

Lonergan's Appropriation of Hegel: Through The Lens of Philosophical Hermeneutics

Patrick Hoburg

In wake of the recent contemplation given to Lonergan's subtle appropriation of Hegel's absolute idealism—pioneered by Dr. Morelli and being furthered by some of us here¹—I wish to view the intimate complexity of their relation upon a new horizon. This horizon is not in itself new, and could be called “philosophical hermeneutics,” with careful qualification.² If Hegel exerts a significant, while *subtle* influence on Lonergan's thinking, Hegel is an *obvious* inspiration for the development of 19th and 20th Century hermeneutics. Sharing an origin in Hegel, the methodological depth of Lonergan's thinking finds a friend in the hermeneutic tradition, which recognizes, in parallel fashion, the epistemic and indeed existential need to think method itself, since to do so is to think the dynamics of human cognition. Because this need is spurred by, but left incomplete in Hegel's absolute idealism, *both* traditions appropriate Hegel as a *transitional* thinker.

The lens of philosophical hermeneutics will serve as a heuristic guide toward new insight into Lonergan's critical realist appropriation of Hegel's half-housed absolute idealism. Through this lens, I claim that a philosophical expression's invitation to future self-appropriation is not merely a methodological preference but a methodological

¹ See Mark D. Morelli, “Going Beyond Idealism: Lonergan's Relation to Hegel,” *Lonergan Workshop Journal* 20, edited by Fred Lawrence [Boston: Lonergan Institute at Boston College, 2008]: 305-336; “Meeting Hegel Halfway: The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan's Relation to Hegel,” Presented at the Conference on Lonergan, Philosophy, and Theology at Marquette University in March 1, 2012; web-published on *Lonergan Resource* (www.lonerganresource.com), 2012.

² Hans-Georg Gadamer calls his work “Philosophical Hermeneutics,” which is systematically developed in *Truth and Method*, , 2nd ed., trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: New York, 1989), 300-5. See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971). This masterpiece is often misunderstood when its aim is superficially construed as “truth against method.” Like Lonergan, he is wary of the artificially rule-governed applications of methods, seeking to ground them in their cognitional truth. Gadamer's hermeneutics thus invites the development of methods by a consciousness hermeneutically self-aware of their basis in the experience and intellection of truth.

necessity. Such an invitation needs what Lonergan calls “pedagogical efficacy,” in order to teach readers into their own freedom for self-appropriation, in relation to the dialectical finitude of the philosophical standpoint expressed. Pedagogically efficacious expressions of philosophical standpoints are performatively central to the rationally self-conscious development and dialectical progression of the pure desire to know (Spirit, for Hegel³).

Hegel’s halfwayness is thus understood here to stem from a failure of expressive openness to future development. Because his expression is dialectically determinate instead of heuristic, it is performatively inconsistent with the self-conscious appropriation of *the* fundamental method—what Lonergan calls “transcendental method.”⁴ While Hegel is to be credited for suggesting such a methodological appropriation, his own self-appropriation is incomplete and thus transitional. The expressive form of this failure is the conceptual vacuum known as his logic, which sucks the whole of dialectic into its fixed structure. Notwithstanding, the key to appropriating Hegel as transitional is to see that his pouring of everything into the concept⁵ is historically ineluctable. Adverting to Hegel’s historicity not only frees us from the deficiencies of his quasi-position, but also allows us to develop its pertinent insights. Peering out of the halfway house window, and

³ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 372-3. “By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection...[the] enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge. The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. By moving him to seek understanding, it prevents him from being content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience . . . This pure desire has an objective. It is a desire to know. As mere desire, it is for the satisfaction of acts of knowing, for the satisfaction of understanding, of understanding fully, of understanding correctly. But as pure desire, as cool, disinterested, detached, it is not for cognitional acts and the satisfaction they give their subject, but for cognitional contents, for what is to be known . . . The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing rather than the act. Still, the desire is not itself a knowing, and so its range is not the same as the range of knowing. Initially in each individual, the pure desire is a dynamic orientation to a totally unknown. As knowledge develops, the objective becomes less and less unknown, more and more known.” *Insight* cited hereafter as CWL3.

