1 Introduction

I would like to begin by thanking Neil Ormerod and Joseph Ogbonnaya for their wonderful contributions to this colloquium. Some of you will recall that in the first three colloquia I gave the first rather than the last lecture, judging it appropriate that the annual Doerr Lecture would also launch the two-day discussion. But this year I was well aware that Dr Ormerod and Fr Ogbonnaya know far more about globalization than I do and have written far more about it. Thus I judged it essential, given that the colloquium is centered round globalization, that they present before I do. I have learned from their writings about the problem, and in fact have used their work in my current undergraduate course to set the context for contemporary systematic theology. Thus my efforts today are focused largely on constructing a theological response to the problem that they have elucidated.

1 This paper was presented on November 2, 2012, at the fourth annual Marquette colloquium on Doing Systematic Theology in a Multi-religious World.

My response is based in my previous work on the scale of values in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*³ and *What Is Systematic Theology?*⁴ as well as on the theology of the divine missions proposed in *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1: *Missions and Processions*.⁵ I am grateful to Professors Ormerod and Ogbonnaya that they have made such a generous use of my treatment of the scale of values in their own writings on the subject of globalization and in their papers in this colloquium.

I am concerned today not so much with repeating positions they have affirmed as with attempting to go beyond what I have said thus far, thus also providing an indication of where I hope volume 2 of *The Trinity in History*, which will be entitled *Processions, Relations, and Persons*, will take me.

In doing this, however, I will attempt to come full circle on an issue that I raised in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, namely, what there I called ‘world-cultural humanity.’⁶ I borrowed the phrase from Lewis Mumford and, also with Mumford, contrasted world-cultural humanity with the post-historic humanity that for Mumford loomed as a clear danger.⁷

⁶ See especially chapter 17 in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*.
⁷ See Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956) chapters 7 and 8. I do not claim that my meaning of these terms is the same as Mumford’s.
World-cultural humanity and post-historic humanity are, of course, models or ideal types, as are Lonergan’s stages of meaning, which I also will rely on here, as well as the categories ‘modernity’ and ‘post-modernity,’ which I am going to suggest can be rearticulated in the better model of the stages of meaning. So I’m making a generous use of models.

Lonergan writes of models:

Models ... stand to the human sciences, to philosophies, to theologies, much as mathematics stands to the natural sciences. For models purport to be, not descriptions of reality, not hypotheses about reality, but simply interlocking sets of terms and relations. Such sets, in fact, turn out to be useful in guiding investigations, in framing hypotheses, and in writing descriptions. Thus, a model will direct the attention of an investigator in a determinate direction with either of two results; it may provide [one] with a basic sketch of what [one] finds to be the case; or it may prove largely irrelevant, yet the discovery of this irrelevance may be the occasion of uncovering clues that otherwise might be overlooked. Again, when one possesses models, the task of framing an hypothesis is reduced to the simpler matter of tailoring a model to suit a given object or area. Finally, the utility of the model may arise when it comes to describing a known reality. For known realities can be exceedingly complicated, and an adequate language to describe them hard to come by. So the formulation of models and their general acceptance as models can facilitate enormously both description and communication.⁸
I am going to propose that the model that in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* I called world-cultural humanity is helpful as a heuristic guide for our way beyond the ambiguity of globalization and into an alternative global situation marked by fidelity to the integral scale of values. I’m also going to propose that the related models provided by Lonergan’s suggestion of the stages of meaning are more helpful in describing the complexities of the reality of globalization than are the terms ‘modernity’ and ‘post-modernity.’ And finally, I want to return to my argument in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* that the scale of values may provide a model for helping us adjudicate the success of that evoking of a situation alternative to the present reality of globalization. In fact, though, the scale of values, while itself an interlocking set of terms and relations, and so a model, is also more than a model. It is a normative structure in the realm of the objectifications of the human spirit. It is isomorphic with the structure of the authenticity of the human spirit itself. That is to say, vital values, social values, cultural values, personal values, and religious values stand to one another in the realm of objective *Geist*, that is, in the world constituted by meaning, as experience, understanding, judgment, decision, and religious love stand to one another in the realm of the concrete universal that is the normative subject. In terms of the scale of values, the model of ‘world-cultural humanity’ assists us, I propose, in diagnosing the alternative at the level of cultural values to the universalization of a particular culture, namely, Western or even American culture, that Neil Ormerod and Shane Clifton stigmatize as one of the negative features of globalization at the very beginning of their book on the topic.⁹ (It may, of course, legitimately be asked whether there even is such a thing as ‘American culture’; the term itself seems to me to be an oxymoron, especially after spending twenty-seven

