Essays in Systematic Theology 3: ‘Complacency and Concern’ and a Basic Thesis on Grace

In two recent articles in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, I have tried to express a basic thesis on sanctifying grace by transposing some of the material from Lonergan’s first thesis in ‘De ente supernaturali’ into categories that are derived more directly or proximately from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness than are the metaphysical categories employed by Lonergan in that thesis. Subsequently I have discovered that Frederick E. Crowe’s articles on ‘Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas’ are pertinent to these attempts, and in the present article I wish to rely on these articles to state my thesis.

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1 This paper was first published in *Lonergan Workshop* 13 (1997) 57-78. New notes are added here.


4 Note that this is not to set up an opposition between the metaphysical categories and those that I have been suggesting. The metaphysics remains necessary, but it must be critically grounded.

5 Frederick E. Crowe, ‘Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,’ *Theological Studies* 20 (1959) 1-39, 198-230, 343-95. 2009: These have been reprinted in *Three Thomist Studies*, ed. Michael Vertin (Boston College, 2000). References here will be to the latter edition.
1 The Question

At the end of chapter 18 of *Insight*, Bernard Lonergan reaches a point in his analysis ‘from below’ of human understanding and of what we understand, where a disjunction is posed: either there is more in the universe of proportionate being, whose immanent intelligibility is an emergent probability, than the intelligibilities grasped in the physical, chemical, botanical, zoological, psychological sciences and in the cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of a book like *Insight*, or human beings are condemned to ‘an incapacity for sustained development.’ 6 There is a basic tension rooted in the duality of human consciousness, a tension that, without proper maintenance as what I have called an integral dialectic of limitation and transcendence, 7 divides and disorientates cognitional activity by the conflict of positions and counterpositions. This conflict issues into contrary views of the good, which in turn make good will appear misdirected, and misdirected will appear good. There follows the confounding of the social situation with the social surd, to provide misleading inspiration for further insights, deceptive evidence for further judgments, and illusory causes to fascinate unwary wills. 8

The problem, which I have argued is one of distorted personal, cultural, and social dialectics in reciprocal correlation with a distortion of the entire scale of values, 9 is, says Lonergan, radical, permanent, independent of underlying manifolds, rooted in personal rather than social distortion, real, and not to be resolved by discovering a correct

8 Lonergan, *Insight* 653.
9 Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, chapter 4 and passim.
philosophy, ethics, or human science or by setting up a benevolent despotism to enforce such a philosophy, ethics, or human science.\textsuperscript{10} Its only solution is ‘a still higher integration of human living’ than anything discussed to that point in the book, an integration that works through our intelligence, reasonableness, freedom, and psychic and intersubjective spontaneities but that is not a product of our own insights, judgments, and decisions. ‘... only a higher integration leaves underlying manifolds with their autonomy yet succeeds in introducing a higher systematization into their nonsystematic coincidences. And only a still higher integration than any that so far has been considered can deal with the dialectical manifold immanent in human subjects and the human situation.’\textsuperscript{11}

This higher integration would entail ‘a further manifestation of finality, of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of generalized emergent probability.’\textsuperscript{12} It would be not simply a higher viewpoint in the mind but a higher integration in being, an integration that, among other things, makes possible a higher viewpoint in the mind.\textsuperscript{13}

The series of higher integrations studied up to this point in \textit{Insight} was restricted to ‘proportionate being,’ that is, to being that, in \textit{Insight}’s terms, does not lie ‘beyond the limits of human experience,’ to whatever is to be known not only by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation but also by human experience.\textsuperscript{14} This restriction is now lifted, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 653-55.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid. 655.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid. 655-56.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid. 656.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 416.
\end{itemize}
the question is raised of our knowledge of transcendent being and of our ‘ulterior finality.’

The source of the necessary higher integration lies in what Christian theology calls grace. *Insight*’s chapter 20 studies grace primarily as healing, as *gratia sanans*, and also primarily as habitual, as introducing into human intellectual and volitional activity the supernatural conjugate forms or habits that are the theological virtues of charity, hope, and faith, and into psychic activity the psychic correspondences to these virtues at the level of image, symbol, feeling, and intersubjective spontaneity; these psychic correspondences are the primary field of a ‘mystery’ that abides in human living despite all advances in human knowledge. But at the very end of chapter 20 the possibility is

