

METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

Vol. 8, No. 1 March 1990

METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

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Institutional Subscription (yearly). . . . . US $20.00
Individual Subscription (yearly) . . . . . US $12.00

Orders Prepaid in U.S. Funds Only

A semiannual journal, Method is published in March and October. Contributors are requested to follow the University of Chicago Manual of Style in preparing manuscripts. Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the Editor and all other correspondence to the Manager, Method, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Blvd. at W. 80th Street, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 90045.

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Method is sustained by Loyola Marymount University

ISSN: 0736-7392

Cover Design by W. Hew Elcock

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Journal of Lonergan Studies

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Published by
The Institute for Integrative Studies, Inc.

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The Rev. Don Thompson provides an account of the way in which he integrates Lonerganian thought into a program of training for ministry.

Matthew Lamb exposes Lonergan's approach to cultural pluralism as an alternative to dominative power.

A CONVERSATION WITH HANS-GEORG GADAMER

Conducted and translated by Michael Baur

Baur: In face of the problem of the historicity of human thought, several philosophers who have been influenced by Thomism have tried to steer a course out of what for them is relativism. Some of them claim the following: even if all our knowledge appears to be historically determined and therefore possibly revisable, there remains still a kind of non-objectifying "reflection" in our conscious acts on the basis of which it is possible to construct a phenomenologically-grounded and non-revisable metaphysics. Lonergan is one example of this kind of thinking. In your own work, you have also emphasized this form of non-objectifying reflection, for example in the Kleine Schriften. But you are not so optimistic about the possibility of such an unrevisable metaphysics. Why not?

Gadamer: Because it cannot be made into an "actus signatus," and that means "objectified." The philosophical development of the modern age has been determined by the fact of modern science. Since then, the old idea of a comprehensive science which one might call "philosophy" or "metaphysics" has been razed to the ground. In the modern age, we speak of "metaphysics" following upon an epoch -- the Greek and the Christian, that is, the medieval Christian -- in which there was no science other than the Aristotelian. Given the standpoint of modern science -- within which Descartes might be named as the leading theorist -- how can one still think one knows, that is, with the claim "It is real knowing?" In this sense, I share the question with the Socratic tradition. I also ask this. I have not said that it's no longer possible to ask in this way. But it is no longer possible to integrate science like Hegel tried to do.

I also say: no metaphysics which does not somehow recognize the different sorts of knowing apart from explanatory science can exist for me. The formulation which you have chosen in connection with Lonergan reminds me very much, all too much, of this huge divergence between what Popper calls "essentialism" and the experiential standpoint of the modern age. Here is the problem, and solving it remains the task of philosophy. But that is the reason why I cannot enter on the one side. I have to consider both sides: both this theory of non-objectified thought and the fact that a mediation, a crossing-over, an

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effectiveness from the one side to the other must also be thought out. And what we in the modern age have experienced there, "philosophical metaphysics" so to speak, finds its extreme expression in Hegel. That was not very encouraging for a lasting mediation.

Baur: You have had some direct contact with Bernard Lonergan, haven't you?

Gadamer: Oh, yes. And I've read his work, especially his second book, in which he criticizes me a bit. But Lonergan was not someone who could discuss. He could talk; he was a fascinating talker. But he really couldn't discuss. But on a friendship-basis, we got along with one another very well. There was never any problem between us in that way.

Baur: In order to defend the unrevisability of a form of human knowledge, neo-Thomists appeal frequently to a certain distinction, namely the distinction between what is historically determined, and what for them is not historically determined, for example the unrestrictedness of our questioning.

Gadamer: I recognize that. But the unrestrictedness of our questioning is always the unrestrictedness of our specifically conditioned questioning, and that means specifically relative questioning.

Baur: Would you say that there is no "pure question" in Lonergan's sense?

Gadamer: Yes, so far as I follow the intention of your question.

Baur: What would you say about the Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the "intellectus agens"?

Gadamer: I do not deny that in every thinkable world two times two is four. The question, however, remains: is that a knowledge of reality? I would say that reason moves within itself here. Thomism deals with the "intellectus agens" just as I recognize that two times two is four. That means that reflection moves within itself here.

Baur: But you would want to ask whether that is knowledge of reality.

Gadamer: Yes. Numbers are not realities. But still they are something. Take, for example, the prime numbers. It can be

proved in mathematics that the prime numbers will go on to infinity. And nevertheless, reason moves here within itself. That is the "intellectus agens." I cannot see how some other approach would suffice, unless one appeals to the Creator-like character of the "intellectus agens." But then one would be God.

Baur: Thomas suggests something about the creative character of the "intellectus agens."

Gadamer: That's something different. I'm speaking of creation itself, not about "a little bit" of this or that. Of course it is creative when I count out the prime numbers. But that is the notion of the "creative" in a mild form. My argumentation has tried to show that the "intellectus agens" naturally has its function within this truth-dimension of reason -- as I myself have learned from Aristotle. But please, is that reality? For that, we would need the Creator.

Baur: Over against neo-Thomism you have written (and I quote): "The attempt to contrast the realist Aristotle with the idealist Plato, an attempt motivated by the neo-Thomist critique of modern idealism, has fallen apart completely" [1].

Gadamer: Yes. It's pure nonsense to say that Aristotle was a realist and that Plato was an idealist.

Baur: I take it that you are referring in this quote primarily to the recent philological as well as philosophical research.

Gadamer: Yes. These concepts, "realism" and "idealism" in the modern sense, are not even to be found in Thomas himself. That's all part of the influence of the reception of Thomism in the nineteenth century. And how that was done is not so terribly inspiring. I can get along much better with St. Thomas himself. You know that there is a section on Thomas in my book Truth and Method.

Baur: Yes. Lonergan wrote a book on "verbum" in Thomas --

Gadamer: -- In order to show that I don't see things correctly? You know, I really haven't read Lonergan sufficiently. That book Insight is so comprehensive and has such small print, that with my old eyes I could just no longer manage.

Baur: In connection with the issue of the neo-thomist interpretation of Aristotle, I would like to turn now to the doctrine of matter or materiality. In your article "Gibt es die Ma-

terie?" you write (and I'm quoting selectively from the passage): "When Aristotle says that matter is the cause of deformities in nature or of the 'individuality' of the specimen of a 'kind,' I do not think of matter, but rather that there is always a determinate being there, an essence which through its determinate 'eidos' is clearly distinguished from lions or insects. I am also prepared to conceive of the fertilized egg from which the embryo and then the newborn infant develop. But to conceive of matter as becoming that -- that is not given to me" [2].

Gadamer: Yes. What I say there is good Aristotle. The idea that matter is the cause or principle of individuation is not an Aristotelian doctrine. Or can you show me where the concept of the principle of individuation is to be found in Aristotle?

Baur: I thought that it was there in the Metaphysics.

Gadamer: Yes, but what is that passage supposed to mean? The idea of matter as the cause of individuation is not an Aristotelian doctrine. Otherwise I might be able to find some sense in the distinction between idealism and realism. But I see no sense in that. When Aristotle speaks of individuation, he means a material being, and not matter as such. When he speaks about the matter as such, then he speaks quite differently. The "hyle" is the "dynameion" and nothing else. It is "that out of which."

I am not saying that Aristotle was an idealist. I am saying rather that it is a complete misunderstanding to speak of idealism and realism in this connection. That's modern epistemology, but neither Aristotle nor Thomas.

Baur: You have also written that the meaning of a text does not lie simply in the intention of the author. Why then should such an appropriation of Thomas, for example, be inappropriate and subject to criticism, namely the appropriation of the philosophy of Thomas in face of the epistemological problems of the modern age?

Gadamer: Because then one makes Thomas a dummy instead of a genius. He did not ask these questions; he saw the world differently.

Of course, when it comes to the question of a natural theology, then one might have some serious thoughts, even from

my point of view. But without revelation Thomas would not have wanted to be a Christian. He was not a gnostic.

Baur: A related question has to do with the issue of the "ground" of human finitude. According to the Thomist tradition, the ground of the finitude of human knowledge is connected with what is meant by materiality.

Gadamer: I don't understand what that's supposed to mean. Our finitude has something to do with death, in any case. Let's make it simpler for ourselves.

Baur: Maybe I can explain what I mean. The human "intellectus" is potentially all beings. But in actual fact it does not become all beings; it can become this or that being only, because of its essential dependence on materiality.

Gadamer: So you mean the Aristotelian concept of "hyle." I know now what you mean. You have referred to my article, "Gibt es die Materie?" In that article, I am not suggesting any kind of idealistic evaporation of reality. I am asking rather, "What did Aristotle really mean?" "To live in the 'logoi'": the expression in Greek philosophy from Socrates to Plato to Aristotle -- even in Aristotle -- implies as self-evident that it's a misunderstanding of philosophy itself if one believes that philosophy can deny the natural experience of reality. We attempt instead to think about what is experienced there, that is, what you're calling materiality. But if we accept that simply as such, then I don't think it's right since then we end up immediately with all the problems of modern relativism.

Baur: So what I have been calling matter or materiality --

Gadamer: Those are categories with which one cannot grasp what it is to be human. With those categories I can grasp what is objectifiable, for example through measuring, counting, and weighing.

Baur: Some neo-Thomist philosophers have tried to explain the phenomenon of being-in-the-world ("In-der-Welt-Sein") on the basis of the materiality of human existence. In terms of explanation, materiality is for them prior to the experienced phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It seems to me that the priority is the other way around for you and for Heidegger: for you, the phenomenon of being-in-the-world is prior, and our talk of materiality, etc. is really only an abstraction which is founded on our modes of being-in-the-world in the first place.

Would you say that these attempts to explain the phenomenon of being-in-the-world on the basis of materiality are senseless?

Gadamer: We can try to see things from the other side. The primary issue which we have before us is the following: "Why are we actually in such a critical world situation? What has modern science actually brought about?" Science has indeed brought something about when it looks down upon every form of thought which does not belong to the laws of methodical objectifiability. How has modern thought actually come to that? One can point to Calvinism as the actual determining world-power of our technical civilization. It's there in Max Weber. Even when I'm simplifying here, you know what I mean. And when one does that, then one must also ask oneself whether things had been inadequately thought out at the beginning.

I'm a Platonist. I am not a Thomist, and so rather an Augustinian, if you will. What I mean about finitude is already there in Plato in black and white. It's in the Symposium. Philosophy is not "sophia." It is a striving after the true. "The eternal reproduction of our knowledge," that's all in Plato. But it would be completely wrong if you interpret that as relativism, since then you would be taking the concepts from modern science as your measure.

Baur: You have said that you are familiar with Lonergan's book Method in Theology. What do you think of his appropriation of your work there? Would you say that this was not a real grappling with your own work?

Gadamer: No, I cannot say that. You see, we are all finite creatures. And so when Lonergan appropriates my work in his own way -- and in a very friendly manner, I would like to emphasize that -- then it is natural that within a completely different conceptual framework it should be so transformed. And then it's quite difficult to recognize it once again as my work. However, I am very far from saying that he did not understand me. It would be very presumptuous to express oneself in that way. I would say only this: the problem of relativism sits much deeper in all of us.

It is a life-long task to ask oneself: "Must it be so, that modern science can demand atheism of us?" I cannot believe that it has to be so. And thus I am a Platonist. And where do the mistakes lie, such that the modern world has become this way? Then I say: in the inadequacy of the appropriation of the Greek

philosophy through the Christian church. That was an inadequate appropriation.

Let me ask you: what is the Greek word for "will," for "voluntas"? There is none. It doesn't exist in Greek. It's a voluntarism to think everything in Latin. That's one of the points that Heidegger made. He had gotten to know a Thomistic Aristotle at first. Then he read Meister Eckhart and Luther, and then he read Aristotle. And there is no "voluntas" in Aristotle, as is so often claimed.

Baur: Given that background, one can understand a bit better why Heidegger so often equates the philosophy of subjectivity with late- and post- medieval philosophy.

Gadamer: What is meant here above all is modernity: subject is still substance, only under a different name.

In order to understand Heidegger, one has to go deeper into Plato and Aristotle. The finitude of human existence is not a Heideggerian invention. Heidegger certainly did not invent death!

Concerning the question to which Heidegger dedicated his entire life: he did not find an answer. Whoever thinks that Heidegger knew better has not understood Heidegger. Heidegger did not know it any better. But what he did see is that the Christian message, so interpreted through Aristotelianism, has brought about the modern world, along with everything for which it stands. These are some of the first things that I learned from Heidegger. He used to quote Adolf Harnack concerning the infiltration of Christianity by Greek philosophy, and so forth. That was Heidegger's question.

All in all, I would say: the basic fact of the modern world is modern science. We must deal with things in such a way, so that science does not become everything. But how are we to achieve that? Unfortunately, we cannot achieve that if we remain Thomists. For then we already share too many presuppositions out of which modern science itself has developed.

Baur: However, Thomists certainly share a sensibility for the problem which you pose.

Gadamer: But of course. Oh, thank God -- otherwise one could not even talk to them.

Baur: But what you have said is probably one of the strongest criticisms that one can make against the neo-Thomists.

Gadamer: Yes. The alliance with modern science within neo-Thomism was deadly. Give me classical Thomism instead.

Baur: This "alliance" with modern science is supposed to be one of the very strengths of Lonergan's philosophy, as it has been understood.

Gadamer: Yes, a bit like Hegel.

Baur: You mean that Hegel also shared too many presuppositions with modern science.

Gadamer: Yes. In this sense Hegel is still a Cartesian. I am not as great a thinker as Heidegger was, so I am a bit cautious when I say this: I'm not quite sure whether I perhaps might be able to admit that Hegel was in part right. But Heidegger knew for sure that he couldn't do that.

Then again, it would be a Thomism to try to think in the Greek way where one can no longer do so. That is to say, when one is Hegel, when one fuses Christianity into a concept. A conceptualized Christianity -- that is a gnosis for the real Christian. And indeed Christian Baur had already criticized Hegel for that. And one would probably be able to, and have to, criticize Lonergan in the same way. But that's not my area.

Of course, Thomas is not as unambiguous as one often teaches within Thomism. He had a strong Augustinian moment as well. But of course when you speak of Thomism as a form of thought in general, then that immediately falls apart once again. You saw at the beginning how I always tried to respond by asking whether you do not make yourselves gnostics, whether you do not elevate yourselves to the point of self-divinization, when you want to know so exactly that which you do not know exactly. Hegel as a gnostic, that's what Christian Baur claimed. He dealt with Hegel and Plotinus together. You know, Plotinus' "self-redemption of the soul through knowledge," and so forth. Christianity did not accept that, and of course Augustine did not accept that. But it remains a constant temptation, and such comes up once again with Hegel.

Baur: You mentioned that Thomism as a form of thought in general falls apart.

Gadamer: Yes, it collapses necessarily with the modern Enlightenment. Thomism fails to deal with something in the Enlightenment, and indeed cannot deal with it. No one, in fact, has found an answer. I can very well see that one can be a

believing Christian and that one can at the same time live in the world of modern science. But how one can do that is a mystery to me. For me, one must really learn to be able to do without having a theology.

On one level, I would see the cases of Hegel and Lonergan in a very parallel fashion: he attempts to deal conceptually with the Christian mysteries, yet without becoming gnostic. That is the task of the Christian theologian. And gnosis remains the danger in every theology. Now Plato is something that I can handle -- I know what that means: "to theion." That is something, and one cannot explain that away with some modern materialism or what not. But whether I know more, "ho theos," as Aristotle says, that seems to me to be a very suspicious adaptation. With Aristotle I am quite sceptical. Does he really mean that? Or isn't he just following a folk religion in this case? Aristotle was not an "anima naturaliter christiana." One could apply that term to Plato, if one needs to apply it.

Baur: You have said that the danger of the modern age lies in the possibility that the way of modern science should become the only way of thought at all.

Gadamer: Yes, and so I go back, even behind Thomas and behind Aristotle. In my eyes, it begins with Aristotle's Physics; that is a magnificent program. And one can always renew it in different romantic varieties, as was done in German Romanticism, and as is now being done with "anthroposophy" and such things. There's always the same need: we want to live once again in one world. I've written an essay called "Burger zweier Welten" ("Citizens of Two Worlds"). In that essay I insist that it won't work. If we do not have any other resources, we can only admit to ourselves that science is a unified body that is closed within itself and obeys only its own laws. The "self-limitation of science" cannot be derived from science itself; anyone who is a scientist is always more than just a scientist.

Baur: This whole issue of limitation returns us in a way to the question of the ground of human finitude. It's what has been called "hyle," the "always-not-yet" in human existence.

Gadamer: Yes, yes. That is the finitude of human existence. We are not Creators.

Baur: And what the neo-Thomists call "matter" or "materiality" is also a concept for that.

Gadamer: Oh yes. Good. Go on.

Baur: But why can't one also speak of matter or materiality -- as is done in neo-Thomism -- in connection with the individuation of different instances of the same form?

Gadamer: Do you know, for example, how one would then have to conceive of the congruence theorems? So there you have two congruent triangles. And where is the matter? The point here is that that's really an eidetic plurality. Aristotle found himself thus forced to speak of a "hyle noete." Just think of that: a non-sensible matter. And in modern science that's what is called extension. In modern science extension is the principle of individuation -- space and time. The source of that is in Aristotle, that is, in Aristotle's Physics. One cannot deny that the consequence of that starting point has become modern science. One can, of course, ask just why it has turned out that way.

Within the realm of Christian belief, for example, Heidegger was a thoughtful, doubting young man. He learned his neo-Thomism but he was not at ease with the modern world. And then he turned to Luther, and then to Gabriel Biel, and to Augustine. And then he finally tried to discern to what extent one could still believe. He recognized that it may very well go beyond what one can know for oneself. In this sense, the church would proclaim a truth. But it is very dangerous when one believes that one knows this truth. Then that's almost Calvinism: one is chosen.

I have lived now for a long time with the question: "What will become of this world if non-Christian religions should stop only imitating us, so to speak, with their 'European room'?" You know that the Japanese have a so-called "European room" in their houses. When they walk around in the streets, it's always "American tailor-made" and so forth. But when they come home, they change. Then they live in a Japanese house. The "European room" is only for guests. That's a symbol for this duplicity which is upheld there. It's the same thing with Shintuism and their ancestral religions. They have not been spoiled with theology.

Baur: And so one lives in two worlds.

Gadamer: Or to express it even better: the world of science is not a world at all. It is a field for our activities, for our struggle for survival against nature. And such alone is not

truly human being. The expression "citizens of two worlds" is a Kantian expression. On the one hand there is causality and modern science; and on the other hand, there is the moral law and freedom. Those are two worlds, and one cannot explain one on the basis of the other.

Baur: You said that the danger in the modern age has to do with the possibility that the way of modern science will become the only way of thinking at all.

Gadamer: Yes. That is the problem of our modern Enlightenment.

Baur: But you also consider it possible that such won't happen.

Gadamer: I take it for almost certain that humanity would much sooner destroy itself before modern science really dominates so completely. I find transcendence -- that is to say, the necessity, based on our own finitude, that we think this out -- so rooted in human nature. Now you can interpret that theologically; that is a bit more than I care to do. However, I do take it as completely certain that we can think this out.

By the way, Heidegger never doubted that. You know he had something of a Joachimistic theology. That's a spiritualistic theology of the mediators sent to mankind from the divine. That is to say, a Hölderlinistic theology. I prefer to call it Joachimistic, because that's where the source is. Joachimism: revelation is a succession of communications. The new book by Heidegger which has just appeared as part of his collected works -- it's called Beiträge zur Philosophie -- ends with a passage about "the God who passes by." But it's not as if God is being doubted here.

Baur: One often reads the famous quote from the Spiegel interview --

Gadamer: -- "Only a God can save us" --

Baur: -- as an expression of doubt.

Gadamer: In my view, Heidegger was always a bit high-flown in his manner of expression, and that applies to this case as well. "Only a God can save us." But then again, we really don't know that either. Maybe he meant the following: "We cannot save ourselves through the consummation of our scientific, technical civilization. The attempt to do so would only tighten the bottleneck in which we are now stuck."

That probably has a religious meaning; but, then again, not a theological meaning. It had meaning for him: "I don't know how we are to get beyond this modern world; I know only that we are finite creatures." I never really spoke with him about that quote. I simply tried to learn from him, given the limits within which I could. And now I try to carry on. My main support is the fact that I go back to the pre-modern world. If I had been educated within the Thomist tradition, I would probably discover as Heidegger did, that there's a completely different Aristotle, one quite different from the one that was taught for example in 1900, and is still being taught today. And I would go from neo-Thomism back to classical Thomism, just as I've already done a bit in my book with that section on "verbum." It has been accepted in the neo-Thomist tradition up to now. And similarly, I see that whole attempt at systematization in the Counter-Reformation as very suspect.

I read just the other day that Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker has recently won this huge prize for "progress in science and religion." Weizsäcker: he is an outstanding physicist and a Christian. And it's right that he won that prize, for he did not try to make it easy by constructing some kind of theology of reconciliation or mediation. No, there are still two worlds, one of which is not really a world at all. Science is a sector of the world, and it's pretty bad that we now regulate our social life as if science were the whole world. I mean, when everything is done with statistics, technology, and so on. For then where is genuinely human life?

Baur: But you still believe it to be unlikely that such scientific, technical thinking will become the only way of thinking.

Gadamer: That, I believe, is out of the question. We'll annihilate ourselves before that happens.

Baur: But why do you believe it's out of the question?

Gadamer: Science will never abolish death. If it were able to do that, then it could happen. You see, I have no actual solution. I am only saying that those who claim to have a solution also have none. Heidegger also knew that he hadn't achieved it, and so his later life was a bit darkened. That was his life-long task: he wanted to come to grips with Nietzsche. He wanted to say: "No, that's not all that there is, this 'will to power,' this fatalism, this 'eternal recurrence of the same,'

'the last man,' and so forth." And now you're asking me just why "the last man" is not in fact the only end of history.

Baur: You're referring to "the last man" in the "Preface" to Nietzsche's Zarathustra.

Gadamer: Yes. And you're asking me why I don't believe that that's the end of history.

Baur: Yes. And what's the reason for the hope, even when we know that science will never abolish death?

Gadamer: Yes, where does the reason for the hope lie? One would like to know that. One can know that as a believer, as a Christian. But one cannot mediate that intellectually.

Baur: Professor Gadamer, thank you very much for this opportunity to speak with you.

NOTES

This conversation took place on June 12, 1989. I would like to thank Prof. Gadamer for his permission to publish this material, and the Fulbright Commission for the grant which made my study in Germany possible. I am also grateful to Anja Pohler for her help in transcribing the tape-recording for my talk with Prof. Gadamer. M.B.

[1] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, Bk. 6: Griechische Philosophie II, "Gibt es die Materie?" (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985), p. 201.

[2] Ibid. p 206.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE GADAMER-LONERGAN DISCUSSION

Michael Baur
University of Toronto

One important element in Lonergan's philosophical work is the attempt to demonstrate the essential continuity between Aristotle's thought and the explanatory viewpoint of modern science. Among other things, this attempt is meant to serve a two-fold purpose: first of all, to defend both Aristotle's intellectualist metaphysics and the explanatory aspirations of modern science over against the caricatured representations of each which grew out of the Renaissance debate between the Aristotelians and the proponents of modern science; and secondly, to demonstrate the intrinsic limitations of modern scientific humanism in much the same way that Aquinas tried to demonstrate the essential incompleteness of Aristotle's non-Christian world view.

Now Gadamer would not deny that there is an essential continuity in thought from Aristotle to modern science; in fact, he explicitly affirms such a continuity. And like Lonergan, Gadamer insists that modern science must play a legitimate, though restricted, role within contemporary culture. Given these and other important similarities between Gadamer and Lonergan [1], it may be difficult to see just where the grounds for possible disagreement lie. As a result, Gadamer's reservations concerning Lonergan's philosophical project may appear to be somewhat puzzling. In what follows, I shall try to shed light on some of the reasons for Gadamer's reservations.

One clear difference between Gadamer and Lonergan is to be seen in their diverging evaluations of that trend in thought which begins with Aristotle and finds its latest expression in the explanatory perspective of modern science. Like Lonergan, Gadamer can appreciate some positive aspects of the Aristotelian appropriation and transformation of Plato's thought [2]. But unlike Lonergan, Gadamer asks whether this Aristotelian transformation also marks the beginning of a trend within which the fact of human finitude is given inadequate attention. For example, the Aristotelian claim that philosophy can mediate real knowledge, and indeed real knowledge of the divinity as such, stands in contrast to what for Gadamer is Plato's more modest position, a position which at times deliberately eschews explanation in favor of story-telling myth. According to

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Gadamer, further stages in the post-Aristotelian "forgetfulness" of the limitedness of human knowledge can be seen in the medieval appropriation of Aristotle's thought for the purpose of an all-embracing speculative onto-theology, and in the more recent "alliance" between neo-Thomism and the explanatory perspective of modern science. Thus for Gadamer, philosophy has already entered "too late" onto the scene if it first adopts the explanatory perspective (which was enunciated in Aristotle's Physics) and then tries to mediate knowledge about human finitude in terms borrowed from this explanatory perspective itself. To meet the problem at its roots, one must go "behind" both the modern and the medieval world-views to a time before human thought started to find itself so "empowered" by Aristotle's explanatory "morphology" [3].

