Essays in Systematic Theology 15: ‘Complicate the Structure’: Notes on a Forgotten Precept

1 The Problem

The importance of the lectures that Bernard Lonergan delivered at Boston College in the summer of 1968 is generally placed in the fact that it was during these lectures that Lonergan first went public with the notion of functional specialties. As one who was fortunate enough to be present at this historic occasion, I can testify to the excitement that was generated as Lonergan pushed himself back from his chair, went to the board, said very diffidently something like, ‘This is something I stumbled on a while back,’ and proceeded to redraw the entire map of the discipline of theology with a schematic diagram of the interrelations among theological operations, a diagram that, many of us recognized quickly, answered the principal methodological questions that we had brought to this institute.

My concern here, however, is with a different, although related, feature of the content of these 1968 lectures. It is different in that it is something that did not survive Lonergan’s subsequent editing of material for the book Method in Theology, at least in the form in which it appeared in the 1968 lectures. It is related in that it states a general methodological precept of which functional specialization is but one example.

1 This paper was delivered at the Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, June 2004. It has not been previously published.

2 2009: The tape recordings of these lectures have been transferred to compact disc and are also available on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, starting at 48100A0E060. A transcript will be published in volume 22 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Works in Theological Method 1.
I am referring to Lonergan’s response to his own question, How does one get from transcendental method to general categories? His answer is as follows. ‘I indicate five ways of going about it. One starts from the basic structure, the transcendental notions, the operations, the structure of the operations, and from the correlative objects. One can: (1) complicate the structure, (2) turn to concrete instances of it, (3) fill it out, (4) differentiate it, (5) set it in motion.’ Lonergan does not mean that one must do all five of these each time one is engaged in deriving and developing general categories, but rather that these are five distinct and related ways in which transcendental or generalized empirical method – here called ‘the structure’ – can function as the transcultural base of the general categories. In this sense, then, my subtitle here is somewhat misleading. These are not so much precepts or canons as they are different ways in which, in different instances depending on the circumstances, and either singly or in various combinations, a theologian can derive general categories from the appropriate base. What is crucial is the claim regarding the base. Once that claim is made, Lonergan lists five ways in which it can be fulfilled. The claim is put as follows in *Method in Theology*: ‘The base of general theological categories is the attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating subject along with the operations that result from attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating and with the structure within which the operations occur … Such is the basic nest of terms and relations.’

Now it is interesting that in the section on general categories in the chapter on Foundations only two of the five ways of ‘going about it,’ of deriving the general categories from the base, that Lonergan specified in 1968 are explicitly treated, namely,

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differentiating the structure and setting it in motion. Two of the other ‘ways of going about it’ from 1968, namely, turning to concrete instances of the structure and filling out the structure, are covered in this section of Method in Theology without being mentioned

4 ‘… the basic nest of terms and relations can be differentiated in a number of manners …’ Ibid. 286-87.

5 ‘… since the basic nest of terms and relations is a dynamic structure, there are various ways in which models of change can be worked out …’ Ibid. 287.

6 1968: ‘From the individual subject of conscious and intentional operations, turn to many such subjects, to their grouping in society, and to the historical succession of such groups. The basic structure becomes an a priori for the individual in the group, for the group, for the history of the group..’ Method in Theology 286: ‘Now there has been for millennia a vast multitude of individuals in whom such basic nests of terms and relations can be verified: for they too attend, understand, judge, decide. Moreover, they do so not in isolation but in social groups, and as such groups develop and progress and also decline, there is not only society but also history.’ It would seem that a clear instance of this ‘turning to concrete instances of the structure’ in a social context is provided in the programmatic and magisterial essay ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: 1985) 169-83, where the issue is the relation between the structure and collective responsibility. We will revisit that issue later in this paper.

7 1968: ‘Experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. Experiencing what? Understanding what? Judging what? Deciding what? Fill it out with details. Now you have a good deal of this in Insight; and we will have two chapters, the fourth and the fifth, concerned largely with that business of filling out, on the human good, values, beliefs, meaning. So there is a move to the concrete.’ (Lonergan changed the ordering of his chapters from 1968 to the final draft of the book.) Method in Theology 286: ‘…
as such. But this means that what seems somewhat lost in the transition from the 1968 lectures to the book *Method in Theology* is the first of these ‘ways of going about it,’ namely, complicating the structure, not in the sense that Lonergan does not *do* it but in the sense that he does not say he is doing it. It is that procedure that I wish to address in a quite preliminary fashion here, and before I do so in the restricted domain of deriving general categories, in this case the general categories of the scale of values, I wish to speak about complicating the structure in the quite open domain of developing transcendental or generalized empirical method itself. Here, I think, ‘Complicate the structure’ does become a precept or, perhaps better, a canon.

### 2 Examples of Complicating the Structure

What, then, does Lonergan mean by complicating the structure? The 1968 lecture on this material offers four examples of complicating the structure. The first is ‘the commonsense development of intelligence studied in chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight.*’ A second way opens upon at least a fourfold differentiation of heuristic structures: ‘the classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical heuristic structures worked out in *Insight:* classical, in classical science; statistical, when you start taking concrete events into account; genetic, in biology; dialectical, dealing with the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory.’ A third way of complicating the structure is by developing the integral the subject is self-transcending. His operations reveal objects: single operations reveal partial objects; a structured compound of operations reveals compounded objects; and as the subject by his operations is conscious of himself operating, he too is revealed though not as object but as subject.’ Ibid. 287: ‘From such a broadened basis one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development.’
heuristic structure that is a metaphysics. ‘It complicates the fundamental business of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding by having several instances of this in certain relations.’ And finally, the notion of functional specialties represents a fourth complication of the basic structure. ‘We have the four levels (experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding) occurring in two phases; and the effort concentrates on the end of the first level, the second level, the third level, and the fourth level. This happens twice, and so you get eight. It’s a complication of the basic structure.’ Presumably, we might consider Lonergan’s later development of a way of speaking about a movement ‘from above downwards’ in the structure to be another instance of complicating the structure, one that in fact is heralded by functional specialization’s movement from foundations through doctrines and systematics to communications in the second phase of the theological enterprise.  

It is clear from this set of examples that not all instances of complicating the structure follow the same pattern of operations. That is to say, complications are not always introduced in the same fashion. The complications that take place when one offers an account of common sense focus on the vagaries of intelligence, first in the concrete

8 2009: Obviously, Lonergan’s later references to further levels would complicate the structure (in ways that some would prefer not to acknowledge, I might add!) As Lonergan came to acknowledge that he was putting too much into the three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, and so that it was necessary to add a fourth level, decision, so later in life he acknowledged that this too was not sufficient, and began to speak of a fifth level of total commitment and love, or even of six levels, with the emergence into symbolic consciousness in the dream as a ‘first.’ It would be interesting from the standpoint of psychic self-appropriation to study the resistance among some in the Lonergan community to categories that not only complicate but also stretch the structure.
living of the subject in the dramatic pattern of everyday experience, and then in the progress and decline of the social order. Here there are opened for consideration such topics as the two variables of the development of the subject to which things are related and the development in the things to which we are related; the manner in which both variables are subject to aberrations of various kinds; the consequences of the refusal of insight in the subject and in the social order; and finally, ‘the relations between different conscious subjects, between conscious subjects and their milieu or environment, and between consciousness and its neural basis.’