15 Ibid. 656. It should perhaps be noted that ‘proportionate being’ has reference to the ‘proportion of nature’ that is so important to Lonergan in establishing his notion of the supernatural in the second thesis of *De ente supernaturali*, and is perhaps better designated in such terms than in terms of what exceeds or lies beyond human experience. While God is not a datum within this universe and while operations that attain to God *uti in se est* are absolutely beyond the proportion of any finite nature and so are simply or absolutely supernatural, such operations do occur, and they are conscious; that is, there is such a thing as religious *experience*, but [2009: if authentic] it is a function of grace and so does not lie within the proportion of nature. Our effort here is to attempt a delineation of one basic feature of such experience. Transcendent reality *does* in some way enter into our experience, and the important point, the issue that in fact is before us at present, is to delineate something of how this occurs. Our point is that God enters our experience through *created grace*, that is, through the external terms of the divine relations constitutive of trinitarian life. Our effort here is to formulate something of what the external terms are that constitute our religious experience.
raised of ‘something more’ than a grace that heals, something whose reality is explicitly affirmed in a *theology* of grace, something that, in fact, Lonergan makes the very starting point of a systematics of grace that would proceed, according to the *ordo doctrinae*, ‘from above downwards.’ In ‘De ente supernaturali’ that something more is called a communication of the divine nature itself, and in *De Deo trino* a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. Habitual grace is here radically *gratia elevans*, it is at its roots distinct from the habits or virtues of charity, hope, and faith, and the source of its power to heal, of its character as *sanans* as well as *elevans*, lies in the fact that it is the created communication to us of a participation in the very life of the triune God.

In ‘De ente supernaturali’ Lonergan explicitly leaves unanswered the question of what the created communication of the divine nature is. It is, of course, materially identical with sanctifying or habitual grace, and yet it is formally distinct from sanctifying grace in that it is sanctifying grace not as such but insofar as this grace is a remote and proportionate principle of *operations* on our part in which we attain to God *uti in se est*, namely, the operations of charity. The proximate principle of these operations is the habit of charity itself, but the remote principle is the ‘something more’ affirmed at the end of chapter 20 of *Insight*, the absolutely supernatural base whose ‘sole ground and measure is

the divine nature itself,’ the base that makes us ‘children of God, sharers in the divine nature, justified, friends of God, and so forth.’ Beyond this we are warned not to venture: ‘Do not try to have a positive intrinsic understanding of the created communication of the divine nature. This communication belongs to the realm of faith and the mysteries of faith. The first and most important thing to look for is the absence of a contradiction; then, insofar as you are able, you may seek that imperfect understanding’ in accord with Vatican I’s direction (DB1796, DS 3016: ‘... ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum, quae naturaliter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo’).

While our own attempts to understand this mystery must heed such a caution, we also note that Lonergan’s own practice indicates that he did not mean by this caution that we are to cease from all further attempts to understand this communication of the divine life. We begin, then, by referring, as we did in ‘Revisiting “Consciousness and Grace,”’ to Lonergan’s own suggestion in De Deo trino that this created communication of the divine nature, materially identical with sanctifying grace, is a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, and we add to this suggestion the observation that, as active spiration is really distinct, by mutually opposed relations of origin, from the passive spiration or proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit,

17 Lonergan, Insight 747.
18 Lonergan, ‘De ente supernaturali’ in thesis 1. 2009: I have discovered a quite comprehensive synthetic statement of the biblical basis of the doctrine of sanctifying grace in Lonergan’s notes for a course on grace taught in 1951-52. See www.bernardlonergan.com at 20500DTE040, in the section ‘Positiva SScr doctrina.’
19 Ibid. end of thesis 2.
so the created communication of the divine nature that is sanctifying grace will be really distinct, again by mutually opposed relations of origin, from the habit of charity that is the created participation of passive spiration or of the Holy Spirit. Sanctifying grace, according to Lonergan’s pregnant formulation, has a special relation to the Holy Spirit, because it is the created external term participating in and imitating\(^{20}\) the very divine relation of which the Holy Spirit is the uncreated internal term. That divine relation, the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word, is really identical with paternity and filiation, and only conceptually distinct from them; and so, in keeping with his four-point hypothesis, Lonergan will refer to those gifted with this external term as ‘children of adoption’ (\textit{filios adoptionis}). Charity has a special relation to the Father and the Word, because it is the created external term participating in and imitating\(^{21}\) the relation of passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit proceeding from Father and Word.

Our question once again, as in ‘Consciousness and Grace’ and ‘Revisiting “Consciousness and Grace,”’ is, Can we point to anything in consciousness itself that would be indicative of these distinct realities, these really distinct \textit{entia supernaturalia}, these mutually opposed relations of origin not in the divine life itself but in that participation in the divine life that lies in the created external terms of the divine relations? This time we can put our question as follows: \textit{Are there mutually opposed relations of origin at the level of religious love in human consciousness?} If the answer is yes, then we have what we need to proceed. The question is essentially the same question we have asked in the two previous articles, and our answer simply builds on what we have said there and perhaps refines the argument a bit. The concern with which I began this investigation remains, namely, that a category seems to have been lost in Lonergan’s own transposition of these issues from metaphysics to interiority (or, perhaps better, in his

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\(^{20}\) 2009: ‘participating in and imitating’ replace the earlier ‘of.’

\(^{21}\) 2009: ‘participating in and imitating’ replace the earlier ‘of.’
grounding of the metaphysics in religious interiority). ‘Being in love’ is too compact a manner of speaking of two created external terms of two uncreated divine relations, at least if one wishes to speak of supernatural explanatory conjugates. My concern is to restore the lost category (the created external term participating in and imitating active spiration), but to do so in the language not of metaphysics (which, of course, remains essential) but of the grounding religious interiority.

