Essays in Systematic Theology 8: Intelligencia Fidei in De Deo trino, Pars Systematica: A Commentary on the First Three Sections of Chapter One

In this article I am following up on a recent contribution to this journal, in which I suggested a hypothesis regarding the development of Bernard Lonergan’s understanding of the functional specialty ‘systematics.’ More specifically, the hypothesis has to do with the history of the text that presents Lonergan’s most thorough treatment of the methodological issues in systematics, namely, the first chapter of De Deo trino, Pars systematica. I begin here to present the hypothesis in greater detail, by way of a commentary on the first three sections of the chapter.

The issue throughout the present article, as in the sections on which it is commenting, is intelligencia fidei, understanding the mysteries of faith. This is the first of two major issues in the chapter under investigation. The other is the relationship of system and history. The present chapter touches on only part of the first issue. Two or three more articles will be required to comment in detail on the entire chapter and to present in full the hypothesis that I wish to contribute to the discussion.

My hypothesis has to do with the differences between two versions of this chapter. The differences first emerge in the third section of the chapter, but I will begin

3 The later version, which is the basis of my comments, is in Lonergan’s De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964). The earlier version, which contained important material that was not preserved in the later version, is in
with some remarks on the first two sections of the chapter, where there are only minor differences, and none that affect the meaning of what Lonergan is conveying. Section 1 of the chapter treats the goal of systematic theology, and section 2 the act by which that objective is attained.4

1 Section 1: The Goal or Objective of Systematic Theology (De Fine)

Lonergan clarifies the goal of systematics by speaking of the twofold operation of the knowing mind. And in order to establish the difference between the two operations, he analyzes the classical definition of science, according to which science is *certa rerum per causas cognitio*, a certain knowledge of things through their causes.5 This Aristotelian

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4 These articles were first written in the form of an extended commentary on the chapter under investigation, for the purposes of teaching this material in a graduate seminar on Lonergan’s notion of systematics (conducted twice at Regis College, Toronto, and once at Marquette University). At times the points made will be obvious to seasoned Lonergan scholars, but I hope they will bear with me.

5 It is interesting, if somewhat perplexing, that in the Latin treatises that he wrote in his years at the Gregorian University, Lonergan continues to appeal to this ‘classicist’ definition of science. He had explicitly moved away from this definition by this time, acknowledging the differences between modern science and the Aristotelian ideal, and
even stating that the modern notion of science has more in common with theological exigencies than does Aristotle’s; the latter point is particularly clear by the time of his lectures on theological method at Regis College in the summer of 1962. In fact he was already well beyond the Aristotelian notion of science in *Insight*. But we will note that he makes a qualification almost immediately in the text under consideration, and that further nuances are introduced later in the chapter.

Moreover, the issue is not simple, not a matter of a straightforward opposition between the Aristotelian and the modern notions. In a course offered in 1959, ‘De intellectu et methodo,’ he presented various notions of science without taking more than a very limited stand on precisely what science is. He gives the impression in that course that he is still working out his own notion, in fact that he is trying to develop a notion of science that will accommodate the changes that have taken place as the notion of science has developed over time. In 1961 he gave a series of lectures in Dublin on ‘Critical Realism and the Integration of the Sciences,’ and, while it seems there are no extant records of the first of these lectures, his comments in the other lectures indicate that in the first lecture he reviewed various notions of science and asked whether there might be formulated a particular methodological stance that could account for all of them and for the changes that have occurred in the notion of science. And in the Regis College institute of 1962 on ‘The Method of Theology,’ he goes perhaps a step further. ‘… we have to admit, make room for, science of the modern type; but we have to do so in a way in which it is a coherent prolongation of the ancient type.’ This is quoted from the text that will appear in volume 22 of Lonergan’s *Collected Works, Early Works on Theological Method 1*, ed. Robert M. Doran, and Robert C. Croken. Tracing the development of Lonergan’s explicit comments about science may well prove to be an important indicator of his development in the crucial years between *Insight* and the breakthrough to the notion of functional specialties.
definition indicates that genuine human inquiry (most clearly differentiable in scientific pursuits) intends two interrelated goals or objectives. In fact, Lonergan’s principal reason for appealing to the definition in this context is to clarify the difference and relation between these two objectives and to specify the implications of this difference and of this relation for cognitional theory in general and for theology in particular.

The two objectives are truth or certitude (certa cognitio) and intelligibility (per causas). The two are inextricably joined in any genuine pursuit of human knowledge. If one has no concern at all for truth and certitude as one pursues knowledge (cognitionem) of causes or reasons or meaning or intelligibility or explanation, then, while one may display great ingenuity and cleverness, one will not learn anything about the things in the definition ‘a certain knowledge of things through their causes.’ One is playing with ideas. One can even develop a theory of truth to justify such dilletantism: truth lies in the coherence of intelligibilities or ideas. In terms of Lonergan’s general cognitional theory, we may say that one is being intelligent but not reasonable, a not infrequent (and often dangerous) occurrence.

On the other hand, one can be so fastened on certitude (not so much perhaps for the sake of truth as for the security that comes with being certain) that one is not willing to inquire about reasons and causes, about meaning and intelligibility. The latter may be doubtful, tentative, hypothetical. But if one pays no attention to them, one will accumulate only a crude and undigested awareness (notitiam, not cognitionem) of things, however certain it may make one feel. This awareness is, in fact, simply a complex function at the level of presentations or ‘experience.’ It does not constitute human knowledge. Many Catholic theologians in the modern period were more concerned with

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6 This is the immediate qualification (‘quippe semper dubias’) of the classicist definition of science to which I referred in the previous note.
reaffirming certainties than with understanding the doctrines they kept repeating. Such
an awareness does not qualify as ‘science’ or, for that matter, even as ‘knowledge’
(cognitio). It is little more than an accumulation of presentations at the merely empirical
level of consciousness (notitia).8

7 ‘... theologians of the end of the seventeenth century ... introduced “dogmatic”
theology. It is true that the word “dogmatic” had been previously applied to theology.
But then it was used to denote a distinction from moral, or ethical, or historical
theology. Now it was employed in a new sense, in opposition to scholastic theology. It
replaced the inquiry of the quaestio by the pedagogy of the thesis. It demoted the quest
of faith for understanding to a desirable but secondary and indeed optional goal. It
gave basic and central significance to the certitudes of faith, their presuppositions, and
their consequences. It owed its mode of proof to Melchior Cano and, as that
theologian was also a bishop and inquisitor, so the new dogmatic theology not only
proved its theses, but also was supported by the teaching authority and the sanctions of
Collection, ed. William F.J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. (latest printing,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 57. For a possible source of these
historical comments, see Yves Congar, A History of Theology, trans. Hunter Guthrie
(New York: Doubleday, 1968) 177-81. Congar’s book is based on an article,
‘Théologie,’ in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique to which Lonergan frequently
refers in other contexts (see below, note 70). It is likely that the comment just quoted
also relies on Congar’s work.

8 See the use of the word notitia in Lonergan, De constitutione Christi ontologica et
psychologica (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7, The Ontological and
Psychological Constitution of Christ, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E.
Crowe and Robert M. Doran), where it often (though not always) refers to the
Certitude is the objective of the question, *An sit?* Is it? Is it so? Knowledge through causes is the objective of such questions as *Quid sit? Cur ita sit?* What is it? Why is it so?9 The two questions and their objectives are related to or, in *Insight*’s terms, isomorphic with, the two metaphysical principles of essence (What is it?)10 and existence (Is it?). Just as essence and the act of existence (*esse*) are always linked with one another, so that one cannot be found without the other, so the two operations of our mind that respond respectively to the questions, *Quid sit?* and *An sit?* are so intimately joined that it is useless to pursue the objective of one question while neglecting the objective of the other.

Still, just as there remains a real distinction between essence and the act of existence, so there remains a real distinction between these ‘two operations of the mind’

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9 In *Understanding and Being* (and elsewhere), Lonergan discusses Aristotle’s point that ‘What is it?’ and ‘Why is it so?’ are really the same question. See Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) index, under ‘What?/Why?’

10 The intricacies of Aristotelian and Thomist discussions of essence and form are presented in detail (more detail, perhaps, than can be found elsewhere), and in relation to the act of understanding, in chapter 1 of Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
(understanding and judgment) and between their respective objectives. And so there is a corresponding distinction of methods to be employed in advancing toward these respective objectives and toward the acts by which these objectives are achieved. And this is the point that Lonergan is making in this section: the distinction of objectives and acts, and the consequent distinction of methods and procedures. This point will, of course, later in his development be nuanced, expanded, and transformed, to become the distinction of functional specialties.

Moreover, the diversity of methods that he is describing here is more pronounced in theology than elsewhere. We can know supernatural truth only through divine revelation, and so theological certitude is born of faith and reliance on legitimate authority. But understanding these truths requires the devout, careful, and sober inquiry

11 Lonergan’s thought on both faith and authority underwent considerable development, a development that has yet to be studied. On faith, there is badly needed, I think, a study interpreting the evolution from ‘Analysis fidei’ (1950) to faith as ‘the knowledge born of religious love’ in Method in Theology. What are the connections? Is there continuity between the later position on beliefs (as distinct from faith) and the earlier position on faith itself, or does Lonergan’s later position represent something quite different from his earlier one, even as regards the genesis of what he came to call beliefs? Regarding authority, Lonergan’s view at the time of De Deo trino is far less dialectical, far less critical, than it became in his later (in fact, post-Method) ‘Dialectic of Authority,’ in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 5-12, where there occurs a naming, an unmasking, an explanation, and a demythologization of illegitimate authority, whether in a cultural tradition or in civil government or in the church, that is as radical and unrelenting as anything found in the literature of deconstruction (and, it should be noted, far more respectful of legitimate authority than are many more recent critiques). ‘Analysis fidei’ is available in a Regis
that is the work of reason illumined by faith, the inquiry encouraged by the First Vatican Council. The two procedures and sets of operations are quite distinct, as are their objectives.¹²

A strictly systematic treatise in theology, then, presupposes an informed faith on the part of the reader. That is, it presupposes assent to the doctrines that it is the primary task of systematics to understand. More broadly, it presupposes certitude with regard to the mysteries of faith that now one is attempting to comprehend. The objective of systematics is the imperfect but most fruitful understanding of mysteries to which informed doctrinal assent has already been given. Its concern is not to remove doubts or to refute errors, and so its method does not involve much of an appeal to the authorities that may be accepted by one’s readers. Even the most erudite faith, even a faith informed by knowledge of the authorities, by scriptural exegesis and historical information, can remain a faith with little or no understanding of the mysteries. Such understanding rests on a further set of questions that would penetrate to the root of revealed truth and help us know just how it can be true, that is, just what it means. This understanding is the goal or objective of systematics.

This position on the objective of systematics remains constant throughout Lonergan’s development. In fact, while Method in Theology uses the expression ‘the College edition, ed. Frederick E. Crowe, Conn O’Donovan, and Giovanni Sala. The Latin text and an English translation by Michael G. Shields will be contained in volume 19 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Latin Theology, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

¹² Lonergan emphasizes here and in many other places that Aquinas clearly recognized the distinction of these two objectives and of the respective acts and methods that each demands. The relevant text in Aquinas is Quaestiones quodlibetales, iv, q. 9, a. 3. See also the Prologue to the Summa theologiae for a related set of observations.
The principal function of systematics, the understanding of revealed mysteries remains the only function that Method’s chapter on systematics discusses in any detail. Natural knowledge of God is also mentioned, but its relation to the understanding of mysteries is spelled out more fully elsewhere. And other functions beyond these two are not mentioned at all.

