Introduction

This paper is part of the work of remote preparation for what I hope will be a more or less organized response from the Lonergan community to the call that Bernard Lonergan issues for explicit Christian participation in interreligious understanding. We do not yet have a universalist language to express the universal gift of God’s love that is given to all participants, a gift that Christian faith identifies with the gift of the Holy Spirit. And so for the present, the best we can do is use the language that our own respective traditions make available to us, purifying it as we do so, ever alert to possible new insights and words. Here I wish to retrieve from Lonergan, in Lonergan’s own language and in the language, both metaphysical and methodical, of his and my tradition some facets of just what the gift is that is offered to all men and women. For Lonergan

---

1 This paper was delivered in somewhat abbreviated form at the 2009 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College. A version of it is scheduled for publication at some point in *Lonergan Workshop*. The present version was edited for this website.

2 See Bernard Lonergan, ‘Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time,’ in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist) at 65-71. The annual colloquia sponsored by the Marquette Lonergan Project have adopted this call as a focus for ongoing discussion. The first colloquium was held in October 2009 and the second in November 2010; the proceedings are available on the website [www.lonerganresource.com](http://www.lonerganresource.com).

3 See Lonergan, ‘Prolegomena …’ 70.
and for me, that language is irretrievably Trinitarian, and good Trinitarian theology will be at the heart of anything that Christians bring to the interreligious table.

I will be speaking of matters that touch on religious self-appropriation, and Lonergan has some wise cautions in this regard that it is well to pay attention to. While his acknowledgment of, for example, the work of William Johnston with Zen practitioners in Japan, as well as his insistence that the first set of special categories is grounded in religious experience, indicate that religious self-appropriation is very important methodologically and theologically, he is also very sensitive to the genuine Catholic hesitation regarding certainty in such matters. I begin, then, with two quotations from question-and-answer sessions that will appropriately relativize this discussion of religious experience.

You have people who ask, What is religious experience? But you wouldn’t be here if you didn’t have it in some form. It can be a concealed vector, a component, an undertow in your life; but it is there. Otherwise, you would find something better to do than to listen to a talk about theology. To identify it psychologically is not easy. However, it is not important either: by their fruits you shall know them.

… Religious self-appropriation: One has to remember that one’s consciousness is a polyphony; it is not just one and the same tune from morning to night that has your undivided attention. On the contrary, there are several things going on at once as in a

4 See ‘Prolegomena…’ 67-68.
6 Bernard Lonergan, quoted from a discussion session at the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology. See www.bernardlonergan.com at 542R0A0E060 (audio) and 542R0DTE060 (text).
symphony. There is a dominant theme, an intermediate theme, and themes that keep recurring, and themes that are only occasional, and things that barely pop up. And religion can be one of the things that barely pops up … The religious self-appropriation is connecting what is there with the way people talk about religion, and the ability to talk about religion and all the different ways in which it needs to be spoken of; and the way people talk about religion can be the big turnoff. Bonhoeffer preferred to talk to people who weren’t religious than to those that were religious, and I’m not sure but that what turned him off from those that were religious wasn’t the fact that they were religious but rather because they were a bit dumb, and talking about it in the most unsatisfactory fashion and using it as an escape or defense mechanism. So being able to connect what is religious in a person’s experience, however occasional, with a language that means something to a person is the fundamental trick in this mediated immediacy. The religious experience is there. God’s grace is there and is working … You can presume it is there … I know a person who was saying he wanted to love God, and his director said, You do, and he didn’t believe it for ten years yet. Making that connection. Again, this knowing is not the important thing; the important thing is loving God whether you know it or not, whether you are in consolation or in desolation; that is the important thing. Religious self-appropriation in the sense of the mediated immediacy, where you know just what religious experience is and is not: that is dessert; it isn’t the meat and potatoes. You can get along fine for years without that, and you need never have any of the dessert in this life. But it helps.7

7 Bernard Lonergan, quoted from a discussion session at the 1975 Lonergan Workshop. See www.bernardlonergan.com at 85400A0E070 (audio) and 85400DTE070 (text).
2 The Issue

Even while he was writing the *Verbum* articles and *Insight*, Lonergan managed to offer extremely fruitful suggestions regarding some of the most hotly disputed theological questions of the day. These include a highly nuanced systematic statement regarding the issues raised in Henri de Lubac’s *Surnaturel* and a hypothetical position on the relation between created and uncreated grace, that is, between sanctifying grace and charity, on the created side, and the divine indwelling. The record of his contributions lies largely, though not exclusively, in Latin class notes and Latin systematic supplements prepared for his courses to Jesuit seminarians in Montreal and Toronto, and partly at least for this reason his contributions are to this day not given the recognition they deserve, despite the fact that some of his work, particularly on the issues raised by de Lubac, has been studied in first-rate scholarly publications, including Michael

8 Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Études historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946). Lonergan addresses the same issues in “De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum,” dated also in 1946; but there is no evidence there that he had yet any knowledge of de Lubac’s work. Perhaps his first explicit mention of de Lubac on the question is in his Latin notes for a course “De gratia et virtutibus,” 1947-48 (on the website www.bernardlonergan.com at 16200DTL040; a translation by Michael Shields has been placed on the site at 16200DTE040).

Stebbins’s *The Divine Initiative*\(^{10}\) and more recently an article by Raymond Moloney in *Theological Studies*.\(^{11}\)

I am concerned here with Lonergan’s work on the relation of created and uncreated grace. It is interesting that the issue was addressed almost simultaneously by Lonergan and Karl Rahner. It is perhaps even more interesting that, while they identified the same problem, their proposed solutions are markedly different.\(^{12}\)

There is an interesting story surrounding Lonergan’s addressing of the issue. At the beginning of his 1947-48 course on sanctifying grace, Lonergan distributed to the students a list of theses that he would be propounding during the course. But when he came to teaching thesis 22, which dealt with the issue of the relation of sanctifying grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, he told the class that he had come to realize that his formulation was wrong but that he had not yet discovered an acceptable alternative. So there was a break in the course until he had figured it out to his satisfaction. He called them back two weeks later. Such was the luxury of teaching in a relatively free-standing seminary!