In the sciences, on the other hand, the complications are all concerned with various ways of coming to understand things, not in their relations to us, but in their relations to one another. Moreover, the classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic structures, as well as the integral heuristic structure of a metaphysics, are all complications of the basic structure in the sense that the scientist or philosopher is able to exploit for his or her specific purposes the fact that, in the structure itself, ‘prior to the understanding that issues in answers, there are the questions that anticipate answers.’ The establishment of a heuristic structure over time by a scientific or philosophic community is a methodological or systematic employment of such anticipation in the determination of answers of various kinds whose shared common feature is that they are as yet unknown.

Finally (and this is the principal example appealed to in this paper), the presentation of functional specialization itself is perhaps the most elaborate complication of the structure, and also perhaps also the most fruitful. I think it can legitimately be argued that functional specialization is the most important set of philosophical insights.

offered by any thinker in the past several hundred years. Moreover, it embodies a structure of complicating that, I wish to argue, is evident in other instances besides the development of the functional specialties. Here the key to complicating the structure is to bring the operations of all four levels of conscious intentionality to bear upon achieving the ends peculiar to each of the four levels, and to do this in two phases, one in indirect discourse, relating the words and deeds of others, and the other in direct discourse, taking responsibility for one’s own words and deeds. Allow me, please a lengthy quotation:

… in a scientific investigation the ends proper to particular levels may become the objective sought by operations on all four levels. So the textual critic will select the method (level of decision) that he feels will lead to the discovery (level of understanding) of what one may reasonably affirm (level of judgment) was written in the original text (level of experience). The textual critic, then, operates on all four levels, but his goal is the end proper to the first level, namely, to ascertain the data. The interpreter, however, pursues a different goal. He wishes to understand the text, and so he selects a different method. Moreover, he cannot confine his operations to the second level, understanding, and to the fourth, a selective decision. He must apprehend the text accurately before he can hope to understand it, and so he has to operate on the first level; and he has to judge whether or not his understanding is correct, for otherwise he will fail to distinguish between understanding and misunderstanding.¹⁰

3 Two Further Instances of Complicating the Structure

Now in the present paper I wish to suggest two further instances of complicating the structure that resemble at least in part this last example, the type of complications that

arise in functional specialization. The two instances have featured in my own work over
the years, the first most recently as I have suggested something of an expansion of the
more or less standard notion among Lonergan students of the first or empirical level of
consciousness, and the second in the elaboration of the scale of values that I attempted in
Thesis and the Dialectics of History. In each case, I suggest, we have instances of
bringing the operations of all four levels of intentional consciousness to bear upon
achieving the objectives of distinct levels. The first instance is simpler, at least in that it is
really a spontaneous complication of the structure in everyday life, where without
thinking we bring the four levels of intentional consciousness to bear upon the reception
of meaningful data at the level of empirical consciousness. In many instances this is
precisely what is meant by the first transcendental precept, ‘Be attentive.’ In the second
instance, complicating the structure becomes itself more complicated. First we must
distinguish the pursuit of the scale of values, whether spontaneous or deliberate and self-
conscious, from the philosophic account of the scale. In the pursuit of the scale of values,
all four levels of intentional consciousness are brought to bear on achieving the multiple
objectives of all four levels of consciousness. And in the reflective elaboration of that
scale in a philosophy this multiple complication has to be accounted for. The principal
objective of my analysis of the scale of values in this paper is to indicate that the integral
pursuit of the scale of values, whether that be done spontaneously or deliberately and
self-consciously, is itself a complication in actus exercitot of the basic structure, and that
this is the basis for the transcendental and transcultural validity of the scale. Moreover, in
regard to this instance of the scale of values we may implement at least two more of
Lonergan’s 1968 canons or precepts or perhaps just suggestions, namely, turning to
concrete instances of the complicated structure and setting the complicated structure in
motion. At this point we are right into the issue that Lonergan was himself addressing in
1968, namely, deriving the general categories for a doctrinal and systematic theology. For
we have here, I believe, at least the beginnings of a set of categories for a doctrine and
theology of social grace. And we are also contributing to his efforts in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ to articulate a basis for collective responsibility.

4 The First Further Instance: Receiving Meaningful Data

Here I am speaking about the first level in the structure, the level we usually refer to as ‘experience.’ The complication involves acknowledging the influence of so-called ‘higher’ levels on this ‘lower’ level, and so recognizing that the movements among the various levels function in more ways than simply the process from experience to understanding, from experience and understanding to judgment, and from knowledge to decision. I have been repeating and developing my arguments in this regard in several papers delivered over the past year.11 Moreover, in some ways I have been talking about this for a much longer period of time, since I am really in effect picking up on and further amplifying the use that I made of Eugene Gendlin’s early work on ‘felt meaning’ in my doctoral dissertation, Subject and Psyche.12 But my central point has been that there is


12 Robert M. Doran, Subject and Psyche, 2nd ed. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994). For references to Gendlin, see pp. 96, 115-17, 169-72. I regard Gendlin’s later developments around ‘focusing’ as exercises in the concrete appropriation of
some evidence even in *Insight* that the more or less standard notion of empirical consciousness entertained by at least some Lonergan students may be an abstraction, and indeed that it should be expanded to include the reception of meanings and values as these are embodied in the various carriers of meaning: intersubjectivity, art, symbol, ordinary and literary and technical language, and the incarnate witness of persons. There is an empirical givenness of intellectually structured meaning, and this meaning functions effectively and constitutively in human living even before it has been subjected to critical examination and personal and communal appropriation or rejection. With a sideways bow to Wittgenstein, I emphasize that received meaning in large part has the intelligibility of ordinary meaningfulness, of public language. But in accord with the emphases of Lonergan, and so with a straightforward bow to him, I insist that it is also the product of the original meaningfulness of the insights, judgments, and decisions of those who have preceded us. There is an ordinary meaningfulness of publicly sedimented expression as such expression mediates the reception of data, and there is an original meaningfulness of what proceeds by intellectual emanation when the subject raises his or her own questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, answers these questions in acts of understanding and in judgments of fact and of value, and formulates the answers in inner and outer words that contribute to the communal fund of ordinary meaningfulness.¹³ This communal fund, which is as variable as the myriad cultures of humankind, is received in the empirical consciousness of subjects in the processes of socialization, acculturation, and education. Eventually, it is hoped, it will be subjected to the processes that culminate in their own original meaningfulness. But the emphasis in the paper was on the expansion of the more or less standard notion or conception of empirical consciousness so as to

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¹³ On ordinary and original meaningfulness, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 255-57.
include the reception of intellectually structured meaning and communally transmitted values.

