Essays in Systematic Theology 25: The Starting Point of Systematic Theology

A remarkable four-point systematic-theological hypothesis has lain hidden for nearly fifty years in the pages of two dusty Latin tomes on the systematics of the Trinity. I wish to elevate the hypothesis to the status in a contemporary systematic theology that de facto the theorem of the supernatural enjoyed in Thomas Aquinas’s great *Summae*. The hypothesis was first expressed by Bernard Lonergan in *Divinarum personarum*\(^2\) and then again in the revision of that document that constituted the *pars systematica* of *De Deo trino*.\(^3\) Despite its heavy overdose of Scholastic language, which must undergo fairly

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1 This article appeared in *Theological Studies* 67 (2006) 750-76. Included in the footnotes are developments in my thinking since the publication of the article.


3 Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo trino: Pars systematica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 234-35. This work is now available in English translation with facing Latin pages, *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). This Collected Works edition includes in an appendix sections from *Divinarum personarum* that had been omitted or changed in Lonergan’s revision in *De Deo trino*. Some of these are very important for understanding the questions that operated Lonergan’s development. On the
massive transposition in the contemporary context,⁴ the hypothesis contains the core systematic conceptions around which other special theological categories can be constructed. Special categories are the categories peculiar to theology, while general significance of some of the differences between the two texts, see Robert M. Doran, ‘The First Chapter of De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica: The Issues,’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 18 (2000) 27-48; ‘Intelligentia Fidei in De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica,’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 19 (2001) 35-83; and ‘The Truth of Theological Understanding in Divinarum Personarum and De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica,’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 20:1 (2002) 33-75. [2010: These three articles are now part of this e-book, chapters 7-9 respectively.]

⁴ The notion of transposition appears repeatedly in Lonergan’s Method in Theology (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), but the dynamics entailed in actually doing what the notion speaks of are not spelled out. A study is needed of Lonergan’s references to transposition. See also his 1979 paper, ‘Horizons and Transpositions,’ in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), esp. 426-31. Some questions that show what a contemporary transposition of Scholastic language entails, along with Lonergan’s response to these questions, would be: (1) What in the world is ‘agent intellect?’ The unrestricted desire to know. (2) What is an ‘intelligible species (species intelligibilis)?’ An idea. The answers light up so many texts of Thomas. But how did Lonergan arrive at them? That involves the question of transposition. [2010: The issues of transposition are tricky, for it is not always a matter of finding an equivalent term in interiority for a metaphysical term in a theoretical theology; sometimes the transposition entails naming the intentional operation in which the theoretical term is known.]
categories are those that theology shares with other disciplines. In general, it may be said that Thomas’s theology relied on Philip the Chancellor’s discovery of the theorem of the supernatural for its special categories and on Aristotle’s metaphysics for its general categories. Today’s systematics, I am proposing, will rely for its core special categories on Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis, which is a fundamental differentiation of the theorem of the supernatural. Later in this paper I will review suggestions that I have made regarding the source of the general categories.

The presentation of my basic point regarding the four-point hypothesis, namely, that we may appeal to it for a new form of the psychological analogy for the divine processions, an analogy located in the divine missions themselves, and that we may begin a systematic theology with that new analogy, will be repeated in somewhat similar but also different ways as the paper proceeds. I hope the repetition is not onerous to the reader, but rather that it fosters a grasp of the multiple sets of implications of what I am proposing. Moreover, I am grateful for the editorial suggestion that I append a glossary of some technical terms: four-point hypothesis, general and special theological categories, theorem of the supernatural, unified field structure, and dialectics of history – to help the reader navigate his or her way through what at first blush may seem to be dense material.

5 On general and special theological categories, see Lonergan, Method in Theology 285-91.

6 See also Robert M. Doran, What is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) index, under Categories.
1 The Four-point Hypothesis: Its Significance and Limitations

The hypothesis is referred to as a ‘four-point hypothesis’ because it relates four created supernatural realities, respectively, to the four divine relations. The created graces are participations in and imitations of the divine relations. Thus, (1) the esse of the assumed humanity of Jesus participates in and imitates divine paternity; (2) sanctifying grace, later identified by Lonergan with a dynamic state of being in love without qualification,\(^7\) participates in and imitates active spiration; (3) the habit of charity that is the first and basic consequence of sanctifying grace participates in and imitates passive spiration; and (4) the light of glory participates in and imitates filiation. In perhaps more accessible terms (1) in the Godhead the Word does not speak but is spoken; the incarnate Word speaks, but he speaks only what he hears from the Father; thus the existence of the assumed humanity is a created participation in and imitation of divine paternity; (2) the dynamic state of being in love is a created participation in and imitation of the Father and the Son as they breathe the Holy Spirit; (3) the habit of charity is a created participation in and imitation of the proceeding Love breathed by the Father and the Son; and (4) the light of glory is a created participation in and imitation of the divine Son in his relation to the Father. The hypothesis reads:

… there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed,\(^8\) namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation,

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7 Another instance of transposition.
8 The editors appeal at this point in a footnote to Lonergan, De ente supernaturali, Thesis 3, §55: ‘Only love is meritorious \emph{per se}; the other virtues or their acts can be informed or uninformed. They are informed by sanctifying grace and love, and when
sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.  

grace departs they become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. For this reason it seems worth while to distinguish between acts that are formally supernatural and acts that are virtually supernatural. The former attain God as God is in se, while the latter do not attain God as God is in se but only in some respect, as in the case of faith and hope.’ The editors comment that the point of Lonergan’s remark here is that the four absolutely supernatural realities are formally supernatural, and necessarily so. For the created correlate of divine communication or divine self-giving is that the creature should attain God as God is in se, and these are the created realities whereby we attain God as God is in se. (The translation of De ente supernaturali is by Michael Shields, and will be published as part of vol. 19 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Latin Theology. The translation as it will appear is slightly different from that which appeared in The Triune God: Systematics, but the meaning is the same.)

9 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 471, 473. I prefer the term ‘divine being’ to ‘the divine substance,’ even though Lonergan’s term is ‘divina substantia.’ I would also prefer to speak simply of four absolutely supernatural ways of imitating God by participating in the divine relations. This is what Lonergan is speaking about, and the work of transposition has to be as direct in its communication as possible. Because there are four real divine relations, there are four supernatural ways in which creatures
1.1 The Place of the Four-point Hypothesis in a Unified Field Structure for Systematics

In *What Is Systematic Theology?* I appealed to the hypothesis in an attempt to articulate what I called a unified field structure for systematic theology,\(^{10}\) that is, a heuristic core around which a systematic theology can be organized. As I said there,

The unified field structure would be … an open and heuristic set of conceptions that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in that discipline or functional specialty of theology whose task it is to give a synthetic understanding of the realities that are and ought to be providing the meaning constitutive of the community called the church. The unified field structure would be found in a statement, perhaps a quite lengthy one, perhaps even one taking up several large volumes, capable of guiding for the present and the foreseeable future the ongoing genetic development of the entire synthetic understanding of the mysteries of faith and of the other elements that enter into systematic theology. It would guide all work at bringing these elements into a synthetic unity.\(^{11}\)

can imitate God; but each of the four ways is based in an intimate created participation in one of the four divine relations.