The formulation that he had come to see was wrong was: “*Through this same finite effect* [that is, created sanctifying grace] there is constituted not only the indwelling of the Holy Spirit but also the vivification of the justified through the same Spirit.” This formulation of the relation between created and uncreated grace contains a difficulty remarkably similar to that which Rahner at almost the same time recognized in the mainline Scholastic tradition. For Rahner, the


mainline Scholastic theology of grace had made created grace the basis of the divine self-communication, whereas the scriptures and the Fathers acknowledge created grace as a consequence of this self-communication. Rahner’s solution applies to the divine self-communication the Scholastic ontology of the beatific vision, so that “God communicates himself to the [person] to whom grace has been shown in the mode of formal [later in the same paper, quasi-formal] causality,” as distinct from efficient causality, which is given short shrift in Rahner’s treatment of the issue. Lonergan, on the other hand, reformulated the problematic thesis 22 as follows: ‘The uncreated gift, as uncreated, is constituted by God alone, and by it God stands to the state of the justified person not only as an efficient principle but also as a constitutive principle; but this constitutive principle is not present in the justified person as an inherent form but is present to the justified person as the term of a relation.’

Moreover, by 1951-52, that is, four years later, Lonergan was quite prepared to speak of distinct relations to the three divine persons, and so of the three divine persons as distinct terms of distinct relations. This is a problem that he had acknowledged in 1947-48 but had passed over in that course, perhaps because he had just reformulated his position and was still working out its consequences, and perhaps because he was concerned not to violate Pius XII’s strictures regarding the question. Pius had warned, ‘All things must be held to be common to the Trinity inasmuch as they relate to God as their supreme efficient cause.’ This statement made many theologians reluctant to speak of distinct relations to the three divine persons in any other way than by appropriation. In 1947-48, Lonergan is on to what will become his response, for he writes, ‘This statement perhaps leaves a certain latitude when God is not considered as an efficient principle but as a constitutive principle.’ But he adds, ‘We shall leave this question to the treatise on the triune God, both on account of its difficulty and also in order not to deal with

13 Rahner, ‘Some Implications …’ 325.
14 Rahner, ‘Some Implications …’ 334, emphasis Rahner’s.
15 Pius XII, Mystici corporis Christi, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 35 (1943) 231.
distinct questions at the same time.’ By 1951-52, Lonergan was quite prepared in the course on grace to speak of distinct relations to the three divine Persons, and proposes a way to do so. Moreover, he writes that arguments to the contrary do no more than prove that grace not as a term but as an effect is related to the essential divine love common to the three persons. So there is a distinction that already was introduced into the 1947-48 revised thesis 22 between divine love considered as an efficient cause and divine love considered constitutively, and that distinction will by 1951-52 lead to an incredibly rich theology of the divine indwelling. That is what I wish to share with you. I am visiting here the 1951-52 notes with the specific intention of presenting Lonergan’s solution to the question of how the divine self-communication, constituted by God alone, allows each of the persons of the Trinity to be present to those to whom the created grace of God’s favor (gratia gratum faciens) has been given, and to be present precisely as distinct terms of created relations. I am also asking how we can preserve this solution in a methodical transposition of these issues.

It is in these 1951-52 notes, moreover, that what has come to be called Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis was perhaps first expressed, the hypothesis in which Lonergan relates four absolutely supernatural created realities respectively to each of the four real divine relations: the grace of union to paternity, sanctifying grace to active spiration, charity to passive spiration, and the light of glory to filiation. The notes offer a far more extensive and richer presentation of this hypothesis than is found in the 1957/1959 Divinarum personarum and, without revision, in the 1964 De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica, texts with which many are more familiar.¹⁶ That hypothesis includes a distinction of sanctifying grace and charity as created participations in and imitations of, respectively, the divine relations of active and passive spiration. It is precisely that

distinction that enables him to speak of distinct relations to each of the divine persons, and it is
that distinction that I wish to emphasize here, as is obvious from my title. So one implication of
my interpretation is that what has come to be called the four-point hypothesis is very important
in the development of Lonergan’s theology of grace.

A particular problem has been raised over my continuing appeal to the four-point
hypothesis, and the problem has to do precisely with the distinction of sanctifying grace and
charity. In effect, the question is being asked whether the distinction survives the transition from
a metaphysical to a methodical theology. As far as the history of Lonergan’s own position on
the issue is concerned, we may say the following. Lonergan made it very clear as early as 1946
that the doctrine of an absolutely supernatural communication of the divine nature can be
maintained whether or not one’s systematic understanding of the doctrine includes a distinction
between sanctifying grace and charity – a distinction that Aquinas makes and that Lonergan
repeats from Aquinas and that Scotus denies. The distinction perdures in his theological
writings in a Scholastic mode, and is very clear in the notes under investigation. However, in the
1974 Lonergan Workshop, in a question-and-answer session, he admits that his later methodical
transposition of the category of sanctifying grace into the expression ‘the dynamic state of being

Doran,’ Theological Studies 68 (2007): 642-60, and my response in the same issue at 674-82,
‘Addressing the Four-point Hypothesis.’ The latter has been uploaded here as Essay 26.
18 Lonergan says in ‘De ente supernaturali,’ ‘… the disputed question whether sanctifying grace
and the habit of charity are really distinct does not affect the substance of our treatment but
only the way in which the matter is presented. It does not affect the substance of the doctrine,
for all Catholic schools of thought admit a created communication of the divine nature; but it
does influence the manner of presentation, inasmuch as different authors arrange the matter
differently in order to expound it in an intelligible way.’
in love with God’ represents an ‘amalgam’ of sanctifying grace and charity. I’m asking whether that methodical transposition can be refined so as to preserve the distinction. And I want to preserve the distinction precisely because it provides us with a hypothetical understanding of how it can be true that we do indeed enjoy distinct created relations to each of the three uncreated divine persons.

The 1951-52 notes are divided into historical, biblical, and systematic considerations. In the present paper I wish to indicate how the seeds of the distinction of sanctifying grace and charity are already implied in the biblical part of the 1951-52 notes. I will be developing implications of what is in Lonergan’s biblical notes, in the retrospective light of the four-point hypothesis, which itself is introduced as such only in the systematic portion. I will be asking whether a systematic understanding of the mystery of the divine indwelling is not enriched by maintaining this distinction. If so, I’ll be proposing that we would do well to find a way of transposing the distinction into the methodical context, and I will be making some suggestions along those lines. Theological categories as worked out in foundations provide models, not descriptions of reality or hypotheses about reality. But when they are taken over into systematics, they receive hypothetical status. Still, no question of dogma or Church doctrine regarding grace is either challenged or strengthened by accepting or rejecting this particular systematic hypothesis. I would like to present an argument for its continuing systematic (and so hypothetical) fruitfulness.

