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CONSCIENCE AND NEWMAN'S ORGANUM INVESTIGANDI

Robert Doran, S.J.

A good paper. You have a fine, active mind. I learned from reading this paper. I'm still not sure about the critical task, but you have given me something to consider. Maybe.

Theology 281
Rev. William Kelly, S.J.
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We did not do it, since he was not forced to do it by a reading of Kant; whereas foreign was forced by his reading of Kant.
A good paper with a representative bibliography. I guess that I forgot to warn you to annotate the bibliography. Did you make any effort to check the Periodical literature since 1969?

Clean the type!
Your research format and style are good. I have noted a few errors.

Consider putting this up for publication! It's a bit long, but maybe you could cut it down a bit.
INTRODUCTION

... (There) is a certain ethical character, one and the same, a system of first principles and sentiments and tastes, a mode of viewing the question and of arguing, which is formally and normally, naturally and divinely, the organum investigandi given us for gaining religious truth, and which would lead the mind by an infallible succession from the rejection of atheism to theism, and from theism to Christianity, and from Christianity to Evangelical Religion, and from these to Catholicity.

John Henry Newman states that one of the principal reasons for writing his Grammar of Assent was to uncover and describe the character of this organum investigandi. The principal reason for the present study is to expose what he has thus uncovered and described and to consider its relation with conscience, i.e., to find the connection between his delineations of conscience and the ethical character of the mode of inquiry conditioning the possibility of the acquisition and acceptance of religious truth and specifically of the Catholic faith. The main work relied on is, of course, the Grammar of Assent, but other writings of Newman and secondary studies will be drawn on as needed and helpful.

It might be wise to indicate a portion of the particular set of "first principles" from which the present study is written. Bernard Lonergan has listed Newman's Grammar along with writings of Augustine, Descartes' Regulae and Pascal's Pensees as "common sense" or "ordinary language" attempts to describe the conscious subject and his conscious operations. Lonergan's meaning of "common sense" distinguishes these attempts from a systematic delineation of the world of human interiority, such as he has presented in Insight. Such works, Lonergan says, display
to us the fact that, in contrast to strict Aristotelianism, a legitimate
movement is possible from a description of mental acts as experienced
and then from their systematic conception and personal affirmation, to
notions of being, truth, and objectivity, and finally to an explicit
metaphysics. It would seem a reasonable hypothesis (yet to be verified,
it is true) that Lonergan's \textit{Insight} can be viewed as a systematic trans-
position of the discourse of Newman's \textit{Grammar} and an explicit statement
of the epistemology and metaphysics therein implied. That is to say,
the "common sense" description given by Newman can be related by and
large to Lonergan's cognitional theory and then, once the world of human
interiority has been systematically conceived and this system personally
affirmed, the questions of epistemology and metaphysics can be dealt
with. This is not meant to imply that Lonergan's cognitional analysis
adds nothing to Newman's \textit{Grammar} other than a systematic framework nor
is it intended as a denial of the creative and original genius of either
mind. Above all, I have no intention of trying to maintain that \textit{Insight}
and the \textit{Grammar of Assent} have the same primary intent. I do wish to
propose, however, that the relations between the \textit{Grammar} and \textit{Insight}
can be more finely articulated than C. S. Dessain has done in his as yet
unpublished comparison presented at the Lonergan Congress in April,
1970.\footnote{Dessain discovers unquestionable parallels between Newman and
Lonergan; but an understanding of Lonergan's notion of "realms of meaning"
and particularly of his distinction between the realm of common sense

\textit{prefer to avoid the formal grammar in research style. It may be
introduced in your conclusion especially when you wish to emphasize
that your contribution is from outside}}

and those of theory and interiority\textsuperscript{6} could, I believe, make possible a very enlightening transposition.

Such an approach might also—again, this is by way of hypothesis—clarify the single area in which Dessain finds little parallel between Newman and Lonergan, the critically important area of conscience and the natural knowledge of God. For it can be intelligently argued, I believe, that Newman’s “ethical character of inquiry” is related to Lonergan’s “transcendental drive” with its imperatives: be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible; i.e., that these two are talking about the same phenomenon. Lonergan shows this drive to open upon the question of God in many ways; Newman would prefer to discuss but one, though he admits the possibility of others. Lonergan’s material on “general transcendent knowledge” in \textit{Insight} might thus be thought of as a display of “conscience” at work in a systematic vein, whereas Newman’s “proof for God from conscience” might be thought of as an instance of the spontaneous reasonableness and responsibility of consistent but non-systematic thought.

At any rate, this is not a comparative study of Lonergan and Newman. I mention these hypotheses simply to indicate the intellectual framework from which this paper is written and to provide an indication of dangers of which I am well aware. In discussing Newman as a psychologist, J.-H. Walgrave\textsuperscript{7} indicates that there are parallels with much in modern psychology, but also that he discovered these parallels only after
his views on Newman's psychology had assumed a coherent form. My own reading of Newman took place, on the other hand, only after five years of attempting to appropriate the philosophical achievement of Lonergan. The danger of exaggerated "eisegesis" is not lessened by the knowledge of Lonergan's careful study of the Grammar of Assent. As much as possible, I hope this paper represents an honest attempt to study Newman on his own merits without seeking correlations or suggesting criticisms.

OK. But you have enough ideas to know the areas of influence on Newman's writing. You are not comparing apples and oranges.
I. THE PROBLEM IN ITS CONTEXT

James Collins indicates that Newman was always haunted by the problem of the rational character of faith. He presents the following quotation as indicative of a fundamental problem lying behind much of Newman's work.

The great mass of Catholics know nothing of argument, how then is their faith rational? . . . How can (the Catholic's) belief be called rational? How can his treatment of his intellect be called honest or dutiful to its great Maker and Giver? . . . If a religion is consequent upon reason, and at the same time for all men, there must be reasons producible sufficient for the rational conviction of every individual. . . . I would affirm that faith must rest on reason, nay, even in the case of children, and of the most ignorant and dull peasant, wherever faith is living and loving; and of course in a great many other cases besides. I start then with a deep conviction that that is the case on which the objection I am to answer bases itself; viz., that faith not only ought to rest upon reason as its human basis, but does rest and cannot but so rest, if it deserves the name of faith. And my task is to elicit and show to the satisfaction of others what those grounds of reason are. 9

By no means, however, was this to imply that Christian belief was to be rationalized into those doctrines which survive strict logical tests, nor that the believer must apply mathematical or scientific canons to his beliefs in order to maintain his integrity. Such a tendency on the part of the Noetic school at Oriel College proved to be an initial point of conflict prompting Newman's interest in this problem. He judged that this approach tended to reserve a well-founded Christian faith for a small handful of scholars. 10 The problem lay not in the fact that faith must be well-founded in reason, but in the foundations offered by the Noetic school. Positively, Newman inherited from the Noetics a deep suspicion of a purely emotional religion. Negatively, he was convinced
of the artificiality and narrowness of their criteria for well founded belief. "Many believers do have a reason for their act of faith and do distinguish it from an ungrounded commitment, without being able to put their evidence into a formula. Their minds operate through an implicit kind of reasoning, even when they do not put it into syllogistic mood and figure."¹¹ Even in natural science Newman was to discover operative this informal type of reasoning.¹² How, then, does the mind work in concrete and historical matters, such as those involved in faith?

Newman was aware that an answer to this question demanded his adherence to a psychological rather than a logical point of view. He must carefully describe our human interiority and its personal acts, "that minute, continuous, experimental reasoning, which shows badly on paper, but which drifts silently into an overwhelming cumulus of proof; and, when our start is true, brings us on to a true result."¹³ As we shall see, Newman will point to the illative sense as a way of meeting the common problem that informal reasoning has a germ of generality and scientific reasoning at times becomes informal. He will also argue that, if we trust this minute and continuous reasoning when it reaches existentially significant results, there is no reason why our trust should be any less strong when the same informal processes of our mind give rise to the assent to God and the world of religion.

Walgrave suggests and initiates a fascinating study. He maintains that an essential core insight of Newman's is the conflict between
conscience and the world, one aspect of which is the opposition of conscience and the self-sufficient reason. He maintains that this same conflict underlies the following antitheses: orthodoxy vs. heresy in *The Arians of the Fourth Century* and in the *Essay on Development*; faith vs. autonomous reason in the *University Sermons*; the Catholic vs. the rationalistic spirit in *Tract 73*; the ethos of the gentleman and the religious ethos in the *Idea of A University*; and real vs. notional assent in the *Grammar of Assent*. In the *University Sermons*, for example, "Newman shows that every person can, by his reason, reach the threshold of faith; even one of little education could do so, but through an 'experiential' process of a kind of implicit and unconscious reasoning rather than by explicit examination. But this gradual approach to faith supposes personal fidelity to conscience, not a scientific attitude; the factors leading to conviction are the profound stirrings of conscience rather than the proofs furnished by history." The aim of the *Grammar* is to grapple with this problem and achieve a definitive solution in its regard. It is really Newman's life's work. In 1860, he wrote to William Froude: "If I wrote a new work it would deal with the popular, practical, and personal proofs of Christianity, precisely in as much as they stand at the antipodes of scientific demonstration; it would aim at showing how any given person, educated or not, possesses as much right to certainty—has, therefore, motives as truly rational—as a learned theologian with his scientific arguments." Newman had very personal reasons for writing the *Grammar*.
he had to draw out and justify the principles and process of thought to which were due the direction of his life and his entry into the Catholic Church. He had long felt the need of a thorough inquiry into the workings of his mind and now it became an imperative duty. Kingsley . . . impelled him to write the Apologia and to bring out clearly the principles and stages of his intellectual growth. As might be expected, there was a reaction from the 'spirit of the time.' In September, 1864, Fitzjames Stephen alleged that the method adopted by Newman had vitiated his thought. This method he interpreted as follows: for motives of an irrational nature, of purely personal feeling, Newman had arbitrarily imposed a particular convergence and direction on a whole collection of likelihoods which, interpreted differently, and under the influence of other sentiments, could have led him in quite another direction. Among the numerous letters Newman received on the subject, those of William Froude, so moving in their sincerity and trust, taught him that the scientific world, though admiring his extraordinary intellectual power, were grieved and amazed to see how he had bridged the gap—so lightheartedly—between simply probability and firm certitude. This reproach went to his heart. His Apologia, then, had to be reinforced with a substructure going much deeper. He would, to justify that work, being to light the whole working of his mind, and this would give the key to his entire work. 17

