

METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

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METHOD

Journal of Lonergan Studies

Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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THE INFLUENCE OF NEWMAN'S DOCTRINE OF ASSENT ON THE THOUGHT OF BERNARD LONERGAN: A GENETIC STUDY

David M. Hammond
Wheeling Jesuit College

Although it is well known that John Henry Newman exerted an important influence on Bernard Lonergan, it is a fact that has received less attention then it merits. With the growing availability of unpublished manuscripts, letters and other materials at the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, the time is ripening for the question to be addressed in more detail. But it is not only the possibility of knowing more about Newman's influence in Lonergan's development that interests me in this essay; I am convinced that there is contemporary theological value in attending to this influence.

My purpose in this essay is not to prove that all, or even most, of the achievements of Bernard Lonergan are to be found, in one form or another, in Newman. Nor do I wish simply to argue that what one finds in Lonergan is a systematic presentation of the ideas to be found, in commonsense description, in the Grammar of Assent [1]. My purpose is much more limited: I wish to trace the development of what became a key influence--Newman's doctrine of assent -- and to investigate how this influence came to be of such importance to Lonergan. I will conclude the essay by suggesting reasons why this doctrine of assent is worth taking seriously in the contemporary theological situation.

Introduction

In an essay [2] published in 1977, George Worgul pointed out four of the most salient points of agreement between Newman and Lonergan: both share (1) a starting point in the operations of the human subject, (2) the conclusion, based on their common starting point, that assent or judgment is the term of human knowing, (3) an evaluation of the complexity of human cognition, most notably their view of the inadequacies of deductive logic, and finally (4) an affirmation of the irreducibly personal character of truth and the act of assent or reflective understanding leading up to judgment. I have largely presupposed many of Worgul's valuable insights, but

my essay is different in two ways: with regard to sources, I will explore a variety of unpublished material from the Lonergan Research Institute as well as the published material that has appeared since Worgul's essay. With regard to content, I will focus on two aspects of Lonergan's appropriation of the doctrine of assent: first, the relationship (which Lonergan asserted in his pre-Insight writings) between real apprehension and assent and what was later transposed into reflective understanding, and second, on the relationship between belief and self-generated knowledge.

Reflective Understanding and the Illative Sense

It has long been noted that Lonergan's idea of "reflective understanding" is indebted to Newman's analysis of what he called "the illative sense" [3]. According to Lonergan, reflective understanding "grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment," (I 279), an apt description for the power of the "illative sense" as what moves the mind from evidence to assent [4]. For both Newman and Lonergan the judgment that something is or is not the case is the product of a unique organization or assemblage of the evidence which bears on the question. Lonergan recognizes that most people know when a grasp of the sufficiency of evidence occurs, "but without prolonged efforts at introspective analysis we could not say just what occurs in the reflective insight" (I 279). As we shall see in our analysis of Lonergan's early writings, his reading of Newman supplied Lonergan with what we might call an "introspective description" of what leads up to judgment, but it was left for Lonergan to provide the theoretical analysis in which the terms of the cognitional operation are fixed and defined according to their relationships to one another [5]. Thus, a judgment results when one grasps a "virtually unconditioned" in which the conditions on which the judgment depends are understood to be fulfilled because all of the relevant questions pertaining to this issue have been faced. "In judgment on the correctness of insights, the link is that the judgment is correct if there are no further, pertinent questions, and the fulfillment lies in the self-correcting process of learning reaching its limit in familiarity and mastery" (I 315)[6].

For Lonergan the product of this reflective understanding is the judgment -- an answer to a yes or no question -- just as for Newman the product of illation (which he also called

natural or informal inference) is assent. And both thinkers shared a keen understanding of the fact that the knowledge constituted by the judgment or assent is rarely a necessary deductive conclusion. There are, in fact, probable judgments, resulting from the incompleteness of our knowledge, which converge on true judgments as toward a limit at which no further pertinent questions arise (I 299-300). Newman made a crucial distinction between the unconditional acceptance characteristic of assent [7] and the conditional acceptance characteristic of inference [8]. The appropriation of Newman's insistence on the unconditional nature of assent is made plain in Lonergan's distinction between insight and judgment. Questions which require a yes or no answer admit of no probabilities, no degrees. For this reason, Lonergan speaks of the affirmation or denial of judgment as the total increment (or final partial increment) in cognitional process (I 276). At this point in an inquiry, one must take a stand: is my idea or supposition or hypothesis true? To answer that it is certainly true is to affirm something. To answer that it is probably true is to affirm something. To answer that it is probably not or certainly not ture is to affirm something. To answer that one does not know is to affirm something. In each case, one is engaged in a type of questioning that is different from the type required for understanding. With Newman, Lonergan makes a clear distinction between the unconditional quality of judgment or assent, and the variable quality of the content of what is affirmed [9].

If we shift our attention from the acts of reflective understanding and judgment to the reflecting and judging subject, we find further similarities between the two. Lonergan's discussion of the criterion of truth (Chapter 17) clearly reveals similarities with Newman's acute probing in the Grammar into the complex and often hidden operations of the intellect [10]. For example, Lonergan distinguishes between infallibility and a certainty that admits of degrees: the latter is rooted in the subject's questioning of his or her possible biases which may be influencing the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Lonergan identifies some of the possible causes of this questioning or self-doubt and suggests ways one may deal with them [11]. With Newman, Lonergan rejects the view that would insist that certitude is possible only if one possessed infallibility. "Only if this obscure region [of the subject's

own self-knowledge] were to become completely clarified, either in fact, or more radically, as a matter of principle, would certitude reach the absolute of infallibility" (I 552). Given such similarities it is perhaps not surprising that Lonergan would echo the title of Newman's book when he identifies Insight as an "essay in aid of a personal appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness" (I 748).

The Blandyke Papers

Let us now explore the origins of Newman's influence on Lonergan and follow the ways in which the ideas outlined in the previous section existed in inchoate form during Lonergan's Heythrop College days (1926-1930?). While in his second year of theology in Rome, Lonergan sent a long letter [12] to his provincial (Fr. Henry Keane); among other very interesting comments, Lonergan admits "I left Heythrop a votary of Newman's and a nominalist" [13]. That early interest in Newman can be seen in the essay "True Judgment and Science" written in February, 1929, for a handwritten student journal entitled "The Blandyke Papers" [14]. In this essay Lonergan will take issue with the familiar enlightenment claim that certitude is restricted to scientific judgments because only in science can one know that one knows. In his rejection of this principle, Lonergan suggests that a satisfactory position requires an understanding of what judgment entails. "[I]f true judgment may be consciously true, then science ceases to be the one measure of evidence for certitude." In other words, Lonergan focuses on the "mind in the function of judging inferences" (p. 195), and finds Newman's illative sense to be the principle of this conscious or reflex knowledge. Thus, whereas logic denies certitude to hypotheses, theories, or views, the "illative sense is just such an absolute verification" (p. 196)[15].

Lonergan defends Newman against Fr. Harper, a well-known contemporary critic of Newman's Grammar, who could not accept the very idea of an informal inference. Lonergan quotes Newman's idea that the mind grasps the antecedent and conclusion as one whole [16] but rejects the idea that Harper's critique could be met merely by arguing that the antecedent is in the conclusion. Such an account "does not determine the way in which the individual did as a matter of fact reach the conclusion" (p. 198). Lonergan discerns the following syllogism implicit in an example used by Newman to illustrate informal inference:

"Any such defiance involves war.
This defiance is such a defiance, therefore..."

Lonergan comments:

> If this is the actual process of thought, then natural inference does differ from formal inference, for in formal inference the major would not be a simple definitive judgment but would be proved by a series of syllogisms... Newman's contention is that we should be satisfied with the simple judgment, because we cannot analyze all our grounds for making the judgment...Thus we are left with the Illative Sense and the work of analysis is supererogatory (pp. 199-200).

Lonergan develops the point by exploring its implications for the problem, which becomes so crucial for him, of the alleged "methodical doubt" of scientific procedure. He then quotes Newman:

> 'Of the two I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything....we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself; and error having always some truth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind and the truth developing and occupying it' (p. 202). [17]

Notice that Lonergan has moved from a discussion of the "conscious" quality of judgment -- the importance of knowing one's own operations -- to the existential concern for the standpoint of the one who judges. He does not dismiss the scientific ideal -- the requirement of adequate evidence -- but rather shifts the statement of the problem to the realm of the one who selects and evaluates the evidence. Thus, "the illative sense is not supplying from non-intellectual sources a defect in the evidence" (p. 196), but rather is operating in the complex manner it naturally employs in questions of concrete fact [18].

Newman's distinction between notional and real apprehension also comes to bear on the issue Lonergan is pursuing here. Notional apprehension is the necessary perspective for geometry as it involves "the assimilation of the data of experience" (p. 203) [19]. Logic and abstraction starve down terms and eliminate the poetry from words, as Newman put it. But such

a procedure is necessary in order to understand "'things not as they are in themselves, but mainly as they stand in relation to one another'" (pp. 204-5). Of course this aspect of Newman's thought, and in fact the very formulation, anticipates the theory/common sense distinction that was to become so central so Lonergan's subsequent work [20].

But Lonergan's interest in the subject in this essay is not limited to the intellectual, much less the notional or abstract, as anyone familiar with the Grammar of Assent might guess. After quoting Newman on the moral requirements and impediments for the attainment of truth, Lonergan remarks, "The evolution of thought in which truth gains the upper hand and error is purged away, is to be accompanied and supplemented by a growth in the moral character" (p. 211). On the religious dimension Lonergan includes a rather long quotation from Newman's Lectures on Justification pertaining to the concrete form of faith "'as it is found in the soul'" as well as a commentary on the text by Henri Bremond, a French interpreter of Newman writing near the turn of the century. Bremond develops the implications of Newman's comment for the bearing of religious subjectivity on his theological method (pp. 207-8) [21].