⁴ See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 20-5.

⁵ CWL3: 446.

up the road to critical realism, we will pay heed to the pedagogical efficacy performed by Lonergan's expression of *Insight*. Attending carefully to its central transition, we will catch a glimpse of Lonergan's turning Hegel inside out through explicit self-appropriation.

The Need for Transitional Appropriation

I encountered Hegel and Lonergan simultaneously, occasioned by concurrent seminars dedicated to each thinker. So it goes without saying that there was a fusion of, indeed a felt need to mediate between their horizons from the very start. Reading Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*⁶ alongside Lonergan's *Insight*, I learned to interpret each by way of the other. When I reached Lonergan's very condensed, but nevertheless convincing critique of Hegelian dialectic—as “conceptualist, closed, necessitarian, and immanent,”⁷—I hesitated to accept it, wanting to give Hegel the benefit of the doubt. Could I somehow exonerate Hegel, this spellbinding thinker of obscurity, from Lonergan's critical configuration, his effective delimitation of absolute idealism? Could I maintain Hegel's dynamic dialectic while affirming Lonergan's program? While accepting his invitation?

Thankfully, I learned that I could have my cake and eat it *too*, well, sort of, as long as this cake was eaten under the critical guidance of a strict Hegelian diet. Thankfully, my intellectual and spiritual journey does not depend on the absolute validity of Hegel's system; nor the “objective” truth of Hegel's original intention. It, instead, depends on my appropriation of Hegel, as a rationally self-conscious reader. More

⁶ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Cited hereafter as *PS*.

⁷ CWL3: 446. This section of *Insight* has been explicated with excellence by Morelli, in the articles cited above. While it will be referred to below, this critique is for the most part assumed in what follows.

precisely, I learned—or to be honest, I’m in the process of learning—how to read Hegel as a *transitional* thinker, thus enabled to preserve pearls of Hegelian wisdom, without getting tied up in the token idealist traps. Swimming against the strong current that is the overwhelming tendency of Hegel scholarship, we must resist interpreting Hegel as simply true or patently false—interpretations historically proven to be inevitably one-sided—but instead as *both right and wrong*, in a word, as *transitional*.⁸ This is an interpretation that attempts to balance what Paul Ricoeur calls a hermeneutic of suspicion with a hermeneutic of affirmation. Dwelling in the halfway house, our task is nothing other than appropriating the transitional character of Hegelian dialectic.

The Philosophical Importance of Expression and Pedagogy

Loneragan, Gadamer, and Ricoeur gather around the notion of dialectic in their appropriations of Hegel. It is not accidental that in chapter 17 of *Insight*, a chapter having to do with “Metaphysics as Dialectic,” Lonergan gives an account of expression. Significant for the present purpose, he relates expression to self-appropriation—considered as the appropriation of truth, interpretation, the notion of the universal viewpoint, and methodical hermeneutics. Let’s integrate aspects of this account with what Gadamer and Ricoeur have to say about expression and its dialectical context.

⁸ Hegel anticipates this one-sided history of interpretations in a number of passages in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here is one from the Preface, #2: “The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements.” There is of course the well-known split between left and right wing Hegelians. For an informative history of this rift see Frederick Beiser, *Hegel* (New York: Routledge, 2005), “Epilogue: The Rise and the Fall of the Hegelian School,” p. 307-313. For a collection of these wide-ranging interpretations, and the demythologization of many one-sided and clearly outlandish readings, see *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, ed. Jon Stewart (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1996).