In support of this position, I argued that what I was doing was analogous to something that happens in functional specialization, and revisiting Lonergan’s 1968 comments subsequently led me to see that functional specialization itself is an instance of complication the structure. I suggested, then, that there is something of an analogy between the four levels of intentional consciousness as they function in everyday living and the same levels as they function in distinct functional specialties in a discipline such as theology. If I may quote the earlier paper: ‘In particular, I suggest an analogy between empirical consciousness as it functions in everyday living and empirical consciousness as it sets the objectives of the functional specialty “research.”’ The common element is that all four sets of conscious operations work together as one receives data. The difference … is that work in the functional specialty “research” is a fully deliberate, chosen set of projects whose mediated object is a carefully isolated set of data that will be subject to rigorous and methodical interpretation. The data that emerge in research are the product of immanently generated acts of insight, judgment, and decision, as, for example, in the production of a critical text. That sort of specialized application does not occur in everyday, commonsense performance. Still, many of the data received in ordinary everyday living are already invested with a meaning that functions effectively and constitutively … The world is already mediated by meaning to a subject whose empirical consciousness is the empirical consciousness of someone intelligent. There is an intellectually apprehensive component that functions at the level of reception’ or empirical consciousness.

We might say, then, that the methodical complication of the structure that takes place in functional specialization is a fully deliberate, rigorous imitation, in the domain of original meaningfulness, of a procedure that happens spontaneously in everyday living, in the domain of ordinary meaningfulness. A good deal of what I came to understand as an
instance of ‘complicating the structure’ is in effect a matter of arguing that the structure complicates itself. Lonergan refers to cognitional structure as a whole that is self-assembling, self-constituting, and so as a formally dynamic structure.\textsuperscript{14} To the characterization of the structure as self-assembling and self-constituting we may add, I trust, the note that the structure is also self-complicating. And from this analysis I proceeded to indicate sources in the book \textit{Insight} that would support this position. Of these I will mention only one here, but this one source is enough, I think, to defend the position that what I am saying is not in conflict with Lonergan’s own mind on these matters.

The source to which I refer is the following schematic representation of the basic structure presented in the chapter on judgment in \textit{Insight}, along with comments that Lonergan makes regarding this schema.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
I. Data. Perceptual Images. & Free Images. & Utterances. \\
II. Questions for Intelligence. & Insights. & Formulations. \\
III. Questions for Reflection. & Reflection. & Judgment.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Lonergan says about this schema, ‘The second level presupposes and complements the first. The third level presupposes and complements the second. The exception lies in free images and utterances, \textit{which commonly are under the influence of the higher levels before they provide a basis for inquiry and reflection}.\textsuperscript{16} That is to say, there are presentations that occur to the conscious subject \textit{on the empirical level of consciousness}


\textsuperscript{15} Lonergan, \textit{Insight} 299.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., emphasis added
that are already *infused with intelligence and rationality and with ethical overtones*. To draw from Heidegger without, I hope, doing violence to his meaning, these presentations occur to a *Verstehen* that is empirical, that receives meaningful data before these data provide a basis for *Dasein*’s own inquiry and reflection. Because these data are meaningful, they are constitutive of the living that they inform. But their constitutive function will be transformed as they are submitted to inquiry, reflection, and deliberation.

5 The Scale of Values

I believe that a reduplicative structure similar to that which accounts for the explicitation of functional specialization is involved in accounting for the scale of values. To my knowledge, Lonergan never tells us how he derived the ascending scale: vital, social, cultural, personal, religious. But to me it has always seemed obvious that the scale is based on the increasing degrees of self-transcendence to which one is carried in one’s response to values at the different levels. This has always made sense to my students when I have explained the scale in this way. Moreover, it has always seemed right to me to assume that the levels of value are isomorphic with the levels of consciousness, so that vital values correspond to experience, social values to understanding, cultural values to reflection and judgment, personal values to deliberation and decision, and religious values to God’s gift of love. This, too, has always made sense to my students. But a respected Lonergan scholar recently greeted this particular point with some hesitation, and that drove me back to the drawing boards. The issue is important for the ulterior objective of developing a systematic theology, for the scale of values represents a crucial set of general categories in the theology that I envision.\(^{17}\) So I wish to suggest that here

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too we are dealing with a complication of the basic structure and not with a simple correspondence.18

The complication of the structure that is involved in accounting for the scale of values assumes that, insofar as we are speaking of the deliberate pursuit of values, we are speaking always of fourth-level activity; but it goes on to suggest that, in our pursuit of values at the different levels of the scale, all four levels of intentional consciousness, within the horizon effected by the gift of God’s love, are brought to bear upon the realization of the objectives of one level, in a manner that is analogous to the manner in which the four levels operate in each of the functional specialties to bring about the objectives of different specific levels in any given specialty.

Thus, surely it is true that vital values entail more than experience, that the social value of the good of order entails more than understanding, that cultural values entail more than reflection and judgment, and that personal value entails more than decision. But may it not be argued nonetheless that vital values have some correspondence to particular goods, which in Lonergan’s scheme of the human good are correlated with the level of experience; that social values have some correspondence to the good of order, which for Lonergan is always a function of understanding; that cultural values have some correspondence to judgment; and that personal values have some correspondence to the existential moment in which one discovers for oneself that it is up to oneself to decide just what one is going to make of oneself? I think that each of these correspondences is clear, except for the third, the correspondence of cultural values with reflection and

18 It should be indicated that even the isomorphism of knowing and known in *Insight* is more than a simple correspondence. The clearest example of this is that what from one standpoint is act, and so isomorphic with judgment, namely, the coincidental occurrences that are departures from schemes of recurrence, from another standpoint is potency for the emergence of a new scheme, and so isomorphic with ‘experience.’
judgment. That correspondence, perhaps, is not immediately clear from the brief mention of the scale of values in *Method in Theology*: ‘Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value.’\(^{19}\) It could be argued that while the validation and criticism of meaning and value might indeed be primarily a function of judgment, the discovery and expression of such meaning and value would be a function more of understanding than of judgment, and that the correction, development, and improvement would entail primarily judgments of value, deliberation, and decision. And so I appeal to other sources in Lonergan’s work for evidence to support the position that in his mind cultural values are primarily a function of judgment. In *Topics in Education* he says the following:

As we distinguished insight or intelligence and judgment, so we shall distinguish two levels of development in the first differential [of the human good]. There is intellectual development, and there is reflective development. Intellectual development corresponds to civilization, reflective development to culture.\(^{20}\)

Again (and here we find what for Lonergan truly constitutes cultural development):

… besides [the] level of intellectual development, which is a development in intelligence, in the question *Quid sit?* What is it? there is also a reflective level of development, a development of culture as opposed to civilization. Civilization is

\(^{19}\) Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 32.