Our treatment of the problem will be as follows: first, we shall give a fairly lengthy summary of the main arguments of the Grammar of Assent, whose main thrust is to display the workings of the illative sense in concrete reasoning. Then we shall locate the nub of our problem, the presence or absence of religious belief, not in the presence or absence of rationality, but in the set of first principles from which one begins. Finally, we shall study the psychology of "ethos" as summarized by Walgrave; Newman portrays, in his typologies of the religious man and the rationalist, the effect of first principles upon religious living. The first principles required for true religion demand a fidelity to conscience and thus provide religious inquiry with its ethical character.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT IN THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

A. A Problem

Aldous Huxley, a surprising admirer, has contended that Newman's analysis of the psychology of thought is one of the most acute and most elegant ever made. There is, however, a persistent problem which we should mention now and for which we should attempt to indicate the elements of a solution. Walgrave judges that Newman may have overestimated the importance of mere analysis in his examination of the process of knowledge. Does not a justification of certitude involve more than a detailed exposition of the way in which the mind comes to be certain? What if the mind is wrong? "It is not enough to say that this is, in fact, how the mind works and, in so doing, discovers the truth. The validity of an intellectual method cannot, in the last resort, depend simply on the fact that it is seen to be a natural law of the understanding, as shown by experience. Such a mode of reasoning seems the crudest kind of 'psychologism.'" 19

The problem is a real one, if indeed one presumes he will find in the Grammar of Assent a complete, critically grounded philosophy. For in such a philosophy, as Lonergan has shown, there are three basic questions: what am I doing when I am knowing? (cognitional theory); why is this knowing? (epistemology); what do I know when I do this? (metaphysics). The second step is very crucial in a critically grounded philosophy, for it calls one to work out and explicate his notions of
reality, being, and objectivity. It seems to be what Walgrave is calling for. But can we legitimately ask of Newman more than he set out to do? Taking Lonergan's tripartite division of questions as a clue, we must locate the Grammar of Assent squarely within the first, as a contribution to cognitional theory. The book is a descriptive account of the processes of inference and assent. Since it is written largely within what Lonergan would call a common sense and ordinary language framework, we can expect to find contained common sense assumptions concerning the matter of the second and third questions of a critically grounded philosophy. The point is that Newman was not formally attempting critically (in the sense of all post-Kantian use of this term) to ground knowledge and certitude at all. It can be argued that only Lonergan has successfully met the Kantian challenge. In a critically grounded philosophy of objectivity and being, we cannot permit common sense assumptions to go unquestioned, for common sense is not capable of gnoseological criticism. But let us take Newman for what he is and allow him simply to present his grammar, just as a grammarian derives patterns of language from current use, without feeling any obligation to ground the meaning of language, relate it to understanding, establish with philosophic rigor the ontological import of its referent, etc. What does the mind do when it functions as mind? This alone is the question Newman felt compelled to answer. To demand that he answer another is not fair.
Put another way: Newman's concern is to display the inherent dynamism of two underlying ethical characters or systems of first principles, the religious and the rationalist. From a contemporary, post-Lonergan perspective, we might say these underlying "horizons" are locked in dialectical conflict, reduce the conflict to the presence and absence of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, develop the positions and counter-positions on objectivity and being that follow respectively from an intellectually converted and unconverted stance, and critically ground the positions in an epistemology. We might even be right in maintaining that Lonergan alone has provided the extremely sophisticated tools for doing what Walgrave demands. (This claim involves, it is true, a position on the meaning of the entire development of modern Western philosophy). But before this could have been accomplished, the inherently ethical character of epistemological stances had to be demonstrated. It had to be shown that types of moral personality and their genesis are intrinsically connected with options regarding the process and import of knowledge. For this, modern Western philosophy owes a debt of gratitude to Newman, among others. This was his concern; let this be what we look for in reading him.

B. Exposition: The Facts of the Mind

1. Assent, Apprehension, and Conscience

Newman's starting point is the facts of the mind, purely and simply.20 The source of his data is primarily personal consciousness, secondarily the testimony of others, which should be in a confirmatory position with regard to what one discovers by rigorous self-examination.
The knowledge of self, an adamantine sense of self, should provide the rules for testing the testimony of others.

What then are the facts which Newman discovers? Throughout the reading of the Grammar, it must be remembered that Newman is concerned with arguing that we have a moral responsibility for our lives of thought. We are responsible for the first principles which direct our thought. We are responsible for assent as a personal act. Thought as expressed exhibits the moral character of the thinker.

What is the peculiarity of our nature, in contrast with the inferior animals around us? It is that, though man cannot change what he is born with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good. Other beings are complete from their first existence, in that line of excellence which is allotted to them; but man begins with nothing realized (to use the word), and he has to make capital for himself by the exercise of those faculties which are his natural inheritance. Thus he gradually advances to the fullness of his original destiny. Nor is this process mechanical, nor is it of necessity; it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species; each of us has the prerogative of completing his inchoate and rudimental nature, and of developing his own perfection out of the living elements with which his mind began to be. It is his gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made. This is the law of his being, which he cannot escape; and whatever is involved in that law he is bound, or rather he is carried on, to fulfill.

... this law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition of knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments. Supposing, then, the advancement of our nature, both in ourselves individually and as regards the human family, is, to every one of us in his place, a sacred duty, it follows that that duty is intimately bound up with the right use of these two main instruments of fulfilling it.

Earlier in the Grammar, Newman states that when we err in the exercise of doubt, inference, or assent, "... such errors of the individual belong to the individual, not to his nature, and cannot
avail to forfeit for him his natural right, under proper circumstances, to doubt, or to infer, or to assent. We do but fulfill our nature in doubting, inferring, and assenting; and our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right rightly.\textsuperscript{22}

Knowledge develops through reasoning, which can be either implicit or explicit. Reasoning is doubly structured; it possesses both a psychological and a logical structure. Explicit reasoning is logical; implicit reasoning is spontaneous.

All inference as such is for Newman the movement of the mind toward the conditional acceptance of a proposition.\textsuperscript{23} The proposition accepted has a "therefore" quality about it. The science of logic is the regulating principle of formal inference.\textsuperscript{24} Newman first distinguishes inference from doubt and assent. All three are mental acts with propositions as their objects, but whereas doubt is interrogative and assent categorical, inference is conditional. Early in the Grammar, he anticipates a central concern by stating that when these three modes of holding propositions are carried out into the intellectual habits of an individual, they become the principles of three distinct states or characters of mind. In questions of religion, these characters are the sceptic, the philosopher, and the believer.\textsuperscript{25}

Inference is contrasted with assent on two counts: assent is unconditional, inference conditional; assent demands apprehension, whereas inference does not. By apprehension Newman means "the interpretation
given to the terms of which (a proposition) is composed. Such terms can stand either for ideas existing in the mind (e.g., abstractions and generalizations) or for things external to us, which are always individual and concrete. The apprehension or interpretation of propositions thus may be either notional or real depending on the reference of the terms. Real apprehension is more vivid and forcible, more exciting and stimulating. It is more cognate to assent, while notional apprehension fits better with inference (though this by no means states a universal law).

In order to assent to a proposition, I must apprehend its predicate. I can do this in a number of ways: if I say "X is Y," and apprehend "Y", I give an assent; but I can apprehend neither and yet assent, "That X is Y is true." Finally, in addition to assenting to the truth of a proposition, I can assent to the veracity of the witness who taught me the proposition in the first place. In all of these instances, the adherence of the mind to the proposition is absolute and unconditional. The third, however, has the greater force. "That he would have to die for all three propositions severally rather than deny them, shows the completeness and absoluteness of assent in its very nature; that he would not spontaneously challenge so severe a trial in the case of two out of the three particular acts of assent, illustrates in what sense one may be stronger than another."
of assent. The kinds of apprehension give to assent a kind of attitudinal or atmospheric quality, related to feeling.

To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded. The latter is the conservative principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its advancement. Without the apprehension of notions, we should for ever pace round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we shall waste ourselves in vague speculations. However, real apprehension has the precedence, as being the scope and end and the test of notional; thus the fuller is the mind's hold upon things or what it considers such, the more fertile is it in its aspects of them, and the more practical in its definitions. 28

Nonetheless, it is this variation in the mind's apprehension of an object and not any incompleteness in the assent itself, which leads us to speak of strong and weak assents. 29

Notional assents bear a resemblance to acts of inference, for the act of apprehension attendant upon inference is also usually notional. Propositions about individuals are seldom the matter of inference.