\(^{10}\) Daniel Monsour is responsible for the expression ‘unified field structure,’ though the conception offered in *What Is Systematic Theology?* as well as here is my own. See also my paper ‘The Unified Field Structure for Systematic Theology: A Proposal,’ on the website as Essay 12 in *Essays in Systematic Theology*.

In terms that Lonergan employs elsewhere, the unified field structure is the articulation at any given time of the most fundamental elements in what happens to be the contemporary dogmatic-theological context.\textsuperscript{12}

The four-point hypothesis would constitute only part of that structure, not the whole of it. The unified field structure, that is, the contemporary articulation of the dogmatic-theological context that it is systematic theology’s task to mediate, would consist of the four-point systematic-theological hypothesis integrated with a theory of history that flows from a complication of the basic structure of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis.\textsuperscript{13} More concretely, the second component of the unified field structure, the

\textsuperscript{12} The notion of the dogmatic-theological context is most fully developed in Lonergan’s 1962 lectures, ‘The Method of Theology,’ delivered at Regis College, Toronto. The lectures are currently available in audio recording on www.bernardlonergan.com starting at 33100A0E060. A transcript has appeared in volume 22 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{13} The complication of the structure is offered in a compendious form in chapter 10 of What Is Systematic Theology? It can also be found in a paper that I offered to the Boston College Lonergan Workshop in 2004 and that has been published on this website and Essay 15 in Essays in Systematic Theology, ‘‘Complicate the Structure’’: Notes on a Forgotten Precept.’ In its fuller details, though, the complication is offered in my book Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, 2001). The cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and fundamental existential ethics presupposed in Theology and the Dialectics of History are all Lonergan’s work. The basic heuristic of history (progress-decline-redemption) is also his, but the amplification and development of the structure in terms of an analogy of dialectics of subject, culture, and community and in terms of the scale of
component added to the four-point hypothesis, is what Lonergan calls the *Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft*, the basic and total science, that consists in (1) cognitional theory, (2) epistemology, (3) the metaphysics of proportionate being, and (4) existential ethics.¹⁴

These would play a role in the contemporary systematics that I am envisioning analogous to the role played by Aristotle’s metaphysics in the systematics of Thomas Aquinas. As Aristotle’s metaphysics provided Aquinas with his general categories and Philip the Chancellor’s theorem of the supernatural grounded Aquinas’s special categories, so Lonergan’s ‘basic and total science’ would ground today’s general categories, and his four-point hypothesis would ground today’s special categories. But the general categories will consist in the philosophic contributions of a basic and total science precisely as they give rise to a theory of history. As Lonergan says in some notes that he wrote around the time of his breakthrough to the notion of functional specialization, the mediated object of values is my own responsibility. These are rooted in my suggestions of a psychic conversion to complement Lonergan’s religious, moral, and intellectual conversions, and in the consequent affirmation of aesthetic-dramatic as well as intellectual, rational, and deliberative operators of human development: symbols, feelings, interpersonal relations, and love. None of this, of course, is in the least bit foreign to Lonergan. I have been drawing out materials for which the room is already provided in his work.

¹⁴ Bernard Lonergan, ‘Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response,’ in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980* at 355 and 357. This paper is a remarkable response to a questionnaire that was distributed by Jesuit superiors in Rome to a number of prominent Jesuit philosophers, regarding the philosophical training of young Jesuits. I hope that the paper will be better attended to and its proposals even implemented?
systematics is *Geschichte*.\(^{15}\) The theory of history emergent from the cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics proposed by Lonergan provides systematics with its general categories, that is, the categories that theology shares with other disciplines. The four-point hypothesis, again, contains the basic set of special categories, the categories peculiar to theology.

Why is the addition of a theory of history required? Why is the four-point hypothesis not enough to provide a statement of the dogmatic-theological context that can get a contemporary systematics started?

If the four-point theological hypothesis were left to stand alone, the theology that would be built around it would be abstract and relatively static. The hypothesis would ground only the use of special categories, that is, of categories peculiar to theology, and not of those general categories that theology shares with other disciplines. The theology that would be developed around it would be like a soul without a body: perhaps something like Bonaventure without Aquinas, or Hans Urs von Balthasar without Bernard Lonergan.\(^{16}\) On its own the hypothesis is not able to account concretely and

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\(^{15}\) For a brief account of some of these notes, see *What Is Systematic Theology?* 149-56. They may now be found on the website [www.bernardlonergan.com](http://www.bernardlonergan.com) beginning at 47200D0E060, the breakthrough page to functional specialization.

\(^{16}\) Conversely, of course, Aquinas can benefit from Bonaventure, and Lonergan from von Balthasar. It is not a question of either/or, but of the appropriate integration of general and special categories in theology. As Aquinas and Lonergan excelled in the use of the general categories within their respective contexts, while not neglecting the special categories, so Bonaventure and von Balthasar have made major contributions to the development of theology’s special categories in their respective contexts. But they are weak on the general categories. I would wager that the appropriate integration of the realities named by general and special categories has always been the major
historically for the sets of relations between the divine and the human that constitute the core intelligibility of a theology. In that sense it cannot provide an articulation of a dogmatic-theological context. For contexts emerge from historical interweavings of questions and answers. The hypothesis provides categories for speaking about the divine and about created supernatural realities that enable human beings to reach the very being of God in love, but very little to guide our understanding of the human precisely as nature and as history. The theory of history provided in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* attempts to add such guidance, precisely by relating religious values (which I am now grounding in the four-point hypothesis) to the rest of the scale of values proposed by Lonergan and developed further in that book.

Since the hypothesis articulates a series of created participations in the divine processions and relations, the integration of the hypothesis with a theory of history would articulate the manner in which historical reality participates in divine life; more precisely, it would articulate the structure of that participation. And such an articulation would constitute what I am looking for, the unified field structure for a systematic theology. Systematic theology, which in its entirety at any one time is always located in a community of inquirers and not in any single individual, is concerned primarily with the methodological problem for systematic theology. It plagued the late Middle Ages in the Aristotelian-Augustinian conflict. The extremes to which it is prone can be found in relatively contemporary theology in some variants of the method of correlation, on the one hand, where special categories can be collapsed into general categories, and in John Milbank’s ‘radical orthodoxy,’ with its rejection of the significance of the general categories, on the other hand. See Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). See also the challenging if not devastating critique by Neil Ormerod, ‘‘It Is Easy to See”: The Footnotes of John Milbank,’ *Philosophy & Theology* 11:2 (1999) 257-64.
participation of historical humankind in divine life. While its principal function is the imperfect and analogical understanding of the mysteries of Christian faith, today that understanding will take the form of a theological theory of history.

