

The Triune God: Systematics on Divine Processions as Intelligent Emanations: A Commentary on pp. 124-229

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1 The Trinitarian Doctrines

The doctrines that Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity attempts to understand are established precisely as doctrines in the *pars dogmatica* of *De Deo trino*, where the five principal doctrinal theses are the following.

(1) 'God the Father neither made his own and only Son out of preexisting matter nor created him out of nothing, but from eternity generates him out of his own substance as consubstantial with himself.'¹

(2) 'The Holy Spirit, Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, and who spoke through the prophets, is to be adored and glorified together with the Father and the Son.'²

(3) 'Thus, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have one divinity, one power, one substance; they are, however, three hypostases or persons distinguished from one another by their proper attributes, which are relative; hence in God all things are one where there is no relational opposition.'³

(4) 'The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle and by a single spiration.'⁴

(5) 'The dogma of the Trinity, which is a mystery in the proper sense, cannot through natural human principles be either understood in itself or demonstrated from its effect. Even after revelation this remains

1 'Deus Pater proprium suum atque unicum Filium neque ex praeiacente materia fecit neque ex nihilo creavit sed ab aeterno ex sua substantia consubstantialem sibi gignit.' Bernard Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, vol. 11 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 256-57

2 'Spiritus sanctus, Dominus et vivificans, ex Patre procedens, qui per prophetas locutus est, cum Patre et Filio simul adorandus et conglorificandus est.' Ibid. 354-55.

7 'Patris ergo et Filii et Spiritus sancti una est divinitas, potentia, substantia; tres autem sunt personae seu hypostases notis propriis iisque relativis inter se distinctae; unde in divinis omnia unum sunt ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.' Ibid. 408-409.

4 'Spiritus sanctus a Patre et Filio tamquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit.' Ibid. 502-503.

true, although reason illumined by faith can, with God's help, progress towards some imperfect analogical understanding of this mystery.⁵

Lonergan proceeds in his systematic treatment according to the same *via synthetica* or *ordo disciplinae* that Aquinas follows in his *Summa theologiae*, questions 27-43. Like Aquinas he begins the systematic treatment with the divine processions, for understanding how processions can be said to exist in God does not presuppose an understanding of the other elements that will be treated in a systematics of the Trinity, but rather grounds our analogical and imperfect understanding of these other elements. 'The processions are the basis for the relations, and in accordance with our manner of our conceiving, the divine persons are conceived subsequently to conceiving the relations.'⁶

2 The Problem

Lonergan states the fundamental problem for a systematic-theological understanding of the doctrine of divine processions in three propositions constitutive of that doctrine: (1) the Son is both from self and not from self; (2) the Holy Spirit is both from self and not from self; and (3) the way in which the Son is not from self is different from the way in which the Holy Spirit is not from self.⁷

The Son and the Holy Spirit can both be said to be *a se*, for each is God and God is *a se*. But the Son is also not *a se*, precisely as 'the Son, born of the Father, only-begotten, from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God' (Nicene Creed [DB 54, DS 125]). And the Holy Spirit, too, is not *a se*, for the Spirit proceeds from

5 'Dogma trinitarium, quod est mysterium proprie dictum, per principia homini naturalia neque in se intelligi neque ex effectu demonstrari potest; quod ita verum manet etiam post revelationem ut ratio tamen fide illustrata ad aliquam Deo dante analogicam atque imperfectam huius mysterii intelligentiam progredi possit.' Ibid. 576-77. Strictly speaking, this is not one of the doctrines submitted to systematic understanding in the *pars systematica*.

6 'In processionibus enim fundantur relationes, ad quas consequuntur secundum nostrum concipiendi modum personae divinae.' Bernard Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 124-25.

7 'Fundamentale problema trinitarium in eo est quod et (1) Filius est tum a se tum non a se, et (2) Spiritus sanctus est tum a se tum non a se, et (3) aliter Filius et aliter Spiritus non est a se.' Ibid. 126-27. From this point, the Latin *a se* will be used rather than the awkward English 'from self.'

the Father (Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed [DB 86, DS 150]), and is 'eternally and at once from the Father and the Son, and has essence and subsistent act of existing at once from the Father and the Son, and eternally proceeds from both as from one principle and by one spiration' (Council of Florence, 1439 [DB 691, DS 1300]). Finally, the manner in which the Son is not *a se* differs from the manner in which the Holy Spirit is not *a se*, because the Son is the only-begotten (DB 54, DS 125), whereas the Spirit is not begotten but proceeding, *procedens* (Athanasian Creed – *Quicumque*, Council of Toledo, 400 [DB 39, DS 75]). The Son proceeds by generation, the Holy Spirit by 'spiration' (on the latter, Council of Florence [DB 691, DS 1300]).

It is not possible that the manner or aspect according to which the Son and Holy Spirit are from themselves be the same manner or aspect according to which they are not from themselves. And so the fundamental systematic Trinitarian problem is one of determining how the Son is *a se* and how not, and how the Holy Spirit is *a se* and how not, and how the manner in which the Son is not *a se* differs from the manner in which the Holy Spirit is not *a se*.

These three doctrinal statements, then, formulate the fundamental Trinitarian problem *for systematics*, that is, for one who wishes to *understand*, however imperfectly, the doctrines articulated by the church concerning the Trinity. It will not be sufficient simply to rearticulate the doctrines so as to express them in a manner that responds to the problem thus formulated, though this is the 'first step' (*primus gressus ... facillimus*): '... as God, the Son is *a se*, from himself, but, as begotten, the Son is not *a se*, not from himself ... as God, the Holy Spirit is *a se*, from himself, but, as spirated, the Holy Spirit is not *a se*, not from himself ... it is very easy to say that being begotten is different from being spirated.'⁸ To leave it at that is to let the solution lie only in words, without any understanding, and so to risk heresy.⁹ What is needed is (1) an understanding of the *emanation* according to which God is from God, yet not as one god from another god, but as the same God from the same God; (2) a grasp of the difference between the emanation by which the Son is generated and that by which the Spirit is spirated; and (3) an apprehension of the first emanation precisely as generation and of the reason why the second emanation is not generation. These are the issues

⁸ 'Facillime enim dicitur Filius qua Deus esse a se sed qua genitus non esse a se. Facillime etiam dicitur Spiritus qua Deus esse a se sed qua spiratus non esse a se. Facillime denique aliud esse dicitur genitum esse et aliud spiratum esse.' Ibid. 128-29.

⁹ '... si tota solutio in vocibus exterius prolatis consistit, fit quidem sonus in aere sed, cum nihil habeatur in mente, ipse sonus omni sensu caret. Quod si quis diceret generationem Filii et spirationem Spiritus nihil aliud esse quam flatus vocis, sane haereticus esset.' Ibid.

to be treated in the first step in a systematics of the Trinity, the step that articulates an understanding of processions in God.

It is not enough, however, simply to understand the meaning of the words 'generation' and 'spiration.' We can conceive what is meant by 'generation' and 'spiration' without locating these in reality, and then we are dealing only with concepts (*entia rationis*); and to say that the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit are only conceptual realities is heretical. So it then must be shown how *in the utterly simple God* the Son and the Spirit are in one regard *a se* and in another regard not *a se*. Since the Son is God, and since God is utterly simple, and since in what is utterly simple there cannot really be one thing and another, is it not contradictory to maintain that the Son on the basis of the same reality is both *a se* and not *a se*? And does not the same problem arise with respect to the Holy Spirit? The question is met by treating the divine relations. We must ask whether there are real relations in God, and if so, how many real relations there are in God; we must investigate whether they are really distinct from one another; and we must inquire whether they are really or only rationally distinct from the divine essence. This will be the subject matter of Lonergan's third chapter.

This, however, will bring us only to the affirmation that there are three really distinct subsistent divine relations. But what we confess in faith is that there are three divine *persons* who are really distinct from one another. Can the distinct subsistent divine relations truly be named persons in both the ontological and the psychological meaning of that word? That will be the topic of Lonergan's fourth chapter. Only by an affirmative answer to this question will we have solved the fundamental Trinitarian problem: without contradiction and with some understanding three really distinct persons in one and the same divine nature are conceived and truly affirmed.

3 Intelligent Emanation

Lonergan offers three assertions that treat the divine processions. They investigate, respectively, (1) how in general we are to conceive of the emanation of God from God, (2) how it is, given that understanding, that we can conceive two and only two emanations, and (3) why the first emanation is properly called generation and the second is not. The presentation of these assertions is preceded by a discussion of the notion of emanation, and specifically of intelligent emanation.

We proceed, then, to the type of understanding that we are able to attain of the divine processions, by analogy with human intellectual process conceived precisely according to its reality and nature as intellectual process.

In Lonergan's judgment St Thomas Aquinas correctly conceived human intellectual process, because he grasped the intelligibility and significance within that process of *the act of understanding*.¹⁰ Others, and particularly Scotus and his followers (whose negative significance or *Wirkungsgeschichte* in the history of philosophy and theology is a recurrent theme in Lonergan's work¹¹), have only confused the issue of a 'psychological analogy' in Trinitarian theology, because they have not correctly understood the human intellectual process from which the analogy proceeds. They neglect the act of understanding and conceive human intelligence on the analogy of sense knowledge. '... the human intellect is conceived first as proceeding from external words to universal concepts, then as proceeding from the corporeal act of seeing to some simple spiritual apprehension whereby concepts become known to us.'¹² Any such approach overlooks precisely the element that allows some analogy to be developed, and so, for all its labors and efforts at argument, it reaches no clear conclusions.¹³

10 '... anima humana intelligit se ipsam *per suum intelligere*, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam.' Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3m. Lonergan's enormously detailed and richly nuanced exegesis of the relevant texts in Aquinas can be found in *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, vol. 2 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). We will be appealing frequently to this text (henceforth *V*) as we treat the various steps in Lonergan's argument.

11 '... there is needed an explanation of Scotist influence' (*V* 39, note 126).

12 '... concipitur intellectus humanus, tum in quantum ex vocibus exterioribus proceditur ad conceptus universales, tum in quantum ex actu videndi corporali proceditur ad simplicem quandam apprehensionem spiritualem, qua conceptus nobis innotescunt.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 132-33.

13 *Ibid.* More extensive treatments of Scotism and of conceptualism in general may be found in *Verbum* (see Conceptualism, and Scotus, in the index) and in Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 108-10, where Thomist and Scotist theories of intellect are compared and contrasted. As Lonergan expresses it in *Verbum*: 'Scotus ... posits concepts first, then the apprehension of nexus between concepts. His *species intelligibilis* is what is meant immediately by external words ...; it is proved to exist because knowing presupposes its object and indeed its object as present ...; its production by agent intellect and phantasm is the first act of intellect, with knowing it as second act or inner word ...; it is not necessarily an accident inhering in the intellect

The psychological analogy, then, is not based on a similarity between sensitive process and the Trinity. Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity depends rather on the cognitional theory that in *Verbum* he finds to be that of Aquinas and that in *Insight* he develops in the contexts of (1) modern mathematics and science, (2) a contemporary theory of the dialectic of history, and (3) the turn to the subject in modern philosophy. Needless to say, he does not repeat this enormous labor in *De Deo trino*, nor will we do so here, though we will draw on it and present aspects of it when necessary.

For the moment we will be content with three affirmations that Lonergan repeats from Aquinas at this point. If we attend, Lonergan says, to our interior *intellectual* experience, we will find these three statements to be true. The statements are: (1) 'Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge.'¹⁴ (2) 'It is of the

but necessarily only a sufficiently present agent cooperating with intellect in producing the act of knowing; ordinarily it is the subordinate, but may be the principal, agent ...; sensitive knowledge is merely an occasion for scientific knowledge ...; as our inner word proceeds from the species, so the divine word proceeds from the divine essence ... The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics' (V 39 note 126).

- 14 'Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex eius notitia procedens.' Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 1. For the translation, see *The Triune God: Systematics* 133. Lonergan notes that the key phrase 'ex vi intellectiva proveniens' is omitted from the edition of questions 27-32 of the *Prima pars* prepared by B. Geyer in *Florilegium Patristicum XXXVII* (1934) 6. It is also omitted from the Blackfriars edition, being mentioned there only in a note as an alternative reading. See vol. 6 of the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa theologiae* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) 4. Omitting it profoundly changes the meaning. The antecedent of the Latin 'eius' becomes 'rei intellectae' rather than 'vi intellectiva.' And so the translation is not: '... which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and *proceeding from its knowledge*,' but '... which is the conception of the thing understood, *proceeding from knowledge of it*.' The dynamic character of intelligence itself in its original meaningfulness and autonomy is not as prominent in the second

nature of love not to proceed except from a conception of the intellect.¹⁵ (3) ‘What proceeds internally by an intellectual process does not have to be different [from that which is its source]. Indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds.’¹⁶ If these three statements are understood, Lonergan says, the fundamental Trinitarian problem is virtually solved; other matters demand, not a further understanding to be acquired, but further applications of a quite suitable and flexible grasp of the meaning of these three statements.¹⁷

That grasp begins with the notion of intelligible or intellectual emanation (or, as I will frequently call it here, intelligent emanation). The ‘intellectual process’ mentioned in the third of the quotations from Aquinas is the key to Lonergan’s understanding of the divine processions. In the body of the same article (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 1, *Utrum sit processio in divinis*), Thomas called it an *emanatio intelligibilis*, thus contrasting it with processes that occur in nonintellectual realities.¹⁸ From the context it is clear that the

rendition. And then we wonder why the psychological analogy has so rarely been appreciated!

- 15 ‘... de ratione amoris est quod non procedit nisi a conceptione intellectus.’ *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m; see *The Triune God: Systematics* 135. Lonergan, it must be said, does not devote the same attention to love in Aquinas as he does to understanding and the inner word that proceeds from understanding. Furthermore, in his later works he adopts a different position on the relation of love and knowledge from that expressed here by Aquinas, a position that I argue elsewhere allows another (though not contradictory but rather complementary and ultimately more satisfactory) conception of the psychological analogy for the Trinity; but it is an analogy, for in God *ipsum intelligere* and *ipsum amare* are *ipsum esse subsistens*.
- 16 ‘... id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili non oportet esse diversum; imo quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.’ *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m. See *The Triune God: Systematics* 135. Aquinas adds: ‘Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliquid magis intelligitur tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti et magis unum; nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intellectu. Unde cum divinum intelligere sit in fine perfectionis ..., necesse est quod verbum divinum sit perfecte unum cum eo a quo procedit absque omni diversitate.’
- 17 See *The Triune God: Systematics* 135.
- 18 Arius and others considered procession in God along the lines of the coming of an effect from its cause; and Sabellius considered procession in God along the lines of the proceeding of causal influence into an effect by setting the effect in motion or impressing on it the likeness of the cause. In either case procession is conceived as a going

‘emanation’ in question is not only intelligible – nonintelligent process is also intelligible – but also intellectual, that is, intelligent.¹⁹ Thus the Blackfriars translation not inappropriately renders *emanatio intelligibilis* as ‘an issuing in the mind,’ and to make this meaning clear we will often translate it as ‘intelligent emanation.’²⁰

In itself the matter is fairly simple. What is the difference between a rash judgment and a reasonable one? A rash judgment is rash because it is offered without sufficient evidence. A reasonable judgment is one that is so grounded in sufficient evidence that by a kind of intellectual necessity – what *Insight* calls an immanent *Anankē* (I 356) – it inevitably issues forth in a mind that is open to truth. The difference shows precisely what is meant by an intelligent emanation, for an intelligent emanation is precisely what is lacking in a rash judgment and what is

forth to something else (*ad aliquid extra*). But the divine processions are *ad intra*; they regard activity that remains within the agent. ‘Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cuius actio, scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid *intra ipsum* quod est conceptio rei intellectae ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat; et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis.’ Here ‘procession’ is understood ‘non ... secundum quod est in corporalibus vel per motum localem vel per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum ... sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis quod manet in ipso.’ *Ibid.* corpus of article, emphasis added.

19 On intelligibility that is also intelligent, and so spiritual, see *Insight* 538-42. Briefly, ‘As known to ourselves, we are intelligible, as every other known is. But the intelligibility that is so known is also intelligence and knowing. It has to be distinguished from the intelligibility that can be known but is not intelligent and does not attain to knowledge in the proper human sense of that term. Let us say that intelligibility that is intelligent is spiritual. Then, inasmuch as we are material, we are constituted by otherwise coincidental manifolds of conjugate acts that unconsciously and spontaneously are reduced to system by higher conjugate forms. But inasmuch as we are spiritual, we are orientated towards the universe of being, know ourselves as parts within that universe, and guide our living by that knowing.’ *Ibid.* 539.

20 On Lonergan’s crucial identification of intellect and intelligence, see Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, vol. 6 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) Index ‘Intellect: and intelligence.’ I have in my own work suggested that ‘autonomous spiritual procession’ might capture well the meaning of ‘emanatio intelligibili.’

present in a true judgment. Whoever grasps sufficient evidence for a judgment, precisely by so grasping, professes a true judgment with an intellectually conscious necessity.²¹ But Lonergan's point is that we all know *from experience* the difference between a rash judgment and a sound judgment.²²

Again, what is the difference between parroting a definition from memory and proposing one because one has understood something? It too is something we all know by experience. It is the difference between uttering sounds based on sensitive habit, on the one hand, and on the other hand, expressing what one has understood and doing so in different ways and by the use of examples, where everything that is said is directed and even in a way necessitated by the act of understanding. '... what is lacking in someone repeating things by memory but present in someone who understands and displays that understanding in variety of ways is again what we are calling an intellectual or intelligible emanation. Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we understand, from the very fact that we understand, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth definitions as well as explanations and illustrations.'²³

Finally, we also know from experience the difference between an inordinate act of choice that is repugnant to reason and one that is ordered, correct, obligatory, holy. When we intelligently grasp and reasonably approve something that is good, we are obliged to it in such a way that, should we choose against the dictates of reason, we are irrational, and should we follow these dictates, we are rational. '... what is lacking in a morally evil act but present in a morally good act is that spiritual and moral procession that effectively obligates the will in such a way that we not only *ought to* love the good, but actually *do* love it. This procession, too, is an intellectual or intelligible emanation, for it consists

21 '... quicumque evidenciam sufficientem perspicit, ex hoc ipso quod perspicit, per necessitatem quandam intellectualiter consciam, profert iudicium verum.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 136. The dynamics of judgment are studied in detail in *Insight*, chapters 9 and 10, and with reference to the texts of Aquinas in *Verbum*, chapter 2. The dynamics of judgments of value are studied (in less detail) in chapter 18 of *Insight*, and, as we will see, it is on these dynamics as understood in *Insight* that Lonergan is relying even in his early systematics of the Trinity for his analogy regarding the procession of the divine Word.

22 'Omnes enim experiendo novimus ...' *The Triune God: Systematics* 134.

23 '... quod in memoriter repetente deest sed intelligente atque multipliciter explicante adest, iterum emanatio intellectualis seu intelligibilis dicitur. Quae sane emanatio nihil aliud est quam hoc quod quicumque intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, per quandam necessitatem intellectualiter consciam, tum definitiones tum explicationes atque illustrationes profert.' *Ibid.* 136-37.

in the fact that a potentially rational appetite becomes actually rational because of a good grasped by the intellect.²⁴

What, then, is the intelligent emanation that we experience as the differential between being intelligent and being stupid, being reasonable and being silly, being responsible and being irresponsible? How is it to be defined? It is the *conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act.*²⁵

The notion of intelligent emanation on which the psychological analogy is built does not proceed, then, from a grasp of sensitive consciousness or psychic process, but from a grasp of intellectual consciousness or spiritual process. 'We are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act.'²⁶

24 'Quod ergo in actu moraliter malo deest, in actu autem moraliter bono adest, processio illa spiritualis atque moralis est, quae ita efficaciter voluntatem obligat, ut non solum bonum amare debeamus sed etiam bonum actu diligamus. Quae sane processio etiam emanatio quaedam intellectualis seu intelligibilis est, cum in eo consistat quod propter bonum intellectu perspectum appetitus potentia rationalis fiat rationalis actu.' Ibid. Lonergan adds a further comment, to be qualified in his later work where the psychological analogy is somewhat differently conceived: 'Therefore, since by its very nature the will is a rational appetite, and since this appetite cannot be actually rational unless it actually follows upon reason, we must say that "it is of the nature of love to proceed only from a conception of the intellect."' Ibid., quoting Aquinas. Lonergan's entire presentation of decision here follows the presentation of *Insight*, which was later complemented by other considerations. See my *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) chapter 2, § 2.1 Moral Conversion.

25 'Emanatio ergo intelligibilis est conscia origo [i.e., processio] actus realis, naturalis, et conscii, ex actu reali, naturali, et conscio, tum intra conscientiam intellectualem, tum vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu priori determinatae.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 140-41.

26 '... dupliciter sumus conscii: alio enim modo per partem sensitivam magis passivi subimus sensata et imaginata, desideria et timores, delectationes doloresque, gaudia et tristitiam; alio autem modo per partem intellectivam magis activi sumus cum conscie inquiramus ut intelligamus, intelligamus ut dicamus, evidentiam ponderemus ut

Moreover, within actively intelligent consciousness a distinction is to be drawn between the fundamental light of consciousness, agent intellect, the desire to know, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the further determinations of that same light. The desire to know is a created participation of uncreated light and is the source of all our wonder, inquiry, and reflection. To it are attributed some most general principles that are operative independently of any determination from experience: the principles of identity, of non-contradiction, and of sufficient reason, and the precept that good is to be done and evil to be avoided. It is the *vis ipsius conscientiae intellectualis* referred to in the definition of intelligent emanation. But what is intellectually and consciously operative in us lies not only in this general light of intelligence, but also is further determined by our conscious acts themselves. We are determined as intellectually, rationally, and morally conscious and consciously active and operative, materially by the objects of sensation, formally by the act of understanding, and actually by the grasp of evidence, by judgments, and by deliberations.²⁷ Thus, if the *vis ipsius conscientiae intellectualis* of the definition of intelligent emanation refers to the light of intelligence within us, the further determinations added by our own activities are what the definition refers to when it describes this consciousness as determined by the prior acts from which, by intelligent emanation, there proceed other acts. Thus the notion of intelligent emanation is what Aquinas is illustrating when he writes, ‘Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from its knowledge.’ Lonergan expands: ‘... when we understand, and by the very fact that we understand, from our intellectual power, which is the general light of intellectual consciousness, and from the knowledge contained in the act of understanding that adds a determination to the general light, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness a conception or definition

iudicemus, consiliemur ut eligamus, velimus ut faciamus.’ Ibid. 138-39. This explicit affirmation of two dimensions to our one consciousness can be added to other texts to which I have appealed in my efforts to establish the validity of the notion of psychic conversion. The difference between the two dimensions of consciousness also grounds my notion of dialectic. See the section ‘The Duality of Consciousness’ in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 46-47. We should note as well in passing the passive or receptive element in understanding itself, an element that is connected with the fact that our understanding involves a *processio operationis*, a movement from potency to act. This element is highlighted in *Verbum* and perhaps not sufficiently noted in *Insight*. See *V Index*, ‘Pati.’