This time we will rely on, and eventually transpose into our own context, some of the material from a series of very important articles that appeared in Theological Studies

22 2009: the same comment as in the previous two notes.

23 The relevance of the question for the number of levels of consciousness was probably made too central an issue in ‘Consciousness and Grace,’ and this may have detracted from the primary concern, which had to do with restoring the lost category. Lonergan clearly affirmed more levels of consciousness than the four levels of intentional consciousness that are the centerpiece of his work. If Philosophy of God, and Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973) 38 is for some not satisfactory evidence of this, ‘Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon’ (in volume 17 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan) clinches it. The question of the actual number of levels is secondary (and, I submit, still to be answered). How we are to talk about these additional levels – and there are at least two of them, one at the base (as it were) and one at the top – is now the central issue, and as my efforts to speak of psychic conversion were intended, as Lonergan recognized, to be a contribution to an understanding of the ‘lower,’ symbolic operator, so the present articles on grace are inviting reflection on our understanding of an ‘upper’ operator, when that operator is the gift of God’s love. 2009 note: See in addition the paper of Christian Jacobs-Vandegeer, ‘Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology,’ Theological Studies 68 (2007) 52-76, for needed precision working toward a solution to the question.
nearly forty years ago, articles written by my colleague and friend Frederick E. Crowe, and entitled ‘Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas.’ Our first concern will be to understand what Crowe is saying on several points essential to our question, and our second concern will be to bring what he is saying on these points forward into the context of our present question.24 The material that we will investigate is contained in the first article and in the section of the second article entitled ‘Complacency in God.’

2 Frederick Crowe on Complacency and Concern

Conveniently enough, Crowe begins his second article with a summary of the first and with several comments anticipating the rest of his argument. His thesis is that ‘there are two distinct attitudes of willing or loving, which may be called complacency and concern.’25 Thomas provides, however unthematically or incompletely, a basic ‘structure of willing sufficiently broad and firm to account for both,’ and that ‘fundamental framework’ is one of a duplex via: ‘the passive process of receiving and the active process of causation.’26 More fully:

Love as complacency is a term in the via receptionis, coming at the end of process; it is found in this form in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire. Love as tendency is at the beginning of the via motionis; it is most evident in appetite, desire, the pursuit of

24 I would like to thank Fr Crowe for reading an earlier version of this paper. He gave me several very useful suggestions, told me that I had not misrepresented his position in his articles, and made it very clear that as for the rest I am on my own!

25 Crowe, Three Thomist Studies 113.

26 Ibid.
beatitude, but perhaps is to be discovered also in an analogous and higher form in the
agapē which desires to give and communicate the self or what the self has.27

Crowe contends that Aquinas ‘never really integrated these two modes of love with one
another, or brought them together in sharp confrontation, or employed them as a scheme
in the systematic articulation of his world.’28 But Crowe himself attempts some of the
necessary integration, and we will attempt to subsume elements of Crowe’s integration
into the context of our question, as this context is already informed by Lonergan’s
suggestion of an analogy between active and passive spiration in the Trinity, on the one
hand, and sanctifying grace and the habit of charity (their respective external terms), on
the other hand. Our question, so informed, is, What in consciousness is the relationship
between sanctifying grace and charity, between our created participation in active
spiration and our created participation in passive spiration? Can we provide terms and
relations from intentional and non-intentional consciousness as categories to express an
understanding of the actual higher integration in being that is absolutely supernatural
because its sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself? As the Holy Spirit is the
uncreated internal term of an active spiration that is really identical with paternity and
filiation, so sanctifying grace is the created external term participating in and imitating the
same active spiration; that is to say, sanctifying grace is the created participation in
divine life that is the consequent condition that the gift of the same Holy Spirit, the Spirit
of adoption, be given to us, that the same proceeding Love be poured forth into (or in) our
hearts. But as the uncreated internal term of active spiration is the notionally proceeding
and passively spirated Love of God, so the created external term of active spiration,
sanctifying grace as a participation of this divine relation, releases the capacity, given

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 2009: ‘participating in and imitating’ replace the earlier ‘of.’
with the gift, for acts of love whereby God is attained \textit{uti in se est}. That capacity is the habit of charity grounding the regular performance of such supernatural acts. Note the structural parallel between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, on the one hand, and active and passive spiration, on the other. As sanctifying grace is a consequent condition of our participation in the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son (an active spiration that \textit{is} the paternity and filiation that are Father and Son as one principle of the Spirit), that is, as sanctifying grace is a consequent condition of our being given the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit of adoption, since as a created participation in the divine nature it proportions us to the reception of this gift, so charity is a consequent condition of our participation in the passively spirated loving that \textit{is} the Holy Spirit, a participation manifest in operations of charity whereby God is loved \textit{uti in se est}.

Such is our schema. Our effort is to understand it in terms of consciousness, and for help in articulating it in a manner that builds on our previous articulations we turn to Crowe’s articles.