If notional apprehension is most congenial to inference, real apprehension will be the most concomitant on assent. An act of inference includes in its object the dependence of its thesis upon its premises, that is, upon a relation, which is an abstraction; but an act of assent rests wholly on the thesis as its object, and the reality of the thesis is almost a condition of its unconditionality. 30

Assent is most perfect when real, inference when notional.

... when inferences are exercised on things, they tend to be conjectures or presentiments, without logical force; and when assents are exercised on notions, they tend to be mere assertions without any personal hold on them on the part of those who make them. If this be so, the paradox is true, that, when Inference is clearest, Assent may be least forcible, and, when Assent is most intense, Inference may be least distinct. 51

Nonetheless, notional assents do occur and Newman lists five types in an ascending order of "strength:" profession (practically mere assertion);
credence (taking for granted, as in, e.g., notional religion); opinion (assert to a proposition as probably true); presumption (assert to first principles, to those propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter); and speculation, or those notional assents which are the firm, conscious acceptance of propositions as true; only the absence of apprehending the objects of such propositions in the concrete keeps such assent from being real.

Real assents are marked by the influence they exert on an individual or on society. "... Great truths, practical or ethical, float on the surface of society, admitted by all, valued by few, exemplifying the poet's adage, 'Probitas laudatur et alget,' until changed circumstances, accident, or the continual pressure of their advocates, force them upon its attention." In religious matters, the Scriptures have an entirely different effect before and after religious conversion, even though they may have been assented to notionally even prior to the moment of conversion.

The distinctness of the images apprehended is no warrant for the existence of the objects represented in these images. "... We have no right to consider that we have apprehended a truth, merely because of the strength of our mental impression of it." Thus, "... when I assent to a proposition, I ought to have some more legitimate reason for doing so, than the brilliancy of the image of which that proposition is the expression." Imagination has, or ought to have, the effect of intensifying assent, not of creating it.
While real assent is more "practical" than notional, it is only indirectly so. For a proposition accepted with a real assent to be carried over into conduct, emotions must be stirred. Thus the images reflected in the proposition must stimulate the powers of emotion, if the proposition is to have an effect on the conduct of our lives.

Real assents are utterly personal, unique to each subject. The reason for this is that the images connected with real assent are often "peculiar and special. They depend on personal experience; and the experience of one man is not the experience of another." Even images shared with others may still be personal accidents. "... an abstraction can be made at will, and may be the work of a moment; but the moral experiences which perpetuate themselves in images, must be sought after in order to be found."

Real assents provide us with our "intellectual moorings," give our minds "a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence," and create "heroes and saints, great leaders, statesmen, preachers, and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in science, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers."

With this introduction, Newman is ready to enter more fully into the discussion of religion. In the important fifth chapter of the Grammar, he discourses on the nature of religious assent in reference to real and notional apprehension. He begins with an important distinction, that between religion and theology. Religion gives a real assent to dogma, theology a notional assent. The mutual relations between the
two are obvious, and each needs the other, but they are in no way to be confused with one another. The chapter deals with belief in the One God and belief in the Trinity, in their relation to notional and real assent.

Belief in One God is an act not only of religion informed by revelation but also of "natural religion." The truth that God is one is "the foundation of all religion." 39 Newman's principal concern with it is as a real assent, as an act of the religious imagination. How is such an act possible? How do we gain an image of God and give a real assent to the proposition that He exists? It is through the intimations of conscience. 40 The first principle to which Newman appeals in seeking to explain this possibility is the fact that "we have by nature a conscience." 41 In the feelings which issue from conscience, God is really apprehended.

Conscience is depicted as "a certain keen sensibility, pleasant or painful,--self-approval and hope, or compunction and fear,--attendant on certain of our actions, which in consequence we call right or wrong." 42 While its act is indivisible, it presents two aspects, which Newman considers separately. The first is a moral sense, a judgment of the reason; the second is a sense of duty, a dictate of moral authority. The universal testimony of conscience is that there is a right and a wrong. The universal sanction of conscience is the feeling attendant upon conduct which I consider right or wrong. This aspect of sanction is what is usually meant by the word "conscience." "Half the world would be puzzled to know what was meant by the moral sense; but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad
Conscience as sense of duty, under its judicial aspect, is primarily concerned, not with objects nor with the hierarchy of values, but with persons, with actions as issuing from persons, as issuing from self, yet as reaching beyond self because of a dim discernment of a higher sanction for its decisions. Because of this sense of a higher sanction, conscience can be thought of as a "Voice." As touching so intimately upon the actions issuing from the self, conscience as dictating affects our emotions, especially that of fear. The emotions attendant upon self-approval and self-disapproval are specifically different from those which attend our other intellectual capacities. As a moral sense, conscience is a sense of admiration and disgust, approbation and blame, as intellectual sentiments. But as a sense of duty, it is always more sharply emotional in tone. For it involves the recognition of a personal being, "the One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear."  

If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of ethics.

It is by means of an impulse of nature or an instinct that such a recognition is spontaneously received, even in the mind of a child. The spontaneously entertained image of God can certainly be strengthened and improved or distorted and obliterated, but such development or decline is dependent on the individual and his circumstances. I quote here a brief passage which substantiates Walgrave's theses that the conflict between conscience and the
world is perhaps the essential core insight in Newman's writings:

> It is more than probable that, in the event, from neglect, from the temptations of life, from bad companions, or from the urgency of secular occupations, the light of the soul will fade away and die out. Men transgress their sense of duty, and gradually lose those sentiments of shame and fear, the natural supplements of transgression, which, as I have said, are the witnesses of the Unseen Judge. And, even were it deemed impossible that those who had in their first youth a genuine apprehension of Him, could ever utterly lose it, yet that apprehension may become almost undistinguishable from an inferential acceptance of the great truth, or may dwindle into a mere notion of the intellect. 48

The spontaneous theology of the religious imagination, on the other hand, is quite distinct, and it is rooted in conscience:

> It has a living hold on truths which are really to be found in the world, though they are not upon the surface. It is able to pronounce by anticipation, what it takes a long argument to prove—that good is the rule, and evil the exception. It is able to assume that, uniform as are the laws of nature, they are consistent with a particular Providence. It interprets what it sees around it by this previous inward teaching, as the true key of that maze of vast complicated disorder; and thus it gains a more and more consistent and luminous vision of God from the most unpromising materials. 49

Newman is dealing here with real apprehension and assent in religion. The key to such assent is conscience. "... Conscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator, and the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion." 50

What Newman has thus delineated is not dependent on revelation, but occurs in the "twilight of Natural Religion." Revelation adds a fulness and exactness to this spontaneous image of God. His main concern at this point is to trace the process leading to this real or religious (as opposed to theological) apprehension or assent to the proposition that there is one personal God present to me. He closes this section with an important statement
on the need for propositions as the object of such religious assent. One and the same proposition may be assented to notionally by the theological intellect and really by the religious imagination. But the presence of a proposition does not destroy the life of religion; there is no opposition between a dogmatic creed and a vital religion. Propositions do not remove religion from the heart and make it a matter of words or of logic. That is, there is no a priori necessity that propositions can be assented to only notionally; there is a necessity, however, that real assents also be to propositions. "The propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts, not notions, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others." Propositions clarify the truths to which the religious imagination, with its affections, assents. Newman here argues for the precedence of knowledge with respect to love:

We feel gratitude and love, we feel indignation and dislike, when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions. We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him. Propositions also place religious imagination and emotion under the control of reason. Newman goes so far (too far?) as to say, "Theology may stand as a substantive science, though it be without the life of religion; but religion cannot maintain its ground at all without theology." With respect to the explicitly Christian dogma of the Trinity:

... theology has to do with the Dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but Religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it, and lives and thrives in the contemplation of them. In them it finds the motives for devotion and
faithful obedience; while theology on the other hand forms and protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one by one, but as a system of truth.54

The ordinary Catholic, then, is bound to believe the separate propositions of such a dogma and can do so because they are capable of being affirmed with a real assent, just as is the proposition that there is one personal God present to me. Devotion may be "careless about intellectual consistency" without thereby forfeiting its claim to integrity. There is no question that the greater number of theological notions may be unintelligible to the ordinary Catholic. How can such notions, then, be included among the Catholic credenda? Most of these dogmatic notions have been propounded by the Church in Council decisions regarding heresies. For Newman, then, the difficulty can be resolved through what he calls implicit faith in the word of the infallible Church.55 The consistency of one's credal affirmations concerning the Church suffice to handle this problem. Even here there seems to be an implicit appeal to conscience, to the obligation to be consistent with what we profess.

However this may be, with respect to the relation between apprehension and assent Newman has clearly demonstrated the directive role of conscience as underlying the very foundations of all religion, "natural" as well as "revealed," namely the real apprehension of and assent to the existence of one personal and present God.

2. Assent, Inference, and the Illative Sense

We said above that Newman distinguishes assent from inference on the basis of the unconditional character of the former. Little account has
been paid to inference thus far, however, in our attempt to depict the function of the *organum investigandi* in religion. The real assent to the existence of one personal, present God as the foundation of all religion did not seem to rely upon an inference but rather simply upon the real apprehension concomitant with that assent, an apprehension in the experience of obligation. Inference is not to be excluded, however, from the realm of personal religious truth and its role is now investigated by Newman.