Gadamer's reservations concerning the Aristotelian legacy can be better understood with reference to a more current issue, namely the question concerning how the restriction of science's role within culture is to be adequately understood and mediated. According to Gadamer, the restriction of the explanatory perspective operative in both the natural and human sciences can be adequately mediated only from a standpoint external to the explanatory perspective itself. Because there is no such thing as the "self-limitation of science," we must learn to live in "two worlds," one governed by the canons of possible explanation, and the other guided by the postulates of practical reason, postulates which are entirely incommensurate with any possible theorizing or "explanation."

According to Gadamer, the philosophical tradition after Aristotle has increasingly overlooked what for the Greeks (including Aristotle) was simply presupposed, namely the primacy of non-explanatory, practical knowledge. Within the tradition of Christian Aristotelianism, for example, there has been a tendency to talk of faith and the limitedness of a purely explanatory viewpoint, yet still from within the explanatory framework itself. Thus in spite of an Augustinian moment in his thought, Aquinas still suggests that a non-Christian explanatory comportment to the world would suffer from an internal lack or incompleteness which ultimately calls for Christian faith [4].

The same tendency is to be found in Lonergan's own work. In a passage that may remind one even of Hegel, Lonergan speaks of the intrinsic capacity of scientific humanism to acknowledge and transcend its own limitedness:

> The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsic invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire [to know], if he is to yield to the demands for the openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself. [5]

Of course, Lonergan is not saying that faith can somehow be "derived" from a strictly explanatory, scientific world-view, or that the higher integration needed to deal with the problem of moral impotence can be achieved without the initiative of God. But Lonergan is claiming that a genuinely open explanatory (or "scientific") world-view as such will be able to acknowledge its own limits, and that the need for self-limitation and transcendence can be understood, articulated, and mediated intellectually by that explanatory world-view itself. (Lonergan's own thought is meant to be a concrete example of such an explanatory world-view which points beyond itself.)

For Lonergan, then, there exists the possibility of a single explanatory world-view which can acknowledge and articulate the limitations of scientific humanism, as well as the need for transcending them through some form of faith. More specifically: the Lonerganian scheme claims to mediate knowledge concerning the human will [6] and the problem of moral impotence and evil which results from human freedom; as well as knowledge concerning a benevolent and omnipotent and personal God who provides a solution to the problem of evil. In another passage reminiscent of Hegel, Lonergan alludes to the possibility of such a comprehensive scheme:

> . . . within this metaphysical context it has been found possible, I believe, to offer a single integrated view that finds its point of departure in classical method yet embraces biology, the psychology of behaviour and depth psychology, existentialist reflection upon man, and fundamental elements in the theory of individual and social history, of morals and asceticism, of education and religion. [7]

Now one of the most impressive features of Lonergan's philosophy may very well be its purported capacity to integrate so many different phenomena within a single explanatory perspective, yet without resorting to any form of reductionism. However, it is precisely this urge towards comprehensive philosophical integration which Gadamer would reject as the human, all too human desire to live again in one world, when such is no

longer possible. From a biographical point of view, one can understand quite well just why Gadamer -- who was influenced very early on by Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky and a bit later by Heidegger -- would want to resist such theoretical talk (no matter how nuanced) concerning apparently everything from the law of falling bodies to the human will and the existence of God. But the question still remains: what good reason does Gadamer have for denying the possibility of explanatory knowledge concerning the human will, the problem of moral impotence, and the existence of God, and therefore for denying the possibility of the "self-limitation" of even a genuinely open humanistic explanatory world-view, as Lonergan suggests? [8]

A significant issue separating Gadamer and Lonergan, then, is the question of whether one can attain meaningful theoretical knowledge concerning the human will, the problem of evil, or the existence of God -- knowledge on the basis of which a non-self-transcending scientific humanism is supposed to be able to acknowledge its own limitations. To keep the following discussion within reasonable limits, I will focus exclusively on the claim to theoretical knowledge concerning the human will [9]. It must be emphasized here that the issue is not whether the freedom of the will can be proven (for Lonergan does not attempt any such proof); and the issue is not whether the problem of evil necessarily implies a supernatural solution to it (for Lonergan does not claim this, either). The crucial issue is not even the question of how, ontologically speaking, a scientific humanism is supposed to transcend itself (for Lonergan would want to say that such self-transcendence would depend, in the final analysis, on God's grace). The issue here rather is whether an explanatory scientific humanism can even <u>begin</u> to acknowledge grounds for its own self-transcendence, i.e. whether one can intellectually mediate knowledge concerning those things which are supposed to imply the incompleteness of scientific humanism.

In my conversation with Gadamer, I attempted to suggest the possibility of a (neo-Thomist) conception of matter or materiality which fits into an explanatory scheme which, in turn, could allow for the fact of human freedom. To simplify greatly, matter is said to be the principle of individuation, i.e. it is the "reason" why there can be several different instances of the same form. Furthermore, since generalization in the sciences requires that there be several different instances of the same

form, one might say that matter is also -- though indirectly -- a principle of generalization in the sciences. It follows that those beings which are less determined by a material component will be less subject to scientific generalization. For example, chemical elements and compounds demonstrate a certain degree of "freedom" from underlying physical manifolds, plants and animals from underlying chemical manifolds, and human beings from the underlying biological and even psychological manifolds. Accordingly, the possibilities for scientific generalization decrease progressively as one moves "upwards" along the hierarchical "ladder of the sciences": while the laws of physics apply to all bodies whatsoever, one would be very hard pressed to articulate some kind of non-tautological "law" which could apply to all human beings as such [10].

Now Gadamer would not reject the preceding explanatory scheme out of hand, provided that "matter" here is understood as a bare "limit-concept,' a concept which does not designate anything positive in itself, and therefore does not yet imply the peculiarly modern determinations of space (extension) and time (duration). However, the above scheme can help to articulate the meaning of human freedom only negatively, i.e. as freedom <u>from</u> determination by underlying material manifolds. If human freedom is not to consist simply in arbitrariness, i.e. in its not being subject to any law whatsoever, then there must be a positive aspect to human freedom as well. According to Lonergan, there is such a positive aspect, and we can mediate knowledge of it intellectually. Lonergan explicitly states that spiritual reality such as will is not only intelligent, but also intelligible, i.e. the possible "object" (though not in any degrading, "objectivistic" sense) of theoretical knowledge. in deliberate contrast to Kant on the issue of freedom and morals, Lonergan writes that one not only may speak meaningfully about what is implied by the word "ought," but also may do so within the sphere of "speculative intelligence and reason" [11]. Since Gadamer would have certain reservations about the second claim here, we have to look a bit further into some of Lonergan's reasons for making it.

How, for lonergan, is spiritual reality such as the human will intelligible? As Lonergan writes,

> spiritual reality has intelligibility, not through subjection to law, but by its native intelligence, and while spiritual reality is manifested through the higher sys-

> tematization or order it imposes on lower levels of being, still that systematization or order is not imposed upon spiritual reality, as the law of inverse squares upon masses, but is generated by practical insights, rational reflection, and decision. [12]

Thus for Lonergan, spiritual reality such as the will is intelligible, not through its subjection to law, but "through the higher systematization or order it imposes on lower levels of being." But one might well ask whether this is really an adequate representation of the intelligibility of the human will when the will -- by virtue of its very freedom -- can confer further disorder as well as order upon the lower levels of being. Is the only difference between the human will (which can impose order on lower levels of being) and chemical process (which can also impose order on lower levels of being) the fact that the human will, in contrast to chemical process, is not subject to any further systematization through a still higher order of being? One might want to suggest that the real difference lies in the fact that spiritual reality such as the human will is intelligent as well as intelligible. Unfortunately, such an answer does not help here, if this "intelligence" (just like the "intelligibility") of the human will is supposed to be manifested in the capacity of the will to confer order upon lower levels of being. By implicitly deriving its standard from those lower orders of being upon which order can be conferred, Lonergan's "speculative" discussion of the will apparently fails to articulate adequately what is truly distinctive about the human will. And because of this failure, the Lonerganian theoretical scheme seems capable of articulating only half of the meaning of the human will, i.e. will insofar as it factually succeeds in conferring order, and not disorder, upon lower levels of being.

The reader who is familiar with Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (which influenced Gadamer tremendously) should begin to understand by now the essential issue behind the objection here: the problem is that Lonergan comes too close to articulating the intelligibility of human spiritual reality (or "Dasein," in Heidegger's terminology) on the basis of those intelligible orders within the worlds of nature and artifacts. Of course, Lonergan would want to draw a sharp distinction between the spiritual reality which we are and the non-spiritual reality of things in the world. But the theoretical basis upon which he

tries to make this distinction would be inadequate for Heidegger or Gadamer. For Lonergan, the intelligibility of the will is manifested (and thus verifiable) only insofar as the will confers order upon lower levels of being, i.e. only insofar as its acts are commensurate with the intelligible orders which can inhere in the lower levels of being. Because of this, Lonergan's scheme is capable of articulating only "one side" of the spiritual reality called will -- its ability to confer order on lower levels of being -- and therefore is essentially incapable of articulating this spiritual reality in its real distinctiveness.

Of course, the Lonerganian would want to point out the metaphysical dimension to the problem here: because unintelligibility prescinds from being, it would be a mistake to suppose that the unintelligent, unreasonable, irresponsible act of will -- the act which confers disorder upon existing reality -- is a positive instance of being which can be understood as such. Such an act of will (and the disorder which results from it) represents nothing positive in itself, but is instead an instance of potential being or potential goodness. It would then follow that there is nothing wrong with a theoretical account of the will which can articulate only the "positive side" of the human will, i.e. the will insofar as it confers further order upon reality. After all, everything that prescinds from intelligibility prescinds also from being.

Now from Heidegger's and Gadamer's point of view, the Lonerganian would be quite justified in pointing out the essential connection between this discussion of spiritual reality and its further metaphysical dimension. However, this essential connectedness can function as a two-edged sword. Either one can maintain (as Lonergan does) the claim to a potentially unlimited explanatory scope and argue that that which necessarily eludes all possible explanation must also prescind from being as such; or else, one can argue that those matters of fact which defy all possible explanation attest to the inadequacy of the explanatory framework as such. In the latter case, one might speak of the need to "overcome metaphysics" (as Heidegger does) or (following Gadamer) of the need to live in two worlds, one of which necessarily remains incommensurate with all forms of possible "explanation" [13]. But common to both the Heideggerian and Gadamerian approaches is the conviction that an explanatory world-view is necessarily inca-

pable of "explaining" -- or even acknowledging -- the grounds for its own limitation.

I have tried briefly to explicate this putative failing of the explanatory world-view by reference to Lonergan's thought concerning the supposed intelligibility of spiritual reality, such as the human will. If Lonergan's "speculative" framework cannot adequately articulate that which makes this spiritual reality truly distinctive, then how is the distinctiveness (and therefore inviolability) of this spiritual reality to be ensured? For Gadamer, this distinctiveness cannot be demonstrated or even mediated intellectually. Any attempt to do so would already imply a kind of violation of the inviolable. Of course, the claim here is not that we can know nothing at all concerning the spiritual reality which we are [14]; the claim is rather that what we may know concerning this distinctive spiritual reality cannot be mediated through any theory or "actus signatus." To express it in Kantian terminology: knowledge concerning the distinctive spiritual reality which we are can be had only through the ideas of practical reason.

If the preceding reflections have succeeded in shedding some light on the reasons for Gadamer's reservations vis-à-vis Lonergan's neo-Thomism, it has not been possible here to examine to what extent such reservations are really justified. By this, however, I am not suggesting that the preceding attempt has been "value-neutral." In my attempt to make Gadamer's position a bit more understandable with reference to Lonergan, I have also tried to point out some of those objections which Lonerganians today would have to meet if Lonergan's project is to remain viable in light of Gadamer's post-Heideggerian thought.

NOTES

I would like to thank Professor Gadamer for discussing several aspects of this essay with me. Of course, I remain solely responsible for the content of this essay.

[1] Some of these similarities include, for example: the emphasis on a kind of non-objectifying concomitant awareness which accompanies all of our conscious acts; the attempt to "go behind" all logics and methodologies to their dynamic source in the ever-self-transcending questioning and answering of the human subject herself or himself; the insistence on the need for some kind of mediation between what Lonergan terms the "classicist" and "empirical" notions of culture, or between what Gadamer refers to as "essentialism" and "the experiential standpoint of the modern age."

[2] It must be kept in mind, however, that those things which Gadamer appreciates in Aristotle are not always the same

as those which Lonergan appropriates, and vice versa. And although both Gadamer and Lonergan borrow heavily from Aristotle for their own purposes, the fact remains that these purposes are often quite divergent. Consider, for example, Gadamer's and Lonergan's diverging approaches to Aristotle's writings concerning how we humans come to know. Lonergan emphasizes that sudden and unexpected occurrence which he calls insight, which (in Lonergan's interpretation) Aquinas called "intelligere," and which (according to Lonergan) Aristotle articulated as the grasp of the form in the image ("eidos en phantasmati," De Anima III, 7). Lonergan's intention is to unfold the implications of this notion of understanding as they apply, not only to the realm of common sense where practical insights occur, but also to mathematics and the natural sciences, where insight makes possible the formulation of implicit definitions, theorems, and generalized laws of nature. In contrast, Gadamer treats as paradigmatic Aristotle's discussion of our coming to know on the analogy of the fleeing army (Posterior Analytics II, 19). Here, our knowing is seen, not as the product of a sudden mental occurrence (which Lonergan calls insight), but as the gradual result of repeated experience. Gadamer appeals to this paradigm of knowing in order to articulate what for him is the foundation of all our knowing whatsoever: our practically-oriented "being-in-the-world."

[3] Gadamer uses the term "morphology" in his article, "Bürger zweier Welten," in Das Erbe Europas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), p. 111.

[4] Gadamer would want to argue further that the question concerning the incompleteness or "self-limitation" of a purely faith-less explanatory world-view never arose for the Greeks as a problem, not so much because they were pagans, but because the Greeks already presupposed and accepted without explicit mention the primacy of practical, lived knowledge over all forms of explanation. (In this sense, the Greeks lived still in "one world.") The need to address the problem explicitly in the Middle Ages and today represents for Gadamer not so much a positive development as a kind of "fallenness" into a state of "being-in-two-worlds" -- a state which contemporary thinkers are still trying (in vain, for Gadamer) to overcome.

[5] Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 728.

[6] Because of his admiration for early Greek thinking, Gadamer himself would be reluctant to employ the term "will" (see interview). In my own presentation of a "Gadamerian critique" of Lonergan, I have nevertheless retained this term (1) for the sake of stylistic convenience, and (2) because Lonergan uses this term. A term such as "Dasein" would be more consistent with Gadamer's way of thinking, but this term would be misleading in the present context. In order to use a term somewhat more amenable to both the Lonerganian and Gadamerian discourse, one could refer to "the spiritual reality which we are"; but it would have been too cumbersome to employ this phrase consistently throughout this essay.

[7] Lonergan, Insight, p. 479.

[8] The "therefore" in this question makes sense if, as Lonergan suggests, the capacity of a scientific humanism to acknowledge and transcend its own limitations is bound up with the possibility of theoretical knowledge concerning the human

will, the problem of moral impotence and evil, and the existence of God. (See, for example, the above-quoted passage from page 728 of Insight.)

[9] This is not to suggest that for Lonergan such knowledge concerning the human will directly implies the need for the transcendence of a scientific humanism. However, Lonergan's account of moral impotence -- which, along with his discussion of God, is supposed to show the need for the transcendence of scientific humanism -- necessarily presupposes theoretical knowledge concerning the human will and what makes the will truly distinctive. Thus if the need for the transcendence of scientific humanism is to be intellectually mediated as Lonergan suggests, then such knowledge concerning the human will must be possible.

[10] To put it differently, higher development implies a higher degree of differentiation.

[11] Lonergan, Insight, p. 600. [12] Ibid., pp. 617-618.

[13] Gadamer would argue that this implies a kind of "irrationalism" only if one presupposes in the first place an unjustifiably restricted notion of rationality.

[14] If this were the claim, then it could be easily criticized; for such a claim would rest on a performative contradiction: "I know enough about X to know that I cannot know anything at all about X."

LONERGAN AND EDUCATING FOR MINISTRY: A CONSTRUCTION

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Although Bernard Lonergan taught theology for years at Regis College, Toronto, as well as at the Gregorian in Rome, he would not likely have styled his contribution particularly as developing a program of "training for ministry." His contribution was much more foundational, both as a theologian of the church and also as one of the major thinkers of this century. Yet the cognitional and theological method he did develop can easily be utilized to provide a comprehensive framework for the rather specialized task of educating persons for ministry. This article is an attempt to do just that; to draw on those aspects of Lonergan's thought which this theological educator has found helpful to apply to the difficult task of educating persons to a vocation of ordained or lay ministry.

It is not uncommon to be only vaguely familiar with Lonergan; much of his writing seems specialized or too exhaustive for the casual theological reader. Yet within his corpus are many gems, and such thoroughness of thought that an equally thorough reading always yields profound results. I hope this article will invite more readers.

One brief comment may be helpful for the reader encountering Lonergan for the first time. Lonergan is always about understanding something sufficiently. While some hear a sense of prescription in the direction derived from these understandings, this has always been preceded by an attempt to describe and understand something so thoroughly, that common norms which govern that understanding clearly emerge. Understanding in common enables decision in common. That is precisely why Lonergan, seemingly a theorist, is so immediately of benefit to the practitioner. But Lonergan is unique amongst twentieth-century thinkers in being convinced that, through the authentic use of cognitional method, we can develop adequate common understandings of whatever comes before us. Hence the following mandate, which he undertook formally in his crucial work Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, comes not from the perspective of a presumptuous optimist but rather from a critical and empirical realist:

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> Thoroughly understand what it is to understand and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding. [1]

It is the gradual realization that there is a fixed base, that there are invariant patterns in our method of understanding, that enables us to steer a course through as diverse a situation as education for ministry in a time of deep theological examination and reassessment.

Finally, it needs to be said that this paper is written by a Priest and Educator in the Protestant Tradition (Anglican). Lonergan would be the first to assert that one always brings with one both the assets and limitations of one's culture, and one's denomination is a chief example of the horizon of a particular ecclesiastical culture. While this educator has been training candidates of other (United, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) traditions, there has been a recent cross-denominational development which has been emerging that has located ordained ministry as really an extension of the ministry of the "whole people of God." Reflected clearly in the World Council of Churches [2] as well as in the documents of Vatican II [3], ministry is now clearly understood as the activity of the whole people by virtue of their baptism. Hence what is understood as a sufficient covenant for ordination, is now foundationally made in the covenant for baptism (the ancient norm of adult baptism being re-appropriated). In the Anglican (Canadian) and Episcopal (U.S.) Churches currently, the following questions are asked of baptismal (adult) candidates, preceded by an initial affirmation of the Apostles' Creed:

Celebrant:	Will you continue in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread, and in the prayers?
People:	I will, with God's help.
Celebrant:	Will you persevere in the resisting evil and, whenever you fall into sin, repent and return to the Lord?
People:	I will, with God's help.
Celebrant:	Will you proclaim by word and example the good news of God in Christ?
People:	I will, with God's help.
Celebrant:	Will you seek and serve Christ in all persons, loving your neighbour as yourself?
People:	I will, with God's help.
Celebrant:	Will you strive for justice and peace among all people, and respect the dignity of every human being?
People:	I will, with God's help. [4]

For the purposes of this paper, these commitments assumed for baptism will be used as a generalized expectation of ordination -- the expectations of personal and collective commitment in faith. Hopefully the reader will translate the above into the particular insights of her denominational tradition.

Community

The Baptismal Covenant, above, prescribes the requirements for inclusion into the whole People of God, membership into the body of Christ as is indicated clearly at the Reception:

> We receive you into the household of God. Confess the faith of Christ crucified, proclaim his resurrection and share with us in his eternal priesthood. [5]

Baptism, as ordination, commits one not merely to understanding and embracing the truths of a faith community, not merely to dedicated Christian service, but to becoming, with the rest of the household of faith, the Body of Christ which was first "God in Christ" (Jesus) and thereafter "Christ in all persons" (the Christian community). This goal of appropriation of a communal Christ identity -- so small a conversion for baptism, and still further a conversion for ordination -- requires a sufficient explanatory understanding in order to clarify the educational process involved. Lonergan understands community as lodged primarily in the development of common meaning that both evolves from common experience, and enables common decisions and actions to take place:

> A community is not just a number of men within a geographical frontier. It is the achievement of common meaning and there are kinds and degrees of achievement. Common meaning is potential when there is a common field experience, and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding by misunderstanding, by incomprehension, by mutual incomprehension. Common meaning is actual in as much as there are common judgements, areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner; and one withdraws from that common judgement when one disagrees, when one considers true what others hold false and false what they think are true. Common meaning is realized by decisions and choices, especially by permanent dedication in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions. Community coheres or deviates, begins or ends, just where the common field of experience, common understanding, common judgement, common commitments begin and end.....as it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgement, and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself. This process for the school master is education, for the sociologist is social-

> ization, for the cultural anthropologist is acculturation. But for the individual in the process it is his coming to be a man, his existence as a man in the fuller sense of the name. [6]

Lonergan is describing here how both a community and an individual go about "making meaning" -- meaning being the fundamental thing that gives cohesiveness and clarity to collective functioning. In all cases, there is meaning that is developed or created -- which did not previously exist -- and there is meaning which already exists, and one goes about learning or appropriating it. The former is the natural process of understanding, which proceeds through the stages of a direct or indirect experience of something, a process of trying to understand that experience, a judgement as to whether that understanding is, in fact, correct, and a deliberate decision to use, implement, or act on that understanding. This fourfold process takes place both within individuals and within communities -- any or all who have experience, understanding, judgement, and decision in common. The cohesiveness of a community evolves from the degree to which this is done in common. Lonergan called this "development from below-upwards" [7]. But there is already meaning in the insights, judgements and decisions of others which have already assumed value and already shaped the living of a given society. This is for Lonergan our initial world of immediacy, which shapes our thinking, living and acting by being a prior world which mediates meanings and motivates our values. In terms of human development, it is almost always chronologically prior. As noted in the above quotation, this world of prior meaning is acquired first by socialization and acculturation; it is "caught not taught." Only "as the individual grows" does one apply one's own creative intelligence to affirm, question, qualify or deny this prior meaning or value, and to decide for oneself. A community also does this as it, causally or formally, evaluates its inherited common meaning.