2 The Act by Which This End Is Achieved

2.1 First and Second Operations

If the distinct goal of systematics is understanding, not certitude, this does not mean that we are to prefer any old understanding to one that has cogency, or a false understanding to one that might be true. What, then, is the act of understanding proper to systematics? What are its properties? And, granted that its specific objective is not certainty or truth,


but understanding and intelligibility, how is that understanding related to the true and the certain?

Lonergan begins to answer these questions by returning to the distinction between understanding and judgment, or more broadly between what Aristotle called the first and second operations of the mind. Each of the expressions ‘first operation’ and ‘second operation’ is used to cover several distinct operations.

Thus, in Aristotle’s ‘first operation,’ we ask, *Quid sit? Cur ita sit?* What is it? Why is it so? and by insight into images we grasp a possible reason or cause, a meaning or intelligibility, and from this insight we utter in an inner word a hypothesis that would answer the question. This hypothesis is the ‘first inner word.’ It proceeds from direct insight in response to the question for intelligence, *What is it?* Because it does not yet entail affirmation or denial, that is, a *positing* of an intellectual synthesis, it is called a simple (*incomplexum*) inner word.

Again, in Aristotle’s ‘second operation,’ we ask concerning our hypothesis, *An sit? Utrum ita sit?* Is it? Is it so? and in an effort to answer such a question we weigh evidence in order to pronounce a true judgment through which, as through a medium, something of being would be known; and if we grasp the sufficiency of evidence for affirming or denying, for saying yes or no, then we utter yes or no on the basis of this reflective grasp, as a second inner word, one that *posits* what prior to the judgment had been merely a mental synthesis (or something that would deny that synthesis). Because an affirmative second inner word *posits* a synthesis, it is called a compound (*complexum*) inner word.¹⁶ Elsewhere, and especially in *Insight*, the metaphor of ‘weighing evidence’

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¹⁶ For the basis in Aquinas of this doctrine on the two inner words proceeding respectively from two distinct acts of understanding, see Lonergan, *Verbum*, chapters 1 and 2. The first thirteen chapters of *Insight* establish these points in Lonergan’s own terms, and in great detail. And it should be noted that Lonergan acknowledged that the
is explained by appealing to a reflective act of understanding that grasps that the conditions for a prospective judgment are or are not fulfilled. If they are fulfilled, the prospective judgment is ‘virtually’ or (better, I think) ‘contingently’ unconditioned.  

Now, while Aristotle speaks of ‘first’ and ‘second’ operations, Lonergan is quick to emphasize that the differential is not a function of time. This point is particularly crucial to the issue under investigation here, that is, to the relation of doctrines to systematic understanding. The distinction of first and second operations is not to be understood by positing the ‘first operation’ as occurring necessarily before the ‘second,’ and the ‘second’ as occurring necessarily after the ‘first.’ It is true, of course, that the ‘first operation’ does spontaneously give rise to the ‘second’: when we have conceived a hypothesis, we spontaneously inquire whether it is true. 

This usual temporal order is reflected in Lonergan’s cognitional theory, where ‘understanding’ (Aristotle’s ‘first operation’) presupposes data to be understood, and where ‘judgment’ (the ‘second operation’) presupposes understanding. But these relations are not the only ones, and in the present context Lonergan must emphasize that it also is true that the ‘second operation’ invites us to a further and more perfect exercise of the ‘first.’ That is, we

distinction was not as clear in Aristotle and Aquinas as he wishes to make it be. See, for example, Method in Theology 335, where it is stated that the Kantian view that understanding is the faculty of judgment has antecedents not only in Plato and Scotus but also ‘to a less extent, in Aristotle and Aquinas.’

17 I discovered the expression ‘contingently unconditioned’ in Gordon Rixon, ‘Derrida and Lonergan on Human Development,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002) 230. I think it expresses Lonergan’s meaning to some contemporary readers more clearly than does ‘virtually unconditioned.’ ‘Virtually unconditioned’ is a misleading term for many contemporary readers coming newly to Lonergan. The term suggests to many younger, computer-literate readers the notion of virtual reality.
desire to understand better what we already know is true. This is precisely the kind of act of understanding that is involved in systematic theology.

The differential between the set of operations that coalesce around understanding and the set of operations that coalesce around judgment is to be located, not in their temporal relations, but in the objects of the two operations or levels. Lonergan presents some general reflections from cognitional theory regarding this point, before proceeding to apply the reflections to systematics.

2.2 Objects and Operations

Before discussing these reflections, though, I wish to emphasize that a central feature of Lonergan’s development in the years that we are studying is the movement from objects to operations as the principal key to method. In De Deo trino (and more precisely, in Divinarum personarum where there is expressed a position that was not revised in De Deo trino), objects are the differential of operations, the key to distinguishing or differentiating operations and tasks. This is straightforward Aristotelian and Thomist doctrine. But there is evidence from these years of a reversal of priorities on Lonergan’s part. In fact, the reversal occurred before the 1964 edition of the material that we are now studying, but it is not reflected in this edition. It is clear, for instance, in the 1962 Institute on ‘The Method of Theology’ that Lonergan conducted at Regis College, Toronto, in the summer of 1962, and in the course ‘De methodo theologiae’ at the Gregorian University in the spring of 1962, on which the Regis Institute is largely based.18 The reversal of

18 Consider the following from the beginning of the first lecture in the Regis Institute:

‘The consideration of method … is not directly the consideration of objects.
According to St Thomas in Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 1, a.7, ad 2m, ‘theologia tractat de Deo et de aliis quae ad Deum ordinantur.’18 That is the object of theology. But
priorities, in fact, seems to have occurred earlier than this, and perhaps with Lonergan’s re-reading of Piaget in immediate preparation for his summer institute in 1959 on the philosophy of education.\(^9\) And beyond that reversal there is evidence of an integration of consideration of method is concerned directly not with the object, not with God, with scripture, with the councils, with the Fathers, with the liturgy, or with the Scholastics, but with me and my operations. It is concerned with the theologian and what the theologian does. It does not imply a total neglect of the object. That is impossible. If you eliminate the object you eliminate operation, and if you eliminate operation the subject reverts to the state of sleep, and there are no operations at all. But it is not directly concerned with the objects, and insofar as it considers objects it considers them through the operations. Similarly, it considers the subject not purely as subject without any operations, but as operating.

‘Accordingly, while it is necessary to begin from objects, still objects are considered simply as a means to pin down the operations that are involved. It considers objects not for their own sake, but as discriminants of operations.’ This will appear in chapter 1 of vol. 22 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, *Early Works on Theological Method I*.

\(^9\) See Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 177: ‘Those operations, as a group, determine an object. There is an object proportionate to such operations. The object will be compounded of act, form, and potency, where act is the component in the reality corresponding to the *is* of judgment, form is the component in the reality corresponding to the intelligibility grasped by understanding, and potency is the component in the reality corresponding to what is abstracted from in all science, a purely empirical residue. Hence scientific knowledge, in the process and in the attainment of the ideal – an explanation of all
the two emphases (objects and operations). The integration may well be related to Lonergan’s post-Insight reading of Husserl.

phenomena – will be the set of theories (form) verified (act) in instances (potency).

All of this, of course, is pure Insight. But what is emergent in it is the centrality of the emphasis on operations, which will yield in the chapter on Piaget to an analysis of development in terms of the group of operations (and implicitly of philosophical development in terms of the basic group of operations). ‘When development moves to the level of the group of operations, the group orders all the objects.’ Lonergan, Topics in Education 202; see 180, note 17. The significance for theology is in retrospect clear, but it was to take another six years before it took the form of functional specialization.

For one instance, see Lonergan, ‘Religious Knowledge,’ in A Third Collection 141:

‘Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.’ The footnote at this point is instructive: ‘Distinguish three meanings of the term, transcendental: the most general and all-pervasive concepts, namely, ens, unum, verum, bonum, of the Scholastics; the Kantian conditions of the possibility of knowing an object a priori; Husserl’s intentionality analysis in which noēsis and noēma, act and object, are correlative.’

Ibid. 145, note 8. The third meaning of ‘transcendental’ does not appear in Lonergan’s discussion of the term in Method in Theology; see pp. 13-14, note 4, where the Scholastic and Kantian, but not the Husserlian, meanings of ‘transcendental’ are mentioned. Lonergan’s few comments on Husserl in Insight are critical, but it is clear that shortly thereafter he was profoundly influenced by portions of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, to which he refers constantly in lectures of the late 1950s and early 1960s (beginning, it seems, with the Boston
2.3 Assent and Understanding

But let us return to the text that we are considering. The term ‘object’ can mean three things. The object can be that which moves us to an operation. It can be the term interiorly produced by an operation. It can be the end intended by the operation, its objective. Lonergan draws on his cognitional theory to elucidate this threefold meaning of ‘object.’

The object that moves us to act in the ‘first operation,’ that is, the object that moves us to direct insight in this life, is, in Thomas’s terms, the nature existing in corporeal matter (*quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens*). In Lonergan’s terms, this is called the intelligibility immanent in the concrete presentations of sense and imagination. The object that is the term interiorly produced in this ‘first operation’ is the conceived definition, hypothesis, or supposition, the inner word that issues from the act of direct understanding grasping that intelligibility.

The object that moves us to act in the ‘second operation’ is sufficient evidence, and the object as immanently produced term is the true, proceeding as inner word in the judgment that issues from a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence: yes or no.

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21 As Lonergan here begins his reflections by considerations of these objects, so at the end of the chapter he will return to the notion of object to unify all that he has said in the chapter. Moreover, a similar, in fact almost identical treatment of ‘object’ can be found in the second chapter of *The Triune God: Systematics* at 205, in a discussion of the distinction between the act of understanding and the consequent inner word.
The object that is the end intended by both operations is being, what is, the end or objective of the entire cognitive process, the objective of the desire to know.

Now the identity of the end intended by the two operations, the fact that each operation intends being, means that the other objects just listed are not distinct in any absolute fashion (non simpliciter distincta). That which we experience by the senses is the very same thing (1) whose intelligibility we seek when we ask, ‘What is it?’ (2) whose intelligibility we grasp in the sensible, (3) whose intelligibility we express conceptually, (4) concerning whose existence we inquire further, (5) about which we grasp evidence sufficient for affirmation, (6) which we affirm to be because of the grasped evidence, (7) whose reality we know through the truth of judgment, and finally, (8) which is better and better known because of the frequent repetition of this whole process until all aspects of the thing are understood perfectly and truly.²²

Moreover, just as it is one reality that we know through many acts, so also it is one act that confirms the validity of all the other acts: the act of judgment. The true, which is formally known only in judgment, regards the truth (correspondence) not only of judgment itself but also of all the other acts. If I truly judge, for instance, that ‘this is a human being,’ the truth of that judgment confirms the truth (correspondence) of (1) the individual known by the senses (‘this’), (2) the intelligibility grasped by understanding (‘human’), and (3) the existence posited in the judgment itself (‘is’).

It is clear from these cognitional-theoretic considerations that the act by which an understanding of the faith is reached is an instance of what Aristotle called the ‘first operation.’ It is not an instance of the ‘second operation.’ The theologian who seeks to understand the mysteries of faith does not doubt whether there are such mysteries or whether they are true. The relevant operation has to be some instance of the ‘first operation,’ where we ask, ‘What is it?’ about something we already believe with

certainty, or ‘Why is this so?’ ‘How can it be true?’ about something that we have no
doubt is truly so.

But in this particular case, the ‘first operation’ – questions for intelligence, the act
of understanding, and the inner word of conceptualization – clearly is not first in a
temporal sense. The assent of faith precedes the systematic understanding of the
mysteries. I believe in the Trinity, and indeed in the divine processions, relations,
persons, and missions (see the wording of the major creeds), before I have any technical
understanding of what a divine procession might be, of the four divine relations, of the
divine persons as subsistent relations, and of the missions of Word and Spirit as the
divine processions joined with a created external term. And this assent of faith, since it is
given to something true, is an instance of the ‘second operation.’