2.1 The Duplex Via

Crowe begins by indicating basic agreement with a minority view among Thomists that ‘the idea of love as a completion and lulling ... of the will has not disappeared in the later works of St Thomas, nor indeed has that of formation. Desire is tendency and movement, but love, like delight, implies presence already of the good and hence a state of rest ... in the later works of St Thomas, as in the earlier, there is the \textit{quietatio} which expresses the psychological repose of the will and there is something like an ontological formation of a potency.’\textsuperscript{30} In fact, Crowe goes on to say, there are two distinct but complementary roles to love: ‘... in one role love is passive, quiescent, complacent; in the other it is active,

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 75.
striving, tending to an object.’ The latter role is the one most regularly spoken of by Aquinas, but it is the former that is ‘basic both psychologically and ontologically.’

Crowe uses the terms ‘complacency’ and ‘concern’ to refer, respectively, to the first and second role. 

Agapē and eros are derivative from an ‘ontologically and psychologically passive’ complacency, as ‘consequent active forms’ that may or may not, depending on one’s terminology, be listed as instances of concern. ‘Complacency,’ then, is for Crowe a general term that ‘indicates that will, before being the faculty of appetite, of process to a term, is the faculty of affective consent, of acceptance of what is good, of concord with the universe of being, and that the basic act of will is to be understood only if it is regarded not as an impulse to a term, or even the principle of process to a term qua principle, but simply as itself a term.’

‘... willing basically is the end of a process, a quiescence; only secondarily is it the initiation of another process.’

The key to understanding this lies in a couplet: there is a via receptionis, and there is a via motionis. ‘There is a double direction in psychological process: in one direction will is at the end of the process and receives from intellect, but in the other will is at the beginning and moves the other potencies to their activity.’ Crowe offers the following statement from De veritate (q. 14, a. 5, ad 5m) as ‘the best’ articulation he has found in Aquinas of the distinction. ‘Will and intellect have a mutual priority over one another, but not in the same way. Intellect’s priority over will is in receiving (in via receptionis), for if anything is to move the will it must first be received into intellect ... But in moving or acting (in movendo sive agendo) will has priority, because every action or movement

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 76.
33 Ibid. 76-77.
34 Ibid. 77.
35 Ibid. 81-82.
comes from the intention of the good; and hence it is that the will, whose proper object is the good precisely as good, is said to move all the lower powers.’ The *via receptionis*, Crowe says, has ‘a close connection in idea’ with the *via a rebus ad animam*, and the *via motionis* with the *via ab anima ad res*.36 The whole scheme ‘enters deeply into [Thomist] cognitional theory’,37 as it affects intellectual activity as such, but it can be found too in discussions of will. The difference between the cognitional and the volitional discussions, one that makes for considerable difficulty, is that ‘intellect precedes will in one way but follows it in another, so that its two functions are separated psychologically by the intervention of an act of will ..., whereas will is a hinge point and its diverse functions [do not] appear so clearly to consciousness.’38 The same difficulty appears in the case of the particular question that concerns us here: what is the relation in consciousness between sanctifying grace and charity?

For Crowe’s study – and our transposition later will have to come back to this – the fundamental point is ‘the priority of intellect over will and the corresponding dependence of will on intellect.’39 This is what is meant and is summarized by the principle, ‘The basic act of will is a term rather than a principle, and “simply term.”’ ‘... it is not a compound act in which an inchoate willing as principle produces another willing as term to provide a parallel with intellect where understanding produces the word. Still less is it a matter of will’s producing its own first act, lifting itself by its bootstraps.’40

36 Ibid. 83.
37 Ibid. 84.
38 Ibid. 84-85.
39 Ibid. 86.
40 Ibid.
Two Thomist doctrines in particular are appealed to, in order to argue the point: the procession of the Holy Spirit and the fundamental passivity of will.

2.2 The Procession of the Holy Spirit

On the procession of the Holy Spirit, Crowe relies on Lonergan’s studies of *verbum* to argue (quite correctly, I believe) that for Thomas the analogy in the creature is ‘not any procession from the will or any procession from something in the will, but the procession of love in the will from the intellect … the procession of love is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from the inner word as the word is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from understanding. And as the word is a term, so the act of love is a term.’

2.3 The Passivity of Will

On the passivity of will, Crowe argues (again correctly) that for Aquinas ‘will is first passive before it can be active in the sense of being an efficient cause.’ All of its self-determination supposes that it has already been actuated. It is actuated with regard to the end, and moves itself to will the means, thus actuating its own potency. But the actual willing of the end is not from will itself but from an external object *quoad specificationem* and an external mover *quoad exercitium*. So too, *gratia operans* (whether habitual or actual) is ‘an effect “in which our spirit (*mens*) is moved but does not move [anything]”’ whereas *gratia cooperans* is an effect ‘in which our spirit both moves and is moved.’