I would suggest that this account of meaning and understanding, drawing upon Lonergan's cognitional theory, should describe the on-going life of a seminary or college community. For the educational process of a seminary, like catechesis itself, starts both with a set of prior meanings and values to be understood (the Christian Faith) as well as (hopefully) the ultimate goal of enabling a person to decide for oneself. To

enable that to happen, one has to be conscious of the seminary's role in socializing and familiarizing its students with the faith tradition they will have the responsibility to maintain in specific communities, while also encouraging an unrestrained creative understanding of that faith tradition in its contemporary setting, such as could develop in both opposition and correction to that tradition. Lonergan would encourage such discussions, but also expect them to include discussion of how one came to understand something a specific way: cognitional theory precedes questions of epistemology and ofmetaphysics [8]. In this educator's current college context, such discussions are realized through the route of asking what is the appropriate nature of adult education? Students are first of all and always encouraged to take full responsibility for their own role as adult learners (rather than to project that responsibility onto "the program"), and this not only includes what is learned but how it should be learned. Reflection on learning styles (e.g., the standard Kolb-Fry theory, and others [9]) inevitably poses the more basic question of understanding itself. This educator in those community discussions raises the matter of a naïve versus a critical realism (Lonergan's cognitional theory), and the issue of whether there is actually such a thing as judgement (Lonergan's appropriation of Newman through the current category of probability theory [10]). As a whole, the faculty challenge the common simplistic assumption that theological education in the faith can take place in a supposedly plural and value-free setting (such an "ideal" setting itself would be value-laden!), and rather point to operative values (justice, peace, truth, etc.) which emanate from the apostolic tradition. Lonergan, using the analogy of science would likely have contributed to the discussion in such a way as this:

> Human knowledge results from a vast collaboration of many peoples over uncounted millennia. The necessary condition of that collaboration is belief. What any of us knows, only slightly results from personal experience, personal discovery, personally conducted verification; for the most part it results from believing. But the eighteenth-century enlightenment was not content to the attack on religious belief. It prided itself on its philosophers. It set up a rationalist individualism that asked people to prove their assumptions or else regard them as arbitrary. In effect it was out to destroy not only the religious tradition but all tradition. Such rationalist individualism in the twentieth century seems to have infected our educationalists. Students are encouraged to find things out for themselves, to develop originality, to be creative, to criticize, but it does not seem that they are instructed

> in the enormous role of belief in the acquisition and the expansion of knowledge. Many do not seem to be aware that what they know of science is not immanently generated but for the most part simply belief. [11]

So having enabled us to clarify how we develop meaning from below upwards, Lonergan would point us back to the huge mass of already generated meanings which are assumed simply through belief, yet each institution, community and society promotes them as true (development from above downwards). Just as the student should be conscious and deliberate about what he or she is developing as a creative and critical understanding, so also should any community be conscious and deliberate about the sets of meanings and beliefs it promotes in its structure and socialization of knowledge and value. Theological colleges and seminaries are just beginning to be open about and even publish what they understand their "Theological Stance" to be [12]. It has to be grounded in the theological mandate and method of that faith community (e.g. Baptismal Covenant, above: "in the apostles' teaching... the breaking of bread and the prayers"). What helps is to make a whole seminary community attentive to that process. In this respect, this educator promotes amongst students a reading of Fr. Fred Crowe's exposition of Lonergan's two vector theory in his recent book Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education [13]. The two vectors are the process of development from below upwards and above downwards mentioned above. In their first term of theological study, students are then required by the college to develop and write their own account of learning and understanding and the role of tradition. An excerpt from a typical response may best illustrate the task:

> The two vector theory was helpful for outlining the basic dynamic and rationale for doing theology. We are socialized into a tradition which we accept uncritically; our task in learning is to examine this tradition in light of our experience.
>
> The approach is helpful, for it steers us away from dogmatism and fundamentalism. It makes clear that we have the authority and responsibility to theologize, make our own conclusions, and refine past understandings for our time. I see that growth moving towards wholeness involves processing our traditions, valuing what is resonant and relevant, and modifying or discarding that which is no longer appropriate or helpful. I note that tradition can also hold negative values; traditions also transmit social sins, such as those contained in sexist and racist attitudes.
>
> In this process, we also formulate new traditions; I see the danger associated with formalizing our own theologies, and then trying to pass them on as dogmas which work well for us, and therefore should for others. In this regard, I not that the theology I will espouse here is also

> in transition, and will be undergoing constant revisions... I appreciate theologians like Dorothee Soelle who are able to integrate new understandings of theology in a fairly orthodox framework and I feel the most at home working in a similar manner. I attempt to hold and affirm as much as I can of tradition, for I can see its value in the lived-out faith of others; at the same time, I work carefully to reinterpret it in light of new understandings, and create expanded definitions of traditional concepts. [14]

While likely applauding such "answers" as the above, Lonergan would then start raising the still further questions which emerge out of the increasing subtlety and nuance of this sort of community discussion. For the insights of individuals and the inherited insights of the community and its leaders will doubtless clash and contradict -- common experiences, understandings and judgements are long in the making, and individual experience and differing context make a good degree of pluralism inevitable. The issue is whether the community will patiently and methodically work through these differences in a common commitment to sufficient understanding, or whether it will retreat into the easy answer of authoritarianism -- be it the authority of particular groups or the authority of particular texts or propositions. Given his role as a theologian in Vatican II and involvement in the subsequent questions of ecclesiastic and dogmatic authority, Lonergan made a helpful analysis of authority which becomes the root issue here:

> Authority is legitimate power... the source of power is cooperation... the carrier of power is the community... the exercise of power is twofold... the world of immediacy... the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values... such meanings and values may be authentic or unauthentic. They are authentic in the measure that cumulatively they are the result of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. They are unauthentic in the measure that they are the product of cumulative inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility. Authority makes power legitimate... Legitimated by authenticity. authority and authorities have a hold on the consciences of those subject to authority and authorities. But when they lack the legitimating by authenticity, authority and authorities invite the consciences of subjects to repudiate their claims to rule. [15]

The foundational issue, then, becomes authenticity, for authenticity gives legitimation to the exercise of authority and power. But authenticity is rooted in process and method; it has to do with the way an experience is experienced, the way that experienced experience is understood, and so on. This brings us back to the heart of Lonergan's cognitional theory that, within

any of the foundational arts of understanding (experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding), can be deciphered an immanent norm which governs that act and provides the dynamism in realizing its intention. Because "in a sense everyone knows and observes transcendental method," we can discover each operation or act within our own consciousness and the norms governing its operation. Lonergan asks us to discover this for ourselves, but does give his own account of it:

> The operations are to be experienced not only singly but in their relations, for they are not merely conscious operations but also conscious processes... On the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous sensitivity; it is intelligible only in the sense that it is understood. But with inquiry the intelligent subject emerges, and process becomes intelligent; it is not merely an intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative of intelligibility, the intelligence that intelligently seeks understanding, comes to understand and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term, or an impasse, intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as critically reflective, the subject stands in conscious relation to an absolute -- the absolute that makes us regard the positive content of the sciences not as true and certain but only as probable. Finally, the rational subject, having achieved knowledge of what is and could be, rationally gives way to conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility. [16]

The immanent norms within each set of operations are attentiveness or sensitivity on the first and empirical level of experiencing; intelligence on the second level of understanding; reasonableness at the level of critical reflection or judgement; and finally responsibility at the level of conscious freedom and decision to act. Advertence to these natural dynamisms of operation enables the intention of the operation to be achieved; refusal to advert or withdrawal from the dynamism has the effect of stalling or subverting the process of the operation. The norms and the operations are called transcendental in that they enable the human subject to transcend the particularity of his or her consciousness by objectifying it into a method that should basically comprehend any field of inquiry.

How does such subtle self-awareness fit into a seminary or theological college? This educator has found that individual awareness of Lonergan's theory can be helpful for students, but the real learning takes place through community dialogue and questioning where the transcendental norms are both implicitly and explicitly used. Questions which probe the sensitivity and attentiveness of a person describing an experience, questions of intelligence which spur one to a sufficient understanding of

something -- these are the good habits grounded in transcendental method which can be passed on in the socialization of the classroom and the monitoring of student/faculty discussions. Negative learning also takes place through those students and faculty who clearly block or avoid the norms. But the framework of cognitional theory and transcendental method enables a community in dialogue (and perhaps in disagreement) to go over together the process by which anything has seemingly been understood, and the degree to which norms were or were not operative in any part of that process. A college community, by being open and public about how it implements this process (e.g., in an "educational stance" [17]) prevents it being misunderstood or purported to be "biased." This educator also offers "guided reflections" on cognition, where persons in a group first of all have a powerful experience in common (a 1-2 min. film clip is effective), and then individually follow a reflection sheet which helps them process the experience using Lonergan's distinction between the four levels. Then as a group they review and share their insights into the process, and not only does the difference in their background understanding and values become apparent, but so also does their relative willingness/unwillingness to advert to the exigency of the particular cognitional operations, making it clear where they can challenge and urge each other in understanding, and where differences in background and context have to be integrated and accepted rather than dismissed. Such discussions are generally vulnerable, humbling, and rewarding. The community increasingly acknowledges the attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility that it should expect of its members. The accuracy of Lonergan's description becomes increasingly evident.

Authenticity

As is evident above, the entering into a community which tries to understand and hold meaning in common inevitably raises the foundational questions of cognition and the norms by which an individual or group evolves and lives its meanings. These meanings are perceived as legitimate or right to the degree that the community has cooperatively and methodically evolved them. They become illegitimate to the degree that they have been realized

> ...by any single act of inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility. But authenticity is reached only by long and sustained fidelity to the transcendental precepts. It exists only as a cumulative product.

> Moreover, authenticity in man or woman is ever precarious: our attentiveness is ever apt to be a withdrawal from inattention; our acts of understanding a correction of our oversights; our reasonableness a victory over silliness; our responsibility a repentance for our sins. To be ever attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible is to live totally in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values. But man also lives in a world of immediacy and, while the world of immediacy can be incorporated in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values, still that incorporation never is secure. Finally, what is authentic for a lesser differentiation of consciousness will be found unauthentic by the standards of a greater differentiation. So there is a sin of backwardness, of the cultures, the authorities, the individuals that fail to live on the level of their times. [18]

Authenticity, then, is the root issue in realization of genuine community and common meaning. It is realized by sustained degrees of understanding and committedness to the transcendental precepts. But in the case of a Christian community the goal (as in the Baptismal covenant) is to become the household of faith, the Body of Christ which was first in Jesus and is now the "Christ in all persons" of the community. How does such individual and communal conversion to "the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread, and in the prayers" take place authentically? How does communal life-meaning develop?

Most theological educators would agree that catechesis for ordination begins with learning of the tradition, and that the matter of authenticity is a later and distinctly personal matter, to be determined by a candidate's vocational director/bishop beyond the context of the program. Lonergan's analysis of authenticity grounded in transcendental method would call for it being addressed collectively as well as individually. For not only do we share as human beings the universal operations of understanding, but we also share the religious experience of faith which we then try, in common, to understand theologically:

> ... However personal and intimate is religious experience, still it is not solitary. The same gift can be given to many, and the many can recognize in one another a common orientation in their living and feeling, in their criteria and their goals. from a common communion with God, there springs a religious community. [19]

The most valuable application of this insight has to do with theological students having to write their "faith journeys." Generally taking most of a semester to complete (many have never developed something derived purely from their own experience), it asks students to reflect on instances or periods when God has

seemed in some way active or involved in their living. It is useful to develop small groups of students to read each other's papers, and to ask questions of clarification so as to help each person develop her account. The profound result of this process is the discovery that there is much correspondence between one person's experience and another's, and openness in community is not a threat to anyone's experience but rather a tremendous opportunity to broaden and deepen one's understanding. It is ideal if an introductory course in theology or foundations is taken at this time, for students find so many correspondences between the writing of theologians, and this process which they are experiencing.

As the "discovery" period of the journey writing wanes, and the task shifts to adequate understanding, the role of the transcendentals becomes very apparent. How attentive has one been with one's experiencing, how intelligently does one really try to comprehend, and does one shift to reasonableness in judgement or by-pass that activity altogether (many do)? Perhaps the most painful discovery of many is their unwillingness or seeming inability to live and act in accord with their own experience, understanding, and judgement (the most common being the inability to live with the reality of grace, to live as one "accepted" and justified by faith!). Here students discover, through direct experience, what conversion is all about in the choice between authenticity and unauthenticity, and how there is a "giftedness" in religious experience which makes one capable of changing one's ways. The personal discoveries of this whole process are useful if they can be incorporated into the field education program and made the object of learning by experience and in community. The awareness of how authenticity is realized through the transcendentals also has the effect, in the strictly academic program, of giving students a frame of reference by which to analyze critically any piece of writing or lecturing: what is the root experience, what is the probability for a judgement, can it be lived out? Lonergan provides a framework to both talk of an evaluate authenticity: "each theologian will judge the authenticity of the authors of views, and he will do so by the touchstone of his own authenticity" [20].

But authenticity has a deeper application. Every baptised Christian, and especially those who are to be ordained, are to

proclaim "by word and example the Good News of God in Christ." The goal of becoming in some sense Christ-like is intimidating indeed unless approached through a framework of method. Yet an experience, the being in receipt of God's love (Romans 5:5), draws one into an immediate experience of love and awe. But even this experience is not solitary but mediated by common meaning that is personal, social and historical:

> ...one needs the word -- the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those that share the gift of God's love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen. [21]

Becoming a community of the word and persons of the word puts time spent in reflection and prayer at the heart of the seminary, and this should never be merely confined to the chapel. The seminary's role should go beyond mere training and should include the active role the seminary plays in the diocese and in the life of the church. To take a stand on major current issues -- treatment of refugees, injustice in the economy, inequality of women in the church, freedom of speech for theologians -- these stances require the community to go back and discover afresh the meaning of the "dangerous memory" of Jesus the Christ [22]. Only through current passionate involvement does one retrieve the passion of one's history. Such retrievals that ave occurred in this educator's context recently have been the recovery of the lay person in Christian ministry, the role of women in the church, and differing possibilities for ecclesial structures from New Testament times such as is presented in Raymond Brown's intriguing book The Churches the Apostles Left Behind [23].

All of these community discussions involved outcomes of some existential or political act, but their by-product was ever-deepening personal and community conversions to "the word" as both re-discovered and discovered. Authenticity and application of the transcendentals frame such discussion:

> Such existing may be authentic or unauthentic, and this may occur in two different ways. There is minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him. There is the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself. In the first case, there is passed a human judgement on subjects. In the second case history and, ultimately, divine providence pass judgement on traditions. [24]

The distinction between personal and collective unauthenticities is important for the seminary community to live out. The clear-

est example of this in recent times has been the invisible role of women in the church, an experience current women could attest to, but who then found the unauthentic tradition and practice of the church, which had lost its sense of the radical dignity accorded all persons in Christ of the apostolic era [25]. The political dimension to the life of the church in the seminary, enables its members to be accountable for the authentic living of the word. It also makes its members very aware that every community as well as the church itself is a carrier of common moral and therefore political meaning within history:

> Meaning has its invariant structures and elements but the contents in the structures are subject to cumulative development and cumulative decline. So it is that man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that each man shapes his own life but does so only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors. [26]

Truth

Familiarity with cognitional theory and the process of understanding helps dispel false expectations about truth. It clearly cannot exist in some "objective" manner distinct from the human minds that think it. It is subject to the sufficient degrees of sensitivity, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility of those who think it [27]. So truth is what is arrived at by that process, the process of authentic subjects engaged in the objective understanding and commitment to their subjective experienced reality. A further asset to studying theology in the late twentieth century is that most students have, in previous scientific studies, become acquainted with probability theory (e.g., in physics, in social sciences, etc.). Therefore it does not come as so much of a surprise as it might to one of a classical education, that truth is not propositional but rather a sufficient degree of convergence of a particular understanding, a sufficient fulfilling of conditions to an understanding that it can be judged as probably so [28]. This self-correcting process of understanding is increasingly the perceived scientific model, and this educator finds it simply has to be reshaped to an application to the study of history as basic to all human "science" and therefore to theology itself:

> Communities endure. As new members replace old, expression becomes traditional. The religion becomes historical in the general sense that it exists over time and that it provides basic components in the ongoing process of per-

sonal development, social organization, cultural meaning and value.

> But there is further and far deeper sense in which a religion may be named historical. The dynamic state of being in love has the character of response. it is an answer to divine initiative. The divine initiative is not just creation. It is not just God's gift of his love. There is a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression. Such was the religion of Israel. Such has been Christianity. Then not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but also the outer word of the religious tradition comes from God God's gift of his love is matched by his command to love unrestrictedly, with all one's heart and all one's soul and all one's mind and all one's strength. The narrative of religious origins is the narrative of God's encounter with his people. [29]

The apostles' teaching comes to us in the form of current lived faith, but it also is contained in the complex narrative of Christian origins. Students facing the reality of historically conditioned Christian truth are often more enabled to do so by having faced hermeneutics in its more immediate forms. The "Journey of Faith" exercise is very useful for this, in that students will hear or express narratives of hitherto unknown experiences utilizing world views and values that appear distinctly foreign. Yet their belief in the narrative cannot depend upon having a similar experience (one cannot experience everything!) but rather in the perceived credibility (authenticity) of the narrator. Community and social analysis, such as comes in courses in ethics and in the field education program, provides similar opportunities to search for "facts" through more and less credible sources. The embarcation into Christian origins can then proceed with some of the complexity it entails. But at least it is approached from the point of view of a constructed understanding rather than an "archeological dig" which not only yields artifacts, but supposedly the understandings to go with them:

> The constructions of the human spirit are man and his world: for his world is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value; and it is the human spirit that constructs the meanings and responds to the motivating values. But what man has constructed man can reconstruct. What man has responded to in thought and word and deed, he can respond to once more if only in thought and word and feeling. Such reconstructing and such responding-to-once-more are the interpretations of the scholar and the narratives of the historian. [30]

One would think that the next aspect of Lonergan's thought which could be directly applied to theological teaching would be his analysis of there being eight functional specialties in the-

ology, and this order could be followed in the program sequence. This might doubtless be the case in a basically Roman Catholic setting. But in a Protestant setting, there is always present that Reformation value (might it actually be a dis-value?) of not entrusting the development of critical theological thought to any professional thinkers beyond the generalized "Priesthood of all Believers" who have equal accessibility to the faith through both scripture and community. However naïve this may be, the sense of there being distinct theological disciplines operating "from below upwards" in Research, Interpretation, History and Dialectic, and "post conversion" disciplines operating "from above downwards" in Foundations, Doctrines, Systematic, and Communication [31] -- such separation does seem to provoke real suspicion amongst Protestants in its distancing of the theological task from those communities which live the faith.

Detouring around these blocks, this educator has developed a year long course for a student's final year in seminary, the writing of a major "Integrative Paper." In essence, it requires each student to develop her operative theological stance (that theology to which one has become "converted" in one's living and understanding). It assumes completion of most of one's theological study. In effect a development of Lonergan's notion of Dialectics yielding Foundations, it asks students to identify those theological themes they derive as true from their own experience, and to relate them to those biblical and theological understandings which historical and current theology proposes. They are asked to state the truths in so far as they can understand them out of the dialectic: a truth which they understand to be sufficiently probable so as to be promoted in their faith communities. The basic categories of systematic theology -- creation, sin and evil, redemption, etc. -- are used as the paper's framework, and classes and private tutorials are provided on each theme. The goal is for each person, in the context of one's ecclesiastical community, to decide for oneself. A working statement on "Creation and Creativity" for one student was as follows:

> My learning this year has involved moving from a very static view of creation, where creation was a once and for all event in the past engineered by an all-powerful, all-knowing god. My view was similar to Deism, in which God sets up the universe to run without intervention. God watches over and supervises creation, yet is somehow not intimately involved; it is up to us to bring the reign of

God by our own efforts. The Soelle reading (To Work and To Love) challenged my notion of a completely sovereign God, creating for no discernible reason. If God is to love and create out of love, God must have vulnerability to the creation. I see the basic nature of God as relational; God desires and needs relationship to the created order,k, and is incomplete without it. God is not only outside of the created order, but is very much a part of it, in humanity and the natural world. A key thought in this area is that ultimate transcendence equals ultimate relatedness.

> Thus, we are created for right relationship -- with God, others, nature and ourselves; our desire for fulfillment and love through right relationship (love) reflects the relational nature of God, and the image of God.
>
> The biblical affirmation that humans are made in the image of God reveals that God is in all persons; thus the holiness and sanctity of all humanity is affirmed. A more traditional way of expressing this idea might be that the spirit of God is in all of humanity.
>
> God is present in our relationships, and in our potential and orientation towards divinity. I see the fully human as divine -- that is, having fullness of relationship with God, others, nature and one's self; in this way I see Jesus as being divine.
>
> As participants in the divine, we also participate in ongoing creation through our creativity; we are co-workers and co-creators with God, i.e., God has no hands or feet but our own. We have the power to create or destroy and thus can participate with God in ongoing creation, or can injure God/others/nature through the destruction of creation... [32].

What is crucial to this exercise is that it requires one not merely to understand, but to decide. But it is also set in a socialization of not only the course but of the whole seminary where all understandings emerge in the contexts of their time, and any understanding is subject to revision given new or conflicting data, a heuristic structure which proves insufficient to its application and must be discarded, a new question which emerges which cannot be answered, or a decision which is revoked when human or ecological values prove it irresponsible. Perhaps the greatest gift Lonergan seems to give an intellectual community is an "unrestricted openness" which acknowledges that "there always is the further question" [33].

Performance

Every Christian, by virtue of Baptism, is required to "seek and serve Christ in all persons," loving one's neighbour as oneself. But how does this take place? How does a person know, through any act, that he has in fact been in receipt of ministry? How does one consciously train to be a ministering person? Lonergan hardly ever explicitly discussed ministry [34], but his insights into meaning and authenticity still lead to the heart of the matter. Ministry is first of all an act: something done,

a word said, a gesture made. While one would expect it to be in the tradition of the Baptismal Covenant (a "striving for justice and peace..."), it is as broad as any act which proclaims love for neighbour as for self. But the key word is "proclaims," for ministry is above all an act of embodied meaning. Lonergan would likely use his term "incarnate meaning," that is, ministry carries the foundational meaning of a person, of one's way of life of both words and deeds. But the person in this case, as is mentioned in the Baptismal Covenant, is none other than "God in Christ." So, to use Lonergan's appropriation of Max Scheler's philosophy of inter-subjective affective cognition, meaning is carried in inter-subjective acts [35]. Scheler actually had a fully developed theory for the cognition of values through feeling, which he suggested could only be carried and apprehended by persons and in acts. Meaning and value are qualities "borne on the back of acts by persons" which are never reducible to mere acts of good themselves. This educator has evolved a working definition for ministry: any act that is capable of carrying the incarnate meaning of Jesus the Christ.

Lonergan does refer to a twofold action of the Holy Spirit in ministry: "There is the grace the Spirit brings to the minister. There is the grace given those that hear his words and are touched by his deeds" [36]. Assuming that God's grace in these situations is operative, then the role of one in ministry is to act cooperatively with that grace. This being so, both the person and the act have to be capable of carrying God's love, so that a person receiving ministry is in receipt of both a caring act and the sense of it coming from God, although possibly through the church and/or particular persons. In this sense, ministry is rather like an "icon" of Christ. How can this happen?

A basic learning of any student in a ministerial field education setting is that almost anything can be an act of ministry, as opposed to the merely formal acts of presiding, preaching, counselling, leading, teaching, and so on. This educator has found that a key process in enabling a student to have such an insight, is the development of a reflection group of lay persons who themselves are active in the giving and receiving of ministry in a faith community. About every two weeks, they meet with the student and reflect on the acts of ministry they understood to have been taking place. To reflect on each incident, they routinely ask the following questions:

Description:	What was the situation which presented itself? What was the "act" of ministry? What was the effect of that act?
Interpretation:	What was the intended meaning of the act? What was the received response of the act? and what was God doing/not doing in this situation?

Seldom need all the questions be answered, but answering some of them enables a ministering person to know how much or little she or he was perceived as a vehicle of the meaning and activity of God incarnate in a given situation. As Lonergan would affirm at this point, "It is quite true that the subject communicates not by saying what he knows, but by showing what he is" [37]. This is not to say that the act itself is not important -- that there is real skill to counselling, to preaching, to educating, to just having a conversation! But this skill in action has to carry a deeper meaning -- the presence and concern of Christ through this person.

What is fascinating is the degree to which these reflection groups, with no prior training or educational socialization, begin to use authenticity as the basic measure of the integrity of any act of ministry. In recorded feedback from such groups, words like "sensitivity," "genuineness," "truth," "feelings," "really so," "responsible," "gutsy" and "faithful" abound. The focus is always the degree of congruence between a person's genuine understanding of faith, and her implementation of it. Students seem both humbled and empowered by this, since it becomes quite obvious that despite and beyond these acts, something of tremendous significance is going on (what God is doing!). Although such responses are ever in conflict with the egocentric need of some to control, the genuineness of the group in trying to be more fully Christ in all of their person, has an attractiveness of its own. Here again, the transcendentals emerge -- attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility -- and much of a student's field experience in its real depth comes from trying to realize these in an authentic way.

On the specifically theological level, there is another type of learning group that can help a student integrate his theological understandings with performance of ministry. Taking place in the final year, during or shortly after the writing of the "Integration Paper" mentioned above, a group is developed from lay persons and faculty who have come to know a particular student very well. They reflect on what the student has written

concerning creation, sin and evil, redemption, etc., and then dialogue with the student as to how they have/have not seen this theological meaning lived out. In some cases, the student re-writes part of the paper to put it more in accord with her actual lived meaning. In other cases, the student pursues situations that will enable him to actually live a theological understanding (the most common one being able to live, say, Tillich's description of justification: "You are accepted" [38]). It is a point of "sounding the depth" that apostolic truth has achieved in integration with anyone's life.