The first question he must answer, and it is indeed a difficult one, is the question of how inference can be so involved in matters of personal religion, since inference results in the conditional acceptance of a proposition, whereas assent (all assent) is unconditional. How can inference precede assent, as it generally does? Above all, how can real assent, such as features in personal religious matters, follow upon inference? Is it not inconsistent that an unconditional acceptance of a proposition result from its conditional verification? The problem is, more specifically, that of certitude in those concrete matters of fact which are known by means other than intuition. Reasonings in concrete matters would seem to be only probabilities; thus the conclusions to such reasonings would seem to be no more than probable. It would seem that only a doctrine of degrees of assent is possible, a doctrine that would correlate the strength or weakness, unconditionedness or conditionality, of an assent with the strength or weakness of the arguments employed in reaching the conclusion. Aside from intuition, the only place for unconditioned assent would seem to be in logical demonstration.
With this view Newman violently disagrees. After taking issue with the inconsistency and general tenor of Locke's thought on the issue, he inquires into what our ordinary experience teaches us regarding the relation of inference and assent in the life of our minds. First, while admitting that assent is always given on the basis of some preliminary reason, he shows in several ways what he calls its substantiveness: it can be withheld in cases where there are good reasons for assenting to a proposition; it can be withdrawn after it has been given, even though the reasons remain; it may remain when the reasons are forgotten; it need not vary in strength with the reasons. These instances point to the difference between assent and inference, unconditionedness being the mark of assent. To show that this is always what is meant, Newman argues that such acts as suspicion, conjecture, presumption, persuasion, belief, conclusion, conviction, moral certainty, doubt, wavering, distrust, and disbelief, are not assents at all, but more or less strong inferences of a proposition or indications of its contradictory; or better, they are "assents to the plausibility, probability, doubtfulness, or untrustworthiness of propositions; that is, not variations of assent to an inference, but assents to a variation in inferences." While the instances are many in which we do not assent at all, there are none in which assent is conditional. We do sometimes assent unconditionally, however, even when our reasoning has been only probable. That is, demonstration is not the only form of reasoning that leads to unconditional assent. "There is a connexion doubtless between a logical conclusion and an assent, as there is between the variation of the mercury and our sensa-
tions; but the mercury is not the cause of life and health, nor is verbal 
argumentation the principle of inward belief. A preponderance of 
probability is sufficient for assuming our assent is correct and for taking 
on ourselves the responsibility for our assent. 

Thus assent, simply considered, is "the mental assertion of an 
intelligible proposition, . . . an act of the intellect direct, absolute, 
complete in itself, unconditional, arbitrary, yet not incompatible with an 

appeal to argument, and at least in many cases exercised unconsciously." In so far as assent is unconscious, it is called "simple assent." Conscious 
and deliberate assents are called complex or reflex. To move from simple 
to reflex assent with regard to one and the same proposition is not the 
same as doubting the proposition. " . . . we may aim at inferring a propo-

sition, while all the time we assent to it." Such investigation into the 
proof of what we have assented to is even a necessity for educated minds. 

To incur the risk of such investigation is not to expect reversal of my 

assent. "My mind is not moved by a scientific computation of chances, nor 
can any law of averages affect my particular case." 

When the proposition to which assent is given is as objectively true 
as it is subjectively, the assent to it is called a perception, the convic-
tion entertained a certitude, the proposition itself a certainty or a matter 
of knowledge, and to assent to it is to know. Doubt is much more frequently 
entertained about true propositions than certitude about those that are 
false. 

Certitude, then, is "the perception of a truth with the perception
that it is a truth." It is not certain of a proposition if I do not spontaneously and promptly reject all objections against its truth. If a man is intellectually tolerant of objections, he virtually countenances them. The main characteristic of certitude is "to be confident indeed that that certitude will last, but to be confident of this also, that, if it did fail, nevertheless, the thing itself, whatever it is, of which we are certain, will remain just as it is, true and irreversible." Certitude, then, is not coextensive with assent. There is a feeling or sentiment of intellectual security attending our experience of certitude. Such a feeling never accompanies simple assent, processes of inference, doubt, investigation, conjecture, or opinion. The feeling is one of "repose in self and in its object, as connected with self," the triumphant repose of the mind after a struggle." Certainly assent and inference are accompanied by pleasurable feelings; even doubt can involve one in "a certain grave acquiescence in ignorance, a recognition of our impotence to solve momentous and urgent questions, which has a satisfaction of its own." But the feeling tone of certitude is different.

More finely put, much, though not all, simple assent could be called material or interpretative certitude; that is, "though the assent in the individuals here contemplated is not a reflex act, still the question only has to be started about the truth of the objects of their assent, in order to elicit from them an act of faith in response which will fulfill the conditions of certitude." There are, of course, simple assents
which are not such virtual certitudes and are lost when we attempt to turn
them into certitudes.

The reflex assent of certitude is always notional. Its predicate is
a general term such as "true," "necessary," "obligatory," etc. Thus the
assent does not touch us and move us to action with the same force as a real
assent. Rather, it records a conclusion. Even though reflex assent lends
depth and exactness it can involve a loss of freshness and vigour. "It is
assent, pure and simple, which is the motive cause of great achievements; it
is a confidence, growing out of instincts rather than arguments, stayed upon
a vivid apprehension, and animated by a transcendent logic, more concentrated
in will and in deed for the very reason that it has not been subjected to any
intellectual development."68

Of course the complex act of certitude itself is really a combination
of simple and reflex assent. But the questioning which makes assent a reflex
matter, when it becomes a habit, introduces the possibility of our substitu­
ting inferences for any assent or tends to render all of our assents merely
notional. Vague thoughts and temptations, appearing almost as a form of
scepticism and doubt, may rob certitude of its normal peacefulness, even
though conviction may still be very much present. Images are required to
make such assent real.

The element of persistence is a very important point of distinction
between certitude and assent. Authentic religious faith is manifested in such
persistence, in habits of prayer and self-sacrifice. How is such a persis­
tence manifest in the faith of a Christian?
In order to answer such a question, some further clarifications need to be made regarding the nature of certitude. Certitude, then, is not infallibility, a faculty or gift relating to all possible propositions on a given matter.

That I am certain of this proposition today, is no ground for thinking that I shall have a right to be certain of that proposition tomorrow; and that I am wrong in my convictions about today's proposition, does not hinder my having a true conviction, a genuine certitude, about tomorrow's proposition. If indeed I claimed to be infallible, one failure would shiver my claim to pieces; but I may claim to be certain of the truth to which I have already attained, though I should arrive at no new truths in addition as long as I live.69

Certitude, then, is a relation of the mind toward given propositions. Even if an experience of failure in one instance should provide us with an antecedent difficulty in a later instance, this should be taken as no more than a warning that perhaps we need be more circumspect before committing ourselves. When certitude is unfounded, what is to be faulted is the reasoning which led to it rather than the assent itself. In a series of sentences very close to the flavor of Lonergan, Newman states:

It is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called a certitude. I could indeed have withheld my assent, but I should have acted against my nature, had I done so when there was what I considered a proof; and I did only what was fitting, what was incumbent on me, upon those existing conditions, in giving it.70

Any given certitude, then, stands on its own basis. Antecedent objections can be abstractly entertained but are powerless in the face of concrete evidence. "No instances then whatever of mistaken certitude are sufficient to constitute a proof, that certitude itself is a perversion or extravagance of (our) nature."71 A careful formation of the mind is called for that enables us to avoid mistaking for certitude states and frames of mind which
make no pretence to such a condition.

What, then, are the occasions fit for certitude? There are certain elementary points of knowledge in secular matters—the ordinary acceptance of sense and memory, elements which bear on daily needs and habits, relate to our homes, families, friends, and civic society—about which we may be certain. Beyond these basic elements, probability is the guide of life in secular matters. In neither secular nor religious matters is it true that our first principles are entertained as mere matters of opinion. In the spiritual realm,

... if religion is to be devotion, and not a mere matter of sentiment, if it is to be made the ruling principle of our lives, if our actions, one by one, and our daily conduct, are to be consistently directed towards an Invisible Being, we need something higher than a mere balance of arguments to fix and to control our minds. Sacrifice of wealth, name, or position, faith and hope, self-conquest, communion with the spiritual world, presuppose a real hold and habitual intuition of the objects of Revelation, which is certitude under another name. 72

Here we find the main difference between nominal and vital Christianity. Here also lies the difference between vital religion and its derivative in the opinions of theology. 73 The first principles (in either department—secular or religious) need not be universally received in order to be certain. What frequently appear to be changes of certitude—e.g., migration from one religion to another—in fact mark only the consistent following through of one and the same first principle whose implications become more and more obvious. A man may make serious additions to an initial ruling principle without losing the conviction originally entertained. "There are few religions which have no points in common; and these, whether true or false,
when embraced with an absolute conviction, are the pivots on which changes take place in that collection of credences, opinions, prejudices, and other assents, which make up what is called a man's selection and adoption of a form of religion, a denomination, or a Church. This is by no means to assert that there are not certitudes which seem to perish in such a change. Now, if such converts never really professed to be quite certain of their former positions, their conversion is not an instance of the defectibility of certitude. Nor is this possible if their former position was really nothing more than a prejudice, based on reports or carelessly examined arguments. Nonetheless, there is such a thing as false certitude, and there is no immediate, interior test to distinguish it from true certitude. But indefectibility itself can be taken as a kind of criterion of the genuineness of a certitude, of whether a conviction is also a certitude.

Certitudes are reflex acts of assent following upon reasoning and inference. Now, how can a conditional act such as inference terminate in an unconditional assent?