Still, the hypothesis does name some of the specifically theological realities or central special categories of the theology that I envision, some of the core categories peculiar to theology. In fact, it names those special categories to which all other special categories must be explicitly related if they are to qualify as special categories in Christian theology.¹⁷ And so the first task before us is to offer as thorough and systematic

¹⁷ Lonergan speaks in *Method in Theology* (pp. 290-91) of five sets of special theological categories. It is clear from his 1968 lectures at Boston College introducing *Method in Theology* that he had been thinking that the five sets would be derived, respectively, from (1) complicating the structure of conscious intentionality, (2) turning to concrete instances of it, (3) filling it out, (4) differentiating it, and (5) setting it in motion. But what eventually became the third set is not accounted for in this way in the 1968 lectures, that is, by filling out the basic structure. If anything, it is the first set of categories in *Method in Theology*, the set having to do with religious experience, that is a function of filling out the basic structure. For the third set, it seems, Lonergan came to see that he had to appeal not to the subject in his or her interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and so not to the basic structure, but to the other dimension of foundations (see *Method in Theology* 267), namely, the tradition as mediated by the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. Thus the third set, the one that is pertinent to the present discussion, is expressed in *Method in Theology* (291) as follows: ‘The third set of special categories moves from our loving to the loving source of our love. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son
a treatment of the realities contained in that hypothesis as we are able to provide. While I will emphasize that the unified field structure in its entirety constitutes the starting point of systematic theology, an elaboration of the four-point hypothesis is essential to such a beginning.

Such a statement, of course, is made from a ‘macro’ point of view. The hypothesis explicitly embraces the doctrines of the triune God, the incarnate Word, the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, and the last things, and it does so in such a way that the mysteries affirmed in these doctrines are related systematically or synthetically to one another. Thus it presents in a systematic order some of the principal realities named by the special categories that a systematics will employ, indeed (it may be argued) the central or core specifically theological realities affirmed in Christian faith. To unpack the hypothesis is a major enterprise, one to which much of an entire first volume of a systematics would be devoted. But the same volume would also have to relate the hypothesis to the structure of history, for only that relation constitutes the unified field structure and the starting point of systematic theology.

The remainder of this paper will attempt to articulate what it means to adopt such a starting point and what is the significance of such an option for the history of the systematic task in theology.

sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.’ This set, thus outlined, incorporates each of the elements contained in the four-point hypothesis. Work remains to be done on the movement in Lonergan’s own thought from the 1968 directives for deriving the special categories to the actual sets that are proposed in Method in Theology. There are some overlaps among the sets suggested in the two presentations, but there is also a development whose progression is not yet clear in all its details, at least to me. For the 1968 set, see Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method I 485-86.
2 Two Requirements

If I am to be faithful to my own prescriptions in *What Is Systematic Theology?* and to those of Bernard Lonergan, whose method I am following and amplifying and whose efforts in systematics I am attempting to sweep up into the perspective of a theological theory of history, two requirements must be met.

2.1 Interiorly and Religiously Differentiated Consciousness

The first requirement is that the objects intended in the four-point hypothesis must be identified, as far as possible, in categories that are based in elements in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. The metaphysical terms and relations of an earlier theology, while still helpful and even necessary, are not enough. For such terms and relations, if they are valid, are derived from operations and states of the conscious subject in his or her authenticity, and a methodical theology is methodical precisely and only insofar as it grounds such terms and relations in those conscious operations and states. ‘… general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states … *For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.*’

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18 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 343, emphasis added. I have qualified the emphasized portion somewhat, though not in the manner that some might prefer, namely, by claiming that Lonergan is exaggerating when he says ‘every.’ He is not. Nor am I in following him. Rather, the qualification is to the effect that the corresponding conscious element is most often found in intentional consciousness, but it may also be
The significance of this first prescription or requirement, that of grounding every term and relation in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, is at least twofold.

2.1.1 The Psychological Analogy

First, the divine relations that are at the core of the hypothesis will be conceived on an analogy with human dynamic consciousness, and so that analogy must be accurately understood and presented as thoroughly as possible. Within the ‘macro’ perspective of assuming the four-point hypothesis into the starting point, which itself consists in the elaboration of the unified field structure of a theological heuristic of history, the initial task involved in unpacking the hypothesis is to provide a hypothetical understanding of the four divine relations. This will entail a rehabilitation in trinitarian theology of what has been known as the psychological analogy.

The psychological analogy has fallen on hard times in theology. Part of the reason for that, I believe, is that it has rarely been understood. But as well, the analogy itself found in nonintentional conscious states. This is particularly the case with the basic gift of God’s love, which is not a response to an apprehended object. One is first in love before one understands who or what one is in love with. In its originary moment, this gift, as consciously received, is nonintentional. It is Ignatius Loyola’s ‘consolation without previous cause,’ that is, consolation with a content but without any apprehended object to which it responds. It is pure gift. But because it is a share in God’s love, it flows from God’s knowledge and word. To cite what is perhaps Lonergan’s favorite scriptural text, Romans 5.5, ‘God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.’
needs a good overhauling, a sublation into a more inclusive perspective, if it is going to be rehabilitated.

What has not been understood very well in the history of theology is how act proceeds from act in the autonomous spiritual dimension of human consciousness, and in particular how different acts of understanding ground a series of inner words. Nothing has more potential to revive academic and intellectual culture in general than to awaken a sense of this dimension of human spirituality. The traditional emphasis as found in Aquinas and made much more explicit in the early work of Lonergan concentrates on how the act of understanding grounds a proceeding inner word, and on how understanding and inner word together ground acts of love.

While it is true that neither of these dimensions of the dynamism of consciousness moving ‘from below,’ that is, neither the cognitional nor the existential, has been adequately grasped in the history of theology subsequent to Aquinas, and so that Lonergan’s retrieval of these emphases is one of the most welcome features in the whole of twentieth-century thought, still it must also be emphasized that these presentations of the analogy for the Trinity are not enough. This was acknowledged explicitly by Lonergan himself in his late reflections on trinitarian theology. Love, not knowledge, is the starting point. Love is not simply the end result of spiritual procession, as in the analogy as it was presented by the early Lonergan. Love propels the entire set of autonomous spiritual processions. And so we have a great deal of work to do, not simply to retrieve the analogy in its Augustinian and Thomist forms, but to develop it and to make it better.

Moreover, there is something of an internal inconsistency in Lonergan’s own presentation of the analogy in his early trinitarian work. For even in his trinitarian treatises of the 1950s and 1960s, the word that provides an analogue for the divine Word is not a concept, not even a judgment of fact, but a judgment of value; and yet his unpacking of the processions is still in terms of the emanation of a purely cognitional
judgment, a judgment in which there is formed (in Thomas’s words) a likeness 
(similitudo) of what is known to be. The truth of a judgment of value cannot be expressed 
in this way, for a true judgment of value may disapprove of what is and approve of what 
is not. And so the work of elaborating what the truth of a judgment of value consists in, 
even when that judgment is generated in a movement from below, remains to be done. 
An overhauling even of the early analogy ‘from below’ is required before we can proceed 
any further. What makes for the truth, not of a judgment of fact, but of a judgment of 
value? The appropriation of the emanation of a word that is a value judgment is by no 
means as clear in Lonergan’s work as is the appropriation of the procession of a true 
judgment of fact. We must try to shore up what is still inchoate in his writings, even in 
the later writings where a new notion of value emerges.

