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AESTHETICS AND THE OPPOSITES

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Theology is the pursuit of accurate understanding regarding the moments of ultimacy in human experience, the referent of such moments, and their meaning for the individual and cultural life of humankind. In the last analysis, the sole foundational issue of theology is transcendence. And yet Christian theologians of both Protestant and Roman Catholic persuasion have yet to meet on the question of God, on its origins in the pure question that is the native drive of human intelligence and evaluation, and on the sources and outcome of its cumulative resolution within the fabric of human experience. The reason, I believe, is that theology's foundations are in need of further elaboration. In this paper, I will suggest an important and relatively neglected dimension of these foundations, the aesthetic dimension.

WHY METHOD?

A sufficiently broad anticipation of the options now confronting human consciousness would seem to provide proper persuasiveness to the opinion that the most significant movement within the theological community in the last two decades has been the gradual emergence of a preoccupation with theology's method and foundations. In retrospect it may be surmised that the preoccupation arose in response to an at first dimly conscious suspicion that something of perhaps evolutionary significance was being demanded of human subjectivity. It may indeed be melodramatic to portray the option before postmodern humankind as one of survival and extinction. Perhaps it is more accurate, and surely more inspiring, to understand the issue as an option between survival and liberation from mere survival, between the rigidifying of certain ranges of schemes of recurrence and the emergence of the beginnings of new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human experience.
living. The question is not biological but human, not whether there will be life on earth, but whether there will be human life on earth. It is a question concerned not so much with living as with the art of living.

The questions of method and foundations in theology, oddly enough, originated in the suspicion that perhaps a qualitative mutation in the evolutionary process was in preparation, failing which human life on earth would cease, even if men and women were to go on living. There is evidence that this suspicion is correct, and for this evidence we need not turn to objective studies of society and culture, of politics and economics, though these studies may and indeed will support the suspicion. The evidence is given more radically in human consciousness trying to find its way into a human future. We each know in the depths of our being that the most endangered species is the human individual, that the only moral problem is the loss of self, that this loss can happen at any moment, and that if perished in it means the end of my human life, the destruction of perhaps the only work of art of which I am capable. I can at any moment switch gears, indeed switch direction from the careful construction of my own work of art in favor of transference, i.e., of participation in or subservience to systems of interpersonal, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, educational, religious domination. The truth that sets free, one that always has to be wrested by an inner violence, is that I need not capitulate, that I can be linked rather to transcendent creativity, and that this link is the key as to whether I will be attentive or drifting, intelligent or stupid, rational or silly, responsible or more or less consciously sociopathic. It is up to me whether I will be oppressed or free, oppressing or liberating. It lies in no one else's hands whether I will be my own man or woman, or whether I will lose my very self. And everyone who loses self is in the very loss a sociopath, destructive of human relationships and of the striving toward that achievement of common meanings and values that is human community.1

The theologians who have acted on this perhaps once dim suspicion have thus turned their attention to the human self or subject. That this attentiveness has simultaneously resulted in groundbreaking efforts at clarifying theology's method and foundations ought not be surprising, though why this was the case has only recently become clear. For a method is nothing other than a self-conscious interrelating of various operations in

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1 The point is well and simply expressed in Lanza del Vasto's journal of his pilgrimage to India and Gandhi, Return to the Source: "The policy of Gandhi is incomprehensible if one does not know that its aim is not political but spiritual victory. "Whoever saves his own soul does not only serve himself. Although bodies are separate, souls are not. Whoever saves his own soul saves the Soul and accumulates riches that belong to all. Others have only to perceive the treasure to partake of it." Lanza del Vasto, Return to the Source (New York: Pocket Books, 1974), pp. 110 ff. It seems obvious from the overall tenor of del Vasto's book that his reference to "the Soul" is figurative, and not an intrusion of Averroistic metaphysics into contemporary spirituality.

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substantial portion of it would be more precisely articulated if the complement I suggest were incorporated into it.

SOUL-MAKING AND THE OPPOSITES

The human subject or self is inescapably a Protean commingling of opposites. The opposites are spirit and matter, archetype and instinct, or, perhaps most precisely of all, intentionality and body. The operator of their progressive integration is the human soul, or psyche, or imagination: the three are the same. But soul, when undifferentiated, is also the defective operator of disintegration. And soul is usually undifferentiated, in fact almost always more or less not transparent to itself.