All of these learning groups and field experiences are of no worth, however, unless the college/seminary itself actually lives out its declared theological meaning. In the end, the communities in which students spend three or four highly intensive years, are the foundation for understanding and socialization into ministry. It is there that the transcendentals, which govern authenticity, are learned not as someone's theory, but as appropriated operations of the human spirit. It is there that performance in ministry is experienced, and givers and receivers of acts of ministry assess whether the acts have anything to do with the theological intentions they have espoused or declared. While this is not an easy environment for a student to be in for three or so years, when literally everything is open to question, so it is even more difficult for faculty who may well spend much of their teaching careers there. Yet if <u>they</u> are not about authentic self-appropriation themselves -- not only personally, but in community -- how can they expect it of students in any course or context? Here, then, we return to our starting point -- community and authenticity. For the progress or decline of the performance of a seminary community can be easily imaged in Lonergan's account of the dialectic of authority:

> The fruit of authenticity is progress. For authenticity results from a long-sustained exercise of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility. But long-sustained attentiveness notes just what is going on. Intelligence repeatedly grasps how things can be better. Reasonableness is open to change. Responsibility weighs in the balance short- and long-term advantages and disadvantages, benefits and defects. The longer these four are exercised, the more certain and the greater will be the progress made.
>
> The fruit of unauthenticity is decline. Unauthentic subjects get themselves unauthentic authorities. Unauthentic authorities favour some groups over others. Favoritism breeds suspicion, distrust, dissension, opposition, hatred, violence. Community loses its common aims and begins to

> operate at cross-purposes. It loses its common judgements so that different groups inhabit different worlds. Common understanding is replaced by mutual incomprehension. The common field of experience is divided into hostile territories.
>
> The breakdown of community entails the breakdown of cooperation. Different groups advocate different policies. Different policies entail different plans, and the different groups employ all their resources for the implementation of the plans that accord with their policies. There may be a see-saw battle between them with the resultant incoherence and confusion. Or one side may gain the upper hand and then exploitation of the other follows. ...However, beyond progress and decline there is redemption. Its principle is self-sacrificing love. To fall in love is to go beyond attention, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility. It is to set up a new principle that has, indeed, its causes, conditions, occasions, but, as long as it lasts, provides the mainspring of one's desire and fear, hope and despair, joy and sorrow. In the measure that the community becomes a community of love and so capable of making real and great sacrifices, in that measure it can wipe out the grievances and correct the objective absurdities that its unauthenticity has brought about. [29]

To incarnate this "new principle" of love-in-community is the challenge faced, not just by a college/seminary community, but by the entire church. It must embody not only the openness which yields progress, but also openness to the redemption of love which can overcome decline. If students and faculty do not live and model this together, a vision of all the communities of God can never be gained.

Conclusion

In a sense, this paper has gone in a circle. It began with the implications of becoming a baptised/ordained member of the whole people of God, to be an inheritor of the apostolic community which understands the "good news of God in Christ" to be something concrete and realizable in our living. But that is to be an inheritor of common meaning, and common meaning cannot be understood without a common understanding of understanding itself. So a community has to struggle, in common, with an understanding of understanding, and hopefully the transcendentals, such as Lonergan described, will emerge. From such common deliberation, the transcendentals take on the role of shaping the progress and decline of the community, and the foundational notion of authenticity becomes the functioning norm of the community. But the community of which we have been speaking has been a seminary/college community, whose intention is to prepare persons to exercise leadership in the ministering life of Christian communities. So the "truths" of apostolic teaching

and living have to be the intended goal of the living and understanding of the community. This is possible, given authenticity as the functioning community norm of the college. But "truths" are not studied "at arm's length" (to use an accounting analogy), but rather through integration into each person's own understanding and living. Objectivity in fact becomes authentic subjectivity [40]. So, too, with entry into the practice of ministry itself. More than acts themselves, ministry is embodied meaning -- and that meaning is the loving and just presence of Jesus Christ. All ministering persons "carry" that meaning. To prepare oneself to carry that meaning, one has to be authentic, with one's own committed meaning and with the sharing and receiving of that meaning with others. Only communities which know of such meaning can help one assess how well and authentically one carries that meaning, for only they do, in fact, carry that meaning. So education for ministry always returns, whether in pursuit of theological truth or ministerial performance, to authentic Christian community. And Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory revealing transcendentals which enable a human community to pursue authenticity, provides precisely the framework which enables sufficient understanding of the whole process, so as to enable a community to realize the results:

> In the Christian, accordingly, God's gift of his love is a love that is in Christ Jesus. From this fact flow the social, historical, doctrinal aspects of Christianity. For the gift of God's love, however intimate and personal, is not so private as to be solitary. It is given to many through Christ Jesus that they may be one in him. They need one another to come to understand the gift that has been given to them, to think out what it implies and involves, to support one another in their effort to live Christian lives. Normally, the gift of God's love is not a sudden transformation of character or personality. It is like the seed planted in ground that needs to be tilled, like the sprout that needs sunlight and rain and protection from choking weeds, devouring insects, and roving animals. As Charlie Brown needs all the friends he can get, so Christians need all the help they can get. Great saints are rare, and even they call themselves vessels of clay. The need of teaching and preaching, of rituals and common worship, is the need to be members of one another, to share with one another what is deepest in ourselves, to be recalled from our waywardness, to be encouraged in our good intentions. [41]

Appendix 1

The Theological Stance of the Centre for Christian Studies, Toronto, Canada

The life and work of the Centre for Christian Studies as a learning community of faith proceeds from a theological foundation that may be described as follows:

God is active and acting in these exciting, troubled and changing days. We believe that God has created the world and that we are called to be co-creators with God, engaged in the struggle to bring wholeness, justice and peace to the world. Jesus Christ is the human expression of God in the world, the Good News for the present day, "the Word made flesh." The Holy Spirit is the power of God for good, moving over the whole of creation, caring, loving, risking and commanding.

Made in the image and likeness of God, humanity is part of God's mystery, a peculiar mix of intentionality and surprise, uniqueness and community, brokenness and wholeness, good and evil, doubt and trust. The imperative of our faith calls us to be in contradiction with many of the behaviours, values and structures of our society. We have received the gifts of the Spirit and in accepting them we are called to accept responsibility to exercise the ministry with others in vision and hope. In our learning community, individual gifts are respected and expected. Some of these gifts are: listening, discernment, wonderment, common sense, animation, availability and embracing of diversity. We believe that all persons need to be challenged to develop their gifts and to challenge their partners in learning to develop their gifts. We experience our gifts and resources increasing as they are shared with others.

We believe that life is a journey. Like the Hebrew people, we are wandering nomads, enduring the wilderness, celebrating the vision of the promised land, the Kingdom of God, and looking forward to the new heaven and new earth as promised in the book of Revelation. We journey as persons in community, aware of our interdependence with all those who seek the Kingdom.

We are a worshipping, witnessing presence, encouraging and equipping people in their ministry. It is a ministry which seeks to touch the world with love, to struggle and to explore, to serve and to heal, to listen and to affirm, to challenge and to transform, and to be prepared to be transformed. We are hopeful, often vulnerable, searching and growing, proclaiming and living the faith upon which we are founded.

Appendix 2

Educational Stance of the Centre for Christian Studies, Toronto, Canada

Education at the Centre happens within a living community, with each person as both learner and educator. Learning is a process and discipline, encompassing the whole being of the person. This is made more powerful when surrounded and nurtured in a worshipping environment.

We are committed to the joy and struggle of learning in community. We are also committed to that learning being self-directed as the means by which individuals can move to their fullest potential within community. We cherish the diversity of our community, diversity of theological convictions, concepts of ministry, academic backgrounds, personalities, ages and cultures. We have a position, but this position may continually

move as we integrate new ideas and struggle with the world around us, the signs of the time which point to God's activity in the world in which we live.

We are accountable for sharing in the transformation of the world as co-creators with God. This transformation involves for us openness to constant reflection, critical evaluation, and mutual accountability within the Centre. Recognizing that we are a minority, we must learn to face life and learning from that position to meet our ultimate goals of integration and wholeness. we are involved in educational, pastoral and social ministries as part of the prophetic mission of the church.

NOTES

[1] Lonergan, B.J.F., Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), xxviii.

[2] Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982), p.20.

[3] "Dogmatic Constitution of the Church," Lumen Gentium 9 in W.M. Abbott, ed. The Documents of Vatican II (New York: Association Press, 1982), p. 20.

[4] The Book of Alternate Services of the Anglican Church of Canada, (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1985), p. 159. also The Book of Common Prayer according to the use of the Episcopal Church, (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 304.

[5] See n.4 above, pages 161 and 308 respectively.

[6] Lonergan, B.J.F., Method in Theology, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 79.

[7] Lonergan, B.J.F. "Healing and Creating in History," A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J..F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. F.E. Crowe, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 106. See also "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," ibid., p. 180.

[8] Lonergan, B.J.F., Philosophy of God, and Theology, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 33.

[9] Kolb, D.A., The Learning Style Inventory: A Technical Manual, (Boston: McBer, 1976), also D. Kolb and R. Fry, "Towards an Applied Theory of Experiential Learning" in C.L. Cooper, ed. Theories of Group Process, (London: John Wiley, 1975).

[10] Lonergan, Insight, p. 67-68. See also John Henry Newman, The Grammar of Assent, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), chap. IX.

[11] Lonergan, B.J.F., "The Response of the Jesuit As Priest and Apostle in the Modern World," A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. W.F.J. Ryan, S.J. and B. Tyrrel, S.J., (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 185-186.

[12] See example in Appendix 1.

[13] (Atlanta, GA: Scholar's Press, 1985)

[14] From a student-authored "Integrative Paper," Centre for Christian Studies, Toronto, 1987.

[15] Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," Third Collection, pp. 5-8.

[16] Lonergan, Method, pp. 15-16.

[17] See example in Appendix 2.

[18] Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," Third Collection, p. 8.

[19] Lonergan, Method, p. 118. [20] Ibid., p. 331.

[21] Ibid, p. 113.

[22] Metz, J.B., Faith in history and Society, (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), p 43.

[23] New York: Paulist Press, 1984).

[24] Lonergan, Method, pp. 79-80.

[25] Fiorenza, E.S., In Memory of Her, (New York: Crossroads, 1985), p. 217f.

[26] Lonergan, Method, pp. 79-80.

[27] Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," Second Collection, p. 30.

[28] Lonergan, Insight, p. 299f.

[29] Lonergan, Method, pp. 118-119.

[30] Lonergan, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," Third Collection, p. 155.

[31] See Lonergan, Method, chap. 5.

[32] From a student-authored "Integrative Paper," Centre for Christian Studies, 1987. The Soelle reference is to Soelle, D. and S.A. Cloyes, To Work and To Love: A Theology of Creation, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).

[33] Lonergan, Insight, p. 546.

[34] See a typical oblique reference in his article, "Pope John's Intention," Third Collection, p. 229.

[35] Scheler, M., Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern U. Press, 1973), see chap. 6, "Formalism and Person." also Lonergan using Scheler, Method, p. 57.

[36] Lonergan, "Pope John's Intention," Third Collection, p. 229.

[37] Lonergan, B.J.F., "Cognitional Structure," Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 238.

[38] See "You Are Accepted" in Tillich, P., The Shaking of the Foundations, (Harmondsworth, MD: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 155.

[39] Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," Third Collection, pp. 9-10.

[40] Lonergan, "An Interview with Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Second Collection, p. 214.

[41] Lonergan, "The Future of Christianity," Second Collection, pp. 156-157.

THE NOTION OF THE TRANSCULTURAL IN BERNARD LONERGAN'S THEOLOGY

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Introduction

Pluralism is the order of the day in any serious discussion of the contemporary world. It is obvious that not only in our present world, but in previous ages also (perhaps even more so), cultural diversity is literally overwhelming. Also evident are the many attempts in human history by one or another powerful culture to enforce its orientations upon other cultures. There is that all too sad truth that a widely used language is usually the result of a dialect with an army and a navy. One does not have to read Michel Foucault to begin to appreciate how profoundly modern Western social and cultural institutions both result from, and carry forward, dominative power.

The discoveries of cultures other than Western and European had usually been within the context of the dominative expansion of the West. Indeed, the West developed its own version of resistance, so that now "the East" tends to be identified with Marxist versions of Western social and cultural orientations.

Is there no other way of approaching cultural pluralism than one of dominative power? Does power as force provide the only category? If so, are we not led, as in Hegel's dialectic of master and slave, to a recognition of violence as intrinsic to any liberation of oppressed cultures? What about modern science and its ability to cross many cultural boundaries? Then there are the discussions surrounding various perspective courses in U.S. universities. Should such programs convey the pluralism of cultures or seek to convey instead an introduction to Western cultures? And if the latter, what about those excluded from contributing to the formation of those cultures? Moreover, is there not a terrible contraction of consciousness in modern Western cultures, so that the study of even past Western cultures tends to be forced into categories foreign to those cultures themselves?

These many questions will not be directly answered in this paper. Rather I wish to propose what I understand to be Bernard Lonergan's approach toward the questions associated with cultural pluralism. The orientation of his work offers, it seems to me, important perspectives which avoid both the dominative universality too characteristic of the modern West,

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and the contemporary historicism which, as a recent exchange between Richard Rorty and Latin American Philosophers made abundantly clear, undercuts the possibility of dialectical criticism in the name of a dominative and complacent historicist hermeneutics [1].

First, I shall sketch how Lonergan developed an understanding of concrete universality; second, his notion of the transcultural; and finally a few ways in which it functions in his theology.

The Concrete Universal

Bernard Lonergan has succeeded in recovering Augustine and Aquinas's understandings of the universal and transposing them into our time. In order to understand the achievement of Lonergan in this regard, it is important to begin with a contrasting orientation. Unfortunately, Lonergan's work is often misread in the modern context.

The "universals" debate in nominalism had prepared the way for a modern conceptualism. Universals are thought of as merely ideas or concepts which do not exist. Only individuals are concrete and existing. Universals are like tags which label different kinds of individual entities. They do not exist as such, except perhaps in the Mind of God. This way of thinking about universals and particulars is a strange mixture of naïve realism (yielding "experiences" of the particular and concrete), combined with conceptualism (yielding "ideas" that "abstract" certain common characteristics from the "experiences" of particular and concrete things).

John Locke, in Book II of his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, provides an impoverished notion of abstraction which both sums up the previous misunderstandings of the topic, and sets the stage for most modern misunderstandings:

> ... The mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, -- separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. [2]

For example, humankind is merely the aggregation of all particular human beings, and the debates ensue regarding how to "define" humankind. The various forms of modern empiricism insist upon the particular, and laws or regularities which can

be correlated with data of sense. The various forms of modern idealism insist that there are valid ideas, some of which are abstracted from the particulars, and that they provide either the critical (Kant) or absolute (Hegel) norms for human knowing and acting.

The transcultural in such frameworks can only be to move beyond the empirical into the ideational. The transcultural is what is common to more than just one particular culture. What, then, could be a universal? It would be something that is common to all instances of a particular class. There is the gap between the empirical and the cognitive or ideational -- a gap well documented in the Kantian dichotomy between the phenomenal and noumenal. The transcultural and universal are thus only ideational or nominal. Even if there are empirically observable similarities or identities in several diverse cultures or classes of things, those similarities or identities can only be partial. They cannot account fully for the empirically different cultures or classes of things, since the latter are different, are diverse. Even a complete uniformity still leaves material differences.

These reflections correlate with some of the elements in Hegel's criticism of the critical idealism of Kant. Kant cannot ground how he knows that he does not know the noumenal. Hegel's move was to posit the absolute and universal as generating its opposite in materiality and difference in order, through history, to re-integrate the differences in "Der Begriff" of absolute knowledge [3]. Indeed, the German word for "universal" reflects precisely the nominalist decline, the reduction of the universal to "what is common to many" -- das Allgemeines, die Allgemeinheit.

Moreover, in this situation it is clear that the work of the Absolute Concept in bringing about the re-integration of material particularity and ideational universality must include violence. Hegel's dialectic of master and slave charts out violence as an intrinsic component of human relationships. Mutual recognition seems no more than a truce in the ongoing struggle and violence of human relations in history. Little wonder, then, that Marx would "put the dialectic on its feet" by indicating how there is a repressed universality (a repressed Allgemeinheit) in the degraded working classes of nineteenth-century industrializing societies. As with Hegel's dialectic of master and slave, so class warfare will usher in a presumably

eternal peace of a classless society. Particularity with its violent confrontations will be sublated (Aufhebung as a movement toward preservation and elevation only through negation) in the noumenal realm of the identification of reason and reality.

Differences in these modern scenarios seem always to involve both irrationality and domination. The movement of liberation is primarily, if not exclusively, misunderstood in terms of metaphors of militant movement. We must bring together the slaves, the oppressed, into cohesive groups demanding and fighting for their "rights." To what extent is this a "cover story" which overlooks how real progress is made in overcoming oppression and injustice? The real gains are in terms of the oppressed and enslaved liberating themselves, becoming active agents or subjects of their history. It is not the "guns" or "new laws" which expand the effective freedom of the oppressed. Rather they are means through which that freedom might be expressed. Dr. Martin Luther King realized the total inadequacy of "militant' metaphors in regard to the Civil Rights Movement. Modern cultures are very prone to the fallacy of misplaced normativeness. Instead of recognizing the norms in ever more attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsibly loving communities, modern cultures tend to fixate upon the products made by those communities.

When Margaret Thatcher stated that "society does not exist, only individuals exist," she was expressing the monadic individualism common to both modern conservatism and liberalism. Society is merely a bureaucratic construct, a complex set of conventions, which with some force has been imposed on the otherwise chaotic anarchy which would result if individuals were left to themselves. The Hobbesian Leviathan adjudicates the war of each against everyone else. Hobbes grounds equality of rights upon the "fact" that even the weakest can kill the strongest. Then there is the Lockean affirmation that toleration in religious matters is fine since it enables the modern State to pursue more single-mindedly the need for defense and victory in the warfare constituting human history.

From the nominalism of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation and Counter-Reformation periods, the problem of universals has a growing significance for us today. For very understandable reasons derivative from the European wars of religion, there are two fundamental presuppositions on which most Western modern philosophers agree, whether they are of

conservative, liberal, or radical bent. The first views natural and historical realities as ultimately conflictive, as though reality was made up of fields of contradictory forces contending for dominance. The second common presupposition casts knowledge as power to control, a learning of secrets in order to enforce order and secure dominance. Little wonder, then, that Max Weber would see social organization as always involving domination (Herrschaft). Habermas concedes partially, at least in regard to the empirical-analytic sciences. These are supposedly informed with instrumentalist interests in technically dominating nature, since "the human species secures its existence in systems of social labor and self-assertion through violence"; but Habermas seeks to differentiate communication and individuation from such dominative interest [4].

Neither Judaism nor Christianity can accept these two fundamental presuppositions. God's creative act is not an act of violence and domination -- indeed, the Hebrew creation narratives repudiated the violent cosmogonies of the surrounding empires. The empires and superpowers of history have become what they are through force and violence, so it is hardly surprising that their visions of world birth would be in the categories of violence and force. Quite different, usually, are the narratives of the victims of empires and superpowers; natural and historical creativity are communicative in which nature and humans nourish each other in cosmic gardening. Why is it so difficult for us to hear the warnings in global environmental pollution? Can you imagine the judgment future generations will pass on our supposedly "enlightened" societies if we fail to heed those warnings?

Insofar as religious faith is a knowledge born of love, then it would be important that the wisdom of such faith engage in communicative praxis with the sciences and technologies which, unfortunately, seem urgently in need of a healing transformation away from the fears and aggressions engendering them. But this "insofar as" has to be stressed. For just as there is needed a dialectic of enlightenment which differentiates the subject-empowering exercise of reason from the use of reason to subject nature and persons as instruments to another, so also there is needed a dialectic of religious experience which differentiates subject-empowering religious praxis from the use of religion to dominate and control [5].

Lonergan's contribution was a recovery and a transposition. He was able to recover the concrete import of Augustine's understanding of God's creative and redemptive act, and how that Divine Act embraces the concrete totality of all events, including all spatio-temporal events [6]. As a young student of philosophy and theology he came to understand the concrete species orientation of the Catholic classics of Augustine and Aquinas. Human nature is not just an idea, a concept that is "abstracted" from many concrete instances of human beings. Lonergan's work on Aquinas indicated how abstraction is a twofold operation. He carefully distinguished apprehensive and formative abstraction in his Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.

There he clearly indicates how Aquinas realized that there is a universality which is more than simply the "universal that is common to many." This certainly occurs in the formative abstraction operative in our concepts and ideas, as well as in all of our thinking. But we do not just think. The horrors of so much of modern social life find their cognitive base in the conceptualism of a Cartesian "cogito" -- a thinking that is cut off from understanding, knowing, and responsibly acting. All operations of formative abstraction are preceded by operations of apprehensive abstraction, of insight into phantasm. This is the major dividing line for Lonergan between what he terms "intellectualists" as opposed to "conceptualists." For conceptualists concepts or ideas come first, and understanding then is a matter of intuiting relations between concepts, ideas, and experiences. For intellectualists concepts and ideas are generated by acts of insight and understanding; understanding comes before concepts which express that understanding.

There are two aspects of Lonergan's intellectualist position relative to universals and particulars. Firstly, there is an attunement between the universal and particular which precedes abstraction altogether.

> ... we may recall that knowing the universal in the particular, knowing what is common to the instances in the instances, is not abstraction at all; it is an operation attributed by Aquinas to the sensitive potency which he names the cogitativa. [7]

It is this prior attunement which Aquinas expressed in terms of the vis cogitativa, which functions in Aquinas's analysis of cognitional operations the way the endopsychic censor functions in Lonergan's analysis. Contrary to the primarily repressive

functions in Freud's censor, Lonergan views the endopsychic censor as constructive. It is attuned to the concrete universe, and only when the constructive orientation is repressed does the dysfunctionalism of what in Insight Lonergan terms scotosis occur.

Secondly, the primordial attunement of matter and mind leads, in the intellectualist orientation, to insights generating and expressing themselves in "inner words" or concepts. Attentive understanding precedes the formation of concepts or ideas. Thinking is only on the level of hypothesis formation, of possible definitions. Its ground is attentive understanding, or insight and it is oriented towards knowing, towards judgment in which we know universals existing in concrete particulars. As Lonergan writes:

> If the formative abstraction is not preceded by apprehensive abstraction, by insight into phantasm, then the application of universal rationes to particular things must be blind; but that is a point against conceptualist interpretation. The intellectualist interpretation finds no implication of idealism ... because for it formative abstraction is not the only abstraction just as the universal common to many is not the only universal; prior to knowledge of essences without existence through definition, there are insights into phantasm in which are known universals, natures, quiddities existing in corporal matter; and as such insight governs the application of them to particular things. [8]

Conceptualism is hardly an esoteric mistake that makes no difference in our concrete living. Note well what Lonergan states: without attention to our insights, to the operations of apprehensive abstraction, "the application of universal rationes to particular things must be blind." Within the intellectualist orientation insight and understanding should govern the relations between universals and particulars. But if insight is overlooked, especially in cultures promoting science and technology, then the "blind" application is extremely dangerous. This blindness identified in his Verbum studies becomes, in Insight, both the scotosis which disorients the human psyche in censoring and blocking needed insights within dramatic living, as well as the general bias which constitutes the longer cycle of decline in which modern cultures are caught. So the two aspects of the cognitive mediation of universality and particularity in his recovery of Aquinas's cognitional theory are transposed in his later work in ways which, as I have indicated elsewhere, meet the challenges posed to Catholic culture by the masters of suspicion: Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche [9].

The universal exists in particulars. Lonergan spelled this out in regard to human nature in some early manuscripts from the 1930's. In a manuscript entitled An Essay in Fundamental Sociology -- which begins on page 95 with the subtitle "A Philosophy of History" -- Lonergan states as clearly as he can that "humanity" is not an abstraction but a reality in the billions of human beings who ever have, are, or will live. He articulates this in the context of suffering:

> That the present should suffer for the past is not unjust, for humanity is not an aggregation of individuals. It is one reality in the order of the intelligible. It is a many in virtue of matter alone. Now any right and any exigence has its foundation only in the intelligible. Matter is not the basis of exigence but the basis of potentiality. The one intelligible reality, man, humanity, unfolds by means of matter into a material multiplicity of men, that the material multiplicity may rise, not from itself, but from the intelligible unity, to an intelligible multiplicity of personalities. Men become from man as grapes from the one vine; if the vine corrupts, so do the grapes; but the grapes suffer no injustice from the vine; they are but part of the vine. [10]

Humankind is one intelligible reality. It is important to notice how the multiplicity of individuals is not only on the level of the "many" which is in virtue of matter alone. The one intelligible unity of humankind unfolds, through material multiplicity, to the intelligible multiplicity of personalities. This is later developed as historical causality, how each and every human person is within the totality of interpersonal relationships constituting human history. Rights are based, for Lonergan, not upon a monadic individualism in which all are fighting each, as with Hobbes, but rather upon the intelligible unity of humankind.