What, then, in the order of understanding, precedes the assent of faith? In De Deo
trino (and the earlier Divinarum personarum), Lonergan speaks of a certain catechetical
understanding by which we grasp the meaning of the articles of faith in a manner
sufficient for the assent of faith. But in the light of Method in Theology, we can say that
in theology itself such a merely catechetical understanding is not sufficient. What
precedes the assent of faith as the latter is articulated in the functional specialty

23 A quaestituncula at the end of the second chapter of the 1959 version of Divinarum
personarum addresses the question of the extent of knowledge of the divine
processions among those who are not technically proficient in theology. Here
Lonergan distinguishes (1) the quite separate conceptions of procession and of
‘divine’; (2) the composition of these two in a faith affirmation; and (3) the
understanding of this faith affirmation, giving rise to some kind of unified conception
of divine procession. All the faithful can ‘do’ the first and second of these, but the
third is the task of theologians, and they can perform this task only gradually, in fact,
only as a community that collaborates over the course of centuries.
'doctrines' are all the operations, including operations of understanding, involved in the first five functional specialties, as well as the extra-theological events that constitute the mediating subject. In some cases this entails a quite complex set of operations, since the theological doctrines to which one gives assent may themselves have been subjected to quite technical processes of transposition from their original formulations. In that case, the judgment is a judgment that the transposition is faithful to the original meaning intended by the Church or by the theologian who first formulated the doctrine.

This does not mean, of course, that every individual theologian has to perform all of these operations. The operations that Lonergan came to differentiate into functional specializations occur within a community of theologians. The theological habit, if you want, is not only individual but also communal. The community in which the habit resides is a function of a collaboration that extends over centuries. That collaboration has resulted in the availability of certain judgments of fact and judgments of value that are constitutive of the community of the Church. In the case of dogmas and other mysteries of faith, these judgments are irreversible; however much their meaning may be reformulated for different ages and contexts, that meaning itself is permanent.

24 On the relationship of theological doctrines to systematics, see Doran, ‘Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology’ and ‘Reflections on Method in Systematic Theology.’

25 There is a fine treatment of the notion of habit as communal at several points in Ivo Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method: The ‘Universal Viewpoint’ in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

26 Evidence can be found in Lonergan’s ‘Doctrinal Pluralism’ (now in vol. 17 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*) that indicate that while he was writing this lecture he changed his formulation from the ‘immutability’ to the ‘permanence’ of dogmatic meaning.
So, while there is a ‘catechetical understanding’ of the mysteries of faith that is prior to the lived assent of faith itself (and a great deal more than catechetical understanding, as Balthasar, for instance, will insist), there is also a more technical hermeneutical and historical understanding (and sensibility) that belongs to the Church and especially to the theological community. It precedes the theological affirmation of doctrines that marks the sixth functional specialty. Furthermore, necessarily contained in what precedes the assent of faith articulated in the functional specialty ‘doctrines’ are the religious, moral, intellectual, and (I maintain) psychic conversions that first make it possible that the truth affirmed in doctrines can come within the horizon of the theological subject. These are definite developments, it seems, in articulating the relation of systematics to doctrines, beyond Lonergan’s formulation of the issue in *De Deo trino*.

Still, despite these developments, the main point remains constant: the particular understanding that we call *intelligentia fidei*, an understanding grounded in the same foundational horizon that grounds the assent to doctrines, follows rather than precedes that judgmental assent.

Next, while the understanding of mysteries intended in systematic theology is an instance of the ‘first operation,’ it is intimately connected with operations of the ‘second’ type, and this in *either direction*. The first set of connections is clear: we are speaking of an understanding of mysteries that have already been affirmed to be true. The second is that, as soon as one has acquired some such understanding of the mysteries, one begins to ask whether one’s understanding is itself true. There are judgments that precede systematic understanding, and there are other judgments that follow upon it. The antecedent judgments regard revealed truth, and the consequent judgments regard theological truth.²⁷

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²⁷ On the position formulated later in terms of functional specialization, there will be the question also of theological truth in some of the antecedent judgments. For ‘doctrines’
Despite its intimate connection with antecedent and consequent judgments, however, the understanding of mysteries is in itself a precisely determined act, and Lonergan goes on at this point to list ten properties of this quite determinate act called as a functional specialty involves or regards not only the mysteries revealed by God (some of which are expressed in dogmatic statements) but also other doctrines that one holds to be true, including the theological doctrines of other theologians or even of oneself. With respect to theological doctrines, the issue of theological truth arises in or with regard to the functional specialty ‘doctrines’ itself. The truth accorded these theological doctrines is hardly the antecedent truth accorded what one regards as revealed mysteries. It is a theological truth, but one that is antecedent to the pursuit of further theological understanding. Its criteria are different from those that affect dogmatic truth. Among these criteria, I suggest the following: (1) Does a particular systematic understanding truly bring closure to a debate? A clear example is Aquinas’s understanding of the relation of grace and freedom, as interpreted by Lonergan. Lonergan’s presentation of Thomas’s position simply ends the De auxiliis controversy, by pronouncing a plague on both houses. (2) Does it employ an analogy that, all things considered, does the job better than any other and links the particular doctrine under investigation with other doctrines? I continue to regard the psychological analogy for the trinitarian processions as meeting this criterion. Is there any other analogy that enables a better understanding of how it can be true that there are three persons in one God? (3) Does it express an inescapable practical or paranetic conclusion of the Gospel of God in Christ Jesus? Despite official bureaucratic hesitations regarding liberation theology, the Catholic Church has come to regard the preferential option for the poor in this way.

These issues are addressed again in ‘Reflections on Method in Systematic Theology’ (below, chapter z).
intelligentia theologica. Some of these statements will require qualification, and I will indicate the need as the issues arise. The ten points treat: (1) the object that moves to theological understanding; (2) the imperfect nature of such understanding; (3) its analogical character; (4) its obscurity; (5) its gradual development; (6) its synthetic character; (7) the imperfection, analogical character, obscurity, and gradual development not just of individual elements but also of the synthesis itself; (8) its fruitfulness; (9) the worthwhileness of pursuing such understanding even when one succeeds but little; and (10) the support given by Vatican I to this notion of theological understanding. I will discuss each of these in turn.

2.4 Characteristics of Theological Understanding

(1) The first point has to do with the object that moves one to theological understanding of divinely revealed mysteries. That object, Lonergan says, is not an intelligibility existing in sensible corporeal matter, but the very intelligibility of God, in whom the mysteries themselves are hidden. But the intelligibility of God moves us, not immediately, as it will in the beatific vision, but mediately, that is, through something true that has been revealed by God and accepted in faith (*per verum divinitus revelatum et fide susceptum*).

This statement calls for some immediate comment. Certainly it is true that, by the time the theological wheel of operations is prepared to move to systematics in the proper sense of that term, the mediation of the mystery of God does occur proximately through those affirmations that have been made in doctrines. And clearly this is what Lonergan means here by mediation through a truth that has been revealed by God and accepted in faith. But it must also be emphasized with Hans Urs von Balthasar that (to use Lonergan’s language) there is a quite definite sense in which the object that moves to theological understanding of divinely revealed mysteries, namely, the intelligibility of
God, *is* mediated through an elemental meaning grasped by ‘the eye of religious love’ *in sensible corporeal matter* before ever it is mediated through a formally true statement or set of statements, that is, through the full acts of meaning that consist in judgments.

For Balthasar (correctly, I believe), such mediation of the intelligibility and goodness of God through the elemental meaning of the beauty that reflects and expresses God’s glory precedes and motivates the assent of faith itself and must be preserved even as faith moves to beliefs, beliefs to doctrines and dogmas, and doctrines and dogmas to theological understanding. The object that moves to theological understanding of divinely revealed mysteries, the very intelligibility of the mystery of God, is mediated to us first through the elemental meaning (to use Lonergan’s term) constitutive of the ‘form’ of revelation itself, the elemental meaning residing in the embodiment of the glory of God in created forms and above all in the assumed humanity of Jesus, in his risen body, and in the drama of his existence. It is mediated through the incarnate meaning of a deed that is true. And that mediation occurs before ever the truth of the divine deed is formulated in doctrines or dogmas. In fact, it is mediated through the incarnate meaning of many deeds that are true, under the impetus of the universal mission of the Holy Spirit.

If I am not mistaken, Lonergan’s later conception and formulation of the entire theological enterprise and of its dependence on religious experience and conversion allow for the point that I am making. So does his later understanding of the distinction between faith and beliefs. But it is difficult to account for this point within the framework of the understanding of theology that still is present in *De Deo trino*. And so I am proposing here a qualification of what he says in that work, one that I believe can be reconciled with statements in the ‘later Lonergan,’ but one also that the Lonergan of 1964 (or 1957, when that part of the text that we are studying was first published) might not have been prepared to grant.

It is primarily Balthasar who draws our attention to the mediation that occurs through the aesthetic *form of revelation*, especially in the incarnation, which is the center
of that form, and through the dramatic sequence of events that constitute Jesus’ history and that disclose the mystery of divine grace and human freedom. But there is to be added to Balthasar’s explicit emphases, which are largely christological, the mediation that occurs through the sensible manifestations of the work of the Holy Spirit in human hearts, whether within explicitly Christian contexts or not: consolations and desolations, created images and desires, manifestations of call and mission, what Eric Voegelin (I believe) calls the silent voice of conscience and grace.28 In fact, it is ultimately in these aesthetic and dramatic dimensions not only of revelation, but also of redemption and the universal gift of grace, that the Church finds the evidence for formal statements regarding its constitutive meaning.

This elemental mediation of the intelligibility and beauty and goodness of God is prior to, and grounds, the mediation of the divine mystery that occurs through the full meaning of those judgments that are dogmas, the mediation to which Lonergan refers in the text that we are studying, a mediation that occurs through true propositions. God’s goodness, Balthasar says, does not encounter us first in ‘already articulated sayings’ that are true but in a deed that is true, a deed whose meaning is formulated only later in human sayings that we hold to be true. And in that deed the beauty, the glory, of the revealing God becomes the first indication of revelation. Balthasar puts it best: the ‘rightful place’ of the pulchrum ‘within the total ordered structure’ is ‘as the manner in which God’s goodness (bonum) gives itself and is expressed by God and understood by

28 I cannot locate the text, but I am almost certain the expression is Voegelin’s. This is not to say that there is not an adequate pneumatology in Balthasar; I am not prepared to make that judgment, one way or the other. It is simply to insist on the balance, indeed even the creative tension, of the divine missions in a way that is not always apparent in his work.
The reception of precisely such a self-giving of God is, I believe, a primal religious experience. One knows in this experience that the deed is already meaning and truth, and so ‘word.’ Faith knows that. The aesthetic reception of God’s self-giving in the mode of the pulchrum is nearer to the immediate self-giving of the beatific vision than anything else that we can experience in this life. Even the most intense experiences of mystical union are but an intensification of the self-gift of the goodness of God in a manner that can only be called beauty. The forms that the self-gift, once received, can take are as many as the individual recipients, since God treats each of us differently, but what is common to them all is the mediation of the goodness and intelligibility of God in the meaning inherent in the received gift.

That meaning Lonergan would call elemental. It is later (sometimes) ‘promoted’ to formal, full or actual, and constitutive status through human words proceeding under God’s grace and direction from human insights; but the elemental meaning of the divine deed will always exceed our ability to formulate it in ‘articulated sayings.’