²⁷ See *The Triune God: Systematics* 139.

of the reality understood. Similarly, when we grasp that the evidence is sufficient, by the very fact that we grasp it, and from the exigency of intellectual light as determined through that grasp, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness either a true affirmation or a true negative assertion. Similarly again, whenever we judge some good as obligatory, by the very fact that we so judge, through our intellectuality, our rationality, we spirate an act of will.²⁸

The definition of intelligent emanation, then, speaks first of *acts*, operations, that are *real*, *natural*, and *conscious*. *Act* here is implicitly defined in relation to form and potency. ‘Act : form : potency :: seeing : eyesight : eye :: hearing something : the faculty of hearing : the ear :: understanding something : the intelligible species : the possible intellect :: willing : willingness : will :: existence : substantial form : prime matter.’²⁹ *Real* acts are acts of which it can reasonably be affirmed, They are, they occur, they happen. While the acts in question are intentional acts, they are considered here not in their intending of an object but as occurring in their own right, hence as *natural*.³⁰ To say that they are *conscious* means that the presence of the subject to himself or herself is constitutive of the acts themselves. The subject is present, not as what is intended (the object, which also is rendered psychologically present by the act), but as what intends, and the act is present to the subject as that by which the object is intended. The presence of the subject to himself or herself in these acts is distinct, too, from the presence of the subject through reflection or introspection. Reflection on oneself renders oneself present as an object, but this would not be possible unless the

28 ‘Quando ergo intelligimus et eo ipso quod intelligimus, ex ipsa vi intellectiva, quae est lumen generale conscientiae intellectualis, et ex notitia, quae in actu intelligendi continetur et lumen generale determinat, procedit intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem conceptio seu definitio rei intellectae. Similiter, quando evidentiam sufficere perspicimus, eo ipso quod perspicimus, ex ipsa necessitate luminis intellectualis per perspicentiam determinati, procedit intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem affirmatio seu negatio vera. Similiter, quando bonum obligatorium iudicamus, eo ipso quod iudicamus, per ipsam nostram intellectualitatem seu rationalitatem spiramus volitionis actum.’ Ibid. 138-39.

29 Ibid. 141. On potency, form, and act as metaphysical elements isomorphic with the experience-understanding-judgment structure of human cognitional process, see *Insight* 456-63.

30 ‘... dividitur reale in naturale (equus in se) et intentionale (equus qua intentus). Unde in actibus psychologicis duplex est aspectus; idem enim actus est intentionalis, quatenus aliud respicit, et naturalis, quatenus in se consideratur.’ Ibid. 140. See *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964* 105 note 16.

subject were already present to himself or herself as a subject, through consciousness – not as what is intended but as what intends.³¹

The emanation is a procession of one such real, natural, conscious act from another such real, natural, conscious act, *within intellectual consciousness*. That is, it is a conscious psychological event *constituted by intelligent and/or volitional acts and the conscious nexus between them*.

As *within consciousness*, the procession is considered precisely as such a psychological event, rather than metaphysically as an accident inhering in a substance or as an act received in a potency. The same reality that, metaphysically considered, is correctly thus described is also psychologically a conscious event that occurs within the field of consciousness. Nor does ‘conscious’ add anything to ‘being,’ for being is not a genus, and what is beyond or outside of being is precisely nothing. ‘Conscious’ simply names a certain degree of perfection within being.

As *within intelligent consciousness*, the procession is constituted by acts of intellect and will. These prescind from sensitive acts. Our one consciousness is not homogeneous, but is diversified in accord with the diverse nature of its acts.

The emanation is not only conscious; it is a conscious procession (*origo*), and it occurs by the power of consciousness itself. The emergence of one real, natural, and conscious act from another real, natural, and conscious act is itself conscious and occurs by virtue of consciousness itself. In this way consciousness *mediates* the procession. ‘... whenever a conscious act originates from a conscious act, consciousness itself mediates between the two, so that (1) the conscious subject as conscious is the principle-which of the procession, (2) the conscious act as conscious is the principle-by-which of the procession, (3) the procession itself has an intrinsic modality that is lacking in an unconscious procession, such as a chemical procession; (4) the act that in some way

31 ‘In omni actu sensitivo et intellectivo, sive apprehensivo sive appetitivo, tria *simul* fiunt: (1) intenditur obiectum; (2) ipsum subiectum intendens redditur sibi praesens; (3) actus subiecti redditur subiecto praesens. Quam praesentiam acute distinguas a praesentia obiecti: praesens est obiectum ut *quod intenditur*, praesens est actus ut *quo intenditur*, praesens est subiectum ut *quod intendit*. Pariter distinguas hanc subiecti praesentiam per conscientiam a praesentia eiusdem subiecti per quandam reflexionem vel introspectionem: per reflexionem enim vel introspectionem praesens redditur subiectum ut obiectum, ut id quod intenditur; quod fieri non posset nisi subiectum iam sibi praesens esset per conscientiam ut subiectum, ut id quod intendit.’ *The Triune God: Systematics* 140.

proceeds consciously is *because of* and *in accord with* the act from which it proceeds.³²

But the mediation that renders possible an *intelligent* emanation is a mediation that occurs by the power of intelligent consciousness itself and not by in virtue of the dynamics of sensitive consciousness. One act can proceed from another within sensitive consciousness, but the procession does not possess the characteristics constitutive of an intelligent emanation. From seeing a large and ferocious animal on the loose there *spontaneously* arises in sensitive consciousness a sense of fear, precisely because one has seen the animal;³³ and so one conscious act proceeds from another because of and in accord with the first act. But in sensitive consciousness this occurs in accord with a particular law of nature, whereas, when one real, natural, and conscious *intellectual* act proceeds from another real, natural, and conscious *intellectual* act, the link is constituted, not by the automatically functioning law of a particular nature but by the self-governing, autonomous, and transcendental exigencies of intelligence itself, according to which our integrity as human subjects is constituted by our ordered allegiance to complete intelligibility, truth, being, and goodness. The transcendental laws of human spirituality are not bound to any particular nature but commit us to a set of objectives that embraces everything, the concrete universe of being. Our fidelity to these exigencies can be violated, for their spontaneity is not a function of specific and automatically functioning laws but is such that in the relevant acts the human spirit is determinative of itself and so autonomous. It is regulated, not by being bound to any natural response, but only insofar as it is actually constituted by its transcendental desire for being. It rules itself, insofar as under God's agency it determines itself to its own acts according to the exigencies of its own being as intellectual. But insofar as this is the case one conscious act will arise or proceed from another conscious act through the mediation of intellectual consciousness itself.

32 ‘... ubi oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio, ibi mediat ipsa conscientia ut, scilicet, (1) subiectum conscius qua conscius sit principium-quod processionis, (2) actus conscius qua conscius sit principium-quo processionis, (3) ipsa processio modum quendam intrinsecum habeat qui in processione inconscia (e.g., chemica) desit, (4) actus procedens quodammodo conscie sit propter et secundum actum principiantem.’ Ibid. 142-43, emphasis in translation added. Lonergan adds, ‘Excluditur ergo phaenomenalismus conscientiae qui causalitatem vel modum causalitatis proprium conscientiae negaret.’

33 ‘... qui canem videt magnum, aspectu ferocem, non ligatum, sponte timet. Sicut videre, etiam timere est actus realis, naturalis, conscius. Neque inter hos duos actus deest nexus: ideo timetur canis quia videtur.’ Ibid. 142.

Finally, there is another kind of procession within intelligent consciousness, one that does not satisfy the requirements of an intelligent emanation. For from questions there can spontaneously proceed an act of understanding, but then the procession is not from act to act but from potency to act. This kind of procession Lonergan, following Aquinas, calls a procession of operation (*processio operationis*). The more autonomous procession that alone qualifies as an intelligent emanation is the procession of a subsequent act *from* a prior act and *in proportion* to that prior act. ‘... thus, we define *because* we understand and *in accordance with* what we understand; again, we judge *because* we grasp evidence as sufficient and *in accordance with* the evidence we have grasped; finally, we choose *because* we judge and *in accordance with* what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory.’³⁴ This type of procession Lonergan, again following Aquinas, calls, not a procession of an operation (*processio operationis*) but a procession of something operated, of a product (*processio operati*).³⁵

4 The First Assertion: Intelligible Emanation

Having thus clarified his definition of intelligent emanation, Lonergan is ready to proceed to his first assertion in Trinitarian systematics. It reads: ‘The divine processions, which are processions according to the mode of a *processio operati*, are understood in some measure on the basis of a likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of divine procession.’³⁶

34 ‘... sic definimus *quia* intelligimus et *secundum* illud quod intelligimus; sic iudicamus *quia* evidentiam sufficere perspicimus et *secundum* evidentiam perspectam; sic eligimus *quia* iudicamus et *secundum* quod iudicamus vel prodesse vel decere vel convenire vel deberi.’ Ibid. 142-43.

35 For an array of details on the matter, see *Verbum*, chapter 3.

36 ‘Processiones divinae, quae sunt per modum operati, aliquatenus intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis; neque alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam.’ *The Triune God: Systematics* 144-45.

4.1 Per Modum Operati

What needs clarification immediately is the phrase ‘according to the mode of a *processio operati*’ (*per modum operati*). The definition of ‘procession’ is abstract: the origin of one from another (*origo unius ex alio*).³⁷ Concretely, there are different modes or kinds of procession, as the examples of sensitive procession, procession of an operation, and intelligent emanation have already indicated. More fully, the mode or kind of a procession can be conceived, determined, and spoken of in a number of ways, and some of these ways combine different and more limited ways of conceiving a procession. Some examples follow. It is important to get straight what Lonergan is doing in these examples, since they determine the nature of the analogy that he pursues.

(1) If we conceive a procession in terms of the principle and what proceeds from it, we are giving it what we may call an *external* determination.

(2) If we speak of the manner in which the procession occurs – it is violent or natural, conscious or unconscious, spontaneous or self-governed, and so on – we are providing an *internal* determination of the procession.

(3) If we specify the procession in such general metaphysical terms as ‘same’ and ‘other,’ ‘potency’ and ‘act,’ ‘absolute’ and ‘relative,’ and so on, we are providing a *metaphysical* determination.

(4) A *natural* determination would speak of the procession in terms of a generic, specific, or individual nature: it is a physical or chemical or biological or sensitive or intellectual or divine procession.

(5) An *analogical* determination would conceive the mode of procession of an unknown nature (for example, the divine) by likeness with the mode of procession of a known nature (for example, procession in human intellectual consciousness).

Some of these concrete ways of specifying a procession may be combined. Lonergan gives the following five examples in which *external* and *metaphysical* determinations combine in the characterization of a procession:

(1) a procession *ad extra*, into another thing, that is, a procession of one thing from another thing – for example, producing something, creating, animal generation; here the mode of procession is determined in an external and metaphysical manner, since the principle and that which proceeds from it are named (external determination), and the metaphysical categories of ‘same’ and ‘other’ are employed in a particular manner (metaphysical determination);

37 Ibid.

(2) a procession *ad intra*, where the principle and what proceeds from it are within the same ‘thing,’ whether in the same subsistent or in the same consciousness or in the same faculty or potency; here again the mode of procession is determined in an external and metaphysical manner, since the principle and that which proceeds from it are named (external determination), and the metaphysical categories of ‘same’ and ‘other’ are employed, but in a different manner, and ‘same’ can mean ‘in the same substance,’ ‘in the same consciousness,’ or ‘within the same faculty or potency’ (metaphysical determination);

(3) a *processio operationis*, a procession *ad intra* in which the principle and what proceeds from it are related as potency and act; again, the determination of the mode is external and metaphysical: the principle and what proceeds from it are named, and the metaphysical categories of potency and act are employed to determine the mode of the procession; examples include: the act of seeing proceeding from the potency of sight and from the eye; the act of understanding proceeding from the possible intellect and the intelligible species; the act of willing proceeding from the will and from a habit received in the will;

(4) a *processio operati*, a procession *ad intra* in which the principle is related to what proceeds from it as act to act; again the mode of determination is external and metaphysical, since the principle and what proceeds from it are named and the metaphysical category of act is employed in the determination of the mode of the procession; examples include the act of desiring or fearing proceeding from the act of seeing, the act of defining proceeding from the act of understanding, the act of judging proceeding from the act of grasping sufficient evidence, the act of choosing proceeding from the practical judgment or judgment of value;

(5) a *processio per modum operati*: like a *processio operationis* and a *processio operati*, it is a *processio ad intra*; but unlike a *processio operationis* and like a *processio operati*, the *processio per modum operati* is one in which the principle and what proceeds are both act; but unlike even a *processio operati*, the *processio per modum operati* is one in which the act that is principle and the act that proceeds are really distinguished, not absolutely but relatively (*non ... secundum esse absolutum, sed secundum esse relativum*); they are not really distinct entities, but really distinct relations within the same *esse absolutum*; the determination again is external and metaphysical; and the definition has been thought through precisely in order to speak about the divine mystery; a procession that is ‘according to the mode of a *processio operati*’ (*per modum operati*) is a procession *ad intra* of act from act, where the acts are distinguished, not by an absolute independence in being from one another, but by relational properties within the same absolute act of existence.

The following examples are given of other ways of determining the mode of procession than by external and metaphysical determination:

(6) when we use the expression *divine procession*, that is, when we speak of the procession of God from God, the mode of determination is still external, since it names the principle and what proceeds from the principle; but it is not metaphysical; rather it is natural, since it specifies the procession in terms of the nature in which the procession occurs;

(7) the definition of *intelligible emanation* – the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act — employs a mode of determination that is not external but internal, since it speaks of the procession as natural and conscious; and it employs a mode of determination that is natural (as well as metaphysical [act from act]), since it names the kind of nature (intellectual consciousness) in which such a procession occurs.

Now what makes the ‘psychological analogy’ an analogy is that in us intelligent emanation is the procession of act from act, but the acts (for example, the act of understanding and the inner word that proceeds from it) are really distinct in an absolute fashion, whereas the procession of God from God, divine procession, is the procession of act from act where the acts are really distinct, not in an absolute fashion, but as really distinct relations of origin. So we proceed from the internal mode of procession that we experience in intelligible emanation to an analogical understanding of the internal mode of the divine procession. When we name the latter procession ‘divine procession,’ we are not determining it in an internal but in an external manner; when we name it a procession *per modum operati*, we are determining it in an external and metaphysical manner; but when we say that it is understood on the basis of some likeness to what we experience as intelligible emanation, we are giving a mediate, imperfect, and analogical *internal and natural determination* to a divine procession. No such determination can ever be more than mediate, imperfect, and analogical. And this means that no matter how great the similarity may be with human intellectual procession, the dissimilarity is ever greater.

The assertion moves, then, (1) from an external and natural determination (divine procession) employed in the confession of faith, to an external and metaphysical determination (*per modum operati*) that is simply an equivalent way of talking about the same thing; and then (2) to an internal and natural determination (*secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis*) that enables us to understand analogically, imperfectly, and mediately how it is possible that the divine processions that we confess in faith can be *processiones per modum operati*. Again, (1) we first transpose the external and natural determination that we use in our confession of faith (divine procession) to an external and metaphysical determination (*per modum operati*) that enables us to distinguish this procession from other types of procession already

spoken of in the section in which intelligible emanation was defined (processions *ad extra*, *processio operationis*, and *processio operati*); and then (2) we try to *understand* what we have given this external and metaphysical determination (which, as we shall see, is ‘theologically certain’) by analogy with the internal and natural mode of determination that we employ when we speak of intelligible emanation. The identification of ‘divine procession’ with ‘*per modum operati*’ is the first step. It simply transposes one way of talking about the reality in question (an external and natural way employed in the confession of faith) into another way of conceiving and determining the same reality (an external and metaphysical way employed in speaking of different kinds of procession). If there are divine processions (and we confess in faith that there are) they cannot be *ad extra* but must be *ad intra*; they cannot be *processiones operationis*, for in God there is no movement from potency to act; they cannot be *processiones operati*, for in God there is only one act, and so they must be *processiones per modum operati*, according to the mode of a *processio operati*, in that they are processions of act from act but also processions in which the act that is principle and the act that proceeds are really distinct, not in an absolute fashion but by relational properties alone; they are really distinct relations of origin (later to be called ‘notional acts’) constitutive of the one real and infinite and pure act, the *actus totius entis*, that is God.

Again, to speak of a divine procession is, as we said, to employ an *external* determination, but not a metaphysical determination; rather, the determination is natural: we are speaking of the procession of God from God, a procession proper to the divine nature, the procession characteristic of the generation of the Son from the Father or of the procession of the Holy Spirit from both. But the definition of an intelligent emanation – the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act – is a natural but *internal* determination. The divine processions, which are *per modum operati*, are understood on the likeness of this internal, experienced character of intelligent emanation. And so we are involved in an *analogical*, mediate, and imperfect, not a natural, determination of their internal mode or character as processions. We are employing an internal and natural determination (intelligent emanation) to understand analogically the internal mode of a procession that by external and natural determination we name ‘divine procession’ (the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both Father and Son). And supposing that there is in God intelligent emanation conceived by analogy with the intelligible emanation that we experience in intellectual consciousness, we can understand how it can

be true to speak of the divine processions with the external and metaphysical determination of *per modum operati*.

The assertion claims also that this gives us what seems to be the only possible analogy for conceiving systematically the divine processions, that is, for interiorly expressing that understanding that virtually suffices to resolve all the related questions in a treatise on the Trinity.³⁸

4.2 Steps in the Argument

The Church's confession is expressed as follows in the Athanasian Creed: 'Pater a nullo est factus nec creatus nec genitus; Filius a Patre solo est, non factus nec creatus, sed genitus; Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens' (DB 39, DS 75). This is the doctrine that we are attempting to understand, the confession of divine processions, where the processions are named in an external and natural fashion, and where one of them is generation and the other is not.

The first part of the argument of the assertion presents a technical formulation of the same doctrine, the doctrine that systematic theology is attempting to understand. This technical formulation shifts the determination of the procession to an external and metaphysical mode of speaking. From a technical point of view, given what we have already seen about the modes of procession understood metaphysically, what can we say in this mode about the divine processions? This formulation will also help, Lonergan says, to remove an apparent inconsistency in the doctrine.³⁹

In the second part of the argument a hypothetical systematic solution is proposed to the problem thus technically formulated; in other words, what is required in order that it be true that the divine processions are *per modum operati*? If they can be understood analogically along the lines of intelligent emanation, this would be sufficient. So this hypothetical solution is offered in this second part.

And in the third part it is judged that this hypothetical solution seems to be the only way available to us of understanding the mystery that we confess.

38 For the above distinctions, see *ibid.* 144-51.

39 '... tum ut clare appareat quaenam sit doctrina intelligenda, tum etiam ut apparens amoveatur contradictio.' *Ibid.* 150. See *Method in Theology* 132: 'It [systematics] is concerned to work out appropriate systems of conceptualization, to remove apparent inconsistencies, to move towards some grasp of spiritual matters both from their own inner coherence and from the analogies offered by more familiar human experience' (emphasis added).

In order better to grasp Lonergan's procedure here, it is well to indicate that first he reviews various attempts to treat theologically (or to ignore) the mystery of the Trinity, and that one of these he treats at greater length in a number of places, whenever he criticizes what he calls 'conclusions theology.' In *The Triune God: Systematics* such an attempt or approach is described as follows: '... there are those who believe the scriptures and embrace the dogmas and seek theological understanding. But they think the understanding should be a theological conclusion demonstrated from the truths of faith and from naturally known principles. It eludes their notice that, while science is concerned with conclusions, understanding is concerned with principles. So, because they aim at conclusions, they do not arrive at understanding.'⁴⁰ In contrast is the procedure that Lonergan follows: '... there are those who believe the scriptures, embrace the dogmas, *and deduce theological conclusions* [and this is as far as the previous theologians will go], but also proceed from those very conclusions to a technical formulation of a problem. They seek the solution to the problem not through deduction but through a hypothesis; and because they deny that we can attain any other understanding in this life, they think that the hypothetical understanding should be accepted.'⁴¹ This is precisely what Lonergan is doing: he is deducing a conclusion, namely, that the divine processions are *per modum operati*; but that deduction has not yet given him the understanding that is the goal of systematics. That understanding is achieved when, given that the processions are *per modum operati*, they are conceived by analogy with the intellectual emanations of word and love that can be discovered in human consciousness.

4.3 The First Step

Part 1 of the elaboration of the assertion, then, sets forth the technical formulation of the problem, and in fact of the doctrine itself that is to be

40 'Alii autem et scripturis credunt et dogmata amplectuntur et intelligentiam theologicam quaerunt. Quam tamen intelligentiam volunt esse conclusionem theologicam quae demonstratur ex veritatibus fidei et ex principiis naturaliter notis. Quos fugit intelligentiam esse de principiis, scientiam de conclusionibus; et ideo quia conclusionem quaerunt, ad intelligentiam non perveniunt.' Ibid. 152-53.

41 'Alii ergo scripturis credentes et dogmata amplectentes et conclusiones theologicas deducentes, ex ipsis his conclusionibus ad problema technice formulatum procedunt; cuius solutionem non per deductionem sed per hypothesin quaerunt; quam intelligentiam hypotheticam ea ratione acceptandam esse ducunt quod aliam a nobis hac in vita attingi posse negant.' Ibid. 152-55.

submitted to systematic understanding. In this part of the assertion, Lonergan *does* use metaphysical principles to deduce a theological conclusion from the truth confessed in faith. The conclusion does not give us understanding, but it does allow us to proceed to understanding; the understanding would provide a hypothetical explanation of how the conclusion could be true. The conclusion itself differs from the doctrine of faith only verbally, and so it is theologically certain. This part of the assertion is a strict deduction from the truths of faith, using, as he says, metaphysical notions and principles available to everybody. Through these notions and principles, it offers nothing more than a technical formulation of the very same truth that we confess in faith.

The technical formulation states that a divine procession occurs *per modum operati*, according to the mode of a *processio operati*. Thus it corresponds to the first part of the assertion itself: 'Processiones divinae, quae sunt per modum operati ...' The deduction proceeds negatively at first, by way of eliminating other possibilities. Then it positively states its affirmation. And finally, it uncovers the roots of an apparent contradiction.