This is the concrete universal of humankind embedded within the concrete existing universe of being. In the same manuscript Lonergan calls attention to historical causality in terms of the "unity of human action" which unfolds from the unity of human being. If any proof is needed of how Lonergan's call to self-appropriation is not the exercise of monadic, individualistic introspection listen to this:

> Human action is one: a statistically predetermined flow; all the individual can do is accept or reject the intellectual forms supplied him for the guidance of his action by the environment; if he thinks of anything not supplied him by the environment, he is merely incidental, or he is an instrument used by humanity to bring forth a new idea which will become part of some existing movement or the initiation of a new movement. [11]

This might well jar many a modern reader. We are so accustomed to imagine that we are all monads with property rights to our "experiences" and our "ideas." Lonergan calls our attention to how neither are our own possessions. Our experiences are embedded within the flow of human action in history. Without our adverting to it, our experiences are intrinsically related to complex physical, chemical, biological, neurological, zoological, psychological, sociological, and cultural schemes of recurrence. If anything is not our own, it is our experience. With every neuron in ourselves we are immersed within the statistically predetermined flow.

So also our ideas are not our own, or if they are, then they are either incidental, or they are aspects of a new movement within human history. Attention to insight-mediating experiences and ideas would lead us to be more aware of how deeply our personal insights are communal. Lonergan expressed this also:

> The human intellect is intellect in potency; it is gradual; it arrives at its perfect act through a series of interactions between objective situations giving rise to intellectual theories and intellectual theories changing objective situations. ...so the human intellect works through its stages of development in the instant of its being which is all time. Thus, intellectual achievement is not the achievement of individual men for individual men are unintelligibly different; intellectual achievement is the achievement of the race, of the unity of human action; the individual genius is but the instrument of the human race in its expansion. [12]

The concrete universality of ourselves is well expressed in the realization of Lonergan that "the instant" of the human intellect's being is "all time." We are not merely an aggregate of monads floating upon a continuum of time, randomly picking now this now that idea out of a past which is cut off from us by death. The past lives on in ways we have scarcely begun to understand. The concrete universal that is humankind embraces all historical time, and this is the human and historical becoming in whom we live and know and act.

In Insight Lonergan develops these notions with a marvelous precision. But the stark simplicity of expression has led many to overlook their significance. So in Chapter XII on "The Notion of Being" Lonergan, realizing how the insights he was seeking to convey would be consternating to many, has a section entitled "A Puzzling Notion." Therein, in the "tenth" place, he states how the notion of being is the notion of the concrete universe. But, he hears his readers object, are not universal

propositions abstract? His response indicates the intellectualist orientation with its attention to questions, insights, and judgments:

> The notion of being is the notion of the concrete in the same manner as it is of the universe. It is of the universe because questions end only when there is nothing more to be asked. It is of the concrete, because until the concrete is reached, there remain further questions. Hence, it is not the single judgment but the totality of correct judgments that equates with the concrete universe that is being. [13]

The totality of correct judgments is hardly the attainment of any one individual or group of individuals. Indeed, the process is one that is ongoing and calls for the creative collaboration which Lonergan sought to articulate in his method.

Just as Lonergan, in his earlier manuscript, analyzed the concrete universality of humankind in order to develop the ontological context within which to understand the Christian and Catholic mystery of the Body of Christ, so he raises these issues in the Epilogue of Insight.

> So it is that the profound and penetrating influence of liberal, Hegelian, Marxist, and romantic theories of history have been met by a firmer affirmation of the organic structure and functions of the Church, by a long series of social encyclicals, by calls to Catholic action, by a fuller advertence to collective responsibility, and by a deep and widespread interest in the doctrine of the Mystical Body. So too it may be that the contemporary crisis of human living and human values demands of the theologian, in addition to treatises on the unique and to treatises on the universal common to many instances, a treatise on the concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel. And as the remote possibility of thought on the concrete universal lies in the insight that grasps the intelligible in the sensible, so its proximate possibility resides in a theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligent progress but also sinful decline, and not only progress and decline but also supernatural recovery. [14]

The proximate possibility involves the overcoming of the false conceptualist orientation in much of modern philosophy and theology. The supernatural solution to the problem of evil in human history is neither some kind of Divine afterthought added on to an otherwise dysfunctioning nature, nor is it an imaginal narrative of symbols and rituals to be sublated by the advance of Geist.

The higher viewpoint which the supernatural solution to the problem of evil offers is one which promotes an ongoing accumulation of insights and judgments in regard to how God brings goodness out of evil, love out of hate or indifference, life out

of death. So Lonergan's dialectic is able to discriminate between advance and aberration in a way that many modern forms of dialectic do not. Lonergan is quite explicit on how his notion of the concrete universal differs from Hegel's:

> Hegel endeavors to pour everything into the concept; we regard concepts as byproducts of the development of understanding and place understanding itself in an intermediate role between experience and critical reflection. It follows that, what Hegel is bound to regard as conceptual, we can interpret quite differently. Thus Hegel's notion of being is a minimum conceptual content that topples over into nothing, but our notion of being is the all-inclusive heuristic anticipation issuing from an unrestricted desire to know. Hegel's dialectical opposition is a contradiction within the conceptual field, but our dialectical opposition is the conflict between the pure desire to know and other human desires. Hegel's sublation is through a reconciling third concept, but our development is both the accumulation of insights moving to higher viewpoints and the reversal of the aberrations that were brought about by the interference of alien desire. Hegel's absolute is a terminal concept that generates not antitheses to be sublated by a higher synthesis; we recognize a manifold of instances of the virtually unconditioned, and through them attain knowledge of proportionate being in its distinctions and relations. Hegel's concrete is an integrated whole of determinate conceptual contents, but our concrete is a prospective totality to be known by answering correctly the totality of questions for intelligence and questions for reflection. [15]

So Lonergan's notion of the universal breaks with the conceptualism which has tended to dominate discussions of the universal and the concrete from the fourteenth century down to our own day. Universality is not restricted to ideas or concepts, it is concretely existent in the human species in history. It is not opposed to the myriad flowering of millions and millions of profoundly different cultures; rather, concrete universality is the matrix of such cultural flowering. Yet this is not historicist, for the concrete universality of cultural creativity is constituted by human operations which are normative.

The Notion of the Transcultural

Lonergan's notion of the concrete universal provides all the clues one needs to understand how the transcultural functions in Lonergan's work. It is not a question at all of following the usual modern dead-ends on the subject. It does not mean doing an exhaustive list of all possible or actual cultures and seeing what is common in them or not. This comparative approach could reduce the cultures to mere illustrations of a "general idea" or a "general paradigm." Some

comparative religious studies are conceptualist: only seeking what is common to many, and then using the fact of similarity or of difference to bracket the question of truth in particular traditions. This is conceptualist to the extent that the understanding which is evoked or emerges from the comparison is truncated; the further relevant question whether or not the understanding is true is systematically blocked.

This is certainly understandable in view of the assertion of religious truth used as an ideological rationalization for violence against those of other religious persuasion. But comparative religious studies can also indicate to what extent the profound religious commitments and truths of particular traditions offer discernments which repudiate such abuses of their teachings. If, however, the comparative studies are themselves conceptualist, then the question of violence tends to be implicitly linked with the question of truth. Nor is it adequate when the conceptualist universality of comparative religious studies is replaced by an historicist effort to remain on the level of the particular. For such historicism cannot account for the profound convictions of truth informing particular religious traditions.

Lonergan does not try to claim that some idea or concept is present in all or many cultures. As Giovanni Sala has clearly established, it is simply flat out wrong to view Lonergan's understanding of the "transcendental" and the "a priori" as anything but a profound critique of the Kantian orientation [16].

The context of Lonergan's understanding of the transcultural is in the shift from classicist to empirical notions of culture. The nature of this shift is often misunderstood: Lonergan's remarks are then taken to mean that, whereas there was the classicist notion of culture, now we are in an empiricist notion of culture, as if that were a realized achievement of our present United States culture. Nothing could be further from what Lonergan was trying to convey. At the beginning of Method in Theology he wrote:

> The classicist notion of culture was normative: at least de jure there was but one culture that was both universal and permanent; to its norms and ideals might aspire the uncultured, whether they were the young or the people or the natives or the barbarians. Besides the classicist, there also is the empirical notion of culture. It is the set of meanings and values that informs a way of life. It may remain unchanged for ages. It may be in process of slow development or rapid dissolution. [17]

What is quite evident from this passage, as well as from a longer study of all the passages in which Lonergan speaks of these two notions of culture, is that he is not predicating the "empirical notion of culture" as one that is fully operative within any particular contemporary culture today.

Indeed, I would argue that by "empirical" Lonergan means an orientation to culture which attends to both the data of sense and the data of consciousness. All cultures, no matter at what time or place, are constituted by sets of meanings and values informing ways of living. Lonergan is defining a notion of culture which is attentive to the shift toward interiority. Cultures have always been "a set of meanings and values that informed a way of life." But cultures did not always advert to that. Many of them, including our own United States culture today, fall into what I would term the fallacy of misplaced normativeness. What seems endemic to humankind is a tendency to commit idolatry or reification. Our God-gifted creative intelligence and love discover or constitute meanings and values. Then, instead of acknowledging the intelligence-in-act which creates those cultural meanings and values, we misplace the normativeness into the languages, the concepts, the ideas, the symbols, or whatever else is the product created by the intelligence and understanding. So the culture is taken as normative rather than the enculturating persons who are attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly creating the meanings and values. The "set of meanings and values" is mistaken as normative, rather than the concrete human persons, the "meaners and evaluators."

As Lonergan indicates throughout Method in Theology, it only takes critical history to dismantle the pretensions of the classicist notion of culture. It reveals that words, concepts, ideas, languages, symbols, etc. have dates. They are expressed at particular times and in particular places. Then how can they be normative for all times or places! But critical history is only a half-way house. It dismantles the pretensions of classicist notions of culture, but it can hardly discover the norms responsible for its own insights and judgments. Too often critical history has simply followed the same mistaken path of the classicist notion of culture. Only now instead of norms found in sets of Hebrew, Greek, or Latin texts, the norm is placed in a critically reconstructed "original" text, or in a set of critically reconstructed redactions. It is little wonder

that such a fallacy of misplaced normativeness would be dismantled by structuralist and deconstructionist orientations which would revive the crisis of historicism.

Contemporary historicism is simply the philosophical reflex of modern liberalism which cannot understand how more than particulars exist. Exegetes who find themselves bewildered by the deconstructionist orientations among their younger colleagues, especially Catholic exegetes, have by and large failed to advert to the normativity of their own related and recurrent operations in interpreting texts and reconstructing historical movements. The freedom from classicist pretensions which those Catholic exegetes won, they now find their deconstructionist colleagues turning into a nihilistic relativism. All texts and cultures can and must be deconstructed in the name of Nietzsche or Derrida or whoever.

Optimally, each individual is her or his own deconstructionist. Deconstruction is the cultural correlative to the nuclear arms race in the "real" world of superpower relations. Cultural nihilism seems less destructive than military nihilism -- but only to those who still fail to advert to constitutive meaning and value. If all that we have are texts (or ideas or experiences or whatever product of human creativity or perversity), then why not "play" at deconstruction? Historicism is merely the flip side of idealism and empiricism.

The answer to the crisis of historicism is not to continue in the fallacy of misplaced normativeness, but to meet the issue squarely. Lonergan does this with his articulation of a third stage of meaning, a shift toward interiority, with its invitation to appropriate the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality. This invitation is precisely Lonergan's notion of the transcultural.

> ... the transcendental method outlined in our first chapter is, in a sense, transcultural. Clearly it is not transcultural inasmuch as it is explicitly formulated. But it is transcultural in the realities to which the formulation refers, for these realities are not the product of culture but, on the contrary, the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. Moreover, since it is to these realities we refer when we speak of homo sapiens, it follows that these realities are transcultural with respect to all truly human cultures. [18]

The transcultural is not some category or paradigm which is "abstracted" from many or all known cultures. It is not some "experience" or "idea" which claims to be verifiable in any and all cultures. The transcultural is the creative reality of

humankind in each and every culture creating, preserving, developing, neglecting, or dismantling the cultures in which they live. The reality simply exists, and to deny it is to deny the concrete universal of the human species. To run away from this transcultural reality is to run away from the concreteness and particularity of both ourselves and the particular cultures in which we live, as well as to run away from our concrete embeddedness in the whole of human history.

To ignore or to neglect our transcultural reality is to succumb to the basic or fundamental form of alienation. The reality of human intelligence and love is transcultural "because it is not the product of any culture but rather the principle that begets and develops cultures that flourish, as it also is the principle that is violated when cultures crumble and decay" [19].

The notion of the transcultural, therefore, is not an abstract concept of an a priori, let alone some universal idea or norm extrinsic to -- floating above, if you will -- the multiplicity of human cultures in history. The transcultural is precisely the human creativity or lack thereof which accounts for any and every culture. Here we see how crucial is Lonergan's recovery of the operations involved in judgment. It cuts through the conceptualist haze in which universals and transculturals were thought to be products rather than producers, experiences rather than experiencers, symbols rather than symbolizers, questions rather than questioners, concepts rather than conceptualizers, etc., etc., etc. The reality of the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality is the reality of the entire human race constituting the myriad cultures which have existed, do exist, and will exist. The transcultural is not the prerogative of some elite; it is the conscious intentionality of each and every human being who raises questions.

Lonergan is much more thorough in the critique he has provided of human alienation and reification than all the masters of suspicion put together. For they did not advert to what they were doing as they were engaging in their criticisms of culture. Hence the sad tragedies and horrors in which, as Marcuse phrased it, efforts at liberating human beings from oppression themselves turned into new forms of oppression. The products of creative or committed people are mistaken as norma-

tive, and so they soon turn into instruments of repressing new questions and new creativity and commitment.

To do this in turn with Lonergan's own formulations would be to fall into the fallacy of misplaced normativeness. What is foundational is coming to appropriate the realities of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. That is why the whole of the book Insight aims at leading the attentive reader to the judgment "I am a knower." The process of intellectual conversion involved in this judgment is the reality of questioning and judging human beings which occurs in all cultures, and also enables those who work through the process of such conversion to come to articulate or express their judgments in whatever cultural expressions are available to them.

The concrete normativeness of the transcultural is hardly "privatized" in the "black box" of billions of monadic human beings. The Cartesian and modern alienations, in which "humanity" is merely an idea or aggregate of the monads, is what has been behind the analytic arguments about consciousness as "private languages," and the many criticisms of the modern "philosophies of consciousness." Lonergan has, in my judgment, gone to the root of such misguided modern orientations by attending to the concrete realities of the related and recurrent operations of human questioning and doing. What do we do when we know? Why is doing that knowing? What do we know when we do it? With these three questions, and the realities they reference, one is able to cut through the conceptualism which blankets a series of philosophies of consciousness, followed by philosophies of the subject, followed by philosophies of production, followed by philosophies of language, etc., etc. Lonergan adverted to the fact that we do not have to study such "philosophies of..." in order to be conscious, to be subjects, to be laborers, to speak language, etc., etc. What all of the philosophies lacked was precisely a verified account of the operations of judging. They have fallen into the fallacy of misplaced normativeness.

This brings us to what Lonergan calls in Insight "the intellectual pattern of experience." It is only within that pattern that one can move from a latent to an explicit metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, as the answer to the question "What do I know when I do know?" [20] It is within this context that Lonergan raises the question of the cultural differences between East and West in

the Epilogue of Insight. The central issue regards whether or not the realities of the questioning dynamism of human beings are different on the heuristic and functional meta-level on which Lonergan addresses them. He responds that they are not, and that response is verifiable; it is transculturally public in terms of how Easterners and Westerners have performed in their own intellectual patterns of experience, their own appropriation of the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality.

> Again, the argument from the cultural differences of East and West does not seem to touch our position. For while those differences are profound and manifest, they are not differences that lie within the intellectual pattern of experience. A man can unfold his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know by asking and answering questions, and then he operates in the intellectual pattern of experience; again, he can reflect that asking questions can never lead to more than mere answers, and then he will endeavour to enter into the mystical pattern of experience. Both procedures have the same origin and both have the same ultimate goal. Both yield their different and basically equivalent accounts of ultimate reality. But both do not yield a metaphysics in the sense in which metaphysics has been conceived in this work; for metaphysics, as it has been conceived, arises in the intellectual pattern of experience, and, when an Easterner inquires and understands, reflects and judges, he performs the same operations as a Westerner. [21]

Presupposed in this response is how the reality of raising questions, of exercising intelligence-in-act or being in an intellectual pattern of experience, is to allow the pure and unrestricted desire to know full scope for its questioning dynamism. This desire is Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas's "lumen intellectus agentis" which, as Aquinas wrote following Augustine, is a created participation in Divine Infinite Intelligence and Love. The mind as "potens omnia fieri et facere" is infinite in the realm of potency, as God is Infinite Act. As "infinite" or "unrestricted" in its orientation, humankind will never run out of questions. The more questions we answer, the more questions emerge. Only when we know everything, when we are one with Infinite Reality as Infinite Understanding, will the potentiality of our intellectual desires, our questioning, be fully actualized. [22]

Theology and the Transcultural

The implications of Lonergan's notion of the transcultural realities of human being and human questioning for theology are extensive. I can only list a few of them by way of conclusions to this paper.

First, there are the very obvious implications in terms of functional specialization as distinct from, and capable of functionally interrelating, field specialization and subject specialization. In approaching functional specialties it is crucial not to fall into what I have called the fallacy of misplaced normativeness. If one has misread Lonergan's notion of transcendental method as just a variation on Kantian or Neo-Kantian themes, then one can imagine that Lonergan is developing a set of rules, or regulative ideas, which ought to be helpful (if one is sympathetic) or harmful (if one is not) in restructuring how theology and/or religious studies departments go about doing whatever they do. It is not by chance that both Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan devoted much of their efforts to re-envision ways of doing theology. Today it is generally recognized that theology and religious studies are in crisis [23].

The crisis is not going to be met simply by attending to products, contents, fields, or subject matters. Attention will have to be directed more at what it is we are doing when we do theology or religious studies, the noetic praxis of our disciplines, if they are not to end up as quaint museum pieces of interest only for fundamentalists or historians. The significance of Lonergan's work is especially important for Catholic theology in this country. If there is one aspect of Catholic traditions which cannot agree with the many Protestant traditions, it is the Catholic rejection of a complete separation or dichotomy between faith and reason. Faith is not a blind or irrational leap in Catholic theological traditions. Yet we are increasingly witnessing public debates between Catholic conservative and Catholic liberal theologians and philosophers in which the conservatives are not conserving Catholic traditions, nor are the liberals advancing or transforming those traditions. Neither side gives evidence of <u>knowing</u> the traditions. Unless this is addressed, Catholic theology will not be in a position to contribute what it could to the cultural and ecclesial crises of today. Catholicism will end up like much of U.S. Protestantism, divided between fundamentalist self-assertion of faith and authoritarianism, on the one hand, and liberal self-depreciation of faith and historicist relativism, on the other hand [24].

Second, Lonergan's notion of the transcultural would be very relevant to a better understanding of Catholic traditions on universality. Catholicism means καθ' ὅλον, according to, within, the whole. It means precisely what Lonergan articulates

as the concrete universal. The universality of Catholicism is not meant to be an Ultramontanist, bureaucratic, "top-down" universality so typical of empires throughout history and now intrinsic to all modern nation-state cultures. The concrete universal is not "in competition" with the particular and the local. It is precisely the matrix of the particular and the local. The fallacy of misplaced normativeness is what leads to bureaucracy rather than catholicity. As Yves Congar and Joseph Komonchak indicated, Roman Catholicism is a communion of local churches in community with the local Church in Rome. The universality is mediated in and through the particularity of local Churches gathered around their local Bishop and celebrating the Eucharistic meal in a communion that is both fully particular and global-historical. In dealing with pluralism and the unity of faith, Lonergan describes and criticizes the classicism which has been "never more than the shabby shell of Catholicism." Unfortunately, it seems that more and more conservative and liberal Catholics have identified with the shell and ignored the substance [25].

The Church is not a democracy if by democracy is meant the mechanical aggregation of monads all having equal rights. The organic orientation of Catholicism, and Catholic social teaching, rejects such social mechanisms. Indeed, within the concretely realized democracies today, do we not find that precisely the monadic individualism they promote undercuts the equality of individuals? In my judgment the so-called "advanced" democracies today exhibit strongly a Max Weberian "democratic dogmatism," wherein dominative power is the name of the game, and the poor, the weak, the dead, the unborn, and the environment suffer as never before in human history [26].

Third, there are fundamental differences between Lonergan's notion of the concrete universal and most modern analyses of universality. In the first section I indicate briefly differences with Hegel. Those are very relevant to contemporary theology, especially as it begins to explore the philosophical and cultural presuppositions of many field specialties. Take, for instance, the historical critical methods. The entire development of nineteenth- and twentieth-century historical criticism has not been immune from the distortions of a very deep-seated conceptualism, with its anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic biases. As John C. O'Neil has very accurately observed, nineteenth-century New Testament criticism was both

Protestant and dedicated to the proposition that "Catholic Christianity was a huge deception" [27].

There were two versions of how the story of huge deception was told, as Nicholas Lash observes, and they both end in conceptualistic or spiritualistic "thought" (Begriff) triumphing over the materialism of imagination and sacrament (Vorstellung).

> According to the first, Jesus's essentially Jewish teaching was eventually distorted by the Gentile Church, but this version could be told with approval by those for whom the distortion in question was a 'spiritualization' of regrettably 'materialist' Jewishness and, as such, a first step on the long road to 'rationality' and 'thought'. According to the second, Jesus's essentially spiritual teaching was distorted by his materialistic Jewish followers. On this account, Paul is the only 'pure' Christian, and Catholicism is a fatal compromise between Pauline Christianity (which is spiritual, and a good thing) and Petrine Christianity (which is Jewish, material, and a bad thing). [28]

The enormously influential German professor of Oriental Languages and historian of Israel, J. Wellhausen, acknowledged his debt to Hegelian concepts (Begriff negating as it sublates Vorstellung) as he traced out the stages of Israel's historical "development." What is usually not taught today is that he was also convinced that, "the truly Christian Church must be a national one, and that ... the nation must assume the spiritual mantle that had belonged to the early Church" [29]. In the modern and Hegelian framework of sublation (Aufhebung), negation plays a major role: mind (Geist) sublates and negates nature, concept sublates and negates image. As the work of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan makes clear, sublation need not involve negation [30].

Fourth, this correction of the Hegelian notion of sublation is fundamental. The differentiations of consciousness do not "negate" earlier, less differentiated forms of consciousness. Understanding does not negate experiencing, nor does judging negate understanding, nor does responsible decision and action negate judging. Faith does not negate reason, intelligence does not negate imagination, theory does not negate narrative and symbol, eternity does not negate time. I could go on and on regarding how crucial Lonergan's and Rahner's very Catholic notion of sublation is, how important it is for contributions to ecclesial and cultural and social crises today.

Negation is everywhere in modern cultures. And so the false universality of empire, which was based on domination and negation (as Augustine saw so clearly in his City of God), has now become endemic, not only to communist and capitalist super-

powers with their nuclear weapons, but to almost all modern nation-states. Theodor Adorno, grasping the horror of Hegelian universality and totality, could only respond with his negative dialectical "the whole is untruth." Because in the modern secularist totality, it is merely an aggregation of all individuals through power and domination. This is deeply ingrained in all modern social theories. Max Weber saw domination (herrschaft) as intrinsic to all social organizations, so it was simply a question of conventionally establishing the "legitimate" forms of domination. Impoverishing abstract conceptualism is at the root of this Weberian notion, which is related to theological treatments of church and sect, of charisma, of patriarchy, and many other important categories in use theologically [31].

Fifth, the theological questions surrounding both enculturation and liberation would be greatly aided, in my judgment, from an understanding of Lonergan's notion of the transcultural and concrete universality. I have already written regarding liberation issues. All too briefly, classism (oppression of the poor), racism, sexism, and technocentrism (oppression of environment and other species) are all not only terrible moral failures but also biases which darken human intelligence. As Lonergan stated, there is not a dialectic of nature. But we humans tend to project our desires and fears into "the wild kingdom" in order to rationalize our oppression and repression of nature and ourselves. This is then carried into the oppression of native peoples, of "primitives" who are not as "cultured" as we moderns. The reified and alienating "universal" of modernity is imposed upon nature and natives "for their own good" as "the white man" assumes his cultural destiny. These alienations are in many ways more lethal in modern societies precisely because of the militarism which puts so much violence at the beck and call of inattentive, stupid, unreasoning, and irresponsibly hateful or indifferent moderns.