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30 Thus Lonergan: ‘By the word is meant any expression of religious meaning or of religious value. Its carrier may be intersubjectivity, or art, or symbol, or language, or the remembered and portrayed lives or deeds or achievements of individuals or classes or groups.’ Method in Theology 112.

31 I believe that what I have just said is consistent with the position on faith found in Method in Theology. I do not know whether it is consistent with that found earlier, and especially in ‘Analysis fidei.’ Furthermore, Lonergan’s later position on faith can probably be easily reconciled with that proposed by Balthasar in the first volume of
(2) Lonergan’s second point is that the theological understanding proper to systematic theology is of necessity imperfect and incomplete (imperfecta). In Scholastic terms, it is a finite act determined by a finite species intelligibilis, and a finite act is in no way proportionate to perfect understanding of the infinitely perfect God. So, since the object of theological understanding is a mystery hidden in God, it is not possible in this life and short of the beatific vision that theological understanding be perfect or complete. In fact, we see here the ground of the insistence on the apophatic dimension of theology that has been a constant emphasis throughout the history of Christianity. And to this we may add with Karl Rahner that because, as Paul puts it, hope ‘remains,’ even the beatific vision is not ‘perfect comprehension’ in the sense of a grasp that transcends self-surrender to the uncontrollability and incalculability of God. Rahner and Lonergan both

The Glory of the Lord, whereas I am not sure that his earlier position can. We might think as well of Eric Voegelin’s constant attempts to penetrate to the engendering experiences that lie behind the statements of doctrines (whether philosophical or theological). Also related to this discussion is the valuable contribution of Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), chapter 9, where Dulles moves beyond model thinking to argue that revelation takes the form of symbolic communication, that is, of what Lonergan would call elemental meaning. The issue is related to the other functions of systematic theology beyond that function that Lonergan emphasizes, the function of understanding those mysteries that have received dogmatic formulation.

Perhaps it is worth mentioning at this point that Balthasar’s presentation of the issues in terms of the transcendentals (pulchrum, bonum, verum) raises the discussion beyond the conceptualist criticisms of ‘experiential-expressive’ models found in George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).
follow Aquinas in saying that in the beatific vision God becomes the *species intelligibilis* that enables the vision. But even there, understanding remains surrender to what cannot ever be controlled or calculated. ‘Mystery’ remains, then, in the beatific vision, and understanding is still *intelligentia mysteriorum*.32

(3) This imperfect understanding is also analogical. A finite act of understanding regards directly something finite, and what directly regards the finite can be extended to the infinite only by way of analogy. The analogy, according to Vatican I, is with realities that can be known by the natural use of human intelligence. As I said in the previous article, this point is important for adjudicating the relationship between Lonergan and Balthasar. Balthasar also employs and recommends analogies, and they can be helpful analogies; but they are not always the analogies of which the First Vatican Council spoke. For example, his analogy between the economic and the immanent Trinity is an analogy *between mysteries of faith*, not an analogy from nature to understand supernatural mystery.33

32 See Karl Rahner, ‘On the Theology of Hope,’ in *Theological Investigations*, vol. 10: *Writings of 1965-67 2*, trans. David Bourke (New York: Seabury, 1977) 242-59. One of the readers of the present paper pointed out to me a connection with Lonergan’s position on Jesus’ own knowledge. Jesus did possess the beatific vision, but he did not know all that is in God’s power, including why God chose this universe that entails, among other things, Jesus’ own passion: all of which bears on the uncontrollability and incalculability of God even as regards the incarnate Son as man.

33 In addition, of course, Balthasar does call for and develop aesthetic and dramatic analogies that in their own way more closely approximate the ideals of the Council (although it certainly cannot be said that the Council intended aesthetic and dramatic analogies). My point is not to deny that Balthasar’s aesthetic and dramatic analogies have some affinity to the Council’s notion of theological understanding but rather to
(4) This imperfect and analogical understanding is also obscure. Analogy is valid only insofar as there exists some likeness (similitudo) between creator and creature. But, as the Church teaches in a formal statement, ‘between creator and creature there cannot be acknowledged so great a likeness that there is not to be acknowledged between them an even greater unlikeness.’ Some light may proceed from the likeness, but a greater darkness proceeds from the greater unlikeness.

The elemental dimension of experience that first mediates the mystery, the dimension to which I called attention in commenting above on Lonergan’s first point, supports the methodological assertion of the obscurity of theological understanding. But I might add that this point regarding the greater unlikeness in the midst of analogical likenesses holds also for the aesthetic analogies employed by Balthasar, where the analogy is between inner-worldly beauty and the otherworldly glory that reveals itself especially in Christ. And it holds, too, for Balthasar’s analogies of faith, for example, for the analogy that he constructs between what have come to be called (for better or for worse) the economic and the immanent Trinity. On Lonergan’s Thomist account (which Balthasar shares) the so-called ‘economic Trinity’ is identically the missions of Word... distinguish the analogies with ‘nature’ (to which the aesthetic and dramatic analogies belong) and analogies between mysteries of faith, such as the analogy that Balthasar relies on between ‘immanent’ and ‘economic’ Trinity, that is, between procession and mission. 2009: I have subsequently come to see a great deal of merit in these analogies between mysteries of faith, as will be obvious in subsequent essays on this website.

34 DB 432, DS 806.

35 They both hold that the divine missions are the divine processions joined to a created term. Balthasar does not rely on a precise understanding of intelligible emanation to gain some remote and analogical understanding of divine procession, nor to my knowledge does he have a methodological doctrine of extrinsic or contingent
and Spirit, and the missions are identically the divine processions linked with a created external term. As created, the external term is finite. For Lonergan, the created external term that is the consequent condition of the mission of the Word is the secondary act of existence of the assumed humanity; and the created external term that is the consequent condition of the mission of the Spirit is sanctifying grace, issuing in the habit of charity. As created and finite, these external terms would seem to fall under the same limitations as other finite realities, as far as their likeness to God is concerned (even though they are created grace, and so supernatural, and so partaking of the very mystery in which they permit us to share). At this point, I am simply indicating questions that need sorting out. A great deal of reflection is set loose by Lonergan’s understanding of understanding in theology, and very little has yet been done to pick up on the questions that his work enables us to raise.

(5) However imperfect, analogical, and obscure this understanding may be, it does grow in the course of time. The assertion that grace does not take away nature but perfects it holds as well for the grace that is at work in authentic theology. The human mind advances slowly to more perfect acts through a series of intermediate acts; insights accumulate into viewpoints, and viewpoints become more and more extensive and inclusive. There is a self-correcting process of learning that can range all the way from shifting the balance of one’s thought to changing one’s judgments so that one now holds to be true what earlier one regarded as false, and vice versa. But what Lonergan is affirming at this point is especially the deepened grasp over time of just where the mystery lies and why, and the heightened appreciation of what does and does not help one to understand it, and in what that understanding consists. Consider the following from *Verbum*:

predication.

… the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone Trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated in its full intelligibility; grasping properly *quid sit Deus* is the beatific vision. Just as an experimental physicist may not grasp most of quantum mathematics, but under the direction of a mathematician may very intelligently devise and perform experiments that advance the quantum theory, so also the theologian with no proper grasp of *quid sit Deus* but under the direction of divine revelation really operates in virtue of and towards an understanding that he personally in this life cannot possess. ³⁷

(6) This imperfect, analogical, obscure, and slowly evolving understanding is also synthetic. Not only do we inquire first about this and then about that, but also, as we come to understand this and then that, we inquire further as to how they are related to one another. After the individual mysteries of faith have been considered separately, there arise questions about their connection with one another and with our last end. ³⁸ As these questions are answered we approach, and eventually arrive at, a synthetic understanding. It is only at this point that a systematic theology is actually being assembled, a unified statement expressing a consistent and coherent understanding of the realities affirmed in the meanings that are constitutive of the community of the Church.

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³⁸ The addition of ‘and with our last end’ depends, of course, on DB 1796, DS 3016, on which Lonergan relies for his understanding of systematic theology. But the relation of our supernatural end to the act of faith and the mysteries that we affirm in faith is also explained by Lonergan in his short Latin work ‘Analysis fidei.’ While I believe that there are elements of that work that Lonergan may have moved beyond, this is not one of them.
(7) This very synthesis is itself imperfect, analogical, obscure, and slowly evolving. Synthesis is the understanding of many things together, and the same reasons that ground the affirmation that the understanding of individual mysteries must be imperfect, analogical, obscure, and slowly evolving obtain for the understanding of many mysteries together.

The ‘slowly evolving’ aspect occupied Lonergan in greater detail in other works, and most principally in the opening part of his 1959 course ‘De intellectu et methodo.’ But further reflection on that notion (except for what Lonergan says later about the proper development of systematic achievement) must be postponed; it belongs properly in the treatment of the relation between system and history. Lonergan introduces discussion of this relation in the later sections of the chapter whose early sections we are examining here.

(8) Although even a synthetic theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and slowly evolving, nonetheless it can also be most fruitful. The condition of one who understands is always better than that of one who does not, whether it be for the sake of apprehending truth, or teaching it to others, or moving oneself to decision and action, or counseling and directing others. The more theological understanding can be extended to everything that has been revealed by God, the more fully can what has been revealed be apprehended, the more deeply can it be affirmed (in real and not simply notional assent), the more efficaciously can it be taught, and the more faithfully can the whole of human life in all its aspects be directed to our ultimate and supernatural end.

39 It is also the dimension of systematic theology that I refer to when, in ‘Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology,’ I speak of a genetic sequence of systematic statements. For greater detail on this notion see ‘System and History: The Challenge to Catholic Systematic Theology,’ in Theological Studies 60:4 (1999) 652-78 (on this website, Essays in Systematic Theology 6).
So worthwhile is the pursuit of theological understanding, Lonergan holds, that no small or mean profit is derived even if one attains but little of such understanding. A person who is seeking theological understanding has to attend to everything that leads to such understanding, and so to all that God has revealed to us and to all that the Church proposes to be believed by all. Obviously no small or mean profit accrues to one who seriously, perseveringly, accurately, exactly considers the things that have been revealed and the things that are to be believed, both in themselves and in what follows from them. It is not true that unless one actually arrives at profound understanding of the mysteries, one has been wasting one’s time.

Finally, as we have seen, the First Vatican Council authoritatively put its stamp of approval on this conception of theological understanding. It affirmed that in fact there does exist such an imperfect, analogous, obscure, gradually evolving, synthetic, and most fruitful understanding. ‘Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires carefully, devoutly, and soberly, attains by God’s gift some understanding, indeed a most fruitful one, of the mysteries, both by analogy with what it knows naturally and from the connection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end. But never is reason made capable of penetrating the mysteries as it penetrates the truths that constitute its proper objects.’

Again, ‘Let … understanding, knowledge, and wisdom advance mightily and strongly in individuals and in all, in one person as well as in the whole Church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time.’

40 DB 1796, DS 3016.

41 DB 1800, DS 3020. We will see in the next section that in the 1964 version Lonergan presents a rather idiosyncratic interpretation of the ‘understanding, knowledge, and wisdom’ extolled by the Council, an interpretation that was influenced by his attempts to come to terms with the ideal of mathematical or symbolic logic and to relate his own thoughts on method to such an ideal.
3 Section 3 of the 1964 Version: Question or Problem

Here we move to the issue of the differences between the earlier and later versions of this chapter. The third section of the 1964 edition of the first chapter, a section entitled *De quaestione seu problemate*, does not appear in the earlier version. It treats, not the act by which we arrive at the goal of theological understanding, but the series of acts by which that goal is *intended* before it is reached. The anticipation is named a question (*quaestio*) or a problem (*problema*). The section investigates (1) what is meant by these terms and (2) how a question or problem, that is, the anticipation of a goal, can be methodically organized so as to lead expeditiously to a resolution. Here is where I find the evidence for part of my hypothesis regarding the relation between the two versions of this chapter, namely, for the claim that in writing this text Lonergan was attempting to relate his thought on systematic understanding to the ideals of contemporary mathematical or symbolic logic, ideals that he addressed in some detail and with a great deal of sophistication in his 1957 lectures at Boston College.42 These ideals are on his mind as he writes this section.