There are other essays written by Lonergan in the late 1920's at Heythrop College which are of some interest to our investigation of Newman's influence. "The Form of Mathematical Inference" [22], published in January, 1928 is concerned with the role of the generic image in what Aquinas called the vis cogitativa, an interior sense, analogous to the sense or instinct an animal has in estimating that which does not come through the senses, such as the usefulness of a twig [23].

But Lonergan does briefly record his impression of the relationship of the vis cogitativa to the illative sense: "I do not think Card. Newman's illative sense is specifically the same as these concrete inferences but that question requires separate treatment." Since this essay was written in January of 1928, it would seem that Lonergan was already and through other sources (Thomas notably) investigating the phenomenon of insight into phantasm; this was probably not Newman's influence. But one may speculate that the judgment recorded here may have been revised after the work in the Grammar which produced his "True Judgment and Science" written a year later [24].

The earliest extant essay of the Heythrop period is "The Syllogism" which was originally read before the student Philosophy and Literature Society, February 26, 1927, but not published in the Blandyke Papers until March, 1928. There is no mention of Newman in this essay, which is somewhat puzzling considering the fact that it is an early forerunner of "The Form of Inference", which does indeed mention Newman and the illative sense [25]. The "main excuse" for the essay, Lonergan tells us, is to argue that "the language pattern of inference is not syllogism but the modus ponens of the hypothetical argument" (p. 6) [26]. This is the thesis of the essay published in Thought where the illative sense is invoked as an example of a form of inference irreducible to syllogism [27].

From Regency through Graduate Studies (1930-1938)

1. Lonergan's Essay on the Grammar of Assent

In the previous section I mentioned a letter written to his provincial in 1935 while Lonergan was a graduate student in theology at the Gregorian University. In it Lonergan mentions two of his projects: a 25,000 word essay on the act of faith, probably no longer extant, and an essay on Newman. He tells his provincial that the latter "was just a feeler of some 30,000 words" (p. 6). Throughout the letter Lonergan writes of his dissatisfaction with the prevailing scholastic philosophy: the Thomists only understand sense knowledge, but not what Thomas and Marechal mean by "intellectual" knowledge, and Lonergan expresses a good deal of confidence that he can prove this charge (p. 4). After a condensed history of the problem of the act of faith since the fourteenth century, Lonergan asks "What do I know of modern philosophy?" His answer is that he has read summaries and studies of particular authors, then adds, "But I know something about it. I submitted to the professor of the history of philosophy here, Fr. Keeler, an essay on Newman....he was quite impressed....He told me that the trouble was that students usually came here and had no grasp whatever of modern thought..." (p. 6) [28]. Lonergan's essay on Newman convinced Keeler that Lonergan was an exception.

A small portion of Lonergan's essay on the Grammar of Assent, written sometime in the early 1930's, has survived [29] and in the first part of these fragments we find Lonergan discussing, among other things, varying degrees of probability (p. 6), insight into phantasm (p. 7), Kant's synthetic a priori judgments (p. 9), and the possibility of miracles as a violation of the uniformity of nature "in an intelligible manner" (p. 23).

But the major thrust of this (at one time) lengthy text is summarized in a paragraph somewhere in the middle of the essay; at this point Lonergan makes the transition from historical, philosophical and religious prolegomena, to a discussion of assent and certitude "in themselves and then in their action in an environment" [30]. What remains of the essay, then, is Lonergan's analysis of certitude and assent; much of the terminology and the ideas are indebted to Newman, but there is much more than mere exposition of Newman's work; much of Lonergan's text anticipates ideas and themes of Insight.

The central importance of the doctrine of assent and certitude for Lonergan is patent. He argues that there are no degrees of assent, for assent is an actus humanus, but there are differing degrees of importance attached to the many assents we make from day to day (p. 32). As examples of the different degrees of importance, Lonergan turns to a discussion of Newman's list of assents, which includes profession, credence, opinion, and doubt. On credence Lonergan comments, "As Newman remarks it is the great means by which we furnish the mind, storing it with facts and views." And on doubt:

> One has first to assent before one can doubt...the general character of doubt is this, that an assent which once was given is now assailed and in danger of being retracted. Once the assent is retracted the doubt ends. Doubt is the act of undoing an assent. (p. 32)

The theory that there are degrees of assent, in other words, is contradicted in the phenomenology of these states of mind. Doubt is one thing, assent another, and the ordinary development of one's mental life begins with "credences" which are eventually confirmed, rejected, or ignored [31].

And yet, in spite of the clear distinction between doubt and assent, there are different modalities given to assent: for example, one may possess certitude or mere probability; and we learn the different modalities through experience. "After it has proved wrong in our past experience -- our great teacher -- then we begin to cast about for a way of testing ideas, for a way as to distinguish between such as are final and such as may not be final however evident they may appear to be" (p. 33). After defining certitude as an assent to a theory as the sole possible explanation of the facts, Lonergan proceeds to suggest four methods of distinguishing certitude for probability:

1. Metaphysical certitude, based on the principle of the intelligibility of reality and its source in intelligence.
2. Methodical certitude, which deals with a defined [notional] subject matter as defined, e.g., geometry.
3. Physical certitude, which argues that, given the facts of this world, and not other possible worlds, this is the only solution. It is defended in the name of common sense.
4. Practical or personal certitude: considers the present order as a real, not a notional thing. It is defended in the name of personal knowledge.

Lonergan's concerns are in substance the same as Newman's, but we see Lonergan attempting to establish greater control over the cognitional events described in the Grammar.

Lonergan's next move is to meet objections, and in doing so he responds to many of the same questions raised by the relativist in Insight: an infinity of possible interpretations makes it impossible to find one which is certain. But

> the hypothesis is not merely a guess...there is an intelligible relation between the hypothesis and the facts; the necessity of this relation limits the number of hypotheses immediately and the greater the knowledge the greater the limitation. (p. 34)[32].

Part of what is required to know that the hypothesis is not merely a guess is to view things as they really are.

> This is the point that Newman was aiming at when he emphasized the importance of the distinction between notional and real apprehension....For it is above all in the knowledge of the self (gnothi sauton), of human living, and of human reality that this form of certitude is paramount. (p. 35)

In Lonergan's discussion of assent we have an anticipation of the idea of reflective understanding. In Insight, the virtually unconditioned is a conditioned in which all the conditions happen to be fulfilled, something which is attained when there are no further relevant questions to be raised. In Lonergan's essay, "real apprehension" of a situation is a common-sense description of what Lonergan later specified in theoretical terms. But the achievement of what is often called "good judgment" is the result of something other than a recipe; it is a profoundly moral act because its condition is self-knowledge. "The right assent is not according to rule but by the act of the living mind. It has no criterion, no guarantee external to itself" (p. 36)[33]. This is, of course,

fundamental to Insight and to Lonergan's position in contrast to rationalism's search for external criteria. We shall return to this idea in the final section.

Let us conclude our analysis of these fragments of Lonergan's essay on Newman by indicating, once again, the importance of Newman's doctrine of assent for Lonergan. On what is the final page of the extant fragments, and perhaps the final page of the section in which Lonergan considered the acts of assent and certitude "in themselves" [34], Lonergan writes, "Does not this doctrine of assent bring us to the very core of the drama of Christianity." There follow biblical texts to support this very strong claim, then the essay, as extant, ends.

Up to this point I may have given the impression that in these early studies Lonergan was little concerned with what many would perceive to be dangers inherent in Newman's strong and confident doctrine of assent. Let me forestall this impression by quoting two comments from the letter to Lonergan's provincial. The first comment is in relation to the 25,000 word essay on the act of faith, which Lonergan gave to his friend Henry Smeaton. Smeaton's response to the text was, as Lonergan portrays it, that "there was no cornering me by appealing to any dogmatic decision" (p. 3). The second comment in the letter falls toward the end of Lonergan's 600-plus word critique of the current Thomist philosophy: "I am not one who becomes certain easily" (pp. 4-5). These remarks are made in the context of a letter in which Lonergan is trying quite forcefully to represent the current philosophy as a kind of fideism; he also insists that many of the criticisms of modern thought against Catholic theology were quite accurate (p. 6). In other words, I am suggesting that there is no evidence that Lonergan's preoccupation with the problem of assent was motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo of the theological tradition as he had inherited it; just the opposite is the case [35].

2. The "History" Project

Let us now turn to a series of drafts of a project which Lonergan entitled PANTON ANAKEPHALAIOSIS [36] and subtitled "A Theory of Human Solidarity, A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul, A Theology for the Social Order, Catholic Action, and the Kingship of Christ". At least one of the drafts was written before 1935, since it is likely that Lonergan

refers to this project in the January 1935 letter to his provincial [37].

The text is about history, society, economics and the facts of progress and decline -- themes so important to Insight-- and so there is predictably little explicit reference to Newman or the Grammar of Assent. But where Newman's influence does enter, it is decisive. Lonergan draws on Newman's doctrine of assent as a key element in the critical method he is to employ. In an introductory note to his thesis Lonergan writes:

> Now plainly it is one thing to justify one's position in this multiple field of science and quite another to pluck as the fruit therefrom a synthetic view revealing the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus, our Lord. On the other hand, the achievement of such synthesis constitutes of itself a manner of proof, proof that may be conceived in terms of Newman's integration of probabilities or, more simply, in terms of the neat French phrase: la verite s'impose; on this ground, it will be seen, synthesis is to no slight extent independent of its presuppositions. (p. 2)

Lonergan, in other words, anticipates the critical question his philosophy and theology of history will raise: can his procedure be justified? He is thus careful to cut off any reductionist theory of rationality or proof by insisting that his synthesis is grounded in the operations of the mind as described by Newman.