The differentiation of soul or imagination is as arduous a task as that of spirit or intentionality. For the human psyche is in one sense not a tertium quid in addition to body and intentionality, but the place of their meeting. And this place is not a point but a field or a dense jungle or a cavernous pit. As the place where body meets intentionality, psyche shares in both. Thus she—for soul is always anima—is both transparent and opaque to herself.

It is important how the opposites are conceived. For Ernest Becker, they are called self and body. This conception involves Becker, I believe, in an exaggerated dualism from which he never manages to extricate his thought on man. Part of Becker’s point, of course, is that the dualism is inescapable, a hopeless existential dilemma, that every attempt to transcend it is a lie. I do not wish to detract from the value of Becker’s profoundly moving closure of twentieth century depth psychology on authentic religion, for I believe he is correct in his synthesis of psychoanalytic and religious insight. However, the dualism can be transcended without lying and without jeopardizing Becker’s conclusions on the finality of the psychoanalytic movement, its inevitable and ironic—considering its origins in Freud—disclosure of a necessary religious spirituality at the heart of the human condition. Becker finds that “in recent times every psychological work has done vital work” has taken the problem of the opposites as the main problem of his thought. Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 26. He includes in his list of psychologists Jung, who, I believe, points the way beyond the opposites. Part of Jung’s technique involves reserving the term “self” for the totality beyond the opposites, thus including body in self. Equally important is the triple constitution of the self, with psyche as mediating the opposites of spirit and matter. See Jung’s programmatic essay, “On the Nature of the Psyche,” in C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Collected Works, Vol. 8, translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XX, 1972), pp. 159–234. The key to the issue is the nature of the symbol. Becker is unfortunately imprecise on this central question, whereas Jung offers a most accurate notion of the symbol. Part of my emphasis on Jung’s importance for theology is based on his contribution to the elucidation of the symbol. In brief, Jung’s notion harmonizes with Paul Ricoeur’s on the structure of the symbol but radicalizes beyond Ricoeur the primordial place of symbolic activity in human life. See my Subject and Psyche: A Study in the Foundations of Theology (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973), Chapter Three.

I am dependent for my notion of imagination on Martin Heidegger’s analysis of Einbildungskraft in Kant and the Problem of the Metaphysik (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951). The German word is helpful: the art of forming into one. So is the Bild aspect of the word. I hope soon to compose an argument that the Einbildungskraft of Heidegger and the psyche of depth psychology can be understood as one and the same. If I am correct, then Heidegger’s Einbildungskraft is removed from its abstract formalism while the psyche of depth psychology is given ontological status.

* The expression, soul-making, is James Hillman’s, but I assign to the phrase a meaning congruent with a closure of psychotherapy on spirituality that Hillman would disavow. The Dionysian quality of Lonergan’s work is temping, but in the seductive manner of a soul only half made. Ultimately it must be said that Lonergan’s work in Jungian thought has taken the problem of the opposites and its integration with Lonergan’s contribution to our knowledge of ourselves. If so, the integration would represent a kind of coniunctio, a marriage of the archetypally masculine (intentionality) and the archetypally feminine (psyche) within the conscious subjectivity of self-appropriating men and women. Furthermore, the art of soul-making would then be the self-owning of the subject as an evaluating and existential subject, in a manner paralleling the way in which cognitive analysis results in a

and she is somehow thus through and through. The writings of Lonergan display the potentialities of spirit or intentionality for self-transparency. The first portions of a Jungian analysis render soul transparent to spirit. But only the mysterious latter phase of the opus disclosed by Jung renders soul transparent to herself, and even then only very precariously, at least for a long period of time. In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras.

The human subject has been disclosed by Lonergan as the center and source of at least two very different kinds of operations. Those Lonergan has most clearly elucidated are cognitive. The other operations are evaluative or existential. They regard decision and action in the world. The delicacy of Lonergan’s uncovering of the operations of knowing would lead us to suspect that the evaluative operations can surely be no more subtle than the cognitive. But this is not the case. For existential consciousness begins in feelings, and feelings are liable to an opaqueness exceeding that of cognitive process. Moreover, self-transparency in the dimension of affectivity is seldom if ever to be achieved by reading a book, whereas there are many who can verify that Lonergan’s work has performed precisely this function with respect to cognition. The mediation of affective immediacy calls upon other techniques than those employed in the self-affirmation of the knower. Many of these techniques have been elaborated by the practitioners of psychotherapy. Others survive in the accumulated wisdom of the great world religions. Ernest Becker points to the synthesis of these two sources of existential mediation of the self. But always the techniques are of soul-making, the subtlest of all human arts.