While my review of Lonergan’s notes breaks no new ground but simply revisits ground already well broken but perhaps allowed to lie fallow for too long, I also have some suggestions of my own prompted by this review, suggestions that I think are entirely in keeping with Lonergan’s own thinking but for which I must assume responsibility, for better or for worse. I’m sure you will recognize these when they appear, but let me recall a confession that Fred Crowe makes at the beginning of his groundbreaking essay ‘Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World

19 See below, at footnote 27.
3 The Historical Notes

In the historical notes, Lonergan is concerned with connecting the steps that led to the Lutheran and Reformed positions on justification. He roots these positions, as have many Catholics including Étienne Gilson, in Scotus. For Lonergan that means they are rooted in confrontationalism and conceptualism, and in subsequent nominalist and voluntarist doctrine. His concern in the section seems to be to set up a context that calls for a review of what the scriptures say about justification and salvation, which, he claims, cannot support the Lutheran and Reformed positions. (Whether the far more ecumenical Lonergan of Method in Theology would present the same historical analysis is an open question; there are probably not enough data to answer it.)

4 The Biblical Basis for the Notion of Sanctifying Grace

The synthetic statement of the biblical basis for the notion of habitual or sanctifying grace reads as follows, in translation.21

To those whom God the Father loves [1] as he loves Jesus, his only-begotten Son, (2) he gives the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so that (3) into a new life they may be (4) born again and (5) become living members of Christ; therefore as (6) just, (7) friends of God, (8)


21 The numbers are Lonergan’s, not mine. Lonergan had not entered ‘1,’ so that is entered here in brackets.
adopted children of God, and (9) heirs in hope of eternal life, (10) they enter into a sharing in the divine nature.

Every one of these ten points, Lonergan maintains, has a firm biblical basis. He supports this claim with abundant quotations from the New Testament.

Lonergan’s principal concern in this biblical section, however, is to establish the point that “sanctifying grace” or “habitual grace” is a synthetic category that unites these ten features of biblical doctrine. The category does not appear as such in scripture. When he comes to the systematic portion of the notes, his specific point will be that each of these ten features of biblical doctrine represents a formal effect of sanctifying grace. The issue of formal effects has to do with the question, What true judgments can be made once one knows a formal cause – judgments whose truth is founded in that formal cause?

The specific character of habitual or sanctifying grace will be found in unifying these formal effects. As the soul is to the potencies of the soul and the habits rooted in them and the operations that flow from the habits, so sanctifying grace is to the various features synthesized in the statement of biblical doctrine. The analogy holds up because these features name characteristics of new and transformed operations, or of new and transformed habits or states, and so of new and transformed or elevated faculties or potencies of an elevated soul. The systematic part of the notes will show how this is the case, treating each of the features of the biblical synthesis in terms of the metaphysical category of formal effects.

The points in the biblical synthesis that are most relevant to my present concerns are the first two, and so I will concentrate exclusively on those: To those whom God the Father loves [1] as he loves Jesus, his only-begotten Son, (2) he gives the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit. Even with respect to these two points I will not be able to cover all the details in Lonergan’s notes.
4.1 The Father Loves Us As He Loves the Son

The key texts read: ‘… I in them and you in me, that they may be perfectly one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me’ (John 17.23); ‘… that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them’ (John 17.26).

In commenting on these texts, Lonergan presents a distinction between essential and notional divine love, and a corresponding distinction between divine efficient causality and the entire question of immanent constitution. These distinctions are crucial to his entire position on these issues. The created gift by which God draws us into participation in the divine life, that is, the created grace by which it is true that the Holy Spirit is given to us and dwells in us, is to be conceived as effected by essential divine love, by the love that is common to the three divine persons. But it is also to be conceived as immanently constituted in terms of the notional acts proper to each of the divine persons. The term “notional” refers to the personal properties of the divine persons, precisely as that by which we know each of them as distinct from the others. In the present instance, the one love common to all three divine persons is exercised in a distinct manner by each of the divine persons. That distinct manner is a function of that person’s ‘notional act.’

The ‘notional acts’ are a function of the relations of opposition that are the divine persons. Essential divine love, not finding us good in the special way that a theology of grace is seeking, makes us good by this gift. Thus the gift is called ‘gratia gratum faciens,’ the grace that makes us pleasing to God. That grace, as caused by God, is the result or effect of the love common to the three divine persons, but at the same time it establishes in us distinct relations to each of the divine persons and a distinct participation in the divine life of each of

22 ‘These divine attributes are called “notional,” not as if they were conceptual beings, but because they cause the divine persons to be known as distinct from one another.’ Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 413.
them, in keeping with the distinct fashion in which each of them exercises the divine creative love. Thus the Holy Spirit is proceeding love, *Amor procedens* (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c. and ad 4m), and the Father and the Son love themselves and each other and us (*notionaliter diligere*) by the Holy Spirit, that is, by proceeding Love (q. 37, a. 2 c. ad fin. and ad 2m). Therein is contained the distinction of active (*notionaliter diligere*) and passive (*Amor procedens*) spiration. Sanctifying grace is *effected, caused* by the essential divine love common to the three persons, but it establishes in us distinct relations to each person, because the gift is immanently constituted in terms of the distinct divine relations and is to be understood as a created imitation of and participation in those relations.

The issue has to do with what can be said of God contingently in the order of sanctifying grace. What can be said of God contingently will be said in terms of transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace: judgments that can truly be said of God, but judgments whose truth requires the created consequent condition called sanctifying grace.

These transcendent formal effects are of two kinds. For sanctifying grace can be considered as an effect of divine love, since it is out of love that God produces grace in a person, and it can also be considered as a term of divine love (for God loves the person made pleasing). The transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace as an effect of divine love regard essential divine love. All three persons are equally one effective principle of every creature whatsoever. And so this effective divine love is predicated equally of all three persons. And love that is predicated equally of all three is essential love. But the transcendent formal effects of sanctifying grace as term are related to notional divine love, that is, to the distinct manner in which each person is subject of the one divine loving consciousness. This assertion is proposed as probable with an intrinsic probability; for what scripture and the Fathers say about the various relations of the divine Persons to the just seems to postulate that grace, while an effect of essential divine love, also be immanently constituted as a term of notional divine love.