When Lonergan speaks of hermeneutics, he is referring to its traditional scope and aim, which quite narrowly has to do with theoretical techniques for the interpretation of texts. Indeed, hermeneutics functions fruitfully in this way today, so Lonergan isn't superficial in his treatment. However, since Heidegger, hermeneutics has taken on a more universal scope, akin to the universal viewpoint in *Insight*, or transcendental method in *Method In Theology*.⁹ Confined not only to the interpretation of texts, hermeneutics has taken on a *philosophical* scope, aiming to understand generally the human encounter with otherness. Gadamer calls his work "philosophical hermeneutics," which "takes as its task the opening up of the hermeneutical dimension in its full scope, showing its fundamental significance for our entire understanding of the world and thus for all the various forms in which this understanding manifests itself..."¹⁰

Hermeneutics is often defined as 'the theory and practice of understanding meanings in language and existence.' We express ourselves in order to bring experience to language, but this act of expression is not a direct transaction. "My experience cannot directly become your experience. Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you...This something is not the experienced as experienced, but *its meaning*."¹¹ In order

⁹ Mediating this kinship is a large project unto itself and will be left for the future. Suffice it to say here that there are fundamental similarities *and* differences between the universal viewpoint and, say, Gadamer's philosophy hermeneutics, as well as between the latter and transcendental method.

¹⁰ "... from the interhuman communication to manipulation of society; from personal experience by the individual in society to the way in which he encounters society; and from the tradition as it is built of religion and law, art and philosophy, to the revolutionary consciousness that unhinges the tradition through emancipatory reflection." Hans-Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. & ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 18.

¹¹ Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Texas Christian University Press: Fort Worth, 1976), 15-6. With philosophical hermeneutics as a basis, Ricoeur develops a heuristic construction for anticipating the dialectical encounter with otherness. It hinges on three performative or "mimetic" moments. Mimesis₁ is called *prefiguration*, mimesis₂ *configuration* or *emplotment*, and mimesis₃ *refiguration*. This threefold hermeneutical construction shows us how to understand the temporally and practically prefigured way in which we meet an expression of otherness, prior to actually

to understand just *how* meaning exists at all and finds its way through the medium of language, we must see that meaning is communicated *dialectically*.

We encounter otherness from historically prejudiced and linguistically bound horizons¹². When our horizons are questioned by novel encounters, there arises a duality in our knowing; a dialectical negativity that presses upon us the need for a more dynamic horizon. In the midst of this essential moment of dialectic, I say with Pascal, ‘I am no longer enough for myself.’¹³ If I am open to greater knowledge and the expression of otherness makes possible what Lonergan calls the “interpenetration of knowledge and expression,” my horizon “fuses” with the expression of alterity, and a more integrated meaning emerges. This interpenetration “implies a solidarity, almost a fusion, of the development of knowledge and the development of language.” We may now begin to grasp why the dynamics of expression are philosophically important and why pedagogical efficacy is methodologically necessary. For “expression enters into the very process of learning, and the attainment of knowledge tends to coincide with the attainment of the ability to express it.”¹⁴

Gadamer often emphasizes the “practical” dimension of his philosophical hermeneutics, in order to highlight the often-overlooked fact that expressions themselves

experiencing it (prefiguration), our apprehension of the expression—implying both passive reception and active intellection (configuration), and finally the “fusion” or “transaction,” if you will, that occurs between the horizon of the expression and the horizon of its apprehender, when the latter existentially appropriates the new insights or epiphanies emerging from this *mimetic* event. This results in the transformation, if only slight, of one’s horizon (refiguration). See Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1983).

¹² Both Gadamer and Lonergan employ the term “horizon,” in almost inextricable ways. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: New York, 1989), 300-5. See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 235-7.

¹³ This is a paraphrase of a central insight found in Blaise Pascal’s *Pensees*, trans. Roger Ariew (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, IN, 2004).

¹⁴ CWL3: 577. This is a citation for this whole string of quotes.

are meaningful as acts. “To affirm consciousness is to affirm that cognitional process is not merely a possession of contents but also a succession of acts.¹⁵ ... By the conscious act is not meant a deliberate act; we are conscious of acts without debating whether we will perform them.”¹⁶ We are always already performing conscious acts, and it is important that we affirm intelligently and rationally that our expressions are conscious acts, so that our *expressive* performances will be self-conscious. Self-conscious performance of expression is the self-appropriation of expression. This requires the insight that “my” expression is limited by its horizon. For the sake of furthering shared knowledge, the expression needs to be structured in such a way that the horizons of its implicated apprehenders can merge with its own. This allows for the self-appropriation of future apprehenders. The dialectical fusion of horizons and the development of shared knowledge are achieved only when expressions are structured so as to involve their apprehenders.