Sexism takes on a particularly virulent form as some women are "freed" from home work and "integrated" into professions, while all women (the degrading abstract universal) are "objectified" in the hundreds of billion dollar advertising world which links female bodies and body parts with consumer goods. Children of both genders and males are also exploited in the conceptualist universalism of Madison Ave. Moreover, as Prudence Allen and Caroline Bynum document, we moderns tend to

project our alienations back onto those who lived in pre-modern cultures, as if their asceticism was as nature-negating as our own culture is. The concrete universality of the human species is not "by nature" engaged in "struggles for survival" in which each must kill the other. The extent to which that describes the sad history of humankind is the extent to which humankind is inhuman. Inhumanity is not only morally and intellectually degrading; it is a sin against God's creation, a fall from Divine grace [32].

Questions of enculturation raise many issues relevant to Lonergan's notion of the transcultural. Central is the need for us to avoid treating cultures as if they were specimens in a modern zoo. The abstract universalist orientation, along with comparative cultural studies, often fail to provide adequate understanding of diverse cultures. What are compared are merely the cultural products, and then it is left up to force or domination to determine whether the "product" from another culture will be "assimilated" into a different culture. This is merely commercialism in on an inter-cultural exchange. Rather, what is needed is an attention to the creative and destructive operations within each and every culture, and the promotion of genuinely attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible human beings within each and every culture in order to counteract the destructive tendencies within their own cultures. The species being of humankind is the transcultural reality which is mediated in and through all cultures, not only now, but in the past and future as well. We can know the realities an Augustine or a Hildegard or an Aquinas knew, just as we can know the realities of our own experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, loving. These realities are never without mediations, and while the cultural mediations differ profoundly, those mediations are just that, they mediate.

Finally, Lonergan's notion of the transcultural would be enormously important in theologically understanding the realities referred to in all of our sacred texts and theological traditions. Modern theologians have too often failed to advert to how the foundations of their work are in ongoing intellectual, moral, and religious conversion processes. Only on such foundations will we be able to understand the realities spoken and written about, the reality of God and of the human need for salvation and redemption. Without such foundations we are locked into a modern secularist prison of mirrors in which we

only see texts, ideas, symbols, words, signs, etc., etc., etc. Theologians in such a prison would be like literary critics confronting a library of texts in high energy physics. To the extent that none of them knew high energy physics, they would proceed to compare texts, to notice how formulae and words were similar or different. This could be a parable about theologians who read texts but do not know the realities about which the texts are speaking. Texts of Augustine are similar to certain Stoic texts here, or Neo-Platonic texts there. Theology becomes only indirect discourse, saying what others said or wrote. In such a context there can be no truth, only opinions.

Dogma is misunderstood as only the result of imperial power games, since truth can only be the result of domination. Lonergan was able to recover the "via doctrinae" precisely because he adverted to the foundational realities on the basis of which doctrines were defined. Again, the fallacy of misplaced normativeness has led many to concentrate only upon the texts, the formulations. Catholics are then Christians who, besides the Bible, also have Denzinger! There grows the mistaken supposition that with the great Councils we have the "hellenization" of Christianity (e.g., Dewart), or the capitulation to Roman Imperialism (e.g., Cox, Moltmass) [33]. Not only do such reconstructions fail to account for significant counter evidence, but they also fail to understand how those invoked as Father, Son, and Spirit are not merely symbols or concepts or names, or myths, but the reality who is the Triune God. Given the enormity of evil and inhumanity in our human history, and especially in our modern human history, if God has not redeemed humankind, then our species is doomed. The transcendent and transcultural reality of God alone can bring life out of death, good out of evil, justice out of such massive injustice. This is anything but a call to passivity or an opiate against suffering, it is God calling us to love and serve and heal.

> God's gift of his love (Rom. 5,5) has a transcultural aspect. For if this gift is offered to all men, if it is manifested more or less authentically in the many and diverse religions of mankind, if it is apprehended in as many different manners as there are different cultures, still the gift itself as distinct from its manifestations is transcultural. [34]

NOTES

[1] Cf. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association vol. 59, n.5 (June 1986) pp. 747-759.

[2] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Dover Publications, 1959) volume One, pp. 206-7.

[3] Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik; also M. Theunissen, Hegels Lehre des absoluten Geist als theologische-politische Traktat.

[4] Knowledge and Human Interests p. 313; also Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979) pp. 53 ff.

[5] Cf. M. Lamb, "Christianity with the Political Dialectics of Community and Empire" in N. Biggar, J. Scott, W. Schweiker (eds.), Cities of Gods: Faith, Politics and Pluralism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (New York: Greenwood, 1986) pp. 73-100. On the relevance of this to Habermas' work, cf. Steven Lukes, "Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical Reason" in J. Thompson & D. Held (eds.), Habermas: Critical Debates pp. 134-48, 254 ff.

[6] There are notes and many illustrations of how deeply Lonergan studied Augustine, especially the Soliloquies, cf. William Matthew's forthcoming intellectual biography.

[7] Verbum p. 39.

[8] Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1967; originally published in Theological Studies, 1946-1949) pp. 155-6.

[9] Cf. M. Lamb "The Social and Political Dimensions of Lonergan's Theology" in Vernon Gregson (ed.), Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to Bernard Lonergan's Theology (New York: Paulist, 1988) pp. 255-284 and references given there.

[10] Bernard Lonergan, An Essay in Fundamental Sociology (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, unpublished manuscript 1935-38).

[11] Ibid. p. 118. Italics are hand written insertions by Lonergan himself in the typed manuscript.

[12] Ibid. pp 99-100. The first italics are my own emphasis; the second italicized phrase was added to the typed manuscript in Lonergan's own hand writing.

[13] Bernard Lonergan, Insight p. 363.

[14] Insight p. 743 emphasis mine. For more on this, cf. M. Lamb "The Social and Political Dimensions of Lonergan's Theology," op.cit., pp. 269-79.

[15] Insight p. 422 emphasis mine. Lonergan goes on to explain how Hegel's notion of dialectic is universal in an undifferentiated way, whereas his own notion of dialectic is specific and applies to human historical process and action, as well as to the human psychoneural, but not to purely natural processes of physics, chemistry, biology.

[16] Cf. Giovanni Sala, Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971). Similar remarks apply to Karl Rahner's work as well. Both Lonergan and Rahner are often referred to as "transcendental Thomists," which have made the "Kantian" turn to the subject. What this overlooks are the profound criticisms of the Kantian and idealist orientations in both Jesuits' work.

[17] Method in Theology p. xi.

[18] Method in Theology p. 282.

[19] Ibid. pp. 283, also 55.

[20] Cf. Insight pp. 385-594.

[21] Insight p. 736.

[22] Cf. Verbum pp. 47-95 on how this relates to the operations of judging, of knowing beings, and occurs within wisdom.

[23] Cf. Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983).

[24] Cf. M. Lamb, "Politische Theologie jenseits von Restauration und Liberalismus" in E. Schillebeeckx (ed.), Mystik und Politik: Theologie im Ringen um Geschichte und Gesellshaft (Mainz: Grünewald, 1988) pp. 95-105.

[25] Cf. Method in Theology p. 326-7.

[26] Cf. M. Lamb, "Communicative Praxis and Theology: Beyond Modern Nihilism and Dogmatism" a paper delivered at the Critical Theory and Theology Conference, University of Chicago, October 1988. It will be published in the proceedings of that conference.

[27] Cf. John O'Neill, "The Study of the New Testament" in N. Smart et al. (eds.) Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 143-178.

[28] Cf. Nicholas Lash, in The Journal of Theological Studies vol.37, n. 2 (1986) pp. 654-66.

[29] Cf. R.E. Clements "The Study of the Old Testament" in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol. III, p. 132.

[30] Cf. Bernard Lonergan Method in Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1972) pp. 240 ff. Johann Baptist Metz situates the significance of Latin American liberation theologies in terms of the movements of post-idealistic theologies cf. his Die Theologie der Befeiung: Hoffnung oder Gefahr für die Kirche? (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1986) pp. 147-57. This is one of the Less well known legacies of idealism, the Hegelian legacy of development and sublation as intrinsically negation. This legacy has extensively derailed historical reconstructions of the past.

[31] Cf. Kathy E. Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984). Note, however, how Ferguson has a truncated notion of constitutive meaning, in which "thinking, ideas, and beliefs" are mentioned but never traced to the realities of human knowing and doing. With such a truncated feminist discourse the real dialectic with bureaucracy is missed. As the history of MS magazine since Ferguson's book illustrates, modern bureaucratic capitalism is fully capable of assimilating truncated feminist discourse. It turns it into an ideology to aid in assimilating women into its cultural evaluation of career and profession above all else. Cf. Christine Luger, The Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) on the class differences of women engaged in pro-life and pro-choice.

[32] Cf. M. Lamb, Solidarity with Victims (New York: Crossroad, 1982). Prudence Allen, The Concept of Women (Montreal: Edens Press, 1986); for an excellent clarification by contrast, cf. Rudolf Bell, Holy Anorexia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195) and Caroline Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy

Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Bynum carefully exposes the modern bias of Bell's work, how he had failed to attentively understand pre-modern women.

[33] Few areas are more misunderstood than the development of doctrine in modern theologies. Lonergan initiated a recovery of the dialectics operative in the classical period. For an historical reconstruction attentive to how orthodoxy precisely avoided both hellenization and imperialism, cf. Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition (Atlanta: John Know Press, 1975 and 1987) volumes I and II.

[34] Method in Theology pp. 282-3.

CURIOSITY AT THE CENTER OF ONE'S LIFE
REFLECTIONS ON ERIC O'CONNOR AND THE THOMAS MORE INSTITUTE

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I

In June of 1980 Eric O'Connor was awarded honorary doctorates in Law by the Universities of McGill and Concordia. In the course of his convocation address entitled "The Learning Community/Community of Inquiry," he referred to Wilder Penfield's posthumous autobiography, No Man Alone:

> Some of you may have read that beautiful posthumous autobiography of Wilder Penfield No Man Alone... About the autobiography, for anyone interested in the devious way that our inquiry leads to results -- devious, not in the sense of the planned deviousness of a person, but in the deviousness of Providence, I think I can say -- it is quite fascinating: the way the things get learned and the skills acquired that were needed for the great work of the Neurological Institute; and not only that, but how he was provided with what was needed so that the autobiography itself could be written. It is a wonderful book and, although Penfield had a fine early education, a book about adult learning. [1]

On December 1st, 1980, less than three weeks before he died, tragically with a suddenness that few were prepared for, Eric O'Connor was interviewed at the Discovery Theatre in Toronto by Therese Mason and Michael Czerney. In their explorations of the theme of "Towards Liberated Curiosity" he gave one of the best accounts of the early days of the Thomas More Institute. In the course of the interview Therese Mason asked him to elaborate on Penfield [2]. He replied:

> He was so beautifully curious. He was not trapped in any one way of working. Neurology seemed to be all in books and not very helpful with concrete problems in a clinical setting. He saw the possibility of joining theory and practice. He heard of a man in Spain who had a technique, so he went and spent some time there; he heard of someone in Germany and went there...
>
> His book, I find, shows him as aware on many levels. He writes about things he got interested in and worked on because his sister had a certain kind of sickness. He didn't intend to go and cure her sickness, but it caused a question in him. Out of letters he wrote to his mother, he had the possibility of writing his autobiography. He seemed led by a fate he didn't know about. That comes through in glimmers when you read the book a second time. Things he hadn't seemed to notice, he caught later from the letters; they had certainly influenced him as he lived his life.

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Penfield, in his personality and life orientation, comes across to me here as a kindred spirit of Eric O'Connor. They both had commitments to institutes of learning and they both had a fundamental openness.

In an interview entitled "Directions of Openness: The Adult Choice," O'Connor explored the distinction between becoming open to one's questioning on the one hand, and finding its particular direction within one's openness on the other hand [3]. It suggests to us that his story and that of the Thomas More Institute are not directionless, an issue explored by Michael Czerney:

> How has the Thomas More Institute grown in its own sense of direction or sense of curiosity as a learning community? Do you know that story now, after thirty-five years of learning together? ... One of the concrete fruits of this interview might be to encourage persons like yourself to find a way of looking back and making a story out of some of the things that have been learned. We are pushing you on this because we have a sense that there is a wisdom and there are insights possible for everyone in the story of how you have muddled through. I come back to the lesson to be drawn from the Penfield letters. I feel there is a story like his in the brochures and in remembrances of the courses [4].

The questions addressed to the devious providence at work in the Thomas More Institute can also be addressed to the life of Eric O'Connor for the two are inevitably intertwined.

The publication of Curiosity at the Center of One's Life makes public very many of the sources in which the story resides. It is a beautifully produced book, a monument to the achievements of O'Connor and his collaborators and their devotion to him and his work. But in order to capture the imaginativeness and creativity of Eric O'Connor it has to be read in conjunction with Conversations with Eric Voegelin, The Question as Commitment, Dialogues in Celebration, and Inquiry as Attunement [5]. Taken together they constitute his currently published "Collected Works." Still missing are details of over two hundred courses that O'Connor lectured in or led discussions in, eighty of them being two-term university courses as well as information on his work in mathematics. In them we will find clues as to what he and the Thomas More Institute were curious about. All I can offer here is of the form of a preface to that work.

II

In 1944, by popular request of a group of teachers in Montreal, a series of six lectures was offered on philosophical

questions arising out of the process of education. One of the lecturers was Bernard Lonergan. The response to the series was substantial. In 1945 Loyola College discontinued its Adult Education or Extension courses. Given the interest in further education among the teachers the closure created a vacuum. Out of this felt need the Thomas More Institute was born. As Archbishop Emmett Carter, who was the first president of the Institute put it:

> During evenings when we gathered at certain homes we were really putting ourselves to this question: how can we set up some intellectual ambience in which ordinary people can pursue questions in a community? [6]

With almost no time for planning, it began suddenly in mid-November. For Carter it was to become a searcher's institute.

Bernard Lonergan lectured in the first year on "Thought and Reality." It was a significant course, both for him and for the Institute. The response to it convinced him that a book such as Insight was a real possibility. But what seems to have impressed O'Connor was not so much the problem Lonergan was grappling with itself -- what do you mean by reality and how do you know it?, as the manner he went about it [7].

> What came through from him was that all questions could be asked and should be asked, that in fact one didn't begin to learn until one began asking questions. This was a shock to anyone educated before 1945. ... Having those lectures didn't become important as a theory. That is definite. It became important as an experience: the way you learned anything was by slow questioning. ... In those early lectures, he somehow gave us the sense that the world is open to explore - because he is curious himself about anything, and explores it. Slowly, in the lectures, he gave us a little glimmer about the obvious next level of questioning. You ask whether you have understood a thing correctly or not. [8]

By way of contrast O'Connor refers to his own training in mathematics. He had first learned the definitions in topology without getting the questions behind them. He didn't know that the way to learn topology was to play with the shapes and then try to define them. He found that he was not asking the questions that were answered by what he was learning. This same point is brought out in his account of one of his earliest meetings with Lonergan in the early forties:

> He came to my room to ask me a simple question in mathematics that he was working on in his book in philosophy. Well, it was a subject that I knew well, the area that I knew very well. I learned more from a few questions of his, just because he was asking the right questions, not being an expert, but asking the question in the right way.

> I learned more about how one proved things in that area of mathematics than I had in getting my Ph.D. [9]

Lonergan's lectures brought about that change in him.

As he with his mathematical education, so he found that people brought up in Catholic, Protestant or Jewish traditions took as unquestionable the notions they had received.

> I understand why you are talking mostly about religious doctrine; that is what many people take over without having lived through the experience of the question. They didn't know what the dogma is answering, but because it's religious it has a lot of importance to them. But on every level of understanding there are doctrines that are just accepted statements. [10]

To put it in present terms, they were receiving in their education somewhat fixed and rigid answers to questions they had not yet raised, rather than signposts to a profound life giving wisdom in the past. The point was made beautifully by a student in answering an exam question:

> Incredible as it seems, up till this year knowledge was always something that I was expected to receive from the outside. I looked upon (unconsciously) myself as the passive partner. For would I have come to learn if I had knowledge already? I always thought my ignorance something insurmountable in the face of all the books that I would have to read to gain the knowledge that men have already studied through the ages. ... Suddenly I realized that if other people's experience and insights are worth studying, the values and insights and the study of my experiences must be of equal value to me and others. [11]

As we listen to the testimony of persons such as this about their own experience it becomes evocative, it interacts with us, opens us up to ourselves.

Finding the questions to which one's early education was providing answers can be a crucial step in adult development. The Thomas More did not mean to question the correctness of the traditions, be they literary, religious, political or cultural. The point was, had they been understood, what did they mean? [12] For Voegelin, a bad introduction to one's traditions results in a fantastic ignorance of the past [13]. For him Flaubert in his Tentation de Saint Antoine and Bouvart at Peuchet was articulating a profound wisdom, but one by and large rejected by the twentieth century. "After all, who knows Flaubert? Who uses him as a source for understanding these matters" [14]. The passages echo Buber's "Prejudices of Youth," the dogma that the world begins with "our generation" and the past, tradition, has nothing to teach us. The fact of the matter is that there is a wisdom in one's past traditions, which properly assimilated equips a modern generation to understand,

diagnose, interpret and respond to the pathologies and the creativities of the human spirit in its own era. Without the proper awakening of our questioning to the meaning and truth of our traditions and their wisdom figures we will be in bondage to them and become bigots. Or we will discard them and become rootless, be at the mercy of the whims of our present with no past wisdom to guide us. Bibby's Fragmented Gods seems to bear witness to such a collapse, especially in Quebec [15].

Four of the best psychiatrists in Montreal lectured in the first year. They were invited to present some of the best ideas in their fields in one or two lectures. Karl Stern was one. Another was Noel Maiou, a Dominican who over time changed the whole attitude to mental illness at St-Jean-de-Dieu from a pre-Freudian to a more human approach [16]. For many years O'Connor was a member of this group concerned with humanizing the institutional care of the mentally ill at the time.

By the end of the first year there had emerged a sense of the importance of questioning, a grasp of the distinction between ideas and judgments, and some interests such as psychiatry. The Institute also had a decidedly Catholic ring about it. But this was not to last. In 1947 a great number of Protestants and Jewish person began to get interested in the courses on offer. That is why, when it was incorporated in 1948, it was under the name Thomas More Institute -- not Saint or Sir Thomas More. That is why, a little later, a grant of one hundred thousand dollars had to be passed over [17].

After four years, without really understanding where it might lead, The Great Books people were invited to come and train the teachers for a week. So there emerged the idea of reading and discussing a text together. Gerald McGuigan would push one side of an issue, then the other, and make the people think. The philosophic-type questioning was extended into other areas. Instead of bringing in personal examples, every person in a group would have the common experience of a story they had all read. But recognition of this only began about 1954 [18]. Needless to say teachers who had been working with the lecture method, the system in which the teacher was an expert imparting knowledge to the ignorant, resisted this new approach in which teacher and student both became learners [19].

So there was a transition from a lecture format, through The Great Books discussions, to "reading-discussion" courses, that was to become the key methodology of the Institute [20].

This was in place by 1957-8 [21]. Over time the word "reading" came to be interpreted widely, including concert hearing, play going, movie-viewing, lecture hearing, sensitivity session experience -- provided they were informed by some kind of inquiry and linked by an obvious theme or set of themes [22]. The goal of the themes chosen is to help the students to find directions in their lives. The adult learners attending the evening courses, aged twenty-five and over and usually in groups of between twelve and thirty, were invited to read a short text each week, specific to the particular course. The task of the discussion leaders was not to suggest answers, but to facilitate the expression of the questions of the members of the group that arose from their reading. Given that the lecture format was the paradigm at the time this transition could not have been easy.

> In our ideal picture of the discussion group, the two leaders try to find the questions that are near the surface of the persons in the group... Not questions out of the blue but ones which touch on something in the reading. It is an experimental method: when we get blank looks, we know we are missing <u>their</u> questions... At first, we used to prepare a list of questions to ask. We found that approach didn't allow for following the cues as to questions people were ready to consider. [23]
>
> How does easy-flowing, satisfying, and really fruitful discussion occur? As some words awaken associations while others do not, what is the way of proposing suggestive questions that will find reverberations in a person's memory and carry that person to those aspects of a subject that could take his interest? How does a discussion leader over time, become more aware of the memory resources of the members of a group so as to be able, for example, to produce a synthesizing question that would enable them to call together their experience (personal, and in the group so far, and in the shared readings) and find a new sense in it. [24]
>
> These last remarks have moved us into consideration of directions of the movements of questioning. Before entering further, there are remarks to be made on the timing of questions. There is a kind of breathing in a good discussion very like the breathing within an orchestra under an effective conductor, or like an audience in the presence of two or more masterful actors; there is relaxation enough to breath and keep thinking alertly, space enough in which to contribute a relevant response, listening enough going on to make thinking in a group possible. [25]

To the disciplined systematic scientific mind, or to the literary mind who is familiar with narrative and style, there is an enormous jump to be made in acquiring and appreciating the method of being a discussion leader of mid-wifing the questions of a group of adults. And yet there is an enormous creativity

in doing just that, a creativity that cannot be acquired in any other way.

> I found the discipline of being a discussion leader was a great thing in my life -- not being called upon to furnish answers to people, not being allowed by the discipline of the round-table to suggest an answer; that I think is a terrific experience. It teaches you to be patient, and respectful of other opinions, as many teachers are not. [26]

The same seems to be true about reading the scripts of the dialogues. It requires patience. There are dull and tedious passages in the conversation. As in mining there is the going down into the soil of the lives and experiences of the group. Out of it at certain points enormously creative passages can emerge quite spontaneously.

If the inspiration of Lonergan is there and clear, what is striking is the quite different direction which Eric O'Connor travelled on his own journey. Whereas a great deal of Lonergan's quest was in solitude, Toynbee's withdrawal and return, with punctuated returns such as giving courses at the Thomas More Institute and other places, the emphasis in the Thomas More was on the community of inquiry. The task seems to be twofold, firstly, to awaken, open up the questioning of the adult in a general way, and secondly, to help them to find their own specific direction within their new openness, to bring about an attunement which can be followed in an interplay of solitude and community. Until a person has had this experience I believe that Lonergan's work in Insight and Method in Theology is inaccessible. In some ways, until the kind of community the Thomas More Institute is interested in creating exists, Lonergan's work does not have an adequate basis from which to grow.

For O'Connor all the great educators he knew had been touched by, had a sense of the wholeness of, what a person can be. In their education they communicated this vision of wholeness. A second feature of adult education is the critical involvement of the human being. There is also the suggestion that:

> An adult has access to himself as an historical being, which made it possible to realize unique aspects of adult learning. [27]

As Buber takes dialogue relations as the anthropological basis for his adult education, so Eric O'Connor takes Lonergan's transcendental method, within the context of a community of inquirers, as his [28]. What Eric O'Connor and the Thomas More Institute recognize well is that adults have their own unique

questioning agenda, and that there is an absolute and irreducible value in that.

Further questions abound. The goal of the interactions is to find the way forward, the arteries of personal intellectual growth in the life of the individual. But in many cases that might require the painful deconstruction of the past before the reconstruction of the present and future could take place. What are the really significant questions at different stages in a particular person's life? [29] Or alternatively, how do ultimate questions arise existentially at different stages in life? My own orientation would be to assert that every human being, in the wholeness of their life, has a unique "question-history." The transcendental notions that Lonergan talks about are basically narratives in time [30]. So as well as becoming attuned to one's agenda at a particular point in adulthood, there is a further task of becoming attuned to the narrative structure of one's wonder, the intellectual plot in one's life. Obviously it is only in retrospect, as one's sense of one's personal history develops that one can, like Wilder Penfield pick up the clues to this [31].

To this end, as well as creative "reading-discussion" courses, I would also advocate the use of a journal in adult education in order concretely to contextualise the educational issues within one's life as a whole. The number of creative individuals who have kept a journal, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Merton, to mention but a few, is surprising. By and large its educational and creative potential has been neglected. It is a tool for communication between the individual and his or her unfolding life as a whole. As such I believe it can foster an appreciation of openness, direction, and of one's personal question history. It can balance out the domination of the demands of the present moment.

III

Eric O'Connor's interests are extremely wide ranging. Curiosity at the Center of One's Life includes his convocation statements over the years 1948-78, reflections on the Great Books and on Adult Liberal Education. There are interviews and dialogues with Eric O'Connor himself, demonstrations of the Thomas More Institute method at work, conversations with Bernard Lonergan, dialogues on India, Mexico, economics and genetics. At a first reading one is likely to be disorientated by the apparent multiplicity of genres and topics. It takes discern-

ment to grasp that what unifies them all is the personality and philosophy of Eric O'Connor. A helpful starting point are the sections which describe in a focused manner what it is that the Thomas More Institute is up to and how they go about it -- "Transcendental Method" at Florida, and "Toronto, Discovery Theatre." I found extremely interesting the pieces: "Knowing and Loving" (pp. 32-9) and "On Story in Relation to Questioning" (p. 209f). Granted the diversity of the material I will focus on O'Connor's interaction with Voegelin, Frye, Lonergan, and Penfield.