The negative portion proceeds through three steps. *First*, dogma, with a firm basis in scripture, denies that the Son and the Spirit are made or created, and so we know that divine procession is not a matter of making or creating; *second*, since in divine procession the same God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, a divine procession cannot be a *processio ad extra*; and *third*, while a divine procession is *ad intra*, it cannot be a *processio operationis*, for such a procession would be an origin of act from potency, nor can it be a *processio operati*, an origin even *ad intra* of one act from another act, where the distinction of the two acts is not only real but *secundum esse absolutum*: in God, who is simple, there can be only one act, and that an infinite act.⁴² So much for the first, negative part of the argument.

The positive part of this portion of the assertion, then, states that divine procession must be *per modum operati*, according to the mode of a *processio operati*, in that it is a procession in which the principle and what proceeds from it, *actus principians* and *actus principiatas*, while they are really distinct, are not two acts really distinct *secundum esse absolutum* – there is only one God, and the three divine persons are consubstantial – but are distinct *secundum esse relativum*. In the language of the Council of Florence, everything in God is one except where the opposition of relation dictates otherwise (DS 703, DS 1130).⁴³

42 Ibid. 156-57.

43 Perhaps it would be well to give this item in its entirety: 'Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia, Domini et Salvatoris nostri voce fundata, firmiter credit, profitetur et praedicat, unum verum Deum omnipotentem, incommutabilem et aeternum, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, unum in essentia, trinum in personis: Patrem ingenitum, Filium ex

The apparent contradiction appears in the two statements that (1) God is from God, and (2) God is one. If there is a real procession of God from God, there would seem to be two gods. But if God is one, there would not seem to be any procession of God from God. Negatively, but only negatively, this contradiction is removed by distinguishing between a procession *ad extra* and a procession *ad intra*. In a procession *ad extra*, one thing, one complete reality, proceeds from another. If a divine procession were *ad extra*, there would be two gods or at least two complete realities. But a procession *ad intra* does not *necessarily* entail the existence of two distinct complete realities; it is not necessarily the case that one thing proceeds from another *secundum esse absolutum*, and so the result is that two gods are excluded. To quote again what we have already seen from Aquinas, ‘... id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili non oportet esse diversum; immo quantum perfectius procedit tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliquid magis intelligitur tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti et magis unum; nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intellecto. Unde cum divinum intelligere sit in fine perfectionis ..., necesse est quod verbum divinum sit perfecte unum cum eo a quo procedit absque omni diversitate.’⁴⁴

Now it is true that an internal procession *can* be the procession of one act from another act within the same thing, where the two acts are distinct *secundum esse absolutum*. The procession of the inner word (for example, an act of defining) from the act of understanding, and the procession of the act of judging from the act of grasping the sufficiency of evidence are clear examples. In either case, we are speaking of two acts that are really distinct *secundum esse absolutum*. And so Lonergan states that the solution to the apparent contradiction, a solution that proceeds by distinguishing *ad extra* and *ad intra*, is merely negative, and that there is needed a positive solution that rests on a grasp of the difference between the divine nature and human nature. Generation *ad intra* does not occur in human beings. Only a positive doctrine about the

Patre genitum, Spiritum Sanctum ex Patre et Filio procedentem. Patrem non esse Filium aut Spiritum Sanctum; Filium non esse Patrem aut Spiritum Sanctum; Spiritum Sanctum non esse Patrem aut Filium: sed Pater tantum Pater est, Filius tantum Filius est, Spiritus Sanctus tantum Spiritus Sanctus est. Solus Pater de substantia sua genuit Filium, solus Filius de solo Patre est genitus, solus Spiritus Sanctus simul de Patre procedit et Filio. Hae tres personae sunt unus Deus, et non tres dii: quia trium est una substantia, una essentia, una natura, una divinitas, una immensitas, una aeternitas, omniaque sunt unum, ubi not obviat relationis oppositio.’

44 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m.

divine nature can give us some understanding of why generation *ad intra* is not incompatible with the divine nature. That positive doctrine is given in the second part of the argument, where the hypothetical solution is offered.

4.4 The Second Step

The positive resolution constitutes the second step in the argument of the assertion. The first step has deduced the conclusion that a divine procession is *per modum operati*. It has thus arrived, not yet at any *understanding* of divine processions, but at a *technical formulation* of the issue to be understood, that is, of the truth affirmed and confessed in faith. It has arrived at this technical formulation by deducing it from the truths of faith as a theological conclusion, using metaphysical principles to distinguish various modes of procession.

The second step seeks a hypothetical *understanding* of the truth thus technically formulated.⁴⁵ It proceeds through four steps: first, the divine processions can be *understood* to be *per modum operati* if we suppose that there is in God intelligent emanation; second, such a deduction brings an increase, not of knowledge but of understanding; third, it is determined in what this increase of understanding consists; and fourth, it is explained that this acquired understanding is mediate, imperfect, analogous, and obscure. The next, third step will argue why this hypothesis is to be accepted.

There are three reasons for proceeding in this way. First, we cannot *demonstrate* that a procession *per modum operati* is an intelligent emanation, since from what is less determinate (*processio per modum operati*) we cannot demonstrate what is more determinate (*emanatio intelligibilis*). Moreover, demonstration is not to be sought of principles. There are principles that are *per se* known by reason; there are principles that are revealed by God and accepted in faith; and there are theological principles that are reached, not by faith alone nor by reason alone nor by deduction from faith and reason, but by the understanding that is the term of an inquiry undertaken by reason enlightened by faith. Such is the supposition of intelligent emanation in God. Third, the present inquiry bears precisely upon such a matter of principle, for a principle is what is first in some set of related matters, and we are here treating the first matter to be treated in a systematic exposition of an understanding of trinitarian doctrine. This principle is not naturally known, nor is it divinely revealed and believed in faith. Rather, what is being sought is an

45 'Comparatur ergo haec altera pars argumenti ad primam, sicut comparatur solutio hypothetica ad problema technice formulatum.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 160.

understanding of the faith, an understanding of what has been revealed by God, proposed by the church, and believed in faith.

4.4.1 The Hypothesis

We begin, then, with the *hypothetical presupposition* – ‘Let us suppose’ – that there is in God intelligent emanation. This is not an article of faith. Nor is it a technical formulation of an article of faith. It is an intelligent hypothesis, and it will be employed to understand the article of faith – there is procession in God – that has been technically formulated – procession in God is not *ad extra*, nor is it *processio operationis*, nor is it *processio operati*, but it is *processio per modum operati*. Again, it proposes that the *processio per modum operati* that constitutes a divine procession is to be understood *by analogy* with what we experience as an intelligent emanation (*secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis*). A divine procession can be, not simply affirmed through deduction from the articles of faith to be *per modum operati*, but *understood* to be *per modum operati*, if (1) there is intelligent emanation in God, and (2) this intelligent emanation is distinct from what we experience, where one act arises from another act and the two acts are distinct *secundum esse absolutum*. In God the *one* infinite act is both *principians* and *principiatus*, and so, when we speak of *actus principians* and *actus principiatus*, we are not speaking of two acts really distinct *secundum esse absolutum*, but of *really distinct relations within the one infinite act* that is God. Again, there occur in us *processiones ad intra* that are *processiones operati*; but there does not occur in us a *generatio ad intra* whose terms are constitutive of *one* act because they are *identical with the relations* of generation and generated. ‘... the divine procession of the Word is not only real but also a natural generation. In us that does not hold. Our intellects are not our substance; our acts of understanding are not our existence; and so our definitions and affirmations are not the essence and existence of our children.’⁴⁶ We rely on the notion of a *processio operati* to understand the divine processions – this is precisely what is meant by *per modum operati* – but the *real* distinction within the one act of two terms *only* by the mutually opposed relations that they *are* is not something to be found in the creaturely realm.

This formulation takes us beyond the divine processions to the divine relations, however, and we have yet to examine Lonergan’s explanation of how the divine processions can be *understood* to be *per modum operati* – that they *are per modum operati* has already been affirmed in the first part of the assertion – if they are conceived on an analogy with the intelligent emanations of the inner word from understanding and of the act of love from that same understanding and

46 Lonergan, *Verbum* 208.

that same inner word, where the word that itself is a judgment of value (second step); and why this seems to be the only manner in which such an understanding is attainable (third step).

What is going forward here, then, is not a demonstration: the notion of *per modum operati* – which is already theologically certain when used as a formulation for the nature of divine procession – is of a lesser determination than that of *emanatio intelligibilis*, and so it cannot be concluded from *per modum operati* that divine procession is to be understood analogically *secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis*. Thus the wording of this second part of the assertion is, ‘If one supposes intellectual emanation in God, it follows that there is a procession according to the mode of a *processio operati*.⁴⁷ We already know that divine procession is *per modum operati*. How can this be possible? It can be possible if divine procession can be understood *secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis*.

The effort, obviously, is to reach a hypothetical understanding of what already is accepted as a technical formulation of what is believed in faith. Moreover, principles cannot be demonstrated, and we are dealing here with a matter of principle, with the first issue in an ordered treatment of Trinitarian systematics. This principle is neither naturally known nor divinely revealed, but a matter of *intelligentia fidei*, of an understanding of what is divinely revealed and believed in faith: ‘suppose this is the case; then it would follow that ...’

What, then, would an *emanatio intelligibilis et divina* be? An intelligent emanation, as we have seen, occurs in virtue of intelligent consciousness itself determined by some act. To suppose hypothetically that there is intelligent emanation in God is to suppose hypothetically, then, (1) that there is in God consciousness and that this consciousness is intelligent, (2) that this intelligent consciousness is determined by some act, which in this case can be nothing other than infinite act, and (3) that this consciousness, so determined, is dynamic, so that it consciously demands or requires an emanation.⁴⁸ All of these points are contained in the supposition that there is in God intelligent emanation.

Six consequences follow from these hypothetical suppositions.

First, infinite act is the act that is principle of the emanation. For there cannot be in God any real distinction between infinite act and

47 ‘Supposita in divinis emanatione intelligibili, sequitur processio per modum operati.’ *The Triune God: Systematics* 160-61.

48 ‘Porro, cum emanatio intelligibilis sit *vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu quodam determinatae*, supponendum est in Deo esse conscientiam, eamque intellectualem; supponendum etiam est hanc conscientiam aliquo actu determinari, qui sane actus non alius esse possit quam actus infinitus; supponendum est hanc conscientiam ita determinatam esse dynamicam, ut scilicet conscie exigat emanationem.’ *Ibid.* 162-63.

divine consciousness, and so we cannot conceive them in such a way that one is really determining (infinite act) and the other really determined (divine consciousness). Thus infinite act itself knows the 'motive' that calls for an emanation and determines what it will be (*motivum propter quod et secundum quod exigatur emanatio*), and by this knowledge and conscious exigence infinite act is constituted as the act that is the principle (*actus principians*) of the emanation.⁴⁹

Second, it follows that there truly and really proceeds within divine consciousness an act that is originated (*actum principatum*). For it cannot be supposed that infinite act is limited by an inconsistency (*sibi non constare*), such that, while there is a conscious demand within it for an emanation, nonetheless the emanation does not exist, or that, while there is a demand that the emanation be within consciousness, nonetheless it is not within consciousness. By the very fact that there is posited an act that is principle, there necessarily is also posited a true and real emanation; and where there is a true and real emanation, there is also that which emanates, the act that proceeds (*actus principiatum*).⁵⁰

Third, it follows that the *actus principiatum* is also infinite act: it is not nothing; and it cannot be finite, for (1) it is not created: everything created proceeds *ad extra*, but any act that proceeds within consciousness and by the force of that consciousness itself proceeds *ad intra*; and (2) it is not contingent: whatever proceeds because of an exigence within divine consciousness proceeds by necessity.⁵¹

49 'Quibus suppositis primo sequitur actum infinitum esse actum principiantem. Non enim in Deo esse potest realis distinctio inter actum infinitum et divinam conscientiam; quae, cum non distinguantur, concipi non possunt ut realiter determinans et realiter determinata; et ideo dicendum est ipso actu infinito cognosci motivum propter quod et secundum quod exigatur emanatio. Qua cognitione atque exigentia conscia constituitur actus infinitus ut actus principians.' Ibid.

50 'Sequitur deinde vere et realiter intra divinam conscientiam oriri actum principiatum. Supponi enim non potest actum infinitum sibi non constare, ut conscie exigatur emanatio et tamen nulla sit emanatio, vel ut exigatur emanatio intra conscientiam et tamen non sit intra conscientiam. Quare, eo ipso quod ponitur actus principians, necessario etiam ponitur vera et realis emanatio; et ubi vera et realis habetur emanatio, ibi etiam habetur id quod emanat seu actus principiatum.' Ibid.

51 'Sequitur tertio actum principiatum esse infinitum. Nam actus principiatum non est nihil, et ideo aut finitus est aut infinitus est. Sed finitus esse non potest. Nam omne finitum etiam est creatum; et omne creatum oritur per processionem ad extra; sed ad intra oritur actus qui intra conscientiam et vi ipsius conscientiae oritur. Praeterea, omne finitum est contingens; sed necessario oritur quod propter exigentiam

Fourth, then, it follows that God proceeds from God, for what is infinite is God.⁵²

Fifth, it follows that the act that is principle and the act that proceeds are not really distinct *secundum esse absolutum*. For each is infinite, and the infinite is unique, and so there cannot be a real distinction *secundum esse absolutum* within infinite act.⁵³

Sixth, it follows that they are really distinct *secundum esse relativum*. The real emanation that has been supposed gives rise necessarily to opposed relations of principle and proceeding. This is so even when the same infinite act is both principle and proceeding, for the emanation in question is not causal. A causal emanation demands that cause and effect be really distinct *secundum esse absolutum*. But the emanation in question is an intelligible emanation, one that involves *because (quia)*: ‘to love the good is right *because* loving proceeds from the good truly affirmed, and affirming the good is true *because* affirming proceeds from a grasp of evidence.’ Nor is there any reason why this truth and rightness are excluded simply because the act of grasping, affirming, and loving is infinite act and infinite act is one.⁵⁴

Lonergan makes the point that in *Verbum* that it is precisely here that the difference between intelligent emanation in us and in God shows

ipsius divinae conscientiae oritur. Relinquitur ergo ut actus principiatu sit infinitus.’ Ibid.

52 ‘Sequitur quarto oriri Deum ex Deo. Nam quod infinitum est, Deus est. Sed actus principians est infinitus; actus principiatu est infinitus; actus principiatu ex actu principiante vere et realiter oritur; ergo, supposita emanatione intelligibili atque divina, oritur Deus ex Deo.’ Ibid.

53 ‘Sequitur quinto actum principiantem et actum principiatu non realiter distingui quoad esse absolutum. Nam uterque actus est infinitus; sed infinitum est unicum; et ideo, quoad esse absolutum, esse non potest realis distinctio inter actum principiantem et actum principiatu.’ Ibid. 162-65.

54 ‘Sequitur sexto actum principiantem et actum principiatu realiter distingui quoad esse relativum. Supposita enim est realis emanatio quam necessario sequuntur oppositae relationes principiantis et principiatu. Neque obstat quod idem actus est et principians et principiatu. Non enim agitur de emanatione causali quae tolleretur nisi causa et effectus essent duo absoluta realiter distincta. Sed agitur de emanatione intelligibili, secundum quam diligere bonum est honestum *quia* ex bono vere affirmato procedit, et bonum affirmare est verum *quia* ex perspecta evidentia procedit. Neque ulla ratione demonstratur hanc veritatem hancque honestatem ideo tolli quia actus perspicendi, affirmandi, diligendi sit infinitus, et infinitus actus sit unicus.’ Ibid. 164-65, emphasis added.

up most clearly. The divine *dicere* is not a *producere verbum*, and there is not in God a *processio operati*.

In us there are two acts, first, an act of understanding, secondly, a really distinct act of defining or judging. In God there is but one act. But not only did Aquinas advert to this rather obvious fact but also he assigned the reason for the difference: ‘*id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit*’ ...

There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us. There is the productive aspect: intelligence in act is proportionate to producing the inner word. There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient. I can imagine a circle, and I can define a circle. In both cases there is efficient causality. But in the second case there is something more. I define the circle because I grasp in imagined data that, if the radii are equal, then the plane curve must be uniformly round. The inner word of defining not only is *caused by* [productive aspect] but also is *because of* [intelligible aspect] the act of understanding. In the former aspect the procession is *processio operati*. In the latter aspect the procession is *processio intelligibilis*. Similarly, in us the act of judgment is caused by a reflective act of understanding, and so it is *processio operati*. But that is not all. The procession of judgment cannot be equated with procession from electromotive force or chemical action or biological process or even sensitive act. Judgment is judgment only if it proceeds from intellectual grasp of sufficient evidence as sufficient. Its procession also is *processio intelligibilis*.

What, then, does Aquinas mean when he writes: ‘*id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit?*’ He does not mean that there can be production, properly speaking, when principle and product are absolutely identical. He does mean that there can be *processio intelligibilis* without absolute diversity, indeed that the more perfect the *processio intelligibilis* is, the greater the approach to identity. In us inner word proceeds from act of understanding by a *processio intelligibilis* that also is a *processio operati*, for our inner word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really distinct. In God inner word proceeds from act of understanding as uttering by a *processio intelligibilis* that is not a *processio operati*, at least inasmuch as divine understanding and divine Word are not two absolute entities really distinct ...

Indeed, the divine procession of the Word is not only real but also a natural generation. In us that does not hold. Our intellects are not our substance; our acts of understanding are not our existence; and so our definitions and affirmations are not the essence and existence of our children. Our inner words are just thoughts, just *esse intentionale* of what we define and affirm, just *intentio intellecta* and not *res intellecta*. But in God intellect is substance, and act of understanding is act of existence; it follows that the Word that proceeds in him is of the same nature and substance as its principle, that his thought of himself is himself, that his *intentio intellecta* of himself is also the *res intellecta*. As there is an analogy of *ens* and *esse*, so also there is an analogy of the intelligibly proceeding *est*. In us *est* is just a thought, a judgment. But in God not only is *ipsum esse* the ocean of all perfection, comprehensively grasped by *ipsum intelligere*, in complete identity, but also perfectly expressed in a single Word. That Word is thought, definition, judgment and yet of the same nature as God whose substance is intellect. Hence it is not mere thought as opposed to thing, not mere definition as opposed to defined, not mere judgment as opposed to judged. No less than what it perfectly expresses, it too is the ocean of all perfection. Still, though infinite *esse* and infinite *est* are identical absolutely, none the less truly there is an intelligible procession. The divine Word is because of the divine understanding as uttering, yet ‘eo magis unum, quo perfectius procedit.’⁵⁵

Thus Lonergan can claim that, if one supposes an intelligent emanation in God, there follow all the points that pertain to a divine procession and that have already been deduced from the truths of faith under the rubric of a *processio per modum operati*.⁵⁶ And a deduction yields some understanding, even when the premises are not anything more than supposition or hypothesis; therefore, if we suppose divine intelligible emanation, we arrive at some understanding of what we confess in faith.⁵⁷

55 Lonergan, *Verbum* 206-208.

56 ‘Supposita ergo emanatione intelligibili et divina, sequuntur omnia quae ad processionem divinam pertinent, quaeque sub nomine processionis per modum operati ex veritatibus fidei iam probavimus.’ *The Triune God: Systematics* 164-65.

57 ‘Sed, ubi fit deductio, ibi habetur aliqua intelligentia; neque simpliciter tollitur haec intelligentia eo quod praemissa non est nisi suppositio seu hypothesis; quare, supposita emanatione intelligibili et divina, oritur aliqua fidei intelligentia.’ *Ibid.*

4.4.2 Understanding, Not Knowledge

What the supposition of intelligent emanation yields, then, is a hypothetical understanding of what faith affirms. More precisely, it yields a hypothetical understanding of how there can be processions *per modum operati* in God, where the first part of the assertion argued negatively that, if there are processions in God, they must be *per modum operati*. The supposition of intelligent emanation does not yield knowledge, for the conclusion follows from a principle that is not known but supposed (there are intelligent emanations in God). The conclusion is already known from other sources (first part of the assertion); what this deduction does is show how it can be the case, how it might be possible. And it does so by supposing a principle that would make it possible that the conclusion, already known, be true. How can the doctrines be true? is the question for systematics. Wherever there is a deduction, the conclusion is known to the extent that the principle is known. But here the principle is not known but supposed, and so what is deduced is also not known from the force of the deduction, but supposed. While the conclusion – the divine processions are *per modum operati* – is known from the first part of the assertion, by being deduced from the truths of faith, the truth of this conclusion does not prove the principles of faith from which it is derived: this can be known from logic itself, and also from the fact that the same conclusion might be drawn equally well or better from another principle.

But the supposition does yield understanding, an understanding that is mediated by the deduction itself, that is imperfect, and that is analogous – and such is the only way we can understand an infinite act that is rationally and morally conscious. And so, in the present deduction, it is only mediately, imperfectly, and analogously that we understood a procession *per modum operati*. This is not negligible, however, but is precisely the kind of understanding approved by the First Vatican Council.⁵⁸

58 'Deinde, quaerendum est in quo praecise consistat momentum huius deductionis ex suppositione.

Respondetur duplex esse posse momentum: aliud quod respicit cognitionem; et aliud quod respicit intelligentiam. Nam ubi fit deductio, ibi eatenus cognoscitur conclusio, quatenus cognoscitur principium; et eatenus intelligitur conclusio, quatenus intelligitur principium.

Porro, momentum cognitionis ex ipsa deductione iam facta, eaque sola, est nullum. Nam principium non cognoscitur sed supponitur; et ideo quod deducitur, vi ipsius deductionis, pariter non cognoscitur sed supponitur. Verum quidem est conclusionem iam aliunde esse

4.4.3 What Kind of Increase of Understanding?

The understanding thus yielded consists in reducing to one a number of elements that are both many and seemingly conflictual. For many elements are contained in the definition of a procession *per modum operati*, and they can be reconciled only in the infinity of God.

More specifically, there are consequences that follow upon the fact that God is infinite act, and there are other consequences that follow from the supposition that God is dynamically conscious. From God's infinity it follows that what proceeds in God is infinite, and from the fact that the infinite is one and unique it follows that what proceeds and the principle from which it proceeds cannot be distinguished *quoad esse absolutum*. But from the conscious exigence in divine consciousness it follows that there is a principle, there is an emanation or proceeding, there is something that proceeds from the principle, and there is a real distinction *quoad esse relativum* between the principle and what proceeds.

As long as we consider each of these separately, there is no difficulty. But when they are considered together, there arise difficulties that manifest the depth of the mystery of the Trinity. Moreover, the argument of the assertion does not directly reconcile the reality of procession with the consubstantiality of what proceeds – it is precisely here that we are confronted with the *altitudo mysterii* – but indirectly and mediately it does reconcile them by reducing them to a common root, the act that is both infinite and dynamically conscious: from its infinity there follows consubstantiality, and from its dynamic consciousness there follows the reality of emanation. But this is the best we can do; beyond this our understanding cannot penetrate.

cognitam; eam enim in parte prima ex veritatibus fidei demonstravimus. Attamen haec veritas conclusionis non est probatio principii, uti constat sive ex minori logica sive ex simplici reflexione aliud posse esse principium ex quo aequae bene vel melius deducatur eadem conclusio. Cf. *Sum. theol.*, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m.