But is there a way of understanding this subtle art that will enable it to be integrated with Lonergan’s contribution to our knowledge of ourselves? If so, the integration would represent a kind of coniunctio, a marriage of the archetypally masculine (intentionality) and the archetypally feminine (psyche) within the conscious subjectivity of self-appropriating men and women. Furthermore, the art of soul-making would then be the self-owning of the subject as an evaluating and existential subject, in a manner paralleling the way in which cognitive analysis results in a
self-owning of the subject as intelligent and reasonable. If the latter analysis grounds that portion of theology’s foundations in which there is articulated the horizon-shift on knowledge which Lonergan calls intellectual conversion, soul-making would ground the articulation of the two other horizon-shifts which for Lonergan constitute theology’s foundational reality, moral conversion and religious conversion. The subtle art of soul-making would then be as foundational for theology’s future as Lonergan’s explorations of the knowing mind. The two movements of the mediation of cognitive immediacy through cognitional theory-praxis and the mediation of existential immediacy through soul-making would somehow be of equal footing, both for theology and for the new human science that takes its stand on self-appropriation and that issues in a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in cultural life.

This coniunctio is perhaps not far from Lonergan’s mind when he writes: “Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult’s world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one’s submerged feelings in psychotherapy.” And yet soul-making is something other than psychotherapy, even if the therapeutic process is to date its most frequent starting-place as an explicit performance of the human subject. Soul-making is life, not therapy, and the place of soul-making is the dramatic stage of life: human relationships, the passages of the subject from childhood to youth, youth to adulthood, adulthood to age, and the conscious recapitulation of those relationships and passages that occurs when I tell my story. As Otto Rank has made so clear in his singular contribution to psychology’s understanding of itself, we live beyond psychology, and therapy must give way to the soul beyond psychology.

**Soul-making but begins when I discover, identify, and accept previously submerged feelings.** That perhaps necessary beginning—necessary at least in this age of the rift of human intelligence from nature—introduces into human living a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence that represent in effect the elaboration of soul. But surely to speak of discovering, identifying, and accepting submerged feelings in psychotherapy does not capture the rich fabric of soul-making which begins to be woven in Jungian analysis. It is the weaving of that fabric of withdrawal and return that constitutes the second mediation of immediacy by meaning toward which Lonergan is stretching in the sentence I have quoted from his *Method in Theology.* And weaving that fabric is a more intricate maneuver than is involved in naming feelings. It is the much more concrete task of negotiating the figures of one’s own makeup as a self: fathers and mothers, soul-partners, lovers, heroes, friends, enemies, gods, and demons. It is in this respect akin to the Hegelian enterprise of *Geist’s* recapturing of its own evolution, although it occurs on the plane of realism. It is telling a story, first perhaps by repeating the story that has been going forward without one’s being able to tell it as it is, but then by creating the story as one lives it, creating it in all its richness and variety and patterns of differentiated response. Soul-making, we said, is life and not therapy. It is living the dream forward, as a living symbol, a symbolic man or woman, and yet as removed from the symbol one is by a detachment from both inner states and outer objects.

This detachment is important. Its failure is inflation, hardly the desired outcome of soul-making. The presence of this detachment is individuation, the self-constitution of the human subject in his or her uniqueness as the individual, as “only this,” with a matter-of-factness or just-soness that springs from a retrieved or second immediacy. This immediacy must be won back from lostness in the world of the figures one negotiates in the process of soul-making. Its retrieval is ever precarious but is nonetheless cumulatively solidified in the suffering of love that is the name of this subtle art.

Despite the fact that our quotation from Lonergan does not capture the full texture of soul-making, it bears a significance that must be sensitively articulated. It places the soul-making toward which Lonergan is stretching by speaking of psychotherapy, on the same level of discourse as the work to which he has devoted a lifetime of research, writing, and teaching. Lonergan’s work is the discrimination of the intentionality of the human subject as human subject. The portion of that intentionality to whose articulation Lonergan has devoted most of his energies is human

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10 On the three conversions as theology’s foundational reality, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 267–9. Intellectual conversion would seem to coincide with intellectual self-appropriation, while moral and religious conversion obviously occur without such objectification. The art of soul-making facilitates the objectification of one’s moral and religious being.