So for our present purposes, it is sufficient to say that Lonergan uses the first of the biblical elements, ‘God the Father loves us as he loves his only-begotten Son Jesus,’ to introduce
the distinction between the essential divine love common to the three divine persons and the specific manner in which each of the divine persons is subject of that love. Anything further about the dynamics of that specific manner is dependent on the way in which Lonergan elucidates the next point, namely, that the Father gifts those whom he loves in this special way with the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.

So to summarize Lonergan’s commentary on the first point, we may say the following. The love that the first of the biblical elements affirms is the love proper to the Father, that is, it is the Father’s proper way of exercising divine love: ‘God the Father loves us,’ with an active loving that corresponds to Aquinas’s ‘notionaliter diligere’ and to the Father’s role in active spiration. That loving is similar to the Father’s love for his only-begotten Son become incarnate, Jesus of Nazareth. This means that as the Father in his love communicates to the eternal Word the divine nature that the Word manifests in becoming incarnate, so the Father communicates to us some participation in that same divine nature. Sanctifying grace will be that created communication of the divine nature, in the language of the first thesis in ‘De ente supernaturali.’ In commenting on what is affirmed in the first element in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine, Lonergan introduces the distinction of essential and notional divine love. When he comes to talk about sanctifying grace, it will be essential divine love that effects sanctifying grace, but that grace itself, as a created communication of the divine nature, will ground a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit, and this in turn will establish the possibility of distinct relations to the other two divine persons. This is the next point in the biblical synthesis.

4.2 The Gift of the Holy Spirit

How can a divine person be given? Lonergan quotes Aquinas:

The word ‘gift’ conveys the idea of being givable. Something given has a relation both to the donor and to the recipient. The donor would not give unless a gift were his to give; and it is given to the recipient for it to belong to her. A divine person is said to belong to someone
either because of origin, as the Son is the Son of the Father, or because the
divine person is possessed by someone. Now, ‘to possess’ means to have something at one’s
disposal to use or enjoy as one wishes, and a divine person can be possessed in this sense
only by a rational creature joined to God. Other creatures can be acted upon by a divine
person, but not in such a way that they have it in their power to enjoy the divine person or to
use his effect. In some cases the rational creature, however, does reach that state, wherein
she becomes a sharer in the divine Word and in the proceeding Love, so that she has at her
disposal a power to know God and to love God rightly. Only a rational creature, then, has
the capacity to possess a divine person. She cannot, however, come to this by her own
resources; it must be given to her from above; for we say that something is given to us that
we have from someone else. This is the way that to be ‘given’ and to be ‘Gift’ are terms
applicable to a divine person. (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1, emphasis added.)

The fundamental divine gift is the gift of the Holy Spirit, because ‘Gift’ is a personal name
proper to the Holy Spirit. As Aquinas writes, ‘… what we give first to anyone is the love with
which we love him. Clearly, then, love has the quality of being our first gift; through love we
give all other gratuitous gifts. Since, then …, the Holy Spirit comes forth as Love, the Spirit
proceeds as the first Gift.’ If the other persons are given or give themselves, it will somehow be a
function of the gift of the Holy Spirit.

4.2.1 Gift and Mission

This gift is also a mission of the Holy Spirit. Again, the scriptural quotations are explained by
quoting Aquinas: ‘A divine person is said to be sent if that person exists in a new way in
someone, and is said to be given if that person is possessed by someone. And neither of these
occurs except in accord with (“secundum”) the grace that makes one pleasing to God’ (Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 3). And ‘… the very notion of mission means that the
one who is sent either begins to be where previously he or she had not been, as happens in
creaturely affairs, or begins to be where the one who is sent had previously been, but now in a new way, as is the case when mission is attributed to divine persons. Thus, two things must be considered in the one to whom the mission happens: indwelling by grace and something new brought through grace. There is, then, an invisible mission to all in whom these two features are found’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 6, emphasis added).

How are these two ‘things’ related to one another? That is the key question.

4.2.2 Created and Uncreated Grace

The relation between these ‘two things’ that ‘must be considered’ has been a matter of dispute. We have already seen how Lonergan and Rahner identified the same problem in the mainline Scholastic tradition at roughly the same time, but arrived at different alternatives. As Lonergan drew upon the intricacies of contingent predication about God to explain his revised thesis in 1947-48, so four years later he appeals to the same rules of predication to explain the second element in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine. Thus, the Holy Spirit is given to us insofar as the Spirit is had by us, and this posits a change, not in the Holy Spirit or in God but in us. For whatever is predicated contingently of God is true through extrinsic denomination, and requires a created consequent condition if the predication itself is to be true. In our present instance, the change in us is denoted by the term gratia gratum faciens, and it is understood in terms of something being given to us, created in us, that renders us pleasing to God in a special, supernatural way, in a way that makes us participants in Trinitarian life. The statement that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit could not be true, were it not for this change in us. For anything predicated contingently of God, while constituted by the divine perfection, demands, if it is truly predicated, that there be a created consequent condition of the truth of the statement that makes the predication. In this case, the created consequent condition of the truth of the statement that affirms the gift and mission of the Holy Spirit is gratia gratum faciens. And gratia gratum faciens makes us pleasing to God in this special way precisely because – and here again
we see the difference between Lonergan and Rahner on the issue – it is the created base of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit as term of the created relation. The Holy Spirit is given to us precisely as the uncreated term of a created relation grounded in a created gift, a gift that elevates the central form of the person to participation in divine life through this created relation to an uncreated divine Person.

Now a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit might appropriately be conceived to share in some way in the uncreated relation to the Holy Spirit that is Father and Son, that is, in paternity and filiation breathing the Spirit, in active spiration. And so gratia gratum faciens, as grounding such a relation, can with some theological fittingness be thought of as some kind of created participation in and imitation of active spiration, the eternal relation of the Father and the Son together to the Holy Spirit. Here we see the reasoning behind the statement in the four-point hypothesis that sanctifying grace is a created participation in and imitation of active spiration; it is so precisely because it grounds a created relation to the Holy Spirit. What makes us pleasing to God, then, in this special way that we call grace is that we have been given a share in the relation to the Holy Spirit that in God is called active spiration, the Father and the Son ‘breathing’ the Holy Spirit, where the Son is precisely Verbum spirans Amorem, a Judgment of Value that breathes eternal Love. That change in us, which may fittingly be conceived as involving a created supernatural judgment of value or set of judgments of value, is simultaneously the created base of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit, a relation that makes it possible for us to say truly that the Holy Spirit is sent to us by the Father and the Son and dwells in us as the other term, the uncreated term, of that created relation. It is this created base of a created relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit that is the habitual grace that unifies or integrates the various elements contained in Lonergan’s 10-point statement of biblical doctrine on grace. This created subject of a relation is an elevation of ‘central form,’ and the ten elements in the biblical doctrine represent elevations of operations, habits, states, and potencies to the supernatural order.