Philosophy’s “primary function [Lonergan tells us] is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions.”¹⁷ Imbued with the responsibility of promoting dialectical development, not only should philosophical expression be self-consciously structured so as to allow for self-appropriation, it should invite it. Insofar as this invitation performs its own self-appropriation and incites the self-appropriation of the apprehender, it is pedagogically

¹⁵ CWL3: 345.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 95.

efficacious. This efficacy requires of a philosophical expression that it begin, as Lonergan's *Insight* does, "not by assuming premises but by assuming readers."¹⁸

"[T]eaching is the communication of insight."¹⁹As conscientious mediators of shared theoretical and practical knowledge, both Hegel and Lonergan are teachers. Hegel's phenomenological narration of spirit is at least minimally structured with pedagogical efficacy, just as *Insight* enacts this efficacy by way of its moving viewpoint. As living dialogues, these pedagogical structures can initiate self-affirmations in their careful and conscientious readers, as rationally self-conscious appropriators of the positions that emerge. Because the human cognitional structure is dynamic, their textual structures are dynamic, thus oscillating between direct and indeed *indirect* modes of expression. According to Gadamer, the paradigm for such a dynamic structure of expressive performance is the Socratic dialectic of question and answer in the Platonic dialogues.²⁰ "The primacy of dialogue, the relation of question and answer, can be seen in even so extreme a case as that of Hegel's dialectic as a philosophical method. To elaborate the totality of the determinations of thought, which was the aim of Hegel's logic, is as it were the attempt to comprehend within the great monologue of modern 'method' the continuum of meaning that is realized in every particular instance of dialogue...a magnificent reminder, even if unsuccessful, of what dialectic really was and

¹⁸ Bernard Lonergan, "The Original Preface," in *The Lonergan Reader*, ed. Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Murray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 34

¹⁹ CWL3: 197.

²⁰ "Hence the Socratic dialectic—which leads, through its art of confusing the interlocutor, to this knowledge—creates the conditions for the question. All questioning and desire to know presuppose a knowledge that one does not know; so much so, indeed, that a particular lack of knowledge leads to a particular question." Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: New York, 1989), 359.

is. [Nevertheless] Hegel's dialectic is a monologue of thinking that tries to carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine dialogue."²¹

Dialectic Before, Of, and After Hegel

When dialectically self-conscious, I become especially aware of my finitude, in the face of the historical dynamics that permeate dialectic. I encounter my situation within a history of thinking and being, the whole of which exceeds my intellectual grasp. The rise of historical consciousness undoubtedly owes itself in some degree to Hegel's limited expression of just what it is, but it goes without saying that Hegel didn't himself invent what history is; nor did he manage to wrap up the whole of dialectic into an absolute eschaton self-sealed and stamped with the name "Hegel." While I readily admit that he makes himself susceptible to this radical interpretation, central to my "transitional" reading of Hegel is that he recognized his own finite, historical horizon. With this recognition, he was at least minimally open to further development, despite his inability to articulate such openness.

For Hegel, philosophies and their expressions are the self-developments of Spirit [*Geist*]. To express a philosophy is to exhibit one's relation to the historical dialectic of spirit. "Philosophy and its history mirror one another. To study the history of philosophy

²¹ "...When Hegel sets himself the task of making the abstract determinations of thought fluid and subtle, this means dissolving and remolding logic into concrete language, and transforming the concept into the meaningful power of the word that questions and answers—a magnificent reminder, even if unsuccessful, of what dialectic really was and is." Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: New York, 1989), 362. The dialectical form of Hegel's thinking stems from his appropriation of the ancient dialectical ways of Plato and Aristotle, not to mention some of their unique contemporaries. While Hegel finds deep dialectical truths in the work of Aristotle, I've discovered, in line with Gadamer, that Hegel's dialectical model and its demonstration are more rooted in the Platonic dialogues; especially in the *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, where dialectic is not only performed dialogically, but explicitly brought forth. In the so-called "preface" to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel even goes so far as to claim that Plato's *Parmenides* is "surely the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic" (PS, 44).

