the subject acted upon or influenced by a cause; the subject of PASSION; the recipient of an ACTION; material cause in the broad sense of the determinable subject of change.

Perfection: 1. Any good possessed by a being; some definite actuality, reality, or good belonging to a being, suitable to it, and conceived as really or mentally distinct from other perfections present in that being. 2. The definite goodness or determinate actuality that a being possesses. 3. A state in which a being completely possesses a definite kind of reality so that nothing is lacking according to its nature, the fulfilment of its natural powers, and the attainment of its end.

Phantasm: “Anyone can experience this in himself, that when he tries to understand something,
he forms certain fantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he desires to understand. It is for this reason that when we wish to help someone understand something, we lay before him examples from which he forms fantasms for the purpose of understanding.”  

“Fantasms are to the intellectual soul as sensible objects are to the senses. ... Fantasms are to the intellect as colors to sight. But colors are to sight as its objects; fantasms, then, are to intellect as its objects.” Aristotle, *De Anima*, III. “In Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can understand only by turning to fantasm.” *ST* I, q. 88, a.

A sense image. The image in the human imagination as related to the activity of the agent intellect and the species in the possible intellect.

Potency: Potency is said of God either merely according to our manner of signifying or really. It is said merely according to our manner of signifying inasmuch as there are distinguished the potency to an act of existing, or understanding, or affirming, or willing or, generally, inasmuch as there are distinguished the perfectible and its perfection. On the other hand, potency is really said of God inasmuch as there is an internal procession of one person from another, and inasmuch as there is the external procession of the creature from God. Potency is said of God externally on the basis of a potency to opposites, but it is said internally inasmuch as what necessarily is is truly said to be able to be. Inasmuch as one is speaking of God internally, there is the potency to generate and the potency to spirate; inasmuch as the potency is a principle, it directly denotes the divine essence; inasmuch as the potency to generate and to spirate denotes some proper element, a relation is indirectly implied; and, indeed, inasmuch as the potency to generate is in order that someone beget, it directly implies paternity. On the other hand, inasmuch as this potency is in order that someone be generated, filiation is indirectly implied; and a similar distinction is to be drawn with regard to the potency to spirate taken actively and passively. In philosophy and metaphysics: 1. Capacity of any sort; capacity of a being or in a being to be, act, or receive. 2. Capacity to be in some way the source of change. 3. Perfectibility or capacity for perfection. 4. Material cause. Active potency: The principle of change or of acting upon another inasmuch as it is another thing; power; capacity to do or to make; principle of action. Being in potency: 1. A being in some way not actual or not fully actual. 2. A possible being. 3. A changeable being. 4. A passive potency. In potency: In the state of receptivity; potentially, not actually. Natural potency: Capacity in a nature proportionate to its nature. Obediential (supernatural) potency: Potency to receive either a miraculous or a supernatural perfection exceeding the natural capacities of a being. Passive potency: 1. Principle which receives change from another inasmuch as it is another thing. 2. Capacity to receive, to be acted on, to be modified. 3. Material cause; the modifiable (determinable) principle in a being.

Possible intellect: The spiritual power of understanding and knowing.

Predicament: One of the ten categories that Aristotle listed: substance, quantity, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, accessory.

Pre-scientific knowledge: See SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.
Principle: What comes first in some order. That from which something in some way proceeds; the starting point of being, of change, or knowledge, or discussion. Thus, the Father is the principle of the Son; the Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit; and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the principle of every creature.

Procession: Origin of one from another.

Procession according to the mode of a *processio operati*: an internal procession in which the originating act and the originated act are really distinct, not however on the basis of absolute existence but on the basis of relative existence. Again, the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. This definition has been worked out in order to state clearly a divine mystery.

Procession, determination of mode: The mode of procession is determined in order to distinguish one procession from another. See PROCESSION, MODE OF.

Analogous determination of: The mode of an unknown nature is determined on the basis of a similarity to a known nature.

External determination of: The determination of the principle and of the one who proceeds.

Internal determination of: The determination of the origin itself, for example, as violent or natural, as unconscious or conscious, as spontaneous or autonomous, etc.

Metaphysical determination of: The determination occurs on the basis of the general notions which are developed in general metaphysics, for example, in terms of the same and the different, potency and act, the absolute and the relative, etc.

