I determined to undertake the study of Bernard Lonergan's handling of the consciousness and self-knowledge of Christ because of my fascination with his handling of consciousness and self-knowledge in his monumental philosophical work, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. This study proved to be more difficult than I had anticipated. I thought that what Lonergan says about consciousness and self-affirmation could be put together rather easily with his treatment of the same matters when dealing with the person of Jesus Christ.

The unexpected difficulty which I discovered is due to several factors. First of all, *Insight* is essentially an exercise in self-knowledge itself, an essay toward "the personal appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness." As such, it abounds in details and brilliantly manages to handle the further relevant questions that keep arising, making Lonergan into one of the rare figures who practices what he preaches. On the other hand, Lonergan's theological treatises on Christology, *De Constitutione Christi Ontologica et Psychologica* and *De Verbo Incarnato* are extremely schematic sketches which provide little more than an outline for a satisfactory Christology, and thus leave many questions unanswered. However, this is not by any means the primary reason for the difficulty of this undertaking. It occurs to me that the very nature of this topic precludes any full satisfaction, unless one wishes simultaneously to negate the radical uniqueness of Jesus of Nazareth, which, of course, is the farthest thing from Lonergan's mind.
In *Insight*, Lonergan seeks to bring his reader to self-knowledge by leading him to an affirmation of what takes place in his own conscious experience. He constantly works from, and draws his reader back to, personal experience in all its many dimensions in order there to find the verification needed for affirmation. Now, if we grant the unique ontological constitution of Jesus Christ, as proclaimed in the dogmatic teaching of the Church, we must begin with the given that his internal, conscious experience was simply quite different from ours. For consciousness simply is being in a certain degree of perfection, and Christ is ontologically unique. Consciousness is determined by the ontological structure of its subject and Christ's ontological structure is not ours. This is one of the main thrusts of the early conciliar pronouncements of the Church.

If it is true that Christ's consciousness was quite different from ours, then so too was his self-affirmation or self-knowledge. For what is affirmed in an act of self-knowledge is, on the basis of Lonergan's own unassailable epistemology, that which has first been experienced. And what was first experienced through consciousness by Christ is not that which I first experience when I am consciously acting.

All of this adds up to stating that, even if Lonergan had not been so sketchy and schematic in his presentation of the matter of Christ's consciousness and self-knowledge, the presentation of this matter would not be totally satisfactory, because ultimately we would have no experience to check it against, except our own consciousness.
and self-knowledge -- but, as was just stated, even a man who has analyzed consciousness and self-knowledge as brilliantly as Lonergan has done cannot succeed in grasping from within the unique experiences of Jesus Christ. The adequacy of any explanation is simply bound to fall short of any other attempts to reach into the inner psychology of another man.

Perhaps this could be explained in another way. In *Insight*, Lonergan talks about the polymorphism of human consciousness, its many-faceted character. He speaks about "patterns of experience," or sets of intelligible relations of elements of experience. In this work, Lonergan is principally concerned with the intellectual pattern of experience, although he is also quite interested in detailing what occurs in the dramatic pattern, that pattern in which man meets people and gets things done, the pattern of common sense. He mentions also the biological and aesthetic patterns of experience and does not at all mean to indicate that the four patterns he expounds are the only patterns into which human experience can be organized. But, granted the unique ontological structure of Christ, would we not have to admit that the predominant pattern of his experience is neither any of these four nor any other pattern we could arrive at by analyzing our own experience? Perhaps we could call the predominant pattern of his internal experience "religious," and could find in our own religious experience, paltry as it is, the closest approximation to what his experience must have been like; but, of course, Lonergan has not yet delivered an analysis of religious experience, even though
he has thrown out several hints that he may do just this before too long. If his Method in Theology should prove to be the analysis of the experience of religion which he indicates it might be, Lonergan would be providing for theology a service as unsurpassed in the entire history of this discipline as Insight is in philosophy. But as things stand right now, we shall have to be content with taking Lonergan's account of consciousness and self-knowledge as he expresses it in Insight and use it as best we can to understand what he says about the consciousness and self-knowledge of Christ.

I. Lonergan on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge

Because we are interested in self-knowledge, we must first be interested in knowledge itself. If we do not know what knowledge is, we shall never know what self-knowledge is, not only because self-knowledge is a particular form of knowledge, but also because what most frequently keeps people from adequate self-knowledge is the fact that they do not know what it means to know and thus do not affirm either the power or the responsibility that lies in them as intelligent persons. Most commonly, the self is thought of as "the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease and even insanity." For True self-knowledge consists in the "self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, intellectual, and rational."
1. Burrell
2. Johnson
3. 4. Inez, p. 385
5. Ibid
6. Ibid., p. 388
Lonergan, the subject becomes known only when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably, and thus only when it affirms itself as intelligent and reasonable; thus the self is not really known in any prior 'existential' state.\(^9\)