Eric Voegelin's first recorded lecture at Thomas More was in 1985, entitled "In Search of the Ground." He was dealing with a question which Lonergan would also address in his Method in Theology, how do you develop theological categories to deal with all cultures? What is their ground? There was to follow a long period of fruitful collaboration, especially in relation to The Ecumenical Age. In his lecture in October 1967 he introduced the notion of the "in-between":

> Man is neither quite man nor quite god but in-between, placed in the consciousness of tension that is Plato's metaxy (which means "in-between"). So existential tension is in-between: it is not quite human, it is not quite divine, but the tension between the two. And a man who is in such tension is not quite, in the old Homeric vocabulary, the "mortal man," nor is he quite a god who is immortal, but he is, again, a man of a type in-between. We need a new vocabulary for that kind of man. (As I said, the classics did not yet have the term "tension.") Plato calls him the daimonios aner. The daimonias is an entity between god and man, a demi-god, you see -- a "spiritual man," one could translate it. [32]

A fundamental characteristic of consciousness for Voegelin is then tension, "in-between":

> If you think of the consciousness with the tension between God and man and if, as is usually done (even by Plato and Aristotle), you call one pole the "timeless pole" and call the other a "pole of time," then you get a peculiar problem. Existence in tension which is consciousness moves in two dimensions at the same time; it is eternal and mundanely timebound. So you can express this existence only by the term (I usually use it) the flow of presence, meaning thereby the intersection of the time and the timeless. That is called the presence. [33]

Eric O'Connor was involved in many recorded interviews with him over those years, some of which appear in Conversations with Eric Voegelin, and in The Question as Commitment. Although he was familiar with the notion of the "in-between" from 1967, it was only towards the very end of his life that its significance and true deep meaning began to fall into place for him.

It is very clear that another major moment in Eric O'Connor's intellectual history was the discovery of Northrop Frye's The Secular Scripture in 1978. In that year, with Voegelin and Lonergan, Frye participated in a seminar at the Thomas More Institute on "Myth as Environment." Four of the essays in Curiosity at the Center of One's Life -- "Continuing Education, Continuing Inquiry," "On Story in Relation to Questioning," "What does the Reader Do?", and "Northrop Frye and Romance," (pp. 197-250) chart his discovery of Frye and growing enthusiasm.

> On the other hand, to relate story to people in terms of what their questions are, or to start their questions, or to guide their questions so that they can go into something like inquiry still remains to be done. ...Northrop Frye has suggested that, just as mathematics is the basis of the physical sciences, so stories can be the foundation for the social sciences. [34]

It seems that he was moving from reading and enjoying and working with stories to grasping their foundational nature, that story or narrative is of the essence of the human. For Ricoeur "time becomes human to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative: narrative in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience" [35]. The question arises, how does one link Frye and Ricoeur on time and myth with Lonergan on transcendental method?

To the extent that everything in our lives grows out of and adds to our own personal narrative, our own personal history, narrative is foundational. It is like the Cartesian "cogito." Any effort to think oneself out of one's personal history proves its impossibility. "Myth" in this sense is our environment. At the same time although Lonergan does not address the question of structure in time of the transcendental notions they are I believe narratives [36]. Questioning unfolds in our lives as the story of a quest, as a narrative. This can be verified in autobiographical texts of Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Darwin, Einstein, Buber, Collingwood and others [37]. It follows that as the transcendental notions come to be understood as a narrative in time the link between the philosophy of Lonergan, on the one hand, and Frye and Ricoeur on the other can be established and explored. Not only are the transcendental notions narratives in time, but so also is our appropriating or owning of them. Following Trainor, the writing down and the telling of the story of the owning of one's wonder, of one's questioning, is a basic form of philosophical "argument":

> The locus of the persuasive power of an autobiography used as a philosophical argument is the connection made between the narrator's personal growth and the way in which he thinks. [38]

Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein's biographer, remarked that the Tractatus was a tour de force in that it combined all the philosophical problems of his life up to that point [39]. But equally, unless you understand the life you don't understand the manner in which the Tractatus brings into a unity problems that arose at different times in the life. The life explains the book.

IV

Curiosity at the Center of One's Life also contains four interviews with Lonergan. It was one of the great skills of Eric O'Connor that he was able to get Lonergan and others to loosen up and talk in an informal manner. The first interview, in February 1969, deals with the transition from Insight to Method in Theology, and the latter's emphasis on the fourth level of intentional consciousness which was one of the key shifts. In discussing the relation between the two books he remarks that:

> You will not get much out of Insight unless you have had experience of insight on your own. [40]

This point has always seemed true to me. A central problem for him in writing Method was:

> How do you reconcile doing theology and at the same time being accurate historically? That is the fundamental problem in Method in Theology. [41]

The interview also reflects on Boyer and his doctoral thesis, the meaning of ecstatic, reflections on Marrou -- The Meaning of History, Gadamer, beliefs, and Chesterton.

The second interview on March 30, 1971 took place just after Method was finished. It discusses history, Heidegger, revelation, meaning, carriers, the smile. Discussing artistic meaning he remarks that the artist's inspiration initially is something that he has not yet objectified. Art is the objectification. He goes on:

> It holds in general for any form of inspiration. For instance, you want to write a book. And before you have it written, you do not know exactly what is going to be in it, but you are totally dedicated to it. ... And it is only in writing and rewriting that you find out what you wanted to do. (389)

The remark is obviously autobiographical, and refers to his experience of writing both Insight and Method in Theology.

The third interview on December 30th, 1971 is entitled "Grace after Faculty Psychology." It opens with a discussion of the shift from faculties to operations and levels of consciousness. It explores the question, "what is not the gratuitous gift of God?"; Philip the Chancellor on the two orders; intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, liberty, good will and good performance. At this point Cathleen Going brings the discussion into the present by asking Lonergan why he was preoccupied with method -- what is so important about method. He replied:

> I taught theology for 25 years under circumstances that I considered absurd. And the reason why they were absurd was for lack of method, or because of the survival of a method that should have been buried 200 years ago... I conceive theology as reflection on religion. And you need that reflection on religion because any human movement, artistic, political, social, literary, and so on, the longer it lasts and the further it spreads, has to reflect on itself and decide precisely what its aims are and its purposes, what purposes, what its assumptions and ground are. Otherwise it can be captured by anybody, and turned in all directions. ...Method is a framework for creative collaboration. [42]

His earlier interest in method in general was sparked off by his experience of the way theology was done. Interesting in the second paragraph is the problem of direction again, method is concerned with keeping the collaboration and religion attuned to its proper direction. He goes on to discuss the different tasks in theology and the problem of not letting any one of them dominate the enterprise, at the expense of the others. Is the method confined to Catholicism or Christian religions? Well, it is up to each to decide what he wants.

The fourth interview on March 28th, 1980 dealt with economics. It discussed the basic and surplus stages, macroeconomics and history; Vatican II and Jesuit scholastics, and Congar. On page 421 Lonergan acknowledges a clear chronological distinction in his education between literature and aesthetics, on the one hand, and philosophy on the other:

> The aesthetic side was my formation at Loyola and within the juniorate which was all literary, pre-philosophic. I had that formation,, but my ability to say things came with my study of philosophy. I remember Bolland asking me if I had any interest in philosophy. I said: I'm very interested in Butcher's <u>The Theory of Art</u>. "Oh! That's not philosophy!", he said.

Up to the time he left the juniorate in 1926 Lonergan had an extensive literary and aesthetic education. It was not until he went to Heythrop College in 1928 that his philosophical educa-

tion and interest really began.

V

Eric O'Connor's last Convocation homily in the Loyola Chapel of Concordia University was on Sunday, June 8th, 1980 just under six months before he died. The title was "Questions In-Between." The influence of Lonergan, Frye, Penfield, and Voegelin are again there. But it seems to me that the melody is changing subtly. Bernard Lonergan had surprised him one year by emphasizing that falling in love changes the knowledge of a person [43]. To know, for Buber, is to embrace lovingly. It is only love that sustains our knowledge. Penfield brought out the sense of the deviousness of Providence in the journey of human curiosity. In his last homily, reflecting on Voegelin's notion of the in-between of ignorance and knowledge, of quest and destination, he was I believe beginning to recognize, perhaps for the first time, who knows, that in the experience of the liberation of one's wonder and curiosity into its life journey, into its attunement to its direction and destination, and in the devious but sustained pursuit of that destination is to be discerned a most fundamental expression of the love of God.

My belief is that God is just as present in our questions as in our answers. In fact God is the one who leads us, who draws us on, [44] who goes before our questioning, and leads us to its destination. Of all the operations that are conscious, wonder and its expression in questioning is the core of the "in-between."

The last recorded discussion group led by Eric O'Connor on October 19th, 1980 took as its set reading Olsen's ballet text, The Born Dancer. Some participants wondered, how could someone be born a dancer? Do you mean to say that life is a matter of becoming what we are? Surely we make ourselves what we are? Well how could...

NOTES

[1] Curiosity at the Center of One's Life, Thomas More Institute Papers/84, Thomas More Montreal, 1987, p. 558. This will hereafter be referred to as CCL. Lonergan himself was also familiar with the deviousness of providence in the unfolding of his own question. In an extra-ordinary self disclosure in The Question as Commitment (Thomas More Institute Papers, Thomas More Institute Montreal 1979, hereafter referred to as TQAC) pages 10 and 32, he made clear that his interest in the question of method, of the surd, and of economics came extremely early and had a quite devious unfolding in his life. "The secondary source is interesting people and interesting books. I read books. If you find a book that hits you, you can say it is

research, or luck, or what I called "emergent probability" (a notion that I developed in Insight: the probability that something that fits in will come along: or, ultimately, Divine Providence." The same kind of experiences are recounted by Collingwood in his Autobiography, (Oxford, Oxford U.P. 1939). As a small boy he tells us that it came to him with some force that his task was to think. But he had no idea at all what he was to think about. There was no special question. He was, as he put it, wrestling with a fog (pp. 4-5). In retrospect he now knew that at that time the problems of his life's work were taking, deep down inside him, their first embryonic shape. The Autobiography is the story of how from such obscure origins the problem of philosophy of history became his life work. To this add Schopenhauer's essay "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual," pp. 201-223 in Pargea and Parlipomena, Short Philosophical Essays, Translated from the German by E.F.J. Payne, Vol I, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1974.

[2] Inquiry and Attunement, Thomas More Institute Papers/81, Montreal 1981, 9f. This will be referred to hereafter as IAA.

[3] CCL 123f takes up the issue of the directions of openness and adult choice. On page 139 a dissenting voice remarks that openness does not seem a characteristic of Catholicism. PP. 147-8 move in the direction of openness.

[4] IAA, Thomas More Institute Papers/81, Montreal 1981, pp. 11, 24.

[5] Conversations with Eric Voegelin, Thomas More Institute Papers/76, Montreal 1976, hereafter referred to as CWEV; The Question as Commitment (see note 1); Dialogues in Celebration, Thomas More Institute Papers/80, Montreal 1980) hereafter referred to as DIC; Inquiry and Attunement (see note 2).

[6] DIC, p. 50. The text contains some perceptive remarks on love and the need for the purification of love.

[7] Lonergan gave two courses in the Thomas More Institute related to Insight, the first in 1945-6, the second in 1951-2. In the second the emphasis was much more focused on the questioning activity and its significance so it is a question - was Eric O'Connor talking about only the first course, or possibly the two?

[8] IAA, pp. 1, 13, 15. [9] CCL 118-9.

[10] CWEV, 101f.

[11] Answer to exam in the course; "The Alerted Mind - Arousal, Inquiry, Performance" in April 1969 by Mrs. Agnes Sunderland, CCL vi.

[12] IAA, p. 6. [13] CWEV, 25.

[14] CWEV, 25.

[15] R.W. Bibby, Fragmented Gods, The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada, Irwin Publishing, Toronto 1987, in particular 19-21 for the situation in Quebec.

[16] IAA, p. 5 [17] IAA, 5.

[18] IAA 2, 3. [19] CCL 92.

[20] See CCL 273-293 for a discussion of this methodology.

[21] CCL 92. [22] CCL 91.

[23] IAA, 4. [24] CCL 152-3.

[25] CCL 95.

[26] DIC pp. 50-1. See also CCL pp. 98-101.

[27] CCL pp. 76-7, on critical involvement. The quote comes from p. viii of the Preface.

[28] For parallels between O'Connor and Buber see Daniel Murphy, Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education, Irish Academic Press, Dublin 1988, especially chapters V, VI, and VII.

[29] QAC, p. 130.

[30] see W. Mathews, "Wonder as Narrative" in Philosophical Studies (NUI), Vol XXXI, 1986-7, pp. 258-279.

[31] As Buber at the end of his life came to appreciate the importance of his own personal history and story, so also I believe with Lonergan and O'Connor. But it was not a major theme and there was some resistance. See CCL 373, for Lonergan on "being-in-love" and personal histories, also page 587 of the notes of his course on Method on Theology at Toronto, July 1969, for a comment on identifying grace in one's psychological experiences; Caring About Meaning, Thomas More Institute Papers/82, Thomas More, Montreal 1982, pp. 16-18 for his reading of Progoff; 197-9 for resistance to autobiography. For O'Connor, "It has been said cheaply, casually, everybody has a story which is their own life story. I think this is highly questionable. I think we may at the end of our life have written a story, but I don't think the story is there yet. I wonder if when we change roles, the role of say a priest, a teacher of mathematics, a lecturer to you people...? In these roles, in a sense, we are in a different story, a slightly different story. We take a different stance. ...is there any way to modify that in a person's story?" (CCL p. 213).

[32] CWEV, p. 45. There are echoes of Kierkegaard on anxiety.

[33] CWEV, p. 62.

[34] The first part of the quote is from CCL, p. 210; the second from IAA, p. 40.

[35] Time and Narrative, Volume 1, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984, p. 3, repeated pp. 6 and 52.

[36] Chapter 1 of Method in Theology offers no clues as to the temporal unfolding of the transcendental notions. My "Wonder as Narrative" was an attempt to do this.

[37] see Paul Trainor, "Autobiography as Philosophical Argument: Socrates, Descartes, Collingwood, Thought, Vol LXIII, No. 251, December 1988, 378-296.

[38] op. cit., p. 382.

[39] Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life: Young Ludwig (1889-1921), Duckworth, London 1988, p. 313.

[40] CCL, P. 381 [41] CCL, p. 386.

[42] CCL, pp. 408-9 [43] CCL, p. 568.

[44] CWEV, p. 83f.

The Third World and Bernard Lonergan. edited by Walter L. Ysaac, S.J. Lonergan Centre, P.O. Box 4082, Manila, Philippines, 1986. Pp. 68. No price given.

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This slim volume groups four articles that link current world experiences and issues to Lonerganian concepts and methods, as well as to Lonergan's own life preoccupations. The title points out the particular relevance of the articles to the issues of economic development and cultural impact being confronted today by the so-called Third World nations. The cover, described in a note as "a white cross emerging...out of a background shadow of light grey" is interpreted in a number of ways -- within the experience of the west as the cross of Constantine, within recent experiences in the Philippines as a human cross formed by people massed at a highway intersection on whom helicopter gunship pilots have refused to fire, or as the symbol of the authenticity currently emerging "among the oppressed peoples of the Third World..." [1]. In fact, this very interpretation of the book's cover design raises two of the major themes of the articles: the urgency of the people's strivings in developing nations and given a common symbol or fact, the differences that can emerge in the interpretation and expression of common human endeavors and dreams.

The Crowe essay, the first in this volume, notes the "turn in our times from the abstract to the concrete, from speculation to involvement..." [2] and seeks to explain the place of such involvement in Lonergan's work. The article responds explicitly to the criticisms of Lonergan's work by liberation theologians who argue that analyses of concrete situations are needed rather than studies on methodology. Crowe in his essay contends that the "legitimate aspirations [of liberation theologians] ...would find strong support in Lonergan's work" [3]. The discussion refers to Lonergan's newspaper articles and his major essay on economics (written in the 1930s and '40s during the Great Depression), as well as his sections in Insight on common sense and cosmopolis, and the chapter in Method in Theology on the human good. What emerges is an impression of a man and priest who had a strong social concern; one who returned even at the end of his working life to the study of economics and the

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application of his Essay in Circulation Analysis to concrete situations.

But, Crowe reminds the reader, there is no illusion in Lonergan that "the rising star of another class or nation is going to put a different human nature in the saddle" [4]. Rather, he notes, it is the link between subject and object that is key in Lonergan's thought. According to Lonergan, "Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity" [5]. And it is the complexity of this dialectic that constitutes the theme of the second 48-page article by Walter Ysaac.

Professor Ysaac, who also edits the volume, states in the foreword to the book that his article "tries to show how Lonergan's insight into interiority can be of use in seeking a solid and adequate praxis-method for the human, religious and Christian concerns and hopes of the Third World." Ysaac approaches his goal principally by showing how human sciences are used (both formally or informally) in inculturation; but also by showing how this objective analysis must be complemented by a parallel inner or personal process of new understanding and transformation that includes openness to what he calls God's love, or, in other words, the Spirit within us. As the quotation from the foreword suggests, inculturation is used both in the broad sense of contacts between cultures as wholes, and more narrowly in the sense of the meeting of two religious traditions. The essay, however, leaves the reader with a strong sense of the complexity and interrelatedness of any and all interaction between cultures.

Ysaac demonstrates how the functional specialties, developed by Lonergan in his Method in Theology and later grouped under the term generalized empirical method, are applicable to the inculturation process. And, he argues, they apply "not only to the data and realities expounded...but also to the data of consciousness constitutive of the very methodical process" [6]. In fact, says Professor Ysaac, the fruit of such procedures in the first seven disciplines or functional specialties -- procedures that are needed to properly identify what is transcultural -- is the eighth discipline of communications. Professor Ysaac considers this eighth functional specialty to be crucial to inculturation for the "cultural self-constitution and self-communication of its [the transcultural's] common meaning" [7]. He contends, furthermore, that inculturation involves a dialectic because it "will unavoidably bring about

the emergence or genesis not only of mere models but of a series of special methods that are in dialectically critical, transformative relation to the traditional cultural and religious structures of a given society" [8].

While the article's emphasis on method may suggest some authoritarian manipulation of inculturation, this is by no means the case. Ysaac defines inculturation of religion as "the difficult yet amazing process in which a church is born in a new culture and constitutes itself and develops within that culture." Thus the essay emphasizes rather the breadth of knowledge, collaboration and personal disinterestedness required by inculturation which, in any event, will follow its own internal processes.

Furthermore, in spite of its attention to method, the essay also communicates the urgency of the pressures of world communications networks and the resulting world economy on various societies and cultures [9].

The third essay, by Professor Marasigan, gives the reader an experience of what inculturation is like in practice. Marasigan discusses his own work over a six-year period with the religious community in the barrio Kinabuhayan, located on Mount Banahaw, in an isolated part of the Philippines. The author examines the parallels between the world view and aspirations of the barrio community, expressed in their 90-page document (which Marasigan has translated into English), and Lonergan's concept of cosmopolis, defined in Insight as "a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a discovery of historical responsibilities." For Lonergan, cosmopolis replaces the liberal notion of automatic progress or the Marxian notion of apocalyptic utopia: "It is the higher synthesis of the liberal thesis and the Marxist antithesis" [10]. Marasigan also points to the essential correspondence between the generalized empirical method implied by Lonergan's cosmopolis and the "prophetic intuition" and "charismatic perception" of the people of Kinabuhayan, a correspondence that focuses on the involvement of the subjects or persons in any objectification of meaning in scholarly writings or social institutions.

In the fourth article, "Surmounting the Economic Surd," again written by Marasigan, the author reminds us that economic fluctuations are not yet understood and, thus, are a surd in the discipline of economics. Marasigan translates some of the ideas in Lonergan's economic work, An Essay in Circulation Analysis,

that explains fluctuations, into the visual imagery of a plumbing or traffic system. These concepts include Lonergan's stages of production, his pure cycle as distinct from less desirable economic fluctuations, and his use of rates of change in variables rather than their levels [11]. Marasigan explains, too, the need for a set of simultaneous equations to define the processes of production, exchange and finance and the relationships between them. He stresses that the equations must be differential equations, because it is the rates of change that are of interest in a pure cycle.

Professor Marasigan goes on to argue that the powers of financism seem to be increasingly beyond the control of the political structures of both Left and Right [12]. Who the "powers of financism" might be is not specified, however. The author appears, in fact, to be raising the question "What international capital movements are normative in a world economy?" This question follows from his discussion of the role of finance that, through Lonergan's distributive function, determines monetary flows. The redistributive function supplies "the monetary demands needed to keep these flows of payments in motion" [13].

All in all, this short book is an appealing introduction to Lonergan's work, especially as it relates to Third World issues. With its mixture of biography and anthropological reporting, and its imaginative presentation of Lonergan's heuristics, the book could be used as an introduction to analysis in a reading program about the Third World. By their very use of references and assertions, the articles raise questions and invite responses. Parts of Lonergan's works, used as references in the articles, could also be added to the reading list of such a course. On the other hand, readers who already have some experience of the concerns of people in poor countries, may well find the book useful for structuring their own thinking and for suggesting directions for their further development to keep abreast with new ideas and thinking in international human affairs. Some collaborative knowledge as to how to go about understanding the complexities of development, proposed by Lonergan's various functional specialties and generalized empirical method (that are introduced in the book), might help to prevent the burn-out associated with those individuals whose work appears to be not only relentless but juxtaposed against an apparently hopeless situation.

NOTES

[1] The Third World and Bernard Lonergan. From the note "About the Cover."

[2] Ibid., p. 1

[3] Ibid., p. 3

[3] Ibid., p. 7

[5] Ibid., p. 14

[6] Ibid., p. 40

[7] Ibid., p. 44. The transcultural here refers to the religious experience of God's love.

[8] Ibid., p. 49

[9] Ibid., p. 16

[10] Ibid., p. 60, quoted from Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight, (London: Longmans, 1961), p. 241

[11] Lonergan, Bernard J.F., An Essay in Circulation Analysis (1944 version). Lonergan Research Institute, 10 St. Mary's Street, Toronto, Canada M4Y 2R5

[12] The Third World and Bernard Lonergan, p. 66

[13] Ibid., p. 64

TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL RETRIEVAL AND CRITICAL THEORY

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James L. Marsh, Post-Cartesian Meditations: An Essay in Dialectical Phenomenolgy. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988. Hard cover. 279 pages.

The nine chapters of Marsh's Meditations comprise a movement towards the emergence of dialectical phenomenology [1]. The book is addressed to scholars in contemporary Continental thought, to undergraduate students who were just introduced to philosophy, to social and political activists in need of theory, and to a general audience. The reader is taken on a rigorous, lucid, original and beautifully written journey through that self-overcoming of Cartesianism which is characteristic of today's critical modernism. Current critiques of Western ratio notwithstanding, Marsh celebrates philosophy: in place of her Cartesian-bourgeois truncation and the postmodern antiphilosophizing from on high, he displays philosophy's genuine appeal and eros.

(1) General Review. Among the many mansions of philosophy with which Marsh carries on either direct or implicit conversation, the first and most obvious is his overcoming of the Cartesian subject: atomistic, subjectivist and objectivist, reified and ahistorical, disembodied and privatist, solitary and non-linguistic, personally repressed and socially alienated.

Secondly, his phenomenological critique of subjectivism has implications for any critical theory of objectivism. While the essay follows the critical modernist tradition of phenomenology, it critiques also that Cartesianism which hides in the method of philosophizing divorced from the philosopher's life world. Marsh makes every step in his analysis part of a dialectical phenomenology. But his methodical self-awareness is not Cartesian: it does not obscure the hermeneutical (e.g. Gadamerian) and critical (e.g. Habermasian) dimensions of truth.

In the first place, his argument is a phenomenological retrieval of authentic selfhood: the essay progresses from Descartes, to Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, to Gadamer and Ricoeur [2]. In the second place, the recovery of the self in eidetic-descriptive phenomenology and the descriptive hermeneutical attentiveness to tradition are complemented by a suspicious and critical inten-

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tionality. The critique of interest and desire shifts gradually from its implicitness in Hegel's historical consciousness, to the impasse within the dialectics of coercion and appeal in Sartre and Foucault, to the critique of ideology in Freud and Marx, to the ideal speech situation in Kosík, Habermas and others [3]. In the third place, dialectical phenomenology emerges in chapter 9 as the theoretically practical overcoming of Cartesianism -- an overcoming of it in phenomenological self-appropriation, in critical methodology, and in the transformative praxis within the life world [4].