Formal inference is reasoning restricted to the symbols of language, verbal reasoning. If it were true that what can be thought can be adequately expressed in words, logic would provide a test and a common measure of reasoning. If it were true that all propositions were mental abstractions, and their objects, not concrete things but intelligible notions, it would be true that all propositions would be suitable for the purpose of inference. But, "... the concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning, as marring the simplicity and perfection of its process." Since we need to reason to the concrete, the force of
inference will frequently be found to be, not demonstration, but the
determination of the probable. The reasons for this are twofold: the
premisses of inference are generally assumed, not proved; and the conclusions
of inference are abstract, not concrete.

Regarding the assumption of premisses, a retrospective movement
through previous conclusions to previous premisses, etc., etc., ends us up
with a set of "first principles," with respect to which logic is helpless;
any set of first principles is accepted by some and rejected by others.
No self-evident propositions can be determined by logic. Here, says
Newman, lies "the whole problem of attaining to truth. . . . Logic . . .
does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies
negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and
when and how far conclusions are probable; but for genuine proof in concrete
matter we require an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic than
verbal argumentation."77

Regarding the abstract nature of logical conclusions, perhaps we
need add here only that it is the living mind which completes logical
reasoning, which, of itself, does not reach the concrete. Generalizations
"are arbitrary and fallacious, if we take them for more than broad views
and aspects of things, serving as our notes and indications for judging
of the particular, but not absolutely touching and determining facts."78
Certainly, then, inference as verbal argumentation cannot be the test of
The real and necessary method for arriving at certainty regarding what is concrete is, rather, "the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible." Concrete informal reasoning has three characteristics. First, it does follow the logical form of inference, even though "it is no longer an abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life, its premisses being instinct with the substance and the momentum of that mass of probabilities, which, acting upon each other in correction and confirmation, carry it home definitely to the individual case." Secondly, the reasoning is implicit, and without the direct and full advertance of the mind exercising it. "... the mind (is) unequal to a complete analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion, and is swayed and determined by a body of proof, which it recognizes only as a body, and not in its constituent parts." Thirdly, as all inference, so informal inference is conditional. In fact, because of the cumulation of probabilities involved, which will vary in number and value from mind to mind, "... what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another, and... the certainty of a proposition does properly consist in the certitude of the mind which contemplates it." Such certitude is "the result of arguments which, taken in the latter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities."  

Certitude
There is correlated, not with arguments, but with "implicit proof." There is a higher logic than verbal argumentation, a "living organon" which is a personal gift, and for which, in some instances, evidence which would not be sufficient for scientific proof does suffice for certitude and assent.

Thus there is a personal element in all such concrete conclusions. Even the language we use points to this personal element. "We are considered to feel, rather than to see, its cogency; and we decide, not that the conclusions must be, but that it cannot be otherwise. We say, that we do not see our way to doubt it, that it is impossible to doubt, that we are bound to believe it, that we should be idiots, if we did not believe." Such language implies that we have arrived at these conclusions "by the action of our own minds, by our own individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness."

This personal element introduces, in certain concrete matters such as ethical and spiritual subjects, the consideration of the moral character of the individual striving for certitude. Personality is an important element in proving propositions in concrete matters. This personal element is what is responsible for the intellectual process from conditional inference to unconditional assent. Newman calls it, as we know, the illative sense. The capacity for such a process is proper to
each individual and, with each individual, differs with respect to subject-matter on which it operates with facility. It is "departmental." 89

Certitude, then, is a mental state, "an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, and, when reason forbids, to withhold." 90 The only criterion of the accuracy of an inference, the final judgment on its validity, is a matter of the personal action of the illative sense. Man's progress is "a living growth, not a mechanism; and its instruments are mental acts, not the formulas and contrivances of language." 91 "... in no class of concrete reasonings, whether in experimental science, historical research, or theology, is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction." 92

Not only does the illative sense function to resolve or conclude concrete inference and permit assent. It also is operative at the beginning and throughout the course of that reasoning. "... everyone has his own 'critical feeling,' his antecedent 'reasonings,' and in consequence his own 'absolute persuasion,' coming in fresh and fresh at every turn of the discussion; and who, whether stranger or friend, is to reach and affect what is so intimately bound up with the mental constitution of each?" 93 Every process of reasoning ultimately rests on first principles on which men radically differ from one another. First principles are drawn from our generalizations of our experience of the real. They are usually
unconscious, spontaneous convictions lying at the deepest level of our personal being. According to Walgrave, Newman distinguishes two main kinds of first principles: those which arise from a genuine experience of the real, and those which come from a public or social "ego," and thus where the nature of credence. Taken together, the first principles of thought are the expression of our personality. Our thought receives impulse and direction from our principles as its first movers.94

In the final long chapter of the Grammar, Newman applies what he has said about the connection between assent and inference to the evidences of religious belief. His primary evidence, he insists, is his own experience; a secondary evidence would be the testimony of those who agree with him.95

Christianity, says Newman, is a religion which comes to us as a whole, and on the authority of God, and which must be accepted as a whole if it is to be accepted at all. It exhibits its own credentials. In relation to nature, it is an addition, not a contradiction. The relation of man to God is a relation of two absolutes.

What, then, are the grounds of religion in nature, the evidences of natural religion, of our knowledge of God, of his will, and of our duties toward him? Newman specifies three channels of information: our own mind or conscience, the voice of mankind, and the course of human life and human affairs. It is the first of these that is most authoritative, the criterion for judging the other two.96 Here we have the clearest statement perhaps in the entire Grammar for the close connection between conscience and the
organum investigandi in religion.

Conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself; I am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's lungs. Conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge. And as it is given to me, so also is it given to others; and being carried about by every individual in his own breast, and requiring nothing besides itself, it is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most momentous to him individually, -- adapted for the use of all classes and conditions of men, for high and low, young and old, men and women, independently of books, of educated reasoning, of physical knowledge, or of philosophy.

Conscience provides the mind with a real image of God, primarily as our judge, as one who ordsins suffering for the wrongdoer. This aspect of God known by natural religion is one which saddens the religious mind.

Corresponding with this burdensome image of God from conscience is the evidence provided by the rites and devotions of men in history. "... Wherever Religion exists in a popular shape, it has almost invariably worn its dark side outwards. It is founded in one way or other on the sense of sin. ... Its many varieties all proclaim or imply that man is in a degraded, servile condition, and requires expiation, reconciliation, and some great change of nature."

The nearly universal practice of atonement or vicarious expiation would seem to conflict with what conscience tells us about our personal responsibility for what we do. Indeed, says Newman, "if (ceremonies and penances) avail, they only avail in the intermediate season of probation; ... in some way we must make them our own; ... when the time comes, which conscience forebodes, of our being called to judgment, then, at least, we shall have to stand in and by ourselves, whatever we shall have by that time become, and must bear our own burden."
The so-called religions of civilization ignore the conscience with its "frightful presentiments." In this they are opposed to the "religions of barbarism" which are more closely a development and reflection of man's original state and speak with a greater authority.

The system and course of the world and of human affairs is the third natural informant on the subject of natural religion. However, when we study this world, we find God's control so indirect and his action so obscure that we are struck by his absence. But my conscience tells me that God exists and that it is I who am alienated from Him. Then too, the problem of suffering, and especially the fact, not that it may have no end, but that it had a beginning which no universal restitution can undo, also points to the alienation between God and man.

This severe aspect of natural religion is also its most prominent aspect. Nevertheless, all true religion is a blessing, and there are other general laws which speak another language of compensation. First, then, religious beliefs, and institutions are of general acceptance in all times and places; part of the explanation of this at least is the hope for the benefits accruing from religion. The enjoyment of the goods of the earth is an earnest of what is hoped for and a reminder to man of God's concern. Moreover, every event can be interpreted in such a way as to become providential, and this by a common and natural collection of first principles, which is lost only wilfully or accidentally. Prayer, too, brings relief and solace in trouble. All religions, too, are based

* Neuman's strong conviction of the reality of natural religion seems to imply that the show of "religion" in the Western world is a sign of the moral health of society.
upon an idea of revelation and include an appreciation of the divine sanction of their practices, and especially of their rites of sacrifice. Connected with vicarious suffering, finally, there is the doctrine of meritorious intercession. "... every religion has had its eminent devotees, exalted above the body of the people, mortified men, brought nearer to the Source of good by austerities, self-inflictions, and prayer, who have influence with Him, and extend a shelter and gain blessings for those who become their clients."¹⁰¹

These natural beliefs concerning sin and expiation can come to us independently of the self-authenticating revelation of Christianity. They are the preparation for such a revelation and are not abrogated by it. The account which Newman has given of natural religion has been, he insists, entirely his own, proceeding from his own set of first principles and issuing from his own illative sense. He holds that the facts of natural religion and of revelation are indeed demonstrable, but they are not by that reason irresistible. "I cannot convert men, when I ask for assumptions which they refuse to grant to me; and without assumptions no one can prove anything about anything."¹⁰²

Thus his attempt to "prove" Christianity will also proceed by way of informal inference and illative sense, by an accumulation of various probabilities from which legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude, may be constructed. In fact we are bound in conscience thus to proceed.

Since a good Providence watches over us, He blesses such means of argument as it has pleased Him to give us, in the nature of man and of the world, if we use them duly for those ends for which He has given them; ... as in mathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding our assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical demonstration, so by a like dictate we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting till such logical demonstration is ours,
but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science.  