years in Canada, where until the present federal government came along, culture was still respected as a constitutive dimension of society, in a way that never has been the case in my lifetime in the United States. What we are really talking about when we fear the universalization of a culture is the global capitalist reduction of culture to market values and the subsequent, progressive, and cumulative evacuation of human living of all genuine meaning. At any rate, I propose world-cultural humanity as an alternative to that scenario.)

I hope also to suggest here that our collaboration in catalyzing this mentality is part of our cooperation with the missions of the Holy Spirit and the divine Word. In doing so, I hope to begin the movement beyond my first venture into a theology of those missions and to introduce themes that will predominate in the second volume.

2 An Interpretation of the Ambiguities of Globalization

A current debate among some Lonergan students will help introduce this section, providing a segue to the question, What precisely is the situation addressed by a contemporary systematic theology?

Much ink has been spilled in recent months on the website www.lonerganforum.com (if you can spill ink on a website!) over whether Lonergan’s notion of functional specialization, which is the heart of his *Method in Theology*, is the equivalent in his later work of what in *Insight* he called ‘cosmopolis,’ that is, of the communal mentality required if a society is to transcend not only individual, group, and dramatic bias but also the ever elusive and supremely destructive general bias of common sense itself against ultimate issues, long-range questions, and theoretical solutions to complex problems.
Without taking anything away from functional specialization, which my work clearly acknowledges as one of the most significant intellectual breakthroughs of our time, applicable not only to theology but also to philosophy and human studies and indeed, as Lonergan said, to any discipline that studies the past in order to mediate what is lasting in it into the future, I propose that what I am calling world-cultural humanity, while intimately related to functional specialization, is a better candidate to succeed the mentality that in *Insight* is called cosmopolis. World-cultural consciousness would proceed *by* functional specialization in its task of assuming collective responsibility for the human good, and so the two are intimately related. But cosmopolis is essentially a *converted* mentality (one that is religiously transformed by the end of *Insight*), and conversion – intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic/affective – is required for the full implementation of functional specialization. Anyone, converted or not, can engage in the first four functional specialties: research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. The methods employed will be the same, whether or not the persons employing them are converted in the four dimensions of interiority. The results will be different, but that is a function not of the method but of the subject implementing the method, and of his or her fundamental commitments. But only persons of a religiously transformed cosmopolitan mentality can do the last four (or in my view five) functional specialties: horizons, categories, doctrines, systematics, and communications. ‘World-cultural consciousness’ is another name for the religiously transformed cosmopolitan mentality that can engage in functional specialization. This ideal collective development of human consciousness is the mentality required if our globalized world is to avoid both the catastrophe that would be visited upon humanity by unfettered neo-liberal economic theory and practice and by the post-historic world that would issue from totalitarian monsters.
Among such monsters, of course, would be the world domination ambitioned by at least some proponents of neo-liberal economics.

However, there is a difference between, on the one hand, the situation that Lonergan addressed in *Insight* and even the one that I attempted to clarify further in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* in terms informed by an understanding of the scale of values, and, on the other hand, the ambiguous contemporary location of globalization. Lonergan’s efforts and mine were attempts to elucidate the differentials of progress and decline in a world where neoliberalism and communism were both clear instances of late stages in the cycle of decline. While I attempted in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* to move the elucidation of the situation beyond the conflict of economic ideologies that established the Cold War, which was still going on while I was writing that book, and into the burgeoning threat of terrorist and counterterrorist violence, which was emerging and which is acknowledged as such in the book, still the ambiguity of globalization provides a new situation. Globalization is caught, not between neoliberalism and communism – that battle has essentially been won, if we can call it a victory – and not between terrorism and national security, but between two distinct communal mentalities, one of which is an unconverted neoliberal economic mentality and the other of which is an immature and undifferentiated, relativistic and at times nihilistic protest against the global reach of such a mentality.