In a section entitled "The Ideal line" in which Lonergan traces "the course of history that would arise did man live according to his nature", he begins his analysis of understanding with the distinction between deduction, which moves in a straight line, and is "simply a matter of greater refinement and accuracy", and induction, which proceeds "in a series of revolutions from theses through antitheses to higher syntheses."

> Thus, there are two ways of being certain of one's understanding: the first [deduction] is philosophic and excludes the possibility of higher synthesis; the second [induction] is full knowledge of the facts, Newman;s real apprehension. Granted a real apprehension and an understanding of what is apprehended [reflex rather than spontaneous intellectual operation], we may be certain; for per se intellectus est infallibilis, while the real apprehension excludes the possibility of antitheticalfact arising. [38]

Lonergan has here returned to the idea, found in the fragments of his essay on Newman, that real apprehension constitutes a grasp of all the relevant data. Of course, the crux of the matter is knowing when one is apprehending really, and Lonergan has at least a heuristic answer to this problem: "The initial understanding of the thesis is true of the facts as they are known, but not all are known; further knowledge will give the antithesis and further understanding the higher synthesis" [39]. Again, at issue is not whether one understands, but whether one's understanding is sufficient for true knowledge. Real apprehension is such a sufficient understanding, so that the shift to yet another antithesis is rendered irrelevant [40]. As we have already seen, the possibility of sufficient understanding will be transposed in Insight from Newman's language of real apprehension to the function of what Lonergan will then call "the operator": questioning. Reflective understanding grasps the fact that there are no further relevant questions to ask (and thus one may, indeed must, reasonably judge). The lack of further relevant questions renders the reflective insight invulnerable (I 284)[41]. As David Tracy has suggested, the great value of this transposition is its "critically explanatory thematization" of what Newman was describing [42].

Real and Notional in Lonergan's Post-INSIGHT Work

I have found no evidence that Lonergan continued to identify the process by which one assents in terms of Newman's real apprehension once he had achieved the theoretic analysis of reflective understanding [43]. One may safely suggest that Lonergan used the phenomenology of cognition found in the Grammar of Assent as the "tweezers" by which the scientist holds the thing being investigated while an explanation is being sought (I 296)[44]. This would explain why Lonergan continued to recommend the Grammar as a possible aid in the struggle to become aware of one's presuppositions. Although Lonergan's achievement surpasses Newman's on this issue, the value of Newman's common-sense phenomenology is not thereby obviated.

But if Lonergan did not continue to talk about reflective understanding using Newman's category of real apprehension, he did find an increasing need to emphasize the importance of the distinction between notional and real apprehension and assent. It is clear from the published and unpublished material of Lonergan's post-Insight work that he was increasingly

concerned with the need for theologians to know how their own religious, moral and intellectual dimensions are related, and in that context spoke of the importance of real apprehension and assent.From the late fifties through his last essays Lonergan appealed to Newman's notion of real apprehension and assent as the prerequisite of conversion, which became the foundational reality of his theological method [45].

In his more recent work, Lonergan draws out the connection between real apprehension and assent and what he saw as the increasing difficulty Catholic theologians are experiencing with doctrine [46]. Clearly Lonergan was dissatisfied with the resurgence of rationalist presuppositions in fundamental theology. The enlightenment myth of pure reason, which sometimes takes the form of the Cartesian principle of methodic doubt, continues to be viewed as a reasonable and responsible theological starting point [47]. The enlightenment myth of autonomy encourages the belief that one can step out of history and tradition. In contrast, Lonergan held that one has no choice but to start where one is and thus begin the long and difficult process of learning, of transforming oneself and perhaps one's tradition [48]. Let us now look at a few examples of the way in which he invoked Newman's phenomenology of cognition and his distinction between real and notional assent in his response to the post-enlightenment problem of belief.

In his essay "Theology and Praxis", written in 1977, Lonergan affirmed the importance of distinguishing between the theologian's spiritual life and his or her professional activities, but rejected the tendency to separate them:

> Separation arises from the controversialist's need to claim total detachment. It arises from criteria of objectivity such as necessity and self-evidence that seem to imply that our minds should work with automatic infallibility.[49]

To correct this mistaken objectivism, Lonergan refers to the foundational self-knowledge which is pursued by Newman, Polanyi and Gadamer [50].

In the essay "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion" originally given at Boston College in June of 1980, Lonergan suggests that a merely notional apprehension without real apprehension leads to what Eric Voegelin calls "doctrinization", a loss of experiential reality in religion. But of course Lonergan distinguishes between "doctrinization" of dogmatizing on one hand and the affirmation of doctrines on the other.

If the two are conflated and thus both dismissed as inauthentic, one wins the battle for religiously moving discourse while losing the war to preserve what one considers to be true in that discourse. In other words, if experiential reality and the affirmation of that reality in propositions are mutually exclusive, the common meaning by which communities are formed and sustained will be lost [51].

In these examples I am not trying to suggest that Lonergan saw no place for an evaluation of the truth status of inherited doctrines, as if all one need do is see things in a "real" way and one could then uncritically accept the inherited tradition. Such an appeal is not only uncritical, but it is in opposition to the very dynamism of inquiry that both Newman and Lonergan sought to clarify [52]. I am merely claiming that to withhold belief in anything one has inherited until one is able to transform it into self-generated knowledge is not only unscientific but unrealistic: it ignores the social and historical nature of human living [53]. Hence the need for an "aid" in coming to greater self-knowledge.

Let me quote one last reference to real apprehension and assent on the issue of self-knowledge, because it expresses so well the value that Lonergan perceived in Newman's work. In "Pope John's Intention", an essay written in 1981, Lonergan discusses the development of horizons, and the barriers, breakthroughs, and breakdowns of this development. Lonergan identifies three kinds of barriers: to purification, to enlightenment, to loving God and neighbor. Barriers to purification are constituted by habitual venial sins in which

> the very slackening of urgency [compared to moral sin] can give place to tepidity, and when that danger appears, we have to proceed against the barriers to enlightenment. In this campaign one does well to turn to John Henry Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent and, specifically, to the passages in which he distinguishes notional apprehension from real apprehension, and notional assent from real assent. For the barriers to enlightenment are merely notional apprehension and merely notional assent, when we are content with understanding the general idea and give no more than an esthetic response that it is indeed a fine idea. On the other hand, the attainment of enlightenment is the attainment of real apprehension, real assent, and the motivation to live out what we have learnt ...grasped not through definitions and systems but through

> the living words and deeds of our Lord, our Lady, and the saints, a meaning to be brought home to me in the measure that I come to realize how much of such meaning I have overlooked, how much I have greeted with selective inattention, how much I have been unwilling to recognize as a genuine element in Christian living. [54]

Conclusion

From his mid-twenties through the end of his long life, Bernard Lonergan drew insights from the work of John Henry Newman, especially his Grammar of Assent. Newman's phenomenology of assent was a decisive influence on Lonergan, and one that has endured through a long career [55]. Lonergan's judgment inthe 1930's that the doctrine of assent touches the very heart of Christianity remained throughout his life. The notion of assent or judgment acted as a rudder to steer him through the problems associated with the integration of historical consciousness and theological method. Lonergan found not only that it is impossible to avoid historicism without a true grasp of the act of judgment, but that there are scientific, historical and sociological supports for his position on these matters.

In an interview in 1981, Lonergan responded to questions about significant influences in his intellectual development with the warning that it is better to focus on his final stage in a particular issue. "The other way," Lonergan said, referring to the attempt to trace the various stages, "is just asking for trouble" [56]. I have not intended to ask for trouble in this essay; on the other hand, I am convinced that there is value in the issues handled by Newman's Grammar of Assent that have made such a distinctive mark on Lonergan's thought. Lonergan has argued that certain permanent achievements in philosophy are made possible only when the right conditions are present. This essay has tried to show how Newman's work helped to establish those conditions for Lonergan's achievement [57].

NOTES

[1] C. S. Dessain, in an unpublished paper delivered at the Lonergan Congress in 1970 entitled "Cardinal Newman and Bernard J. F. Lonergan", dwells essentially on this similarity-in-difference.

[2] "The Ghost of Newman in the Lonergan Corpus," The Modern Schoolman 54 [1977]: 317-32.

[3] In Lonergan's own words, Second Collection [Phila., 1974], p. 273. See also F. E. Crowe, "The Exigent Mind: Bernard Lonergan's Intellectualism," Spirit as Inquiry, Continuum 2 [1964]: 320; David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan

[NY, 1970], p. 127. Note also Lonergan's comment: "I don't mention Newman in Insight either [in addition to Marechal] because I would have had to explain what Newman said, and that's another task"; Caring About Meaning [Montreal, 1982], p. 109.

[4] Newman does not distinguish, as Lonergan does, between the various types of propositions: deductive, analytic, mathematical, common-sense, etc. Newman occasionally hits on an interesting difference, but does not lay them out in any systematic way.

[5] I believe that the present paper will show that Patrick Byrne's judgment, that introspective self-appropriation was the achievement of Lonergan's research on Verbum (published between 1946-49), is only part of the story. See Byrne, "The Fabric of Lonergan's Thought," Lonergan Workshop 6 [1986]: 57.

[6] Although the fulfilling conditions exist on the level of presentations, the reflective insight must grasp the link (Insight [NY, 1978], p. 282; henceforth, this text will be abbreviated as I). Newman's insistence on the role of experience, as in his insistence that it is reasonable to trust the expert's illative sense, is evident in Lonergan's notion of learning as a self-correcting process. The self-correcting process of learning consists of a circuit that moves from insight, to the shortcomings of that insight, to complementary insights (I 174). On the expert's judgment, cf. I 283.