12 Otto Rank, *Beyond Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1958). The conclusion of Rank’s lifelong pursuit of the meaning of psychoanalysis as a human and cultural phenomenon is expressed in the following words from the preface to this extraordinary book, Rank’s final and posthumously published work: “Man is born beyond psychology and he dies beyond it but he can live beyond it only through vital experience of his own—in religious terms, through revelation, conversion or rebirth.” P. 16. A helpful introduction to Rank is provided by Ira Proffitt, *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1973), Ch. 7. But it is Becker who has persuasively shown the towering significance of Rank’s critique of psychotherapy, I view Rank’s *Beyond Psychology* as something akin to the final word on the subject. Nonetheless, neither Rank himself nor Becker seems to have appreciated the significance of Jung’s contribution to the transition beyond psychology. Proffitt has caught this better. Part of the problem is the tenacious insistence with which Jung’s followers have created an orthodoxy of psychological redemption out of his work and thus perpetuated as illusion to which Jung’s work remains vulnerable, even though Jung himself, I believe, continued to remain free of this illusion himself. My experience at the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich, where I completed writing my doctoral dissertation on Lonergan and Jung, has convinced me of the acuteness of Jung’s expectation that this enterprise would outlive its creative uses within a generation of its establishment. See Laurens van der Post, *Jung and the Story of Our Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1973), p. 4. Psychology, indeed Jung’s psychology above all, is beyond Jungianism.
knowledge. Thus he speaks of "objectifying cognitional process." This is precisely what he has done in Insight: to raise to the level of self-recognition the operations that enter into every process of human knowledge. In this sense he is mediating, or providing the occasion for us to mediate for ourselves, our cognitive immediacy to the world. The world itself, by the nature of our knowledge, is mediated to us by meaning. What the objectification of cognitional process does is to mediate by meaning our cognitive immediacy to a world itself mediated by meaning.

Soul-making, then, is an analogous process. What goes forward in soul-making is the mediation by meaning of a different dimension of immediacy to the world. This immediacy is not so much cognitive as dispositional. It is Heidegger's Befindlichkeit. But even to speak of it as dispositional provides too much of a therapeutic meaning to the mediation. Perhaps the immediacy mediated by meaning in soul-making is better referred to as dramatic. Soul-making is the mediation of immediacy by a story. It is the elevation to story-telling of a story that already was going forward without being told very well. And it is also the elevation to story-making, to self-constitution, of a story that otherwise would continue, without being either made or told. It is the elevation of the subject from a condition of being dragged through life to a condition of walking through life upright. It is the discovery of the paradoxical yielding without which one cannot walk through life upright. It is first the elucidation and then the knowing participation in creating the drama that one's life is. Soul-making, then, is the mediation by meaning of dramatic immediacy, the immediacy of the fears and desires of a self-conscious animal haunted by the inevitability of death, but also of the dramatic component in the struggle for authenticity in one's knowing, one's doing, and one's religion.

BEYOND CRITICISM AND THERAPY

Surely the two mediations are spoken of as separate only for the purpose of analysis. For the two immediacies, while distinct, are not separate from one another. Cognition surely figures in one's dramatic living, just as there is something dramatic about insight and the pursuit of truth. The analytic separation is important, though; Lonergan would never have written Insight had he concerned himself also with soul-making; and the question before a person seeking psychotherapeutic assistance is hardly Lonergan's concern, What am I doing when I am knowing? But the conjunction of the two mediations, and so of the two immediacies, is the concern of this paper. That conjunction through mediation is a second immediacy, a retrieved

spontaneity, a post-critical and post-therapeutic naïveté. Perhaps it is closely aligned with what religious traditions have called wisdom. I suspect it is. But even wisdom need not be mediated to itself by criticism or therapy, and in most instances has not been. Moreover, most efforts at critical and therapeutic mediation have not issued in wisdom. But they have been pointing toward such a term. That pointing is itself the historical meaning of modern philosophy's turn to the subject and of psychoanalysis. The post-modern era may take its stand, then, on the achievement to which modernity, in its philosophy and depth psychology at least, has been pointing.