is to study philosophy itself, *logic above all* [he emphasizes].”²² The logical unfolding of philosophy, of Spirit, proceeds in its own necessity. “The advance of philosophy is necessary. Each philosophy must have appeared of necessity at the time of its appearance. Each philosophy has thus appeared at the right time; none has outsoared its own time; all of them have comprehended the spirit of their time [*Zeitgeist*] in thought.”²³ According to Hegel’s own conception of philosophy, it is therefore necessary that Hegel’s philosophical expression emerged historically when it did. It is also necessary that the philosophical expression of Spirit develop beyond Hegel’s particular *Zeitgeist*. It is to Hegel’s great credit to recognize and express his own historical age as one in transition: “Ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labor of its own transformation. *Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward.*”²⁴ In this limited sense, then, when we appropriate Hegel as transitional, we are appropriating him on his own philosophical and historical terms.

Pointing forward to the higher cognitional viewpoint of operational dynamism, he shows the way toward spirit’s manifestation through the thinking of method itself. This forward-looking is expressively stuck, however, in the conceptual mud he might call the standpoint of the understanding, or what Lonergan calls the realm of theory.²⁵ Hegel

²² G.W.F. Hegel, *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. T.M. Knox and A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 88-9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 93.

²⁴ *PS*, 6. I added the emphasis.

²⁵ “Hegel consistently employs terms drawn from the indigenous language of the realm of theory when he is speaking from the standpoint of Reason, e.g., concept, logic, system, deduction...” Mark D. Morelli, “Meeting Hegel Halfway: The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan's Relation to Hegel,” Presented at the

looks conceptually ahead to the realm of interiority, but this interiority lacks operational depth, since its cognitional operations are given only by virtue of Hegel's conceptual field.²⁶ It follows that a language of strict, logical conception expressively controls the meaning of Spirit's movement. Within this linguistic vacuum the dialectical development of Spirit is strangled in its need to move forward, beyond finite Hegel and his age.

Hegel's dialectical expression is therefore determinate, as to heuristic, and closed, instead of open to further development. His logic renders dialectical movement static, even if its conceptual guises morph throughout the expression of his *Phenomenology*, and more directly in his *Logic*. As readers, we become alienated in suspicion of this conceptual movement, and with Kierkegaard, we notice no self-appropriative freedom, as knowers of future facts, when Hegel's concept moves itself.²⁷ We notice that there can be no factual movement within a static logic!²⁸

Conference on Lonergan, Philosophy, and Theology at Marquette University in March 1, 2012; web-published on *Lonergan Resource* (www.lonerganresource.com), 2012, 14, footnote 36.

²⁶ "Hegel's appropriation of the realm of interiority, then, attends to the dynamic, operational side of subjectivity but the purely dynamic object of that attention is obscured by conceptual determination on the noematic side of subjectivity." Mark D. Morelli, "Meeting Hegel Halfway: The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan's Relation to Hegel," Presented at the Conference on Lonergan, Philosophy, and Theology at Marquette University in March 1, 2012; web-published on *Lonergan Resource* (www.lonerganresource.com), 2012, 26.

²⁷ "The self-movement of the concept, which Hegel's *Logic* attempts to follow, thus rests entirely on the absolute mediation of consciousness and its object, which Hegel thematizes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The latter prepares thought for the sphere of pure knowing, which is not at all knowledge of the world totality. For it is not at all knowledge of existent beings in the world [i.e. facts], but rather it is always, together with knowledge of what is known, knowledge of knowing." Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1971), 11.