[7] "When I assent to a doubtfulness, or to a probability, my assent, as such, is as complete as if I assented to a truth; it is not a certain degree of assent. And, in like manner, I may be certain of an uncertainty; that does not destroy the specific notion convened by the word 'certain'" (Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed., with notes by Ian T. Ker [Oxford, 1985], p. 116; henceforth, this text will be abbreviated as GA). Against Locke's position that there are degrees of assent: cf. GA, pp. 106-110. Note the similar remarks of Lonergan in his dialogue with the relativist: "You warn me that I have made mistakes in the past. But your warning is meaningless, if I am making a further mistake in recognizing a past mistake as a mistake" (I 344). "Each judgment is a limited commitment" rather than a claim to know everything about everything (I 345). "Again, as intelligence abstracts, so reflection prescinds...If I were a relativist I would have to know the universe to know all that is relevant to that single judgment" (I 355). "Errors are just as much facts as are correct judgments" (I347).

[8] Inference as a product, not as a process in cognition: cf. GA, p. 173.

[9] "...[T]he probability of a judgment, like the certainty of a judgment, is a property of its content. If that content coincides with what is grasped as virtually unconditioned, then it is a certainty. But what is grasped as virtually unconditioned may be that a given content heads towards the virtually unconditioned, and then the content is a probability. On this analysis, every judgment rests on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and the probability of a probable judgment is a certainty. But the content grasped as virtually unconditioned may be coincident with the content of the judgment or, on the other hand, merely with the approximation of that content towards an ideal content that would be virtually unconditioned" (I 550-1; my emphasis).

[10] See GA, pp. 201, 208, 221 for representative texts.

[11] Anxiety, a flight from the commitment required to make a judgment, etc. may be met by calling "upon the judgments of others to support one's own" (I 552). These psychological observations and the remedial strategy is unmistakably Newmanesque.

[12] The letter is dated 22 January, 1935, and is available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.

[13] Letter, p. 3. Lonergan repeats this comment in Second Collection, p. 263.

[14] Blandyke Papers #291; page numbers refer to the handwritten text.

[15] For a developmental study of Lonergan's use of the term "verification" see Des O'Grady, "'Verification': A Survey of Lonergan's Usage," Method 5 [1987]: 13-40.

[16] See GA, pp. 167-170.

[17] Lonergan also quotes Newman on the religious value of the rejection of methodic doubt: "'This is the secret of the influence by which the Church draws to herself converts from such various and conflicting religions...[a reference to light contained in other religions that draws men to the One religion...]...taking our certitudes with us not to lose but to keep them more securely and to understand and love their objects more perfectly'" (pp. 201-2). Toward the end the paper becomes very critical of the pretensions of "science" especially as it displays a methodic doubt as the only legitimate method of knowing; see pp. 211ff.

[18] Note the comment on the relationship between evidence and truth: "Again, it is fallacious to urge that assent must be proportionate to evidence, for evidence is the mark of truth, not the measure of assent, and truth once known is to be assented to unconditionally (cf. p. 172)" (p. 203). The reference in the Grammar is to a passage which makes the same point.

[19] "When we would have the terms of another inquiry as univocal and precise, we must substitute notional for real apprehension" (p. 204).

[20] On the distinction between real and notional Lonergan writes, "I am not aware of the impossibility of a distinction being made upon such grounds between different intellectual apprehensions of the same object. The imputation of nominalism may be thus explained away..." (p. 209). But recall that in 1935, in the letter to the Provincial, he says he left Heythrop College a votary of Newman and a nominalist. Yet even in the letter he does not say that Newman was a nominalist, even though that charge has often been made.

[21] See Henri Bremond, The Mystery of Newman, trans. H. C. Corrance [London, 1907] and Roger Haight, "Bremond's Newman," in Newman and the Modernists, ed. Mary Jo Weaver. College Theology Society Resources in Religion No. 1 [Lanham, 1985], pp. 119-137. There is evidence that Lonergan had read Newman's Arians of the Fourth Century and Oxford University Sermons by this time (see "True Judgment and Science," p. 212).

[22] Blandyke Papers #283.

[23] F. Copleston tells us that, unlike animals, the human "compares particular things. What in animals, therefore, he calls the vis aestimativa naturalis, St. Thomas calls vis cogitativa in the case of human beings. Something more than instinct is involved." See A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Part 2 [NY: 1962], p. 99.

[24] This judgment is strengthened when one considers the "History" texts from the early 1930's in which real assent sounds a lot like reflective understanding. See below pp. 106ff.

[25] "The Syllogism" (Blandyke Papers #285) is to be found at the Lonergan Research Institute. Before it appeared in Thought "The Form of Inference" was being reworked sometime between 1933 and 1940. This version is partly preserved in what F. Crowe has named the "logic fragments". In these fragments Lonergan discusses various objections to the Grammar's main argument (p. 2).

[26] See I 576-77 for a restatement of the thesis of "The Form of Inference".

[27] Collection, p. 2. There is also mention in this essay of notional apprehension ("The mathematician deals with ideal entities, with things that are exactly what he defines them to be; this makes it possible to abbreviate without falsifying"), and real apprehension ("In such inferences the data are not ideal but real...", p. 5). As we shall see in the next phase of Lonergan's work, the distinction between real and notional will merge with Lonergan's continuing invocation of the illative sense.

[28] Keeler asked Lonergan to review his book The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: An Historical and Critical Study for Gregorianum (Vol. 16, [1935]: 156-160]) which Lonergan took to be a sign of Keeler's respect for his student's abilities.

[29] Among Lonergan's papers, Robert Doran has discovered twenty-three pages of legal-sized, single-spaced, typed text, probably from the same typewriter as was used for the letter to the provincial, much of which is on the Grammar. Lonergan used the sheets as makeshift folders or wrappers to hold together other batches of material.

[30] "Such is the 'Whole I planned', the general scheme of human life into which the acts of assent and certitude must be fitted and of which they form parts. We now may consider them in themselves and then their action in an environment" (p. 28).

[31] Lonergan tells us that Newman's famous saying that ten thousand difficulties do not make a doubt "has served me in good stead. It encouraged me to look difficulties squarely in the eye, while not letting them interfere with my vocation or my faith" (Second Collection, p. 263; see also p. 97).

[32] On relativism, see I 342-347.

[33] "The essential morality of assent is the supreme contention of the Grammar of Assent. Assent is moral in its prerequisite of moral living..." (p. 36). Lonergan identifies Newman's conversion as illustrative of the moral struggle of one who felt the intellectual pull of Catholicism, but who wondered whether he was being deceived.

[34] See above, note 30.

[35] One of his professors, a Fr. Hingston, "put the question, Was I orthodox? I told him I was but also that I thought alot" (p. 3).

[36] Lonergan Research Institute, file #713.

[37] In reference to Leo XIII's "Back to Thomas" Lonergan writes, "I take him at his word. I also accept his 'vetera novis augere et perficere', hence my excursion into the metaphysic of history" (Letter, p. 6). See also p. 5 for a brief summa of the PANTON text.

[38] PANTON, section 5 ("The Ideal Line"), subsection (f), p. 10, first draft. Compare I 406-07: insight is per se infallible.

[39] Ibid.

[40] In subsequent drafts Lonergan attempted refinements of the same text. The second draft (p. 8) reads: "Again, we may be certain if we understand what we know in one of Newman's real apprehensions: for a real apprehension involves a grasp of all possibly pertinent fact and so excludes the possibility of antithesis." The third draft (p. 8) reads: "We might note, then, that the significance of Newman's real apprehension as a criterion of certitude is that with real apprehension false understanding is impossible: real apprehension is exhaustive; granted an understanding of such apprehension there is the impossibility of any other factor or point of view being brought forward to require or effect a change of 'interpretation'."

[41] In his identification of real apprehension with a knowledge of all the relevant information, Lonergan prescinds from the fact that Newman usually spoke of real apprehension as it relates to the imagination and affections. Recall in the Blandyke Papers that the moral and religious dimension is clearly integrated into the doctrine of assent which Lonergan appropriated from Newman. Perhaps here Lonergan is moving toward a more systematized response to the question "how does one know that one knows?" and therefore must treat real assent in a notional way, if that is not too paradoxical an expression. In any case, I do not think Lonergan is rejecting the moral/religious aspect of real apprehension, only setting it aside to be brought in later (see sections VI and VII: "Decline" and "Renaissance").

[42] Tracy, Achievement, pp. 127-128. But for another point of view of the value of Lonergan's systematization of the illative sense see David Burrell, "Method and Sensibility: Novak's Debt to Lonergan," JAAR 40 [1972]: 349-67.

[43] he does, of course, continue to refer to the importance of the unconditional quality of assent as Newman has described it.

[44] Science's sometime scorn of common sense has its root in the confusion of heuristic and representative functions of imagination: "...they assumed that the business of science was to paint a picture of the really real" (I 298). For Lonergan's recommendation of the Grammar, see Method, p. 261 and p. 338 and Third Collection [NY, 1985], pp. 195 and 236.

[45] See his "Lectures on Existentialism," delivered at Boston College, July 15-19, 1957, and in "The Philosophy of Education" (transcribed and edited by James and John Quinn, 1979), delivered at Xavier University, August 3-14, 1959. Both are available at the Lonergan Research Institute.

[46] "There is a responsibility to intelligence or reasonableness, and it is neglected when one overlooks the inadequacy of answers and, no less, when one withholds a qualified assent when further relevant questions are not made available" (Third Collection, pp. 206-07). Contemporary theologians are right to dwell on the first sin -- overlooking the inadequacy of answers -- but sometimes pay too little attention to the latter -- withholding assent when assent is reasonably demanded.

[47] Recall that Lonergan's rejection of methodic doubt appears as early as his 1929 essay on Newman, "True Judgment and Science." The principle Lonergan attacks, as formulated in Insight, is "Doubt everything that can be doubted" (I 408). Lonergan is critical of this Cartesian principle, but not of Descartes' desire to achieve complete understanding (I 411).