Newman here discloses one of his first principles, the providence and intention of God. To begin without his first principles necessarily prevents one from arriving at his conclusions. 

The fact remains, that, in any inquiry about things in the concrete, men differ from each other, not so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise, that these principles are of a personal character, that where there is no common measure of minds, there is no common measure of arguments, and that the validity of proof is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense.  

Thus the belief which one has in natural truths generates belief in revealed truths. To accept Newman’s review of Christianity, one must have been imbued with the religious opinions and sentiments of natural religion. "... it is plainly absurd to attempt to prove a second proposition to those who do not admit the first." The presence of God in our conscience and the universal experience of guilt for sin must be assumed. 

Natural religion creates an anticipation for revelation, because of our presentiment of God’s goodness and our sense of our own extreme misery and need. Paley had argued that it was enough to say that a revelation was not intellectually improbable. Newman would prefer to speak to those whose hearts have longed for the enlightenment and purification of a revelation and who would use the anticipation of its probability in seeking it, who will act as suppliants rather than judges. He also will
not appeal to miracles but will "only insist on those coincidences and
their cumulations, which, though not in themselves miraculous, do irresistibly force upon us, almost by the law of our nature, the presence of the
extraordinary agency of Him whose being we already acknowledge." 106

Regarding the fact, Newman maintains there is only one religion
which tends to fulfill the aspirations, needs, and foreshadowings of natural
religion. Christianity alone has a message addressed to all mankind.
"... either Christianity is from God, or a revelation has not been
given to us." 107 It continues and concludes what professes to be an
erlier revelation, which can be traced into prehistoric times.

The first step, however, in the direct evidence for Christianity,
is the Hebrew religion. The Jews are a people marked by the progress of
the development of religious truth. The fact that theism is their life
and made them a people is a singular and meaningful phenomenon. And
Christianity professes to be the completion of their law, to be Judaism
itself, developed and transformed. For Newman (at the rather insensitive
ending of a generally fine argument), the controversy between Christianity
and Judaism is decided in favor of Christianity, by the very reason that
Christianity has done what Judaism was to have done, in terms of a mission
to the nations. At any rate, the probability of divine revelation is
raised, in religious minds, almost to a certainty in the case of both
Judaism and Christianity. And, "... no other religion... but these two
professes to be the organ of a formal revelation, certainly not of a
revelation which is directed to the benefit of the whole human race.\textsuperscript{108}

The messianic prophecies add further substance to this argument. The Jewish Scriptures declare that their people was established to be a blessing to the whole earth through their own progeny. The race would lose its old self in gaining a new self in Him. The Jews understood their Scriptures in this way and expected their great ruler in the very age in which he came. Newman concludes:

New, considering that at that very time our Lord did appear as a teacher, and founded not merely a religion, but (what was then quite a new idea in the world) a system of religious warfare, an aggressive and militant body, a dominant Catholic Church, which aimed at the benefit of all nations by the spiritual conquest of all; and that this warfare, then begun by it, has gone on without cessation down to this day, and now is as living and real as ever it was; that that militant body has from the first filled the world, that it has had wonderful successes, that its successes have on the whole been of extreme benefit to the human race, that it has imparted an intelligent notion about the Supreme God to millions who would have lived and died in irreligion, that it has raised the tone of morality wherever it has come, has abolished great social anomalies and miseries, has elevated the female sex to its proper dignity, has protected the poorer classes, has destroyed slavery, encouraged literature and philosophy, and had a principal part in that civilization of human kind, which, with some evils, has still on the whole been productive of far greater good,—considering, I say, that all this began at the destined, expect- ted, recognized season when the old prophecy said that in one Man, born of the tribe of Judah, all the tribes of the earth were to be blessed,—I feel I have a right to say (and my line of argument does not lead me to say more), that it is at the very least a remarkable coincidence; that is, one of these coincidences which, when they are accumulated, come close upon the idea of miracle, as being impos- sible without the Hand of God directly and immediately in them.\textsuperscript{109}

Such is the prophetic outline and the historical reality, which can now be filled in with more figurative, vague, and ambiguous details. Nor may the failures of Christianity in corresponding to some details of this
outline be taken as destroying the force of its correspondence to others. In fact, Christianity assumes a prophetic character of its own. It knew itself to have a universal message to be spread by the means of preaching and suffering, even failure. And it warns us from the beginning against any anticipation of a reversal of the consequences of sin. That the Messiah would enter into his glory by preaching and suffering surely must suggest to us some Divine Power accompanying him and embodied in him.

The history of the rise and establishment of Christianity also suggests such a presence. It does not admit of being resolved into a moral, social, or political cause. At least the coincidence of available human causes does not readily admit such an explanation. But the proper set of first principles is needed to look elsewhere for an explanation: to the theological virtues, repentance, faith; the imprint of the image or idea of Christ must be apprehended and worshipped and become a principle of association and a bond between believers. It is, says Newman, miraculous that such an image should enter at once into so many minds and change so many lives and inspire so much courage. This image of Christ was, then, the principle of Christian conversion and fellowship. And its principal success lay with the uneducated and the powerless.

Finally, not only does natural religion prepare the way for revelation. The latter begins where the former fails. Natural religion knows well the sense of sin, but it cannot find its remedy, the mediation of Christ. The power of Christianity is in the present. It is addressed
to these minds which believe in God and in a future judgment. It addresses them through the intellect and through the imagination, "creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for direct enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for refutation. . . . One and the same teaching is in different aspects both object and proof, and elicits one complex act both of inference and of assent. It speaks to us one by one, and it is received by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves, and is real as we are real."
III. THE PROBLEM OF FIRST PRINCIPLES

The context of the problem dealt with in the Grammar of Assent was, as we have seen, the reasonableness of the faith of even the most uneducated believer. The existence of the illative sense, operative in all of our concrete and informal reasoning, is Newman's answer to this problem, and in the final chapter he has demonstrated the operation of this faculty or organon in determining the truth of natural religion and of Christianity. It is by the illative sense that both Newman and the uneducated believer come to accept the divine origin of their religion.

But what about those who deny the truth of religion and Christianity? Surely we cannot say that they have no illative sense, or that they do not know how to use it. For it can even be maintained that the use of the illative sense, of reasoning in the concrete, is involved in their conclusion which is opposed to that of the believer. The problem lies much deeper, in the area of first principles. This is stated many times in the Grammar, but the following instance will suffice:

It is not wonderful then, that, while I can prove Christianity divine to my own satisfaction, I shall not be able to force it upon any one else. Multitudes indeed I ought to succeed in persuading of its truth without any force at all, because they and I start from the same principles, and what is a proof to me is a proof to them; but if any one starts from any other principles but ours, I have not the power to change his principles, or the conclusion which he draws from them, any more than I can make a crooked man straight. Whether his mind
will ever grow straight, whether I can do anything towards its becoming straight, whether he is not responsible, responsible to his Maker, for being mentally crooked, is another matter; still the fact remains, that, in any inquiry about things in the concrete, men differ from each other, not so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise, that these principles are of a personal character, that where there is no common measure of minds, there is no common measure of arguments, and that the validity of proof is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense.¹¹²

In more contemporary terms, and following Lonergan, there are irreconcilable horizons resulting from the presence and absence of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Here is the ultimate point of divergence between men, not the capacity of reasoning but the freely chosen horizons from which they begin. No single proposition will mean the same thing to men who have undergone any or all of these conversions and to those who have either refused conversion (as happens especially with religious and moral conversion) or have not achieved it for other reasons (as in intellectual conversion, whose occurrence is rare). From Lonergan's standpoint, religious conversion generally precedes the others, for it is universally accessible and depends on man's acceptance of God's gift of his love. Religious conversion enables a man to be more sensitive to the biases which infect his living and thus to achieve moral conversion; and such a sensitivity, in the extreme and rare case, could lead a man to the investigation and appropriation of the structure, process, and import of his cognitive activity, and thus to the achievement of intellectual conversion. It is in terms of these conversions, of their presence and absence,
that the first principles of which Newman speaks are determined. A man is, in the general case, responsible for his first principles, for he is responsible for the state of his own subjectivity. If life and death have been set before him, as they are each day, he is responsible for his choice.

Although there are many instances in the Grammar of Assent which would enable us to relate dialectically the two sets of first principles with which Newman was most concerned, the religious and the rationalist, Walgrave has brought to bear on this subject material from many other sources. Thus what follows and concludes this study will be largely a summary of Walgrave's analysis of these types.
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHOS

According to Malgrave, there are, in the general case and irrespective of content, two sets of first principles. One set is derived from human nature, the other from the personal qualities of the individual, and particularly as he is a participant in the sentiments of his age and culture. The latter consist of attitudes of mind, points of view, norms of judgment and of value, whose origin lies in a group-sentiment, the spirit of the time, the 'cultural' environment; they insinuate themselves, as it were, by stealth, and are thus unresisted and unquestioned. It is not by personal experience that we first acquire them, but rather, for the most part, realize them. We take them for granted, because we breathe them in as part of the surrounding atmosphere. In the aggregate, they constitute what may be called, in a special sense, our 'culture,' or "culture," as let out for the new world. This world is by no means opposed to breadth of culture, nor does it set nature and culture in irreconcilable opposition one to the other.

But the personal and profound thinker is distinguished from the superficial and unimpassioned one in that the world of the former is aduated by an immanent principle of progressive realization, while that of the latter is imposed from without, because he has no personal intellectual mooring.