Again, even the retrieval of the earlier forms of the analogy, and especially of the 
emanation of word from understanding, is compounded today by the one-way emphases 
of much of the philosophy of language, whether analytic, Heidegerrian, or 
poststructuralist,¹⁹ and by the consequent neglect that the science of spirituality, precisely 
as spiritual, has suffered. The linguistic idealism that has neglected the dependence of 
word upon understanding is only the culmination of the decline in philosophy and 
theology alike that was initiated by Scotus and Ockham. So a rehabilitation of the 
psychological analogy involves as well a massive reversal of centuries of philosophic 
decline in this one area, even as gains were undoubtedly made in others.

¹⁹ For an effort at balance see Robert M. Doran, ‘Reception and Elemental Meaning: An 
Expansion of the Notion of Psychic Conversion,’ Toronto Journal of Theology 20:2 
Problem,’ Divyadaan 15:3 (2004) 405-26. 2010: These are now available on this 
website, Essays in Systematic Theology, numbers 13 and 14.
Again, what is the character of an analogy that begins, not from knowledge but from love? It thoroughly complicates the matter that there are actually two psychological analogies in Lonergan’s own writings, analogies drawn from the dynamic consciousness of the intelligent creature; and that one of these, the purely cognitional analogy, is natural, and the other, the one that begins with love, is an analogy in the supernatural order; for the love with which it begins is the love of God poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. The natural analogy has been worked through by Lonergan, even if with the inconsistency pointed out above, but it is the supernatural analogy that is really the one we should be hitching our star to. We have work to do, for we must go beyond the analogies that have been offered to us in relatively detailed fashion by Augustine, Aquinas, and especially the early Lonergan, even as we acknowledge that developing these analogies promoted permanent achievements in human self-understanding and that we must rely on those achievements as we move on from them to develop an analogy that was only hinted at by Lonergan in his late reflections.

For all that, though, we must follow Lonergan in articulating the analogy from nature first, the cognitional analogy. Only on that basis can we take up the challenge that he presented late in life to develop an analogy in the supernatural order. By following through on his work in this way, we will locate the inconsistency and the relative deficiency of the earlier analogy, but we will also have the best opportunity we could ask

20 2010: It has been pointed out to me that the analogy that begins with love need not be an analogy in the order of grace, and I thoroughly agree. But nothing prevents it from being realized in that order either.

21 2010: It will be clear from the later paper ‘Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling,’ to be uploaded soon on this site, that the analogy being presented here may be closer to Augustine’s than I realized when I wrote the present article.
for in a systematic theology to present the extraordinary analysis of cognitive and existential interiority that Lonergan has offered us. Since this analysis grounds all of our general categories, it must be featured from the outset in our efforts at constructing a systematics. I cannot repeat the work of *Insight* every time I write something new, but I can subsume it into the new work and point to its abiding significance. And in a trinitarian theology, the way to do this is to review the work that Lonergan himself has done in moving toward an acceptable psychological analogy for trinitarian processions.

2.1.2 Religiously Differentiated Consciousness

The analogy grounded in love opens onto the second point of significance for the requirement of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. For, since the four-point hypothesis speaks of realities that are named in special categories, the base of these categories in religiously differentiated consciousness must also be specified as carefully as possible. This is particularly true for the second and third points of the hypothesis, those having to do with sanctifying grace and the habit of charity as created participations, respectively, of active and passive spiration. In fact, our understanding of the first and fourth points of the hypothesis (the secondary act of existence as the base of the relation of the assumed human nature to the divine Word and the light of glory) can be had only by extrapolation from and modification of our understanding of the second and third points. These created participations in active and passive spiration are precisely the area in which the supernatural creaturely analogy for the trinitarian relations is developed. Thus such efforts will be providing something of significance, I believe, for the theological treatment of spirituality. What, in terms derived from religiously differentiated consciousness, is such a created participation in divine life? How can we

22 2010: This part of the parenthetical material has been reworded.
name terms and relations in religious experience that express created participations in active and passive spiration? And since active spiration is identical with paternity and filiation considered together, the question reflects our participation in trinitarian life in toto. That is the question. That is the task.

This second matter of significance can be expanded upon briefly here, though a full development must be postponed.

In the quotation referenced above in note 18 (Method in Theology 343), Lonergan speaks of general basic terms, general basic relations, and special basic terms. What of special basic relations? He does not mention them in Method in Theology or in any of the archival manuscripts that are pertinent to this passage. I suggest that ‘special basic relations’ might be articulated on the basis of the four-point hypothesis. This suggestion may bring us as close as we are going to get to specifying in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness what is meant in a more metaphysical context by speaking of ‘sanctifying grace’ and ‘the habit of charity.’ Let me explain.

Sanctifying grace has been called an entitative habit, rooted in the essence of the soul. Such it is. Such terminology of itself says nothing about the difference that this habit would make in consciousness. But transposing the traditional psychological analogy for the trinitarian processions and relations (as Lonergan has developed this analogy in De Deo trino) into a supernatural psychological analogy based in religiously differentiated consciousness, we might say the following:

(1) The conscious reflection of the entitative habit is found in a given grasp of evidence, at a most elemental level, and, at the same level, in a given affirmation of value proceeding or emanating from that grasp (a given ‘yes,’ where ‘given’ signifies ‘gift,’ that is, faith as the knowledge or horizon born of religious love, that is, born of the gift of God’s love);

(2) both the grasp and the proceeding affirmation are grounded in a given being-in-love that participates in and imitates the notionaliter diligere of Father and Son in
active spiration, and that is experienced by us in an extremely elemental and tacit fashion; and

(3) the grasp and the affirmation together ground, are the principle for, a proceeding habit of charity that shows itself in self-transcendent schemes of recurrence in human living, a habit that participates in and imitates the *amor procedens* that is the Holy Spirit.

The entitative habit at its root, then, is a *being-in-love*. While it is experienced in an elemental and tacit fashion, it manifests itself consciously in the knowledge or, better, the horizon born of that love, which may be differentiated into something analogous on an elemental level to a grasp of evidence that is possible only for a lover and something analogous on the same elemental level to the proceeding word of assent to what has been grasped. Lonergan is helpful here:

To our apprehension of vital, social, cultural, and personal values, there is added an *apprehension* of transcendent value. This apprehension consists in the *experienced* fulfilment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our *actuated* orientation towards the mystery of love and awe. Since that thrust is of intelligence to the intelligible, of reasonableness to the true and the real, of freedom and responsibility to the truly good, the *experienced* fulfilment of the thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a *clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness*. With that objectification there recurs the question of God in a new form. For now it is primarily a question of

23 2010: I have subsequently spoken of ‘memory’ in this regard. The paper ‘Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and the Divine Indwelling: The Key to the *Nexus Mysteriorum*’ represents the first major move in this direction. This paper will be uploaded to this e-book soon, and is also scheduled for publication in *Lonergan Workshop 22*. 
decision. Will I love him in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of his love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw? Only secondarily do there arise the questions of God’s existence and nature, and they are the questions either of the lover seeking to know him or of the unbeliever seeking to escape him. Such is the basic option of the existential subject once called by God.  