The reason for this is found in the very nature of knowledge itself. For whatever is known is known through an act of affirmation; but a true act of affirmation or judgment is consequent upon an insight or act of understanding which itself is dependent upon an experience. And what is experienced is the same reality as that which is understood and then affirmed. If this is the case, and if we are seeking an affirmation not of what a rock is, or a tree, or a dog, or even God, but rather of what I am, then this affirmation must rest upon an insight into the experiences which are mine and which are of myself. And the experiences which are mine are precisely the experiences of an empirical, intelligent, and rational subject. Thus I do not know myself unless I affirm myself precisely as such a subject. The implications of this affirmation work themselves out in time and are not fully obvious in the affirmation itself, but, as Lonergan manages to suggest very forcefully, the failure to make such an affirmation as this leads me not only down the path of philosophic counter-positions doomed to reversal, but also down the slow but sure labyrinth of personal self-destruction, through a life at least half-crippled by the bias of radical particularity and almost biological extroversion and immediacy.
Before anything can be said concerning the self-consciousness of Christ, it is important to specify precisely what is meant by consciousness. Lonergan has written abundantly on this question. In all of these writings we find him inveighing heavily against those who, taking looking as a model of knowing, regard consciousness as some kind of "inward look." In order fully to understand the meaning of Lonergan's emphatic rebuttal of what might be called "peeping Thomism," we need to take a brief look at his theory of the structure of human knowing.

Knowing, for Lonergan, is a "formally dynamic structure," i.e., a self-constituting structure whose composite parts are activities. Human knowing is composed of many distinct, irreducible activities. These activities can be divided into three groups or levels: the level of immediate presentation, that of intelligent grasp, and that of reasonable judgment. No one of the activities, as isolated from the others, can be called human knowing in the strict sense of the word, even judgment, for "to pass judgment on what one does not understand is, not human knowing, but human arrogance. To pass judgment independently of all experience is to set fact aside."

Knowing is distinct from most other dynamic structures, e.g., a dance or a symphony, in that it is self-constituting. "It puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached. And this occurs, not with the blindness of natural process,
but consciously, intelligently, rationally. Experience [level 1] stimulates inquiry, and inquiry is intelligence [level 2] bringing itself to act; it leads from experience through imagination to insight, and from insight to the concepts which combine in single objects both what has been grasped by insight and what in experience or imagination is relevant to the insight. In turn, concepts stimulate reflection [level 3] and reflection is the conscious exigence of rationality; it marshals the evidence and weighs it either to judge or else to doubt and so renew inquiry.14

The reason for the self-constituting character of human knowing is to be found in the "pure desire to know," which is also the "notion of being." This pure desire, as desire, heads for the satisfaction of acts of understanding [level 2], but as a detached and disinterested desire, it heads for, not acts, but their contents, for the truth of things. And because acts of understanding can be either true insights or merely the producers of bright ideas, the pure desire moves cognitive process beyond the level of intelligent grasp to the acts of reflection, weighing the evidence, and judgment concerning the truth of one's understanding. The pure desire scorn the satisfaction experienced when I am really wrong and prizes only the satisfaction of being correct, not because of the satisfaction but because of the correctness of my understanding.15

After this brief presentation of the structure of human knowing as viewed by Lonergan, we can proceed to analyze more carefully his insistence that consciousness is not to be thought of as an inward look.
Lonergan castigates both idealism and naive realism (i.e., Gilson's Thomism) for taking looking as a basic model for all human knowing. Looking may very well be used as an example of what goes on at the level of experience or immediate presentation, but is not to be extended so as to characterize the nature of the other levels of the cognitive process. For, if looking is an act performed at the first level, then it is not human knowing in the strict sense of the word, since human knowing is had only when the entire dynamic structure has been gone through. And if looking is not human knowing, but merely a potential part in the full act of human knowing, then it possesses of itself no guarantee of objectivity. In addition, as a potential part of human knowing, its relation to the other parts is functional, not one of similarity. And so looking cannot be taken as the basic model of human knowledge, either in the sense of regarding all knowledge as looking or by viewing all knowledge as similar to looking.

Those who regard knowing as equivalent or similar to looking frequently do so because of a false illation from the structure of grammar to the psychology of knowing. They feel that "when the verb, to know, is used actively, the grammatical subject names the psychological subject and the grammatical object names the psychological object. Therefore the conclusion is that the subject is the knower and the object is the known."\(^{16}\) Knowledge is thus viewed as a kind of intuition "in which one term is the knower, the other term is the known, and the intermedium is the act of knowing."\(^{17}\) Consciousness, being a form of knowing, is then viewed as a perception; the only
difference between this and other forms of knowledge-perception is that in consciousness one and the same reality is both knower and known, perceiver and perceived.

Lonergan's objection to this view of the nature of consciousness is expressed in the following way in De Verbo Incarnato: "Although the subject is a knower, the act is one of knowing, and the object is a known, this third element is not convertible. It is not true that only the object is known and that everything known must be an object. For in every act [of knowledge] the known is threefold but the object is one: when one who sees, sees color, not only the colors are known but in addition the subject is present to himself. And he does not see by any unconscious act of seeing but by a self-present act of seeing."18 The threefold known in any act of knowledge thus consists of the object, the subject, and the act: all three are known, but the subject and his act are not objects of the knowing act, since the subject performs the act and the act is not an act of knowing itself but of knowing the object.