41 Ibid. 87-88.
42 Ibid. 88.
43 Ibid. 89.
44 Ibid.
via receptionis, where willing is a term, and its efficient causality belongs to the via motionis, where will is a principle. The judgment on the good as end, itself a word proceeding from understanding, specifies the act of willing the end, which is a passive act in which the will is moved, not moving. Under the influence of this same act in the via motionis, the intellect takes counsel searching out means to the end, and this counsel is followed by the choice of some means, an act in which the will is moved and moving.45

2.4 The Basic Act

In an important step, the argument is then extended by Crowe so that the first act of will is separated from any idea of an end to be sought. In the latter schema, this act is first passive and then active, but there is required, says Crowe, ‘a passive act ... that is simply the end of a process, a coming to rest, an act that is more accurately named complacency in the good than willing an end, ... an affective response

45 While the issue is secondary for our present concerns, it should probably be added here that there is a subsequent freedom with regard to the end itself, that is, a freedom that is subsequent to the will’s being moved by God with respect to the end. See George P. Klubertanz, ‘The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas’s Later Works,’ Gregorianum 42 (1961) 701-24. I used Klubertanz’s interpretation in my M.A. thesis, ‘The Development of Saint Thomas’s Theory of Freedom’ (Saint Louis University, 1964), in which I argued for this subsequent freedom with regard to the end itself in interpreting Thomas’s position in De malo and the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae. It is possible that Lonergan does not sufficiently emphasize this in his presentation of Aquinas’s doctrine of freedom, and again it is possible that this subsequent freedom is better disengaged in Lonergan’s later presentation of the notion of value than in his earlier writings on the issue; but I raise these two distinct questions only as questions.
to the good that is, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of the good that is not.\textsuperscript{46} Only under this aspect does love provide the analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. ‘... the Third Person is a term bringing the divine processions to a close and is certainly not a Love for an object good-to-be-made, to-be-done, to-be-attained, or to-be in any way that involves a not-yet.’\textsuperscript{47} This passive act is complacency in the good (\textit{complacentia boni}).

2.5 Complacentia Boni

In Aquinas, \textit{complacentia boni} is an ‘aspect of charity’ and of the general form of human love.\textsuperscript{48} It is a \textit{quies} preliminary to charity’s movement or love’s movement as \textit{intentio boni},\textsuperscript{49} and both it and the subsequent movement are explained by analogy with physical motion.

Every moving agent attracts or repels the body moved. In attraction three stages are distinguishable: the agent first gives an inclination or aptitude for being moved; secondly, it gives motion (if the body be not already at the term of motion); thirdly, it gives rest in the term. When the idea is transferred analogously to the field of sensitive appetite [and Crowe reminds us that the point is asserted by Aquinas to hold for rational love as well], the agent becomes the good which gives ‘inclination,’ or ‘aptitude,’ or ‘connaturality’ towards the good, and this response of the subject

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\textsuperscript{46} Crowe, \textit{Three Thomist Studies} 90-91.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. 91.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. 96.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
pertains to love. Then the agent gives motion towards acquisition of the good (desire), and last of all it gives rest in the good acquired (delight, joy). The preliminary *quies* is here called an inclination or aptitude for being moved, a connaturality toward the good, and in q. 25, a. 2, a proportion to the end. The proportion itself is love, and the love is defined as complacency in the good. It precedes desire and joy, the second and third steps in the process. In q. 26, a. 1, the same *quies* or *complacentia boni* is called a *coaptatio* of appetite to the good, and in q. 29, a. 1, a *consonantia*. And in several texts it is spoken of in terms of formal causality: it is *informatio quaedam ipsius appetitus* (*De spe*, a. 3 c.), and its object ‘causes love by adapting and “conforming” appetite to itself’ (*Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 30, a. 2 c.). The desirable itself changes appetite *ut ei appetibile complaceat* (ibid. q. 26, a. 2, ad 3m). The change brings about ‘a relationship, a harmony, an agreement, a resonance, a similarity, a concord,’ terms that ‘seem just as well suited to the notion of love as a term as to the notion of love as a principle of tendency.’ Aquinas’s proliferation of words, says Crowe, shows him ‘struggling to express ... an idea that has not yet acquired its own technical name,’ and corresponds to the ‘linguistic lacuna’ he pointed out for speaking of the names of the Holy Spirit. ‘We have a word ... to express the relation of knowledge to its object, scil. *intelligere* ...; we have also words to express the process of intellectual conception, scil. *dicere* and *verbum*; hence we can use *intelligere* for divine essential knowledge, and *dicere* and *verbum* to add the relations which distinguish Father and Son. But we have no parallel wealth in talking of the will; *amor* expresses a relation to the object (love of this or that); but there are no special words for the process by which love originates and for its relation to its principle; and so we must use the same word, *amor*,

50 Ibid. 98-99. The relevant text in Aquinas is *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 26, a. 4.
52 Ibid.
for both essential love and proceeding Love.’\textsuperscript{53} Crowe contends, reasonably enough I believe, that the lack of a suitable terminology in one case and the other is the same lack: ‘... the question of the nature of love in itself is solidary with that on its origin as an \textit{emanatio intelligibilis} from the word of intellect, and that is the aspect in view when St. Thomas says we have no special word for proceeding Love in the Trinity.’\textsuperscript{54}