Before taking its stand, though, the post-modern era must reach that achievement, and what is at stake in the achievement of a post-critical and post-therapeutic wisdom is a new control of meaning, and consequently the beginnings of a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness. Post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity is the beginning of new ranges of series of schemes of recurrence in human history, analogous to but superseding the schemes introduced by critical man—in, e.g., the Socratic maieutic art—and by therapeutic man in psychoanalysis. Post-critical humanity is a retrieval of criticism as it springs from the human mind, of criticism in its roots in spontaneous intelligence and reflecting reasonableness. Post-therapeutic humanity is a retrieval of what criticism criticized, of mythic or, more broadly, symbolic consciousness, but again a retrieval in radice. And the root of mythic consciousness is the maternal imagination of man or anima or soul. Post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity takes its stand on this twofold retrieval of the roots of the stages of meaning that have preceded it. In so taking its stand, it ushers in a new stage of meaning. Our age is as pregnant for a radically different future as was the Greece of 800–200 B.C. that saw the emergence of criticism from myth, the miraculum Graecum. Interestingly enough, though purely by coincidence, Jung has predicted, on the basis of dreams, another period of roughly 600 years before the new stage of meaning, or the "new religion" as he put it, has taken firm hold. In the meantime, there will be much darkness and

15 On the stages of meaning; see Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 85ff.
16 See Max Zeller, "The Task of the Analyst," Psychological Perspectives, (Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring, 1975), esp. p. 75, where Zeller relates a dream that was visited upon him at the very end of a three-month period in Zurich during which he was seeking to answer the question of how he was to understand what he was doing as an analyst. The dream is as follows: "A temple of vast dimensions was in the process of being built. As far as I could see—ahead, behind, right and left—there were incredible numbers of people building on gigantic pillars. I, too, was building on a pillar. The whole building process was in its very beginnings, but the foundation was already there, the rest of the building was starting to go up, and I and many others were working on it." Jung called the temple the new religion, said it was being built by people from all over the world, and indicated that dreams of his own and others indicated that it would take 600 years until it is built. I owe to a student of mine, Bozidar Molitor, the precious insight that the dream, so interpreted, reverses the myth of the Tower of Babel.
CRITICISM AND THE SOUL

The philosophy of self-appropriation, when limited to the dimension of spirit, is a matter of coming into possession of one's own infinite curiosity, one's unrestricted impulse for correct and thorough understanding. It is, if you want, the differentiation of the thinking function of human consciousness. But Jung, at least, speaks of three other functions of human consciousness: sensation, feeling, and intuition. These constitute an infrastructure of the body and the psyche. Their clarification, rendering consciousness. But Jung, at least, speaks of three other functions of human consciousness. Jung says, is something of inevitability. That is all that matters. The foundations of the temple consist in the two mediations of immediacy, cognitive and dramatic. The lowest level of the temple begins to build on these foundations, demonstrating their capacity to complement one another in one movement of foundational subjectivity. That is where we are now. The temple is in its very beginnings, so much so that the foundations themselves need to be strengthened before building further. It must be shown that one temple can be built from these two sets of foundations that have opposed one another so often in human history: intentionality and psyche, spirit and soul. It must be shown that such a temple will not collapse like a house of cards in the gentlest breeze, in fact that it can sustain the torrential rains of an epochal change in human conscious performance. Neither transcendental method alone nor archetypal psychology alone can find post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity; each needs and implies the other, in fact, implicates the other by the very non-separability of cognition from drama and of drama from cognition. And if post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity is a temple, it is because transcendental method and archetypal psychology, in their mutual implication one of the other, both give way to the mystery beyond criticism and beyond psychology.


AESTHETICS

fears a negotiation, for that in itself would be erotic, and so it flees the question and ridicules the concern with an obscurantism that it would despise if manifested in any other dimension of human living. Its flight and ridicule widen a rift that is already the major cultural problem of our age. There are certain things that even an infinite curiosity would prefer not to be curious about, that even an unrestricted desire to know would rather not have to face. The issue is Oedipal, but in the sense of the conflict between the desire to know and the desire not to know, the intention of being and the flight from what can be understood and affirmed. Even an infinite curiosity will find certain questions unsettling.