These mentalities are instances, respectively, of what have been called in descriptive terms ‘modernity’ and ‘postmodernity,’ but they may more exactly and in explanatory terms be differentiated in terms of Lonergan’s stages of meaning. Stages of meaning are ideal constructs or models whose key is the differentiation or undifferentiation of consciousness. A first stage operates exclusively in the realm of common sense. A second stage takes its stand on theory controlled by
logic. A third stage turns to interiority for the control of meaning. Specific historical exigences mediate the transition from one stage to the next: a theoretical or systematic exigence for the transition from the first stage to the second, and a critical exigence for the transition from the second stage to the third.

Modernity, postmodernity, and the stages of meaning are, again, all models. What I am suggesting is that the stages of meaning provide a more helpful set of models for describing and diagnosing the contemporary situation of globalization than do modernity and postmodernity. The so-called modernity that characterizes globalization both positively and negatively – positively as the fruit of modern science and negatively as the immature posture that asserts the superiority of cultures governed by technical rationality – is really a late version of Lonergan’s second stage of meaning. In the second stage of meaning theory governed by logic exercises the control of meaning. In the late second stage of meaning, the invitation to yield to the appropriation of interiority is on the table, but it is refused. Theory that refuses to move to interiority as the locus of the control of meaning, by this very refusal, makes for a late version of the second stage, where the word ‘late’ connotes not only a temporal difference from ‘early’ but also the qualitative difference connoted by the word ‘moribund.’ But the other side of globalization, namely, the concrete exposure of the fact that no culture is normative and that every culture has something to contribute to the fulfilment of the humanum, reveals in a positive light that Lonergan’s third stage of meaning, grounded in the appropriation of interiority, is not only an intellectual and methodological exigence but a global cultural requirement. For only through that appropriation is there discovered what truly and solely is normative. Everything else really is up for grabs, and should be, but not the validity of the injunction to be ever attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and, by God’s grace, loving.
Still, this third-stage appropriation of the concrete universal that is the normative subject is not yet the end point of communal conscious development but a stepping stone needed to help us to advance to what John Dadosky has called a fourth stage of meaning.\(^\text{10}\) I understand the fourth stage as a stage of interpersonal community that is both emergent from the deference to the other that characterizes the postmodern and that issues in collective responsibility for the human good. The fourth stage, however, depends on the appropriation of interiority that marks the third stage, for without the discovery of what really and solely is normative, namely, the transcendental exigences identified in the precepts of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love, the fourth stage of meaning loses out to relativist cynicism, as is clear in at least some of the authors who consider themselves ‘postmodern.’

Without this movement to the models provided by the stages of meaning, the temptation, I think, is too great to portray modernity largely in negative terms and postmodernity largely in positive terms. This temptation reveals itself in, among other places, the evaluations of globalization. As Ormerod and Clifton write, ‘globalization is given an entirely positive meaning by many politicians, economists and corporate leaders who, from the perspective of neo-liberal economic theory, understand it as the process of overcoming barriers to trade.’ But, they continue, ‘Pro-globalization enthusiasm is matched by that of anti-globalization protesters, who are far from being a small minority, and who are

equally certain that globalization is responsible for the political, economic and environmental crises that have taken on global dimensions in the twentieth century, and that seem inexorably likely to frame life in the new millennium.’ Such depictions, modern or postmodern, pro- or anti-globalization, are naive and simplistic, as Ormerod and Clifton stress. In particular, the temptation to portray modernity largely in negative terms and postmodernity largely in positive terms overlooks the advances that the Enlightenment has made possible and the tendency of some so-called postmodern authors to complete relativism and nihilism. And in either case the temptation is intimately linked to the refusal to accept the challenge to mediate the transition from the late, moribund second stage of meaning to the fourth stage through prolonged engagement in the third stage.