‘E contra, momentum intelligentiae non est nullum. Sane nisi mediate, imperfecte, analogice non intelligimus actum infinitum rationaliter et moraliter conscium; et ideo vi peractae deductionis non possumus nisi mediate, imperfecte, et analogice intelligere processionem per modum operati. Attamen, vel mediata et imperfecta et analogica intelligentia non est nulla: imo, ea praecise est intelligentia quam laudavit c. Vaticanum I (DB 1796).’ *Ibid.* 164-67.

4.4.4 Mediate, Analogous, Imperfect, Obscure Understanding

And so the understanding thus yielded is imperfect. The one root to which everything is reduced is the infinite, rationally and morally conscious act that is God. A conclusion is understood only to the extent that the principle is understood, and a conclusion is not understood to the extent that the principle is not understood. Even if we can reduce everything pertinent to a procession *per modum operati* to a common root and to that extent reach some understanding, nonetheless the understanding reached is no better than our understanding of this one common root. But the root is the infinite, rationally and morally conscious act, and we do not understand the infinite in a positive, but only in a negative, way. Even our own rational and moral consciousness is something that we rather live than understand clearly and distinctly. While we suppose that this consciousness is an image of God, we also know that it is a very deficient image, through whose mediation we can conceive the divine consciousness only analogously and imperfectly. Moreover, we do not *know* there is dynamic consciousness in God; we reach this affirmation only on the basis that, if do we presuppose it, those consequences follow which can also be concluded from the truths of faith (that is, that divine processions must be *per modum operati*). Nonetheless, such imperfection of understanding only confirms the intellectual divine emanation: ‘... never does ... reason illumined by faith become capable of understanding the mysteries the way it does truths which are its proper object. For divine mysteries of their very nature so exceed the created intellect that even when they have been given in revelation and accepted by faith, that very faith still keeps them veiled in a sort of obscurity, as long as “we are exiled from the Lord” in this mortal life.’⁵⁹ We can say of Lonergan’s treatment at this point what he says of Thomas’s trinitarian theology:

... the procedure of the *Summa* ... reveals the measure of significance to be attached to the *imago Deo*. As we have seen, there is a twofold systematization: first, our concepts are *in fieri*; secondly, their order is reversed and they stand *in facto esse*. As long as our concepts are in development, the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery. In other words, the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated in its full intelligibility; grasping properly *quid sit*

59 *The Triune God: Systematics* 168-69, quoting db 1796 (ds 3016).

Deus is the beatific vision. Just as an experimental physicist may not grasp most of quantum mathematics, but under the direction of a mathematician may very intelligently devise and perform experiments that advance the quantum theory, so also the theologian with no proper grasp of *quid sit Deus* but under the direction of divine revelation really operates in virtue of and towards an understanding that he personally in this life cannot possess.

... do not think that Aquinas allows the psychological analogy to take the place of the divine essence as the one sufficient principle of explanation. The psychological analogy is just the sidedoor through which we enter for an imperfect look.⁶⁰

4.5 *The Third Step*

The third step consists in affirming that this particular analogy of intelligent emanation seems to be the only analogy we may employ for a systematic conception of the divine processions.⁶¹ Thus at this point Lonergan is arguing that the proposed solution ought to be accepted because no other solution is possible.

He tries to order the various criteria by which one may judge the issue, and in the course of doing so he further characterizes and qualifies the particular analogy that he is employing.

First, the mode of conception must be concrete. The abstract definition of a procession – the origin of one from another -- yields only a minimal formality that prescind from every concrete difference between modes. Thus it yields no understanding at all. Concrete conceptions distinguish different modes of proceeding for different natures,⁶² as we have seen above, in the discussion of the various determinations of modes of procession.

Second, the mode of conception must be analogical. There is no immediate knowledge of God in this life, and all mediated knowledge of God is necessarily imperfect and analogical, since every finite medium is deficient to the utmost in representing the infinite, and all knowledge

60 Lonergan, *Verbum* 215-16.

61 'Praeter similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis non alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 168-69.

62 'Circa processionem distingui potest inter abstractam rationem et modum concretum. In concreto enim alius est procedendi modus in alia natura; sed abstracta processionis ratio (origo, nempe, unius ex alio) adeo brevis et tenuis est ut ab omni modorum differentia praescindat. Quaestio ergo ponitur, non de hac minima ratione quam quilibet nullo negotio attingit, sed de concreto modo divinae processionis.' *Ibid.*

reached through a deficient medium is necessarily imperfect and analogical.⁶³

Third, the analogy must be systematic, that is, it must be one that is explicitly and thematically employed to resolve, not just one question but an entire series of questions. One does not proceed systematically if one uses analogies only implicitly and nonthematically; and if one employs different and ever new analogies in distinct questions or even in the same questions, then one achieves only a rhetorical heap of examples. A theologian should proceed systematically, and so much the more if one is investigating the mode of the divine processions, for the divine processions provide the key to the whole range of Trinitarian questions. We do not begin a Trinitarian systematics by treating immediately the divine persons, but rather we start from the processions, since the key to the entire problem is to be found in the notion of procession and the appropriate mode of procession proper to the processions in God. Thus the analogy proposed should be such as to resolve virtually every other theoretical question about the triune God.⁶⁴

Fourth, the analogy should proceed from what is naturally known, as Vatican I taught. The reason is that all analogical knowledge is mediate, and all mediate knowledge is grounded in some immediate knowledge. Therefore, since we know the supernatural only analogically,

63 *‘Modus analogice notus. Modus concretus divinae processionis vel immediate vel mediate cognoscitur. Sed immediata Dei cognitio nisi ab ipso Deo et a beatis non habetur, et ideo hac in vita a nobis quaeri non potest nisi mediata quaedam cognitio. Porro omnis mediata Dei cognitio necessario et imperfecta est atque analogica, cum omne medium finitum quam maxime deficiat in infinito repraesentando, et omnis cognitio, quae per medium deficiens attingitur, necessario sit imperfecta atque analogica.’* Ibid. 168-71.

64 *‘Analogia systematica. Systematica nominatur analogia quae explicite et signate adhibetur neque unam tantummodo resolvit quaestionem sed totam quandam quaestionum seriem.*

‘Systematice ergo non procedit, vel qui analogias quidem adhibeat sed hoc nisi implicite et exercite non faciat, vel qui in distinctis quaestionibus, vel etiam in iisdem, diversas et semper novas adducat analogias, ut in fine nisi rhetoricum quendam exemplorum acervum non attingat.

‘E contra theologum oportet systematice procedere, et eo magis qui de modo divinae processionis inquirat. Ideo enim non immediate de divinis personis quaeritur quales sint, sed a processionibus incipitur, quia iam pridem constat totius materiae trinitariae clavem in ratione processionis eiusque modo inveniri.

‘Quae cum ita sint, quaerenda est analogia systematica quae ita modum divinae processionis concipiat ut virtualiter omnis alia quaestio theoretica de Deo trino iam solvatur.’ Ibid. 170-71.

we know it only mediately, and so should proceed from things naturally known.⁶⁵

Fifth, the analogy should proceed from an immediately known nature. Common metaphysical notions – ‘ens, unum, verum, bonum, idem et diversum, actus et potentia, absolutum et relativum et eiusmodi’ – provide one way of knowing things immediately and naturally, namely, by the analogy of being; and these yielded the conclusion that a divine procession is *per modum operati*. But things can be known immediately and naturally also in accord with their generic or specific natures, and only an analogy that proceeds from a specific nature immediately and naturally known to us enables us to conceive a divine procession *per modum emanationis intelligibilis*. Similarly, in natural theology we can proceed by common metaphysical notions to determine that God is *ipsum esse*, but only by moving from an analogy with a specific nature can we determine as well that God is *ipsum intelligere*.

Moreover, the very definite conclusions that we can arrive at by employing common metaphysical notions would not enable us to understand systematically two *distinct* divine processions, one of which is generation and the other of which is not. Nor would such conclusions provide the common root for treating systematically not only the processions but also the relations and the persons and all other related issues. So the analogy of being is not sufficient; we must seek an analogy that proceeds from a determinate nature immediately and naturally known to us.⁶⁶

65 ‘*E naturaliter notis*. Docuit enim c. Vaticanum I quaerendam esse mysterii intelligentiam “... ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia ...” (DB 1796). Cuius rei ratio est quod omnis cognitio analogica etiam mediata est; et omnis mediata cognitio in aliqua cognitione immediata fundatur. Quare, cum supernaturalia nisi analogice non cognoscamus, sequitur nos ea nisi mediate non cognoscere. Et ideo relinquitur ut analogia ex rebus naturalibus desumatur.’ Ibid. 170-71.

66 ‘*Ex immediate cognita natura*. Dupliciter res immediate et naturaliter cognoscimus: uno modo secundum rationes communes, uti sunt ens, unum, verum, et bonum, idem et diversum, actus et potentia, absolutum et relativum, et eiusmodi; alio modo secundum genericas et specificas rerum naturas. Et primo modo iam determinavimus divinam processionem esse per modum operati; altero autem modo supposuimus eandem processionem esse per modum emanationis intelligibilis. Et similiter in theologia naturali secundum rationem communem determinatur Deum esse ipsum esse, sed secundum rationem specificam determinatur Deum esse ipsum intelligere.

‘Porro, eiusmodi sunt rationes et principia communia ut, veritatibus fidei applicata, conclusiones pariant omnino certas. Attamen eo ipso quod communia sunt, non sufficiunt ad praesentem

Sixth, this nature must be spiritual. God is immaterial, and so the Trinitarian analogy must proceed, not from minerals, plants, and animals, but from human beings, and indeed from what is proper to them as human. Now, among the things that are proper to human beings, some are strictly spiritual, while others depend intrinsically on the body, on vegetative life, or on sensitive life. To understand, to judge, and to decide are not only proper to human beings but also depend on matter only extrinsically,⁶⁷ whereas speech, for example, while proper to

quaestionem solvendam quae analogiam vult systematicam. Ita enim cognoscendus est divinae processionis modus ut duae et specificae distinctae concipi possint processionibus divinae, quarum alia generatio sit et alia generatio non sit; et similiter non solum de processionibus sed etiam de relationibus et personis et caeteris omnibus iam virtualiter et quasi in radice solutiones praebere debet analogia systematica.

‘Quae cum ita sint, ultra metaphysicam analogiam entis procedi oportet, ut analogia quaeratur de determinata quadam natura quae a nobis immediate et naturaliter cognoscatur.’ Ibid. 170-73.

⁶⁷ See *Insight* 540-41. ‘Matter’ is characterized as that whose functioning could not occur apart from the empirical residue, that is, ‘apart from manifolds of instances in a space-time continuum, and apart from actual frequencies that nonsystematically diverge from ideal frequencies,’ and so matter is defined as ‘whatever is constituted by the empirical residue or is conditioned intrinsically by that residue.’ The spiritual, then, or the immaterial is what is neither constituted by, nor conditioned intrinsically by, the empirical residue. Not constituted: ‘inasmuch as we are understanding, we are abstracting from that residue; and inasmuch as we are grasping the unconditioned, we are attaining the lucid, fully rational factualness that contrasts so violently with the brute factualness with which instances similar in all respects still are different instances, with which the multiplicity of the continuum is noncountable because nonordinable, with which actual frequencies diverge from ideal frequencies in any manner provided it is nonsystematic. But if insight and grasp of the unconditioned are constituted quite differently from the empirical residue, so also are the inquiry and critical reflection that lead to them and the conception and judgment that result from them and express them.’ Not conditioned intrinsically: ‘Quite obviously, there is some conditioning. Our inquiry and insight demand something apart from themselves into which we inquire and attain insight; initially and commonly that other is sensible experience, and in it is found the empirical residue. But if sensible experience and so the empirical residue condition inquiry and insight, it is no less plain that that conditioning is extrinsic. Seeing is seeing color, and color is spatial, so that seeing is conditioned intrinsically by the spatial continuum. But insight is an act of

human beings, nonetheless immediately and necessarily proceeds from mouth and tongue and throat. Since nothing in God depends intrinsically on matter, any similitude of nature that there may be between God and human beings can be found only in those elements that not only are proper to human beings but also strictly spiritual.⁶⁸

Seventh, the analogy must be from a spiritual procession, for only there is there to be found a *similitudo naturae* to a divine procession: the analogy has to be from a procession, and one whose mode will give a *similitudo naturae*; only a spiritual procession will do. Nor will those strictly spiritual processions suffice in which act proceeds from potency or habit. And it is not sufficient to consider the strictly spiritual mode only in common metaphysical categories; specific determination is necessary. What is required is a created spiritual procession in which (1) a strictly spiritual act proceeds (2) from a strictly spiritual act (3) according to a strictly spiritual way of proceeding. Every strictly spiritual act is a real, natural, and conscious act; every conscious act is within consciousness; and where a conscious act proceeds from a conscious act within consciousness, the procession itself is conscious and occurs somehow by the force of consciousness itself; such acts are not epiphenomena. Moreover, every strictly spiritual act that we know of

understanding, and so far from being conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue, understanding abstracts from it. Again, to grasp the unconditioned there is a prerequisite of a known fulfilment of conditions; commonly this fulfilment lies in sensible experience; still, the fulfilment is anything but unconditioned; and it is the unconditioned that intrinsically conditions a grasp of the unconditioned.'

68 *'Ex spirituali natura. Quorum naturae immediate a nobis cognoscuntur, aut mineralia sunt, aut plantae, aut animalia, aut homines. Sed mineralia, plantae, et animalia prorsus sunt materialia; Deus autem omnino immaterialis est. Quare, cum analogia fundetur in similitudine, et analogia naturae in similitudine naturae, quaerenda est analogia trinitaria, non ex mineralibus, plantis, vel aliis animalibus, sed ex homine et quidem secundum ea quae homini sunt propria.*

'Praeterea, quae homini sunt propria ita dividuntur, ut alia inveniuntur stricte spiritualia, alia autem quae intrinsece a corpore, vel a vita vegetativa, vel a vita sensitiva dependeant. Ita intelligere et iudicare et velle non solum homini propria sunt sed etiam nisi extrinsece a materia non dependent. Sed locutio ita homini propria est, ut tamen non exerceatur nisi ore et lingua et gutture, e quibus immediate procedit. Iam vero, nihil in Deo intrinsece a materia dependet; et ideo inter Deum et hominem similitudo naturae inveniri non potest nisi in iis quae non solum homini propria sunt sed etiam stricte spiritualia.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 172-73.

occurs either in the intellect or in the will. So the analogy must be from the conscious procession of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, within intelligent consciousness and in virtue of that intelligent consciousness itself.⁶⁹

Eighth, since we want a likeness of nature, we must attend to the internal mode of the procession. The phrase ‘by the force of intelligent consciousness’ draws our attention to that internal mode, and helps us to qualify the mode of procession internally as itself a spiritual mode of proceeding. Sensitive consciousness is governed by specific laws, and intellectual consciousness by transcendental laws. Thus, as we have already seen, in sensitive consciousness a conscious act proceeds from another conscious act by the spontaneity of sensitive nature itself; that spontaneity is perfected by acquired dispositions and habits, so that it quickly and easily and with delight does what is fitting for this determinate nature in proper circumstances. But the spontaneity of intelligent consciousness is regulated by transcendental laws that are not bound to any particular nature but are ordained to the transcendentals themselves: to being, to the one, to the true, to the good.

69 *‘Ex processione spirituali. Similitudo naturae ad processionem non invenitur nisi in processione; et similitudo naturae ad modum processionis non invenitur nisi in modo processionis. Non ergo omnia homini propria et stricte spiritualia ad nostrum finem faciunt, sed tantummodo processiones stricte spirituales et modi stricte spirituales procedendi.*

‘Neque quaecumque processio stricte spiritualis ad nostrum finem facit, sed eae sunt praetermittendae in quibus procedit actus ex potentia vel habitu, cum in Deo non sit nisi actus.

‘Neque modus stricte spiritualis quomodocumque est considerandus, sed procedi oportet ultra rationes communes ad modum procedendi specificè spiritualem; secus similitudo naturae non attingitur.

‘Desumenda ergo est analogia ex processione creata in qua oritur (1) actus stricte spiritualis (2) ex actu stricte spirituali (3) secundum modum procedendi stricte spiritualem.

‘Sed omnis actus stricte spiritualis est actus realis, naturalis, et conscius; et omnis actus conscius est intra conscientiam; et ubi intra conscientiam oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio, ibi ipsa origo est conscia et quodammodo vi ipsius conscientiae. Non enim epiphaenomena sunt actus conscii ut alius quidem alium sequatur quin alius vi alterius qua conscii oriatur.

‘Praeterea, omnis actus stricte spiritualis, quem cognoscimus, vel in intellectu est vel in voluntate. Desumenda ergo est analogia ex origine conscia actus realis, naturalis, et conscii ex actu reali, naturali, et conscia, intra conscientiam intellectualem, et vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis.’ Ibid. 172-75.

Thus intelligent consciousness is master of itself, self-determining, autonomous. It is ruled insofar as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire, but it rules itself insofar as, under the agency of God, it determines itself to its own acts according to the exigencies of its own nature as intelligent. Thus whatever proceeds *vi conscientiae intellectualis* proceeds in virtue of a natural desire, an intellectual spontaneity, a tendency that is both conscious and transcendental. Such a tendency is displayed in questions, whether practical (What is to be done? Is it to be done?) or speculative (What is it? Is it so?) or existential (What am I to make of myself? Will I really make such of myself?). It is manifest in the precepts we direct to ourselves to inquire, reflect, deliberate. It is manifest in the reasons we offer for so proceeding: we must inquire so that we do not judge what we do not understand; we must reflect so that we do not mistake the false for the true; we must deliberate so that we do not blindly fall into perdition.

Nonetheless, there are different ways of proceeding in virtue of intelligent consciousness. When intelligent consciousness is determined by some conscious act, from that determined consciousness as from a proximately proportionate principle there proceeds another act. Such is the autonomy of freedom when we choose *because* and *insofar as* we judge; such is the autonomy of rationality when we judge *because* and *insofar as* we grasp the evidence; such is the autonomy of intelligent clarity when we define *because* and *insofar as* we grasp the intelligible in the sensible. But when intelligent consciousness is not already determined by a conscious intellectual act, we are more spontaneous than autonomous. Thus it is that we proceed from questions to an act of understanding. And when we proceed to conscious acts from dispositions and habits that of themselves are not conscious, the procession is so far from being autonomous that it occurs unconsciously.

The type of procession that, however spiritual, is more spontaneous than autonomous, that is, a procession from potency to act, will not suffice for a Trinitarian analogy. What is needed is the procession of one act from another act, an autonomous rather than spontaneous procession; as when, by virtue of consciousness determined by an act of understanding there proceeds an inner word, and by virtue of consciousness determined by a judgment of value, which itself is a complex inner word, there proceeds a decision.⁷⁰

70 *‘Ex modo procedendi spirituali. Porro, ut attingatur analogia secundum similitudinem naturae, ad ipsum internum procedendi modum attendi oportet, et ideo quaerendum est quid sit illud “vi conscientiae intellectualis.”*

Differt ergo conscientia sensitiva ab intellectuali, quia illa legibus specificis, haec legibus transcendentalibus, regitur. Unde in parte sensitiva oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio secundum spontaneitatem ipsius naturae sensitivae; quae spontaneitas ita per

ipsam naturam determinatur ut acquisitis dispositionibus et habitibus perficiatur; unde prompte, faciliter, delectabiliter omnia operari possit quae huic determinatae naturae his in occurrentibus adiunctis convenient. Sed in parte intellectuali ita datur spontaneitas ut tamen non regatur nisi legibus transcendentalibus, quae nulli naturae particulari alligantur sed ad ipsa transcendentalia, ens (= concretum, totum, existens), unum, verum, bonum, ordinantur. Quam ob causam, pars intellectualis est sui domina, sui determinativa, autonoma. Regitur quidem quatenus per transcendentale suum desiderium constituitur; et tamen ipsa se regit quatenus sub Deo agente ipsa se ad suos actus determinat secundum exigentias propriae intellectualitatis.

‘Quare, quod procedit “vi conscientiae intellectualis” procedit in primis vi desiderii naturalis, vi spontaneitatis intellectualis, vi tendentiae et consciae et transcendentalis. Quam radicalem tendentiam, seu spontaneitatem, seu desiderium, seu inclinationem multipliciter manifestamus. Eam enim quaestionibus exprimimus, tum practicis (quid faciendum, an faciendum), tum speculativis (quid sit, an sit), tum existentialibus (qualem ipse me efficere possim, debeam, an talem ipse me efficiam). Quam quaestionibus exprimimus, eandem praeceptis agnoscimus atque consecramus: inquirendum est, dubitandum est, deliberandum est. Quam praeceptis agnoscimus, eandem rationibus explicamus atque defendimus: inquirendum est ne ea iudicemus quae non intelligamus; dubitandum est ne specie veri falsis inhaereamus; deliberandum est ne caeci in perditionem ruamus.

‘Aliter tamen alia procedunt vi conscientiae intellectualis. Ubi enim conscientia intellectualis actu quodam conscio determinatur, ex conscientia determinata tamquam ex principio proxime proportionato procedit alius actus. Et eiusmodi est autonomia libertatis ubi eligimus quia ipsi iudicamus et secundum quod ipsi iudicamus; eiusmodi etiam est autonomia rationalitatis ubi iudicamus quia evidentiam perspicimus et secundum perspectam evidentiam; eiusmodi est autonomia claritatis ubi definimus quia in sensibilibus perspicimus intelligibile et secundum intelligibile perspectum.

‘Ubi autem conscientia intellectualis non iam determinata est per actum quendam conscium et intellectualem, magis invenitur conscia quaedam spontaneitas quam autonomia; et ita ex quaestionibus ad actus intelligendi procedimus. Denique tandem, quatenus ex dispositionibus vel habitibus de se inconsciis ad actus conscientes proceditur, ipsa haec processio adeo non autonoma est ut potius inconscie fiat.