Natural determination of: The mode is determined on the basis of some generic or specific or individual nature, for example, on the basis of the physical nature, or a chemical nature, of a biological nature, or a sensitive nature, of an intellectual nature, or of a divine nature.

Procession, divine: The origin of God from God. Here the determination of the mode of origin is external but natural. Illustrations: the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son.

Procession, external: The origin of one complete reality from another complete reality. Here the determination of the mode of origin is external and metaphysical. Producing, creating, and animal generation are all illustrations of external processions.

Procession, intelligible (*processio intelligibilis*): Procession of the inner word of understanding has both productive (see PROCESSION OF THE OPERATED) and intelligible aspects. Intelligible procession denotes the intelligible “because-of-ness” of rationality. In us the inner word proceeds from the act of understanding by a *processio intelligibilis* that is also a *processio operati* (procession of the operated), for our inner word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really distinct.

Procession, internal: Both the principle and that which proceeds are in the same. Again, the determination of the mode of origin is external and metaphysical. However, “in the same” can be understood in three ways, namely, in the same subsistent, within the same consciousness, or in the same faculty or potency.

Procession, mode of: Procession taken concretely; that which this or that case of procession adds
to the abstract definition or to the formality “the origin of one from another.”

Procession of an operation: [processio operationis]: an internal procession in which the principle and that which proceeds are related as potency and act. Again, the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. The procession of an operation is illustrated by the act of seeing taking its origin from both the power of sight and the eye, the act of understanding taking its origin from both the possible intellect and the intelligible species, the act of will taking its origin from both the will and from a habit received in the will.

Processio operati: procession of the operated. An internal procession in which the principle is related to that which proceeds as act to act. Again, the determination of mode is metaphysical and external. A processio operati is illustrated by the act of desiring taking its origin from the act of seeing, by the act of defining taking its origin from the act of understanding, by the act of judging taking its origin from the act of grasping sufficient evidence, by the act of choosing taking its origin from a practical judgment. See also procession according to the mode of a processio operati

Quality: In metaphysics, an accident intrinsically completing and perfecting a substance either in its being or in its operation.

Quicumque: “The document of our faith which we call either the Athanasian Creed, because Athanasius (wrongly) was credited with writing it, or the Quicumque from the opening words, ‘Whoever wishes to be saved …’ It first appears in the writings of Cesarius of Arles, is almost certainly to be attributed to the south of France or Spain, probably to the region of Lerins and Arles, is indebted for its doctrine to Augustine and also to the school of Lerins, is dated by its most recent ‘biographer’ (J.N.D. Kelly, The Athanasian Creed, London, 1964) as probably around 435 to 450, certainly not later than 535, since Cesarius used it. ‘It was drafted as a summary of orthodox teaching for instructional purposes’ (Kelly, ibid., p. 109). …” Crowe, The Doctrine, 89.

Quoad nos: The thing considered in relation to us. The notion opposed to quoad se.

Quoad se: The thing in relation or in regard to itself; something as it is in itself; e.g., God quoad se; the notion opposed to quoad nos. Western culture gives priority to the thing in itself, considers it metaphysically and scientifically before considering the same thing quoad nos and going on to ultimate questions of reality and meaning. It is an important distinction to note because it applies to everything. We are apt to confuse subjectivity and objectivity. Keeping in mind the distinction quoad se and quoad nos provides a fairly painless way to make a good habit of thinking of things as things, and our knowing as really knowing them as real.

Ratio: It has numerous meanings. Ratio denotes the essence or nature as intelligible, and is used in the present document to mean the ground, reason, or rationale of a thing.

Rational distinction: See distinction, rational.

Real distinction: See distinction, real.

Real: That which is truly affirmed to be. That which truly is; the real stands in opposition to a being of reason (ens rationis), which is indeed conceived but which is not within the real; or
that which is not only thought but which is also truly affirmed to be; or that which is not only conceived but which also truly is. That to which the act of existence belongs in its own way. That which is truly affirmed to exist, either that which exists or that by which an existent being is constituted.

Reduction: The act or process of bringing something to a specified form or condition, especially to a more fundamental form.