connected with technology, economy, and the polity or state. But there is the quite
different level of reflective thought. This level arises because advance in
civilizational order both presupposes and results in a fresh apprehension of the
structural invariants. Particular goods change, and changes arise as well in the good
of order and in the concrete way in which aesthetic, ethical, and religious values are
realized. The mere fact of the advance of civilizational order, the transition from one
form of material civilization to another, involves some sort of new incarnation, new
realization, of the structural invariants … [T]his shift in the apprehension and
realization of the structural invariants of the human good is essentially different from
the civilizational process. In the latter case insight leads to new discoveries, new
ideas, new possibilities, and the process spreads and radiates through a whole society
and extends into other societies … But the structural invariants do not change. They
are not the object of a new discovery. They are always there, operative though they
are not noticed … Nonetheless, there is a progress in the apprehension of the
structural invariants. That progress is from the compactness of the symbol to the
differentiation of philosophic, scientific, theological, and historical consciousness.21

The correlation of cultural development with the ongoing differentiation of
consciousness, and the further correlation of each of these with reflection and judgment,
does not represent simply an early or intermediate stage in Lonergan’s development. It
survives in Method in Theology, where we read, ‘We have set forth a bare list of the
differentiations of human consciousness. But these differentiations also characterize
successive stages in cultural development and, as each earlier stage fails to foresee
subsequent stages, the series as a whole may be named the ongoing discovery of mind.’22
What is the ongoing discovery of mind but progress in the apprehension of the structural

21 Ibid. 54-55, emphasis added.
22 Lonergan, Method in Theology 305.
invariants, culminating in the plateau that is reached with Insight’s chapter 11 and its self-affirmation of the knower and that is only further explored and developed as other levels are added and the interactions of the various levels are acknowledged? Moreover, the series of developments that are acknowledged in Method in Theology as they enter into church doctrine simply amplify and specify the earlier mention of progress ‘from the compactness of the symbol to the differentiation of philosophic, scientific, theological, and historical consciousness.’ For these developments are ‘(1) the reinterpretation of symbolic apprehension, (2) philosophic purification of biblical anthropomorphism, (3) the occasional use of systematic meaning, (4) systematic theological doctrine, (5) church doctrine dependent on systematic theological doctrine, and … (6) the complexities of contemporary development.’ 23 That all of these are functions of a cultural line of development that corresponds to the ongoing discovery of mind or the ongoing progress in the apprehension of the structural invariants is clear from the three sections of the chapter on Doctrines in which these matters are given extensive treatment, sections entitled ‘The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part One,’ ‘Ongoing Contexts’ (where the contexts themselves are cultural), and ‘The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part Two.’ 24 That all of this is correlated with reflection and judgment is at least implicit in the fact that the discussion takes place in the chapter on the functional specialty ‘doctrines,’ which itself is a function of judgment. The discussion is concerned, in fact, with what is called in Insight ‘the contextual aspect of judgment.’ 25

So I think it can be argued that there is sufficient evidence in Lonergan’s writings to support the position that the scale of values is a function of these structural invariants, and is indeed isomorphic with them, even as the pursuit and realization of any one of the

23 Ibid. 305-306.
24 See ibid. 305-18 passim.
25 Lonergan, Insight 301.
levels of value (at least of vital, social, cultural, and personal value) entails bringing the intentional operations of all four levels to bear upon attaining the objective of one level. It can, in fact, be argued that we are here dealing precisely with a fresh apprehension of the structural invariants themselves. This is the essential complication of the structure to which I would call attention in defending the position that the ground of the scale of values precisely as a scale lies in the structural invariants. My ulterior motive, of course, goes beyond this. I am concerned to establish that the scale of values does indeed provide a legitimate complex of general categories for a systematic theology that would be a theology of history. It will function in this way only if it can be shown to be derived from the basic structure of the invariant features of intentional consciousness. This is why I have been so concerned with trying to establish this point.

This position on the scale of values remains static, however, until we turn to two more canons from Lonergan’s 1968 presentation: ‘identify concrete instances of the complicated structure,’ and ‘set the complicated structure in motion.’ In fact, I devoted a great deal of attention to beginning those tasks in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, and so I will complete this paper with a very brief summary of what I tried to do there, bringing it up to date by harmonizing it with the new methodological perspectives of this paper.

### 6 Instances of the Complicated Structure in Motion

We begin with Lonergan’s statement in the magisterial essay ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ that the normative source of meaning in history is more than the transcendental imperatives associated with the four levels of intentional consciousness: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. It is rather ‘a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational
reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these’ in love.\textsuperscript{26} I wish to argue (1) that this statement itself demands a further complication of the basic structure, even when that structure is applied only to the authenticity of the subject; (2) that the statement supports another complication, namely, the complication of the notion of dialectic that I presented in \textit{Theology and the Dialectics of History}; (3) that this statement can be employed as well to complicate and fill out the structure of the scale of values; and (4) that when this latter task is done, the way is open both for a fuller account of the collective responsibility that was Lonergan’s principal concern in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ and for a new moment in the theology of grace, namely, a theological grounding of the notion of social grace or grace-filled social structures.

\textit{6.1 The Structure of Authenticity}

First, then, this statement from ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ demands a further complication of the account of the structure of the subject’s authenticity. In the context in which the statement appears in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ the statement stipulates or at least implies that we must grant that what I have called the symbolic operator at the base of the structure, as well as the feelings that permeate the structure itself and what Lonergan calls the topmost operator of interpersonal relations and total commitment, provide a needed complement to the operators of intellectual and moral development specified in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. This is confirmed by the fact that the statement that I have quoted appears in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ as an answer to a question: because what is attained by the several principles that are operators of conscious intentionality (questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and questions for deliberation) ‘are only aspects of something richer and fuller, must not the several principles themselves be but aspects of a deeper

\textsuperscript{26} Bernard Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ 175.
Lonergan’s answer to that question is another question: ‘And is not that deeper and more comprehensive principle itself a nature, at once a principle of movement and of rest, a tidal movement that beings before consciousness, etc.’ The whole movement, which is ‘an ongoing process of self-transcendence,’ is explicitly identified as ‘the normative source of meaning’ in history.

This normative source ‘reveals no more than individual responsibility,’ and so Lonergan has not yet answered the central question that he posed in the paper, namely, the question regarding the structure of collective responsibility. ‘Only inasmuch as the immanent source becomes revealed in its effects, in the functioning order of society, in cultural vitality and achievement, in the unfolding of human history, does the manifold of isolated responsibilities coalesce into a single object that can gain collective attention.’

But we will come back to that topic later. The subjective context of the operators of conscious intentionality is mentioned also in the slightly earlier paper ‘Mission and the Spirit,’ where Lonergan’s term corresponding to what in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ is called ‘a tidal movement’ is referred to rather as ‘the passionateness of being.’ The passionateness of being, he says, ‘has a dimension of its own’ that enables it to underpin, accompany, and reach beyond ‘the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious.’ As underpinning this intentional subject, it is what at this point he calls ‘the quasi-operator that presides over the transition from the neural to the psychic’; as accompanying intentional operations it is ‘the mass and momentum of our lives, the color and tone and power of feeling’; and as reaching beyond or overarching conscious intentionality it is ‘the topmost quasi-operator that by intersubjectivity

27 Ibid. 174.
28 Ibid. 175.
29 Ibid. 176.
30 Ibid.
prepares, by solidarity entices, by falling in love establishes us as members of community."