The major elements of Lonergan's notion of consciousness are contained in this refutation of the position that consciousness is some kind of inward look. One way he has of stating what he means by consciousness is by way of presence. "Presence" can have three connotations: first there is local, physical, or ontological presence, presence "in which no knowing is involved, and such is the presence of the statue in the courtyard." This, of course, is of no interest to us here. Secondly, something can be present as an object. This is
the way in which colors are present to one who sees, a definition to one who understands, the true to one who judges, etc. And thirdly, there is the presence of the subject to himself. "By the very fact that one sees (hears, touches, understands, judges, etc.), he is present to himself as seeing (hearing, touching, understanding, judging, etc.)".

This third kind of presence "is not the presence of another object dividing his attention, of another spectacle distracting the spectator; it is presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending."\(^{20}\)

Consciousness is defined by Lonergan, then, as "that by which the subject is present to himself and the acts of the subject are present to the subject."\(^{21}\) Since the acts of the subject, in the order of cognition, are acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging, consciousness can be defined also as "the experience of experiencing, understanding, and judging."\(^{22}\) Of course, Lonergan explicitly states that cognitional acts are not the only conscious acts,\(^{23}\) but, as in \textit{Insight}, so in his discussion of the psychological structure of Christ he is mainly interested in the consciousness which is "an awareness immanent in cognitional acts."\(^{24}\)

Consciousness, then, is the presence of the subject to himself which is found in all cognitional activity, the self-awareness necessary if any knowledge is to be had. A conscious act is neither a deliberate act nor one to which I attend. Finally, "by the conscious act
is not meant that the act is somehow isolated for inspection, nor that one grasps its function in cognitional process, nor that one can assign it a name, nor that one can distinguish it from other acts, nor that one is certain of its occurrence. Cognitional acts differ from unconscious occurrences because of this "factor or element or component over and above its content."

Another way in which Lonergan defines consciousness is in terms of experience. In his work De Constitutione Christi, he defines consciousness as "internal experience, in the strict sense, of the word, of oneself and one's acts." Experience, for Lonergan, can be either external or internal. In "cognitional Structure," he explains what he means by these spatial metaphors precisely in terms of the three modes of presence described above. Internal experience is "of oneself and one's apprehensive and appetitive activities," whereas external experience is "of sights and sounds, of odors and tastes, of the hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth, wet and dry." External experience is never had without internal experience, yet only the latter is consciousness. Finally, experience in the strict sense of the word is precisely what comes at the first level of cognitional activity, the level of immediate presentation, prior to all intellectual inquiry and presupposed by the latter. Consciousness, then, viewed in terms of experience, is the immediate internal experience of oneself that is had when one is performing any apprehensive or appetitive activity.
Consciousness thus differs from self-knowledge, since consciousness is not the kind of self-knowledge that is had from a definition of man, or of such acts as seeing and understanding, nor is it the self-knowledge had by judging that I am a man, that I see and understand, that I am a knower, an empirical, intelligent, and reasonable subject of activity. It is rather the rudimentary, unformed awareness that is had prior to all definition and judgment concerning the subject or activities which are present in consciousness. What is achieved in the act of defining is achieved precisely as intelligible; what is known in the act of judgment is known as true. But that which is "known" through consciousness is known neither as intelligible nor as true, but precisely as experienced. The implications of the position which views knowing as looking thus become obvious: experience is identified as the arena of objectivity; the only problem with this is that as experience everything which occurs at this level is equally valid; and so being, or the real, becomes merely a subdivision of the "already out there now," along with the apparent. When pushed to the extreme, such a position leads to the counter-position of the denial of the possibility of any objective knowledge. For within the realm of experience as such there is no criterion for distinguishing the real from the apparent; the only criterion is found in the natural and spontaneous unfolding of the pure desire to know, which leads the mind of man to grasp the virtually unconditioned character of its understanding and thus to affirm what is true and attain the real.
This is not to say that consciousness does not attain to being, to what is true, to what is intelligible; but because consciousness is only a potential component in the full dynamic structure of human knowing, being, the true, and the intelligible are grasped, not as such, but only as experienced. The pure desire to know moves cognitional process from this first level to understanding, in which what was experienced is now grasped as intelligible, and then to judgment, in which my understanding of experience is judged to be true.

The distinction between consciousness and self-knowledge is put as follows in "Cognitional Structure": "Self-knowledge ... is experience, understanding, and judging with respect to experience, understanding, and judging. Consciousness, on the other hand, is not knowing knowing but mere experience of knowing, experience, that is, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging."

Consciousness, then, is the experience which the subject of apprehensive and appetitive activities has of himself in his subjectivity. This means that a man can never fully know, in any reflex way, himself as a subject. "... if he tries to find himself as subject, to reach back and, as it were, uncover his subjectivity, [he] cannot succeed. Any such effort is introspecting, attending to the subject; and what is found is, not the subject as subject, but only the subject as object; it is the subject as subject that does the finding. To heighten one's presence to oneself, one does not introspect; one raises the level of one's activity." Introversion is consequent intellectual inquiry, in which what has been attained
as experienced -- i.e., myself in my activities -- is attained as intelligible, as true, and as being. It is one thing to be conscious of oneself and one's acts, and quite another to attend to oneself and one's acts. Complete self-knowledge is impossible, because of the dichotomy of subject and object introduced by introspection, and yet no self-knowledge is attained until the subject affirms, in an act of judgment, what was presented to himself first as simply experienced, namely, himself performing empirical, intelligent, and reasonable acts. Lonergan seems to intimate that most men do not attain this self-knowledge, because they do not affirm the latter two elements of their experience, intelligence and reasonableness, and thus do not grasp the virtually unconditioned understanding of themselves as intelligent, reasonable, and consequently free and responsible subjects. Insight is a book written precisely to bring more people to true self-knowledge, a knowledge which continually grows in the course of a lifetime, but whose essential attributes, once affirmed, are grasped as not subject to revision.