Reflective understanding: The act whereby we weigh the evidence for judgment. We judge in light of having grasped sufficient evidence. Sufficient evidence is drawn from prior insight(s) to inform the reflective insight, our grasp that the object we understand is a real thing. One is not certain the prior understanding is true (thus real knowledge) until one has a reflective insight into the data that grasps evidence sufficient to judge that one’s understanding is true.

Relation: The order of one thing to another. That to which “to exist with respect to” belongs. The ordering of one thing to another; its opposite is absolute. External: That which may be present or absent without affecting the subject. Internal: That which is so intrinsic to the subject that it cannot be nullified without nullifying the subject also. Mutually opposed: Relations are mutually opposed if each is the term of the other; thus, father is the term to which son is referred, and son, in turn, is the term to which father is referred. In created reality there is a difference between a human person and humanity, between father and paternity, and between son and filiation both with respect to the manner of meaning and with respect to that which is meant. In created reality the subsistent which is differs from the essence or form or relation whereby it is. In the divinity, on the other hand, God and divinitas, Father and paternity, Son and filiation, Spirator and active spiration, Spirit and passive spiration differ with respect to the manner of meaning but not with respect to what is meant. Furthermore: in created reality, the subject related by a relation is to be distinguished from the relation whereby the subject is related. In the divinity, on the other hand, the subject related is the same as the relation whereby the subject is related. Thus when a real relation is posited in the divinity, not only is there posited that whereby some subject is related, but there is also posited that which is related: for from the mere fact of positing paternity there is posited Father as well; and the same holds for the other relations. (Cf., Summa Theologiae, I, q. 40, a. 3: “For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own ‘supposita,’ inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father himself.” On the fact that the properties denote the same reality as the relations, see the introduction to ST, I, q. 40.) Moreover, the foregoing brings to light what is intended by the distinction between a relation as a relation and a relation as a subsistent. The relations as relations are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. On the other hand, the relations as subsistents are Father, Son, Spirator, and Spirit. These terms respectively differ from each other with regard to the manner of meaning, but they coincide with regard to the reality meant.

Relative: That which has an order to another being. 1. Referred to another in some way; ordered to, connected with, dependent upon, limited by another in some way. 2. Considered in its
relation to something else rather than absolutely in itself. 3. Unintelligible or impossible except as related to something else.

Scientific knowledge: The certain knowledge of realities through a knowledge of their causes. Before realities are known through their causes, the causes must themselves be discovered; and as long as the causes have not yet been discovered, we employ a general and PRE-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE whereby we do indeed apprehend and describe realities although we are as yet ignorant of their causes.

Species: The class comprising the constituent notes of the genus and specific difference. In epistemology, the cognitive form representing the object and present in the cognitive power as the intrinsic principle determining the knowing power to know actually and to know this object.

Specific difference: The ultimate essential characteristic that distinguishes species from species in the same GENUS.

Spiration: The procession of love from the speaker and from the word.

Spiration, active: The relation of the one who spirates to the one who is spirated; relation of the Spirator (Father and Son) to the Holy Spirit.

Spiration, passive: The relation of the one who is spirated to the one who spirates; relation of the Holy Spirit to the Spirator (Father and Son).

Spirit: The word itself denotes the immateriality of the divine substance, and thus it is a common name. Inasmuch as “spirated” is understood when “spirit” is being employed, a relation of origin is implied; and the term is thus being used as a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

Sublate; sublation: In cognitional process, as we advance from experience to understanding and so forth, what sublates at a particular level goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

Subsistence: 1. The existence proper to a whole and uncommunicated substance. 2. The formal perfection whereby a nature is completed and is uncommunicated to another. 3. The existence of the being who exists essentially or by identity with his essence; the being who is completely self-sufficient for existence and action.

Subsistent: A being in the strict sense (ens simpliciter); the that or the “thing” which is; thus the following are not subsistents: 1. the accidents which exist in the “thing” which is; 2. the intrinsic principles of a being whereby there is constituted the “thing” which is; 3. the possibles which can be but are not; and 4. beings of reason which are merely thought but are not truly affirmed to exist. Ens quod: literally, a being that. Further: “As every being is one, so every finite being is a whole compounded of parts, an ens quod made up of entia quibus.” Verbum, 70. “There also is what is said to simply be; for example, minerals are, plants are, animals are, people are, angels are, God is, the Father is, the Son is, and the Spirit is. Since these
simply are or are in the strict sense, since they are the ‘things’ which really are, they deserve a
special name and are thus called subsistents…. The subsistent, then, is whatever is a ‘thing’
which is, or a that which is, or an id quod est, and it stands in contrast to a being of reason, a
possible, an accident, a constitutive principle of a being.” (S 120.)