My own proposal is that this dimension, distinct from but related to intelligent, rational, and moral operations, is released into the possibility of some appropriation by specifying a set of aesthetic-dramatic operators that mediate between the two dimensions, as these operators promote something that underpins, accompanies, and reaches beyond intentional operations. The set of aesthetic-dramatic operators consists of (1) the symbolic operators that effect the transition from the neural to the psychic, (2) the affective operators that consist in the feelings that permeate all intentional operations, and (3) the interpersonal operators that found community. In the posthumously published (indeed posthumously discovered) paper ‘Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,’ Lonergan speaks of operators, not quasi-operators, on either end, and extends his analysis of consciousness to include six levels of consciousness, four of which are the levels of intentional consciousness with which we are familiar.

6.2 Dialectic

Next, it is on the basis of this distinction-in-relation between intentionality and psyche that I would posit a certain dialectical nature to the normative source of meaning in history. One of the more controversial claims that I have made in my own work is that there are two types of process that satisfy Lonergan’s initial definition of dialectic in 

\[ \text{Insight}. \] ‘… a dialectic,’ Lonergan says, ‘is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1) there is an aggregate of events of

a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of two principles, (3) the principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from them.”

It was from my study of Jungian psychology that I first learned how essential it is to distinguish two kinds of opposed principles of change. Jung and his disciples tend to treat all opposition as capable of reconciliation in some kind of higher synthesis. This works fine for such principles of change as consciousness and the unconscious, spirit and psyche, or the masculine and feminine dimensions of the psyche itself, but it wreaks havoc and disaster when the opposed principles are self-transcendence and the refusal of self-transcendence, authenticity and inauthenticity. For then one is engaged, as some Jungians indeed are engaged, in the fruitless and indeed very dangerous quest to reach a position beyond good and evil. But there would be a reverse sort of havoc, the kind that has been wreaked on people by centuries of false Catholic repression in spirituality and moral teaching and that continues to plague church teaching, were Lonergan students to treat the opposition between neural demands and the censorship, for example, or between intersubjectivity and practical intelligence, as if one of these principles of change were somehow a source of evil or falsehood and only the other principle a source of the good and the true. We have to acknowledge something like what, for better or for worse, I have called dialectics of contraries, such as the dialectic of the subject in chapter 6 of *Insight* and the dialectic of community in chapter 7, and dialectics of contradictories, such as the dialectic of ‘thing’ and ‘body’ introduced in chapter 8 of the same book and the dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity that features so prominently in Lonergan’s later work. Dialectics of contraries are grounded a tension between intentional consciousness and the passionateness of being that, we recall from ‘Mission and the Spirit,’ *has a dimension of its own*. The only satisfactory negotiation of this tension is to bring it fully into

consciousness and let oneself be established in it as the creative source of one’s further development and one’s efforts at world constitution. Lonergan’s presentation of genuineness in chapter 15 of *Insight* supports this analysis. Neither limitation nor transcendence is to be neglected; the tendency to such neglect, in either direction, is, theologically viewed, concupiscence, and capitulation to the tendency is basic sin. Intentionality and psyche constitute a *dialectic of contraries* that is to be affirmed, strengthened, and assumed as the foundation of one’s conscious dramatic living.\(^{34}\) That dialectic constitutes the normative source of the subject’s authenticity. Fidelity to the dialectic would imply progress. Skewing that dialectic in favor of either psyche or intentionality, either the movement or the search for direction in the movement, is the source or root by default of personal decline.

There is, however, also a dialectic of contradictories: *either* the solidary and creative tension of psyche and intentionality as normative source of authenticity, *or* its dissolution by neglect of *either* pole. That either/or is the basis of the either/or of what is authentic or inauthentic. Lonergan’s usual, though I would maintain not his sole, use of the term ‘dialectic’ has to do with the concrete, the dynamic, and the *contradictory*, and so with the dialectic of contradictories. But in *Insight* there is a single but complex notion of dialectic that can be reduced to some manageable clarity only by grasping the distinction between consciousness and knowledge. There is a duality to both consciousness and knowledge, but the duality is to be negotiated in a different manner in each case. The duality of consciousness is precisely the duality of intentionality and ‘tidal

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34 It is not to be maintained, however, that intentionality is always the source of transcendence, and psyche always the source of limitation. ‘The initiative of development may be organic, psychic, intellectual, or external …’ Lonergan, *Insight* 496. What counts is satisfying the principle of correspondence among the different levels.
movement’ or ‘passionateness of being’ or sensitive psyche or vertically finalistic undertow (or whatever one chooses to call it), where the latter has ‘a dimension of its own.’ But there are also two kinds of knowing that exist without differentiation and in an ambivalent confusion until they are distinguished explicitly and only one of them is acknowledged to be full human knowing. Thus the duality of knowing is to be negotiated, Lonergan says, by ‘breaking’ it and affirming oneself a knower in the sense of a concrete unity, identity, whole that performs cognitive operations on the three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment. But breaking the duality of knowing entails affirming, maintaining, and strengthening the unity in duality of consciousness, a concrete unity of opposed principles, both of which are ‘I’ and neither of which is merely ‘It.’ The duality of sensitive and intellectual consciousness is constitutive of full human knowing. To break the duality of consciousness in favor of either sense or intellect to the exclusion of the other would be to invite, indeed to guarantee, conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration in the unfolding of the linked but opposed cognitive principles of sensitive and intellectual consciousness, whereas to preserve that dialectic results in the cognitive progress consequent upon the harmonious working of these principles. The basic position on knowing affirms the unity in duality of consciousness, while the basic counterpositions break that unity in duality. Moreover, preserving that unity in duality is a realization of the tension of limitation and transcendence that constitutes genuineness. That tension is not mere homeostatic balance but conscious finality, in which psychic spontaneity heads toward the transforming enrichments effected by successive sublations in virtue of further questions, or, as Lonergan puts it, in which ‘the operator is relentless in transforming the integrator.’

Thus the experience of movement and rest changes as one moves from level to level. And the feeling of the

creative tension is the affective indication of integrity in the process of inquiry whereby one arrives at the intelligible, the true, and the good.

The two quite distinct kinds of realization of this single but complex notion are unified by the fact that there is a dialectic when there is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change, where the principles themselves are modified cumulatively by the unfolding. But they are distinct because a dialectic of contraries calls for a choice of both generative principles in their functional interdependence, while a dialectic of contradictories demands that we choose one principle of the process and reject the other. But this either/or bears upon the harmonious working of the internally constitutive principles of the dialectic of contraries: either the creative tension of the two (authenticity) or the displacement of this tension in one direction of the other (inauthenticity).