I am proposing, then,

(1) that the apprehension of transcendent value to which Lonergan appeals, an apprehension that is grounded in a tacitly experienced being-in-love, can be differentiated into an elemental grasp of evidence and an elemental proceeding word of an affirmation of value (‘Yes’ to the goodness of it all),

(2) that these are not human achievements but rather are given with the gift of God’s love,

(3) that they correspond to faith as the knowledge or horizon born of religious love,

(4) that they are a created participation in the active spiration, the notionaliter diligere, of Father and Son, in that they are the grasp of evidence and proceeding affirmation of one who is in love with a love that participates in God’s own love, and

(5) that the consequent decision to which Lonergan refers here, the decision to love in return, is a function of an at least incipient habit of charity, an amor procedens, a love that proceeds from this grasp and affirmation. The habit, of course, precisely as a habit, precedes the objectification that makes a conscious decision possible, for it is part of that same experienced undertow of grace that Lonergan is trying to articulate. Finally, it is in this process that there can be found and differentiated the realities that Aquinas,  

24 Lonergan, Method in Theology 115-16, emphases added to highlight the conscious components.
building on Augustine, referred to as *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans*. They are both effective throughout this process, for it is the same grace doing two distinct things: operating by giving, and cooperating in our reception of the gift, which grounds our further response.

It is in these directions, then, that I think we must turn if we are to specify the conscious difference that the entitative habit makes. We must search for some conscious participation in the relationship in the triune God between the *notionaliter diligere* of Father and Son and the *amor procedens* that is the Holy Spirit. And that conscious participation will be found, I suggest, in the relation between, on the one hand, a grasp of evidence and a consequent yes, both of which are not our own work, and, on the other hand, the habit of charity, proceeding from the dynamic state of being in love and giving rise to the schemes of recurrence of self-transcendent living. Such would constitute ‘special basic relations.’

This first requirement, then, calls for self-appropriation (a) in the natural order and (b) in the supernatural order, that is, it calls for interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, respectively. These are its two areas of significance.

25 2010: That is, both of which begin with *gratia operans*, which is exclusively God’s work.

26 2010: Subsequently, I have spoken of charity, which is a created participation in the Holy Spirit or passive spiration, as the base of a relation to the Father and the Son, who are the active spiration in which sanctifying grace participates. As Father and Son together are to the Holy Spirit, so the gift and its word together are to charity – in both ways.
2.2 History

There is a second requirement. I announced in What Is Systematic Theology? that the systematics that I want at least to begin will assume the general form of a theology of history, and this means not only that the realities named in its special categories must be mediated with those named in its general categories – this would be the case no matter what the option regarding the overall form of systematic theology – but also that the general categories will be focused around the complex dialectical process of human history. These categories are at present partly supplied by Lonergan (most subtly but also most completely in his late paper ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’\textsuperscript{27}) and partly, I hope, by my book Theology and the Dialectics of History. But no doubt there are more categories to be generated on the basis of these still early reachings for a comprehensive heuristic of history. I think in particular of Lonergan’s efforts to develop a macroeconomic theory in the context of his notion of the dialectic of history.\textsuperscript{28}

In Theology and the Dialectics of History, relying on Lonergan, I add or develop the following notions: (1) the analogy of the dialectics of the subject, community, and culture, (2) distinct dialectics of contraries and contradictories in each of these realms, and (3) the scale of values as explaining the intelligible ongoing relations in history


among these three complex dialectical processes. The mediation of general and special categories in a theology of history would also enable us to generate theological doctrines regarding creation, revelation, redemption, church, sacraments, and praxis, which are not explicitly included in the core ‘focal meanings’ contained in the four-point hypothesis, and to submit to systematic consideration these doctrines, as well as those explicitly mentioned in that core statement. But that mediation itself will primarily be a matter of bringing the supernatural realities affirmed in the four-point hypothesis, as constituting the core of religious values, to bear on the other levels of value: personal, cultural, social, and vital. The mediation will bring human participation in trinitarian life into the very heart of the dialectical process of history.

The implications of such a procedure can already be dimly glimpsed. It is one thing to transpose, for example, trinitarian theology into categories dictated by interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. Such a transposition is essential for a contemporary systematic-theological understanding of the mystery we profess in faith. But we are already familiar with the historical antecedents of such a transposition. The psychological analogies of Augustine, Aquinas, and the early Lonergan provide successive developments of the analogy from nature, culminating in Lonergan’s understanding in terms of interiorly differentiated consciousness; and a different analogy,

29 A summary and development of the understanding of the scale of values is presented in chapter 10 of What Is Systematic Theology? (sections 3.3-3.5).


31 2010: That is, the theological mediation will objectify how participation in divine life is found in the dialectics of history. The sentence could easily be misunderstood as claiming that theology effects that reality, which is not at all my intention.
one that Lonergan suggested late in his life, an analogy that begins with the supernatural state of being in love in an unqualified fashion, supplies a second psychological analogy, an analogy developed from religiously differentiated consciousness.\textsuperscript{32} It is another thing to add to this requirement of self-appropriation, which in one form or another and to a greater or lesser extent is already followed by the trinitarian theologies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan, the additional requirement of formulating all of this material eventually in terms of a theory of history. The direct impact, of course, is on that dimension of trinitarian theology that treats the divine missions, and particularly the mission of the Holy Spirit. But

\begin{enumerate}
  \item when intelligent, reasonable, and responsible emanations in the order of nature, and emanations from the dynamic state of being in love in the supernatural order, become the source of all authentic making of history, of historical progress, of healing and creating in history,\textsuperscript{33}
  \item when these emanations are conceived as the analogue according to which we are to approach some imperfect understanding of the processions within God of Word and Spirit, and
  \item when the missions are identified with those processions linked to an external term as consequent condition of the procession being also a mission, the full implication is something like this:
    \begin{enumerate}
    \item the emanations of Word and Spirit in God, linked to their appropriate contingent external terms in history (the \textit{esse secundarium} of the Incarnation, sanctifying

\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{32} 2010: It must be said that Lonergan’s starting point in love is not necessarily a starting point in unrestricted being in love, or in the supernatural. I’m not sure, though, that the supernatural state of being in love is not what Lonergan was thinking of.