For, even at its Enlightenment best, modernity displays the exigence, the demand, to move beyond theory to interiority as the source of differentiation and evaluation. That exigence arises in modern science itself, as Lonergan has made clear in his talk of the critical exigence;\(^\text{11}\) and even at its relativistic and nihilistic worst,

\(^{11}\) ‘... to meet fully the systematic exigence [the ambition of the second stage of meaning] only reinforces the critical exigence. Is common sense just primitive ignorance to be brushed aside with an acclaim to science as the dawn of intelligence and reason? Or is science of merely pragmatic value, teaching us how to control nature, but failing to reveal what nature is? Or, for that matter, is there any such thing as human knowing? So [we are] confronted with the three basic questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structure, their norms,'
postmodernity has removed the arbitrary standardization of human reality characteristic of both classicist and modern societies, both of which are instances of the second stage of meaning, and so has opened the way to acknowledging the social construction of much that previously had been judged matters of natural law. Here I think, for instance, of what we have come or at least are coming to acknowledge about race, gender, and sexual orientation. If modernity is the blossoming into every feature of human life of the rise of distinctly modern science, postmodernity is what has issued from the historical consciousness that began to infiltrate human studies in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth called into question the automatic legitimacy of any human authority. Both of those, in their positive moments, are contributions to the ‘novum’ that we can only hope will have a chance to emerge. And if nothing else, the interpersonal community that issues in collective responsibility will prove to be the antidote to the immaturity of a modernity that stalled globalization in the narrow straits of a purely pragmatic and utilitarian implementation of a particular (and, it seems, quite erroneous) macroeconomic theory. We cannot but welcome this. But for the so-called ‘postmodern’ mentality to achieve these welcome goals, it must pass through the appropriation of normative human interiority that marks the transition from the late second to the early fourth stage of meaning. That appropriation issues in what I call ‘world-cultural humanity.’

Let me go over this suggestion once again. I have been arguing that interpreting the ambiguities of globalization in terms of the stages of meaning is more helpful, because more explanatory, than interpreting the same data in terms of modernity
and postmodernity.

Postmodern critiques of modernity regard modernity as defined by a subtle or at times not so subtle cultural arrogance that privileges Western European and North American white male or patriarchal capitalist hegemony and regards these cultural values as normative. Modernity in these critiques is seen as permitting and encouraging the manipulation of social forces in the direction of economic and political domination. Out of modernity in this sense there has arisen globalization, where globalization means multinational corporate ownership and control of the resources of the earth across national boundaries.

But, perhaps ironically, globalization has also had the effect of uncovering the vast differences that exist among the peoples of the earth and of beginning to privilege voices that previously were unheard in the halls of power: the voices of women, of people of color, of the poor, and of sexual minorities. That too is a fruit of what has come to be called globalization. And so ‘globalization’ is ambiguous, caught between the cultural arrogance of modernity and the cultural relativism of postmodernity. But I propose that it is more precise and that it will be more fruitful to understand this ambiguity in terms of the late second stage of meaning and an early drift of meaning that has not yet taken the time to find in the third stage of meaning the norms that would enable us to move toward the genuine community of a fourth stage of meaning. Again, that genuine community would be constituted by what I am calling the world-cultural mentality.