The distinction that I am drawing is not unrelated, I believe, to a use of the term ‘dialectic’ that appears in some of Lonergan’s early writings on dialectic and history, where he distinguished a natural dialectic, a dialectic of sin, and a supernatural dialectic. The dialectics of contraries that, as we will see in a moment, I am locating at the personal, cultural, and social levels of the scale of values would be complications of the structure of what Lonergan called a natural dialectic, where there is ‘a series of ascending general principles each followed by expansion, antithesis, and a soluble problem.’

The term ‘natural dialectic’ thus corresponds to the term ‘progress’ in the familiar theory of history as progress-decline-redemption, just as ‘dialectic of sin’ corresponds to ‘decline’ and ‘supernatural dialectic’ to ‘redemption.’ If the normative source of meaning in history is now the ‘tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible decision, only to find its rest

beyond all of these’ in love,\textsuperscript{37} then that tidal movement takes the place that previously was assigned to the ‘natural dialectic’ of ‘progress.’ And if this is the case, then that ‘natural dialectic,’ now identified with the ‘deeper and more comprehensive principle,’ the ‘something richer and fuller’ than intentional consciousness alone,\textsuperscript{38} is dialectical precisely in the sense that I am appealing to in speaking of a dialectic of contraries.

Dialectic is a relatively a priori component in the heuristic structure of human science, when this science studies data that lie beyond those that are to be found within a single consciousness, whether in the relations between consciousness and the unconscious, or in the relations among different conscious subjects, or in the relations between conscious subjects and their historical milieu. ‘Dialectic’ functions in the study of these data much as the differential equation functions in classical physics: as the physicist anticipates that the correlation that will provide an explanatory account of the relations among sense data will be the solution of a differential equation, so the human scientist anticipates that the relations between consciousness and the unconscious, between different conscious subjects, and between conscious subjects and their milieu will be some realization of dialectic.

Note that with the notion of dialectic applied in this way we are inching toward some greater specification of the structure and constitution of collective responsibility, that is, toward something that would be more than simply the affirmation, regarded by Lonergan as unsatisfactory, that ‘as [people] individually are responsible for the lives they lead, so collectively they must be responsible for the resultant situation.’\textsuperscript{39} We will come closer still when we flesh out this discussion with a consideration of the scale of values.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{37} Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ 175.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. 174.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. 169.
\end{flushright}
6.3 The Scale of Values

Thirdly, then, the same statement from ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ concerning the normative source of meaning in history can be applied to complicating and filling out the structure of the scale of values.

In *Theology and the Dialectics of History* I argued that the dialectical structure of the normative source of meaning has at least three realizations, and that these are intimately interrelated, while remaining distinct. There is a dialectic of the subject, where the respective poles are the censorship exercised by dramatically patterned intentional consciousness and imagination, on the one hand, and the neural demands that would reach a conscious integration in image and affect, on the other hand. There is a dialectic of community, where the respective poles are the practical intelligence responsible for technological innovations, economic systems, and the political and legal stratum of society, on the one hand, and the intersubjectivity that prepares the way for the function of the topmost operator, on the other hand. And there is a dialectic of culturally constitutive patterns of meaning. Cosmological constitutive meaning finds the paradigm of order in cosmic rhythms, which are drawn upon to inform first the life of the community, and then the order of individual life. Anthropological constitutive meaning is based on the insight that the measure of integrity is world-transcendent, and that it orders first the life of the individual, and, through well-ordered individuals, the life of the community. The dialectics of the subject and of community are found in Lonergan (chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight*, respectively). The dialectic of culture is my own contribution, drawing on suggestions that I found in Eric Voegelin’s work but taking these suggestions in directions that are different from those of Voegelin, who does not envision anything like a dialectic of contraries between these cultural meaning systems.

All of this is preparatory to the task of setting our increasingly more complicated structure in motion. That is done by specifying how the three dialectical processes of
subject, culture, and social community are related to one another. The interrelations of the three dialectical processes can be understood by relating them to respective levels in the scale of values: the dialectic of the subject to the level of personal value, the dialectic of culture to the level of cultural values, and the dialectic of community to the level of social values.

6.4 Collective Responsibility and Social Grace

Fourth, with the complication of the scale of values that is introduced by pairing it with an analogy of dialectic at the levels of social, cultural, and personal value, the way is open both for a fuller account of the collective responsibility that was Lonergan’s principal concern in ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ and for a new moment in the theology of grace, namely, a theological grounding of the notion of social grace or grace-filled social structures. It has barely been acknowledged that the principal impetus for a theology of social grace is provided by Lonergan himself in the final chapter of the systematic part of his De Deo trino, where ‘the state of grace’ is, for the first time that I am aware of, distinguished from ‘the habit of grace,’ and is identified as a social and interpersonal situation, where the subjects involved in the situation are the three divine subjects and a very widely inclusive community of human subjects, namely, all those who have said ‘Yes,’ either explicitly or implicitly, to God’s offer of God’s own love.

First, then, collective responsibility. Lonergan begins ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ by commenting on the difficulty of the notion of collective responsibility and even more on the difficulty of ever achieving its reality. Still, he says, ‘if collective responsibility is not yet an established fact, it may be a possibility. Further, it may be a possibility that we can realize. Finally, it may be a possibility that it is desirable to realize.’\footnote{Ibid. 169.} His efforts to clarify the notion take the form of the conjunction of
the notion of natural right and human historicity. If the complications of the basic structure that I have suggested in this paper have any validity at all, they would represent contributions to the articulation of these two conjoined realities. And if that is the case, then perhaps we are closer to realizing an adequate account of collective responsibility.

I begin the chapter on the scale of values in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* by drawing on chapter 7 of *Insight* to posit a fivefold constitution of society: (1) intersubjective spontaneity, (2) technological institutions, (3) the economic system, (4) the political order, and (5) culture. Then, again with Lonergan, I distinguish culture into the two dimensions of the everyday set of meanings and values informing a given way of life, and the reflexive level arising from scientific, scholarly, philosophic, and theological understanding. The question then becomes, How are these elements related to one another? And I argue that the answer lies in developing Lonergan’s notion of the scale of values, which I am here suggesting is a complication of the basic structure of the normative source of meaning in history.

The social, cultural, and personal levels of value, then, are immanently constituted as dialectics of contraries or ‘natural dialectics’: the dialectics, respectively, of community, culture, and the subject. Each is a dialectical finalistic tension of limitation and transcendence or going beyond. The foundation and prime analogate lies in the twofold dialectic of the subject. The dialectic of the subject is twofold in that there is a basic dialectic of consciousness in its entirety, psyche and intentionality, with the unconscious, and a derived dialectic within consciousness between the psychic and the spiritual dimensions of consciousness.

The following schema setting up the scale of values is somewhat different from that offered in the book (pp. 95-97), but it contains all of the essential elements of that schema and is simply another way of formulating it.