²⁸ Hegel thus "effectively acknowledged a pure desire with an unrestricted objective. But he could not identify that objective with a universe of being, with a realm of factual existents and occurrences. For being as fact can be reached only insofar as the virtually unconditioned is reached; and as Kant had ignored that constitutive component of judgment, so Hegel neither rediscovered nor reestablished it. The only objective Hegel can offer the pure desire is a universe of all-inclusive concreteness that is devoid of the existential, the factual, the virtually unconditioned. There is no reason why such an objective should be named being. It is, as Hegel named it, an Absolute Idea. It is the all-inclusive summit of the pure desire's immanent dialectical process from position through opposition to sublation that yields a new position to recommence the triadic process until the Absolute Idea is reached . . . It is interesting to note that, if the foregoing succeeds in fixing fundamental features of Hegel's thought, by that very fact it shows that on Hegelian

The transitional character of Hegel's philosophical expression is most fundamentally due to his logic's enclosure of method. In Hegel's own, prefatory words: "It might seem necessary at the outset to say more about the *method* of this movement [of the concept], i.e. of Science. But its Notion [also translated "Concept"] is already to be found in what has been said, and its proper exposition belongs to Logic, or rather it is Logic. For the method is nothing but the structure set forth in its pure essentiality."²⁹

Your own Matt Peters has developed the notion and demonstration of viewpoints in both Hegel and Lonergan.³⁰ Hegel's static logic expresses itself as a *static* viewpoint, unable to execute the shift to a *dynamic* viewpoint. "The shift from the static to the dynamic viewpoint relativizes logic and emphasizes method."³¹

It is a structural shift from the realm of theory to that of interiority, in which concrete subject—as subject and not as substance—is given priority. "Lonergan's appropriation of the realm of interiority affords him an understanding of the dynamic,

criteria Hegelianism is mistaken. Hegel's System is not afraid of facts: it explains any fact alleged against it by showing it to be a manifestation of an incomplete viewpoint included within the System. Hegel's System is not afraid of contradictions: it explains any contradiction alleged against it by revealing what opposed and incomplete viewpoints, accounted for by the System, yield the alleged contradictory terms. The only thing the System has to fear is that it itself should be no more than some incomplete viewpoint, and in fact that is what it is. Hegel aimed at rehabilitating the speculative reason that Kant had dethroned. But the basis of the Kantian attack was that the unconditioned is not a constitutive component of judgment. A complete rehabilitation of human rational consciousness will show that the unconditioned is a constitutive component of judgment. This, Hegel did not do. His viewpoint is essentially the viewpoint of a thinker who does not and cannot regard the factual as unconditioned, who cannot acknowledge any factually fixed points of reference, who cannot advance by distinguishing the definitively certain, the more or less probable, and the unknown. Hegel's range of vision is enormous; indeed, it is unrestricted in extent. But it is always restricted in content, for it views everything as it would be if there were no facts. It is a restricted viewpoint that can topple outwards into the factualness of Marx or inwards into the factualness of Kierkegaard. It is a viewpoint that is transcended automatically by anyone that, in any instance, grasps the virtually unconditioned and affirms it." CWL3: 397.

²⁹ *PS*, 28.

³⁰ See Matt Peters, "Lonergan, Hegel and the Point About Viewpoints," presented here at Marquette's Lonergan On the Edge conference in 2010 and also at the 2011 WCMI conference at Loyola Marymount University. See also, "The Hermeneutical and Dialectical Significance of Lonergan's Notion of Viewpoints," presented at the 2012 WCMI conference; web-published on *Lonergan Resource* (www.lonerganresource.com).

³¹ Bernard Lonergan, "Static and Dynamic Viewpoints," in *The Lonergan Reader*, ed. Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Murray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 547.

operational side of subjectivity, unobscured by Hegel's preoccupation with the conceptual field."³² "Lonergan...performs a thoroughgoing 'conceptual negation.' He negates the staticity, emptiness, and isolation of categories, and then peels off the conceptual field with its punctuated dynamics, sets it aside, and locates the source of the dynamism in the fluid dynamics of the operational field."³³ So from the realm of interiority, "language speaks indeed of the subject and his operations as objects but, nonetheless, rests upon a self-appropriation that has verified in personal experience the operator, the operations, and the processes referred to in the basic terms and relations of the language employed."³⁴ We turn now to this, Lonergan's self-appropriative expression.