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The dialectical roots of the difference between the religious man and the rationalist are stated in the following paragraph from Walgrave:

Thought that is strongly engrained, deeply reeled in real experience, is ultimately religious, even though this character may long remain only implicit. That which is not so reeled is nothing more than the play of abstract reason. The former develops in a genuine and continuous process of growth, slow but sure, and leading on to certitude; the second is spasmodic and fitful, dazzling at times in its speed, but never stable, ever in pursuit of the latest idea, the most recent argument. It is evident how the first is directed, above all, by living and implicit reasoning, while the second is the work of explicit and formal argument with no solid connection with personal experience. Though both comprise at once unconscious procedures and those which are technical, personal experience, because it is mere living and profound, possesses a more vigorous and spontaneous power of expansion, though it is more resistant to expression in conceptual form. Thought which is impersonal and purely rational, being received more passively by the mind, does not arouse the same unconscious and spontaneous stirrings, though it furnishes reason in its deliberations with mere tractable material, for, unlike intuition, it is unaccompanied by a painful awareness of the inadequacy of its concepts to represent reality.

Thus among the set of natural first principles, which can be either followed or ignored in one's personal life, is the principle of fidelity to experience and of reliance upon informal, concrete reasoning. The religious man will tend to rely upon the illative sense, as a matter of principle, while the rationalist will want everything put in terms of "tractable material" or paper logic, even though, against his own admission, there are unconscious and implicit reasonings involved in the process of his thought.

To say this, according to Walgrave, is to speak of fidelity to conscience as the predominant mark of the religious man, whose develop-
ment "is a dialectic of fidelity to conscience." Conscience is part of man's nature. We have seen above the two sides of conscience, the moral sense and the sense of obligation. The latter guides us to a sanction deriving from God and to an admission of dependence on a transcendent realm. The experience of sin is a sentiment of an injury to love. Conscience is the natural bond between man and God, the creative principle of religion. It provides us with a living and concrete image of God. As its light increases, "... moral and religious realities ... become the chief concern of our lives. They are livingly received into the soul, and there they gather up all its faculties into a single living force, directed, tranquilly and unremittingly, to its religious good. Under this profound, affective impulse, living, implicit thought develops and, by degrees, brings into being a religious conception of the world and of life." In this development of living and implicit thought principles of value arise in whose light we judge the remainder of our experience. Walgrave lists among these principles: "the primacy of conscience in the search for truth and the judgment of values; sin as a formidable reality of life; goodness and badness as ultimate qualities of every human action; the meaning and value of life found in moral action, in holiness, rather than in a high state of culture; our whole life as surrounded by mysteries, and our having to be content with the degrees of evidence afforded by our earthly condition." Conscience also illumines the world to which it seems to opposed.
The result of such illumination is summarized above in the discussion of natural religion's emphasis upon the alienation of the world from God but also upon God's goodness. It is the idea of Providence, as we have seen, that provides the key to the enigma of the world and of religion's uneasy state within it.

What, then, of the "ethos" of the rationalist? It results ultimately, says Walgrave, from the clouding over of conscience. As a general but not universal rule, personal infidelity to conscience explains why religious experience fails to expand in man's heart and remains barren in his mind. With regard to the role of thought in this infidelity, Walgrave states:

Sin, by itself, would not be enough to degrade our conscience; but we have an unfortunate tendency to align our thought with our conduct, and a subtle power to achieve this effect. The intrinsic evil of the world is that it reasons against God and provides sin with the support of an intellectual system. Man rebels against feeling himself in the wrong, in an inferior position; he prefers to act as he pleases, in independent fashion, his mind at rest. Like the Pharisee in the Gospel, he desires to be contented with himself. Very well, then; his intellect will be the go-between to arrange the matter and to build, with the help of a number of ingenious theories and subtle arguments, a vast substructure from which, admittedly, it does not exclude his higher, ineradicable convictions, but where they are prudently adjusted and 'explained', allowing falsehood a placid co-existence with a religious veneer to a life in accordance with the maxims of the world.¹²⁰

The "religion" of such a man is described by Newman: "It has as foundation self-sufficiency, and for result self-satisfaction."¹²¹

Reason first, then, reduces the feeling of obligation to the other constituent of conscience, the moral sense, thus dissipating the transcendent aspect of conscience. "Its centre, then, is no longer God the lawgiver,
but the man of sense... For a voice which commands and threatens is substituted a delicate feeling for human perfection... In short, the moral imperative with its firm foundation in God gives place to a humanist ethic... What remains, in the end, is a certain number of social sentiments, varying according to time and circumstance, a creation of human culture, and equally relative. A more or less radical scepticism prevails. But a reason divorced from conscience is a reason divorced from its roots. This is the reason for the fluctuating diversity of the morality "espoused" by such a reason. Such a philosophy, however, is not without its first principles. First, it claims to be realistic in its recasting of conscience along the lines of principles drawn from tangible reality. The universal fact that man must exercise his capacities in the sphere of the visible world must be looked at, not "from within" by conscience, but "from without" by common sense. The "objective" data of experience and the conditions of success in the world provide the first principles of such an ethic. The reason and measure of human nature are to be found in the utilitarian demands of life and of earthly happiness. The unproductive virtues espoused by conscience are rejected or ignored in such a view. The virtues which lead to advancement of oneself and the general good, and the virtues which make life mere pleasant, are the only virtues recognized. The idea of God in such an ethic eliminates all anxiety, oppressiveness, and severity. The quest for palpable results leads, in turn, to an emphasis on the kind of thought that can be easily
dealt with in language, on verbal reasoning. A reason divorced from its roots will be a reason less inclined to be sensitive to the implicit concrete tendencies of the illative sense and to the validity of the conclusions to which we are urged by the spontaneous life of a mind that is rooted in conscience.
CONCLUSION

It would seem, then, that we have uncovered the roots of the ethical character of a particular mode of inquiry through which religious truth is acquired. The mode of inquiry itself is the implicit and concrete reasoning spelled out in fine detail in The Grammar of Assent, culminating in and permeated by the operation of the illative sense. The ethical character of such inquiry is rooted in conscience, with which such reasoning is in profound touch. The habits of mind of the religious man, educated or not, result from his fidelity to conscience and carry him to religious truth and certitude. The habits of mind of the rationalist are divorced from the life of conscience and thus from the very natural roots of the human mind. True religion is seen as more in keeping with the nature of man than either irreligion or the sophisticated "religion of culture."

Conscience is the key to a set of first principles which render religious truth possible. And among these first principles is the necessity of reliance upon the implicit workings of a mind that has maintained contact with its roots in conscience.

James Collini's two studies God in Med. Phil. and the Emergence of a Phil. of Rel. are most helpful to me to unravel the reasons for the demise of an unbelief of which post-modern man (unbeliever) is so proud.
I. Primary Sources


II. Secondary Sources


O.K. any articles worthy of mention?
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 387. J.-H. Walgrave has pointed to the need to found any study of Newman's notion of doctrinal evolution in its psychological and apologetic context. Newman the Theologian, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960, p. 5. We will not be able here to attempt to demonstrate the continuity between the individual psychological point of view and the historical evolutionary reference. However, that the same principles apply in either case and that there is such a continuity is one of the objects of Walgrave's fine study. "In his later works, especially in the Grammar of Assent, he explores and vindicates the psychological and methodological grounds of the Essay." Ibid., p. 4.


6 See Method in Theology, pp. 81-85.

7 Ibid., p. 74.


10 Collins, p. 5.

11 Ibid., p. 6. In the Apologia, Newman explains why he wrote the piece on the "prophetical office": "I felt then, and all along felt, that
there was an intellectual cowardice in not having a basis in reason for my belief, and a moral cowardice in not avering that basis. I should have felt myself less than a man, if I did not bring it out, whatever it was."

_Apologia pro Vita Sua_, New York: Doubleday Image, 1956, p. 177.

Regarding the question of emotion, Meriol Trevor refers us to the parochial sermons. "The theme of obedience runs through all these parochial sermons, obedience to conscience as the path to the understanding of truth, and obedience to God to putting his commandments into action. Many deal with the use and misuse of emotion in religion, with warnings against relying on feelings much needed then in the heyday of the Evangelicals. Typically, Newman did not merely denounce emotion; he recognized its use in providing an initial impetus to action but showed the danger of identifying holiness with feeling good." *Newman: The Pillar of the Cloud* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 99.

12 In one respect, he regarded the two (scientific and religious reasoning) as quite similar. Both of them are paramountly concerned at some phase with matters of fact, and hence they must move beyond pure mathematics and its abstract type of demonstration. They deliberately use certain methods of investigation, instead of confining themselves to one rigid pattern. . . . Just as religious inquirers must take a personal approach to the problems of faith, using all the virtualities of informal reasoning, so it is remarkable that not even in (Newtonian) physics can real genius submit to the trammels of that Novum Organon of investigation, which, as Bacon truly says, is so important, so necessary, in the case of the many. Both the natural scientist and the religious mind must employ methods of discovery which are not fully formalizable, must attend to the import of probabilities (in the sense of concrete factual findings not previously given in mathematical constructions), and must recognize unexplored depths in our universe calling for a personal sense of the mystery of being." *Collins*, p. 8. These analogies between scientific and religious reasoning first appear in an 1821 article in _The Christian Observer_, which, Collins observes, is probably Newman's first published writing.