\subsection*{2.6 Conclusion of General Argument}

To this discussion of the general form of love, Crowe adds in his first article treatments of (a) the general form of \textit{velle} and (b) beatitude, to conclude as follows:

The framework of the \textit{duplex via} shows how we may integrate a passive, merely affective attitude of the will with its consequent, active pursuit of the good. The questions dealing directly with complacency, by the very fact that they make it the principle of all movement as well as by other evidence they provide, show that complacency itself is not a movement but a simple change of will. The general rational psychology of St. Thomas puts at the beginning of all volitional activity a passive act that seems at least to share some of the characteristics of complacency. The doctrine on beatitude is in perfect accord, for it asserts a state of will in the imperfect beatitude of earth which is akin to the heavenly state, and the latter is certainly not one of tending to a goal but rather one of quiescence in a term attained.\textsuperscript{55}

To quote again the basic conclusion of Crowe’s first article, love as complacency ‘is found in this form [that is, as a term in the \textit{via receptionis}, coming at the end of

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. 112.
process] in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire.\textsuperscript{56}.

The first of these instances is discussed in more detail in a section of the second article. The section is called ‘Complacency in God.’\textsuperscript{57}

2.7 Complacency in God

Complacency in God, of course, affects both divine essential love, common to all three Persons, and the notional Love that proceeds as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Regarding divine essential love, various proofs for will in God are summarized, and it is noted that ‘the love which is analogous to love in God comes with the possession of the good at the term of process and is posited in God by negating the process.’\textsuperscript{58}

As for divine notional Love, ‘... many characteristics of the love of complacency are predicated of the Holy Spirit, though not under the name of complacency.’ The first of these is that ‘the Third Person is conceived as proceeding from the Verbum and the Dicens, from the Word and the One uttering the Word. That is to say, it is not as tendency that this Love is primarily conceived, but as proceeding, as term, as bringing process to a close.’\textsuperscript{59} Secondly, the Holy Spirit is said to be analogous to \textit{quaedam impressio \textellipsis rei amatae in affectu amantis}, the impression that what is loved makes on the affection of the lover (\textit{Summa theologiae}, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.). But the loved object is \textit{present} in the lover by complacency, which is the ‘reception of the good into the affective

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 113.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. 135-40.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. 138.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. 138.
faculty,’ so that the divinity of the Holy Spirit is ‘the presence of God in divine proceeding Love.’ Again, the Holy Spirit is *aliquid manens in amante* (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 2m), so that ‘the divine processions reach an internal term in the Love which is the Holy Spirit.’ Finally, Crowe reviews the use of the notion of love as *tendere* in what Aquinas writes of the Holy Spirit, but only to suggest that it can be discarded: ‘Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of *complacentia boni*. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive.’

### 3 A Transposition

It would be tempting for us to make a simple identification of sanctifying grace with one form of *complacentia boni* and of charity with the resulting *intentio boni*, and to have done with the matter. While our position will approximate this double identification, the texts of Aquinas and Crowe do not allow it precisely as just stated. For both aspects of love (*complacentia boni* and *intentio boni*), when the love is supernatural, are aspects of charity, and charity in the Thomist system is radicated in the will, whereas sanctifying grace is radicated in the essence of the soul. ‘Charity as a general virtue governing all others is a motive force, an efficient cause; as such it must precede what it governs, whether this be a judgment or some other act coming under charity’s universal sway. But charity, like every other act of will, follows a judgment, in this case a judgment of faith;

60 Ibid. 139.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. 140.
and under this aspect it seems to correspond more to a contemplative, affective function and to the *via receptionis*.

On the other hand, if Aquinas himself never adequately integrated these two approaches, perhaps room is left to others to try to do so. A central question in such an effort, perhaps the central question, would be, What is it that renders the conscious human subject somehow proportionate to God, in the sense in which Aquinas speaks of ‘proportion to the end’ as correlative with the *quies* that is *coaptatio* or *consonantia*? More precisely, can we point to something in consciousness itself, something that affects the whole of consciousness and not just the fourth level that in an intentionality analysis includes primarily the activities that a faculty psychology ascribed to will? Can we link this ‘something’ to the basic repose, the *quies*, that Crowe is talking about? I think we can, and my arguments are an attempt to establish this point.

We begin by noting two points. First, Crowe in these articles, the early Lonergan, and Thomas are all working from an understanding of the basic relationship of knowing to willing and to loving that conceives that relationship ‘from below upwards’; but the Lonergan of *Method in Theology* and later writings proposes a basic relationship between loving and knowing that proceeds ‘from above downwards.’ Second, in a very late paper and in some comments made in the Boston College Lonergan Workshops in the 1970s, Lonergan proposes as well an analogy for the trinitarian processions and relations that proceeds ‘from above downwards.’ Our efforts will pick up on each of these later

64 Ibid. 86.

65 ‘The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.
developments, in order to effect a certain transposition of the emphases highlighted by Crowe.