Moreover, the questions it finds unsettling are remarkably proximate to the domain opened up by spirit's self-appropriation. If the appropriation of spirit is the subject coming into possession of intelligent and reasonable consciousness, the appropriation of soul is the subject coming into possession of the two levels that surround intelligent and reasonable consciousness, namely empirical consciousness, both dreaming and waking, and existential consciousness, particularly as it primordially apprehends values in feelings. Somehow the marriage of spirit and soul is terribly elusive, even though they interpenetrate so fully. One abhors the other. They are indeed opposites.

And yet to call them opposites seems somewhat contradictory to what we said above, where matter was spirit's opposite, and where soul was said to share in both matter and spirit. This latter formulation is in fact more rigorous. But soul does seem more at home with matter than with spirit, and surely matter is more at home with her than spirit is. Matter is not afraid of feeling, sensation, and intuition, of the light buried within the dark side. Spirit is. Spirit fears its own corruption by the dark side—with good reason—and knows where it cannot conquer. But, being spirit and thus arrogant, it will not settle for negotiation. It would prefer to disown its very self, to cut short its questioning in the name of a strange intellectualistic
bias, to cease being curious but in the name of intelligence! It is infinitude preoccupied with being infinite. In its preoccupation it becomes finite by obscurantism, schizophrenic. Its refusal to negotiate finitude in the body is the despair of infinitude disembodied.

And yet the advocate and ally of spirit’s own self-possession, Lonerigan, has, as we have seen, himself opened us upon soul’s self-transparency. The breakthrough is significant. It is the essence of Lonerigan’s later development. Insight alone can be an alienating book. The word “alone” is important. Insight can also be a first step into a new epoch of human consciousness. The epoch itself will be the overcoming of alienation within human consciousness, and thus, viewed historically, Insight would not be alienating at all, but a contribution to wholeness and liberation. In fact, perhaps one of its principal contributions is the liberation from the illusion of a wholeness that is not self-transcending, the futility of the project of psychological redemption to which psychotherapy itself is too prone. But the book is alienating if it is taken as a complete anthropology. This is precisely what it is not. It is primarily a study of the intellectual pattern of experience. If taken as an anthropology, it encourages a dangerous rift of intelligence and reason from the body. If placed within the broader horizon established by complementing spirit’s self-appropriation with soul’s self-transparency, the book takes its rightful place as a contributor to human evolution. The movement of self-owning instituted by the author of Insight extends to soul, to a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, and such an extension opens upon an appropriation of a moral and religious subjectivity that are capable of sublating a self-owning spirit, an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness. Let it be noted that not all moral and religious subjectivity can sublate such a consciousness. There is a moral and religious consciousness that precedes the moment of spirit’s preoccupation with owning itself. This consciousness, while converted, is not self-appropriating. Moral and religious self-appropriation are hastened into being by spirit’s insistence on coming of age. This occurs through soul’s self-transparency. Without it, even spirit’s insistence on self-owning might become immoral and irreligious, a demonic power-drive. With it, spirit’s self-owning becomes spirit’s self-surrender.

The surrender is to the earth. For soul is tied to body, and body is of the earth. The moral and religious consciousness that is given in soul’s self-transparency is womanly consciousness, roaming the expanse of the earth, at home there, able to kiss and embrace the ground. But it is woman as wisdom, Sophia. Only woman as wisdom is transparent to herself in a second immediacy. And spirit’s surrender is to wisdom, where soul performs the wedding that keeps spirit from the demonic, the wedding of spirit to body: to a moral and religious consciousness that are humble, humilis, of the earth, grounded, in the body, “just this.”

The issue is of import for the co-operation of disciplines. But the disciplines must first find themselves. Lanza del Vasto has said that philosophy is lacking in the West, that those who talk about it and teach it do not know what it is about. They lack the joint “between what they believe, what they think, what they know, what they feel, what they want and what they do.” He is correct. The joint is the self, and self’s joint is soul or psyche. And yet psychology in the West does not help philosophy to find psyche. What is taught in university departments of psychology surely has nothing to do with psyche. It has in fact very little to do with humankind. It would, James Hillman says, better be called statistics, physical anthropology, cultural journalism, or animal breeding. If philosophy and psychology were in possession of themselves—i.e., if philosophers and psychologists were moving toward self-transparency—it would be fair to speak of the import of our issue for interdisciplinary co-operation.