It is the question of normativity that motivates my suggestion that we replace talk of modernity and postmodernity with the language of the stages of meaning. What has been called postmodernity would shatter many cultural presuppositions as little more than social constructions that can and should be deconstructed and overcome.
At the heart of this postmodern critique of modernity is an insistence that postmodernity shares with Lonergan, namely, that no culture, including so-called modern Western culture, is normative. There are as many cultures as there are sets of meanings and values informing given ways of living. The difference between some postmodern authors and Lonergan is that for many so-called postmodern writers nothing is normative, while for Lonergan normativity is to be located somewhere else than in culture. It is to be located in the exigences whose appropriation established a stage of meaning governed by interiority – those exigences expressed in shorthand by Lonergan’s articulation of what really is natural law, namely, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible, and by God’s grace Be in love. Perhaps it is descriptively more or less accurate to say that the emerging global or world-cultural matrix with which Christian theology today would mediate the significance and role of Christian faith is characterized by a tension between modern and postmodern emphases in the realms of meanings and values determining and informing given ways of living. But I think this can be expressed in a more explanatory fashion in terms of a late second stage of meaning and an incipient fourth stage. That is the tension built into the ambiguity of globalization. Christian theology would mediate the significance of faith with what I am calling a world-cultural matrix by catalyzing that matrix in the first place, by encouraging it to come into being. And to do so it must encourage serious engagement on as wide a scale as possible in the appropriation of interiority that begins by asking the question, What am I doing when ...? It must encourage the appropriation of interiority on a global scale. That appropriation issues in world-cultural community.

It is in these terms, then, that I would understand the ambiguities of globalization: descriptively as caught in the tension of modernity and postmodernity, and in a
more explanatory fashion as caught between a late and exhausted second stage of meaning, reluctant to surrender its false normativity to the claims of interiority, and an emerging fourth stage that needs to pass through self-appropriation before its openness and deference to the other are grounded in the only norms that really do exist.

3 What Is Meant by ‘World-cultural Humanity’?

The argument of Theology and the Dialectics of History is fairly simple once one has grasped the significance of the scale of values. The scale of values is a heuristic tool for the social analysis of human situations. If I am correct in my insistence that the scale is isomorphic with the levels of consciousness, then it possesses a notable, indeed normative, validity.

We are probably all familiar with Lonergan’s basic statement of the scale of values, presented on pp. 31-32 of Method in Theology. It has been repeated by many authors in many publications. It has been at the heart of all my presentations in these four years of colloquia. It appears in Method in Theology in a discussion of feelings, and is a development on the basic statement that intentional feelings may be responses to values and not simply to what is agreeable or disagreeable from the narrow perspective of individual or group satisfaction. The presentation there reads as follows:

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social
values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as an originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man’s living and man’s world.

The principal development of the notion of the scale of values that I tried to introduce in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* has to do with the relations from below and from above, as it were, among the levels of value. Lonergan suggests one of those relations when he says that ‘cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values,’ but far more can be said than this. His statement calls attention to the fact that the emergent probability of a concern with the higher levels is dependent upon certain schemes of recurrence already functioning at the more basic levels, schemes that condition the emergence of schemes at a higher level: people cannot devote themselves to the good of social order when they themselves are starving; the cultural pursuit of the transcendental objectives of intelligibility, truth, the moral good, and the beautiful depends on the social infrastructure providing institutions and economic conditions that render a commitment to cultural values possible; persons of integrity arise out of cultures where these transcendental objectives are taken seriously; and God’s grace builds
upon and perfects human nature. But the more important relations are manifested when we investigate the malfunctioning of the scale.

Problems in the equitable distribution of vital goods cannot be met at the level of vital values but only by appropriate and commensurate adjustments at the level of social values: in the formation of capital, in the economic system, in the political persuasions that are effective, and in the intersubjective habits present in the group. But those adjustments are a function of the meanings and values that inform a given way of life, and so of cultural values. Moreover, the adjustment, correction, and development of cultural values depends on the effective presence of persons of integrity; and divine grace is required for consistent personal integrity. Thus, from above, religious values, understood in the sense of the divine grace that elevates us into participation in divine life, condition the emergence of persons of integrity. Such persons condition the possibility of culture performing its role of discovering, expressing, validating, criticizing, correcting, developing, and improving cultural meanings and values. Only cultural values that are commensurate with the required social transformations are sufficient to effect the political, economic, and technological adjustments that, in turn, will render possible a more effective and equitable distribution of vital goods to the entire community.