‘Proinde, cum unumquodque cognoscatur secundum quod est actu, modus procedendi stricte spiritualis sumi debet, non secundum ea quae hominem manifestant potentialem sed secundum ea quae sunt actu. Processio autem ex actu non spontanea est sed autonoma,

Ninth, the most suitable instance of such intelligent autonomy for a Trinitarian analogy is the procession of the word from understanding and the procession of a decision from the word of judgment, not in practical affairs and not in speculative matters, but *in the existential issues in which we inquire about ourselves, understand what we ought to be, judge how we can make ourselves be such, and proceed to the existential decisions through which we so constitute ourselves*. For when we are inquiring about the triune God we are not considering God as creating or acting, and so we prescind from practical autonomy. Nor are we considering God insofar as God understands and affirms and loves all things, and so we prescind as well from speculative autonomy. Rather, we are considering God as God from eternity is constituted in Godself as triune, and therefore we take our analogy from the processions that exhibit existential autonomy.⁷¹

Thus, by a series of disjunctions Lonergan has argued that there is no *similitudo naturae* for understanding the divine processions other than the *emanatio intelligibilis* through which one conscious act proceeds from another conscious act in a manner that is both conscious and autonomous: the understanding can only be mediated, not immediate; the analogy should be explicit, thematic, and systematic, not implicit, unthematic, and rhetorical; the systematic analogy has to be grounded in a specific created nature and not just in metaphysical categories; the analogy from a likeness of nature has to be from a strictly spiritual nature, not a material nature; and the mode of strictly spiritual

ut vi conscientiae per actum intelligendi determinatae oriatur verbum, et vi conscientiae per actum iudicandi (*i.e.*, verbum complexum) determinatae oriatur electio.’ *Ibid.* 173-77.

71 ‘*Autonomia existentialis*. Tripliciter in homine exercetur illa autonomia secundum quam ex intelligentia oritur verbum et ex verbo oritur electio. Primo modo, in practicis quatenus homo intelligit, iudicat, eligit agenda et facienda. Altero modo in speculativis quatenus homo de universo quaerit, illudque quantum potest intelligit, unde et quale sit iudicat, ut denique in amorem quendam contemplativum universi prorumpat. Tertio denique modo in existentialibus quatenus homo de se ipso quaerit, et qualis esse debeat intelligit, et quemadmodum ipse se talem facere possit iudicat, unde procedit electio existentialis per quam, quatenus hic et nunc in se est, ipse se talem facit.

‘Proinde, analogia trinitaria ex exercitio autonomiae existentialis sumenda esse videtur. Qui enim de Deo trino quaerit, non Deum considerat ut creantem vel agentem, et ideo ab autonomia practica praescindit; neque Deum considerat quatenus omnia intelligit et iudicat et diligit, et ideo a speculativis praescindit; sed Deum considerat prout ipse Deus ab aeterno in se ipso constituitur ut trinus, et ideo analogiam ex processionibus secundum autonomiam existentialem sumit.’ *Ibid.* 176-79.

procession has to be conscious and autonomous, not conscious but spontaneous nor unconscious; nothing remains but the analogy suggested here.⁷²

5 The Second Assertion: Two Processions

The first of Lonergan's three assertions on the divine processions establishes only the generic notion of an intellectual and intelligible ('because and insofar as') emanation as the basis for a psychological analogy for understanding the Trinitarian processions. How many processions of this kind are there in God? The generic notion is differentiated in the second assertion, which maintains that there are two and only two divine processions that can be conceived by analogy with human intellectual emanation, namely, the procession of the word from the one who speaks the word and the procession of love both from the one who utters the word and from the word uttered.⁷³ The third assertion will clarify these specific notions by asserting that the divine emanation of the word, but not the emanation of love, is properly called generation.⁷⁴

Lonergan's treatment of the second assertion is brief. Regarding the terms employed in the assertion, what an intellectual emanation is has already been established; what needs definition are the terms 'speaker' (*dicens*), 'word' (*verbum*), 'love' (*amor*), and a term not employed in the wording of the thesis itself but used in its elaboration, namely, 'spirating' (*spirans*).

First, then, *dicens* and *verbum*. *Dicens* means the principle of intelligible emanation insofar as the determination of that principle is through an act of understanding⁷⁵ (or, we might say, insofar as that principle is determined to be an act of understanding, the act of understanding as uttering what is understood), and *verbum* is the immanent term of such an intelligent emanation, of such an utterance.⁷⁶

72 '... alia non relinquitur similitudo naturae ad modum divinae processionis nisi emanatio intelligibilis per quam oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio secundum modum et conscius et autonomum.' Ibid. 180.

73 'Per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis duae et tantummodo duae processionis divinae concipi possunt, nempe verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque.' Ibid. 180-81.

74 'Divinam verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae.' Ibid. 188-89.

75 '*dicens*: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus per actum intelligendi determinatur.' Ibid. 180-81.

76 '*verbum*: immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente.' Ibid.

In us there is a twofold inner word, corresponding to the twofold operation of human intellect, but in God, whose existence is the divine essence, there is one infinite act of understanding, and so one word.⁷⁷

On the twofold inner word in us, Lonergan refers us to the second appendix of the book, 'De actu intelligendi,' section 2, 'De obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino.' A brief summary of what he says there may be helpful. (The main source, of course, is *Verbum*.)

The object of intellect, where 'object' means 'end,' is being in its entirety, for intellect is that by which we can do and become all things (*omnia*), and *omnia* is not limited to any genus.⁷⁸ But the object of intellect, when 'object' means 'a term produced within the intellect,' is the inner word (*verbum cordis seu verbum interius*). And since the operation of our intellect is twofold, the term immanently produced is also twofold: the simple word of hypothesis, consideration, supposition, definition, and the compound or complex word of affirmation or negation, that is, the true or the false. Inner words are not to be confused with *acts* of understanding or of thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, denying, but with *what is intended* through such acts, not in its 'natural' but in its 'intentional' being. This 'intentional being' is the medium in which the thing itself is known. The inner word is not *noēsis* but *noēma*, not *la pensée pensante* but *la pensée pensée*, not *intentio intendens* but *intentio intenta*, not *intentio intelligentis* but *intentio intellecta*.

Next, *spirans* and *amor*. *Spirans* is the principle of an intelligent emanation insofar as the determination of that principle is both by an act of understanding and by the consequent word, when that word is a judgment of value⁷⁹ (or, we might say, insofar as that principle is

77 'Duplex esse verbum interius sicut et duplex est operatio nostri intellectus ... In Deo, tamen, sicut idem est esse quod essentia, et unica infinita est intelligendi operatio, ita unum est verbum.' Ibid. note 23.

78 We are referred here to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a. 7 c.: 'Intellectus ... respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est *quo est omnia fieri*.'

79 '*spirans*: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus determinatur tum per actum intelligendi tum etiam per consequens verbum quod est iudicium valoris.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 180-81. In note 24, Lonergan tells us that '*spirans*' is the same as 'notionaliter diligere' in *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1, c. ad fin. Aquinas's text is as follows: '... in quantum in amore vel dilectione non importatur nisi habitudo amantis ad rem amatam, amor et diligere essentialiter dicuntur, sicut intelligentia et intelligere; in quantum vero his vocabulis utimur ad exprimentam habitudinem ejus rei quae procedit per modum amoris ad suum principium et e converso, ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens et per diligere intelligatur spirare amorem

determined to be an act of understanding *and* the judgment of value that emanates from it). And *amor* is the fundamental act of the will, the immanent term of an intelligible emanation from the spirating principle (*ex spirante*), just as the word is the immanent term of an intelligent emanation from the speaker. Although this love is received not in the intellect but in the will, still it occurs within intellectual consciousness, since the will is an intellectual appetite, that is, an appetite that follows upon intellect.⁸⁰

The position that there are two divine processions is, of course, *de fide divina et catholica*. That the processions can be conceived according to some intelligent and volitional emanation is *the common opinion of theologians*. But that they are to be conceived according to the intelligent emanation of the word from the speaker and of love from both speaker and word is a position that Lonergan says seems to be that of St Thomas. It must be added that the qualification that *spirans amorem* is characteristic of a judgment of value is, if I'm not mistaken, Lonergan's own. It does not seem to be found as such in Aquinas.

The thesis continues to proceed in accord with the *via synthetica* or *ordo doctrinae*. After determining that the divine processions are to be conceived on the analogy of intelligible emanation, it remains to be asked how many such processions of this type are to be conceived in God. And since two and only two are found, the psychological analogy is compatible with what we believe in faith.⁸¹

Lonergan assembles a number of texts from Aquinas,⁸² to establish the following points of interpretation: (1) Aquinas used the word

procedentem, sic Amor est nomen personae et diligere vel amare est verbum notionale, sicut dicere vel generare.'

80 '*amor*: fundamentalis actus voluntatis: cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 20; I-II, qq. 26-28; II-II, qq. 23-33. Qui quidem amor, quamvis non in intellectu sed in voluntate recipiatur, sane est intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem, cum voluntas sit appetitus intellectum sequens seu intellectualis. Quare sicut verbum est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente, ita amor est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex spirante.' Ibid. 180-81.

81 '*Asserti intentio*. Continuatur via synthetica. Postquam enim determinatum est processionem divinas esse concipiendas per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis, remanet determinandum quot processionem eiusmodi in Deo concipi possint. Cumque duae et duae tantummodo inveniantur, congruit analogia psychologica cum iis quae ex fide cognoscimus.' Ibid. 182-83.

82 *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 93, a. 6: 'Cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris ab utroque ...'; ibid., q. 27, a. 1: 'Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens';

intelligibile to mean what is strictly spiritual, and it is in this sense that the emanation of the word is called *intelligibile*; (2) this emanation is such that what proceeds is not different from its principle; (3) the emanation of the word and the emanation of love are to be conceived in similar fashion (that is, in the same sense of the word *intelligibile*). Other ideas on the psychological analogy Lonergan finds to be quite inferior, primarily because they conceive intellectual and volitional operations, not according to their proper reality and nature, but only according to analogies drawn from the sensitive dimensions of our experience. These other views also suffer from the fact that Aquinas's terminology is so complex, and from the influence of Augustinian writers and the doctrine of vital act that they seem to have invented.⁸³ The issues here regard the

Compendium theologiae, c. 49: 'Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili actu intellecto'; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 1: '... secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae ... secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente ...'; *ibid.* ad 2m: '... quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili ...'; *ibid.* ad 3m: '... procedere ut intimum et absque diversitate per modum intelligibilem ...'; *ibid.*, a. 2: 'per modum intelligibilis actionis ...'; *ibid.* ad 2m: 'verbum quod secundum intelligibilem operationem procedit in nobis ...'; *ibid.* ad 3m: 'verbum intelligibiliter procedens ...'; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 11, § 8: 'Relinquitur igitur quod generatio divina secundum intellectualem emanationem sit intelligenda'; *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 10: 'ipsa res [materialis] quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile'; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 87, a. 1: 'Essentia igitur Dei ... est simpliciter et perfecte secundum seipsam intelligibilis ... Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus ... Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium ...'

83 The complexity of Aquinas's terminology is the subject of chapter 3 of *Verbum*. Summaries are given in appendix 1 of *De Deo trino*. On 'vital act,' Frederick Crowe indicates that Lonergan 'has shown that [the doctrine that all vital acts must be produced by the subject as efficient cause] cannot appeal to St. Thomas.' This is the issue to which Lonergan is referring here in his reference to vital act. Frederick E. Crowe, 'Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas' (the first in a series of three articles), *Theological Studies* 20:1 (March, 1959) 17, note 36. Crowe appeals to appendix 1. Lonergan mentions in the part of the text that we are summarizing here that the influence of these ideas was such that even the best commentators on Aquinas, such as Cajetan, presented obscure and confused notions of immanent operation. Cajetan is quoted: 'Intelligere ergo non est

intelligibility of immanent operation and the nature of intellect. They are primarily philosophical, and they are difficult and intricate. Those who hold contrary views attribute the obscurity of their views not to philosophic error but to the profundity of the mystery. Lonergan is content at this point simply to indicate the root of the problem. The real treatment occurs in *Verbum*, and Lonergan refers us to appendices 1 and 2 in *De Deo trino* for brief summaries of his extensive treatment of these issues in *Verbum*.

The argument of the thesis has two steps. First, two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation. Second, only two processions can so be conceived.

Why, then, is it that (at least) two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation? God is (1) being by essence and the very act of understanding, (2) truth by essence and the very act of affirming, and (3) goodness by essence and the very act of loving. For it is not possible (1) that in the supreme being there be lacking the perfection of intelligence; (2) that in the supreme truth there be lacking the truth formally, that is, the act ‘to affirm’; and (3) that in the supreme good there be lacking the goodness of love itself. Now, every affirmation is true insofar as it emanates from one who understands, and all spiritual love is right and holy insofar as it proceeds from a true affirmation of the good. Therefore, if any intelligent emanations can be conceived in God, at least the emanation of the word from the speaker and the emanation of love from both speaker and word can be conceived. Nor can these be reduced to one. To emanate from the word and not to emanate from the word are contradictories. But love emanates from the word, and the word does not emanate from itself but from the one who understands and speaks. No contradictions can be posited in God, and so the emanation of the word and the emanation of love cannot be posited as one and the same emanation. Therefore two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation.⁸⁴

formaliter pati; quamvis, proprie loquendo, non sit etiam formaliter agere, sed potius active passiveque vitaliter operari. Et idem iudicium est de sensatione.’ Much more could and should be filled in here on Lonergan’s position on ‘vital act.’

84 ‘... Deus est ens per essentiam et ipsum intelligere, verum per essentiam et ipsum affirmare, bonum per essentiam et ipsum amare. Fieri enim non potest ut in summo ente desit perfectio intelligentiae, ut in summo vero desit verum formaliter (quod est affirmare), ut in summo bono desit bonitas ipsius amoris.

¶ Tam vero omne affirmare, quod cognoscimus, eatenus verum est quatenus ex intelligente emanat; et omnis amor spiritualis, quem cognoscimus, eatenus rectus sanctusque est quatenus ex vera boni affirmatione procedit.

Why is it that *only* these two emanations can be conceived? Lonergan uses a syllogism to argue this second step.

The major is that in God there can be conceived only one act of understanding, one word, and one love, for (1) by reason of act, God is utterly simple and so in God there is only one act, and (2) by reason of object, by the infinite act of understanding there is attained all being, by the infinite act of affirming all truth, and by the infinite act of loving all good.⁸⁵

The minor is to the effect that there is only one emanation of one love, and only one emanation of one word, and that the divine act of understanding itself cannot intelligibly proceed from some other principle. The first two points are obvious: the one divine act is eternal and immutable, and in that act there can be only one emanation of one word and one emanation of one love. The third point requires us to distinguish human from divine understanding. There is in us an intelligible procession of the act of understanding itself; since as intellectually conscious beings we inquire, investigate, and reason in order to arrive at an act of understanding. But this cannot be so in God, since God is not reduced from potency to the act of understanding.⁸⁶
Ipsum esse subsistens is ipsum intelligere subsistens.

‘Quare, si ullae emanationes intelligibiles in Deo concipi possunt, sane emanatio verbi a dicente et emanatio amoris ab utroque concipi possunt.

‘Neque hae duae, si in Deo ponuntur, in unam solamque reducuntur. Nam contradictorie opponuntur duo haec: ex verbo emanare; ex verbo non emanare. Sed amoris est ex verbo emanare. Et verbi non est ex se ipso sed ex intelligente et dicente emanare. Iam vero in Deo poni non potest contradictio; et ideo in Deo ita poni non possunt et emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris ut una solaque sit emanatio. Duae ergo processiones divinae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis concipi possunt.’ Ibid. 186-89.

85 ‘... in Deo concipi non possunt nisi unum intelligere, unum verbum, unus amor ... *Maior* constat tum ratione actus tum ratione obiecti. Ratione actus, cum in Deo simplicissimo nisi unus actus non sit. Ratione obiecti, quia per actum infinitum intelligendi attingitur omne ens, per actum infinitum affirmandi attingitur omne verum, per actum infinitum amandi attingitur omne bonum.’ Ibid. 188-89.

86 ‘Sed unius amoris non est nisi una emanatio; unius verbi non est nisi una emanatio; neque intelligere divinum ex quodam alio principio emanare potest intelligibiliter.

‘Ergo in Deo concipi non possunt nisi duae processiones in quantum ad similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis attenditur ...

‘*Minor* est evidens, quatenus asseritur in unico actu aeterno et immutabili emanatio una unius verbi, et emanatio una unius amoris. In nobis autem aliquo modo invenitur intelligibilis emanatio actus

6 The Third Assertion: Generation and Spiration

Lonergan's third and final thesis on divine processions maintains that the divine emanation of the Word, but not that of Love, can properly be named generation,⁸⁷ and so the Word bears the property of Son. It thus displays a further way in which the psychological analogy is congruent with what we already believe in faith.⁸⁸

The argument depends upon three prior steps. The first treats the intelligibility of generation, the second the need to conceive the divine nature as intellectual, and the third the difference in such an intellectual nature between the emanation of the word and the emanation of love. With these clarifications, the thesis becomes obvious.

6.1 Generation

Generation, strictly so called, is the origin of something alive from a conjoined living principle, with a resulting likeness in nature (*origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae*).⁸⁹ While each and every element in this definition must be verified if we are to speak of something as generation,⁹⁰ special attention is to be paid to the

intelligendi quatenus intellectualiter conscii inquirimus, investigamus, ratiocinamur ut ad actum intelligendi perveniamus. Sed hoc in Deo esse non potest, cum Deus non reducatur de potentia in actum intelligendi.' Ibid. (Actually, there is not found in us an *intelligible emanation* of the act of understanding, if intelligible emanation is by definition the procession of act from act. It would have been more accurate for Lonergan to have said '*In nobis autem aliquo modo invenitur processio actus intelligendi.*' It can be said, however, that in the definition of terms for this thesis he uses the word *emanatio* more broadly, defining it as *quaecumque origo*).

87 'Divinam Verbi emanationem, not autem emanationem Amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae.' Ibid.

88 '... ut ulterius congruere videatur analogia psychologica cum iis quae de fide cognoscimus ... Quod Filius est genitus, Spiritus sanctus non genitus, *de fide divina et catholica* (DB 39 [DS 75]). Quod idem omnino est et Filius et Verbum, *de fide divina et catholica*. "In nomine Verbi eandam proprietatem importari, quae in nomine Filii" est *sententia S. Thomae* [*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 34, a. 2, ad 3m] et caeterorum theologorum qui S. Augustinum [*De Trinitate*, VII, ii] sequuntur; quos occasionem nactus approbavit Pius VI (DB 1597 [DS 2698]).' Ibid. 190-91.

89 Ibid.

90 Thus Lonergan speaks of a number of processions that are not generation in the strict sense of the term: the origin of something non-

phrase ‘with a resulting likeness of nature,’ which does not mean only that what emanates must be like in nature but also that *this likeness in nature must result by virtue of the emanation itself (haec in natura similitudo oriri debet vi ipsius emanationis)*.⁹¹

6.2 *The Divine Nature as Intellectual*

If the likeness of nature, thus understood, is so important, then attention must be paid to the divine nature and how we conceive it. But there is an intrinsic difficulty here. For ‘nature’ can be understood to mean either (1) an immanent principle of movement and rest⁹² or (2) essence; and in either case there is a difficulty in conceiving the divine nature. As to (1) the notion of nature as an immanent principle of movement and rest would seem to have no place in God, for God is entirely simple, and so there can be in God no real distinction between a principle of movement or operation and the movement or operation itself, so that ‘nature’ in this sense has no place in God. As to (2) if ‘nature’ is taken to mean ‘essence,’ then while we can acknowledge nature in God in this sense, the divine nature cannot be known to us, for in this life we do not know what God is; while we use the word ‘God’ to mean the divine nature, this word is not taken from a known nature; the most proper name of God is *Qui est*, precisely because this name is taken from the *esse* of God, omitting every determining form, so that it signifies an infinite ocean of substance.⁹³

living from something non-living (for example, water from hydrogen and oxygen), the origin of something living from a non-living principle (so-called spontaneous generation), the origin of something living from something that is living but not conjoined (for example, the creation of living things), the origin of something living from something living and conjoined but dissimilar (for example, the growth of hair from the head), and the origin of something living from something living, conjoined, and similar but not into a likeness of nature (for example, the biblical account of the origin of Eve from a rib). Ibid.

91 Ibid. 192-93.

92 The definition is Aristotle’s; more fully, ‘principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.’ Ibid., with a reference to Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 1, 192b 23.

93 ‘Si autem sumitur natura pro essentia, ita natura in Deo agnosci potest ut tamen eam non cognoscamus. Nam hac in vita nescimus quid sit Deus. Quamvis enim nomen, Deus, imponatur ad divinam naturam significandam, ipsum tamen nomen non a cognita natura sumitur; et ideo nomen, Qui est, maxime proprium Dei nomen videtur, quia hoc nomen ab esse Dei sumitur et omnem formam determinantem omittit ut significet quoddam pelagus substantiae

Lonergan responds to the second point first. St Thomas says that God's act of understanding is God's substance (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 14, a 4), that the nature of God is God's act of understanding (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 18, a. 3 c. ad fin.), and that intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they possess a specific likeness (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 93, aa. 2-4). How is it possible for him to say this, if we cannot know what God is? We cannot know the divine nature in this life, for we do not understand God through a species proportionate to the divine essence (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12, aa. 2, 4, 5, 11). But this does not mean that we cannot in this life know God analogically and so order the analogically known realities as to place something first in the mode of nature or essence. In this sense, the nature of God is God's act of understanding, on which there follow God's infinity, aseity, simplicity, and whatever else there is in God that is not known to us.

It must be said that this is Lonergan's ordering; St Thomas, it seems, places the divine simplicity first. But Lonergan presents the argument for his own ordering.

(1) *Infinity* belongs to the nature of intellect in such a way that intellect in act with respect to the totality of its object is itself infinite. For (a) intellect is *quo est omnia fieri*, and (b) *omnia* admits no generic or specific limitation, so that (c) the object of intellect is all of being, *ens totum* (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a 7). For this reason (d) intellect tends toward its object in such a way that it does not rest until it sees God *per essentiam* (ibid. q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 25-63). For this reason, too, (e) every created intellect is a passive potency (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a. 2) and (f) every created act of understanding is other than the substance of the creature, other than the creature's act of existing, and other than the creature's operative potency (ibid. q. 54, aa. 1-3). On the same grounds, (g) an intellect that is in act with respect to its complete object is itself infinite being (ibid. 1, q. 79, a 2).

(2) Infinite being cannot be from another, and so an intellect in act with respect to its entire object is *a se*, from itself.

(3) The infinite excludes potency, for what is in potency to a further perfection *eo ipso* falls short of infinity.

(4) Intellect in act is the intelligible in act, so that intellect differs from the intelligible only insofar as both are in potency (ibid. 1, q. 14, a. 2); but the infinite excludes potency, and so (a) the act of understanding that is in act with respect to its total object is not distinct from the intellect that understands, (b) the infinite qua intelligible is not distinguished from the act of understanding by which it is understood (ibid. 1, q. 14, a. 4), and (c) the infinite act of understanding is true with respect to itself, not according to a likeness as though knowing and

infinitum.' Ibid. 192-95, with reference to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 13, a. 8 c. and ad 2m; a. 11 c. and ad 1m.

known were two things, but according to the absence of unlikeness (ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m).