The principle excludes all concrete judgments of fact because it "requires not the fact but the impossibility of further relevant questions." See also Method in Theology [NY, 1972], p. 223 on the difference between Descartes and Newman regarding the value of belief as a starting point for philosophy. Newman's text is GA, pp. 242-43. The same point is employed by F. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," in P. McShane (ed.), Foundations of Theology [Notre Dame, 1972], pp. 22-40. See also D. Burrell, "Religious Belief and Rationality," in C. F. Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief [Notre Dame, 1979], pp. 84-115 for a persuasive case against the Cartesian starting point. Burrell argues that the role of the 'proofs' for the existence of God is one of predisposing one to belief, not as foundational to belief.

[48] See Third Collection, p. 121.

[49] Ibid., p. 196.

[50] Lonergan praised Eric Voegelin's awareness "that only through one's own experience of that dynamism [of the self-transcendence of truly human living] can one advert to its working in others. By a brilliant extension he moves on to his distinction between revelation and information..." According to Lonergan, what Voegelin says "is foundational. It is the kind of knowledge that scientists and scholars, philosophers and theologians, presuppose when they perform their specialized tasks. It is the knowledge of which Newman wrote in his Grammar of Assent, Polanyi wrote in his Personal Knowledge, Gadamer in his Truth and Method" (p. 195).

[51] "Church doctrines are the content of the church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and values that inform individual and collective Christian living" (Method, p. 311). Lonergan refers to the sociologist Georg Simmel's notion of die Wendung der Idee which every social movement must make if it is to survive (Method, p. 139). Note that in Insight the attributes of God imply that the solution to the problem of evil will have a cognitive aspect and this aspect will be given an institutional form for making judgments and keeping the collaboration (of those working to translate it into other cultures) from straying (see Charles Hefling, "On Reading The Way to Nicea", p. 160). For an excellent and very readable discussion of the sociological function of doctrines see Hefling's Why Doctrines? [Cambridge, 1984], pp. 37-70.

[52] "...believing can be too helpful. It can help one to see what is not there.... The investigator needs a well-stocked mind, else he will see but not perceive; but the mind needs to be well-stocked more with questions than with answers, else it will be closed and unable to learn" (Third Collection, p. 17).

[53] See Method, pp. 45 and 223. For an excellent analysis of Lonergan's struggle with the relationship between doctrine and history see Charles Hefling, "On Reading The Way to Nicea," in T. Fallon and P. Riley, eds., Religion and Culture [Albany, 1987], pp. 149-166: "Are dogmas grist for the historical theologian's mill, or foundations on which the mill itself is built? It is not, I think, too much to say that in Insight Lonergan wants to have it both ways." This changes with the arrival of functional specializations in 1965. "Conversion, not proof, provided the specifically theological component..." p. 161).

[54] "Pope John's Intention," in Third Collection, p. 236. This essay was given at Boston College in June, 1981.

[55] In his 1979 essay "Reality, Myth, Symbol," (in Myth, Symbol and Reality, ed. Alan M. Olson [Notre Dame, 1980], pp. 34-35) Lonergan wrote, "My fundamental mentor and guide has been John Henry Newman's Grammar of Assent. I read that in my third-year philosophy (at least the analytic parts) about five times and found solutions for my problems. I was not satisfied with the philosophy that was being taught and found Newman's presentation to be something that fitted in with the way I knew things. It was from that kernel that I went on to different authors."

[56] Caring About Meaning, p. 73.

[57] There are other areas besides the question of assent in which to explore Newman's influence on Lonergan. For example, there is Lonergan's use of what he calls "Newman's Theorem", in The Idea of a University, that the omission of a part of knowledge involves ignorance of that part, mutilation of the whole, and distortion of the remainder. See Second Collection, pp. 141-48 and 185; see also the audience notes of J. M. LaPorte of the lectures entitled "Knowledge and Learning" delivered in the Institute in the Graduate School, Gonzaga University, July 15-26, 1963. The notes are available at the Lonergan Research Institute.

LONERGAN ON THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Richard M. Liddy
Seton Hall University

In 1951 Bernard Lonergan wrotes an article entitled "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World." Originally published in French, it can be found in Lonergan's Collection [1]. Published at the same time he was working on his magnum opus, Insight, it reflects the basic thrust of that major work.

Some years later, in 1959, in a series of lectures in Cincinnati on the philosophy of education Lonergan touched again upon the subject of the Catholic university [2]. Here he adverted to the fact that of its verynature the whole immense Catholic school system is rooted in a "supernaturalist vision" that is in conflict with the dominant philosophies of education of modern times.

> The fact is that we have a Catholic educational system, with primary schools, high schools, colleges and universities. That is the concrete fact and its exists because it is Catholic. [3]

What Lonergan finds lacking is a philosophical vision capable of defending the existence of the Catholic school system. Educational theorists tend to be divided into "modernists" whose appeal is to human experience and scientific verification and "traditionalists" who appeal to immutable truths transcending scientific verification. Catholics certainly are to be found on the traditional side of the argument, but Lonergan found the traditionalist program, as usually expounded, inadequate in its argument against modernism.

> An educational philosophy that appeals to the immutable elements in things, to their eternal properties, to the truths that hold in any age, and simply urges that empirical methods are not the only methods, really is defending a negative position. It is not offering a vision. [4]

That element of vision is present in Lonergan's 1951 article on the Catholic university. My essay will be a comment on that article with clarifications from some of Lonergan's later writings. This is particularly topical at a time when the Sacred Congregation for Education is asking Catholic universities to clarify their own mission. Lonergan provides

some elements that can be helpful in constructing a mission statement for a Catholic university.

Lonergan divides his article into six sections which Frederick Crowe, the editor of his Collected Works has subtitled: "The Human Good," "Community," "The Dialectic of History," "The Modern World and the University," "The Catholic University," "The Catholic University in the Modern World." For our purposes three points are central to Lonergan's argument: first, he defines the university as a mediator of culture; secondly, he points out the ambiguity of culture and, hence, of the university; thirdly, he locates the precise mission of the Catholic university in the transformation of culture.

Readers of Lonergan's later writings will recognize in these three elements a parallel to what he will call the three vectors of human history: progress, decline and redemption [5]. Lonergan's 1951 article can be seen as a particular application of that schema.

1. The University as an Organ of Cultural Community

> A university is a reproductive organ of cultural community. Its constitutive endowment lies not in buildings or equipment, civil status or revenues, but in the intellectual life of its professors. Its central function is the communication of intellectual development. [6]

In this short definition of the university Lonergan states that the constitutive endowment of the university, that which makes it what it is, is the intellectual life of its professors. The central function of the university is the communication of that development to others. In this process of personal development and communication, there takes place the transmission of human culture.

In order to clarify this description of the educational process, it is helpful to use a metaphor which Lonergan employed frequently in his later writings; and that is the metaphor of human development taking place in two ways: "from below upwards" and "from above downwards" [7]. It is from below upwards as the person develops his or her intellectual capabilities. It is from above downwards as community, tradition and culture make personal development possible.

Clearly, our first and most obvious image of human development conceives it as "from below upwards." The seed gives way to the sprout and to the gradually developing plant. The major thrust of Lonergan's early work was to highlight human development as "from below upwards." Human consciousness moves

from experience through questioning to understanding, judgment and decision. The process is recurrent and cumulative as wider experience gives way to fuller understanding, wiser judgment and more effective decisions. Throughout a lifetime this inwardly driven conscious process develops through the rejection of inattention, ignorance, stupidity, selfishness. According to Lonergan, such development is the human response to the notion of being, the notion of truth, the notion of value, the notion of the good. Such notions are the inner anticipation of the answers to all our questions and all our human striving.

Such is the whole point of Lonergan's "transcendental method" in philosophy: to highlight this inner drive to authenticity that issues in developed understanding, judgment, decisions [8]. Such highlighting is in the first place pedagogical, for it involves calling each person to pay attention to their own inner being, their own understanding and drive for truth, their own thirst for authenticity. Such a program issues in the personal appropriation of the structures of one's own conscious life.

In particular, such a program of self-appropriation particularly involves the appropriation of one's own intelligence and the structures of intelligence in general; and such intelligence is the focal point of the university. In his 1951 article Lonergan gives this manificent description of intelligence, the act of understanding:

> [I]t is the intus legere of intelligence in act that alone grasps many truths in comprehensive synthesis, that holds ranges of concepts in the unity of their intelligible relations, that moves back and forth freely between the abstract and the concrete, the universal and the particular, the speculative and the practical. Without developed understanding, explanations are of hypnotic drugs by their virtus dormitiva, truths become uncomprehended formulas, moral precepts narrow down to lists of prohibitions, and human living settles into a helpless routine without capacity for vital adaptation and without the power of knowledge that inspires and directs the movement from real possibility to concrete achievement. [9]

"Insight into insight" -- the point of Lonergan's work by that title -- is really the concrete realization of Newman's "science of sciences" which the latter saw as the integrating factor in the university. Thus, Lonergan in his lectures on education extols the value of a "general education" that allows

a person to move in and out of many different areas of inquiry.

> In other words, you are educating, in the sense of developing assimilative power, by the study of language, by teaching people to read, so that they are able to read not merely comic books and the titles under the pictures in Life, but anything. If you spend long hours reading Thucydides and Plato, you do not find much that has been written since heavy reading. You are in training, and when you sit down with a book you have not got an irresistible tendency to go to sleep, or to get out somewhere and move around. There is a development in assimilative power in the study of languages and literature...Similarly, the study of mathematics rather than natural science, of philosophy and history rather than the human sciences, are all cases in which you are developing the assimilative power of the pupil or student, enabling him to do whatever he may choose to do in any particular field. [10]

Such is the importance of development "from below upwards." It is the development of human intelligence. But Lonergan's metaphor from his later writings highlights the concomitant importance of development "from above downwards." It is the development that takes place by trusting others: parents, teachers, professors, mentors. Through this trusting of others one comes to see what others have seen, to hear what they have heard, to understand what they have understood and learned. Without this development from above through trusting others, that is, trusting the tradition, the infant would remain the bundle of unfocussed needs and experiences. The communal element is essential to all human development.