First, then, we need not quote in detail the point made by Lonergan at several points in *Method in Theology*, namely, that there are exceptions to the Latin tag *Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*, Nothing is loved unless it is first known. In that case, however, Crowe’s ‘fundamental point,’ namely, ‘the priority of intellect over will and the corresponding dependence of will on intellect,’ is not without exceptions. And so we

‘Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named *ho Theos*, who is identified with *agapē* (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its *verbum spirans amorem*, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

‘There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.’ Bernard Lonergan, ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ *A Third Collection* 93-94.

66 Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies* 86.
must ask the question, What happens to his principle that the basic act of will is a term rather than a principle, and ‘simply term,’ ‘not a compound act in which an inchoate willing as principle produces another willing as term to provide a parallel with intellect where understanding produces the word’ nor ‘a matter of will’s producing its own first act.’\textsuperscript{67} Does the principle still hold if the basic act of ‘will’ in some instances does not proceed from human intellect uttering a word, a judgment of value, on the basis of a grasp of sufficient evidence for such a judgment to be uttered? Does the principle still hold when the movement between love and knowledge in human consciousness goes the other way round, when love precedes knowledge, as seems to be the case for Lonergan in religious experience?

I believe that the principle still obtains. In the matter that we are considering it obtains in the following way. Sanctifying grace, as created external term participating in and imitating\textsuperscript{68} the divine relation of active spiration, is simply term, but \textit{it proceeds not from any human word but from the divine Word eternally generated by the Father}. There is in human consciousness some awareness of this terminal state precisely as gift, as something that does not correspond to or result from anything we have ourselves understood or judged or decided, something that in no way depends on any human \textit{verbum interius}, but still something that is not experienced as irrational or absurd or random or arbitrary, and so that can be said to proceed from the Word of an intelligent Speaker. I have suggested several ways of speaking of this awareness once we have reflected on it – being loved, assurance, and so on – all of which are meant to objectify a \textit{quies}, a being proportioned, a being attuned, a consonance, that in itself is simply experienced; theologically, the objectification will speak of being on the receiving end of an actively spirating Love and Judgment of Value, and so of being \textit{given} the Holy Spirit.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} 2009: ‘participating in and imitating’ replaces the earlier ‘of.’
If there is a created external term participating in and imitating\textsuperscript{69} active spiration, an external term that is a consequent condition of the gift of God’s love to us, an external term that proportions us to the reception of that gift, what would correspond in consciousness to that created external term? What would be its conscious representation, assuming that it has one (and surely there is no a priori reason to assume that it does not)? I continue to maintain that the answer to this question will speak of some kind of reception of love, some kind of awareness that can then, in subsequent theological reflection, be objectified as being on the receiving end of the actively spirating Love and Word that are the divine foundation of the universe that is created through the eternal Word. Christian language will speak of this created awareness in terms of receiving the Holy Spirit, just as the internal term of active spiration is the very uncreated Person of the Holy Spirit. The awareness of which I speak is, as awareness, not limited to Christians, even though I would be prepared to defend the Christian language about it as being as clear as any we can expect, and more articulate and doctrinally more accurate than any other of which I am aware.

Is this the same as what Crowe means by \textit{complacentia boni}? In a sense, yes, but not entirely. \textit{Complacentia boni}, it seems to me, has in fact two meanings in his articles. The primary meaning is simply as term; and the secondary meaning is as a term that quickly becomes principle. The reception of God’s love of which I am speaking is, I believe, the primary instance of \textit{complacentia boni} in its primary meaning. But in the other meaning, as term that quickly becomes principle of other acts, it corresponds more to charity, as Crowe points out.

But then, are Crowe’s strictures regarding Thomas’s other language regarding the Holy Spirit entirely justified? Should we simply discard what St Thomas says about love as \textit{tendere} in what he writes of the Holy Spirit? I think not. Here is what Crowe says:

\textsuperscript{69} 2009: the same qualifications obtain as earlier.
Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of **complacentia boni**. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive. Nor is there any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency. St. Thomas felt obliged to assign a Scholastic sense to the word ‘Spirit’ and did so in terms of tendency, but we can drop that attempt today and so avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse **ad aliquid faciendum**. Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of movement. The twofold **habitudo**, to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object, still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (**generatio**) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains. There seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain.\(^{70}\)

I suggest, rather, that as there are mutually opposed relations of origin between **complacentia boni** and **intentio boni**, so there are mutually opposed relations of origin between active spiration and passive spiration. The love that proceeds in the Trinity is a loving. It is spirated, and so at the term of divine procession, but nonetheless it is a distinct relation from the spiration from which it proceeds; it is a relation to the Father and the Son from whom it proceeds, as charity is the created external term that is our participation of that relation, a created external term that, Lonergan says, has a special relation to the Father and the Son, a relation in the mode of a **tendere**, an intending of good that orients us to **aliquid faciendum**, that is, to the spread of the reign of this God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Let us conclude, then, with another statement of a transposition of part of Lonergan’s first thesis in ‘De ente supernaturali,’ a statement that builds upon our earlier

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\(^{70}\) Ibid. 140.
attempts in the two articles mentioned in note 1 but that adds to these attempts something of what we have learned from Crowe.