(5) The *esse naturale* of the infinite is not something different from its *esse intentionale*, for the *esse naturale* of something is the *esse* by which it is, the *esse intentionale* is the medium by which it is known, and in the infinite the act of understanding by which it is known is the same as the intelligible that is known; and so its *esse naturale* is the same as its *esse intentionale* (ibid. q. 34, a. 2, ad 1m; see q. 27, a. 2 c. and ad 2m).

(6) The infinite is completely simple, for one act of understanding is simple, the infinite act of understanding is one act, and this one act is the same as everything that the infinite knows about the infinite.

(7) Although we can conceive the infinite only analogically insofar as we ascend from our own finite act of understanding, nonetheless the infinite act of understanding perfectly understands itself. And it does not understand itself as other than the act of understanding itself but as the same in all respects.

And so, if the nature of God is conceived as intellect in act with respect to the whole of its object, there follow the infinity of God, the aseity of God, the simplicity of God, and whatever else in God there is that is not known to us.

As for ‘nature’ understood, not as the essence from which all the rest follows, but as an intrinsic principle of operation, we arrive again at the conclusion that the divine nature is intellectual. For while it is true that our natural knowledge of God yields no real distinctions in God, faith and theology tell us of the real distinctions of persons constituted by relations of origin. But modes of origin are different in different things, according to the nature of each thing, and the distinction of the divine persons corresponds to the divine nature, where the Trinity is distinguished in accord with the procession of the Word from the one who utters it, and Love from the speaker and the Word (ibid. q. 93, aa. 5 and 6), that is, according to emanations of intellectual consciousness.⁹⁴

94 ‘Quamvis enim nulla prorsus distinctio realis in Deo poni possit secundum quod Deus naturaliter nobis innotescat, tamen prout Deus nobis per fidem et theologiam cognoscitur, inveniuntur reales personarum distinctiones quae per relationes originis constituuntur. Iam vero “non est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae: aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, et aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit” [*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 93, a. 5]. Sed “increata trinitas distinguitur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque” [ibid. a. 6]. Et ideo, cum origines in divinis sint secundum emanationes conscientiae intellectualis,

The point of this entire second step, then, is that we are to conceive of the divine nature, whether as essence or as immanent principle of operation, as intellectual. It is thus that we can affirm with St Thomas that (1) *intelligere Dei est eius substantia*, (2) *Dei natura est ipsum eius intelligere*, and (3) *creaturae intellectuales sunt ad imaginem Dei quia similitudinem specificam habent*.

6.3 Emanation of Word and Emanation of Love

Thirdly, then, if we turn to intellectual nature, we find that there is a difference between the emanation of the word and that of love.

Lonergan is here working on the analogy ‘from below upward,’ according to which intellectual consciousness first understands something, then from the understanding speaks a true word about the thing understood, then from understanding and word spirates a love of the thing, and finally is carried by love toward the loved thing.⁹⁵

Now the emanation of the word heads toward the formation of a likeness of the thing understood: a true word about the thing is had insofar as there is formed within the intellect a perfect likeness of the thing.⁹⁶ But a love of the thing is had only insofar as the lover is inclined, borne, impelled to the thing that is loved, is united to it, and adheres to it; and so the emanation by which love proceeds heads toward a constituting of an inclination, impulse, adherence.⁹⁷ These two attitudes or orientations are to some extent opposed. The object of intellect is the true, and the true is found within intellect itself, so that one who is intellectually committed to the interior formation of a true likeness of something can seem to others to be rather cold, little inclined or drawn toward realities in themselves. On the other hand, the object of the will is the good, and the good exists not within the will but externally in realities themselves, so that the lover can be so occupied with the

concludendum est divinam naturam esse intellectualem.’ Ibid. 196-99.

95 ‘... distinguere oportet 1) ipsam rem, 2) intelligentiam rei, 3) verbum rei, et 4) amorem rei. Conscientia enim intellectualis ita se ad rem habet ut, primo, rem intelligat, deinde, ex intelligentia dicat verbum rei verum, tertio, ex intelligentia verboque spirat rei amorem et, quarto, vi ipsius amoris in rem amatam feratur.’ Ibid. 198-99.

96 ‘... eatenus habetur verbum rei verum quatenus efformatur intra intellectum perfecta rei similitudo. Qua de causa, illa emanatio qua verbum oritur est in similitudinem rei efformandam.’ Ibid.

97 ‘E contra, eatenus habetur amor rei, quatenus amans in rem amatam inclinatur, fertur, impellitur, eique unitur atque adhaeret. Qua de causa, illa emanatio, qua oritur amor, est in inclinationem, impulsum, adhaesionem constituendam.’ Ibid.

beloved that people who cultivate the affections rather than true knowledge are said to be blind. A complete circle of consciousness, of course, would see to it that one is intelligent enough to avoid the blindness of the lover and committed enough to reality itself to avoid the coldness of the intellectual. And such a circle begins with the intellect's grasp, moves to the representation in a true word of what has been grasped, and proceeds to a love of what is so represented that heads one toward the loved reality as it is in itself and in its own right.⁹⁸

The emanation of the word and the emanation of love differ, then, in that true and false are in the mind, while good and evil are in things. It is because the intellect tends toward an interiorly held truth that the intrinsic intelligibility of the emanation of the word is to head toward the interior formation of a true likeness of the thing. And it is because the will tends toward a good external to itself that the intrinsic intelligibility of the emanation of love is to head toward actuating an inclination toward the thing itself.⁹⁹ A very important reference is given to Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m: 'Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum ... Et ideo *voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipso, quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.*' The last sentence is crucial: whatever proceeds in the will itself proceeds only *per modum*

98 'Quae quidem duo inter se quodammodo opponuntur. Cum enim obiectum intellectus sit verum, cumque verum intra ipsum intellectum inveniatur, ita occupatur intellectus in veram rei similitudinem intus efformandam ut ii qui scientiis vacent frigidiores et leviores videantur, cum parum in ipsas res secundum se inclinentur, impellantur, ferantur. E contra, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum, cumque bonum non intra voluntatem sed extra et in ipsis rebus existat, ita amans cum ipso amato occupatur ut ii, qui magis affectus quam scientias colant, caeci dicantur.

'Quod si per intellectum caecitas et per voluntatem levitas evitantur, perfectus quidam conscientiae circulus completur. Ab ipsa enim re incipitur ut intellectu perspiciatur, et perspecta verbo vero repraesentetur, et repraesentata ita amore diligatur ut in ipsam rem secundum se redeatur.' Ibid. 198-201.

99 'Quibus perspectis, manifestum videtur quo differant emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris. Verum enim et falsum in mente sunt; bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus. Quia ergo intellectus tendit in verum interius, intrinseca ratio emanationis verbi est in similitudinem rei veram intus efformandam. Quia autem voluntas tendit in bonum exterius, intrinseca ratio emanationis amoris est ut inclinationem in ipsam rem actuet.' Ibid. 200-201.

operationis, whereas in the intellect there are not only *processiones per modum operationis* but also *processiones per modum operati*. The procession of the act of love is, of course, a *processio operati*, but it is not a procession *in* the will; rather, it is a procession from the intellect into the will. This, Lonergan will argue, is a point missed by most commentators on Aquinas.

6.4 The Argument

The three points on which the argument depends have now been exposed. The argument consists in showing that all the elements of the definition of generation are verified in the divine emanation of the word, but not in the divine emanation of love.

The divine emanation of the word, then, is a procession (*origo*) of what is living (God is living, and the divine word is God) from a living principle (the speaker is also the living God) that is conjoined with what proceeds from it (the two are, respectively, principle and term within the same consciousness) into a likeness (it is of the nature of the emanation of the true word that it proceed to the formation of a true likeness) where the likeness is a likeness of nature (the intentional *esse* of God is identical with God's natural *esse*, so that, while other inner words are 'like' only according to their intentional *esse*, the word of God, by being like according to intentional *esse*, is necessarily also like according to natural *esse*).

But not all of these elements are verified in the divine procession of love. It is an *origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto*, and through it God proceeds *secundum esse Dei naturale*, but the emanation of love is not an emanation that heads toward the formation of a similitude of the thing loved but rather an emanation that heads toward the constitution of an impulse or adherence to the thing it itself. While there does arise from this emanation what is similar in nature, the intelligibility (*ratio*) of the emanation is not such that the emanation is headed to the constitution of a likeness.¹⁰⁰

7 Four Questions

7.1 Understanding and Word

Lonergan concludes his treatment of the divine processions by asking and answering four related questions. The first is whether, in us, understanding and inner word are really distinct (*utrum aliud in nobis sit*

100 See *ibid.* 200-203.

intelligere et aliud verbum).¹⁰¹ The argument is metaphysical rather than psychological, and we will limit our present discussion to these points. In this argument Lonergan treats two acts of understanding and two inner words: the direct act of understanding and the inner word of concept or definition or hypothesis that proceeds from it, and the reflective act of understanding and the proceeding inner word of judgment. Despite his use of the expression ‘iudicium valoris’ for the relevant inner word that provides an analogy for the divine Word proceeding from the Father, the treatment of insight and word at this point does not proceed to that level.

The metaphysical basis of the argument is the familiar Aristotelian-Thomist principle that different acts are distinguished in accord with different specific objects.¹⁰² Five objects are disengaged in intellectual activity, and four of them are really distinct.

The first is the object as end, that is, being, which is the end or objective of intellectual activity. This is *Insight’s* ‘Being ... is the objective of the pure desire to know.’¹⁰³

The second is the object as term of the second operation, which is the true.

The third is the object that moves to this second operation, that is, sufficient evidence.

The fourth is the object as term of the first operation, namely, the definition or hypothesis.

And the fifth is the object that moves us to the first operation, namely, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter.

Being and the true are not really or specifically distinct, however, since being is attained in the very act in which truth is reached. Truth is the medium in which being is known. But there *are* four objects of intellectual operation that are specifically distinct.¹⁰⁴

First, then, the true and sufficient evidence are really distinct, and so, exercising the metaphysical principle that an act receives its specificity from the object, we conclude that it is in one act that we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence and that it is in another act that we affirm what is true or deny what is false. The two acts are connected by an intellectual or intelligible emanation, since we are able to affirm the true *because* we have grasped the sufficiency of the evidence. Consequently, in the matter of the second operation of the intellect, the one in which we answer the question, Is it so? it is necessary to distinguish between the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of the evidence is grasped and the affirmation of the true, which is the word interiorly spoken.¹⁰⁵

101 Ibid. 202-203.

102 ‘Cum actus ex obiecto sumat speciem, ubi aliud et aliud inveniuntur obiecta specifica, alius et alius actus distingui debent.’ Ibid.

103 Lonergan, *Insight* 372.

104 See *The Triune God: Systematics* 202-205.

105 Ibid. 202-205.

Regarding the first act of the intellect, the object that moves us to the act is external, an intelligibility existing in bodily matter. First, then, the corporeal and individual matter is disclosed to the senses. Secondly, from agent intellect there arises wonder, so that we ask what it is or why it is so. Thirdly, there is formed an image, so that the intelligible to be grasped in the sensible might be more clearly brought to light in the sensible itself. Fourthly, the possible intellect, turned to the image, grasps the intelligible in the image. And fifthly, the same possible intellect, now actually understanding the intelligibility, speaks a simple inner word, the definition or the hypothesis.¹⁰⁶

Now the intelligible grasped in the sensible and the intelligible spoken in the word are the same intelligible; but the object when it is grasped and the object when it is spoken are different. For when it is grasped, corporeal matter is made known through the senses but the intelligibility is made known by the intellect; but in the hypothesis or definition what before were made known in distinct acts are joined into one. The matter that is posited in a definition or hypothesis is not individual but common. And what is defined or understood hypothetically is not the quiddity, nature, or cause itself, but the thing in its intelligibility, that is, according to its quiddity, nature, or cause. Thus, because the objects are distinct, so too are the acts distinct.¹⁰⁷

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid. 104. Examples are added:

‘What is an eclipse? An eclipse is the darkening brought about on a heavenly body by the interposition of another heavenly body. That is a quidditative definition, for it states what an eclipse is. How, then, does it differ from any other kind of definition? It differs in that not only does it set forth sensible similarities, but also assigns a cause or reason why. For the cause of an eclipse is the interposition of another heavenly body: that cause is grasped in the sensible data themselves, or at least in the phantasm, by an act of understanding, before an eclipse can be defined through its cause.

‘What is a circle? A circle is the locus of points lying on the same plane surface and equally distant from a center. That is another quidditative definition. For it does not state that the circle is a perfectly round plane figure; rather, it assigns the cause why the circle necessarily is perfectly round. Moreover, this necessary consequence itself must be grasped in the phantasm by an act of understanding before there can be an intellectual emanation of the definition of the circle.

‘What is a human being? A rational animal. That again is a quidditative definition, because it assigns the cause. For what becomes known through the senses is a certain kind of organic body. A form is understood in this body: the soul that is both sensitive and rational. Because the form is a sensitive soul, the reality is an animal.

7.1.1 Appendix 2

Lonergan also refers the reader to appendix 2 of the entire volume for further discussion of the relation between the act of understanding and the inner word. We have already seen one item from this appendix, but now we will treat it a bit more fully.

Appendix 2 is entitled ‘De actu intelligendi,’ ‘The act of understanding.’ Understanding is required for the emanation of a word or concept. The object of this prior act from which a word emanates cannot be the word itself that will emanate, and so it must be the case that ‘our intellect grasps not only conceptual objects but preconceptual objects as well. Otherwise we would not form conceptions because we understand, but rather, as the Scotists teach, we [would be] able to understand because in some manner conceptions have been formed.’¹⁰⁸ The issue is very important not only for our self-understanding and self-constitution but also for Trinitarian theology. ‘... the unconscious formation of the word would destroy that intellectual emanation which we have considered to be the psychological analogy of the Holy Trinity.’¹⁰⁹

The appendix is divided into seven sections, the first of which treats the notion of object. We have seen this already, but briefly we may say that it is because object has a causal relation both to potency and to act that ‘an object may be either a mover that brings about an act in a potency, or a term produced by an act, or the end to which a potency tends through acts.’¹¹⁰ ‘... an object is to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause; for color is the principle of vision insofar as it moves the faculty of sight. But an object is to the act of an active potency as term and end; as the object of the faculty of growth is achieving its due quantity, which is the end of growth’ (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 77, a. 3 c.). The issue, of course, grows in complexity as we consider the transposition of the notions of active and passive potency in Lonergan’s later work: ‘... the active potencies are the transcendental notions revealed in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation. The passive potencies are the lower levels as presupposed and complemented by the higher.’¹¹¹ The transposition of the language of object vis-à-vis active potencies seems

Because the form is a rational soul, the reality is a rational animal.’
Ibid. 204-207.

108 ‘Relinquitur ergo ut intellectus noster non solum conceptualia sed etiam praeconceptualia obiecta perspiciat. Secus non quia intelligamus conceptiones formaremus sed, ut docent Scotistae, quia conceptiones inconscio quodam modo formatae essent, intelligere possemus.’ Ibid. 558-61.

109 Ibid. 560-61

110 Ibid.

111 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 120.

fairly straightforward, but the relation of object and passive potencies is problematic in this new formulation, in my view, without some careful elucidation. The new formulation, it seems, makes sense within the context of the vertical finality of the lower 'levels' as presupposed, complemented, and sublated by the higher, but the horizontal finality of each 'level' also exhibits a character of passivity that is the key to the Aristotelian-Thomist analysis. We will see in a moment, though, that the problem can be solved.

First, 'object' is on this metaphysical reading not a primitive notion. It reduces to the notions of potency, act, mover, and end or term.

The notion of object as end or term is treated first, in section 2 of the appendix. As we have just seen, the notion of object as end reflects *Insight's* second-order definition of being as the objective of the pure desire to know. But the notion of object as term is far more modest: the term produced within the intellect is always the inner word of conception or judgment, which always represents but a minuscule increment in our advance toward the objective of being.

But do such inner words really exist? The question is real, as anyone who has so much as begun to read Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* will know all too well. What makes the matter more difficult in the context of linguistic philosophy is that Lonergan would demonstrate the existence of inner words from the presence and functioning of outer words, which mean the inner words. Lonergan says in *Verbum*:

[T]he inner word is what can be meant (*significabile*) or what is meant (*significatum*) by outer words, and inversely, ... the outer word is what can mean (*significativum*) or what does mean (*significans*) the inner word ... [C]ommonly [Thomas] asked what outer words meant and answered that, in the first instance, they meant inner words. The proof was quite simple. We discourse on "man" and on the "triangle." What are we talking about? Certainly, we are not talking about real things directly, else we should all be Platonists. Directly, we are talking about objects of thought, inner words, and only indirectly, only insofar as our inner words have an objective reference, are we talking of real things. The same point might be made in another fashion. Logical positivists to the contrary, false propositions are not meaningless; they mean something; what they mean is an inner word, and only because that inner word is false, does the false proposition lack objective reference.¹¹²

In the present context, he writes in similar fashion:

112 Lonergan, *Verbum* 15.

The existence of these inner words is proven from the meaning of outer words. We speak of 'man' or 'triangle,' and we surely mean something by these words. Unless, therefore, you believe that universals subsist as real entities, you will necessarily conclude that universals are conceived in the mind and signified directly and immediately by external words. Again, human speech states what is true and what is false. What, then, is signified directly and immediately by a false statement? Unless along with the neo-positivists you maintain that false statements signify nothing, you will necessarily acknowledge a compound word formed inwardly in the mind and signified directly and immediately in an external statement. Finally, we all hold that human speech also signifies things, and yet we do not accept anything unless it is true. But the true and the false are in the mind; truth, in fact, is formally only in a judgment. Again, therefore, one must conclude that outer words signify things, not immediately, of course, but through the medium of inner words that are true.

Hence, primarily and *per se* outer words, whether spoken or written or present in the imagination, signify and are not signified. Things, on the other hand, are signified, but primarily and *per se* do not signify. Inner words, however, both signify and are signified: they are signified by outer words, and signify things themselves.¹¹³

Again, as we have seen, this inner word is not to be confused with the act of understanding or with the acts of thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, or denying. The inner word is 'that which is understood, is thought, is defined, is supposed, is considered, is affirmed, is denied – not, of course, according to its natural existence but according to its intentional existence. Intentional existence [*esse intentionale*] is the medium in which a thing is known.'¹¹⁴

The intellect, however, is a passive potency, and so there must be an object that moves it to its act, to the act of understanding. Since the intellect has two operations, it requires two moving objects. In the case of the second operation, which in the order of intentionality analysis would be the level of judgment, the moving object is the sufficient evidence that moves the intellect to the grasp of its sufficiency in a reflective act of understanding. From the reflective act of understanding there is spoken the word of judgment. In the case of the first operation, the moving object is 'the actually intelligible as luminous in the phantasm and directly discerned by the intellect.' This moves the intellect to the act of direct understanding, and from the direct act of understanding there is spoken

113 *The Triune God: Systematics* 563. The latter paragraph is an early expression of what soon would be affirmed in the statement that the real world is mediated and constituted by meaning.

114 *Ibid.* 562-65.

the interior utterance of definition, hypothesis, supposition, or what have you. What is known through the entire process is the *quod quid est*, the 'what something is.' Again, all of this has to be reimagined and reformulated in the context of the hermeneutical turn to the world mediated and constituted by meaning, in terms of Lonergan's later appropriation of the notion of historical consciousness through the significance of the *esse intentionale*, intentional existence. But that can be done without violence to the genuine Aristotelian-Thomist analysis. It requires little more than an extension of 'quod quid est' to something like 'what's up.' The appropriation of *esse intentionale* is what interiorly differentiated consciousness is all about, and history itself is a function of *esse intentionale*. Thus historical consciousness emerges from what Lonergan calls 'the transition from substance to subject.' Once that step from substance to subject has been taken, the *esse intentionale* assumes a far greater importance in any attempts at philosophical or theological synthesis than classical Scholastic philosophy and theology was able to acknowledge. While it presupposes the *esse naturale* of human beings, still, as soon as one asks what kind of a subject one is or is to be, one enters into the order of what we understand, what we think, what we utter, what we consider true, what we choose, what we propose, what our intentions are, what our goals in life are. All of this is within the psychological-intentional order, and it is that order, the *esse intentionale* of our acts of knowing and willing, not our *esse naturale*, that settles our eternal destiny. It is in that order that the various carriers, functions, realms, and stages of meaning take on their significance for human life. That order is not only formally constitutive of human living. It develops. History itself is the history of the development of meanings and orders that are constituted by meaning. Divine revelation is the explicit entrance of God's meaning, including God's incarnate meaning, God's incarnate Logos, into history. The exploration, then, of the realm in which a psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions can be elaborated has profound significance for the theological articulation of the meaning of human history.

Within the context of historical consciousness, then, we can effect a transposition of the notions of active and passive potency that Lonergan employed to articulate his cognitional theory in Scholastic language. Those notions had reference to faculties, which were thought of as sensitive, intellectual, apprehensive, and appetitive potencies. A good deal of Scholastic psychology was engaged in the questions about the mutual interactions of the faculties. But Lonergan has replaced the Scholastic faculty psychology with an intentionality analysis that distinguishes four levels of intentional consciousness: presentations of sense and of consciousness, understanding, judgment, and decision. The lower levels, as it were, are presupposed and complemented by the higher, while the higher sublate the lower into their more comprehensive

concerns. In that context, the transcendental notions themselves assume the role of the active potencies, as these notions are manifest in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation, in the operators that, in *Insight's* language, are relentless in transforming any temporary integrations that our interior development, the development of our *esse intentionale*, may have achieved. And the role of 'passive potency' now characterizes each successive lower level of consciousness and all of the operations and correlative objects at those levels, as these levels are presupposed, complemented, and sublated by the higher. This transposition of the notions of active and passive potency in no way detracts from the analysis of objects and operations that Lonergan provides in a more Scholastic context in *The Triune God: Systematics*. Insight remains insight into phantasm, where the intelligibility in the data of sense and of consciousness moves us to understand under the force of the questions for intelligence that are raised by the transcendental notion of the intelligible (which, after all, is partly constitutive, along with the other transcendental notions, of what the Scholastic philosophy called 'agent intellect'). Again, in the context of intentionality analysis, it remains true that the reflective grasp of sufficient evidence moves one to the inner word of judgment. In all of these instances of transposition, then, nothing of permanent significance is abandoned. What are abandoned are the fruitless questions to which the older conceptuality was prone, in this case the questions concerning the relative priority of the various faculties with respect to one another.¹¹⁵

7.2 Can We Demonstrate That There Is a Word in God?

The second question following the assertions regarding divine processions concerns the capability of reason unaided by faith to demonstrate the existence of the divine Word. The First Vatican Council repudiated the semirationalists, who maintained that such a demonstration was possible (DB 1816, DS 3041), but Lonergan's efforts are directed rather to *understanding* why we are not able so to demonstrate. He proceeds, then, to investigate why the word necessarily is found in us, so as to argue that there is no natural knowledge available to us regarding the similar or analogous necessity of a word in God. As Lonergan puts it in *Verbum*, 'We are not concerned with the necessity *quoad se* of the Word in God; whatever is in God is necessary ... we are concerned with the necessity *quod nos* of an inner word in divine self-knowledge and in divine knowledge of the other. Why cannot

115 For further details on this transposition, see the section called 'A Technical Note' in Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 120-24.

we establish by the light of natural reason that there is a Word in God?'¹¹⁶

There are four reasons given in *De Deo trino* for the necessity of an inner word in human intellectual process. *First*, the inner word is required if we are to proceed from a grasp of intelligibility to the conception of the *reality* under consideration. For while we are moved to the act of understanding by the causes or quiddities of things, these causes or quiddities are not the things themselves but parts of the things or relations. An inner word is required if we are to proceed from the grasped quiddity to the thing quidditatively defined.¹¹⁷

Second, an inner word is required if we are to proceed from definitions and evidence grasped to the thing *as existing*. This happens only if from the grasped evidence there proceeds the affirmed truth in which, as in a medium, being is known.¹¹⁸ The inner word in question here is the 'yes' of true judgment.