> As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes himself. The choice of roles between which he can choose in electing what to make himself is no larger than the accepted meanings of the community admit; his capacities for effective initiative are limited to the potentialities of the community for rejuvenation, renewal, reform, development. At any time in any place what a given self can make of himself is some function of the heritage or sediment of common meanings that comes to him from the authentic or unauthentic living of his predecessors and his contemporaries. [11]

Learning, then, takes place through this scissors-like action of primarily trusting others so that one can come more and more to trust oneself and add one's own personal contribution to the communal fund of the human family's intellectual development. To quote Lonergan's own description of this scissors-like action:

> The handing on of development...works from above downwards: it begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son, the pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows the growth in understanding of one who has found a genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one's growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptive by one's developed understanding. With the experiential confirmation the inverse process may set in. One is now on one's own. One can appropriate all that one has learnt by proceeding as does the original thinker who moved from experience to understanding, to sound judgment, to generous evaluation, to commitment in love, loyalty, faith. [12]

Now in the definition with which we began this section Lonergan sees the university as the point of intersection of both of these movements of development. On the one hand the obvious and central function of the university is to foster personal intellectual development. On the other hand, the university is obviously a communal enterprise; it is obviously a community. It is organized in such a way as to pass on some values. The good of order that is the concrete functioning of the university necessarily sets all its elements -- buildings, finances, personnel, etc. -- within the light of the values it passes on. Through its professors, through the organization of their research and teaching, the university passes on something that is not limited to any one course or one area of science or scholarship. It passes on a way of looking at things. It passes on a culture: a certain set of meanings and values.

That culture may be popular American or secularist or Catholic. It may try to be relativist: explicitly limiting itself to being a structure where any combination of meanings and values is passed on. But the university, by being a communal enterprise in the area of intelligence, is by its very nature "a reproductive organ of cultural community."

What is cultural community? In his 1951 article and in Insight Lonergan defines cultural community by distinguishing it from intersubjective and civil community. Just as the human person is a composite of various levels of consciousness, so there are various levels of human community [13]. Corresponding to a first experiential level there is the spontaneous intersubjective community that finds its special expression in the family.

But the human person also understands and organizes his or her life, and so labor is divided, systems are created, collaboration is encouraged and, as a result, civilizational community emerges. This is the level of the technology, economy, politics. Such civil community comes to distinguish itself from more primitive society by its tremendous division of labor, its developed institutions and chiefly through its achievement of theory, the ability to understand things in their relations to each other and not just in relation to our own subjective needs. Such civilizational achievement found its particular expression in Greek philosophy.

> There is, then, the emergence of individualism and critical thinking. There are discussion groups and wandering teachers. There is the formation of academies, schools, libraries, universities, universalist tendencies in intellectual, religious, and political fields; and there is the pursuit of wisdom and of culture for its own sake. It is a pure development of intelligence that is not practical. [14]

Therefore, just as human intellectual consciousness gives rise to civilizational community, so evaluational consciousness gives rise to cultural community. For civilized people can and sometimes do ask questions about the meanings and values of civilizational community. Where did it come from and where is it headed? What is the meaning and value of it all? Is some of it good and valuable and some of it evil and degrading? The human person and human community are capable of both appreciation and criticism. Such appreciation and criticism transcends the frontiers of states and the epochs of history. It is enshrined in the classic writings of the human family. As Lonergan puts it, cultural community is

> the field of communication and influence of artists, scientists, and philosophers. It is the bar of enlightened public opinion to which naked power can be driven to

> submit. It is the tribunal of history that may expose successful charlatans and may restore to honor the prophets stoned by their contemporaries. [15]

Although transcending the boundaries of the university, such cultural community is especially mediated by and passed on by the university. In the university these questions arise in the movement from the field specializations of research to the communication of the results of that research in university departments and in the subjects taught in those departments [16]. What data in fact will we research? Why? What conceptual categorization will we use to communicate the results of our research? What will we communicate to our students and why? What subjects are truly valuable for them and why? Why do it at all? What in fact is it that we are doing?

Such are the questions about the meaning and value of the sciences, the professions, the humanities. They are the subject matter of cultural community of which the university is and should be the reproductive organ.

As I mentioned previously, Lonergan in his lectures on the philosophy of education points out the value of a general education in literature, philosophy, history and mathematics that can protect a student from premature specialization. With a background in these more general studies that correspond to more general questions about the human person, one can then go on to master the various specialties of human intelligence. Without this development one's mind can easily contract into the horizon of one particular specialization.

> General education, then, aims primarily at the development of assimilative power. If a man learns to know man, through the reading of literature and the study of history, he will have a basis for stepping into the human sciences that is much more useful perhaps than the study of the human sciences. If he spent all that time studying the human science, what would he know? He would learn what his professor knew of what the bigger men had figured out five years ago, ten years ago, fifteen years ago, thirty years ago. By the time he set about working in the field, he would have something to do to keep abreast; and ten years later all of his stuff might be out of date. And would he have the capacity to judge the new, to jump with it or stand against it? If he has had this more general development in assimilative power, this more intimate communication of what it really is to be

> a man, the development of the human touch that comes through the traditional classical education or the literary education as opposed to the scientific education, he would have a basis within himself that would enable him to judge about men, and not become a crackpot. It is easy to produce crackpots by premature specialization. [17]

2. The Ambiguity of Cultural Community & the University

Obviously, cultural community is not utopia; it is not the ideal cosmopolis where unbiased rason reigns supreme. It can be filled with Heideggerian "chatter". Words can enchant and distract. Just as the nature of cultural community is to arrive at judgments on the meaning and values of civil community, about what constitutes progress, so cultural community itself can be riven with decline. Its judgments can be biased. In theological language, our cultural community itself is subject to the drag of sin.

The darkness that affects the individual's judgments to blind him to his own egoism, can also affect the group. Then group feelings can mobilize judgments that seen no limit to a group's pretensions: those people are the evil ones--that group, that clique. "My country right or wrong, but my country." Then the Marxist feeling-driven class warfare issues in a disintegrating process of violence. Civil community itself is split into self-serving factions.

But most of all the darkness can be such as to claim it is light. The individual and the group can claim that their egoism is "reasonable," practical, the only common-sense way of acting. Then philosophies appear in the cultural community that claim that the whole thing is about electro-chemical events, a materialistic universe heading nowhere. In the words of the existentialists, it is all absurd; or in the words of the ancient tragedians, "Whom the gods destroy they first make blind" [18].

Such is what Lonergan in his 1951 essay called "the ambiguity of cultural community." Such a deep ambiguity clinging to cultural community concerns the nature of human reason itself. Lonergan describes the "rationalizing" tendency of human reason in this way:

> The pronouncements of rational reflection are splendid but they lack efficacy. In another universe things could be different, but in the existing universe man suffers from moral impotence. This fact leads men to question

> the hegemony of reason, to relegate its precepts to some isolated academic or ecclesiastical sphere, to develop "realist" views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done. It follows that, besides the succession of higher syntheses characteristic of intellectual advance, there is also a succession of lower syntheses characteristic of sociocultural decline. [19]

Lonergan delineates the spiral of cultural decline with an assessment that he repeats in Insight. The medieval synthesis of faith and reason shattered into the several religions of the Reformation. The wars of religion proved that human life was to be led not by revelation but by reason. The disagreements among reason's representatives opened the door to toleration as the fundamental value. The helplessness of toleration to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian who collapses all of reality into economic and military development and the dominance of the all-inclusive State. It is a spiral of narrower and narrower decline [20].

Such is the world in which we live. It is the cumulative product, not just of personal and cultural development, but also of personal and cultural decline. Such decline becomes solidified in human assumptions, mentalities, interpretations, philosophies, tastes, habits, hopes, fears. These ways of thinking, attitudes and practices distort the character of the human spirit and human society. In his Method in Theology of 1972 Lonergan describes this human situation of cultural ambiguity.

> Initially not all but some religion is pronounced illusory, not all but some moral precept is rejected as ineffective and useless, not all truth but some type of metaphysics is dismissed as mere talk. The negations may be true, and then they represent an effort to offset decline. But also they may be false, and then they are the beginning of decline. In the latter case some part of cultural achievement is being destroyed. It will cease being a familiar component in cultural experience. It will recede into a forgotten past for historians, perhaps, to rediscover and reconstruct. Moreover, this elimination of a genuine part of the culture means that a previous whole

> has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to compensate. [21]

This distortion of the culture takes place in different ways in different societies and exacerbates the already disastrous effects of individual and group bias. In these cases believing what is told you will work toward your destruction rather than toward your growth. As belief in a humanly developing society aids personal development, belief in an ambiguous culture can work toward your destruction [22]. Examples among our young people abound.

In this situation of cultural ambiguity people tend not to comprehend their own situation, and so appropriate action is impossible. To this extent the modern or postmodern world is involved in a major crisis -- and the university is itself caught in the same crisis, the same ambiguous cultural situation.

> It may lag in consenting to aberrations but in the long run it has to yield, for it recruits its students and their professors from the sociocultural situation that exists. [23]

To a great extent this has been the import of Bloom's book, The Closing of the American Mind. Whatever its exaggerations, it is a trenchant critique of the contemporary university and the relativist culture its reflects. It is a critique of our culture, that is, our modern philosophies, and their effect on the university.

3. The Mission of the Catholic University

It is precisely here, face to face with the ambiguous development and decline of modern culture that the Catholic university finds its mission. Certainly as a university it has the identical function as the secular university, that is, the communication of intellectual development.