Moreover, active spiration is the ‘notional love’ of the Father and the Son from which the Holy Spirit proceeds, and so sanctifying grace, as a share in that ‘notional love’ entailing a
created supernatural judgment of value or set of judgments of value, sets up a relation that is precisely a relation of active loving. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit, to whom we are related anew and in this special way, is a Proceeding Love in God that is an uncreated relation to the Father and the Son, a passive spiration that in its proper character is nothing but Love, the mutual Love of Father and Son. And so if the Holy Spirit abides in us, is present to us as the uncreated term of a created supernatural relation, it is appropriate to say that there takes place in us some further created change that is the base of a created relation to the Father and the Son. Our created share in active spiration obviously does not spirate the Holy Spirit, but if it is a share in active spiration, it must spirate something. It spirates charity. The further created change is charity. Charity is our created participation in the Holy Spirit, a change in us that proceeds from sanctifying grace in a manner that is analogous to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son and that grounds a created relation to the uncreated Father and Son.

This created change called charity proceeds from the unification that is gratia gratum faciens and that includes a set of created supernatural judgments of value, in a manner analogous to the way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, where the Son is Verbum spirans Amorem, the Judgment of Value that spirates Proceeding Love. So gratia gratum faciens includes a set of judgments of value that, like the eternal Son of the Father, are verbum spirans amorem, where in this case the proceeding amor is the charity that grounds a relation of love to the Father and the Son. I would suggest that we might want to explore the possibility that this set of judgments of value constitutes the universalist ‘faith’ that the later Lonergan distinguishes from the beliefs of particular religious traditions. Sanctifying grace, then, will stand to charity in the created supernatural order as active spiration stands to passive spiration in the uncreated immanent Trinitarian life, and all three persons are present to us precisely as the uncreated terms of distinct but intimately connected created relations of love.

23 2011: More recently, I have also suggested that it is a participation in the invisible mission of the Word.
They are all our beloved, and the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by and identical with love.

4.2.3 The Analogy of Grace

I have suggested in previous writings the possibility of developing a Trinitarian analogy in the order of grace, and reflection on what we have just seen provides me with a sharper formulation than I have been able to come up with previously. The analogy in the order of grace begins with the gift of God’s love, retrospectively interpreted as a gift of being on the receiving end of a love that is without qualification and that has about it something that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe. I suggest that that retrospective interpretation might be linked to Augustine’s memoria, which was the starting point of the first great psychological analogy. The various modalities that such experience can take are as varied as the individual lives of men and women gifted with this love. This experience is the conscious manifestation of ‘gratia gratum faciens,’ of the grace that makes one pleasing to God in the special way that elevates one into participation in the divine life. It is the gift of God’s love precisely as both received and as retrospectively acknowledged as a fundamental undertow in one’s life and development.

This initial step, though, is composed of two elements: the gift itself recollected and acknowledged in memoria and the inner word of a judgment of value that proceeds from memoria and acknowledges the goodness of the gift. These together are the conscious manifestation of a created participation in active spiration, in divine notionaliter diligere, in the

loving of the Father and the Son for each other from which divine Amor procedens, passive spiration, the Holy Spirit, originates.

The gift and its confirming word, as a created participation in active spiration, ground a created relation to the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the innermost being of the person thus gifted, precisely as the uncreated term of this created relation. But the confirming word that is an element in this created participation in active spiration is a verbum spirans amorem, a word that breathes love, just as the uncreated reality of active spiration includes the eternal Verbum spirans Amorem, from whom and the Father who utters this Word there proceeds the mutual Love that is the Holy Spirit. The created love that issues from the gift and its word is the disposition of charity, the antecedent universal willingness that is a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit. The relation between the love acknowledged in memoria and its word, on the one hand, and charity on the other is analogous to the relation between active and passive spiration in God. Moreover, the disposition of charity grounds a reverse created relation of love to the Father and the Son as its uncreated term. Thus it may be said that the three divine persons dwell in us and among us, are present to us, precisely as the uncreated terms of two created supernatural relations: supernatural, because their subjects are created participations in divine life, namely, sanctifying grace (gift and word, notionaliter diligere) and charity (amor procedens). Sanctifying grace and charity, thus conceived, are the special basic relations that ground the derivation of special categories in theology.

That is the basic analogy that I want to appropriate and develop. Many further elements stand in need of clarification, including the relation of this analogy to the later analogy suggested by Lonergan, the distinction of faith and beliefs found in Method in Theology, the universalist faith that Lonergan proposes in the same book, distinguishing it from the beliefs proper to different religious communities and traditions, even from beliefs that themselves come from divine revelation, and Lonergan’s reversal of the adage Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, Nothing is loved unless it has first been known. I am not prepared as yet to address any of these issues except the first.
4.2.4 Lonergan’s Later Trinitarian Analogy

Lonergan has given us a very succinct presentation of the analogy that he suggests in his later work. It appears in ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections.’

The psychological analogy … has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is identified with agapē (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.  

As Lonergan remarks in a question-and-answer session in the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, the only difference between this proposed analogy and the one that he develops in his Trinitarian systematics has to do with the first element in the analogy. ‘My systematics on the Trinity is in terms of Ipsum Intelligere, and then the word and proceeding love. You can now start off from Agapē. 1 John 4.4-9 and 4.20: God is love, where God is ho theos. Ho theos in the New Testament is God the Father, unless there is contradictory evidence, and there’s no contradictory evidence in 1 John. So it is the Father that is Agapē, and the Agapē is being in love, Absolute Being in Love; and the Logos is the Eternal Judgment of Value; and the Spirit is the Gift; and the person gives his loving, the act of loving; the Spirit is proceeding love from the Judgment of Value. A minor change: the structure remains the same, but we shift from orthodoxy to orthopraxy.’