13 Quoted in Collins, p. 18, from a letter of April 29, 1879, to William Froude. Cf. _Apologetics_, p. 264: "... I had a great dislike of paper logic. For myself, it was not logic that carried me on; as well might one say that the quicksilver in the barometer changes the weather. It is the concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and I find my mind in a new place; how? the whole man moves; paper logic is but the record of it."

14 *Walgrave*, p. 56.

15 Ibid., p. 47. In the _Apologetics_, Newman refers to the University Sermons as "... the tentative commencement of a grave and necessary work; . . . an inquiry into the ultimate basis of religious faith, prior to the distinction into Creeds." P. 183.
Quoted in *Ibid.* p. 61, from G. H. Harper, *Cardinal Newman and William Froude. A Correspondence,* Baltimore, 1933, p. 127. On the importance of the Newman-Froude correspondence, see Walgrave, pp. 62 f., and Collins, p. 8 and pp. 38 ff. "Freude maintained that anyone aiming at intellectual integrity must forego certitudinal assent to the teachings of religion, since they must be qualified by the same notes of tentativeness and revisability, which attach to our scientific propositions. Newman regarded Froude as his whetstone, particularly when the latter suggested that the stress on probability in Newman's *Apologia* implied that our assent of faith is uncertain and conditional. Newman's response to this challenge was only gradually hammered out, resulting in the characteristic argument of the *Grammar of Assent.*" Collins, pp. 39f.

16 Walgrave, pp. 63f.

Desmain has pointed out that this starting-point is the most striking parallel between Newman and Lonergan. Rather than some such expression as "the facts of the mind," Lonergan would prefer to speak of "the data of consciousness," for a "fact" for Lonergan is not simply what is given but what is known by being verified. Whatever the terminology, both begin with what is given. See p. 272 in GA: "We are in a world of facts, and we use them; for there is nothing else to use. We do not quarrel with them, but we take them as they are, and avail ourselves of what they can do for us... We are conscious of the objects of external nature, and we reflect and act upon them, and this consciousness, reflection, and action we call our rationality. And as we use the (so called) elements without first criticizing what we have no command ever, so is it much more unmeaning in us to criticize or find fault with our own nature, which is nothing else than we ourselves, instead of using it according to the use of which it ordinarily admits."

A dogma is a preposition; it stands for a notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands for the one or for the other. To give a real assent to it is an act of religion; to give a notional, is a theological act. It is discerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious imagination; it is held as a truth by the theological intellect." *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Newman is well known for his proof of God's Being from conscience. However, this proof is not his concern here. Nor is the proof of God's attributes and character. For both of these proofs he begins with conscience also, but here he is simply concerned with the possibility of real assent to the preposition that God is. See *ibid.*, p. 97.

In a very interesting but easily misunderstood book written from the perspective of Jungian psychology, Erich Neumann clearly wants to make a distinction between conscience and inner voice. But he is considering conscience much more in the sense of the Freudian superego with its cultural accretions and learned patterns of response in particular situations. Actually, his "voice" would seem to be the same psychic phenomenon as Newman's "voice" or conscience. See Erich Neumann, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, New York, 1969.
As you saying that not only Kant's critical challenge, but also the psychoanalytic methods are "at work" in Lønberg.

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drushed the role of the suppression or bypassed

The analytical psychotherapy of Carl Jung, for example, as well as the philosophical hermeneutic of Ricoeur and the self-appropriation furthered by Lønberg's Insight, can effect a return on various levels to an immediacy similar to that here described by Newman. It is exceedingly doubtful that the spontaneous theology of the religious imagination can be preserved intact any longer by anyone exposed in some completeness to the bewildering world in which we live. For it is doubtful that in Western society, at least, there is anything any longer such as a once-born religious imagination, except of course in children and in minds not capable of appreciating the complexities of our world (but still, of course, capable of religion). The very existence of a religious imagination in an educated Western adult may very well demand the adoption of and exposure to very sophisticated psychological, philosophical, or religious techniques (yoga, spiritual direction, meditation, etc.). But see GA, pp. 110f.

Lønberg has argued that there is one exception to the adage, nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, and that is the gift of God's love, which has been given to us. Such love, however, is frequently unspecified with regard to its object.

But see GA, p. 122.


56 Ibid., pp. 140-5.

57 Ibid., p. 147.
73. "... we have a direct and conscious knowledge of our Maker, His attributes, His providences, acts, works, and will, from nature, and revelation; and, beyond this knowledge lies the large domain of theology, metaphysics, and ethics, in which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain more than an opinion." Ibid., p. 194.

74 Ibid., p. 200.

75 "Now, without external symbols to mark out and to steady its course, the intellect runs wild; but with the aid of symbols, as in algebra, it advances with precision and effect. Let then our symbols be words; let all thought be arrested and embodied in words. Let language have a monopoly of thought; and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language. Let every prompting of the intellect be ignored, every momentum of argument be disowned, which is unprovided with an equivalent wording, as its ticket for sharing in the common sense search after truth. Let the authority of nature, common sense, experience, genius, go for nothing. Ratiocination, thus restricted and put into grooves, is what I have called Inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is Logic." Ibid., p. 212.
James Collins has helped an investigator deal with assumed first principles in Kant and suggests that the critical problem will follow the solution of the principle. (Frank Modem Phil.)

76 Ibid., p. 214.

77 Ibid., pp. 216f. It is to be noted that Lonergan has developed the tools of dialectic (not logic) to the point of enabling an investigator to deal with, but not resolve, such ultimate differences in first principles as result from the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. See his Method in Theology, Chapter 10.

78 GA, p. 223. Cf. p. 227: "... thought is too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit of the trammels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever compass."

79 Ibid., p. 230.

80 Ibid., pp. 232f.

81 Ibid., p. 233.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., p. 234.

84 Ibid., p. 239. "Thus in concrete reasonings we are in great measure thrown back into that condition, from which logic proposed to rescue us. We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds." Ibid., p. 240.

85 Ibid. . . . the processes of reasoning which legitimately lead to assent, to action, to certitude, are in fact too multiform, subtle, omnigenous, too implicit, to allow of being measured by rule, that they are after all personal, verbal argumentation being useful only in subordination to a higher logic." Ibid.

86 Ibid., p. 250.

87 Ibid., p. 251.

88 Ibid., p. 252.

89 Ibid., p. 267. Cf. p. 281: "... it is in fact attached to definite subject-matters, so that a given individual may possess it in one department of thought, for instance, history, and not in another, for instance, philosophy."

90 Ibid., p. 271.
"Great as are the services of language in enabling us to extend the compass of our inferences, to test their validity, and to communicate them to others, still the mind itself is more versatile and vigorous than any of its works, of which language is one, and it is only under its penetrating and subtle action that the margin disappears, which I have described as intervening between verbal argumentation and conclusions in the concrete."


Ibid., p. 281.

Ibid., p. 288.

See Walgrave, pp. 143ff.

In these provinces of inquiry egotism is true modesty. In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others; he cannot lay down the law; he can only bring his own experiences to the common stock of psychological facts. He knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure, it is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one truth. . . . His best evidence is (that) which is derived from his own thoughts; and it is that which the world has a right to demand of him; and therefore his true sobriety and modesty consists, not in claiming for his conclusions an acceptance or a scientific approval which is not to be found anywhere, but in stating what are personally his own grounds for his belief in Natural and Revealed Religion,—grounds which he holds to be so sufficient, that he thinks that others do hold them implicitly or in substance, or would hold them, if they inquired fairly, or will hold if they listen to him, or do not hold from impediments, invincible or not as it may be, into which he has no call to inquire. However, his own business is to speak for himself."

The most authoritative of these three means of knowledge, as being especially our own, is our own mind, whose informations give us the rule by which we test, interpret, and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by the universal testimony of mankind, or by the history of society and of the world." Ibid., p. 303.

Ibid., p. 304.

Ibid., p. 305.

Ibid., p. 307.

See ibid., p. 308.
101 Ibid., p. 317.
102 Ibid., p. 319.
103 Ibid., p. 320. Emphasis added.
104 Ibid., p. 321.
105 Ibid., p. 323.

106 Ibid., p. 332. "I think, then, that the circumstances under which
a professed revelation comes to us, may be such as to impress both our reason
and our imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be made
to strictly miraculous intervention—in saying which I do not mean of course
to imply that those circumstances, when traced back to their first origins,
are not the outcome of such intervention, but that the miraculous interven­
tion addresses us at this day in the guise of these circumstances; that is,
of coincidences, which are indications, to the illative sense of those who
believe in a Moral Governor, of His immediate Presence, especially to those
who in addition hold with me the strong antecedent probability that, in His
mercy, He will thus supernaturally present Himself to our apprehension."  
Ibid., p. 333.

107 Ibid., p. 335.
108 Ibid., p. 341.
109 Ibid., pp. 344f.

110 "If then it be objected that Christianity does not, as the old
prophets seem to premise, abolish sin and irreligion within its pale, we
may answer, not only that it did not engage to do so, but that actually in
a prophetical spirit it warned its followers against the expectation of its
so doing." Ibid., p. 333.

111 Ibid., p. 379.
112 Ibid., p. 321.
113 Walgrave, pp. 144f.
114 See GA, p. 294.

115 It could be fairly said that the work of Lonergan in Insight is
aimed at making possible a "real assent" to the inherent dynamism of the
human spirit.
116 Walgrave, pp. 147f.
117 Ibid., p. 148.
118 Ibid., p. 154.
119 Ibid., p. 155.
120 Ibid., pp. 157f.


122 Walgrave, pp. 158f.