Because consciousness is the concomitant awareness of self which the subject has while performing apprehensive and appetitive acts, it is not homogeneous, for these acts differ in kind and are related to one another, not by similarity, but functionally. "... because human knowing is a structure of different activities, experience of human knowing is qualitatively differentiated. When one is reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging, one is experiencing one's
own rationality. When one is inquiring, understanding, conceiving, thinking, one is experiencing one's own intelligence. When one is seeing or hearing, touching or tasting, one is experiencing one's own sensitivity. Just as rationality is quite different from intelligence, so the experience of one's rationality is quite different from the experience of one's intelligence; and just as intelligence is quite different from sensitivity, so the experience of one's intelligence is quite different from the experience of one's sensitivity. 34

Despite the heterogeneity of consciousness, however, consciousness is also unified, both from the side of what is known and from the side of the knowing subject.

... there are unities of consciousness. Besides cognitional contents there are cognitional acts; different kinds of acts have different kinds of awareness, empirical, intelligent, rational. But the contents cumulate into unities: what is perceived is what is inquired about; what is inquired about is what is understood; what is understood is what is formulated; what is formulated is what is reflected on; what is reflected on is what is grasped as unconditioned; what is grasped as unconditioned is what is affirmed. Now, just as there are unities on the side of the object, so there are unities on the side of the subject. Conscious acts are not so many isolated, random atoms of knowing, but many acts coalesce into a single knowing... Indeed, consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between conscious acts occurring within the field and unconscious acts occurring outside it... The unity of consciousness... is given. By this, of course, I do not mean that it is the object of some inward look. What is meant is that a single agent is involved in many acts, that it is an abstraction to speak of the acts as conscious, that, concretely, consciousness pertains to the acting agent... Consciousness..., as it is given, is primarily an identity uniting my seeing and my hearing or your seeing and your hearing.
We will see later, much more in detail, the relevance of this entire discussion for an understanding of the consciousness of Christ. For the moment, however, we can indicate the significance for this question which Lonergan finds in the statement that consciousness is not some kind of perception or looking but is rather to be identified with internal experience in the strict sense of the word. "Whoever thinks that consciousness is perception, asks whether the assumed nature, the assumed humanity, the soul of this man, the human consciousness of Christ perceived the divine person. On the side of the subject something created is posited and it is asked whether, on the side of the object, the divine person is known. Whoever, though, considers consciousness to be experience, asks whether the divine person subsisting in a human nature consciously or unconsciously sees, hears, delights, suffers, understands, judges, wills, chooses, desires. The divine person is posited as subject; it is indifferent what happens to be the object; the only question asked is whether the subject experiences in the production of psychological operations."\(^{36}\)

Several more general points should be made at this juncture. The first concerns the matter of consciousness of identity. This is a prior and formless awareness of self, which by introspection we can judge to be an awareness of oneself as identical, despite differences in time. For Lonergan, this consciousness of identity is simply had in one's presence to himself. It does not amount to judging that I
am the same as I was yesterday, or to any manner of understanding what identity is, but rather, being an unformed and undifferentiated awareness, it is on the first level of cognitional process, and is thus a purely potential component in human knowledge; i.e., every man has the raw materials for making this judgement of identity or for arriving at a definition of it. Thus what is given in consciousness is the same subject (consciousness of identity) with diverse acts succeeding themselves (consciousness of time).37

The second point is that Lonergan recognizes a "succession of enlargements of consciousness, a succession of transformations of what consciousness means." Here is what he means by this: "Waking replaces dreaming. Intelligent inquiry emerges in waking to compound intelligent with empirical consciousness. Critical reflection follows understanding and formulation to add rational consciousness to intelligent and empirical consciousness. But the final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing, and (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably."38 This final, moral level of consciousness, Lonergan terms "rational self-consciousness."

Consciousness, as the field of self-presence in which my cognitive and appetitive activities occur, permits knowledge; it is the condition of its possibility. But it is also the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge, which is a grasp and affirmation of what occurs precisely in consciousness. Self-knowledge, as we said,
is necessarily objective in its character and thus, since it is knowledge of one who is precisely not an object but a subject, it is never totally adequate. But it does pass the irreversible state of security when it attains to the judgment that I am an empirical, intelligent, and rational subject, because I experience my own experiencing, intelligence, and reasonableness. A subject can never fully communicate what he is to another, since he can never totally define himself in an adequate fashion. My subjective self-presence is, at its deepest dimensions, hidden from my own objective grasp and not communicable to another. My communication of who I am to another person can only be done over a period of time and indirectly, through the gestures and words and sensible actions which are the expression of who I am. But these gestures and words and actions will never totally express my deepest subjectivity.
II. Lonergan's Procedure on this Question

Lonergan refers to the subject who is present to himself through cognitive and appetitive acts as the psychological subject. When Lonergan is dealing with the question of the consciousness of Christ, he is not content to remain on the level of a phenomenology of consciousness, i.e., a scientific method which displays the immediate data of experience in their immediacy, deliberately prescinding from all philosophical questions. Lonergan feels that this entire question demands that he establish a relation between the immediate data of consciousness and the philosophical and theological notions of subsistence, person, divine person, and nature. This entire question is taken up by Lonergan, both in De Verbo Incarnato and in De Constitutione Christi only after he has discussed the conciliar dogmas concerning the question of the ontological constitution of Christ.