First, the spontaneous intersubjectivity that is one of the constitutive principles of the dialectic of community is also one of the five elements constitutive of society.
Second, practical intelligence, the other constitutive principle of the dialectic of community, is the source of three of the other constitutive elements of society: technology, the economic order, and the political and legal stratum of society.

Third, these three elements must be kept in a taut dialectical tension with spontaneous intersubjectivity: ‘… the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal. For *dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles*; the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium.’

Fourth, the integrity or distortion of this dialectic of community is a function proximately of the everyday level of culture, and remotely of the reflexive level of culture; and general bias is connected to a refusal to acknowledge the significance of the reflexive level for the well-being of the social order.

Fifth, spontaneous intersubjectivity, technology, economic relations, politics, and the everyday level of culture constitute the infrastructure of a healthy society, and the reflexive level of culture constitutes society’s superstructure; and culture at both levels is the condition of the possibility of an integral dialectic of community.

Sixth, there is needed at the superstructural level an orientation that would take responsibility for the dialectic of community by attending to the integrity of cultural values at both the superstructural and the infrastructural levels. This orientation or mentality is what Lonergan calls cosmopolis.

Seventh, the foregoing can be expanded into a reflection on the relations that obtain among all the levels of value. The relations among the levels are isomorphic with those among the levels of consciousness. Moreover, from below, more basic levels are required for the emergence of higher levels, but they also set problems that only

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41 Lonergan, *Insight* 258. Emphasis added, to draw attention to ‘natural dialectic’ or the ‘dialectic of contraries’ as opposed to the ‘dialectic of contradictories.’
proportionate developments at the higher levels can solve; whereas from above, these proportionate developments are the condition of possibility of the appropriate schemes of recurrent events at the more basic levels. Thus, while people cannot devote their energies to creating and maintaining a social order if they are starving, and so while the emergence and development of effective schemes of recurrence in the good of order rests on previous schemes of vital values, conversely the effective and recurrent distribution of vital goods to the whole community is a function of the social order, which in its integrity is constituted by the dialectic of spontaneous intersubjectivity and the practical intelligence that institutes technological, economic, and political structures. Next, while culture rises on the base of social institutions, the effective integrity of the dialectic of the social order is a direct function of the cultural values that inform the everyday life of the community, and these in turn depend on the superstructural level of scientific, scholarly, philosophic, and theological meaning. Third, while personal integrity emerges in the context of cultural traditions, still both dimensions of cultural value are a direct function of the integrity of persons in community. Fourth, while the religious development of the person builds on and perfects natural development, personal integrity is a direct function of God’s grace, and natural development is incapable of sustained development without that grace.

The same scale is related also to dialectics of contradictories. ‘… just as sensitivity can suffer a breakdown under the cumulative misinterpretation of experience, so the social schemes required for distributing vital goods can be responsible instead for the maldistribution of these goods. And as a reinterpretation of experience is required for the healing of the psyche, so new technological, economic, and political schemes are required for the redistribution of vital goods. Again, as a reinterpretation of experience requires a shift in one’s meanings and values, so the new social schemes need new cultural values to inform and motivate their emergence and sustenance. Again, as the new meanings and values required for a reinterpretation of experience are a function of
religion, moral, intellectual, and psychic conversion, so the new cultural values
informing new social structures are a function of the conversion of persons as their
originating values. Finally, as conversion is the work of grace in personal life, so too the
originating values of authentic culture are God’s instruments for the renewal of the face
of the earth.”

The heuristic structure of these relations of progress and decline is: (1) the
breakdown of the effective recurrence of events at the more basic levels provides
problems that can be resolved only by emergent transformations at the more complex
levels; and (2) the proportions of the problems at the more basic levels determine the
range and efficacy that the more complex developments must achieve if they are truly to
meet the problems. The dynamics are spelled out in the following paragraph from the
book.

From above, then, religious values condition the possibility of personal integrity;
personal integrity conditions the possibility of authentic cultural values; at the
reflexive level of culture, such integrity will promote an authentic superstructural
collaboration that assumes responsibility for the integrity not only of scientific and
scholarly disciplines, but even of everyday culture; cultural integrity at both levels
conditions the possibility of a just social order; and a just social order conditions the
possibility of the equitable distribution of vital goods. Conversely, problems in the
effective and recurrent distribution of vital goods can be met only by a reversal of
distortions in the social order; the proportions of the needed reversal are set by the
scope and range of the real or potential maldistribution; the social change demands a
transformation at the everyday level of culture proportionate to the dimensions of the
social problem; this transformation frequently depends on reflexive theoretical and

42 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of
scientific developments at the superstructural level; new cultural values at both levels call for proportionate changes at the level of personal integrity; and these depend for their emergence, sustenance, and consistency on the religious development of the person.\textsuperscript{43}

The integrity of the superstructure thus conditions the integrity of the infrastructure. The breakdown of infrastructural integrity calls for proportionate developments at the superstructural level of culture. While personal integrity and authentic religion in one sense stand beyond both infrastructure and superstructure, they are essential to the integral functioning not only of a just society but also of the entire scale of values.

Section 2 of the chapter, ‘Expansion of the Basic Structure,’ develops the notion in several directions, and so represents a further complication of the structure, but also a further setting in motion. One implication is that, if the scale or proportion of the problems that exist at the more basic levels determines the extent of the changes that must take place at the more complex levels, then today, when the problem of the effective and equitable distribution of vital goods is global, so its solution must entail new technological, economic, and political structures that, while always local, form global networks, as well as commensurate intersubjective spontaneities and interpersonal relations. These socioeconomic, political, and interpersonal relations in turn will depend on the generation of cultural values that in some sense are crosscultural (the dialectic of culture). The theoretical developments required to institute alternative technologies, economies, polities, and communities are a function of the superstructure of culture, where the refinement of the dialectic of culture can be elaborated and where particular communities can communicate and collaborate in the institution of social schemes that promote a just social order. Again, this dialectic of culture will depend on the

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. 96-97.
appropriation of crosscultural psychic and intentional constituents of personal authenticity. And finally, such authenticity is itself dependent on the universal gift of God’s grace, or on what Christians would call the universal mission of the Holy Spirit.

If this analysis is correct, then the kind of self-appropriation of the crosscultural constituents of personal integrity that Lonergan’s work joined with psychic conversion makes possible is a culturally necessary form of self-transcendence at the present time. There is required on the part of a creative minority of subjects – and cultural leadership is always taken by a creative minority – the achievement of interiorly differentiated consciousness. There is also required something like a post-interiority mentality at the level of common sense, an attention to and recognition of the factors facilitating authentic progress on a transcultural basis. Moreover, the work of God’s grace in our contemporary situation includes this movement to interiorly differentiated consciousness as an agent of a world-cultural network of alternative communities. We must look to the dialogue of world religions as a principal arena for the crosscultural generation of world-cultural values. And religion, to be authentic, must be concerned not only with personal transformation but also with cultural and social change, again in accord with the structure of the scale of values.