I would submit that the difference between the analogy that I am proposing here and Lonergan’s later analogy is also a difference that affects only the first element in the analogy. As Lonergan went from Ipsum Intelligere to Agapē as the dynamic state of being in love, so I am suggesting a shift from the dynamic state of being in love, which for me in the supernatural order is charity and not sanctifying grace, to a principle of love understood precisely as lovableness recollected in something like Augustine’s memoria.

This proposed shift is not without precedent in Lonergan’s work. In his 1951-1952 class notes on sanctifying grace, Lonergan lists participation in active spiration as one of the primary immanent formal effects of sanctifying grace. Primary immanent formal effects include anything that can truly be said of a subject because of what is intrinsically constitutive of that subject. For example, if one has a human central form, it is truly said of that person that he or she is a human being. What is intrinsically constitutive of the recipient of sanctifying grace is that, because this

26 This quotation is taken from the third question-and-answer session at the 1974 Boston College Lonergan Workshop. The recording of this session appears as 81200A0E070 on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, with a corresponding transcription at 81200DTE070.
grace founds a created relation to the Holy Spirit, it can fittingly be conceived to be a created participation in active spiration. But, Lonergan goes on to say, since uncreated active spiration is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it is also the principle of proceeding divine Love itself. And the principle of proceeding love is lovableness. Love proceeds in God because the Father and the Son acknowledge each other as lovable. And so active spiration is God as lovable. Therefore, because sanctifying grace imitates active spiration, it imitates God insofar as God is lovable, and so it makes the one who possesses it lovable with a special divine love, prompting in us the judgment of value ‘This is very good,’ ‘It is very good to be loved in this way,’ which becomes a verbum spirans amorem, a word that grounds the created procession of charity.

Perhaps, as I have already suggested, it may be said as well that we are rejoining Augustine at this point, for whom ‘memoria,’ understood precisely as the condition under which the mind is present to itself, functions as the analogue for the divine Father.27 The condition under which the mind is present to itself, of course, can be lovableness or it can be just the opposite, and ultimately it is self-presence that has known ‘gratia gratum faciens’ that is ‘memoria’ as the mind present to itself in a manner that can function as the supernatural analogue for the divine Father. Augustine’s ‘memoria’ thus understood, we might say, is at least roughly similar to Heidegger’s ‘Befindlichkeit,’ when the latter is graced in the same way. As

27 This interpretation would seem to be consistent with the view offered by Edmund Hill, who writes in his introduction to his translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate, ‘… what he means in this context by self-memory, memoria sui, is the mind’s sheer presence to itself, which is basically given in the very fact of its being mind; rather as you might say that the Father is the basically divine person, since he is just God, whereas the Son is God from God.’ Again, in book 14 Augustine rephrases his image as ‘remembering, understanding, and willing God, rather than remembering, understanding, and willing self.’ See Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991) 52 and 54. I am grateful to Gilles Mongeau for pointing me to Hill’s interpretation.
‘memoria’ and ‘mens’ are equiprimordial for Augustine’s understanding of self-consciousness, and as ‘Befindlichkeit’ and ‘Verstehen’ are equiprimordial ways of being ‘Dasein’ for Heidegger, so perhaps lovableness recollected in memoria and intelligere as dicere, where what are uttered are supernatural judgments of value, are equiprimordial constituents of the originating element in a psychological analogue for the Trinity in the order of grace. All of this is marked, notice, by a massive ‘perhaps.’ Systematic theology is irretrievably hypothetical.

5 The Basic Systematic Position

The systematic statement first ‘locates’ sanctifying grace metaphysically (with Aquinas) as an accident in the genus of quality, reduced to the species of a habit that is radicated in the essence of the soul. That, of course, was in the thirteenth century an entirely new category creatively forged from philosophical materials familiar at the time, in a manner at least somewhat similar to the way in which ‘homoousion’ was reconceived for explicitly theological purposes centuries earlier. But it will be in terms of the formal effects of this gift that the truly systematic question will be answered, How can sanctifying grace unify the various elements mentioned in the synthetic statement of biblical doctrine?

As we have seen, the issue of formal effects has to do with the question, What true judgments can be made once one knows a formal cause – judgments whose truth is founded in that formal cause? So each of the elements mentioned in the biblical synthesis is understood as a formal effect of sanctifying grace, where ‘formal effect’ has precisely this meaning taken from the conditions of true judgment and predication. In this case, then, the formal intelligibility is the entitative habit known as sanctifying grace, and the true judgments that can be made once one posits that intelligibility have to do both with the person gifted with sanctifying grace and with the God who gives the gift. We have considered two of these formal effects: The Father loves us as he loves his Son Jesus, and the Father gifts us with the gift of the Holy Spirit. Certain true judgments can be made about the person gifted and about God, and these true judgments will be
found to affirm one or other of the elements contained in the biblical synthesis. The judgments about God concern what is truly said of God both as the one efficient cause of sanctifying grace and as the triune term of the relations that are established as a result of the gift of *gratia gratum faciens*. In the systematic portion of his notes, Lonergan outlines the way in which the notion of formal effects provides a systematic explanation of each of the ten features of the biblical synthesis. I do not have the time to go into these elements here. I will, however, make a few further comments on these issues.

I have already called attention to the way in which Lonergan speaks of a special kind of lovableness as one of the primary formal effects of the gift of sanctifying grace. This brings to mind what my previous attempts to address these issues have emphasized as a central theme, namely, God’s love for us and our being on the receiving end of divine love. That reception grounds a created relation to the Holy Spirit, which releases in us the love for Father and Son in return, the charity that grounds a created relation to the Father and the Son and a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from their Loving precisely as their mutual Love for each other. In terms of the issue of the first set of special theological categories, which *Method in Theology* says is a set grounded in religious experience, I have already suggested in this paper and elsewhere that the relation between sanctifying grace and charity as a relation between being loved unconditionally in a special way and loving in return in a manner that is without qualification or reservation, with these understood as participations respectively in active and passive spiration, would constitute the *special basic relations* in a methodical systematic theology.

Special basic relations are for some reason not mentioned in the following central methodological passage in *Method in Theology*: ‘… general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian

witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states.' The passage invites us, almost begs us, to ask, What about special basic relations? I wish to suggest that the special basic relations might be the created participations in the divine relations of active and passive spiration, through being on the receiving end of God’s love in \textit{gratia gratum faciens} and loving God in return in charity.