Third, inner words are required if we are to be able to develop the *sciences*. Without the formation of universal concepts our knowledge would be limited to particular sensed and imagined things; we would never be able to know the perceptible world in its entirety (*totum mundum aspectabilem*). Again, without the formation of exactly defined words we would be carried along by a flow of images as in a mythic mentality, never knowing clearly and distinctly what it is we are dealing with.¹¹⁹

And *fourth*, inner words of definition and judgment are required if we are to move by analogy and by the way of eminence beyond the limits of this world.¹²⁰

116 Lonergan, *Verbum* 199-200.

117 'Prima ergo necessitas verbi in nobis est ut ex perspecta causa seu quidditate in rem concipiendam procedere possimus. Nam ad actum intelligendi movemur per rerum causas seu quidditates; quae tamen causae seu quidditates non sunt res ipsae sed rerum partes vel relationes; et ideo prima necessitas verbi est ut ex perspecta quidditate in rem quidditative definitam procedatur.' *The Triune God Systematics* 206-209.

118 'Alteri autem verbi necessitas est ut ex definitionibus et ex perspecta evidentia in res qua existentes procedamus, quod tamen non fit nisi ex perspecta evidentia procedat verum affirmatum in quo tamquam in medio ens cognoscatur.' *Ibid.* 208-209.

119 'Tertia autem verborum necessitas est ut scientias excolere possimus. Nisi enim verba universalia formarentur, totum mundum aspectabilem numquam scire possemus, sed ad particularia experta vel imaginata religeremur. Item, nisi verba exacte definita formarentur, fluxu quodam imaginum ad modum mentalitatis mythicae ferremur, cum numquam clare et distincte constaret de quanam re ageretur.' *Ibid.*

120 'Quarta denique verborum necessitas est ut ultra limites mundi aspectabilis per analogias et viam eminentiae procedamus. Quod sane

Now the common root of these four requirements is the fact that the object that moves us to understanding is distinct from the object towards which we are tending as an objective or end. What moves our intellect to understand in this life is the intelligibility of material things, and what we are tending toward is all of being.¹²¹ Thus, 'Because we begin from a quiddity, the word is required, first, so that the thing may be defined through its quiddity; second, so that we may judge whether what we have defined exists; third, so that we may be directed away from sensibly perceived particulars toward the entirety of the visible universe; and fourth, so that we may be able to reach beyond the material world to God.'¹²²

In *Verbum* the first two of these reasons are expressed as follows:

... to ask about the essential necessity of inner words in us is to ask about the essential necessity of our complementing acts of understanding with inner words to obtain knowledge of external things. The answer will be had by comparing the object of understanding with the external things. Now the first and proper object of understanding, the 'what is known inasmuch as one understands,' must be simply intelligible; accordingly, the proportionate object of our intellects is the *quidditas rei materialis*. This quiddity prescind from individual matter, for individual matter is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the per se universality of forms which it individuates. Again the quiddity prescind from contingent existence, for contingent existence is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the necessarily Existent which is final, exemplary, and efficient cause of contingent beings. The essential necessity of inner words in our intellects is the necessity of effecting the transition from the preconceptual *quidditas rei materialis*, first, to the *res*, secondly, to the *res particularis*, thirdly, to the *res particularis existens*. The transition from *quidditas rei* to *res*, say, from *humanitas* to *homo*, occurs in conception, in which there emerges intellect's natural knowledge of *ens*. In virtue of

numquam fieri posset, nisi verba interiora tum definitiva tum iudicativa formarentur.' Ibid.

121 'Quae quattuor necessitates hanc communem radicem habent, quod aliud est obiectum quod nos ad intelligendum movet et aliud est obiectum in quod tamquam in finem tendimus. Quod enim movet intellectum nostrum hac in vita est quidditas rei materialis; finis autem in quem intellectus tendit est totum ens.' Ibid.

122 'Quia enim ex quidditate incipimus, primo requiritur verbum ut res per quidditatem definiatur, deinde requiritur verbum ut res definita utrum existat iudicetur, tertio requiruntur verba ut ex sensibilibus in universum aspectabile convertamur, et quarto requiruntur verba ut ultra mundum materialem in Deum ascendere possimus.' Ibid.

this step, understanding moves from identity with its preconceptual object to confrontation with its conceived object; but as yet the object is only object of thought. The second step is a reflection on phantasm that enables one to mean, though not understand nor explanatorily define, the material singular. In this step intellect moves from a universal to a particular object of thought. Finally, by a reflective act of understanding that sweeps through all relevant data, sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, and grasps understanding's proportion to the universe as well, there is uttered the existential judgment through which one knows concrete reality.¹²³

But such a necessity for a word cannot be said to exist in God. The divine intellect is not moved by an other, nor does it tend toward something else as toward an end, but, infinite in perfection, it exists eternally, both comprehending itself and perfectly understanding and knowing all other things in itself.¹²⁴

Lonergan then proceeds to respond to arguments that claim to demonstrate a divine Word.

A first argument would be that an understanding that is not expressed in words is not clear and distinct, and that, since God's knowledge is completely clear and distinct, it must not be without its verbal expression. Lonergan responds that an understanding that is by means of many acts is not clear and distinct without words, but that this is not the case with an understanding that is by means of a single infinite act. Moreover, since the word is merely the expression of what is made known through the act of understanding, *per se* the word adds no clarity and distinctness to the understanding; but *per accidens*, that is, when there are many diverse and imperfect acts of understanding, words are needed for clarity and distinctness. Thus, were there no words in us, we would hardly be able to know what we have already grasped and what remains to be investigated.¹²⁵

A second objection would argue that the duality of subject and object is of the very essence of knowledge, and so a divine subject would have to speak a word to know himself; and since God knows himself, God speaks a word. Lonergan responds that the principle of this argument is simply false, grounded in an image of the person looking and the thing looked at. The principle is found in the Platonic positing in a certain first order or place the eternal subsistent simple Ideas, and at a

123 Lonergan, *Verbum* 201.

124 'Iam vero, eiusmodi necessitas verbi in Deo esse non potest.

Intellectus enim divinus a nullo alio movetur neque in ullum aliud tendit tamquam in finem, sed perfectione infinitus existit aeternus, tum se ipsum comprehendens, tum omnia alia in se ipso perfecte intelligens atque sciens.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 208-209.

125 Ibid. 208-211.

second level the gods who contemplate the Ideas. It is found in Scotus's *distinctio formalis a parte rei*, which Lonergan will return to later. It is found in Günther and Rosmini's attempt to demonstrate the necessity of the divine Word. It is found in Jean-Paul Sartre's distinction of *en soi* and *pour soi*, and his insistence that a God, conscious of himself and at the same time simple, is an intrinsic contradiction. It is found in conceptions of consciousness as perception of oneself, a notion that leads to insoluble difficulties concerning the consciousness of Christ. On Aristotelian and Thomist grounds, the intelligible in act is the intellect in act, and in that which is without matter the intellect and the understood are the same. The intellect differs from the intelligible only to the extent that each is in potency.¹²⁶

A third objection would affirm that a consciousness that is intellectual and dynamic is so perfect that it must be posited in the infinite perfection of God. Lonergan responds that, of course, the procession of Word in God is completely necessary and completely perfect; but in what *we* naturally know of God, there occurs no demonstration that dynamic intellectual consciousness is a pure perfection (since, I believe, in our experience of dynamic intellectual consciousness there are movements from potency to act); and so there is no demonstration of the fact that it must be posited in God. Moreover, even with the help of inner words, we cannot arrive at a perfect understanding of the things we believe in faith, for the reality of emanation and the consubstantiality of the one who proceeds seem to be at variance with each other, so that only with difficulty can we consider them simultaneously and reconcile them.¹²⁷ (The issue of this reconciliation and its difficulty will be raised again, for it is here that the mystery resides.)

The matter is treated in somewhat greater detail in *Verbum*. Two questions are faced: (1) 'Why cannot natural reason demonstrate the existence of the divine Word from the premise of divine self-knowledge?'¹²⁸ and (2) Does not divine knowledge of the other seem to require an inner word?

The first question is handled with dispatch.

First, the demonstration cannot be effected by contrasting the proper object of understanding with the divine essence. God is simply intelligible. He is pure form identical with existence. There is no distinction between his essence or his existence or his intellect or his understanding. There is not even a distinction between his *esse naturale* and his *esse intelligibile*. Secondly, the demonstration

126 Ibid. 210-11. Lonergan's footnote at this point mentions *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4.

127 Ibid. 212-13.

128 Lonergan, *Verbum* 201.

cannot be effected by arguing that without an inner word there would be no confrontation between subject and object. For one cannot demonstrate that such confrontation is essential to knowledge. Primarily and essentially, knowing is by identity. The natural light of reason will never get beyond that identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God.¹²⁹

The second of these arguments matches the second objection and response in *The Triune God: Systematics*, but the first is an additional argument, drawing on what has immediately preceded it in *Verbum* itself. What does it mean? We require inner words because there *is* a contrast between the proper object of understanding, which must be simply intelligible, for us the *quidditas* of the material thing, and any *thing* that we come to know as *res*, as *res particularis*, and as *res particularis existens*. But when God knows himself there is no contrast between the proper object of understanding, the intelligible, and the divine essence that he knows. And so that particular ground in us of the necessity of the inner word does not obtain for God's self-knowledge.

What, then, about the divine knowledge of the other? Does it not seem to require an inner word? After all, 'the other is not simply intelligible, nor always in act, nor identical with the knower. Further, in confirmation of this argument, there is the fact that Aquinas wrote some of his finest passages on *verbum* in the context of divine knowledge of the other. In additional confirmation there is the familiar doctrine that secondary elements in the beatific vision are known *in Verbo*.¹³⁰

Lonergan treats the two confirming arguments first. They are based on a traditional association that Aquinas was heir to, namely, the connection between the divine Word and the divine Ideas that is to be found in the entire Christian Platonist tradition and can be traced back to Philo's conception of the Logos as containing the ideas. More than likely, there was no 'intrinsic exigence of his own thought' that led Aquinas to treat *verbum* in the context of the divine ideas. Where he differs from the Platonist tradition is not in this association but on the basic assumption regarding knowledge. 'The Platonist assumption that knowledge involves confrontation led later Scholastics to attribute to the ideas an *esse obiectivum*. Certainly Aquinas was free from that error and so he can be expected to apply the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by identity to reconcile divine simplicity with divine knowledge of the other.¹³¹

Regarding the issue itself, then, there are two steps that Lonergan takes in *Verbum*. First, distinctions are drawn regarding our knowledge. Secondly, steps are taken to move from this finite model to God.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid. 202.

131 Ibid.

Regarding our own knowledge, then, Lonergan distinguishes '(1) the thing with its virtualities, (2) the act of understanding with its primary and its secondary objects, (3) the expression of both primary and secondary objects in inner words.' An example is given:

... the human soul formally is an intellective soul, subsistent, immortal; it is not formally a sensitive soul nor a vegetative soul; but virtually it does possess the perfection without the imperfection of sensitive and vegetative souls. When, however, we understand the human soul, we understand as primary object an intellective soul and as secondary object the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul; both objects are understood formally and actually, but the secondary object is understood in the primary and in virtue of understanding the primary. Further, once understanding of the human soul has developed, there are not two acts of understanding but one, which primarily is of intellective soul and secondarily, in the perfection of intellective soul, is of the sensitive and vegetative souls. Finally, our one act of understanding expresses itself in many inner words, in which are defined intellective, sensitive, and vegetative souls and the relations between them; further, these inner words are the *esse intelligibile* or the *esse intentionale* of soul as distinct both from the *esse naturale* of soul itself and from the *esse intellectum* which is an extrinsic denomination from an *intelligere* of soul whether real or intentional.¹³²

What happens when one moves from this model to God?

... the divine essence formally is itself but eminently it contains all perfection. The divine act of understanding primarily is of the divine essence but secondarily of its virtualities. The divine Word that is

132 Ibid. 202-203. 'Extrinsic denomination' is explained in Lonergan's supplement *De scientia atque voluntate Dei*. It is an extraordinarily important notion in a good deal of Lonergan's theology. 'God knows that this world exists' is an extrinsic denomination from the existence of this world; for it to be true it requires the existence of this world. Two simultaneous truths are posited in this one judgment: 'This world exists' and 'God knows that this world exists.' So too, the proposition, 'The soul, whether in its *esse naturale* or its *esse intentionale* has been understood (*esse intellectum*),' is an extrinsic denomination from the act of understanding. It requires the existence of 'an *intelligere* of soul whether real or intentional' for it to be true. Two simultaneous truths are posited in this one judgment: 'An act of understanding has occurred in which either the *esse naturale* or the *esse intentionale* of soul has been understood' and 'The soul, whether in its *esse naturale* or its *esse intentionale* has been understood.'

uttered is one, but what is uttered in the one Word is all that God knows. Moreover, the divine essence, the divine act of understanding, and the divine Word considered absolutely are one and the same reality; hence there can be no real distinction between ‘contained eminently in the essence’ and ‘secondary object of the understanding’ or between either of these and ‘uttered in the one Word.’ Further, utterance in the one Word does not confer on the ideas an *esse intelligibile* that otherwise they would not possess; for in God *esse naturale* and *esse intelligibile* are identical. It remains, then, that divine knowledge of the other provides no premise whence the procession of the divine Word could be established by natural reason. The plurality of divine ideas within divine simplicity is accounted for by an infinite act of understanding grasping as secondary objects the perfections eminently contained in the divine essence and virtually in divine omnipotence. As we can understand *multa per unum*, all the more so can God.

Hence, though our *intelligere* is always a *dicere*, this cannot be demonstrated of God’s. Though we can demonstrate that God understands, for understanding is pure perfection, still we can no more than conjecture the mode of divine understanding and so cannot prove that there is a divine Word. Psychological trinitarian theory is not a conclusion that can be demonstrated but a hypothesis that squares with divine revelation without excluding the possibility of alternative hypotheses. Finally, Aquinas regularly writes as a theologian and not as a philosopher; hence regularly he simply states what simply is true, that in all intellects there is a procession of inner word.¹³³

7.3 Does the Word Proceed from an Understanding of Creatures?

The third question is related to what we have just seen from *Verbum*. It goes on to ask whether the divine word proceeds from the divine understanding of creatures or only from God’s understanding of God. Initially, it would seem that it could not be the case that the divine Word proceeds from divine understanding of creatures, since the Word of God is necessary and eternal, and creatures are contingent and temporal. But St Thomas taught that God understands Godself and creatures in one act of understanding and speaks Godself and creatures in one Word, and also that, as the divine act of understanding knows itself, and both knows and creates creatures, so the Word of God expresses God and both expresses and is operative of creatures.¹³⁴ Thus it is his teaching

133 Ibid 203-204.

134 *The Triune God: Systematics* 213. The reference is to *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 34, a. 3 (*utrum in nomine Verbi importetur respectus ad*

that the Word of God proceeds from the divine understanding of creatures.

The problem mentioned at the beginning of this section is resolved, Lonergan says, by correctly grasping the nature of the psychological analogy. Nobody who conceives the emanation of the word as proceeding from the object, as the act of seeing proceeds from colors, will ever be able to admit that the divine Word proceeds from creatures. One will have less difficulty if one conceives the word as proceeding from the knowledge of the object, since the object then is not the cause *simpliciter* but a kind of co-cause. But one must grasp the nature of intellectual consciousness itself, and then one will have no difficulty. For the proper principle of an intellectual and intelligible emanation is not the object but the subject. This is the case even in us: an intellectual emanation is not possible unless, and except to the extent that, the subject is intellectually conscious in act. It is even more clear in the case of God, since God is the first principle of all things.¹³⁵

Moreover, the *necessity* of an intellectual emanation arises, not from the object but from the conscious intellectuality of the subject: because intellectual consciousness is bound (*sibi debet*) truly to express its understanding to itself, what is understood must be truly expressed; because it is bound to bestow its love in a morally good way, what is truly judged to be good must also be loved. We are bound to judge on the basis of evidence and to choose on the basis of judgment, even to the extent that, should our understanding be deficient or our judgment in error, an unknown obligation does not hold us to act contrary to conscience; rather, the known obligation binds us to judge on the basis of evidence and to choose on the basis of judgment.¹³⁶

creaturam): ‘... in Verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam. Deus enim cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum autem in mente conceptum est repraesentativum omnis eius quod actu intelligitur; unde in nobis sunt diversa verba secundum diversa quae intelligimus. Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum eius est expressivum non solum Patris, sed etiam creaturarum. Et sicut Dei scientia Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva, ita verbum Dei eius quod in Deo Patre est est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum.’

135 *The Triune God: Systematics* 212-13.

136 ‘... emanationis intelligibilis necessitas non ex objecto provenit sed ex conscia intellectualitate subiecti. Quia enim conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut suam intelligentiam vere sibi exprimat, consequitur ut id quod intelligitur vere exprimi debeat. Quia conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut honeste suum amorem largiatur, consequitur ut quae vere bona iudicantur etiam amari debeant. Quod si per accidens vel intelligentia deficit vel iudicium errat, non praevallet debitum ignotum

It might be thought that this is to exaggerate the autonomy of intellectual consciousness. Well, first of all, the divine autonomy (which is really what we are considering here) is absolute and so cannot be exaggerated; secondly, however, even the autonomy of human consciousness is subordinate *not to any object*, but *only to the infinite subject* in whose image it is made and which it is bound to imitate.¹³⁷

Now it is true that different objects enter in different ways, both into the act of understanding whence proceeds the divine Word, and into the act of understanding and the Word whence proceeds Love. For the primary object of divine understanding is the divine act of existence itself. Other objects are secondary. Moreover, these secondary objects are connected with the primary object in different ways: either as possibles under the formality of being, or as possibles under the formality of possibility, or as past, present, and future actual realities.

Possibles under the formality of being are nothing other than the divine active power that can create them, and so God understands and speaks the possibles insofar as God understands and speaks God's own power, which is one with God's own essence and act of understanding.

Possibles under the formality of possibility are in God as understanding and speaking in the manner of a certain implicit being of reason: a being of reason, because the entire reality of the possibles is the divine active power; an *implicit* being of reason, because God does not speak as many distinct words as there are distinct possibles. Nonetheless they are all and each distinctly in God insofar as God, by understanding God's own power, clearly and distinctly understands each and every possible being, and by speaking God's own power, clearly and distinctly speaks in one infinite Word each and every possible being.

Finally, all past, present, and future actual beings God intuitively understands and speaks by the Word and loves with the love that proceeds from understanding and Word. If another world existed God would intuit and speak and love those other beings as actual, not because God can be now this and now that, nor because divine intellectual emanations can be now this and now that, but because the

ut quis teneatur contra conscientiam agere, sed debitum cognitum ut quis teneatur secundum evidentiam iudicare et secundum iudicium eligere.' Ibid. 214-15.

137 'Quod si obicitur exaggeratam esse hanc conscientiae autonomiam, respondetur dupliciter. Primo, enim, ipsa divina autonomia, cum absoluta sit, exaggerari non potest: et cum de hac autonomia intelligenda agatur, obiciens extra ipsam quaestionem ad alia vagari videtur. Deinde, subordinata quidem est autonomia conscientiae humanae, non tamen omnibus et quibuscumque obiectis, sed subiecto infinito ad cuius imaginem facta est et quod imitari tenetur.' Ibid.

knowledge and affirmation and love of actual beings add only a relation of reason to the infinite act of understanding and affirming and loving.¹³⁸

Thus the emanation of the divine Word depends on the divine intellectual consciousness and on the infinite act of understanding. Because these are one not only with one another but also with the divine act of existence, the divine essence, and the divine power, the divine emanation of the Word depends as well on the divine essence and power. Furthermore, because divine understanding includes the possibles as possibles in the mode of an implicit being of reason, the divine emanation of the Word has an exigence to speak the possibles as possibles in the mode of an implicit being of reason. Again, because the divine understanding, due to the addition of a relation of reason over and above the infinite act, understands all actual beings as they are, the emanation of the divine Word has an exigence that, with this addition of a relation of reason, all these actual beings be spoken by the Word, and the divine emanation of Love an exigence that, again with the addition of a relation of reason, all actual beings be loved with the Love that proceeds from understanding and Word. Finally, because the divine understanding clearly grasps that the divine Word and the divine Love do not depend on a relation of reason, because it clearly perceives that all actual and possible beings depend on divine understanding, on the divine Word, on divine Love, the divine Word proceeds from an understanding of creatures in such a way that the creatures are spoken as truly and eternally dependent on the Word, and the divine Love proceeds from the divine understanding and affirmation of creatures in such a way that the creatures are truly and eternally loved as dependent upon this divine love.¹³⁹

7.4 The Presence of the Beloved within the Lover: Is It Constituted or Produced by Love?

7.4.1 The Treatment in De Deo Trino

The fourth question to which special attention is devoted has to do with the analogical conception of the procession of the Holy Spirit as the procession of love, and principally with the analogy itself, with the procession of love in human dynamic intellectual consciousness. Is the presence of the beloved in the lover *constituted* by love, or is it *produced* by love? That is, is it really the same as love, as the act of loving (and so constituted by love), or is it really distinct from love and something that proceeds from love (and so is produced by love).

138 See *ibid.* 214-17.

139 *Ibid.* 216-17.