An adequate handling of this question demands that the purely psychological data be combined with the philosophical and theological facts to form one consistent theory.

The reason for this insistence on Lonergan's part lies in his theory of knowledge, according to which the immediate data of consciousness are a potential component in the full dynamic structure of human knowing. If this epistemology is correct, then what is known as experienced is the same reality as what is understood, defined, and judged as known correctly. Thus, in Lonergan's cognitional theory, the phenomenological 'I', which is attained through immediate experience, is the same reality as the philosophical 'I'. The phenomenological
'I' is the center of many acts; the philosophical 'I' is "this subsistent being," where "this" means that which is an immediate given of consciousness. The phenomenological description and the philosophical conception are equally immediate data of consciousness, in the sense that through them there is attained, at the level of intelligent grasp [level 2], a knowledge of precisely what is given in the immediate data of consciousness.

This, then, is the reason for introducing the notion, e.g., of person into a discussion of the self-consciousness of Christ. In descriptions of human consciousness, we do not find the philosophical notion of person, but this does not mean that the person, human or -- in our case -- divine, is not an immediate datum of consciousness. For, if person is understood at the level of intelligent grasp, and if my understanding is judged correct at the level of reasonable affirmation, then person must be known as experienced at the level of immediate presentation, for it is the same reality that is attained through immediate experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. 41

Lonergan proceeds, then, to discuss the relationship between the psychological subject, i.e., the self-present subject of apprehensive and appetitive activities, and the philosophical notion of person. As we said above, consciousness is given as a unity, both from the side of the subject acting and from the side of the contents of his awareness. We are aware that it is one who is performing these diverse acts. This one is a person, i.e., a distinct subsistent in an intel-
lectual nature. He is in an intellectual nature because some of his acts are intellectual. We know he is distinct for all the data of consciousness, and especially that of unity, are his own and not shared with others. We know he is subsistent for he is clearly that which performs these operations. This one person is a psychological subject, for when he performs these activities he is present to himself, and when he is not performing these activities, i.e., when he is asleep, he can perform them. Therefore one and the same reality is both person and psychological subject. The person, as defined above, is always at least potentially a psychological subject and sometimes actually so.42

Because the Chalcedonian dogma forces a distinction to be made between person and nature, and since person is the same identity as psychological subject, a distinction must be drawn between psychological subject and nature. For if psychological subject and nature are identical, then so too are person and nature, and we end up with either a) monophysitism, eliminating any true human consciousness in Christ, or b) Nestorianism, resulting in the presence in Christ of two psychological subjects. Therefore the defined dogma of the Church compels Lonergan to distinguish between psychological subject and nature. Moreover, he feels that the facts of human consciousness allow him to do this.

The earlier material in his works, on the ontological constitution of Christ, had brought Lonergan to a definition of "nature," as this word is used in the Chalcedonian symbol, as "the remote principium quo or operations." As we have seen, the meaning of "psychological
subject" is "he who is present to himself." In relation to the person as psychological subject, "nature" would then be defined as "that by which the manner of self-presence is determined." Surely the remote principle of operations or, in this case, the determining principle of the manner of self-presence, is not an immediate datum of consciousness, and so cannot be identical with the psychological subject.

Now, as we mentioned in part I, the way in which a man is present to himself is quite complex, depending on the operation or activity he is performing at a given moment. And yet all of these activities and operations, and so all of these modes of self-presence, pertain to one and the same man, person, or psychological subject, who is present to himself in different ways. Thus the distinction between the psychological subject and nature, as the determining principle of the mode of self-presence, seems established. Consciousness is proper to the person or subject, but the mode of consciousness is determined by the composite nature of man. Thus human consciousness belongs to the person by reason of his nature.

The final preliminary point discussed by Lonergan is the meaning of "I". There is first of all an "I" who speaks, and this "I" is identical with the psychological subject, i.e., with the person operating psychologically. Secondly, there is an "I" who is signified, and this is the person, not only as an ontological unit but also as psychological subject, for it makes sense to say "I was sleeping." Thirdly there is an "I" by which the signification is given, and this "I" is the "I" known either through the concept or in a judgment,
whether the judgment be uttered or not. Finally there is an "I" which is a conclusion of psychological investigation and is to be identified by the operations performed by the person. This "I" is determined by the grade of self-presence which an individual has at a given moment, and this degree of self-presence is known by the operations which he is performing, by the way in which he says "I". "If, for example, you hear the word "I" uttered by a man who is sleeping, you conclude that he is dreaming and has some inchoate consciousness. But if you read the gospel, where it is said, 'Not as I will but as you will,' you conclude to a self-consciousness involved in an interpersonal situation." 44