Perhaps all talk of interdisciplinary co-operation is an evasion of the issue, however. Are we not really talking about an entirely new science of being human? What current so-called humanistic discipline, aside perhaps from literature, would be at home with the claims here registered? Perhaps the humanistic disciplines as we have known them are themselves passé. I suspect they are. Nonetheless, it can be maintained that the issue opened by Lonerigan and extended here means at least a unity-in-differentiation of three previously separate disciplines: philosophy, depth psychology, and theology. The statement is too cautious, but nonetheless true.

Theology was not mentioned above as a discipline in trouble. This is not because theology is free of the alienation from its subject that afflict philosophy and psychology. Far from it. And who is theology’s subject? The theologian: spirit and soul and body. Lonerigan has provided a maieutic for theologians to employ to help them overcome alienation and the ideologies that justify it. These ideologies are usually called dogmatics or systematics. But here again, we have no more than a beginning. The method of theology is a method of knowing. Fair enough, since theology is knowledge. But the atmosphere of knowing, the drama inseparable from insight—only soul’s self-transparency can provide a grid for this. And only with this is alienation overcome.

This drama, however, depends for its elucidation on an accurate understanding of insight as an activity and as knowledge. Here we locate Lonerigan’s contribution to the new science of the art of being human. No

\[1\] Lanza del Vasto, Return to the Source, p. 230.

\[2\] James Hillman, Re-Visioning Psychology, p. xii.
articulation of consciousness according to which being is laid out before it, and where the problem of knowledge is one of moving from "in here" to "out there" will provide us with more than a melodrama. And the essence of melodrama as opposed to drama is that it could have been avoided by understanding things correctly from the beginning. The question of how I move from "in here" to "out there" in my knowledge is not the right question, does not reflect the problem which obtains between knowing and being. The problem, Lonergan has shown, is one of advancing from the real as experienced to the real as known. The real as known is being, and to reach it one does not move from interiority to exteriority, subjectivity to objectivity. One rather passes from subjectivity as experientially objective to subjectivity as absolutely objective. And this one does by letting subjectivity be normatively objective. What constitutes the normative objectivity of subjectivity is the desire to know, and the first imperative of this desire is understanding. The drama of insight is constituted within interiority, for in addition to the desire to know there is a flight from understanding. Being is a task.

This means too that the rejection of Cartesian subjectivity cannot be made on Cartesian terms. That is, it will not do simply to deny gratuitously the alienation of subjectivity from being which Cartesian subjects gratuitously posit. The real as experienced is not the real as known, and so cannot be affirmed as real until it is known. The affirmation of an unknown as real is naïve realism. Here too there is no drama of insight. There is, in fact, not even a melodrama. There is only a kind of crude epistemological striptease. Neither Cartesian subjectivity nor naïve realism consummates the marriage of knowing and being, for neither is normatively objective. Both flee understanding, and become victims of the desire not to know which is responsible both for the drama of insight and for the failure of insight into the drama of living.

Lonergan’s acknowledgment of a second mediation of immediacy by meaning is tied to an appreciation of the subject and of the objectivity of subjectivity that is more nuanced than the treatment accorded these topics in Insight. In fact, the development of Lonergan’s thought from Insight to Method in Theology is more than a matter of greater nuance in respect to interiority. It involves something of a transformation. The subject as existential is now accorded a primacy or priority of importance previously granted to the subject as cognitive. The issue of subjectivity is now the drama of living, and cognitional analysis is intended to be in aid of that drama. A new and quite distinct level of consciousness is now acknowledged. The subject’s evaluations and deliberations about decision and action are no longer reducible to the questions of whether one is being intelligent or stupid, reasonable or silly, for the human good is something distinct from the intelligent and reasonable.  

The remainder is, I believe, best understood as the aesthetic dimension of the subject. It is this dimension that calls for a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, one that for subjects hitherto negligent of the aesthetic may begin as therapy but that more radically is soul-making. Soul is aesthetic. And soul-making is thus the recovery of aesthetic subjectivity. If values are primordially apprehended in feelings, then aesthetics is the foundation of existential subjectivity and thus of ethics and religion. Soul-making, as the recovery of the aesthetic dimension, is the post-therapeutic basis of morals and prayer. Lonergan’s opening of a distinct level of consciousness that has to do with value, dialectics, and foundations as something distinct from, including, but more than and sublating meaning and truth is really an opening upon aesthetic consciousness as distinct from, including, but more than and sublating cognitive consciousness. Ethics is radically aesthetic; and the existential subject, concerned with character as his or her issue, is the aesthetic subject. Soul, beyond intelligence and reasonableness, is the key to character.