Now, in a question-and-answer session at the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, Lonergan explicitly stated that his expression ‘the dynamic state of being in love’ is an ‘amalgam’ of what in a metaphysical theology were called sanctifying grace and charity. I have always suspected that that is the case, and I have always had a problem with it, and it was interesting for me to find him saying this. I want to backtrack a bit so as to avoid that amalgam, or rather to differentiate it in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness in a manner analogous to Aquinas’s metaphysical differentiation between sanctifying grace and charity. If I’m offering anything of my own in this paper, it would be this suggestion; but even here I feel I’m doing nothing more than interpreting and expanding on what is already found in Lonergan’s notes.

I suggested these relations in a somewhat less technical manner in my 1993 article ‘Consciousness and Grace,’ but the response to that article focused so exclusively on the further suggestion of a fifth level of consciousness that some of the major points of the article were missed in the subsequent discussion. Those major points, which I am only retrieving now, are, I think, supported by the notes that I have just summarized.


30 This comment occurs in the last of the question-and-answer sessions in the 1974 Workshop. The recording of this session appears as 81500A0E070 on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, with a corresponding transcription at 81500DTE070

6 The Question of the Fifth Level of Consciousness

Obviously, these notes say nothing about levels of consciousness, let alone a fifth level. The history of the responses to the suggestion of a fifth level that I took from Lonergan and tried to develop has been very accurately summarized by Jeremy Blackwood in a paper that he first wrote for a course at Marquette University and then shortened for presentation at the West Coast Methods Institute at Loyola Marymount University this past April. The paper is entitled ‘Sanctifying Grace, Elevation, and the Fifth Level of Consciousness: Further Developments within Lonergan Scholarship.’ It is a major contribution to an ongoing conversation among some of Lonergan’s students. I will conclude the present contribution by summarizing Blackwood’s paper, which I regard as the most complete treatment to date of this issue and by suggesting several other possible connections. Page numbers in Blackwood’s WCMI paper are given in parentheses.

Blackwood indicates that Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer’s article in _Theological Studies_ in 2007, ‘Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology,’ correctly suggests that sanctifying grace should be understood in a methodical theology as an intrinsic qualification of the unity of consciousness. The moment I saw Jacobs-Vandegeer’s statement to this effect, I knew it was correct. However, Blackwood also points out that ‘further development of his position is required on two points: the precise meaning of “elevation” needs clarification, and recently-noticed material in the Lonergan archives suggests that the notion of a fifth level needs re-evaluation’ (1). The first point is further articulated in two sub-points: ‘First, just what occurs in this elevation of central form and consequent enlargement of horizon is not fully explained, and a deeper appropriation of Jacobs-Vandegeer’s solution requires a fuller articulation of the meaning of “elevation.”’ Second, elevation of central form pertains to all the levels of consciousness [a point I also made in “Consciousness and Grace” but that escaped subsequent discussion], and a significant element in the discussion has been the possible relevance of a fifth level. If the whole subject is elevated in virtue of the elevation of central form, a fuller grasp of the number of levels
in consciousness is required’ (2-3), or (and here I’m speaking in my own voice), if you don’t want to talk about levels and numbers of levels, then we might say that a fuller grasp of the full range of sublating and sublated operations and states is required. The basic four levels of intentional consciousness are not enough, and to say that they are is to place on our consciousness a similar kind of straightjacket that for at least some of us was experienced when we tried to bunch our experience of existential decision-making into the confines of chapter 18 of *Insight*. While that chapter remains a valid account of one mode of making decisions, a mode that St Ignatius Loyola formulated in his third ‘time of election,’ this is not the only mode, and other accounts are required. So too with elements of consciousness that lie beyond the levels of intentional consciousness, on either end.

Blackwood finds an indication of an elevation of cognitional levels of consciousness in Lonergan’s papers ‘The Natural Desire to See God’ and ‘Openness and Religious Experience,’ while the Latin ‘Analysis Fidei’ offers a detailed account of such elevation. In ‘The Natural Desire to See God,’ Lonergan points to philosophy, theology, and the beatific vision as three successive ways in which the human intellect knows the intelligible unity of the existing world order. Blackwood relates these successive ways, respectively, to the three Scholastic epistemological principles of the light of intellect (philosophy), the light of faith (theology), and the light of glory (the beatific vision). The movement from the lower to the higher involves an elevation of knowing, and so ‘it is to knowing, and specifically to the horizons of knowing constituted by the light of intellect, the light of faith, and the light of glory, that we ought to attend in order to begin to grasp Lonergan’s notion of elevation in consciousness’ (3). ‘… whether or not a given object is supernatural to a particular knower is not determined by the object itself, but by the light by which that object is attained’ (5). Elevation pertains to judgment, as is emphasized especially in ‘Analysis Fidei,’ but it can be extended beyond judgment. It is the addition of absolutely supernatural formal objects of judgment, but that definition too ‘can be extended to other levels of consciousness, such that at each of the levels of intentional consciousness, an elevated subject has two formal objects – the natural/proportionate and the
supernatural/ disproportionate’ (5-6). In explicit belief, the elevation of central form and the consequent horizon known as the light of faith elevate judgment by allowing the subject to know what one could not know without the elevation of central form and the light of faith. Likewise, on the level of decision, the elevation of central form and the consequent horizon of evaluation allow the subject to evaluate with God’s own values (9), which I am assuming are quintessentially expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. We could speak as well of the elevation of understanding, perhaps most dramatically expressed in mystical insight, at times ineffable, into the meaning of the divine mysteries, but also manifest in much genuine theological understanding at a more pedestrian level. We can speak of the elevation of the level of experience itself, most dramatically expressed in intense physiological participation in divine love, but also abundantly illustrated in less intense fashion in what some theologies have called the spiritual senses. The relation of the natural and supernatural objects of any level is one of obediential potency. And the conscious experience of elevation at each level is related to ‘an act, the content of which is not fully accounted for by the act itself’ (6).