With the help of these notes on the meaning of psychological subject and its relation to person and nature, we can return to the notion of consciousness and give to it a more complete definition. Consciousness, in Lonergan's view, could adequately be defined as the given, primitive, concomitant, unified field of self-presence in which the subject/person's cognitional and appetitive activities occur. We should now be ready to move to a discussion of the consciousness of Christ.
III. The Divine Consciousness of Christ

According to the Chalcedonian symbol, Jesus Christ is a divine person, the Son of God, subsisting in two natures or principles of activity. He is a divine person subsisting in a divine nature, and so he is God. He is a divine person subsisting in a human nature, and so he is a man, for any person subsisting in a human nature is truly a man. Because the nature of principle of activity determines the mode of self-presence which is consciousness, and because divine nature is qualitatively distinct from human nature, there must be in Christ two modes of presence to self and thus two consciousnesses, one divine and one human.

What can this possibly mean? To say that there is in Christ a divine consciousness is to say that the Word of God is present to himself in a divine way. To say that there is in Christ a human consciousness is to say that this same person or psychological subject is present to himself in a human way. Lonergan proceeds analytically to talk about each of these separately, and thus abstractly, and then attempts a synthesis, a return to the concrete unity of the God-man.

We shall look first, then, at the way in which Lonergan handles the divine consciousness of Christ. The first question to be asked is whether or not God can be called conscious. Lonergan answers that God can truly be called conscious, since (1) consciousness is the subjective field in which intellectual and volitional acts occur, and (2) God is the infinite act of understanding (ipsum intelligere) and of loving (ipsum amare). Now, if Archimedes, because of a finite act of under-
standing, could run naked from the baths of Syracuse excitedly crying "Eureka," because he was aware of his understanding, the infinite act of understanding can hardly be called unconscious. In fact, God must be more present to himself than the most watchful man, since he is really identified with the infinite act of understanding. 

However, God must be called conscious in a way analogous to what we mean by consciousness. For in human consciousness, a distinction can be drawn between the conscious subject, the act by which the subject is conscious, and the object attained through the act. Such a distinction is not found in nor predicated of God, for these three are the same. Also God is not conscious through many acts but through the one infinite act which he himself is, whereas our knowledge of ourselves moves from a rudimentary, formless or undifferentiated self-awareness into intellectual inquiry, understanding, reflection, and judgment. This difference does not exclude a true analogy, however, since the essence of consciousness does not consist in the multiplicity of elements which enter into the field of human consciousness, but in presence to self and this, as we have seen, is greater in God than it is in us.

The next question for Lonergan is whether the Word is conscious, not as God, but precisely as word, i.e., as spoken by the Father and as spirating, together with the Father, the love which is the Spirit. Lonergan regards his affirmative conclusion on this point as quite probable, and states that this is a question handled by very few authors. His argumentation is based on his *Verbum* articles and on his systematic
understanding of Trinitarian theology. His affirmative answer is based on his understanding of the divine processions as analogous to the operations of perfect consciousness.

This question is to be answered only by asking a more fundamental question; namely, whether the three divine Persons are conscious not only in the essential acts of the Godhead which they share in common but also in the acts which are proper to each. Only the Father speaks the Word; only the Father and the Son spirate or "produce" the Love which is the Holy Spirit. Only the Son is spoken. Only the Holy Spirit is spirated. Do they perform these operations consciously or unconsciously? Are they conscious in, because of, and according to these proper operations? Lonergan gives his fullest treatment of this question in De Deo Trino.

The existence of this divine consciousness is obvious. For two divine processions are really identified with four relations, since a divine procession, in which there is no motion, is nothing other than the relation of principle to term and of term to principle. Moreover, these four relations are subsistent, so that the subject which is referred by the relation is the same reality as the relation by which it is referred. Moreover, these processions are intellectual and intellectual conscious emanations; and therefore whatever is really identified with the processions is equally intellectual and intellectually conscious. Therefore the subjects which are related to one another by the relations and the relations by which they are related to one another are intellectual and intellectually conscious. And therefore according to this consciousness the Father and the Son and the Spirit are each conscious of themselves and of one another, since it is impossible that any be consciously related to another unless he be conscious of himself and of the other to whom he is related.

The relevance of this question for the matter of the consciousness of Christ is manifest when one asks whether the person of Christ
is conscious as a person, and not simply as God. "For if the person as person is unconscious, the hypostatic union takes place in an unconscious being. But if the very person as person is conscious, the hypostatic union takes place in a conscious being." It is thus important to our understanding of the hypostatic union to see that, because the three persons are conscious according to these "notional acts," as well as according to the essential acts of the Godhead, they are conscious according to paternity and filiation, and active and passive spiration. There is nothing unconscious in a divine person, and so the hypostatic union is conscious.