The gift of God’s love poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace (the Holy Spirit) that effects in us, as a consequent condition of its reception and as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of a dimension of consciousness that is distinct from the intentional levels discussed by Lonergan in his intentionality analysis. At this distinct and nonintentional dimension – nonintentional because, while it has a content, it has no apprehended object – we experience what can, upon reflection, be objectified as an inchoate and abiding satisfaction of our intentional longings for intelligibility, truth, and goodness, and of the psychic correspondences of these longings. This inchoate and abiding rest (quies, assurance, consonance, attunement, etc., etc.) from intentional striving, a secure base that sustains and carries us in our intentional operations, can be further objectified, with the help of the revelation manifest in Christ Jesus, as a resting in divine love, a being loved, a being gifted with God’s love. This resting in God’s love can be understood in a Christian theology as a created participation of the active spiration of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Word. It invites and empowers us to love, and the love to which we are invited and empowered is a created participation of the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit. The initial and grounding nonintentional ‘complacency’ can be theologically objectified as the conscious reflection of our share in the inner trinitarian life of God. The dynamic state of being in love that it releases, with our assent and cooperation, which themselves are enabled by the gift itself, is what the Scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, which is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained uti in se est. But the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations – what Scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature – involves as part of its constitutive formation a distinct dimension of consciousness: the nonintentional experience that can be objectified in Christian terms as a resting in God’s
unqualified love. This experience, as a dimension of the created external term of active spiration, entails a real relation of origin to the indwelling God who, as Father and Word, is principle or subject of the relation; it is a created participation of the active spiration that gives, breathes, the Holy Spirit; and the charity that it releases is a created participation of that Spirit that is proceeding Love, and as such, is a special relation to the Father and Word from whom it proceeds. The dicere and verbum from which the created communication of divine life proceeds are not a human dicere and verbum but the divine Dicere and Verbum that are Father and Son. The created participations of active and passive spiration are constituted by the indwelling God as consequent conditions of the indwelling itself.

4 Conclusion: A Clarification and a Question

Two further words are required at this point. The first is a clarification of a point I made in the earlier articles concerning the relation of sanctifying grace to St Ignatius Loyola’s consolation without a cause. I owe this clarification to correspondence with Tad Dunne. Strictly speaking, Ignatius’s consolation without a cause is actual grace as gratia operans, and what I am talking about is sanctifying grace as gratia operans. But sanctifying grace as gratia operans can be spoken of by analogy with Ignatius’s consolation without a cause in this sense: while it is habitual (‘Remain in my love’) and not transitory nor specifically related to particular circumstances in our lives, it has a content, but it has no apprehended object; it is received without being caused by anything that we have understood, affirmed, or decided; it flows, as does actual grace, from divine, not human, Dicere and Verbum. The revelation of God in Christ Jesus is what enables us to name it

71 2009: Might this be the conscious correlative of ‘gratia gratum faciens?’ And might that correlation be the key to the entire issue?
and to attempt some obscure, imperfect, analogous, but (we always hope) fruitful understanding of it.

Secondly, Lonergan’s ‘new’ psychological analogy (or at least an analogy that can be built from what he says in ‘Christology Today’) begins, it seems, from charity, from the very created participation of passive spiration that is our supernatural ‘being in love;’ it proceeds to the judgments of value that originate from such being in love, and then to the acts of loving that proceed from such a *verbum spirans amorem*. Thus the created participation of the Holy Spirit that is charity, which has a special relation to the Father and the Son, would be the very starting point of an analogy for understanding the divine processions; the created participation of passive spiration is what gives us a created analogue for the ‘origin’ of the processions, that is, for the Father! ‘The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in ... the dynamic state of being in love.’

Perhaps there is room here for a rehabilitation of the Augustinian and Bonaventurian distinctions of *imago Dei* and *similitudo Dei*. Only the saint’s life in unqualified love, only the life of one who is ‘subject in Christ Jesus’ through the gift of the Holy Spirit, provides a living, existential *similitudo Dei*. Moreover, perhaps only an existential approximation to such a likeness can make us aware in the first place that the very structure of our intentionality even from below, when it reaches *dicere*-*verbum-amor procedens*, is an *imago Dei*, and

72 Ibid. 93.
can make it possible that we ‘[decide] to operate [from below] in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.’\textsuperscript{75} Certainly the realization that the structure from below of intentional consciousness is \textit{imago Dei} has not occurred independently of lived Christian faith, that is, apart from the holiness that makes people like Augustine and Aquinas \textit{saints}, people who live the \textit{similitudo Dei} from above, through the gift of charity, that is, through a created participation of the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit. This, of course, is a subject for future exploration, but in a publication honoring Frederick Crowe, perhaps I might be permitted to ask whether this line of reflection might provide some help in treating vexing questions about the Holy Spirit that continue to attend even the best reflections, such as Crowe’s, on the trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and Lonergan.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology} 15.

\textsuperscript{76} For some of these questions, see Frederick E. Crowe, ‘Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the “Homoousios,”’ \textit{Science et Esprit} XLVII:1 (1995) 13-31.