Jung was concerned with character, but ambiguously. There are romantic interpretations of his thought which seem to prescind from this concern in favor of his love of soul.24 Jung’s ambiguity appears above all in his somewhat confusing and inconsistent semantics of evil,25 which may well conceal a hidden agenda. But character and soul are bedfellows. Character is a dance-step one must work out with soul. Character emerges from “that refining fire Where you must move in measure, like a dancer.”26 And the rhythm of this movement is aesthetics. What Lonergan hints at is

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13 I refer particularly to James Hillman’s disparaging of the theme of the heroic in Re-Visioning Psychology. But the same intonations can be heard in more orthodox Jungian publications, e.g., in Marie-Louise von Franz, C. G. Jung: His Myth in Our Time (New York: C. G. Jung Foundation, 1975). Jungians can too easily overlook the correct estimation of Laurens van der Post that Jung’s main concern was consciousness, not the unconscious. See van der Post, Jung and the Story of Our Time, p. 61. The fact is that raising what is dark and inferior in oneself to the same level as what is light and superior was conceived by Jung as something to be done without the surrender of the previously affirmed values, which for most of us in the West are the values inculcated by Christianity. See ibid., p. 199. Perhaps the common misconception concerning Jung on this point is related to the lack of a developed image of the father in his own psyche and in his psychology. See ibid., p. 79, as well as my own work, Subject and Psyche.

28 David Burrell has offered preliminary suggestions for cleaning up Jung’s language on this point. See the chapter on Jung in Burrell’s Exercises in Religious Understanding (South Bend: Notre Dame, 1974).

that the deliberating, evaluating, deciding, existential subject is also the aesthetic subject. The uppermost level of intentional consciousness is art. In its originating moment, apprehension of value in feelings, and in its terminating moment of fidelity to decision, it is radically aesthetic. Aesthetics, in its education or Bildung, must pass through dialectic. For dialectic is a portion of the refining fire. Lonergan's positioning of dialectic as a matter of existential subjectivity is of the utmost significance. It is in fact a breakthrough in understanding this subtle movement of subjectivity. For it means that in the last analysis dialectic is a matter of the heart more radically than of the mind. Better, it is an issue of the drama of insight. It is as insight issues from the struggle with the flight from understanding that the refining fire is at work. To get stopped in dialectic is to suppose dialectic to be a matter principally of mind, and mind to be something whose significance is other than dramatic. Both suppositions are mistaken. The ultimate finality of mind or spirit is existential subjectivity. If this is true, then mind's dialectic is subordinate to and sublated by the dialectic of the heart in morality and religion. The dialectic of the heart moves toward the condition of complete simplicity, where the fire and the rose are one. This condition beyond the opposites, Eliot reminds us, costs not less than, everything. The "everything" includes even a kind of sacrificium intellectus, in the sense that there is another mediation beyond the cognitional. Dialectic is in the service of a story.

We may, then, safely begin from the presumption that Lonergan's opus constitutes an irrevocable achievement on the part of the human mind's knowledge of itself and thus an essential contribution to theology's foundations. The burden of proof surely now lies on the shoulders of one who would refute this presumption. But Lonergan's opening of consciousness upon existential subjectivity as of primary concern for itself, and thus his explorations of value, dialectic, and foundational subjectivity, still constitute no more than a problem. He has opened the door to a room which he has not furnished for us, and it is the central room of our dwelling-place, the living room. I do not fault him for this. To fault one whose achievement is unparalleled for what he has left to others to do is, to put it mildly, an irresponsible escape from accepting the possibility that one may oneself be one of those others. It also constitutes an unrealistic expectation even of genius. But one also must be realistic about one's self-expectations, and so I hasten to conclude with a comment about what we cannot claim or ambition to do. No thinker can furnish the living room. More precisely, I can furnish only my own dwelling-place, and you yours. But I can suggest where the materials are to be found and how the task of their arrangement can most artistically be approached. In this sense the task I propose, while complementary to Insight, is of another order. No workbook in the.

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