A key insistence of Theology and the Dialectics of History, and one that I believe is very much in keeping with Lonergan’s own convictions, has to do with the significance of the cultural superstructure. The breakdown of everyday cultural values can often be reversed only by prolonged and difficult artistic, theoretical, scientific, philosophic, and theological work. The cultural values of a healthy society are constituted by the operative assumptions resulting from the pursuit of the transcendental objectives of the human spirit: of the beautiful in story and song, ritual and dance, art and literature; of the intelligible in science, scholarship, and common sense; of the true in philosophy and theology; and of the good in all questions regarding normativity. Such operative assumptions alone permit the subordination of practicality in the origination and
development of capital and technology, the economy and the state, to the construction of
the human world, of human relations, and of human subjects as works of art. These
pursuits cultivate an interiority that maintains practicality in a creative tension with
intersubjective spontaneity.

We can specify further relations within the structure (and so still one more
complication of the structure) by focusing on the elements that constitute the
infrastructure. What are the relations among technology, the economy, and politics when
these practical elements are a function of integral praxis constituting the human world as
a work of art? The answer lies in what Lonergan calls the political specialization of
common sense. Legal and political institutions are an element, not of the superstructure,
as Marx would maintain, but of the infrastructure, where they are to mediate between
culture in its everyday dimension and the economic and technological institutions of a
society, with a view to seeing that the latter are placed in dialectical relation with
intersubjective interaction. While the specialization of intelligence or mentality that
Lonergan calls cosmopolis mediates from the superstructural to the infrastructural level
of culture, the mediation from the infrastructural level of culture to the economy, to
capital formation, and to the intersubjective community is the responsibility of the
political specialization of common sense. When the integral scale of values is neglected,
the legal and political institutions slip out of the infrastructure and become the lowest
rung of a mendacious superstructural edifice erected to preserve a distorted economic
order in which intersubjective interaction in its autonomous capacity is overlooked and
instead is twisted through group bias into becoming an ally of a practicality distorted by
general bias. Politics should be the institution whereby the whole community can be
persuaded by rational argument and symbolic example to exist and change in the tension
of the opposites of vital spontaneity and practical ideation. What it becomes under the
dominance of group bias allied with general bias is an instrument of the distortion of the
dialectic of community through a displacement of that tension, a mendacious but quite
public determinant of the meanings and values that inform the way of life of segments of the community rather than a mediator to economic institutions of meanings and values that flow from the pursuit of the transcendental objectives of the human spirit. Culture itself then becomes an instrument of distorted practicality, and the superstructure becomes a surd when the political invades its domain. As culture retreats, morality and religion follow suit: personal values are ignored or amputated, and religious values are either explicitly denied or twisted into supports for a distorted culture and society. The entire structure is upset by the derailment of the political, a derailment rooted in the loss of the tension of practicality and intersubjectivity that it is the responsibility of culture to inform and of politics to implement.

In Lonergan’s terms practical intelligence *evokes* technology and capital formation, technology *evokes* the economy, and the economy *evokes* the polity. ‘Evokes’ suggests relations ‘from below,’ relations of differentiation and creativity. ‘… technology arises and develops because of the recurrent intervention of practical intelligence to devise means to meet more readily the recurrent desires of the community for the particular goods that satisfy their vital needs. The recurrent interventions call forth a division of labor and an economic system … for the sake of meeting the problems set by the distribution of the consumer goods emergent from the technological institutions … The economy … evokes the polity, for the sake of effective agreement on the integral unfolding of the dialectic of community … politics meets the problems occasioned by the tension of the economic and technological orders with the intersubjective spontaneity of the groups who compose the society … by giving each pole of the tension its due place in determining the unfolding history of the community. But when it displaces its function, politics becomes the instrument, not of the common good, but of one or other of the groups constituted by the economic order.’

44 Ibid. 104.
So much for the contribution that my efforts here might make to Lonergan’s attempt to frame a notion of collective responsibility adequate for our time. I wish only to add a final note regarding the ulterior theological significance of this notion. If it is the case that the scale of values is a complication of the basic structure that fills out the notion of collective responsibility that Lonergan grounded in that structure, then it must also be maintained that the relation of vital, social, cultural, and personal values taken together to religious value must be isomorphic with the relation of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision taken together to grace: a relation of obediential potency. As Daniel Monsour has written, the relation of the bases of the general and special categories is largely determinative of the relation of both the spontaneous expansions and enrichments and the reflective, explicit expansions and enrichments from these respective bases; and the relation of the bases of the general and special categories is a relation of that remote essential passive potency that is capable of being moved to receive a form by the omnipotent power of God alone, and so of obediential potency. ‘… the base of general theological categories, the transcendental notions as the unrestricted core of our capacity for self-transcendence, stands to the base of special theological categories, the state of being-in-love in an unrestricted manner, in the relation of obediential potency.’  

The potency is a real orientation or order, and being-in-love in an unrestricted manner is a real, intrinsic, proper, supernatural fulfillment of our natural capacity for self-transcendence. The fulfillment occurs in accord with the actual order of this universe that mirrors forth the glory of God. The missions of the Son and of the Spirit are in harmonious continuation with the actual order of this universe. In ways we hardly understand, this universe and everything in it were from the beginning oriented, ordered, 

configured to the missions of the Son and the Spirit. Our next task in the theology of grace, I suggest, is to show how this is the case precisely with regard to the constitution of a society that is ordered in accord with the scale of values. If I am correct on this point, then it may very well be that the considerations of the present paper are circling around the starting point for the next development that must take place in the theology of grace, namely, developing a doctrine of social grace corresponding to the recent development of the theological doctrine of social sin. All I can do at this point is suggest the possibility of such a development and the lines along which fruitful exploration might be possible.

7 Conclusion

My purpose in this paper has been to explore the possible significance of what I am calling a neglected precept: ‘Complicate the structure.’ I presented two examples beyond those indicated by Lonergan, the first having to do with the empirical reception of intellectually determinate meaning and value, and the second with the integral scale of values. With regard to the scale of values, I applied two other precepts, namely, ‘Find concrete instances of the complicated structure’ and ‘Set the complicated structure in motion.’ And in the course of doing that we saw how it was possible for Lonergan to say in 1968 that one instance of complicating the structure can be found in his treatment of common sense in *Insight*. That becomes even clearer, perhaps, when the treatment of common sense is integrated with considerations of the scale of values. At any rate, I am painfully aware that these reflections are at best heuristic, and that even the heuristic needs more detailed elaboration. That elaboration will take the form, I believe, of applying the structure of emergent probability to these matters in a more precise fashion.

46 2009: I have also suggested the complication that comes from acknowledging dimensions of consciousness beyond the four levels of intentional consciousness with which most Lonergan students are familiar and comfortable.
than I am prepared to do at the present time. On this latter task, may I call for collaboration from those with the expertise to do this work, so that together we may continue to complicate the structure and in the process derive the appropriate general categories for a systematic theology that would be a theology of history.