The focus on ‘question’ or ‘problem’ in systematics has its own history in Lonergan’s development. Clearly, this section is related *ahead* to the section called ‘Mystery and Problem’ in the chapter on systematics in *Method in Theology*, where the issue is presented more clearly because the issues related to logic that are in the forefront of Lonergan’s presentation in 1964 have been settled. But it is also related *back* to a series of lectures and courses that Lonergan gave between the two editions of his systematics of the Trinity. It was in these lectures and courses that the issue of ‘the problem’ or ‘the question’ became prominent in his discussion of what systematic

42 These lectures have been published as part 1 of *Phenomenology and Logic*. 
theology is all about. The treatment of *problema* or *quaestio* appears in 1964; no explicit attention was paid to it in the earlier *Divinarum personarum* of 1957 and 1959; but the complexities of the 1964 treatment have to be traced to issues that arose, I believe, in the ‘in-between’ period, and the clarity of *Method in Theology* is due to the fact that those issues eventually came to be settled in a manner that allowed Lonergan to move on. Such are the broad parameters, I believe, of this particular development on Lonergan’s part.

The relevant issues that arose in the period between the publication in 1957 of *Divinarum personarum* and the revision of 1964 as the *pars systematica* of *De Deo trino* have to do especially with the distinction of method from logic. Lonergan was already aware of the distinction; I am not trying to claim that the distinction arose for him only at this time. But the 1957 lectures on mathematical logic express an explicit focusing on the distinction, and especially a concentration on how to express it in a way that might enable communication with contemporary logicians while assuring Scholastic philosophers and theologians of the distinct procedures peculiar to the exercise of their specialties. Some of the key issues in Lonergan’s development of a position on method emerged as he confronted these issues. The concern is most clear in the opening section of the 1959 course ‘*De intellectu et methodo,*’ but it is also apparent in the section that we are studying at present, and especially in the interpretation that Lonergan gives here to the notions of *sapientia,* *intelligentia,* and *scientia.* From his struggles during this period with the question of how to formulate the difference between logic and method, Lonergan derived positive fruit in his understanding of several important points in his own

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43 For the development of the treatment of ‘problem’ or ‘question’ as it affects systematic theology see the notes on the courses ‘*De intellectu et methodo,*’ (1959) and ‘*De methodo theologiae,*’ (1962) as well as the 1962 Regis College Institute, ‘The Method of Theology.’
understanding of method, and especially in his understanding of ‘foundations.’ The
direction in which he will go on the question of foundations is clear already in the fourth
of the lectures of 1957 on mathematical logic; but it is worked out with ever greater
precision as he attempts to speak of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge or science in
the context of distinguishing Scholastic procedures from logical method and of relating
the two to one another. But he had to go through this complex effort in order to arrive
where he did. What we see in De Deo Trino is an instance of the effort.

These are the considerations that govern the interpretation that I am presenting
here of this section of the first chapter of De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica. Let us move,
then, to exposition.

3.1 Questions Occur Spontaneously, Explicitly, and Knowingly or Reflexively

A ‘question’ or ‘problem’ can arise in three ways: spontaneously, explicitly, and
knowingly or reflexively (sciente). A ‘question’ or ‘problem’ occurs spontaneously
whenever we experience the wonder that Aristotle called the beginning of all science and
philosophy. A question occurs explicitly when we clearly and distinctly say what it is we
are seeking. And a question arises knowingly or reflexively (sciente) when we are able to
present reasons for asking a particular question.

When problems arise for systematics, the precise reasons for raising them are
presented, and so the manner in which the questions arise is the third, reflexive manner.
The question for systematics expresses some such difficulty as, How can this be true,
What can this possibly mean? where this has already received a clearly defined
problematic status.
3.2 Reasons Regard Coherence, Understanding, or Fact

A further set of distinctions is required. Not only does the raising of a properly systematic question include indicating the reasons one is asking the questions, but also such reasons may be at least threefold, and only one of the types qualifies as properly systematic.

Questions for which reasons may be given can regard coherence, understanding, or fact. But only questions for understanding are proper to systematic theology.

44 A theology that would take account of and address so-called ‘postmodern’ concerns and the various hermeneutics of suspicion would have to come to grips as well with darker ‘reasons’ for asking questions than those that Lonergan mentions at this point. Here, of course, the word ‘reasons’ does not refer to anything within reflective self-awareness that can be provided as a legitimate intellectual motive, but rather to causes and ‘motives’ that lie at another level, requiring a hermeneutic of suspicion if they are to be uncovered. But such an investigation would be a matter of dialectic and foundations. Systematics presupposes a precarious intellectual genuineness under grace that not all postmodern worldviews would acknowledge as a possibility.

Lonergan had no doubt that ‘the age of innocence is over,’ and the differentials that he proposes for progress and decline, authenticity and inauthenticity, address precisely this situation. In particular, he knows how precarious cognitive authenticity is. But he is also aware of its conditions, as is clear from his outline of the dimensions of conversion. Without grace we are incapable of any sustained intellectual integrity.

I believe, too, that what I have called psychic conversion is pertinent to various post-Nietzschean suspicions and to uncovering biases that would use questions as instruments of power or for some other less worthy end. In fact, it may be, at least in some instances, the most pertinent aspect of generalized empirical method for
Questions about coherence or about fact are not properly speaking systematic questions, however much they may be related to the goals and objectives of systematic theology.

The example that Lonergan uses to illustrate the differences among these three reasons for raising questions is the question of the ‘aseity’ of the Holy Spirit. Questions about the aseity of the Holy Spirit can be asked in the interests of coherence, or for the sake of understanding, or in the form of a question of fact.

If the reason for asking the question has to do with coherence, the question will be something like the following.

How can the Holy Spirit be \textit{a se} if the Holy Spirit is from the Father and from the Son? For whoever is from others is not \textit{a se}.

Yet how can the Holy Spirit not be \textit{a se}, since the Holy Spirit is God, and God is \textit{a se}?

Obviously there exists a problem that demands some kind of answer, but in this case it is a problem of coherence. As Lonergan emphasizes in the studies that he did of mathematical or symbolic logic (which influenced both his lectures ‘De intellectu et methodo’ and the treatment of ‘question’ or ‘problem’ that we are now considering), questions that have to do with coherence or consistency arise if it seems that either part of a contradiction can be established or demonstrated.\textsuperscript{45} That is precisely the case in the question under consideration.

The same express question, Is the Holy Spirit \textit{a se}? can be asked for other reasons. One of these is concerned with the problem of \textit{understanding}. Granted that the Holy Spirit is both \textit{a se} and not \textit{a se}, how can both of these alternatives be true? The question for understanding is the type of question entertained and pursued in systematic theology: granted the doctrine, how can it be true? In this case, the answer would be

\textbf{adjudicating such issues.}

\textsuperscript{45} See especially the first lecture on mathematical logic.
simple if the Holy Spirit were composite, for then in one regard the Holy Spirit could be
\textit{a se}, and in another regard not \textit{a se}. But the Holy Spirit is entirely simple, and so there
arises a very serious problem of understanding: How can the utterly simple Holy Spirit be
both \textit{a se} and not \textit{a se}? Again, this is precisely the type of question entertained in
systematic theology: granted that the doctrine is true, how can it be true?

Finally, the same express question can address the problem of \textit{fact}. Does there
really exist a third divine person? Is the existence of the Holy Spirit taught in the ‘fonts of
revelation’? Is it understood in the fonts of revelation in the same sense as appeared later
in the councils and the writings of theologians? Here we revert from systematics to a
question for doctrines or, in Lonergan’s earlier language, to a question for dogmatic
theology as contrasted with systematic theology.

The three kinds of questions are intimately connected, but at different times one
or other form of the question will be more pronounced. At the very beginning of a
scientific enterprise, when it might be necessary to persuade people to engage at all in
such inquiry, it can be most useful to posit the problem of coherence. Thus in the history
of theology Abelard, following in the footsteps of canonists and anticipating the
development of speculative systematic theology, wrote his \textit{Sic et non}, offering both
affirmative and negative support from authorities for 158 different theological
propositions. In this way he demonstrated that \textit{questions exist}. His efforts were followed
by a number of attempts to resolve the questions. Some wrote books of sentences, in
which the materials of the problems from the scriptures and the Fathers of the church
were gathered and arranged. Others developed various solutions and made them available
either by way of commenting on books of sentences, or more independently in shorter
collections of \textit{quaestiones}, or even in those larger works that qualify as \textit{summae} of the
whole of theology. With these developments there began the movement from questions
regarding the coherence of doctrinal statements to questions that seek to understand those
same statements.
3.3 Wisdom, Understanding, and Knowledge

In the *Quaestiones disputatae* and the *Summae* the concern shifted from coherence to understanding. Genuinely systematic theology began at this time. But when the objective is ordered, synthetic understanding, new problems arise. Perhaps the most important of these is that questions cannot be put in just any order whatever; some questions cannot be resolved until and unless others are settled first, and, conversely, once some questions are settled, the way is open for the solution of others.

The systematic ordering of questions occurs according to what Lonergan, following Aquinas, calls the *ordo disciplinae* or the *ordo doctrinae*. It is clear that Aquinas rearranged the order of theological questions as his own development went forward. His development precisely as a systematic theologian can be ascertained by following the course of the various ways in which he arranges the questions. One order, in retrospect seen to be almost haphazard when contrasted with what followed, is found in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. A quite different and much more systematic order is found in the *Summa theologiae*. In between, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, there can be found yet another order that in many ways is transitional. Moreover, by the time at least of the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas had become aware of the significance of the different ways of ordering questions. In the Prologue to the *Summa theologiae* he distinguished the order of learning (*ordo disciplinae*) from, for example, the order to be followed when one is commenting on a book. ‘We have considered how newcomers to theology are greatly hindered by various writings on the subject, partly because of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments, partly because what is necessary for such people if they are to understand is presented not according to the *ordo disciplinae* but according to the requirements of textual commentary or the occasions of an academic debate, and partly because repetition has bred boredom and
confusion in the minds of the students. The statement reflects his own learning process regarding the ordering of questions: he was not always as clear on the matter as he is by the time he wrote the *Summa theologiae*.

Lonergan’s reading of Thomas’s development toward the *ordo disciplinae* can be found in *Method in Theology*, where he appeals to the example of Thomas’s various treatments of God.

… in the first book of the *Scriptum super Sententias* there is no separation of the treatment of God as one and of God as Trinity; at random questions regard either the first or the second. But in the *Summa contra Gentiles* a systematic separation is effected: the first book deals solely with God as one; Chapters Two to Twenty-six of the fourth book deal solely with God as Trinity. In the first part of the *Summa theologiae* questions 2 to 26 regard God as one, while questions 27 to 43 regard the Trinity. What in the *Contra Gentiles* was treated in very separate books, in the *Summa theologiae* is united in a continuous stream. For questions 27 to 29 are still concerned with God, while the elements of Trinitarian theory are gradually constructed. Question 27 asks, not whether the Son proceeds from the Father, but whether there are processions in God. Question 28 asks whether these processions give rise to relations in God. Question 29 asks whether these relations are persons.