Thirdly, there are several implicit themes in Marsh's essay. In the first place, the essay bridges an existing gap between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy [5]. In the second place, such a gap is, as shown by Marsh, largely displaced by the debate between critical modernism and post-modernism occurring on both sides of the Atlantic [6]. In the third place, Marsh's essay is written from the posture of intellectual and moral conversion and in that sense embodies a praxis of self-appropriation in the spirit of Lonergan's philosophy. It is my intention to address Lonergan scholarship and focus primarily on this last, the strongest, of Marsh's implicit themes [7].

(2) Lonergan and eidetic-descriptive phenomenology. Intellectual conversion mediates Lonergan's transposition of eidetic-descriptive phenomenology [8]. Chapters 1-3 of Marsh's Meditations are quite valuable in developing the notion of self-appropriation in relation to the Cartesian-Husserlian legacy in phenomenology. Lonergan's one paragraph on Husserl in Insight and his strong emphasis on finality over the embodied, fungierende intentionality are descriptively enriched by Marsh's analysis of the experiential-transcendental precept: be attentive (48-50)! In articulating Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, Marsh effectively critiques subjectivism, objectivism, and offers a descriptive account of the incarnate subject [9].

Two points deserve the reader's careful study: first, the link between perception and judgment, second, the link between patterns of experience and human interest. Marsh distinguishes three levels of "perception" as used in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, then juxtaposes these levels of usage to Lonergan's cognitional structure of experience, understanding and judgment. (1) Perception as prescientific and commonsensical remains

uncritical; perception as reflection is (2) mediated by meaning for me (intelligible insight) and (3) allows for the resolution of conflict in perceptual judgment. While there is no already-out-there-now-real percept available for eidetic description and variation, we can distinguish various embodied, i.e., interest-laden, perceptual patterns of experience from the perception as the level (1) within cognitional structure. Perception and reflection share common cognitional structure: (1) sensuous experience, (2) interpretation and (3) judgment. Reflection occurs within an intellectual pattern where Merleau-Ponty is doing his phenomenology of perception.

Just as Merleau-Ponty blurred the distinction between perception as a pattern of experience and as the level one within the cognitional structure, so likewise Habermas, commenting on Hegel's portrait of dirempted modernity, distinguishes well between three major patterns of experience but fails to account phenomenologically for the unity among them (72). Habermas has resources to deal with the Nietzschean and post-modern objection that all desire of truth is shot through with interest, but he lacks the criteria of eidetic-descriptive phenomenology, i.e., of cognitional structure, to mediate various interest-laden patterns of experience [10]. Lonergan's cognitional structure provides the counterfactual link between Habermas' three patterns into which modern rationality according to Hegel differentiated: (i) the symbolic interaction in the life world, (i) an aesthetic expressivity of the subject, and (iii) the purposive-rational action of science.

In chapter 3, the reader will benefit from studying the eight kinds of objectivity. These not only develop Lonergan's three cognitional types of experiential, normative and absolute objectivity (82ff.), but also address the confusion between objectivism and that objectivity which is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Even more crucial are the canons of generalized empirical method. These canons figure in Marsh's encounters with Gadamer's hermeneutics and Derrida's deconstruction, Freud's psychoanalysis and Habermas' critical theory [11].

(3) Lonergan and the hermeneutics of recovery and of suspicion. Chapters 4-6 affirm the historical, embodied, linguistic, intersubjective, hermeneutically embedded and reflectively distantiated, free knower and doer [12]. Just as before, so also here Marsh unites Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's analyses with Lonergan's argument for self-affirmation in

Insight (108-11). Moreover, in an unequivocal manner he mediates the transcendental-phenomenological retrieval of the self with a critical theory of society:

> This book...inscribes a circle in which there is a movement from practice to theory and back to practice, or a movement of ascent ...and of descent... out of the cave of late industrial society into the sunlight of self-knowledge and then back into the cave for an enlightened praxis flowing from that self-knowledge. (111) [13]

If the recovery of authentic selfhood calls for fidelity to the four transcendental precepts, then the recovery of the ideal communication community -- in the sense that Peirce, Apel and Habermas articulate communicative ethics -- solicits fidelity to the four validity claims [14]. These two four-fold structures are not necessarily analogical. But their actualizations are just as mutually interdependent as are intellectual and moral conversions. The shorthand for this mutuality is the theorem that authentic subjectivity implies ethical intersubjectivity. If I am to be authentic, then I must be attentive, intelligent, critical, and responsible. The ideal communication community presupposes that everyone's discourse respects truth, rightness, sincerity, and intelligibility. We can agree with Marsh and claim a weak, counterfactual apodicticity for these two sets of transcendental norms: the violation of the first set leads to self-alienation; the lack Of the second set distorts discourse. The former gives rise to the latter, the latter impedes the recovery of the former.

This is precisely the way in which Marx and Habermas, Freud and Kierkegaard, Husserl and Lonergan become Marsh's philosophical gadflies: "If all the preceding is true, then it follows that self-knowledge and self-recovery are the first stage in overcoming social alienation" (112) [15]. The argument moves from the self-affirmation of knowing and free self (109), to the disclosure of the telos of phenomenology (213, 251f.) as critical social theory and praxis (258).

Dialectical phenomenology is a conclusion to Marsh's rigorous philosophical argument, but it might find the reader resisting the implications of authentic self-recovery for political action. "Authentic selfhood is incompatible with capitalism..." (257). "Capitalism is the secret, hidden worm at the heart of modern philosophy and modern life... The loss of self and of being... is to a significant extent a political problem" (258). But Marsh draws these critically-political implications not from a dogmatic ideological Marx-Leninism but

from fidelity to the four transcendental precepts and to the four validity claims of the ideal speech situation:

> If philosophy remains bourgeois, merely subjectivistic or merely objectivistic, it cannot fulfill its basic telos toward radicality and self-conscious living. If Socrates is correct about the unexamined life not being worth living and capitalism is the dominant modern version of the unexamined life, then living the examined life in its full sense means ceasing to be bourgeois. If philosophy remains unconsciously bourgeois, then it has not asked all the relevant questions. If it remains consciously bourgeois, then it is in conscious bad faith, at odds with itself, inconsistent, ambiguous in a bad sense. (252)

Marsh's use of transcendental method becomes then what one might call with the later Merleau-Ponty, a new, non-communist, leftist, existential and political theory and praxis [16]. Given Lonergan's performative argument for the non-revisability of self-affirmation (109), if Marsh's claim of weak apodicticity that emerges from fidelity to the four transcendental precepts and the four validity claims is sound, then the implications for radical socio-political conversion and praxis seem to be inescapable.

Marsh comforts an unconvinced reader by the fact that dialectical phenomenology is equally incompatible with the Soviet and Eastern European versions of alienation [17]. His type of phenomenologically grounded social critique might be uncomfortable within any cave -- Platonic, American, Soviet. The ideal community of experiencing, inquiring, judging, and existential subjects is opposed to every sort of coercion (132-40). The argument neither takes hostages nor has ideological favorites: self-affirmation and an affirmation of either capitalism or state socialism are a lived contradiction.

(4) Higher Viewpoints: Lonergan and Marsh. In conclusion, I wish to address some possible objections to Marsh by a Lonergan reader.

First, there are the movements from below upwards and from above downwards. Marsh follows the movement upward from eidetic description, to suspicion, and toward a higher mutual mediation; and the descending movement downward from description, to interpretation, to critique, and toward praxis (179). In this two-fold movement, he dialectically engages an openness to tradition with the critique of personal and social unconscious, the unthematized ground with the perspectives on the figure, his fidelity to the four transcendental precepts with the four validity claims of dialogue. Marsh calls this dialectic the

higher viewpoint of the concrete universal: descriptive-eidetic, hermeneutical, and critical theory; reformist and radical, personal and social praxis (xi, 177-79).

One might object that Lonergan's dialectic of higher viewpoints emerges in concreto existentially and not as dialectical phenomenology. One might focus on the argument from self-appropriation and suggest that Lonergan is to Marsh as Kierkegaard is to Hegel. The religiously motivated objection sounds like but is not identical with the post-modern complaint against reason.

Lonergan shows that the full recovery of the self and of the world occurs not, as in Hegel, within the Aufhebung of theory and praxis, but only when the vertical movement of divine love, from above downward, joins both one's receptivity to tradition and the hermeneutics of suspicion. The two movements within Marsh's dialectical phenomenology are for Lonergan the one movement from below upwards and, thus, still partially in the cave. Lonergan complements the two-fold psychoanalytical and social critiques of ideology with the distinct critique of idolatry. This "hermeneutics of suspicion III" would comprise the religious critique of the epistemic and deliberative effects of sin in the subject and in social structures. Sin is used by Lonergan not only as a theological-metaphysical but also as a philosophical-existential category when he discusses personal alienation and social aberrations [18]. Lonergan articulates the religious dimension both existentially and contemplatively, both in its active critique and receptive fulfillment. This objection states that Marsh allows for the contemplative fulfillment but by-passes the existential self-recovery.

Secondly, on a similar note, one might object that Marsh's three-volume project, even though set in parallel to Lonergan's intellectual, moral and religious conversions, follows more strictly Hegel's division into subjective, objective, and absolute Spirit. But we should let Marsh speak for himself against this type of precocious comparison and point out that the Meditations are only the first installment in a projected trilogy. "Authentic appropriation of one's own interiority is revolutionary in a threefold sense: as self-reflexive, as ethically and socially critical and as metaphysical-religious" (258). Marsh not only disclaims the march towards Hegel's absolute knowing or Husserl's non-fallibilist apodicticity but also acknowledges the limit of any self-transparent ideology

critique. "Ideology critique shows the impossibility of total ideology critique" (173). Dialectical phenomenology is bereft of total reduction, total critique, absolute self-possession and totalitarianism.

But his second objection like the preceding one might not be satisfied with Marsh's awareness of limitation and human finitude: acknowledging the impossibility of a total reduction and of a total ideology critique doesn't mean that the philosopher surrendered the "both-and" of sublations to the "either/or" of conversions. While Lonergan articulates all three conversions as a leap, Marsh progressively incorporates every fruitful either/or of existence into the Hegelian logic of both-and mediation [19]. Lonergan, while remaining a Thomist and very much influenced by Hegel, is unequivocal on this Augustinian, Kierkegaardian and most un-Hegelian point: the nature of all three conversions is a leap. "Moving to a new horizon, conversion, involves a leap. What is needed in man to break away from the aberration of sin is a leap" [20]. Because conversions are not logically and speculatively homologous with mediations, they represent the qualitative leap that can't be aufgehoben without a residue [21]. Conversions neither need nor allow for their sublation: they are not, unlike alienation and sin, irrational. They are the unmediatable prerequisite for the novel stage of development itself characterized by various types of sublations.

Thirdly, with regard to the postmodern objection to modern ratio which only echoes the objection of ethico-religious existence to speculative reason: even though Marsh differentiates the hermeneutics of recovery from that of suspicion, he does not address the difference between finitude and deception [22]. While the phenomenologist might be aware of limitation, and while Heidegger and Derrida might reproach the philosopher for her dialectical numbers on limit, neither of these philosophical and anti-philosophical moves represents the hermeneutics of suspicion [23]. Hegel, the later Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Caputo develop the hermeneutics of finitude; but only thinkers like Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Kierkegaard, Ricoeur, Marcel, Sartre, Habermas, Levinas and Lonergan elaborate also the hermeneutics of suspicion. Philosophy can become suspicious of self-deception only on an ethico-religious plain.

The difference among the latter is that Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Sartre and Habermas acquire the concept of despair but

still lack faith; and Kierkegaard, Ricoeur, Marcel, Levinas and Lonergan move from the conceptuality of ideology-critique to the existential suspicion of ideology-critique as itself a causa-sui project. Thus, there are at least two types of surds that Lonergan has in mind in the canon of residues: the order of intellectual passion (limit and finitude) and the order of deliberative-religious passion (deception and sin). Heidegger's ontology and Derrida's deconstruction of finitude, différance, are not yet the subject's surrender of the will to power, they are not yet his or her consciousness of deception and sin, of the absolute difference [24].

Finally, on political conversion and praxis I would defend Marsh's leftism as compatible with Lonergan's centrism [25]. Lonergan has no reasons to disagree with Marsh's hermeneutics of suspicion, "until we overcome capitalism we do not achieve fully authentic selfhood" (258). An Augustinian-Thomistic-Kierkegaardian juxtaposition of Lonergan to Marsh's Aristotelian-Hegelian logic does not invalidate Marsh's critical leftist appropriation of Lonergan's third stage of meaning. Marsh's sophisticated Marxism fits quite well with Lonergan's critique of bias, coercion and alienation [26]. While it is true that Lonergan would not prescribe an overcoming of capitalism and state socialism as the primary cure but only as treating of symptoms, we do not know what complex diagnosis and cure will emerge when Marsh's trilogy is completed. From Marsh's Hegelian perspective, the first volume remains an unfinished moment of spirit. But already as a decisive, rigorously argued and clear encounter with a lot of gobblety-gook in the contemporary postmodern/modern and Continental/Anglo-American philosophical scenes, the book is eminently worth the reader's serious attention.

NOTES

[1] In notes abbreviated as PCM. All page references will be included in the main text and only when longer in the notes.

[2] PCM, Chapters 1-6. [3] PCM, chapters 7-9

[4] The last chapter is Marsh's methodological return to the beginning; it repeats the movement without, however, culminating either in Cartesian strong apodicticity or Hegelian absolute knowing.

[5] See an excellent discussion of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in ch. 1.

[6] In the spring of 1989 James L. Marsh and John D. Caputo, moderated by Merold Westphal, held at Fordham University a symposium on critical modernism and post-modernism where these

themes were confronted head on. This symposium and further exchange among Marsh, Caputo, Westphal, and others will be edited and published by Fordham University Press. Marsh published several critical articles on post-modernism in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, a feature review of Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Indiana University Press, 1987) in International Philosophical Quarterly, XXVII, 4 (December 1988): 459-65, and a critical essay on post-modern strategies of evasion which is published by IPQ in the Fall 1989 issue.

[7] While Marsh refers to Lonergan either directly or indirectly in all nine chapters and marks this carefully in endnotes, Lonergan's name appears neither in the body of the text nor in the author's Preface nor in the main Index. Thus, the reader should find it helpful to include the following index to Lonergan in PCM:

/1/ "incarnate subject" x, 30, 38, 60, 105, 1099 168, 255; as opposed to truncation in capitalism 241, in phenomenology 242f.
/2/ "a moving stand-point" as the dialectic in PCM xi, chs. 6, 8, 9; higher viewpoints in the hermeneutics of recovery and of suspicion 177-79, in psychoanalysis 194, in critical theory and in Marsh's book 200ff.
/3/ collaboration xiii.
/4/ objectivity as the fruit of authentic subjectivity 46, 81f., 205-215, 246-51, 257f.
/5/ patterns of experience 50, 52, 71, 72, 81.
/6/ mediation: mediated immediacy 53; mutual mediation 142-43. 178f; naive immediacy as the root of conservatism 240.
/7/ insight and definition 61 and 73 n. 19, 62.
/8/ perception and judgment 63, 66 and 73 n. 25; questions and the desire to know 64 and 72 n. 22; Lonergan and Husserl 66, 112, 179, and the virtually unconditioned 66, 128, 166, and eidetic variation 66f. and 73 n. 27; and cognitional structure 71; Lonergan and Merleau-Ponty 71f. and 74 n. 31.
/9/ the canons of parsimony, complete explanation, and statistical residues 84 and 90 n. 25; in hermeneutics 165-69 and 181 nn. 12-14, against Derrida n. 18; in psychoanalysis 190f. and 198 n. 24; as the reading rules of consistency, comprehensiveness, parsimony and residues in critical theory and dialectical phenomenology 216 and 232 n. 25; against postmodernity 255; as foundation and fallibilism 256.
/10/ objectivity 83-85.
/11/ cognitional structure 71, 107-11, 143; and the four validity claims 148-50, 165 (see also Habermas).
/12/ self-affirmation 109 and 123 n. 26; and the telos of phenomenology 252; and Habermas' critical theory 253; as revolutionary 258.
/13/ knowing as looking 111.
/14/ transcendental, phenomenological method 111-12; 178f.; and the four transcendental precepts 122, 165f., 254, also n.. 13-p. 157; and ideology critique 252; and alienation 1122f; Lonergan and Kierkegaard 113 and 124 n. 13; and Derrida 120f., 169 and 181 n. 18.
/15/ performative self-contradiction in Sartre 158f n. 28., 156.
/16/ Lonergan and intersubjectivity 128-38.
/17/ conversion and political change 139f.; the full recovery of the self and the world 237; three conversions

and projected three volumes in Marsh's dialectical phenomenology 258.

/18/ self-appropriation and the four validity claims 150, 154.

/19/ description and explanation 175 and 182 n. 29, 179.

/20/ Lonergan and Gadamer 166-68, against Derrida 169.

/21/ movement from below upward and from above downward 179.

/22/ Lonergan and Habermas 72, 150, 178, 200-15, against Foucault 154f, 253.

[8] See note 7, entries #4, 5, 8, 11, 12.

[9] Ibid., entry #1.

[10] Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), especially Part Three and ch. 12 on Nietzsche. On the argument with post-modernity, see Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT, 1987). On the distinction between various "patterns" of experience -- the three value spheres of morality, art, and science -- see Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vols. I and II, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987).

[11] See note 7, entry #9. Marsh refers to p. 84, where his adoption of the generalized empirical method occurs throughout the book. I applied extensively Lonergan's canon of incommensurable residues vis-à-vis the methodologies of structuralism, post-structuralism and Derrida's deconstruction in my Mediation of Deconstruction: Bernard Lonergan's Method in Philosophy -- The Argument from Human Operational Development (Lanham: UPA, 1988). I distinguished Lonergan's method in philosophy as a type of 'deconstruction' upwards towards greater intelligibility, i.e. self-mediation of human operational development in cognitional structure and existential living, from Derrida's deconstruction downwards to the loss of meaning, i.e. interminable and limitless textual hermeneutics of finitude. The above book is an edited M.A. thesis, "Bernard Lonergan's Notion of Mediation," which I wrote under the direction of professor Marsh (St. Louis University: University Microfilms, 1985).

[12] See note 7 above, entries #12, 18, 20.

[13] Also James L. Marsh, "Truth and Justice at Fordham," Fordham's Point Magazine (May 1989): 29-31.

[14] See note 7, entry #22. While Habermas distinguishes only three validity claims -- truth, normative rightness, and sincerity corresponding to the three types of speech acts, constative, performative, and expressive -- Marsh includes also comprehensibility or intelligibility as the fourth validity claim (148-9). If intelligibility is also a validity claim, then Marsh, following Lonergan and not Habermas, will be able to argue in his third volume for some form of religious transcendence.

[15] See note 7, entries #12, 14, 17, 18, 22.

[16] Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of a Dialectic, trans. J. Bien (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973), p. 226f. Martin J. Matustik, "Taking the Attitude of the Other: Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Intersubjective Selfhood," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (forthcoming).

[17] PCM 205, 231 n. 10, 215, 232 n. 21. Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete, eds. R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (Boston: Reidel, 1976), whom Marsh names as one of the main inspirations for his dialectical phenomenology, has been prohibited in his native Czechoslovakia until the revolution in November 1989. Most writings in phenomenology -- Husserl, Patocka, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc. -- have been an anathema to that Marx-Leninism which was practiced within state socialism. In Prague, Charles' University rehabilitated Kosik among others in January 1990, but the new thinking there returns neither to Kosik's Marxism nor to the ideas of the socialist-market economy with a humanist democratic tradition: today's Czechoslovak state President, Vaclav Havel, comes from the traditions of Patocka's Husserlian and Heideggerian philosophy (Patocka and Havel were the co-founders of the Czech opposition in 1977, Charta 77), from Komensky, Masaryk, and from his own existential confrontation with totalitarian power.

Thus, Marsh's phenomenology must come to terms with the non-violent, existential nature of the revolution in Kosik's Czechoslovakia and resulting post-Marxian civil society. It must come to terms with the historical fact that in Prague the 1989 revolution succeeded when it did not postpone the existential dimension to a later contemplative moment, but made what Havel calls an "anti-political form of politics" into an intrinsic, albeit non-fundamentalist, moving force of its critical theory and practice (cf. note 19 below). Cf. Vaclav Havel, Versuch in der Wahrheit zu Leben, trans. from Czech by Gabrile Laub (Hamburg: Rowholt Varlag, 1989), "Slovo o slovu," [A Word about the Word], in Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 1989 (Frankfurt/M: Borsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, 1989).

[18] On Lonergan's references to the hermeneutics of suspicion and of recovery, see Lonergan A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. Ed. by F.E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," pp. 152, 157, 160-64; "Healing and Creating in History," pp. 100-09. "I have written at greater length on bias in Insight, pp. 191-206, 218-242, 627-633, 688-693. In the same Hegelian-Marxist tradition bias is treated obliquely under the name of alienation" (ibid., 1099, note 10).

[19] PCM 1, 16, 31, 38, 45, 54, 61, 71, 89-90, 93, 97, 99, 105-06, 147-48, 131, 133, 158 n. 25, 174, 196, 245, 250, 252. It is not obvious from any of these references that Marsh rejects only the Sartrean horizontal either-or of violent gazes and not also the Kierkegaardian vertical either/or of the ethical and religious retrieval. Because Marsh contemplatively, i.e., non-existentially, postpones the religious question for pedagogical reasons that emerged within the secular modernity until the third volume, his ambivalent posture toward the disjunctive radicality of the latter either/or creates an unfruitful ambiguity in the book. To give full justice to Marsh's position, we would need to evaluate the first volume, written from the standpoint of intellectual conversion, with volumes two and three, which will parallel Lonergan's moral and religious conversions, respectively. Further, Marsh will undermine any easy Hegelian or even deconstructionist reading of his three volumes with the fourth, now completed unsystematic text of radical fragments: these fragments allow for dissonance and discontinuity but without needing to bash philosophy or to reduce the genre of critique to metaphor.

[20] Bernard Lonergan, Notes on Existentialism, IV. The Existential Gap (Boston College, unpublished); Philosophy of Education (Ohio: Xavier College,k 1959, unpublished), p. 55f.

[21] This point does not invalidate my polemic with Derrida in my Mediation, cf. pp. 190-91.

[22] PCM 173, 177, 202 and 231 n. 4, 260 n. 11.

[23] The objection is addressed, among others, to the following statement: "Within phenomenology, two other possible models of suspicion I might employ are the Derridean and the Heideggerian. Derrida is inadequate for reasons discussed in the chapter on the self: an undialectical rejection of presence and identity, and affirmation of absence and différance. Derrida absolutizes the moment of suspicion or deconstruction..." (PCM 202).

[24] For reasons why Derrida's différance can never play the role of the absolute difference, consult Søren Kierkegaard's analysis of the consciousness of sin in Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Hong and Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[25] On Lonergan's depiction of the religious-political right, left and his affiliation with the center, consult Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Collection, ed. by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 244-45.

[26] Cf. Lonergan, A Third Collection, n. 18 above.

[27] James Marsh communicated to me his reactions to this review. With his permission, I am citing a part of his defense against my criticisms: "I found interesting you noting a possible tension between Hegelian, Marxist and Lonerganian, Kierkegaardian aspects of my thought: it is something to think about, in this work and in future work. In this book a possible defense might be mounted in the following way:

1. I would claim that every choice involves a leap that is at the same time motivated: see pp. 99-103. Conversion would be such a choice.
2. Either-or arises on and is explicitly recognized on the fourth level: see pp. 92, 96, 100, 113-14.
3. Because leaps are motivated, we can talk about a limited mediation even here.
4. Consequently leap and mediation are not incompatible, as you put it, be related to one another. Aufhebung operates in any choice to the extent that it sublates previous standpoints: see p. 92. In a different respect, either-or operates: conversion is an integration of both-and and either-or.
5. I am critical of Kierkegaard's account of mediation and of the relationship between motive and leap: see pp. 75-81.
6. I agree that self-deception can only receive its full interpretation and critique in Suspicion III. However in the book it seems that there is a limited critique of self-deception on the psychological and sociological levels. Indeed the object of suspicion is a self-deception intermingled with social deception.
7. I would argue that finitude is the object of eidetic description, self-deception of interpretation and suspicion. Aspects of the former include the receptive aspects of perception, the ambiguity of experience, the impossibility of a complete reduction or suspicion, the dependence of thought on the body, language, freedom; the involvement of the person in tradition. Thus I would claim that in the book there is a basis for distinguishing between self-deception and finitude."