IV. The Human Consciousness of Christ

In our preceding discussion of the divine consciousness of Christ, we prescinded from the incarnation in order to consider simply the consciousness of the Word of God both as God and precisely as Word. In this section we are considering the consciousness of Christ precisely in so far as he is man. Lonergan's statement on this is worded as follows: "The same divine Word, according to his human nature, is also present to himself in a human manner." The same position is expressed in De Constitutione Christi in this way: "Christ as man attained to himself as experienced through his human operations and according to the perfection of those operations." This part of Lonergan's handling of Christ's human consciousness is relatively easy to deal with.
Lonergan points out in *De Constitutione* that he is here dealing, analytically, with Christ *as man*, i.e., the divine person in a human nature, but *prescinding from the divine nature*. He is also dealing with consciousness in the strict sense of the word, i.e., with the rudimentary and formless awareness of himself in his subjectivity, and not with what is known as an object through acts of understanding or judging.

Lonergan's arguments in support of this assertion are basically the same in *De Verbo Incarnato* and in *De Constitutione Christi*. The first argument is based simply on the dogmatic fact that the Word of God *is truly a man*, like to us in all things but sin. Every man has the kind of self-awareness which Lonergan is here predicating of Christ. Without this consciousness Christ could not be a man, like to us in all but sin.

A second argument found in both works is drawn from the dogmatic fact of the nature of Christ's Passion. The Catholic faith holds neither that Christ suffered in his divinity, nor that he suffered in his humanity in such a way as to feel nothing. Obviously, then, if he were not conscious, he would have felt nothing in his "sufferings" and so would not have really suffered.

Some would maintain that Lonergan's exposition up to this point misses the real question, which is how Christ, through his human consciousness, is conscious of his divinity. Lonergan replies that it misses the question as this question is usually and erroneously posed,
but that he would prefer to postpone his discussion of this point until later; right now he simply wants to indicate that the divine person is conscious of the divine person precisely through human consciousness. He is not maintaining that the divine person is attained precisely as divine through human consciousness, but rather that the divine person subsisting in a human nature is attained sub ratione experti. 63 Lonergan admits that he is dealing here with distinctions of reason, but maintains that these both have a foundation in the concrete reality of Jesus Christ and are necessary in the analytic portion of systematic theology. 64

It is important to note at this point that Lonergan is here opposed to those who would maintain that the subject of the human consciousness of Christ is one of the following: some assumed man, some psychological subject or psychological "I" which is not identical with the divine person, the human soul of Christ, the human nature of Christ, or the human consciousness of Christ. Since the person is identical with the psychological subject, the subject of Christ's human consciousness is the divine person, so that the divine person is conscious of the divine person through human consciousness. This simply must be the case if we admit that the divine person is truly man. 65

Thus in Lonergan's view one and the same divine person is present to himself in a human way and in a divine way. Because of the identification which we drew earlier between person and psychological
subject, we can say that there is in Christ the God-man one psychological subject, i.e., the one divine person present to himself in two ways. In De Constitutione Christi, Lonergan adds a few refinements to this statement. Because Christ is one person, we cannot say that there is one subject of divine consciousness and another of human consciousness, even though we can and must distinguish between Christ as man and Christ as God. Although it is not the same thing to subsist in divine nature and thus to be present to oneself as God and to subsist in human nature and thus to be present to oneself as man, nevertheless we must say that one and the same subject is present to himself through divine consciousness (and thus as God) and through human consciousness (and thus as man). In the ontological order Christ is one in so far as he is one person and two in so far as he subsists in both a human and a divine nature. In the psychological order Christ is one in so far as one and the same person is present to himself through two consciousnesses, and two in so far as there are precisely the two consciousnesses, one by which he is present to himself as God and other by which he is present to himself in a human way. So far, of course, as Christ's knowledge is concerned, we have dealt only with his presence to himself, i.e., his experience of himself as a psychological subject, and have not touched upon his understanding and affirmation of himself as an ontological subject, i.e., as the Person of the natural Son of God.

We will look now at some of the more particular questions which Lonergan handles on the matter of Christ's consciousness. First of all,
in what way can the Person of the Word be referred to as the psychological subject of human consciousness? Lonergan first states that this does not take place by any kind of influence of divine activity on Christ's humanity, and this for two reasons. First, the divine activity is common to the three persons of the Godhead, so that if it were through divine activity that the Person of the Word were the subject of human consciousness, the Father and the Son would equally be subjects of the same human consciousness. It is rather by eliciting and producing, through his human nature, human sensitive and intellectual operations that the Person of the Word is the subject of human consciousness, in other words by means of the same operations which render us conscious. 68

Secondly, what are the reasons for saying that the Person of the Word is present to himself in a human way through his human sensitive and intellectual operations? Lonergan presents two reasons. First, through the Incarnation the Person of the Word is everything which this man Jesus of Nazareth is. That is, because of the Incarnation everything which is said in the Gospels concerning Jesus is to be understood as said of the Son of God. This is a consequence of the conciliar teaching that Christ is one person, a divine person, of whom both human and divine predications are made. 69 Secondly, because of the definition which states that Christ is similar to us in all things save sin, what we say concerning our consciousness must also be said of Christ's. Since we become present to ourselves through our human sensitive and intellectual operations, the same must be true of Christ.
The fact that the Person of the Word is humanly conscious through human sensitive and intellectual operations thus seems evident. The understanding of this fact has proved to many to be a stumbling block. Lonergan quotes A. Patfoort, who disagrees with him on this point. Patfoort feels that it is true to maintain that the Incarnate Word by a part of himself is aware of another part of himself, but not that by this part of himself he has an awareness of his divine personality. For Patfoort the question of Christ's consciousness is not to be handled by saying that the person of the Word is the subject of consciousness, but rather in terms of some "operative continuity" between the Word and the human nature of Christ.