\textsuperscript{33} See Bernard Lonergan, ‘Healing and Creating in History,’ in \textit{A Third Collection} 199-109.
grace, the habit of charity, and – beyond history but proleptically within it in the form of hope – the light of glory), are the ultimate condition of possibility of any consistent and sustained intelligent and responsible emanations in human beings, precisely through the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is the eternal emanation of the Spirit in God linked to its external term in history and proceeding not only from the eternal Father and Word but also from the same Word as incarnate and as sent by the Father;\textsuperscript{34} and

(b) such a collaboration of autonomous spiritual processions, divine and human, is the condition of the possibility of the consistent authentic performance of that normative source of meaning that, building on Lonergan’s analysis in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ I have already identified with the taut dialectical tension of psyche and intentionality in human conscious acts – that very normative source that is the origin of progress in history, whether in a creative mode ‘from below upwards’ or a healing mode ‘from above downwards.’\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Thus the explicit theological significance of the general theorem from my analysis of the scale of values in \textit{Theology and the Dialectics of History}, to the effect that religious values condition the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the sphere of personal value. The statement (a) in the text will require greater precision in regard to the relation between the mission of the Word and the mission of the Spirit. 2010: Something of that greater precision has subsequently been offered in the hypothesis that the faith that issues from the gift of God’s love is a participation in the invisible mission of the Word. See ‘Social Grace and the Mission of the Word,’ currently available on this website in the proceedings of the 2010 Marquette Colloquium on Doing Catholic Systematic Theology in a Multi-religious World’: under ‘Events/Conferences.’ This paper will also be uploaded to this e-book.

\textsuperscript{35} Thus the significance of the theorem that personal value conditions the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the spheres of cultural, social, and vital values.
The starting point for a systematic theology, then, consists in the elaboration of the unified field structure. The first step lies in unfolding the four-point theological hypothesis, with the help of analogies drawn from cognitional and ethical theory and from religious experience. The second step relates that unfolding in greater detail to the complex dialectical process of history, though the first step will itself incorporate a large amount of material relevant to the theological theory of history. A projected first volume in systematics proper would be devoted to setting forth the unified field structure. The general character of the unified field structure would be found in the title of such a book, which at present I would call *The Trinity in History*. For the four-point hypothesis presents an analogical understanding of trinitarian doctrine, where the analogy is twofold, natural and supernatural, and the theory of history completes the unified field structure precisely by locating the realities named in the four-point hypothesis in the dynamic unfolding of human history.

In his later work on the dialectic of history, Lonergan emphasizes the two dimensions of the normative source of meaning in history, intentional and psychic. See Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ 174-75, where in addition to the precepts of authentic intentional performance there is reference to a dimension that can be called ‘psychic’: ‘a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these’ in love; see also Lonergan, ‘Mission and the Spirit,’ in *A Third Collection*, at 29-30, where the same dimension is called ‘the passionateness of being’ that ‘underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious.’ The articulation of this psychic dimension and of its integration with the operations of intentional consciousness is the meaning of almost all of my earliest published work.
3 The Character of the Starting Point

If the unified field structure in its entirety is the beginning, then the beginning of the beginning lies in a systematic understanding of the doctrine of the triune God. But this systematic understanding will differ from those of Aquinas and the early Lonergan in two important and far-reaching respects.

Like those theologies, it will proceed by analogy from naturally known realities to an obscure understanding of divine mystery.

Like those theologies, it will follow the way of teaching and learning rather than the way of discovery, and so it will begin with those realities whose understanding does not presuppose the understanding of anything else, but which, once understood, render possible the understanding of everything else. In trinitarian theology this means starting with the divine processions.

But unlike those theologies, it will, almost from the beginning and not simply at the end of the entire systematic trinitarian treatise, appeal also to an analogy with created realities in the supernatural order, that is, to an analogy with what we know only by revelation, to an analogy with realities in the order of grace: realities that enable us consciously to participate in, and so to imitate, the conscious inner life of the very God whose mystery we are attempting to understand. I say ‘almost from the beginning’ because even these analogies from created supernatural realities, precisely as humanly constructed analogies, are themselves grounded in analogies from what is naturally known. And it should be emphasized that the imitation of God’s life is at first and for a long time in most people’s lives not a deliberate mimesis, but a function of the participation in divine life that is given to us in grace.36

36 There are explicit links to be drawn here with the mimetic theory of René Girard. I hope to show that soon in another article. 2010: The article turned out to be ‘Imitating
The first difference from the classic expositions of the psychological analogy, then, is that there are not only natural analogues for the divine processions and relations but also supernatural analogues in the realm of created grace, and that both of these sets of analogues can and should be drawn upon in the elaboration of a systematic understanding of this most central mystery of faith. While we will begin, as we must, with the natural analogues, the introduction of the supernatural analogies that are encouraged by Lonergan’s later remarks on trinitarian theology open the possibility for the following developments:

(1) What a metaphysical theology calls the secondary act of existence of the assumed humanity of the incarnate Word is a supernatural analogue for divine paternity, a created participation in and imitation of the Father, of the one who speaks the Word, of ‘Abba.’ ‘Whoever has seen me has seen the Father’ (John 14.9). Again, the divine Word as immanent in God does not speak; the divine Word is spoken by the Father; the incarnate Word speaks, but he speaks only what he hears from the Father.

(2) What a metaphysical theology calls sanctifying grace is the dynamic state of unqualified being in love. It is a supernatural analogue for divine active spiration, a created participation in and imitation of the Father and the Son as the one principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds. As the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, so sanctifying grace, as providing at the most elemental level of our being (‘entitative habit’) both a given grasp of evidence (understanding) and a gifted affirmation (judgment) on the part of one who is in love in an unqualified fashion and so with God’s own love (experience), gives rise to the habit of charity.

(3) What a metaphysical theology calls the habit of charity is a supernatural analogue for divine passive spiration, a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit who proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son. As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so the habit of charity proceeds from sanctifying grace, that is, from the elemental grasp of evidence by a lover and the fundamental yes to being and value that reside entitatively in the ‘essence of the soul’ as a function of a created and tacitly experienced participation in the notionaliter diligere of Father and Son breathing proceeding Love.

And (4) what a metaphysical theology calls the light of glory is a supernatural analogue for divine filiation, a created participation in and imitation of the Son, the Word, whose entire being is a relation to the eternal Father from whom he proceeds and to whom he refers, subjects, brings home all things.

This is part of the significance of accepting the four-point hypothesis as the special-categorial component of the unified field structure of systematic theology.

Obviously, the second and third of these supernatural analogues will be the most prominent, and it is to them that Lonergan refers when he sets forth his later psychological analogy:

The psychological analogy … has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is identified with agapē (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of
value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.37

Only by extrapolation from our own participation in divine life can we find some structural understanding of the human Jesus’ created participation in divine paternity and of the saints’ participation in the divine Son.

The second difference in the systematic understanding of the triune God that I am proposing vis-à-vis the classical psychological analogies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan is that this trinitarian theology initiates a theology of history. It spells out the religious values that are the condition of the possibility of an integral functioning of the entire scale of values, where personal, cultural, social, and vital values are related to one

37 Bernard Lonergan, ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ in A Third Collection 93-94, emphasis added to support the position expressed above regarding the conscious component of sanctifying grace as created participation in active spiration.
another in such a way as to yield the structure of history. This vision of history has been spelled out at least inchoately in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*.

### 4 Theological Development

I am proposing here an instance of what in *What Is Systematic Theology?* I called the genetic sequence of systematic theologies. Precisely because of the trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan, theologies which begin with the processions, move to the relations, progress to the persons, and end with the missions, we are now able to come full circle and begin a systematics of the Trinity somewhere else: namely, with a synthetic position that treats together both the divine processions and the divine missions. The missions are the processions in history.