47 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 346. This passage provides an important clarification and in fact a correction to some facile criticisms of Aquinas. When Thomas is criticized for separating the treatment of God as one and the treatise on the Trinity, where the treatment *de Deo uno* is regarded as philosophy, and where Thomas is said to allow philosophy to have the upper hand over theology, it should be recalled that by the time of the *Summa theologiae* the treatment of God as one and the treatment of the
So much for the general issue of the order of questions. Now we must relate that issue to a quite complex question regarding the interpretation of the text under investigation. The views given here are my own, and they are subject to refinement and correction from other Lonergan scholars. I put them forward as a hypothetical account of the available data.

The first point is clear. There is a certain order of questions and of ideas that is appropriate to systematic theology, and that order is quite different from the order that we follow when, for whatever reason, we are doing anything other than systematics. Conversely, we are doing systematics in the strict sense of that term only when we are following the systematic ordering of questions and ideas. When one is not following that order, when one is proceeding according to a different order, one may be doing something that is not only worth while but also necessary. One may be doing something that has to be done before one can do systematic theology. One may be doing something that is preparing one to do systematics. But one is not doing systematic theology itself.

It is only after acknowledging this point that difficulties arise in interpreting the text under investigation. In the 1964 edition of the first chapter of *De Deo trino*,

Trinity are ‘united in a continuous stream.’ The separation clearly is found in the transitional *Summa contra Gentiles*, where Thomas is still on his way towards a systematic theology in the fuller sense of following as much as possible the *ordo doctrinae*. The separation is not found in the *Summa theologiae*. Moreover, in neither text does Thomas ever function simply as a philosopher. Philosophy alone is for him a pagan enterprise. He took over and transformed Aristotle’s philosophy, as he understood it, in the service of theology.

Neither of these positive qualifications discounts Aquinas’s beginning his treatment of God in the *Summa theologiae* with the question of God as one. In the *ordo disciplinae or doctrinae* this is the appropriate place to begin.
Lonergan addresses the issue of systematic order first by giving, in section 3, a quite idiosyncratic meaning to the terms sapientia, intelligentia, and scientia (wisdom, understanding, and knowledge). Moreover, a longer treatment of the two ways of ordering ideas occurs later in the chapter, in section 5, and that section contains one important difference from the earlier version of the chapter: in the earlier version there was a third movement to the act of theological understanding, namely, the historical movement, whereas in the 1964 text only the dogmatic (analytic, via inventionis) and systematic (synthetic, ordo disciplinae) movements are strictly movements toward the systematic act. Correlative with this difference, I believe, is the treatment of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge in section 3 of the 1964 text, a treatment, again, that does not appear in the earlier version.

My hypothesis is that Lonergan is interpreting the meaning of the terms sapientia, intelligentia, and scientia against the backdrop, as it were, of his concerns with contemporary logic. In doing so he is engaging these terms in what Husserl calls an Umdeutung, a shift in meaning from the way in which they were employed in Thomas’s texts. Even more certainly, there has been a shift in meaning from the way in which the terms were employed in the document of Vatican I to which Lonergan appeals so often; in fact, there has been even a shift in the order of the terms, since the Council speaks of intelligentia, scientia, and sapientia. When the Council prays that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom increase in each person and in the whole church, it is not using these terms in the same way that Lonergan uses them in this text. But also, Thomas’s question regarding the intellectual virtues in the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, q. 57, a. 2, asks about sapientia, scientia, and intellectus, in that order, and his response speaks first of intellectus, then of sapientia, and finally of scientia, and his

48 Lonergan interprets Husserl’s notion of Umdeutung in chapter 11 of Phenomenology and Logic.
meaning is not exactly the same meaning that Lonergan gives these terms in *De Deo Trino*. Lonergan’s order (wisdom, understanding, knowledge) is his own, and it is governed by logical concerns, whereas, in all likelihood, the Council’s meaning is more rhetorical than technical, while Thomas’s meaning, although technical, is governed more by the spontaneous procedures of his own mind than by any strictly logical ordering. Thomas’s meaning is theoretical, and the Council’s meaning is post-theoretical. But when Lonergan tries in the text under investigation to give the terms a technical meaning, he does so, not so much in the light of the meaning of these terms in Aquinas’s writing on the intellectual virtues as in the light of his own concern with contemporary logical ideals.

While *De Deo Trino*’s interpretation of *sapientia*, *intelligentia*, and *scientia* is not found in the earlier version of this text, *Divinarum personarum*, it is presaged, I believe, by the treatment of *sapientia* in the first part of ‘De intellectu et methodo,’ where Lonergan is engaged in working out the notion of foundations, still reaching for something that he has not yet quite discovered or at least figured out how to express. If that is the case, then we might say that in the 1964 *De Deo trino* he is trying out one way of resolving those efforts; and it is a way that he will not adhere to for long. This particular treatment of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge is not found, to my knowledge, in any of his other writings on systematic theology. It is influenced by his studies in mathematical logic and by his concern to relate theological procedures to the procedures of contemporary logicians and to distinguish method from any and all purely logical ideals. This, at least, is my hypothesis, and I put it forward in the interest of discussion among Lonergan scholars, so that we may clear up what have been long-standing difficulties in attempting to understand the differences between the earlier version and the later version of the chapter under consideration.

It is clear, then, from the 1957 lectures on mathematical logic that Lonergan studied carefully the issues raised by contemporary logicians. He read widely in the field,
he took the questions with utmost seriousness, and his studies had a profound influence on the series of questions that he had to work through as he came to his position on method in theology. This was no incidental encounter in his development, and much of the output, published and unpublished, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s is devoted to coming to terms with it.

The influence of these concerns on the question of theological method becomes clear, perhaps for the first time, in the first part of the course that Lonergan taught in the spring of 1959, ‘De intellectu et methodo.’ Both there and in the 1964 revision of his 1957 text of the chapter that we are investigating, he is attempting, in part, to prevent theology from being overly influenced by the logical ideal, and so to distinguish the methodical point of view from the logical. But he is laboring hard to understand the distinction and to express it clearly, and one could even say that he comes close to flirting with the logical ideal. He is attempting to work out what precisely a deductivist ideal in theology would be. While he is concerned throughout to show how theological method ultimately will demand something different, he is more attracted to the logical ideal at this time than we might suspect, knowing as we do the direction in which his subsequent development was to move. The questions posed by logical ideals assume an importance, in both ‘De intellectu et methodo’ and the 1964 text of De Deo trino, that later was transcended. It is almost as if he tried seriously for a time to entertain the idea of a deductivist approach in systematics, never committing himself to it, and yet only later definitively abandoning it as not worth the effort or as not fruitful in the long run. He seems to have gone through a period in which he was absorbed with addressing the logical-deductivist ideal. He never subscribed to this ideal, but he did ask seriously about its possibility, even for theology. He remained ever suspicious of its limits, especially as far as theology is concerned. In fact, his awareness of the limits is clear already in Insight, where Gödel’s theorem figures prominently in the very introduction to the book. The limits are also clearly presented in the second of the lectures on mathematical logic,
and that lecture influences the direction in which the subsequent three lectures will go.

But a period of deep absorption with the issues seems to have lasted from about 1955 to 1965, and in the 1964 edition of *De Deo trino* such absorption affects the way in which Lonergan will interpret the meaning of the *ordo doctrinae*, the meaning of the church’s few conciliar statements regarding systematic theology, and the meaning he will assign to the intellectual habits of *sapientia, intelligentia, and scientia*.

The passages of *Method in Theology* that treat the systematic ordering of ideas (which itself is essentially the same as the ordering discussed in *De Deo trino*) do not seem to be under the same influence. The fascination has not only passed, but Lonergan has found an explicit way to get beyond it.

That is my basic hypothesis about this particular dimension of ‘what was going forward.’

There is also an open question, I think, to what extent this concern for the relation of method to logic influenced Lonergan, when rewriting the chapter under investigation, to remove the fascinating, indeed programmatic, passages on *theology and history* that can be found (albeit in smaller type\(^{49}\)) in the text of *Divinarum personarum*. I will discuss

\[^{49}\text{The Latin of both versions is printed in two typefaces, one larger and the other smaller, depending on the relative importance of the matter; this is similar to what we find in Barth’s *Church Dogmatics*. I have found evidence in the Lonergan archives that the distinction of typefaces was important to him, and not simply a printer’s or editor’s decision. A particular passage in larger typeface in chapter 2 of *Divinarum personarum* was marked in his hand for smaller typeface, and, sure enough, smaller typeface is what we find in *De Deo trino*. 2009: The Collected Works versions retain the distinction of smaller and larger type on the Latin pages but not in the facing pages of English translation.}\]
these passages in detail in another article.  

This question is worth exploring in some detail. It is one of the major questions to be faced in any interpretation of this extremely complex period in Lonergan’s development. For the moment I leave it as a question, although I would risk stating the additional hypothesis that there is a connection: as logic is addressed, the vision of a more concrete and comprehensive synthesis of history fades, and as the exaggerated concern for logical issues is transcended with the breakthrough to functional specialization, that vision returns, at least to the extent that the mediated object of systematics is said to be Geschichte. A new technique for explaining history, the technique first uncovered in Insight under the rubric of dialectic, regains its prominence, and with that move the possibility of a new form of systematic theology is released. Still, that new form does not appear clearly even in Method in Theology, despite the fact that Lonergan has transcended the logical concentration that we find in the 1964 text of De Deo trino. 

Let us turn, then, to the treatment of the intellectual habits of sapientia, intelligentia, and scientia in the section under investigation. 

Lonergan interprets the Latin adage sapientis est ordinare (it is the task of the wise person to put things in order) in the context of his understanding of the ordo disciplinae. It is the office of wisdom to discover that problem that is first in the sense that (1) its solution does not presuppose the solution of other problems, (2) its solution leads to the expeditious solution of a second problem, and (3) the solution of these two means that a third can be solved immediately, and so on through all consequent

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connected problems. Understanding or *intelligentia*, then, has to do with principles, with what is first in some order, and so it is the office of understanding to grasp the solution of that problem that wisdom has identified as first. And since the order dictated by wisdom is such that, when the first problem is solved, the others are solved expeditiously, *intelligentia* contains in itself virtually the solutions to the remaining questions. Finally, knowledge or *scientia* is about conclusions. But questions are put forth in such an order that, when the first is solved, there is no problem with proceeding to the solution of the others. Thus, because the remaining solutions are connected to the first as conclusions are connected to a principle, all solutions except the first pertain to knowledge or *scientia*.

This particular treatment of the intellectual virtues of *sapientia*, *intelligentia*, and *scientia* seems clearly to be governed by a desire to come to grips with the logical ideal

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51 ‘… sapientis est ordinare, et ideo sapientis est primum invenire problema quod eo sensu primum est quia (1) eius solutionem aliorum problematum non praesupponit, (2) eo soluto expedite solvitur alterum, (3) primo alteroque solutis statim solvitur tertium, et similiter deinceps per omnia problemata consequentia atque connexa.’ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 22.

52 An existential differentiation of ‘what is first in some order’ is what will lead Lonergan eventually (in fact, soon after the publication of the *pars systematica*) to his own position on foundations. With the emergence of that position, the fascination with the problems raised by logic fades. The problems are still important, of course, but they no longer preoccupy Lonergan. In fact, he presents his own notion of foundations, of ‘what is first in some order,’ by contrasting it with the deductivist ideals of the logicians. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 269-70.

53 *The Triune God: Systematics* 23.