Such a relatively transcendental analysis – transcendental at least if the levels of value are isomorphic with the levels of consciousness, which I am convinced they are – is purely heuristic, an upper blade to be applied to the data of concrete circumstances. The given situation provides the lower blade, and the core of my argument in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* is that today that situation must be understood in global terms. The maldistribution of vital goods is a global phenomenon that can be met only by massive transformations at the level of social values. Such dramatic political, economic, technological, and habitual
intersubjective changes require a different and globally efficacious set of cultural values if they are to become real. But such values can be devised and implemented only by persons who have appropriated the interiority that itself is what is common to and normative for all human beings. And the gift of God’s grace, which is required for consistent personal integrity, must come to be understood as a universal reality, offered to all, available to all, and calling all to come together in the unfolding of what Bernard Lonergan called ‘the emerging religious consciousness of our time.’

World-cultural consciousness is the mentality that emerges when, at the level of personal values, the appropriation of the universally, crossculturally humanum – attentiveness, inquiry and intelligence, reflection and reasonableness, deliberation and moral responsibility, and awareness of the gift of divine love – are made the source of precisely those cultural values that will see to the transformation of social structures so that the goods of the earth are provided for all. World-cultural consciousness is the mentality equal to this challenge presented by globalization.

World-cultural consciousness in its fullness is a mentality that characterizes not individuals but groups. In its totality it is probably beyond the reach of any but a very select set of individuals, but that is not the point. It is the group that in its collective responsibility – an ideal said by Lonergan to be imperative for meeting the needs of our time – sets the standard for the global rearrangement of social structures so as to level the playing field of justice in human relations. The definition that I presented in Theology and the Dialectics of History is ‘a religiously and soteriologically, morally, intellectually, psychically converted consciousness that is differentiated in the realms of practical common sense, modern scientific theory, scholarship, art, interiority, transcendence, and ecological participation in nature.’ It is spoken of as ‘a regulative and normative ideal that can
be employed as a device to guide the development of a cosmopolitan community of persons across cultures that can effectively articulate an alternative to the post-historic existence emerging from the competing and escalating distortions of the dialectics constitutive of history. It defines a community across cultures and across religions that as a community honors at least nine differentiations of consciousness – realistic common sense in all its forms, art, ecological sensitivity, transcendence, theory, modern science, scholarship, religious giftedness, and interiority – and the four dimensions of conversion that Lonergan and I both call religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic. The ongoing differentiation and ever more refined conversion of human consciousness in community is the effective operator of the cultural and social transformations that the current state of our globalized humanity imposes upon us. The application of the scissors whose upper blade is the scale of values and whose lower blade consists in the data on globalization leads to the requirement before us today of catalyzing the emergence, across cultures and religions, of this world-cultural humanity. Its indispensable condition is the appropriation of interiority that constitutes the third stage of meaning, but its flowering would be the emergence of the fourth stage, a genuinely postmodern emergence of community and collective responsibility.

4 The Divine Missions and World-cultural Consciousness

I said earlier that world-cultural consciousness is another name for the religiously transformed cosmopolitan mentality that can engage in functional specialization, and that working to midwife its emergence is a form of collaboration with the missions of the Holy Spirit and the divine Word. I wish to conclude with a brief elaboration of this point.

12 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History 550.
My theology of the divine missions, based on the work of both Bernard Lonergan and Frederick Crowe,\(^\text{13}\) can be stated succinctly in three points. These will be familiar to those of you who have followed my efforts in the previous colloquia.

First, the triune God is a God whose gift of grace (religious values) is offered to all women and men at every time and place. This offer is the universal gift and mission of the Holy Spirit, the gift of a relation to the Holy Spirit that enables us to love in turn with God’s own love. This gift is offered in a manner that calls for the transformation by persons of integrity (personal values) of cultural meanings and values (cultural values) and the elaboration of social structures and transformed intersubjectivities (social values) that deliver the goods of the earth in an equitable fashion to all (vital values). It is first and foremost the mission of the Holy Spirit that constitutes the universal realm of religious values in the integral scale of values. The first task of theology in this twenty-first century is to work out the discernment of the gift of the Holy Spirit in terms that can locate that gift wherever it is to be found and whether it is recognized and named as such or not.