This ‘somewhere else’ does not depart from the starting point that is to be found in Aquinas and the early Lonergan, but sublates that starting point into a more comprehensive dogmatic-theological context that has emerged partly as a result of their work. The four-point hypothesis itself is part of our starting point, not our conclusion, and that hypothesis aims at an obscure understanding not only of divine processions but also of divine missions and of the created consequent conditions of divine missions – the secondary act of existence of the assumed humanity, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory – as a new set of analogues from which we can gain an obscure understanding of the processions and relations immanent in God’s being.

Theology is an ongoing enterprise, and what was not possible for Aquinas, simply because of the historical limitations of the dogmatic-theological context of his time, and what for Lonergan was arrived at toward the end of his systematics of the Trinity, may well be the starting point for another generation, precisely because of Aquinas’s own gains in understanding and Lonergan’s firmer rooting of these gains in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.
Thus, as the way of discovery that Lonergan outlines in *De Deo trino: Pars dogmatica*\(^\text{38}\) ended with Augustine’s psychological analogy, which then became the starting point of the way of teaching and learning, so Lonergan’s particular embodiment of the way of teaching and learning ended with a four-point hypothesis that now informs the starting point of a new venture along the same kind of path, the *ordo doctrinae*. If we are beginning our systematics in its entirety where Lonergan ended his systematics of the Trinity, it is only on the basis of the development found in his own trinitarian theology that we are able to do so. He began with the processions. We begin, on a ‘macro’ level, with the processions and missions together, affirming with Lonergan’s assistance that they are the same reality, except that the mission adds a created contingent external term that is the consequent condition of the procession being also a mission.

As is clear from the foregoing, we must, of course, also relate these supernatural analogues of divine life to operations and states identified in our own interiority and to our participation in the historical dialectic. We are obliged to this

(1) by the core meanings expressed in the passage that we have taken as central to our systematics, the four-point hypothesis,

(2) by the stress on interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and

(3) by the insistence that a systematic theology must be a theology of history.

It will be crucial, then, to pinpoint just what we are talking about by identifying it with operations and states in interiority. And that is not easy, especially in the case of the supernatural analogy. A phenomenology of grace has barely begun to be composed.

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In fact, in the case of the secondary act of existence of the incarnate Word, there are available to us no data whatever for such a phenomenology, even if the affirmation of the *esse secundarium* can be shown to be isomorphic with human acts of reasonable judgment, and even if we are able to conclude from dogmatic premises something about the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus.

Nor is there available any material that would enable us to compose a phenomenology of the light of glory and the beatific vision.

In the case of both the secondary act of existence and the light of glory, then, we must move by extrapolation from what is available to us, namely, the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified sense and the operations of charity, of the originated loving, that follow habitually from such a state.

Thus, only in the realm of the supernatural analogues of active and passive inspiration do we have the data for a phenomenology of grace; and even there, only with great difficulty.

Thus too, pneumatology will become, in such a systematic theology, the source of much of Christology and eschatology. And that too is a function of the evolving dogmatic-theological context. Only today is the theology of the Holy Spirit emerging as the centerpiece of systematic theology: only in a day when perhaps the very future of the human race depends on our being able to specify with a precision sophisticated in the way of religious interiority just how we can affirm that the Holy Spirit is poured out on all people and may be found in religions other than Christianity as well as in the Christian churches. But this will not entail, for example, the kind of ‘Spirit-Christology’ that sets itself up as an alternative to ‘Logos-Christology.’ It is the assumed humanity of the Incarnate Word that we will attempt to understand by extrapolating from the gift of the Holy Spirit in sanctifying grace and the habit of charity and then making the necessary adaptations demanded by the dogmatic tradition.
Thus again, if there is a divine relation of paternity, we must understand it not only by analogy with the grasp of evidence giving rise to the judgment of value but also from the very participation in and imitation of divine paternity that is found in history, namely, in the secondary act of existence of the assumed humanity of the incarnate Word, Jesus of Nazareth.

Again, if there is a divine relation of active spiration, which itself is identical with paternity and filiation together ‘breathing’ the Holy Spirit, we must understand it not only by analogy with the combined influence of the grasp of evidence and the word of a value judgment that proceeds from it, as these are the principle, ‘from below’ as it were, of acts of love and of good decisions, but also in the very participation in active spiration, in paternity-filiation, that is found in history, namely, in the entitative habit radicated in the essence of the soul, or rooted in the very core of our being, that is our sharing in the notionaliter diligere of God, from which sharing there proceeds in human consciousness ‘from above’ the habit of charity that is our historical participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit who proceeds as Amor procedens from the Father and the Son. For this reason, Lonergan rephrases the reality that we call sanctifying grace as the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified fashion.

In other words, in the supernatural analogy the grasp of evidence that is not only an analogy for the Father but that is also the created participation in and imitation of paternity, and the consequent ‘yes’ that is not only an analogy for the Son but that is the created participation in and imitation of filiation, are themselves in the supernatural order. They are the grasp of evidence (understanding) and the consequent ‘yes’ (judgment) of a person already in love with a participation in God’s own love (tacit, even ineffable, experience). What an earlier theology called sanctifying grace is a habitual grasp of evidence and a consequent habitual ‘yes’ on the part of one who is in love with a love that is given by God and that is a participation in the love that is God. Together the grasp of evidence and the affirmation that constitute the conscious dimension of this entitative
habit spirate the habitual performance of loving acts. This grasp and affirmation are
themselves habitual, the function of what the medievals saw to be an entitative habit
rooted at the deepest and most intimate core of our being. It is a habit that is a gift from
God operating a person’s participation in, and imitation of, divine active spiration. This
habit is rephrased by Lonergan as the conscious dynamic state of unqualified being-in-
love. But if we are going to continue to distinguish sanctifying grace from the habit of
charity, as the four-point hypothesis beckons us to do, it is important to specify some
distinction in consciousness here; and I suggest that the distinction is one between the
habitual grasp and affirmation of the lover (sanctifying grace) and the habitual state of
originated loving (the habit of charity) that flows from that. The divine love is the starting
point, since it is the gift of divine love that gives us the habitual grasp of evidence for a
global judgment of value that determines our entire life. These are the grasp and
affirmation of one who already is in love, entitatively. And they ground the habitual
dynamic state that we call the habit of charity. To repeat, the distinction corresponds to
the trinitarian distinction between the notionaliter diligere that is Father-and-Son as one
principle and the Amor procedens that is the Holy Spirit.

Again, if there is a divine relation of passive spiration, identical with the Holy
Spirit who proceeds from Father-and-Son as from one principle of divine emanation, we
must understand it from the beginning not only (a) by analogy with the acts of love that
proceed in human consciousness from the combined influence of evidence grasped and
consequent value judgment, but also (b) by analogy with the very participation in and
imitation of passive spiration that is the habit of charity and the acts of unqualified love
that proceed from the habit in a regular sequence of schemes of recurrence.