Blackwood then goes on to indicate how records of question-and-answer sessions from Lonergan Workshops, records that had not been appealed to in previous discussion, confirm that Lonergan did maintain a fifth level, but that it is not exclusively connected with the supernatural but with love in its various forms, including the unrestricted being-in-love that he identifies with sanctifying grace. This extension is what I missed, let me add, in my appeal to a fifth level in ‘Consciousness and Grace.’ The distinguishing characteristic of the fifth level is the interpersonal character of so-called fifth-level experience, the concern with the ‘other’ who is the object, with the beloved whose presence in the lover is constituted precisely by love itself. Fifth-level experience is the conscious relation between the conscious subject in love and the other with whom the subject is in love. One thinks readily of Lonergan’s discussion in *The Triune God: Systematics* of the presence of the beloved in the lover, a presence that is constituted by
love. In Blackwood’s words, ‘… the fifth level is constituted insofar as the subject operating is also operated on; it is a union of object and intending operation’ (8). Lonergan’s own notes for one of his responses reads, ‘love is subjectivity linked to others.’ Lonergan explicitly relates the fifth level of love and the fourth level of deliberation in a manner parallel to the relation between other higher and lower levels, a relation of sublation. Moreover, the sensitive psyche is related to the levels of intentional consciousness through vertical finality, which is reaching toward being in love. ‘… the unconscious desire [a phrase that needs some work] to being in love underlies the first through fourth levels, and it reaches beyond and through the horizontal finalities of those levels as a vertical finality fulfilled in the fifth level’ (9). Aside from the expression ‘‘unconscious desire,’ which is found in Lonergan, not in Blackwood, and which reflects his own tendency at times not to distinguish between the unconscious and the unobjectified, this is a position that I think is supported by ‘Mission and the Spirit’ and ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.’ Lonergan explicitly subdivides the fifth level into domestic, civil, and religious loves, and characterizes it as ‘the level of [total] self-transcendence, self-forgetting, the level at which the subject is no longer thinking of him- or herself’ (10). Thus, in ‘Philosophy and the


34 Bernard Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ in A Third Collection 169-83. Here the relevant material speaks of the ‘tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these’ in love. ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ 175.
Religious Phenomenon,’35 we find that ‘beyond the moral operator that promotes us from judgments of fact to judgments of value … there is a further realm of interpersonal relations and total commitment,’ which in a 1980 question-and-answer session he speaks of as ‘the sublation of deliberation by self-forgetting love’ (10).36


36 Subsequently, I have found distinct confirmation in one of the question-and-answer sessions from the 1975 Lonergan Workshop:

‘Question: Recently you have spoken of a fifth level of human intentional consciousness, whereby a plurality of self-transcending individuals achieve a higher integration in a community of love. Please expand on this.’

‘Lonergan: There is very little to expand on this. Everyone knows what it means. (Emphasis added.) Getting there is another thing. But the constitution of the subject is a matter of self-transcendence. You are unconscious when you are in a coma or a deep sleep, a dreamless sleep. When you start to dream, consciousness emerges, but it is fragmentary; it is symbolic. You wake up, and you are in the real world. But if you are merely gaping and understanding nothing, you are not very far in. And so you have another level of asking questions and coming to understand. There is the understanding that people can have from myth and magic and so on, but arriving at the truth is a further step of being reasonable, liberating oneself from astrology, alchemy, legend, and so on and so forth. And responsible. And this is all a matter of immanent development of the subject. But even before you’re born you are not all by yourself, and all during your life. Robinson Crusoe is a real abstraction. And if he really is all alone, his history does not go beyond himself. There is living with others and being with others. The whole development of humanity is in terms of common
Blackwood thus characterizes fifth-level operation as constituted by the self-forgetting of love, ‘the self-possessed handing over of one’s central form to the determination of another’ in love. He speaks of a fifth-level question in terms of ‘What would you have me do?’ And the fifth-level object is persons as persons, as subjects. As elevated, the fifth level gains the absolutely supernatural personal object of the three divine persons of the Trinity. The advance meaning. Not just my meaning, attention to my experience, development of my understanding, and so on. Common meaning is the fruit of a common field of experience, and if you are not in that common field of experience you get out of touch. There’s common understanding, and if you have not got that common understanding, well, you are a stranger, or worse a foreigner, you have a different style of common sense, and so on. Common judgments, what one man thinks is true another man this is false, well, they are not going to be able to do very much about anything, insofar as those judgments are relevant to what they do. Common values, common projects, and you can have a common enterprise, and if you don’t [have common values], you will be working at cross-purposes. The highest form of this is love as opposed to hate. It is a hard saying, “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, love them that persecute you,” and so on. There are all kinds of things in the New Testament expanding on this.’ The links with René Girard are obvious: ‘… the real human subject can only come out of the rule of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and the “interindividual.” Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure.’ Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) 199, emphasis in the text. Girard’s response: ‘That is quite right.’
made by Jacobs-Vandegeer is not negated by this return to fifth-level talk, since the fifth level is the elevation of central form itself in complete self-transcendence to God.\textsuperscript{37}

I find Blackwood’s discussion convincing. I also find it relevant to John Dadosky’s proposal at the 2008 Lonergan Workshop regarding a fourth stage of meaning – a stage that, as I understand Dadosky, has to do with the communal discernment that would lead to the collective responsibility of a community of persons in love.\textsuperscript{38} Let me add that we might also correlate such a discussion with Lonergan’s treatment of beauty as a transcendental, as found for example in his response to several questions at the 1971 Dublin Institute on Method. Beauty is a transcendental, he says, but in a different way from the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good, in that it is not the objective of a specific transcendental notion but rather ‘evokes a response from the whole person.’ Perhaps in this way we might link the emphases of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics to the still unfolding Lonerganian analysis of the unity and levels of consciousness, and we might include the vertical finality of the passionateness of being or tidal movement that begins before consciousness, permeates each level, and comes to its fulfillment in love: an emphasis that I have explicitly linked to the notions of psychic conversion, of the series of dramatic-aesthetic operators that precede, accompany, and reach beyond intentional consciousness as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, and to the role of those operators in partly constituting the normative source of meaning in history. Perhaps that fulfillment in love is also intimately related to our response to the transcendental ‘beauty,’ a response that satisfies not a particular transcendental notion but the entire person, central form. Perhaps, then, Balthasar’s theological aesthetics are articulating the elevation of that response of the total person to the transcendental ‘beauty’ under the gift of God’s divine love orienting us to

\textsuperscript{37} Needless to say, many issues of distorted or deviated transcendence to the other will need to be sorted out in future discussions of this level of consciousness. Again, the relevance of Girard to this discussion is clear.

the glory of God, precisely as the inner word entailed in this response has been articulated and confirmed in or perhaps awakened by the outer revelatory deeds and words that, while articulating a universal reality, are as articulated (again perhaps) peculiar to Israel and Christianity.

But that is a subject for another and probably far longer paper or papers or book or series of books.