> Nor can anyone suppose that a secondrate Catholic university is any more acceptable to God in the new law than was in the old law the sacrifice of maimed and diseased beasts.[24]

Nevertheless, this identity of essential function is overlaid with "profound difference." The secular university of its nature is caught in the ambiguities of civil and cultural development and decline. The same situation constrains the Catholic university. However, as Lonergan says in his 1951 essay, the latter is "armed against the world."

> The supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity are named theological because they orientate man to God as he is in himself. None the less they possess a profound social significance. Against the perpetuation of explosive tensions that would result from the strict application of retributive justice, there is the power of charity to wipe out old grievances and make a fresh start possible. Against the economic determinism that would result in egoistic practicality given free rein, there is the liberating power of hope that seeks first the kingdom of God. Against the dialectic discernible in the history of philosophy and in the development-and-decline of civil and cultural community, there is the liberation of human reason through divine faith; for men of faith are not shifted about with every wind of doctrine. [25]

It is precisely in the liberation of human reason through divine faith that the Catholic university as a university finds its specific difference and makes its unique contribution. For as Lonergan defined the university, its constitutive endowment lies in the intellectual life of its professors. In the major work of his later years, Method in Theology, Lonergan spells out more fully this liberating character of divine faith.

> Without faith, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist. But faith recognizes that God grants men their freedom, that he wills them to be persons and not just automata, that he calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good...Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence...Most of all, faith has the power of undoing decline. Decline disrupts a culture with conflicting ideologies. It inflicts on individuals the social, economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinism. It multiplies and heaps up the abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, violence. It is not propaganda and it is not argument but religious faith that will liberate human reason from its ideological prisons. [26]

Such a liberation is aided by a Christian theology that is both faithful to divine revelation, on the one hand, and open to an interdisciplinary integration with all the other

sciences on the other. For Christian revelation is not only doctrine about God; it is also God's word about the meaning and values of human life. Divine revelation is God's entry and his taking part in our communal making of our world. It is God's claim to have a say in the aims and purposes, the direction and development of human lives, human societies, human cultures, human history [27].

Theology in the university, then, will not just be reflection on the truths of revelation. It will also be reflection on how those truths relate to, refine, explain and complete all the other truths the human family knows. The example of Aquinas is instructive.

> In the medieval period theology became the queen of the sciences. But in the practice of Aquinas it was also the principle for the moulding and transforming of a culture. He was not content to write his systematic works, his commentaries on Scripture and on such Christian writers as the Pseudo-Dionysius and Boethius. At a time when Arabic and Greek thought were penetrating the whole of Western culture, he wrote extensive commentaries on numerous works of Aristotle to fit a pagan's science within a Christian context and to construct a world view that underpinned Dante's Divine Comedy. To this paradigm theology today must look if it is to achieve its aggiornamento. Its task is not limited to investigating, ordering, expounding, communicating divine revelation. All that is needed, but more must be done. For revelation is God's entry into man's making of man, and so theology not only has to reflect on revelation, but also it has somehow to mediate God's meaning into the whole of human affairs. [28]

In order to mediate God's meaning into the whole of human affairs, theology needs an interdisciplinary philosophy. It needs a vision of how the various sciences are related to each other, to the human person, to the universe, to God. It needs a vision of genuine intellectual development and of the accompanying cultural development, decline and possible redemption.

Today theology itself is heavily influenced by the other sciences of the modern university: just think of the influence of critical history on the study of Scripture, Patristics, Church history. But what about theology's own contributions to the other sciences? Was that not Newman's point in the

Idea of a University when he vindicated theology's rightful place in the university curriculum? Is this not the specific mission of the Catholic university: to foster the influence of Catholic theology on all the university disciplines? This is particularly true of the human sciences. As Lonergan wrote in 1951:

> Not pure nature envisaged by philosophy but man as he exists is the object of empirical anthropology and psychology, of economics and sociology, of the existentialisms, of explanatory histories of civilizations and cultures, of religion and dogma.But man as he has existed and exists is man subject to moral impotence; it is man as the cooperative or uncooperative recipient of divine grace. Hence, the integration of sciences that deal with man concretely has to be sought not in philosophy but in theology. The old maxim that theology is the queen of the sciences has been given new relevance and Newman's Idea of a University a fresh significance. [29]

Theology will be able to integrate the other sciences to the extent that the philosophy it employs, its explicit vision of the human person and of reality, can be related to all the other sciences. As it "sublates" philosophy into a faith vision, that is, brings it into a higher viewpoint, so its interdisciplinary philosophy will sublate the other sciences as well. Through its interdisciplinary philosophy economic theory will be evaluated in the light of fundamental moral values. Genetic research will take place against the backdrop of the transcendent dignity of the human person. Political science will take place in the light of evaluational history, a foundational vision of what constitutes human progress and what constitutes human decline. As Lonergan noted in a writing from his later years that showed his continuing commitment to the idea of a Catholic university:

> As it is only in the university that all aspects of human living are under study, it is only in the Christian university that theology can attain its full development and exercise its full influence. [30]

This is not an easy project. It calls for a fundamental commitment on the part of Catholic universities to their theology and philosophy departments -- hopefully working together and fostering interdisciplinary dialogue. To quote Lonergan in his Halifax lectures on Insight:

> To put it more concretely, we go to great expense to have Catholic universities; yet, our professors cannot be anything more than specialists in physics, specialists in chemistry, specialists in history. If they can search and search for philosophic and theological aids to give them the orientation that would be specifically Catholic in their fields and still not find them, because neither philosophy nor theology are doing their job of integrating, then we have a problem. [31]

One final point. Contemporary events reflect the fact that the Catholic university is involved in an ambiguity of its own. Lonergan's 1951 articles has two things to say on this point.

> From the schools of Alexandria and Antioch, through the medieval universities, to Pascendi and Humani Generis, Catholic intellectuals have been discounted as doubtful blessings. Praise is given to St. Thomas because of his merits; it is concentrated on him because one finds it a little difficult to be outright in praising so many others. Indeed, the misadventures of Catholic intellectuals could be taken as a counsel to wrap one's talent in a napkin and bury it safely in the ground, were not that conclusion clean contrary to the gospel which demands, beyond capitalist expectations, one hundred percent profit. Such then is this third ambiguity: Catholic intelligence is to be used to the limit; yet so complex, so arduous, so excellent is the task confronting it that failure is both easy and disastrous. [32]

Lonergan's final word on the subject is a call to conversion. If the Catholic intellectual is to call others to authenticity, he must be pure himself. If he is to pronounce on the ambiguities and decline of contemporary culture, he must be aware of his own biases. One canot remove the mote in another's eye when there is a beam in one's own; the true intellectual has to be humble, serene, detached, without personal or corporate or national complacence, without appeals to contemporary, let alone archaist, bias or passion or fads [33].

Conclusion

Lonergan's 1951 article provides the elements for constructing a mission statement for a Catholic university. Certainly, Lonergan did not foresee all the legal and political complexities involved in that project in our own day. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he highlighted three specific elements

that should be kept in mind in designing such a mission statement for a Catholic university.

1) The Catholic university as rooted in and related to God's self-revelation in Christ, a revelation that is also the revelation of the ultimate meaning of human life and human history.

2) The Catholic university precisely as a university as the locus of cultural development and transmission.

3) The Catholic university through its theology and interdisciplinary philosophy as serving the redemptive transformation of culture. Such commitment to Catholic philosophy and theology will be reflected even in its budget.

It seems tht almost forty years after Lonergan's article, Catholic universities are barely beginning to take up the challenge. Monumental obstacles remain. The turf-wars among university departments militate against Lonergan's interdisciplinary vision. So also do short-sighted hiring and tenure-review practices. In America the very idea of a university embodying any cultural view whatsoever -- besides a secularist view -- is at issue.

Still, beginnings are begin made here and there. Lonergan's model can help us focus on what still needs to be done. The catalogs of our Catholic universities generally have mission statements included. It would be interesting if in their last year at such universities students were asked to take a seminar whose whole theme would be: how has that mission been fulfilled in my educational experience at this Catholic university?

NOTES

[1] Lonergan, Collection, eds. F. E. Crowe & R. M. Doran, Vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan [Toronto, 1988], pp. 108-113. Originally published in New York by Herder & Herder, 1967, pp. 114-120. My citations will be to the 1988 edition.

[2] Lonergan, The Philosophy of Education, transcribed by James and John Quinn. Unpublished notes of an institute at Xavier University, Cincinnati, August 3-14, 1959. These will appear as Vol. 10 of the Collected Works.

[3] Ibid., p. 20. [4] Ibid., p. 8.

[5] Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology [NY, 1972], pp. 53-55; A Third Collection [NY, 1985], p. 10.

[6] Collection, p. 111.

[7] A Third Collection, pp. 106, 126, 180-181.

[8] Insight [NY, 1957]. A brief outline of Lonergan's cognitional theory can be found in "Cognitional Structure", Collection, pp. 205-221.

[9] Collection, p. 111.

[10] Philosophy of Education, pp. 276-277.

[11] Collection, p. 227. [12] A Third Collection, p. 181.

[13] Collection, p. 109. [14] Philosophy of Education, 95.

[15] Collection, p. 109. [16] Method in Theology, pp. 125-145.

[17] Philosophy of Education, pp. 277-278.

[18] Insight, pp. 225-234. [19] Collection, p. 110.

[20] Insight, pp. 231-232.

[21] Method in Theology, pp. 243-244. [22] Ibid.

[23] Collection, p. 111. [24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 112.

[26] Method in Theology, p. 117. [27] Ibid.

[28] A Second Collection, eds. W. F. J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell [Phila., 1974], p. 62.

[29] Collection, p. 113.

[30] Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy," Method 2/2 [October 1984]: 9.

[31] Lonergan, Understanding and Being, eds. E. Morelli and M. Morelli [Lewiston, 1980], p. 119.