54 Ibid. 25
that Lonergan addressed in some detail in his 1957 lectures on mathematical logic. The similarities to the portrayal of that ideal in the first lecture are obvious. I am not saying that Lonergan is attempting to present systematic theology as an axiomatic system along the lines of a mathematical-logical formalization. I am saying that his presentation in 1964 of the systematic ideal in theology, and especially of the *sapientia*, *intelligentia*, and *scientia* that govern that ideal, is influenced by his attempt to come to terms with contemporary logic and to clarify where the systematic ideal in theology is similar to the logical ideal and where it differs from it. And I am saying that, in proceeding in this way, Lonergan is giving an *Umdeutung*, a shift in meaning, to both the Thomist understanding and the conciliar usage of *sapientia*, *intelligentia*, and *scientia*.

In the fifth lecture on mathematic logic, Lonergan considers the question whether Scholastic thought is an axiomatic system – the lectures were given to Jesuits familiar with Scholastic philosophy and theology. That question is not the same as the question, Is Scholastic thought to use deduction, Is it to use syllogisms? The theses in Scholastic manuals involve deductive arguments, but they differ from the axiomatic systems that symbolic logicians attempt to construct in that the arguments work in different ways, from different premises, and in that they allow for the introduction of new points and new insights to meet new objections as one goes along. ‘So what do you have? You have a sequence of positions. One position will depend on another, but it will also depend upon further evidence drawn from other fields or from other aspects of the matter.’55 And that is precisely what the axiomatic systems of the logicians will not allow. The question whether Scholasticism is to be cast in the form of an axiomatic system is the question, ‘Is the Scholastic at the beginning of the whole course of philosophy, or is the professor of a particular section of philosophy at the beginning, to lay down a set of principles, premises, and say nothing in the whole course that he does not deduce with strict rigor

55 Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic* 121.
from those premises?  

Again: ‘Theology uses deductive argument; it argues from scripture, it argues from the Fathers, it argues from the councils, it argues from the opinion of the theologians, and it argues from papal documents, all of them deductive arguments. But theology is not the exposition of an axiomatic system. The speculative part of a given treatise may, more or less, be something like an axiomatic system. But that is only one element in theology.’

Now, in the section of De Deo trino that we are examining, Lonergan exhibits a concern with considering how close the speculative part of theology may come to something like an axiomatic system. In ‘De intellectu et methodo,’ he goes into far greater detail in examining how the obvious ‘sequence of positions’ (see the quotation above from the fifth lecture on logic) can still qualify in any way as logical. He quotes I.M. Bochenski to the effect that ‘the reduction of the Summa theologiae of St Thomas to symbolic logic will require the collaboration of many specialists working over a period of three or four centuries.’

In the fifth lecture on mathematical logic, he says that it is not impossible, but perhaps also not very desirable, that a philosophy that conceived itself as an open structure could be expressed in the form of an axiomatic system. And in the section of De Deo trino under investigation he seems to be at least gently exploring what such an exposition might mean within the context of systematic theology.

Let me provide just a bit more evidence. The formulation that we have seen of the systematic ideal in theology in terms of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge is much more rigorous than the use of deduction in Trinitarian theology that Lonergan speaks of

56 Ibid. 122.
57 Ibid.
58 Quoted from Michael Shields’s translation of the first part of the student notes on ‘De intellectu et methodo.’
in the fifth lecture on mathematical logic, indicating to me that perhaps the problem became more acute. Here is what he says in that lecture.

For example, take the treatise on the Trinity. There is the psychological analogy. You posit two processions in God. You deduce from the two processions four relations. You show that the relations are identical with the substance and although identical are rationally distinct from it, and that three of them are really distinct from one another, and that they are subsistent. And you show that the subsistent relations in God, divine subsistent relations, are persons. So, there are speculative procedures for setting up the treatise on the Trinity, and the sequence of notions is somewhat deductive. Is there a rigorous deduction from processions to relations? Well, theologians offer a *ratio theologica* in that direction, but at the same time they argue from scripture: the names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are relative names. They also argue that it is only if the persons are relations that you can have real distinctions in the absolute being. They argue perfectively from the name ‘person.’ In other words, the arguments they bring in to affirm the thesis come from all over. There is the fundamental line of development in the thought, but the Trinitarian speculation does not rest simply on that fundamental line. It rests on considerations coming from all over.\(^{59}\)

This is a different view, I believe, from the ideal presented in *De Deo trino*, with its procedure of locating the first problem, whose solution allows for the expeditious solution of the second problem, with the two together allowing for the immediate resolution of the third, ‘et similiter deinceps per omnia problemata consequentia atque connexa’ (and similarly from there through all the consequent connected problems). The latter ideal approximates much more closely the axiomatic systems that Lonergan

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discussed in the lectures on mathematical logic, and especially in the first lecture, where
the ideal was set forth. The discussion quoted from the fifth lecture on mathematical logic
also is much closer to the actual procedures of St Thomas, to Thomas’s meaning of the
three speculative intellectual virtues,60 to Lonergan’s own procedures in Trinitarian
theology, and to the meaning of intelligentia, scientia, and sapientia (spoken of in that
order) in the text of the First Vatican Council’s prayer for theological development:
closer than is Lonergan’s treatment of sapientia, intelligentia, and scientia in the first
chapter of the systematic part of De Deo trino.

But I do not mean this evaluation to be simply negative. There is considerable
motivation for the attempts that Lonergan is making in this section. In another article, I
will try to examine in detail Lonergan’s contrast in this text between the analytic and
synthetic ways of proceeding.61 That contrast remains a feature of his thought through all
of the subsequent developments. The presentation of the two ways in this chapter is
perhaps the most complete and thorough to be found, not only in Lonergan’s writings but
anywhere in theological literature. The position is found again in the chapter on
systematics in Method in Theology. A significant qualification on it was made in De
constitutione Christi, one that does not appear explicitly in either De Deo trino or in
Method in Theology, but that must be included in any complete presentation of
Lonergan’s notion of systematic theology. But the important point at this stage of our
argument is that there are the two ways of proceeding. It is not a simple matter, nor is it
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60 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 2, for Thomas’s basic meaning
of sapientia, scientia, and intellectus (sic) as speculative intellectual virtues. It can
reasonably be argued, I think, that more than a stretch is required to align it with
Lonergan’s meaning in De Deo trino.
61 See ‘The Truth of Theological Understanding in Divinarum Personarum and De Deo
Trino, Pars Systematica.’
self-evident. Lonergan struggled to articulate it, and what may appear to be an exaggerated concern with logical-deductivist ideals at this time in his development is one indication of his struggle. Much of what passes for systematics or calls itself systematic theology or synthesis is still in the *ordo inventionis*, and not in the *ordo doctrinae*. That is what he is trying to clarify and rectify. The problem is especially acute in an age when positive studies, exegesis, and historical research have been so prominent that the systematic *habitus* is in danger of being completely forgotten or its possibility denied. In the earlier version of the material under consideration here, Lonergan at least hinted that a new type of synthesis is being prepared by today’s positive research. But in the present section he is simply reminding us that, no matter what type of synthesis we may have in mind, the first element in the synthetic *habitus* is the facility for finding the proper order of the questions that will head toward a synthetic understanding. That emphasis can and must be preserved, even as one disengages it from what is perhaps too great a concern for the procedures of symbolic logicians.

At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that, when the logical-deductivist ideal became briefly perhaps too prominent in Lonergan’s concerns, he dropped from his text the hints on a synthetic recovery of the results of positive research. The correlation, I believe, is not purely coincidental. The synthetic theology of history can be restored to the center of reflection on systematic theology without lessening the positive results of Lonergan’s exposition of the *ordo doctrinae*. But those positive results will stand forth clearly only when they are disengaged from an overly logical context.

62 My own reading of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s three-volume *Systematic Theology* is that most of it is not what Lonergan would regard as systematics. It is work in a number of other functional specialties, sometimes very good work in those specialties. One is hard pressed to find any argumentation in the *ordo doctrinae* in the work.

63 Further evidence for the textual hypothesis that I am presenting can be found in later
There are other longer-term advantages of the struggles we are discussing. If it is the office of sapientia to discover the problem that is first in a deductivist fashion, understanding (intelligentia) is, not simply the act of insight itself, but a habit of understanding with regard to principles. Now a principle is what is first in some order, and a benefit of Lonergan’s preoccupation with the logical-deductivist ideal is that the clarifications it brought enabled him to clarify several meanings of ‘what is first in some order.’ At this point he is still trying to give the expression a propositional meaning. We might say that he is still moving out of ‘foundationalism’ in the pejorative sense of that term emphasized by so many writers today. Lonergan succeeded in overcoming that sense of ‘foundationalism’ more than thirty years ago. When he moved to an explicit acknowledgment of the centrality of operations, the whole context changed. It was clear references in this same chapter to the three intellectual habits, in sections 8-10. There are passages in the last three sections of the chapter that mention the three habits. The passages were written for Divinarum personarum and retained in De Deo trino. The order is that found in the conciliar statement: intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, and the meaning is much closer to Thomas’s meaning in the passage mentioned above in note 58. (It might be objected that the conciliar order appears also in section 4, written for the 1964 text, on p. 27, but I suggest that here the order is dictated by the fact that Lonergan is at this point discussing the gradual development of intelligentia theologica.)

64 At least in principle, he was beyond ‘foundationalism’ in Insight, if indeed he was ever caught in it. The only explicit reference to a ‘foundation’ in Insight speaks not of propositions but of inevitable pragmatic engagement in operations. See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 356.
by 1967 that even in his own work the ‘shift from a deductivist to an empirical approach has come to stay.’ The ‘deductivist’ approach to which he is referring in this comment is the method of what Lonergan calls ‘conclusions theology,’ which is something that he always opposed. Never in his flirtations with a deductivist ideal did he believe that theology’s ‘theses were conclusions to be proven from the premises provided by Scripture and Tradition.’ But we may speculate, I think, that by this time Lonergan had also abandoned any easy accommodation with the logical-deductivist ideal even for systematics itself, that is, even for the task of understanding the mysteries of faith. And with this realization comes the broadening of what is meant by ‘first in some order.’

If the ordered set consists in propositions, then the first will be the logically first propositions. If the ordered set consists in an ongoing, developing reality, then the first is the immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in the process ... if one desires foundations for an ongoing, developing process, one has to move out of the static, deductivist style – which admits no conclusions that are not implicit in premises – and into the methodical style – which aims at decreasing darkness and increasing light and keeps adding discovery to discovery. Then what is paramount is control of the process. It must be ensured that positions are accepted and counterpositions are rejected. But that can be ensured only if investigators have attained intellectual conversion to renounce the myriad of false philosophies, moral conversion to keep themselves free of individual, group, and general bias, and


66 Ibid. 58. His opposition to conclusions theology is just as strong during the period in which he was concerned with the logical ideal as it was later.
religious conversion so that in fact each loves the Lord his God with his whole heart and his whole soul and all his mind and all his strength.\textsuperscript{67}

It is important for us to grasp, I think, the struggle that Lonergan himself went through to arrive at this position. While it may be claimed that the position can be found already in \textit{Insight}, indeed even in \textit{Verbum}, it was not until many years later that he was able explicitly to say

… it does seem necessary to insist that the threefold conversion is not foundational in the sense that it offers the premises from which all desirable conclusions are to be drawn. The threefold conversion is, not a set of propositions that a theologian utters, but a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality that a theologian is. It operates, not by the simple process of drawing conclusions from premises, but by changing the reality (his own) that the interpreter has to understand if he is going to understand others, by changing the horizon within which the historian attempts to make the past intelligible, by changing the basic judgments of fact and of value that are found to be not positions but counterpositions.\textsuperscript{68}

In retrospect we can see that this position was more than prefigured in \textit{Insight} and that it is present in the discussion of foundations in the lectures on mathematical logic; but the appropriation of its significance for the issues that we are treating here may still have taken some time to come to fruition. When it is asked, What happened to the \textit{sapientia}, \textit{intelligentia}, and \textit{scientia} of \textit{De Deo trino}? I want to suggest that the three terms were

\textsuperscript{67} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology} 269-70. To these three conversions, I have proposed that there be added a psychic conversion that, among other things, would help one adjudicate tendencies to dramatic bias.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. 270-71.
given a forced meaning in *De Deo trino*, that this meaning is not exactly what the First Vatican Council was talking about when it prayed for an increase of these virtues in the Church, and that the theological place assigned principally to *sapientia* or wisdom in this forced and stylized sense is later occupied by the concrete dynamics of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.