At the threshold of *Insight's* crucial moment of turning, from Part 1 to Part 2 (a chapter named "Self-Affirmation of the Knower"), Lonergan imparts *directly*: "It is time to turn from theory to practice."³⁵ This does not mean that Part 1 ("Insight as Activity") is void of practice, but rather implicit, now moving more explicitly into view as part 2 ("Insight as Knowledge"). Just in terms of Lonergan's performative expression as invitation, perhaps Part 1 is directly theoretical while indirectly practical, and Part 2 is directly practical while indirectly theoretical. The Part titles, along with the first line of Part 2, clue us into *Insight's* structure.

Part 2 begins with the most fundamental judgment of fact, namely Lonergan's self-affirmation of *himself* as the self-critical and self-correctional horizon upon which *Insight's* moving viewpoint is presented. It is presented as an invitation to further

³² Mark D. Morelli, "Meeting Hegel Halfway: The Intimate Complexity of Lonergan's Relation to Hegel," Presented at the Conference on Lonergan, Philosophy, and Theology at Marquette University in March 1, 2012; web-published on *Lonergan Resource* (www.lonerganresource.com), 2012, 26.

³³ *Ibi.* 41, footnote 93.

³⁴ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 257.

³⁵ CWL3: 343.

development. It invites the reader's self-appropriation, not only by implicating them, but also by explicitly adverting to this implication. For "not only are we writing from a moving viewpoint but also we are writing about a moving viewpoint."³⁶

While Lonergan alerts us to the ultimate lesson to be learned from *Insight* in its introduction, namely self-appropriation³⁷, this lesson emerges directly only when exhibited or performed, that is 'practiced,' in Part 2 by Lonergan's own self-appropriation of the dialectical history of Western, philosophical thought. In other words, he exhibits for the reader his own development of positions and reversals of counter-positions, which pronounce epistemological, metaphysical, theological, and ethical viewpoints. These viewpoints are based in self-aware *or* self-unaware commitments to cognitional structures; 'ideals of knowledge' adverted to and thus virtually complete or neglected and thus incomplete. His way through this maze is paved by rationally self-conscious advertence to methodology in its variant history. What, then, results from this performed self-appropriation?

Not only does Lonergan provide us with an invariant, while dynamic, foundation from which we can become aware of the patterned way that we *understand*—our cognitional structure—he also gives us an integral *heuristic* suggestive of how to appropriate our intellectual and rational capacities. Notwithstanding, Lonergan can't hand self-appropriation off as if it were a football. We have to go through the hard work of appropriating our respective selves, an existential purpose and task never absolutely achieved. Adverting to the reflexive presence of self, *as subject*, we can begin to take

³⁶ CWL3: 20.

³⁷ "...the personally appropriated structure of one's own experiencing, one's own intelligent inquiry and insights, one's own critical reflection and judging and deciding." CWL3: 13.

rational responsibility for the judged facts of the past, as *our* past, at once plotting a progressively intelligent route into the future, as *our* possible future.

Indeed, self-appropriation is missed without critical reverence of past thinking and openness to the development of future thinking. Lonergan does not pretend to present us with the final word and pays heed to *Insight's* finite and transitional voice, within the vast and ever-dynamic human conversation.³⁸ Lonergan invites us to be intelligent and rationally self-conscious readers, by affirming the task of developing his positions in novel directions, pertinent to our present horizons. There's no question that all of you know this well, for you are *here*, as rationally self-conscious presenters, in unique acceptance of this invitation. The more debatable question, central to *this* presentation, has been whether or not there would be such acceptance and appropriation if this were a Hegel conference. Is Hegel's work—specifically the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—a pedagogically efficacious invitation to appropriate his insights? Perhaps on the edge you'll find, that this, as well, is transitionally so.

³⁸ "I can but make the contribution of a single man and hope that others, sensitive to the same problems, will find that my efforts shorten their own labor and that my conclusions provide a base for further developments." CWL3: 24.