Substance: That to which to exist through itself belongs.

Synthesis: Combining of elements in a unified, more complex form; e.g., a synthesis of relations
in a system.

Synthetic: See SYNTHESIS.

Systematic analogy: The type of analogy called systematic analogy is explicitly and thematically
employed and resolves not just one question but a whole series of questions. Therefore, he
is not proceeding systematically who does indeed use analogies but merely implicitly and
unthetically; nor does he proceed systematically who, in distinct questions or even in the
same questions, is always adducing new analogies with the result that in the end he attains
just a rhetorical heap of examples.

Systematic concept: A concept which expresses an understanding that is virtually sufficient for
the resolution of all the questions of some treatise.

Systematic principle: Understanding is of principles. A principle is defined as what is first in
some order. Thus, it pertains to understanding to grasp the solution of the problem that is
first in the order of wisdom. But this order is such that, once the first problem is resolved,
the resolution of all others follows expeditiously; and so the understanding must be such
that it virtually contains in itself the solutions to the remaining questions.

Term: That to which a subject is related. The term may be the term either of an operation or of a
relation. The first and last units, points, or terminals of any series.

Term from which: The state or condition of a being at the start of change in it; initial term; termi-
nus a quo.

Term to which: The state or condition of a being after a change or at the present moment in a
still continuing change; the end term; terminus a quem.

Theology: The science of theology differs from the natural and human sciences in that it takes
its beginning not from data but from truths. For in the natural sciences one seeks to under-
stand what is given to the senses; advance to truth is only through the understanding of
sensibles, and the hope is to attain no more than a greater verisimilitude and probability
through a succession of ever better hypotheses and theories. Likewise, in the human
sciences, although the starting point is not from bare sensibles but from sensibles endowed
with human meaning and significance, nonetheless, this meaning is not accepted as true;
and so, just as the natural sciences, the human sciences intend and advance to their own
proper truth through ever more probable theories. But the meaning which is found in the
word of God proceeds from an infallible divine knowing; and thus, the theology that begins
from revealed truths is said to be a science subalternate to God’s knowing.

Thus theological understanding is true in the sense that it consists in understanding
divinely revealed truth. But if some element is understood in addition to the truth revealed by God, understanding can indeed be present, but there can be no theological understanding present. For the understanding that Vatican I extolled was one that was of those mysteries which are hidden in God and which were unable to be made manifest to us save they be divinely revealed.

One can ask whether theologians are to go to Scripture or the Magisterium to learn of the mysteries whose understanding they seek. With regard to the truth and its meaning, it matters little whether they go to the Scriptures or to the Magisterium. For what the Church proposes to be believed by all as divinely revealed, this same is contained in the sources of revelation and indeed in the same sense as defined by the Church.

Truth, the true: The correspondence of intellect to reality. In God, the true does not imply a relation of origin; and so, it is essential or common. Nonetheless, if one considers the true or truth according to its criterion, which is the grasp of sufficient evidence, then there is implied a relation of origin. On this basis Truth is a name proper to the Son. Similarly, if one gives consideration to the INTELLIGIBLE EMANATION that is from a grasp of evidence to the word, the true is implied on the basis of the criterion of truth; and so, the first divine procession can properly be called an emanation on the basis of Truth.

Within consciousness: See CONSCIOUSNESS, WITHIN.

Word: Verbum. Immanent term of an intelligible emanation from the speaker. Name proper to the Son because it implies a relation to the act of understanding whence the Word intelligibly emanates. Similarly, to be spoken implies the same relation, while to speak is the opposed relation; and the same holds for to be conceived and to conceive. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to reserve some name to designate this act under its absolute aspect; and in this fashion Lonergan employs the word to affirm ("affirmare"). In us there is a twofold inner word just as there is a twofold operation that is characteristic of our intellects. In God, however, just as his act of existence is the same as his essence, and just as there is but a single and infinite operation of understanding, so too is there just one Word.
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