### 3.4 Categories and System

Two further points will bring to a conclusion our presentation of the issues addressed in section 3 of the chapter under investigation. The first has to do with *concepts and terms* (in Lonergan’s later terminology, *categories*), and the second with the dialectical history of systems.\(^69\)

If the various sets of problems and solutions are interrelated, then the concepts and terms (categories) that express them will also be interrelated. Just as when the first problem is solved the others are already virtually solved, so also the concepts and terms that define and express the first problem and its solution should not undergo drastic change when one comes to defining and expressing the other problems and their solutions. Thus the very interconnectedness of questions and solutions *demands* the formation of *systematic concepts and a technical terminology* corresponding to those concepts. Systematics cannot be done without a differentiation of consciousness that enables one to maneuver in the realm of theory. Lonergan is here emphasizing what in *Method in Theology* he would call the systematic exigence. The critical exigence that had

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\(^{69}\) Apart from obvious side comments of my own (such as the brief discussion of Rahner on the Trinity) and from the footnotes, the remainder of the text of this paper is simply an exposition of what Lonergan says about these issues.
already appeared in *Insight*\textsuperscript{70} has not yet made its explicit entry into theology, or, if it has, it has not been made explicit in this particular text. By the time of *Method in Theology* there will be an insistence not only that systematic theology demands that technical terms be employed but also that ‘for every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.’\textsuperscript{71} What is important at this earlier point is the insistence on the systematic and theoretical: achieving the theological understanding proper to systematics is not just a matter of finding individual responses to individual questions; the demands are far more rigorous; the entire series of questions has to be properly ordered (the task of what is here called *sapientia*). The first question must be solved by a fruitful act of understanding (*intelligentia*). Other questions have to be solved in an orderly fashion by the power of the first solution (*scientia*). A system of definitions must be introduced in order to formulate the solutions. And a technical terminology must be developed to express the defined concepts.

### 3.5 The Dialectical History of Systems

A system can undergo various adventures in its history. It is proper to a good system that, once having been discovered, it will grow and be perfected. This alone serves to distinguish a system that is based on the methodological pursuit of understanding from the static, deductivist ideal of logic, where, as Lonergan makes very clear in the first of his 1957 lectures on mathematical logic, everything must be contained from the outset, and if it is not one must start over. A system grows because new insights are added, new

\textsuperscript{70} ‘… every statement in philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional fact.’ Lonergan, *Insight* 5.

\textsuperscript{71} Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 343.
connections are drawn, new implications are realized, and new and higher viewpoints are attained.

On the other hand, accidents happen; the continued growth of a systematic achievement is no more guaranteed than the occurrence of fruitful insights. The course of theological decline can follow at least the threefold process that Lonergan mentions in the text under investigation: first, the system can be poorly understood; second, it can be rejected out of hand; third, the very facts that it would understand can be denied.

There is, then, an ideal line of pure progress. Thus we can speak of a series of genetically related systematic developments. Once a system has been discovered, its proper course of development entails that it will grow and be perfected in this way. It will grow insofar as vitally, organically, intellectually, and rationally (1) it is extended to all other parts of theology, and (2) it assumes for its own ends both philosophy and other disciplines. It is perfected insofar as the understanding of the principle grows, for then conclusions drawn from the principle will penetrate matters more profoundly and be extended more widely to illuminate ever further dimensions of the related questions and problems.

Obviously, this does not always happen, as is clear, for example, from the subsequent history of the synthesis that de facto was achieved by Thomas Aquinas. The system can be poorly understood, then it can be totally rejected, and finally the very facts that it once understood can be denied. I hesitate to suggest what seems to me to be the clearest contemporary example of this course of events, since it involves the work of Karl Rahner, for whom I have enormous respect (and whom Lonergan relied on for some key elements in his own work, such as the meaning of sublation and the interpretation of St Ignatius’s ‘consolation without a cause.’) Nonetheless, in our own day, I fear, Rahner’s

72 Note the insistence on what in Method in Theology are called general categories, that is, categories that theology shares with other disciplines.
slogan-like statement of his Trinitarian Grundaxiom (‘The immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, and vice versa’) hides what has to be judged a misunderstanding of Thomas’s emanatio intelligibilis. From this lack of appreciation of a genuine systematic achievement, some have moved all too easily (and quite contrary to Rahner’s intentions, it must be added) to collapsing the immanent into the economic Trinity. This is the second step of which Lonergan speaks: the rejection of the system that first had been poorly understood. The next step is all too easy: the denial that there is in fact any immanent inner life of God to be understood.73

At the root of a poor understanding of a system is a poor understanding of its principle. Rahner, it seems, just did not understand Aquinas on emanatio intelligibilis.74 Without that first step, one will draw a blank on the whole of Thomist Trinitarian theology. The immediate result of poorly understanding principles is that the first problem and those consequent problems that are closely connected with it are at best only imperfectly solved. Imperfect solutions are only partly solutions; they are also partly new problems. (New problems can originate, of course, from investigating scripture and the church’s tradition more deeply, but in the present case the new problems arise for a quite

73 For what seems to be a straightforward movement through these three steps, see Nancy A. Dallavalle, ‘Revisiting Rahner: On the Theological Status of Trinitarian Theology,’ Irish Theological Quarterly 63:2 (1998) 133-50.

74 Lonergan acknowledges this in one of his responses to questions at the 1969 Regis College institute on Method in Theology: ‘Kant does not know about insight, and neither does Maréchal … Rahner asks, What does this mean, this emanatio intelligibilis? It is the action of an intelligence. A person, insofar as he is acting intelligently, rationally, responsibly, is a principle of something else that occurs because this is intelligent, or because this is rational, or because this is the responsible thing to do.’ See www.bernardlonergan.com at 51600DTE060.
different reason, namely, because a system has been poorly understood.) Rahner, of course, is not alone. In Lonergan’s view, theologians have failed for seven centuries to understand the *emanatio intelligibilis* that is the principle employed to resolve the very first problem in a systematics of the Trinity, the problem of the divine processions. Lonergan’s study of *verbum* in Aquinas was undertaken in order to correct that failure, but his own work on these issues has by and large met the same incomprehension as did that of Aquinas.  

The next effect of not understanding the principle is that the order in which the new problems are addressed is one that has been imposed by those who do not understand the issue. The problems are then solved by the same people whose poor understanding was the *fons et origo* of the problems in the first place. A new system may arise, but it will be at best a mere vestige of an adequate system. Its problems are not really problems, but the artificial product of misunderstanding. Its order satisfies only those who have no habitual inclination to establish a genuinely systematic order. Its principle suffices only for those whose understanding is superficial. Its ‘knowledge,’ that is, its drawing of conclusions, is a morass of obscurity and confusion. And because the foolishness of the unwise is multiple, no single foolishness pleases everybody; and so an even newer system replaces the first replacement. Great strokes of genius may multiply unexpectedly, but what is really ruling the day is not reason enlightened by faith but the study of parts. The data are being prepared, Lonergan says, not for the history of the sciences but for the sociology of knowledge.

75 At some point we need to ask just what is responsible for the enduring oversight of what is meant by intelligible emanation.

76 In the light of *Method in Theology*, we may say also that the data are being prepared for the functional specialty ‘dialectic.’ Lonergan refers here to Yves Congar’s article ‘Théologie’ (*Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. 15, Paris: Letouzey & Ané)
It can follow that the poorly understood system will itself be totally rejected. Many students of theology have never known anything but the mere vestiges of an adequate system. They acknowledge that the ersatz system is bad, but, as happened in the case of many medieval Augustinians, they can easily proceed to the mistake of judging that every system is an aberration. They can also labor under a deeper ignorance, for they can fail to grasp what it is to understand, and then they will identify what is really a problem of understanding as a problem of truth or of fact. They may regard a genuine systematic understanding of some aspect of divine revelation, not as an understanding at all, but as a new doctrine resting on philosophical dogmas or scientific hypotheses that are not theological. For example, at the time of the Aristotelian-Augustinian conflict, subjecting the ideas of the saints, and especially of Augustine, to systematic understanding was considered by some to be, not an effort to understand those ideas, but their rejection. If ‘system’ is entirely excluded, so is the problem of understanding. In

410, which corresponds to material that can be found in Congar, A History of Theology 141-43, where there are discussed (1) the consequences of the ‘useless subtlety’ manifest after Aquinas, when the dialectical method of the quaestio was pursued, not for the sake of understanding but for its own sake, and (2) the consequent crystallization of theology into petrified systems and schools, where the schools were a function of identification with distinct religious orders. The latter identification is probably what Lonergan had in mind when he spoke in this context of the sociology of knowledge.

77 A similar problem can be found, I believe, in some of the work of Karl Barth. His wholesale rejection of theological complicity with ‘contemporary worldviews’ reflects a failure to distinguish assent (judgment) and understanding of what one has assented to. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, The Doctrine of Creation, part 2, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) 3-19.
yet a later medieval scenario there was a regression to the problem of coherence. With Scotus, for example, theological discussion became a matter of applying logical subtlety to questions regarding the absolutely necessary and the absolutely possible. And once these logical exercises are rejected, the problem of fact, of the truth of the doctrines themselves, comes to center stage. The very facts that a previous system attempted to understand can be denied, and this can happen in many different ways. Some (the intellectual descendants of medieval ‘Augustinians’) will say that the entire decline was due to the very attempt to understand the mysteries.

But the Church has made it clear that a more balanced judgment can be offered. *Abusus non tollit usum*, abuses do not remove access to the proper use. While Vatican I was not ignorant of abuses, while it presented a positive and direct statement of Catholic doctrine in opposition to the semirationalism of its time, it also taught that an understanding of the faith is both possible and extremely profitable. Lonergan adapts to this issue a teaching of Newman and uses it to conclude the present section. No part of a science can be omitted without inflicting a threefold harm on the students of that science. First, the omission means that they will not know that part of the science. Second and more seriously, the science itself will be mutilated: what constitutes a science as a science is found not in a part but in the whole of that science, and so whoever takes the part for the whole is working against the science rather than serving it. Third and most seriously, a mutilated science sooner or later becomes a distorted science. Because people are intelligent and critical, they at least feel the omission. Then they seek compensation or a supplement, and the other parts of the science are so twisted from their proper role and function that they are made to bear the burden alone of giving the science its total unity. For instance, the more vehemently speculative theology is abhorred, the more ardently do people indulge in historical speculations. But historical speculations cannot take the place of systematic speculation, and the very effort to have them do so is the source of pseudo-
problems and pseudo-systems. A mind that is unformed philosophically or theologically will simply be tossed about by the most recent theoretical winds.

8 Conclusion

I have commented here on the first three sections of chapter 1 of the pars systematica of De Deo trino. In particular I have attempted to express a hypothesis about section 3, where the chapter differs most markedly from the earlier version. The hypothesis interprets the changes in terms of Lonergan’s preoccupation with problems raised for him in his study of contemporary mathematical or symbolic logic.

I hope to follow up on this article with commentary on the further sections of the chapter. More is to be said about Lonergan’s account of systematics as an understanding of the mysteries of Christian faith. And we have only begun to touch on the crucial issue of the relation of system and history, an issue that is raised quite explicitly in studying the differences between the two versions of the chapter.