If I may anticipate for a moment a much later discussion both in Lonergan's writings and in the work of some of his students, the question is most relevant to the discussion of the so-called fifth level of consciousness, or better of that level that is beyond, and a higher integration of, the four levels of presentations, understanding, judgment, and decision. The fifth level, the level of love, is itself interpersonal. It is the level of total self-transcendence to another, whether in the love of intimacy or in love in the community or in the love of God. I do not want to belabor this point in the present context of commenting on a much earlier text by Lonergan, but it is important to highlight the relevance of this early discussion to a much later issue.

If the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love, then the beloved is in the lover through the procession of love, as the thing spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the word; the presence of the beloved in the lover is the same as love, as the act of loving itself. Then, within the context of the faculty psychology that Lonergan is employing at this point, the Trinitarian analogy is based on a first procession within the intellect and a second *from the intellect into the will*: we judge because and to the extent that we have grasped sufficient evidence (procession of the word), and we choose or love because and to the extent that we have judged (procession of love). The 'thing spoken or understood' is constituted in the one who understands through the word itself; the 'beloved' is constituted in the lover through the proceeding love itself.

If, on the other hand, the presence of the beloved in the lover is distinct from love and produced by love, then the Trinitarian analogy is based on a procession within the intellect and a distinct procession within the will. From the the act of understanding there comes forth a conception of the understood reality in the one who understands, from one's love there comes forth a distinct impression of the beloved reality in the affections of the lover. The word is produced through the act of understanding, and the presence of the beloved in the lover is produced through the act of loving.

The immediate relevance of the question for Lonergan has to do with the possibility of a psychological analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. If the second of these ways of thinking about the presence of the beloved in the lover is the correct way of thinking about it, then the analogy that Lonergan has set up breaks down. For that analogy states that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is analogous to the procession of the presence of the beloved in the lover as flowing from understanding and word.

We have already seen in passing, in our discussion of Lonergan's treatment of the previous question as to whether the Word proceeds from the understanding of creatures, the general approach that he will take to the procession of Love within God. All past, present, and future actual beings God intuitively by understanding and speaks by the Word and *loves*

with the Love that proceeds from understanding and Word. Thus the analogy has Lonergan opting for the view that the presence of the beloved in the lover is *constituted by a love that proceeds from understanding and word, and so not by a love that is produced by a distinct act in the will.* He views this as the position of St Thomas, and in so doing he differs from John of St Thomas and Thomists in general.

Two different theoretical systems are represented in the question. The position that Lonergan rejects bases its conception on the assumption that there are in our dynamic intellectual consciousness two processions, one within the intellect and the other within the will: according to the first, the act of understanding produces the word, and according to the second the act of loving produces the presence of the beloved in the lover. This is the position of John of St Thomas and of most Thomists. Lonergan's own position is based on the *experience* of two processions, of which the first is within the intellect and the second is *from* the intellect *into* the will. By reason of the first procession we judge because and to the extent that we grasp sufficient evidence, and by reason of the second procession we choose because and to the extent that we judge.

Lonergan begins the discussion by quoting two texts from St Thomas, one of which seems to favor the position adopted by Lonergan, and the other of which seems to favor the opposed position.

In the first text (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 3 c.) the beloved is said to be in the lover *by the procession of love (processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante)*, just as the thing spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the word (*sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente*). As the thing spoken or understood is in the one understanding through the word, so the beloved is in the lover through the love that proceeds. But in the second text (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.), from the fact that someone understands there emerges in the one who understands the conception of the thing understood, and similarly from the fact that someone loves there emerges a certain impression of the beloved in the affections of the lover. For the word is produced through the act of understanding, and in parallel fashion the presence of the beloved in the lover is produced through the act of loving.

The question reduces, then, to the experience: Are there in us two processions, one of which is in the intellect and the other of which is in the will, so that according to the first the act of understanding produces the word and according to the second the act of loving produces the presence of the beloved in the lover? Or is it not rather our experience that there are in us two processions of which the first is in the intellect – we judge because we grasp sufficient evidence and in accord with the evidence grasped – and the second is from the intellect into the will – we choose and love because we judge and in accord with the judgment of

value that we have made? The issue is one of experience itself. In treating the option that he prefers, Lonergan uses the words ‘in nobis experimur.’ Similarly, he says that he rejects the mainline Thomist view ‘tum quia *ab experientia nostra interna* praescindit in concipienda analogia trinitaria et psychologica, tum quia *ab experientia nostra interna* praescindit in interpretandis textibus S. Thomae de re psychologica.’¹⁴⁰

So Lonergan proceeds to cite other passages from St Thomas, texts that show that for St Thomas the beloved is present in the lover because love is present, not because anything is produced in the will through the act of love. In *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3560, the beloved is in the lover by reason of the love itself that is the moving principle in the lover. Moreover, the presence of the beloved in the will of the lover differs from the presence of the beloved in the lover’s intellect in that the latter is ‘by reason of a likeness of its species’ whereas the former is ‘as the term of a movement’ or relation. Nothing is said of a term immanently produced by this love. It is the term *in*, not produced by, its proportionate moving principle, that is, love. Again, in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3563, the beloved is in the lover because the beloved is loved, not because something is produced by love in the will. *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 13m states that love transforms the beloved into the lover inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very one that is loved. The presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love insofar as the lover is moved to the beloved, not insofar as something is produced in the will by love. Finally, in *Compendium theologiae*, c. 49, that by which the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted is *secundum quod amatur actu*, and the principles from which there proceeds the presence of the beloved in the lover are the potency for loving and the word one has conceived concerning the one loved.

So much for texts from Aquinas that establish the analogy. Further texts are cited that argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word as love proceeds in us from a mental word. *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘... the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.’ *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 speaks of a word that spirates love. *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 24, §3617 states, ‘Love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.’ Next, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3564 actually states the analogy: ‘... that something is in the will as what is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it and to the thing itself whose conception by the intellect is called the word: for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known ... It is necessary, therefore, that the love by which God is in the divine will as the beloved in the lover proceed both from the Word of God and from God whose Word he is.’

140 Ibid. 220-21.

Further texts go beyond the affirmation that as love proceeds from word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word, to state that the Holy Spirit *is* proceeding Love itself, not something else produced by proceeding love. The first of these texts is *Summa theologiae*, q. 37, a. 1, Sed contra: ‘Ipse Spiritus sanctus est Amor,’ ‘The Holy Spirit himself is Love.’ Again, in the corpus of the same article, it is stated that ‘Insofar as we use these words (*amore, dilectione*) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by “love” proceeding love is understood ..., and so Love is the name of a person.’ In the same article, ad 3m, ‘The Holy Spirit is called the bond of Father and Son insofar as the Spirit is Love, since because the Father loves with one love both himself and the Son, and the Son with one love both himself and the Father, there is conveyed (importatur) in the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Spirit is Love, the relation of the Father to the Son and the relation of the Son to the Father, each as a relation of lover to beloved. From the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love each other it follows that their mutual Love, which is the Holy Spirit, must proceed from both. Thus with respect to origin the Holy Spirit is not a medium but the third person in the Trinity, but with respect to this relation he is a connecting bond between the two, proceeding from each of them.’ The same article, ad 4m, moves into the territory of the one divine consciousness participated in distinct ways by each of the persons: ‘Granted that the Son understands, it is not proper to him to produce the word, since he understands as the Word that proceeds. So too, granted that the Holy Spirit loves with the essential love of God, still it is not proper to the Holy Spirit to breathe love, which is loving in the notional sense, since the Holy Spirit loves essentially precisely as proceeding Love, not as that from which love proceeds.’ Next, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3m: ‘The Father loves in the Holy Spirit not only the Son but also himself and us; since to love in the notional sense not only includes the production of a divine person but also the person produced by way of Love, who is related to what is loved. Thus, since the Father utters himself and every creature in the Word which he begets insofar as the Word begotten sufficiently represents the Father and every creature, so he loves himself and every creature in the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love of the prime goodness according to which the Father loves himself and every creature. And so it is also clear that some relation is implied to creatures both in the Word and in proceeding Love, insofar as divine truth and goodness *quam Pater amat se et omnem creaturam. Et sic etiam patet quod* are the principle of understanding and loving every creature.’

Several other texts conclude this argument, and then *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m, is produced to show that for St Thomas there is in the will no procession in the mode of *rei operatae*. Lonergan denies that Thomas ever retracted the position expressed in this text, as others have

claimed. 'The will does not have anything proceeding from itself that would be in the will, except what is in it after the manner of an operation (*per modum operationis*); but the intellect has in itself something that proceeds from itself not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of something operated (*per modum rei operatae*).' If nothing proceeds within the will *per modum operati*, then the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted and not produced by love. There is no procession of act from act within the will, only from the intellect into the will.

The principal argument for the opposed position is the opinion of John of St Thomas concerning vital act. According to this position every vital act is produced by that potency in which it is received, and so love must be produced, not by the intellect nor by the word, but by the will itself in which it is received. This is not the position of St Thomas, but it has been held by many so-called Thomists. Lonergan concludes that St Thomas explicitly taught: (1) the second procession is one of love from the word; (2) the Holy Spirit is both 'amatum in amante' and proceeding love; (3) there is not a procession in the will except *per modum operationis*; and (4) the beloved is present in the lover because the beloved is loved (*secundum quod amatur*). The opposed position, if it were to be faithful to St Thomas, would have to show that as his work developed, he came to opposed positions on each of these points, so that: (1) the second procession is not the procession of love from the word, but of 'the beloved in the lover' from love, (2) the Holy Spirit is 'beloved in the lover' but not proceeding love, (3) there is in the will a procession *per modum rei operatae*, and (4) the beloved is in the lover, not because the beloved is loved but because from this love there proceeds something really distinct from the love, which is called 'the beloved in the lover.' It may be that the elements of the other position can be found implicitly here and there in St Thomas's writings, but certainly nothing more. And Lonergan's position is clearly that which he finds to be the more consistent position in the writings of Aquinas.

8 Comparison with Chapter Two of *Divinarum Personarum*

The first assertion is one of the areas in which Lonergan made some major changes between *Divinarum Personarum* and *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*. It is best to review these differences now

8.1 The Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis

The first major difference is in the definition of *emanatio intelligibilis*. In *Divinarum Personarum*, *emanatio intelligibilis* is defined as 'conscia origo actus tum intra conscientiam intellectualem tum vi ipsius conscientiae

intellectualis actu determinatae.¹⁴¹ In *De Deo trino* the definition is ‘conscia origo actus realis, naturalis, et conscii, ex actu reali, naturali, et conscio, tum intra conscientiam intellectualem, tum vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu priori determinatae.’¹⁴² The differences are two, and they both have to do with the fact that the later definition includes explicitly items that in the earlier version are introduced only after the shorter definition has been given. First, in the later work the fact that the procession is not only of an act but also *from* an act is included in the definition, whereas in the earlier version that point is added explicitly only later (*Divinarum Personarum* 60, *The Triune God: Systematics* 762: ‘emanationes alterius actus ex alio’). Second, in *De Deo trino* both acts are qualified or described with the adjectives ‘real,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘conscious,’ whereas in *Divinarum Personarum* the fact that the *emanatio* is *ens reale et naturale* is added immediately after the presentation of the definition. On the other hand, the explanation of the meaning of *naturale* is clearer in *Divinarum personarum* than in the later version: ‘Est ens naturale: non enim affirmatur in intellectu ita realiter esse ut sit medium ad aliud cognoscendum [ens intentionale]; sed ita in intellectu realiter esse affirmatur ut ad ipsam intellectus naturam pertineat.’¹⁴³

De Deo trino provides in the explication of the thesis a two-page explanation of terms that has no parallel in *Divinarum personarum*. A major difference in content appears in the treatment of causality. In *Divinarum personarum* the difference even in us between the emanation and an exercise of causality is stressed, while in *De Deo trino* mention is made rather of a causality peculiar to consciousness. In *Divinarum personarum* causality is ‘imperfecta quaedam et *inconscia* imitatio ordinis intelligibilis quae in mente creatoris adest’ (an imperfect and *unconscious* imitation of the intelligible order, which is present intentionally in the mind of the Creator) that is not found in the created image of the Trinity,

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- 141 ‘... the conscious origin of an act both within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness as determined by an act.’ Lonergan, *Divinarum Personarum* 59; see *The Triune God: Systematics* 761, where ‘as determined by the act’ should be ‘as determined by an act;’ the Latin is clearer on 766: ‘vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu *quodam* determinatae.’
- 142 ‘... the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act.’ *The Triune God: Systematics* 141.
- 143 ‘It is a natural being: that is, it is not affirmed to be really in the intellect as a medium through which something else is known; rather, it is affirmed to be really in the intellect as belonging to the very nature of the intellect.’ Lonergan, *Divinarum personarum* 59-60; *The Triune God: Systematics* 760-61.

that is, in our *emanatio intelligibilis*;¹⁴⁴ whereas in *De Deo trino* the notion of causality is extended to include a peculiar kind of causality proper to conscious acts. No help is given, though, to indicate just what that ‘modum causalitatis proprium conscientiae’ might be. More help is provided in *Verbum*, where a distinction is presented between the Aristotelian restriction of efficient causality to exercise of an influence that proceeds from one being to another, on the one hand, and ‘a more general notion’ found in Aquinas.

Aquinas developed a more general notion of efficient causality than that defined by Aristotle. Thus *principium operati*, *principium effectus*, *processio operati* include the idea of production but do not include the Aristotelian restrictions of *in alio vel qua aliud*. The act of understanding is to the possible intellect, the act of loving is to the will, as act to potency, as perfection to its perfectible; the procession is *processio operationis* and cannot be analogous to any real procession in God. But the inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the procession is *processio operati*; in us *dicere* is *producere verbum*, even though it is natural and not an instance of Aristotelian efficient causality.¹⁴⁵

Even more helpful is the following, reflected a bit, but not this clearly, in *De Deo trino*’s explanation of the phrase ‘actu priori determinatae.’

There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us. There is the productive aspect; intelligence in act is proportionate to producing the inner word. There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient. I can imagine a circle, and I can define a circle. In both cases there is efficient causality. But in the second case there is something more. I define the circle because I grasp in imagined data that, if the radii are equal, then the plane curve must be uniformly round. The inner word of defining not only is *caused by* but also is *because of* the act of understanding. In the former aspect the procession is *processio operati*. In the latter aspect the procession is *processio intelligibilis*. Similarly, in us the act of judgment is caused by a reflective act of understanding, and so it is *processio operati*. But that is not all. The procession of judgment cannot be equated with procession from electromotive force or chemical action or biological

144 *The Triune God: Systematics* 764-65.

145 Lonergan, *Verbum* 205-206.

process or even sensitive act. Judgment is judgment only if it proceeds from intellectual grasp of sufficient evidence as sufficient. Its procession also is *processio intelligibilis*.¹⁴⁶

8.2 The Wording of the First Assertion

The second major difference between the two texts is in the wording of the first assertion itself. The wording in *Divinarum personarum* is simple and straightforward: 'Processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis.'¹⁴⁷ In contrast is the elaborate statement of *De Deo trino* that we have already seen: 'Processiones divinae, quae sunt per modum operati, aliquatenus intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis; neque alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam.' The difference in the wording of the assertion itself dictates a corresponding difference in the presentation of terms: *Divinarum Personarum* has a short section *Ad terminos*, while *De Deo trino* expands the treatment even beyond the terms contained in the assertion itself to discuss the various determinations of the mode of procession that we have already discussed.

A short 'Asserti intentio' in *Divinarum pesonarum* indicates that the thesis presupposes revelation and dogma, the treatise 'De Deo uno,' and the 'via analytica' movement from the fonts of revelation to the understanding from which the present thesis begins to return to the revealed mysteries. Thus with this thesis, says *Divinarum personarum*, the 'via synthetica' begins. The test of that claim will be to see whether in the course of further assertions anything else emerges that could be considered 'prior quoad se.' If not, then definitely the 'via synthetica' has begun with this thesis.

The corresponding 'Sensus asserti' in *De Deo trino* does not discuss the 'via analytica' and 'via synthetica' in those terms, but indicates rather

146 Ibid. 207. The correspondent to this in *De Deo trino* is the following: '... we define *because* we understand and *in accordance with* what we understand; we judge *because* we grasp evidence as sufficient and *in accordance with* the evidence we have grasped; finally, we choose in a certain way *because* we judge and *in accordance with* what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory.' (Translated from: '... sic definimus *quia* intelligimus et *secundum* illud quod intelligimus; sic iudicamus *quia* evidentiam sufficere perspicimus et *secundum* evidentiam perspectam; sic eligimus *quia* iudicamus et *secundum* quod iudicamus vel prodesse vel decere vel convenire vel deberi.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 142-43.

147 'The divine processions are to be conceived through their likeness to intellectual emanation.' *The Triune God: Systematics* 764-65.

that we are dealing with a mystery that is hidden in God but that can be mediately, imperfectly, analogically, and fruitfully understood by reason illumined by faith. Then it simply indicates that there will be three parts to the exposition of the assertion: a first section that works out a technical formulation of the problem that differs only verbally from the doctrine of faith itself; a second section that argues hypothetically that if one presupposes that divine procession is along the lines of intelligible emanation, it can be understood how it satisfies the technical formulation of the first part (*per modum operati*); and a third part arguing that no other way is available to us of gaining any understanding of this mystery.

8.3 *The Argument*

As the wording of the assertion, so the argument differs considerably as we move from the earlier to the later version.

8.3.1 The Argument in *Divinarum Personarum*

The argument in *Divinarum Personarum* establishes through a syllogism that the divine processions are to be conceived *per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis*, because they *can* be so conceived and because they *cannot* be conceived in any other way or by the analogy of any other type of emanation.

First, then, it can be claimed that they *can* be so conceived, because once one posits intelligible emanation in God there follow (1) the reality of the one emanating, (2) the consubstantiality of the one emanating, and (3) our imperfect understanding of the two together. And this is precisely what we are seeking: an imperfect understanding of the fact that Son and Spirit are *a se* and not *a se*. 'Intelligible emanation' yields 'not *a se*,' while 'consubstantiality' yields '*a se*.' The two together yield the kind of obscure conception that the First Vatican Council proposes.

Thus it may be said that (1) when intelligible emanation is posited in God, the reality of emanation follows *a parte rei*: really in God, naturally and not just intentionally, there is emanation; (2) there follows as well the consubstantiality of the one emanating; and (3) this imperfect understanding of divine procession excludes causal emanation and affirms intelligible emanation. The '*a se*' dimension means that it is non-causal, the '*non a se*' dimension that the emanation is from a principle. Curiously, however, the non-causal nature of intelligible emanation is generalized: causal emanation in general is *extra conscientiam intellectualem*. In *ens per essentiam*, one act understands being, affirms the true, and loves the good, even though in that act, the affirmation is

'from' the understanding, and the love is 'from' both understanding and affirmation. But neither in infinite nor in finite consciousness does the 'from' (*ex*) mean causal emanation. In finite consciousness one accidental act intelligibly emanates from another accidental act. In infinite consciousness, one subsistent person intelligibly emanates from another. This element will be expressed differently in the 1964 version.

Again, the understanding is imperfect. First, we do not clearly and distinctly perceive the *ratio* of intelligible emanation. In us one accidental act proceeds from another, and in God there is real emanation in one act. Second, in created intelligible emanation, there is one accidental act proceeding from another accidental act, while in God one subsistent person proceeds from another; this is a radical difference. In us there is one person, and there are three accidental acts. In God there is one act, and there are three subsistent persons.

Lonergan ends his discussion of the argument by excluding every other kind of emanation, to establish that the procession is from act to act, from the same act to the same act, natural, spiritual, intellectual, and volitional.

8.3.2 The Argument in *De Deo Trino*

The argument in the later version is much longer (fourteen pages as compared with five in the original Latin) and more complex. We have been through the argument in detail, and will not repeat it here. It is enough to call attention to the major differences from the argument in *Divinarum Personarum*.

The argument, as we have seen, is divided into three parts. In the first part it is argued that divine procession is *per modum operati*, along the lines of a *processio operati*, differing from a *processio operati* in the strict sense of that term in that it is not *secundum esse absolutum* but *secundum esse relativum*. Next, it is argued that this affirmation (*per modum operati*) is intelligible only if we posit in God intelligible emanation. Finally, it is argued that no other analogy is satisfactory.

The key parts, of course, are the first and the second, at least as far as the methodological dynamics of systematic procedure are concerned. The two parts together demonstrate one instance of the movement from the way of discovery to the way of teaching. The first part of the argument draws conclusions from dogmatic affirmations, and in so doing is proceeding in the way of discovery. The conclusions are every bit as certain as the affirmations of faith themselves. But the second part deduces the same conclusions from a hypothesis: How is it possible that those conclusions are true? Well, those conclusions can be true *if* we posit or presuppose intelligible emanations in God. We already know that the processions in God are *per modum operati*, and so the deduction does not add to our knowledge. But the deduction does enable us to

understand how it can be that the processions in God are *per modum operati*.

We have seen precisely and in detail what Lonergan means by *emanatio intelligibilis et divina*, and here we need note only that in discussing what this means he also arrives at a different notion of the relation of causality to intelligible emanation in general. There *is* causality in the emanation of one distinct act from another distinct act, as occurs in human intellectual consciousness; but there is no causality when the emanation occurs in the same act *because* of a natural connection within the infinite act itself.

In the argument for the validity of this analogy *alone*, while the later presentation is more detailed than the earlier, the only significant difference in the content is the clear statement that existential autonomy provides the context for the intelligible emanations that best name the processions of Word and Love in God.

The final difference of any consequence has to do with the presentation of the material on *amatum in amante*. The argument is more complex in the later version, because Lonergan is more ready to admit some ambiguity in the text of Thomas on the issue. In fact he begins with two texts, neither of which was mentioned in the corresponding section of *Divinarum personarum*, and while the first of these (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 3 c.) favors Lonergan's view, the second (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.) favors the usual Thomist position. So Lonergan has to stand more on his own here, rather than simply arguing, as he did in *Divinarum personarum*, that there is no doubt where Thomas stood on the issue. There *is* a doubt, and he begins his exposition of the question by pointing to it. Then he argues (in a fashion not contrary to Thomas's own procedures) that we *experience* two processions, one within the intellect and the other from the intellect into the will. In the first we *judge* because of and in proportion to the evidence that we have grasped. In the second we *choose* because of and in proportion to our judgment. The reasons for not following the usual Thomist position lie, then, not so much in the texts of Thomas himself (though many texts in support of Lonergan's position are cited and commented on) but in our experience. Still, Lonergan does argue from the texts of the later Aquinas to counteract the arguments of those who would claim that Aquinas changed his position on the issue so that his later position is the one that is defended in the usual Thomist accounts of the matter.