Finally, if there is a divine relation of filiation, which itself is identical with the
eternally proceeding Word of God, we must understand it from the beginning not only by
analogy with the word of a judgment of value that says yes to evidence grasped as
conclusive regarding our own existential self-constitution as authentic human persons.
We must understand it also by analogy with the very participation in and imitation of divine filiation that is the light of glory that enables the perfect return of all God’s children to the divine Father in the inheritance promised to us in the incarnate Son and confirmed by the pledge of the gift of the Holy Spirit.

In other words, the basic hypotheses that will have a profound effect on the remainder of the systematic theology that I am envisioning are more complex than those found at the beginning of Aquinas’s or Lonergan’s trinitarian systematics, and that greater complexity is a function of a theological history decisively influenced by Aquinas and Lonergan themselves, a history that permits us now, from the very beginning, to add to the natural analogies employed in understanding the divine processions and relations the graced participations in those relations, and so to begin a trinitarian systematics with the processions and missions as one piece. In the context of the theory of history constituted internally by the scale of values and the three dialectical processes of subjects, cultures, and social communities (that is, the theory proposed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*), these graced participations constitute the realm of religious values. The theory of history based on the scale of values displays precisely what the historical significance and influence is of these religious values, these participations in and imitations of divine relations. For from above, grace conditions personal integrity and authenticity, which itself is the condition of possibility of genuine and developing cultural values; the latter, in turn, influence the formation of integrally dialectical communities at the level of social values, and only such communities functioning in recurrent schemes of a good of order guarantee the equitable distribution of vital goods to the entire community. The resultant of such an analysis will be a doctrine of social grace. As recent theology has enlightened us about social sin, so now it is time to propose a

39 See the presentation of the scale of values in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* passim, but most compendiously in chapter 4.
theology of social grace. I am suggesting one way of going about that task, way that also connects with Lonergan’s redefinition of what we have called ‘the state of grace.’ For Lonergan the state of grace is not an individual but a social reality. It is the divine-human interpersonal situation that resides in the three divine subjects giving themselves to us. That gift itself, while ‘intensely personal, utterly intimate,’ still ‘is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. Finally, what can become communal, can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances, confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or epoch.’

This position is not a denial of the analogies from nature that provided Aquinas and Lonergan with an initial glimpse of the divine mysteries. Quite the contrary, for these very analogies are required if we are to have any understanding, however imperfect it may be, of the supernatural life itself that is our participation in the divine relations. Sanctifying grace, again, entails the elemental habitual grasp of evidence (understanding) and the elemental habitual consequent yes (judgment) that flow from being invested with a share in divine love (elemental experience): the horizon of the graced person. Thus, if we are really to understand anything at all about sanctifying grace, we will have to understand what is meant by ‘elemental or tacit or ineffable experience,’ by ‘a grasp of evidence’ and by a ‘consequent yes,’ and that means understanding the natural analogy.

Still, in his later work Lonergan proposes, not a natural but a supernatural analogy. For he says of the psychological analogy that it ‘has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the

judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.’ But that ‘higher synthesis … that is the dynamic state of being in love’ (enabling the grasping the evidence that only a lover can grasp) and the manifestation of that love in an attitude that is a habitual judgment of value, are themselves created participations in divine paternity-filiation, in active spiration, from which created participation there proceed in a habitual fashion the acts of love of a person who is in love. We could not understand these supernatural participations if we did not have the natural analogy that is provided, possibly for all time, in Lonergan’s work on insight, verbum, and the divine processions. That work will provide the analogy not only for our understanding of the trinitarian processions but also for the habitual grasp and habitual judgment of value and habitual proceeding love in us that are themselves created participations in the divine relations. These supernatural realities, which provide a psychological analogy for the divine processions, can themselves be understood only by analogy with what we know by nature regarding the spiritual dimensions of the dynamics of human interiority.

Conclusion

The starting point of the systematic theology that I envision is the elaboration of the basic set of special and general categories of that theology. The basic set of special systematic categories is found in the four-point hypothesis suggested some fifty years ago by Bernard Lonergan. The basic set of general systematic categories will consist of a theory of history derived from and grounded in Lonergan’s cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics, and in the complement to these that I have tried to suggest in speaking of psychic conversion. The basic sets are bound together by the scale of values suggested by Lonergan in Method in Theology and worked out in greater detail in Theology and the Dialectics of History. Together these basic sets of categories
constitute a unified field structure for systematic theology at the present time in its evolution, the basic dogmatic-theological context for a systematic theology on the level of our time. Once they are elaborated in their integration with one another, they will render possible a fuller systematic presentation of the other doctrines that enter into the church’s constitutive meaning: creation, revelation, redemption, church, sacraments, praxis. The elaboration will also consolidate the permanent achievements in the theological tradition to the present time, and the consolidation will be the point of departure for the next advances in the genetic sequence of systematic theologies. For questions will arise out of the elaboration of the unified field structure that cannot be answered on the basis of that elaboration itself. Those questions will be the operators of further systematic-theological development.

**Glossary of Some Technical Terms**

*Four-point hypothesis:* A synthetic statement that identifies four created supernatural realities each as a participation in and imitation of one of the divine relations – the *esse secundarium* of the assumed humanity of the incarnate Word as a created imitation of divine paternity, sanctifying grace as a created imitation of active spiration, the habit of charity as a created imitation of passive spiration, and the light of glory as a created imitation of filiation. There are thus four fundamental ways of imitating God, and each of them is a created participation in one of the divine relations.

*General and special theological categories:* General categories come within the purview of other disciplines besides theology, and so are shared with these disciplines; examples would be ‘justice,’ ‘social structures,’ ‘alienation,’ ‘ideology,’ ‘existence,’ even ‘God.’ Special categories are peculiar to theology: for example, ‘grace,’ ‘sin,’ ‘the mystical body of Christ,’ ‘the beatific vision.’ For Lonergan all theological categories should have a proximate or remote base in interiority and religious experience; thus, all
general categories should have a corresponding element in intentional consciousness while all special categories should have a corresponding element in religious experience; and the theologian should be able to show the relation of the categories he or she employs to these respective bases.

**Theorem of the supernatural:** The theorem is a speculative development that arose from Philip the Chancellor’s affirmation of the distinction between natural and meritorious love of God and the implication that he drew of an entitative disproportion between nature and grace and so between reason and faith, human esteem and merit before God.

**Unified field structure:** At any given point in the evolution of systematic or speculative theology, it is possible to articulate the basic elements around which such a theology is constructed. Those elements constitute a unified field structure. While their full articulation might take volumes, naming them is basically quite straightforward. Thus, it could be said that for Aquinas the unified field structure consisted of (1) the theorem of the supernatural and (2) Aristotle’s metaphysics. The present paper is proposing that a contemporary unified field structure would consist of (1) the four-point hypothesis and (2) a theory of history emergent from Lonergan’s cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics along with the author’s complementary suggestions regarding psychic conversion and aesthetic-dramatic operators of human development. I regard these as basically continuous developments on the two elements of Aquinas’s unified field structure.