Second, the Incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus of Nazareth is the revelation of that universal offer of grace and of the demands that come with it. Even Jesus thought for a time that he was sent only to ‘the lost sheep of the house of Israel,’ but he realized that the scope of his mission was larger when a Syro-Phoenician woman convinced him to heal her daughter (Matthew 15.21-28) and Jesus had to say to her, ‘Great is your faith.’ His own self-understanding changed in that encounter. Not only does he acknowledge a form of faith not limited to his own

religious community, but also he no longer thinks he is sent only to the people of Israel. From our perspective centuries later, we may say that the introduction of divine meaning into human history, and especially the introduction of the very divine Word into human history – and this is what revelation is -- is redemptive of that history and of the subjects and communities that are both formed by that history and form its further advance in turn. It is redemptive because it makes a great deal of difference whether you know you are loved or not, and the Incarnation is the revelation of a love that has already and from the beginning been given to us.

Third, the gift of grace to all is an invisible mission of the Spirit, and it is not isolated from an equally invisible mission of the Word. I have emphasized in recent writings how the elaboration of the gift of the Spirit enables us to develop a new reading of the Augustinian-Thomist psychological analogy for understanding the divine processions. As the gift of God’s love comes to constitute the conscious memory in which the human person is present to herself or himself – the summation of one’s life experiences as these constitute one’s self-taste or Befindlichkeit (to borrow a term from Heidegger) as one who is unconditionally loved – it gives rise to a set of judgments of value (a word) that constitute a universalist faith, a faith that gives thanks for the gift, a faith that in fact is the created term of an invisible mission of the divine Word. This is the universalist faith already acknowledged when Jesus says he finds ‘faith’ outside the Jewish tradition that was his own. The centurion in Luke 7.1-20 is another instance. Jesus is led to say of him, ‘Not even in Israel have I found such faith.’

Together, this self-presence in memory and its word of Yes in faith breathe charity, the love of the Givers and a love of all people and of the universe in loving the Givers of the gift. But they breathe charity by establishing a created relation to the
Holy Spirit. Charity is a created participation in the Holy Spirit, our created share in the very love of God. It is the created base of a created relation to the uncreated Father and Son from whom the gift of the Holy Spirit proceeds.

Finally, the church’s mission is to be an explicit prolongation and continuation of the divine missions, visible and invisible, of the Spirit and the Son in the world. And today that means catalyzing into effective existence the personal integrity that will work for the differentiations and conversions required to form a world-cultural community whose mission it is to cooperate with the divine Persons in the emergence and development of the reign of God on earth – the effectiveness of the gift of grace through the realms of personal, cultural, social, and vital values.

Thus the relation between the divine missions, invisible and visible, and globalization is, first, that the universal gift of the Holy Spirit establishes the context of love, faith, and hope that can be and must be shared across religious boundaries to form persons of cosmopolitan integrity to assume responsibility for the global community. That responsibility will manifest itself principally in the transformation of the meanings and values that inform given ways of living. That transformation, as I argued in the second lecture that I gave in this series, ‘Social Grace and the Mission of the Word,’ is a participation at least in the invisible mission of the divine Word and, indeed, at least for Christians, a participation also in the divine Word’s visible mission in the incarnate Son of God. Principal among the transformations that must be effected is the development of a globally effective macroeconomic theory, a theory to which I believe Bernard Lonergan contributes, but one also that must take seriously the provisions suggested by the Pontifical
Council on Justice and Peace in its recent declaration regarding the global financial crisis.\textsuperscript{14} (Our spring colloquium will focus on these issues.)

That reorientation across cultural and religious boundaries of the meanings and values by which societies are structured will in turn effect a transformation of social structures – technological, economic, and political – so as to render far more probable the effective distribution of the goods of the earth to all God’s children.

It might be objected that what I am proposing is more closely related to the mission of the church than it is to the divine missions. And to this objection I would respond that the mission of the church is nothing but an extension into human history, to the end of time and to all corners of the earth, of the visible and invisible missions of the Holy Spirit and of the Word of God. That point could be argued at length, but this is the material for another paper.

\textsuperscript{14} \url{http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/index.htm}: ‘Towards Reforming the International Financial and Monetary Systems in the Context of Global Public Authority.’