Lonergan in response appeals to the axiom actiones sunt suppositorum. The principal application of this axiom, he says, is that it is not a power of sense which senses nor the intellect which understands, but man through his senses performs the operation of sense and through his intellect understands. Because the Incarnate Word is metaphysically one we cannot say that a part of this one person performs human sensitive and intellectual operations, but the Person himself. No distinction can be made to the effect that such a statement is true of Christ ontologically but not psychologically, for the psychological aspect adds nothing to being; rather a psychological subject must be classified as a being in a certain degree of ontological perfection. The consciousness of Christ simply cannot be explained through efficient causality, since the question of consciousness is to be handled through the intrinsic constitution of a psychological subject. Just as the
Person of the Word is constituted a sensing man in so far as the operations of sensing are elicited in the senses of this man, so he is constituted a conscious man in exactly the same way. "Since he who senses, consciously senses, and he who understands, consciously understands, and he who chooses, consciously chooses, by the very fact that the Person of the Word is he who senses, he is also he who consciously senses, etc." 

Thus, that which is present to itself in Christ the man is not the assumed nature, not the human soul, not the created intellect, not human consciousness, but the very Person of the Word subsisting in the assumed nature. Lonergan thus conceives and poses the question in a different way from those authors who ask how something created and human can become conscious of the divine Person. These authors are laboring under the misconception that consciousness is a kind of perception or introspection. The fact of the Passion prevents us from thinking of Christ's consciousness in this way, for the sense of physical pain is had without any introspection, reflex perception, and without any *visio beata*. The subject is present to himself in the performance of sensitive and intellectual acts; in this case, Christ the subject, sensing the pain in his body, is present to himself *modo valde doloroso*. 

Lonergan next takes up the question of the unity of the two consciousnesses in Christ, maintaining that they are united not directly but in their one psychological subject. He argues from the fact that the two natures are united in the person and not directly. Conscious-
ness comes through the performance of certain operations; these are operations of the person, determined by the nature. Thus consciousness too is the consciousness of the person, with its mode determined by the operations, and ultimately by the nature which is the principle of those operations. Just as the hypostatic union takes place not in a nature but in a person, so too does the union of the two consciousnesses take place in the one psychological subject, which is ontologically identical with the person. Thus Christ's divine consciousness is not related to his human consciousness in the same way in which man's intellectual consciousness is related to sensitive consciousness. In man these two form a natural unity because of their multiple interdependence, whereas Christ's divine consciousness is itself a unity and his human consciousness another unity. The similarity between Christ and us lies rather in the fact that in both instances there is one psychological subject present to himself.74

Christ was conscious of the divine person through human consciousness, because he was conscious of himself through human consciousness. However, he was not conscious of his divinity through human consciousness alone. For only one who is present to himself in a divine way is conscious of divinity through consciousness alone. Nevertheless, through his human consciousness Christ is in potency to know that he is God. This knowledge is given him through the visio beata. Anyone who shares the visio beata knows what God is but only the Son knows that he is God; the reason for this difference is found precisely in the human consciousness of the Son. But this
whole question brings us beyond the matter of Christ's consciousness to the question of his knowledge.
FOOTNOTES

2 P. 748.
5 See pp. 181 ff.
7 Insight, p. 385.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 388.
11 See, e.g., Insight, p. 20.
12 For a brief presentation by Lonergan of this same material, see "Cognitional Structure," pp. 221-4.
13 Ibid., p. 223. Judgment is referred to, however, as the only "complete increment of knowing." Insight, p. 350.
15 See Insight, pp. 348-9.
16 De Verbo Incarnato, p. 279.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 280.
19 De Verbo, p. 267.
21 De Verbo, p. 267.

23 See Insight, p. 321

24 Ibid., p. 320.

25 Ibid., p. 321

26 Ibid.

27 De Constitutione, p. 83.


29 Ibid. See De Constitutione, pp. 84 f.

30 Ibid., p. 85.


32 Ibid., p. 227.

33 De Constitutione, pp. 87-88.


35 Insight, pp. 324-6; see De Verbo, pp. 283-4.

36 De Constitutione, p. 92.

37 See De Verbo, pp. 277-279.

38 Insight, p. 613. See "Cognitional Structure."


40 Refer, e.g., to what was said above concerning the consciousness of identity as raw material for understanding and judgment.

41 See De Verbo, pp. 281-3.

42 Ibid., pp. 283 f.

43 Ibid., pp. 284-6.

44 Ibid., p. 288.

45 See Insight, pp. 3 f.

46 De Verbo, p. 290.

De Deo Trino, EE: Pars Systematica, Rome; 1964, pp. 186 ff.


Among these authors are listed De. Parente, B. Xiberta, A. Perego, and H. Diepen. Lonergan deals more extensively with each of these except Perego, in De Constitutione, pp. 141-4; he deals rather brutally with Perego in "Christ as Subject: a Reply," Collection, pp. 164-197.
73 De Verbo, pp. 306–7.
74 Ibid., pp. 307–8.