[32] Collection, p. 112.

[33] Ibid., p. 113.

SOURCES OF VALUE

Garrett Barden
University College Cork, Ireland

That people have different values is, and has always been in philosophy, a commonplace. That argument about values is in the end fruitless is rapidly becoming a commonplace. This second commonplace is one which I do not accept and my present purpose is to discover if an analysis of the sources of value will help dispel it.

There is a theorem in Euclid to the effect that the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees. The meaning of the term "sources" may be illustrated by asking for the sources of that theorem. There are at least these: (1) the axioms of Euclid; (2) the imagined triangle; (3) the geometer's understanding that the imagined triangle only approximates the ideal triangle that is to be understood; (4) the geometer's question about the triangle; (5) the two-dimensional plane; (6) the geometer's grasp of the necessities involved.

No one of these sources is, so to speak, the privileged source. The sources are compatible with one another. The sources are not all of the same kind.

I shall try to show that value emerges from a similar variety of sources; that these several sources are compatible; that to concentrate on some to the exclusion of others will distort one's theory of value.

Before making the attempt I must say something about the term "value" as it is used here.

First, there are, as a matter of fact, judgments of value. These are of the form: "It would be good to do X"; "Y is more worthwhile than Z"; and so on. The question is not whether these occur but how to understand them. Did they not occur, there would be no question of value.

Secondly, animals, including ourselves, have preferences, likes and dislikes, are attracted and repelled. Thus, cats on the whole prefer meat to vegetables. The question is not whether there are such preferences but how they are to be understood.

Thirdly, the term "value" is not always used in the same way. In many economic theories, for example, something is considered to be a value only if it may be associated with

scarcity. In general, philosophers do not use the term in this way.

Ordinary usage, which serves its own purpose well, may be insufficient for analysis. I shall then stipulate that a value is the object of deliberation and choice or something that can be the object of deliberation and choice. Thus, we do not deliberate about or choose tomorrow's weather and so tomorrow's weather is not, in the present sense, a value.

There were, and perhaps still are, those for whom judgments of value are to be identified with preferences. There are more or less refined versions of the position but each version reduces the question of the sources of value to the question of the sources of preference; the question of the sources of value arises in its own right only if it is incorrect to reduce value to preference.

However, even if value is not simply preference, preference may be a source of value. The mistake of the reductionists -- if it is the mistake which I take it to be -- is to posit preference as the sole source of value and, having done so, to reduce value to preference.

To have decided to read this article is an example of deliberation and choice. For the reader the article in prospect was a value. If I had asked beforehand why you had decided on reading it you would have known the kind of question I was asking and would have given me reasons. I do not for a moment suppose that everyone's reasons would have been the same although I do, as a matter of fact, suspect that there would have been considerable agreement. I do also suspect that, as a matter of fact, we all share a context within which certain answers will appear as reasons while others will not. Here are some examples of answers to the question: why are you reading this article?

(1) Because I am a serious academic.

(2) Because the topic interests me.

(3) Because I am paid to do so.

(4) Because I shall be damned if I don't.

(5) Because oranges are fruit.

Of these suggested reasons the first three, although they differ from each other, are, I think, in the same social context. The fourth is in a context which I suspect most readers understand but may not share. The fifth is so out of context that it does not appear to be a reason at all.

None of the reasons is so self-contained and complete that it provokes no further questions, but what the interested inquirer is looking for, at least as a first approach, is a further elucidation of the speaker's context, that is, an account of why and how the answer is a reason.

Because the fifth reason does not appear as a reason we should ask: why is that a reason? And we ask this precisely because we do not know the context within which it is a reason. But of the other reasons we could ask the same question. If we do not, this is often because we already share (or at least understand) the context within which the preferred reason is a reason.

The context within which the reason emerges is the value biography of the speaker and so further questions provoke the gradual articulation and elucidation of that biography. The second reason above will fairly quickly go back to: Because I find philosophy interesting. And that reason will give rise to the question: why do you find philosophy interesting? I shall return to that question later because the way that we answer it throws a good deal of light on the sources of value.

First, however, I want to look at another aspect of the question: why are you reading this article? That question looks for a reason. You find it appropriate to attempt an answer precisely because you have already so ordered your life that you take that order as already being the answer; the reason is not something added on to your decision to read this article; it is part of your decision; it is part of your reading. You may never have expressed the reason in words but the reason is already, in Aristotelian terms, the form of your reading.

The proferred reason is a source of value. But the fact that we are the kind of beings that ask for and give ourselves reasons is another source of value. More fundamental than having a particular reason for a particular action is the fact that we are the kind of being that wants reasons for action. We are the kind of being that imagines its future, that deliberates about possible courses of action, that judges and chooses. We do not <u>decide</u> to be that kind of being; we <u>discover</u> ourselves to be so. Most basically reasonableness is not that we already have articulated reasons but the fact that we are the kind of being that looks for reasons. In this basic and quite precise sense we do not choose to be subject to the demands of reasonableness; we discover ourselves to be so.

Correlative is a world within which the future is not utterly determined by the present. Actual values arise, through question and decision, upon possibilities, and those possibilities are sources of value. Accordingly, the world, the present in all its detail, which includes our present selves, is a source of value.

Question, deliberation, judgment and decision are sources of value. The present as possibility of an undetermined future is a source of value. They are not sources of the same kind. In Aristotelian terms, they are formal and material sources.

Formally there would be no possibility of value were we not the kind of being that asked about its own realization, that presented itself with imagined possibilities, that judged and that decided. Materially there would be no possibility of value were there not a correlative universe where the future is not wholly determined by the present.

I want now to return to the question of why I find philosophy interesting. If I am asked why I study philosophy I can give several reasons but one of them surely is that I find philosophy interesting. We live within a social and intellectual context in which that answer appears as a reason.

If I go on to ask why I find philosophy interesting I am engaged in a different kind of inquiry and to that question there is a different kind of answer. I want to take these questions in turn.

Why do I study philosophy? Because I find it interesting. I do not want to claim that this is a sufficient or even a necessary reason in our culture. A fortiori, I do not want to claim that interest is the fundamental source of all value. Again I do not claim that there are no intellectual and cultural contexts within which interest simply does not count as a reason. My claim is more modest: interest, within many versions of contemporary western culture, does as a matter of fact count as a reason. Those who find it a bad or inadequate reason still find it an intelligible reason. But why does it count? Some would claim that there must be something presupposed. That presupposition may be articulated as: "that something is interesting is a reason for doing it."

The practical argument would then be something like the following:

If X is interesting, there is a reason for doing X
And X is interesting
Therefore, there is a reason for doing X

Both the major and the minor may be challenged.

The challenge to the major takes the form: why do you accept the posited relation between interest and reason? Or, why is interest a reason? If we remain within logical system (ethica more geometrico demonstrata) then we are condemned to find two more premises for an argument to which the posited relation between interest and reason is a conclusion. To avoid infinite regress there must be first principles, axioms, absolute presuppositions or whatever. Fundamental to contemporary relativism, for example, are the twin assertions that (a) there must be these axioms, and that (b) they are incommensurably and irrevocably distinct between personal or intellectual or cultural or historical contexts. Contemporary relativism is, I think, correct if it is true that we are confined to logical system.

Relativism and some version of absolutism are often contrasted. The contrast is, of course, present and, indeed, obvious. However, the very clarity of the contrast masks a more fundamental agreement. Both relativists and absolutists assume that if we are to make sense of action as reasonable then we are constrained to discover basic presuppositions from which less basic positions may be derived. Absolutists consider that these presuppositions are in some sense given to humans qua humans; relativists think that basic presuppositions are culturally given and differ from culture to culture. What I am suggesting is that we should look elsewhere for the reasonableness of human action.

The matter may be approached otherwise. First, interest is not in itself a reason. In itself, interest is simply interest. Secondly, interest inclines the one experiencing interest in one direction rather than another. Thirdly, for interest to become a reason for action it must be transformed into a reason.

Interest is not itself a reason. The person who denies that interest is a reason for action is not required to deny the existence of interest; what is denied is that someone who acts simply out of interest is acting reasonably. That interest is given is not to say that it is given as a reason. Hunger is given and is correlated with eating but hunger is simply hunger; in itself it is not given as a reason for eating. Desire may be accepted as a reason for action but is first experienced simply as desire.

And yet interest, like hunger, inclines the person in a particular direction. The world, including oneself, is no longer neutral. Still, the non-neutral world is not yet a reason.

How does the transformation occur? The formal source of value is our presence to ourselves as oriented to an undetermined future for which we are, in part at least, responsible. The formal source of value is, in Lonergan's terms, responsible consciousness. In Sartre's terms it is the nothingness of present consciousness in the face of possibility. Responsible consciousness is doubly undetermined; it is undetermined with respect to the future inasmuch as it realizes one of several undetermined possibilities; it is undetermined with respect to its material inasmuch as the possibilities do not determine it. Interest is the material source of value but interest does not determine the value which the responsible consciousness will posit. Since interest is not simply neutral, the possibilities are not crudely and undifferentiatedly there. The world of possibility is differentiated by feelings, orientations, habits, cultural discoveries, social forms and so on. The world of effective possibility is different for different actors and it is this rather than a sheerly neutral universe that responsible consciousness transforms.

I am present to myself as responsible in a world differentiated by my interest. My interest inclines me. If I am, on the level of responsibility, oriented towards my future, then I am so inevitably since I live in time and the present inexorably transforms itself into the future. Thus, my responsibility is one among many transformation operators. My question, then, is how am I to transform the present responsibly? But to transform the present responsibly is to give oneself a reason for transforming it. So I seek in the present not reasons but aspects of the present that can become reasons.

I discover my interest in philosophy and I may take this discovered interest as one reason for pursuing philosophy, but I am not committed to take interest in general as a reason for action. The reason for studying philosophy is not baldly "interest" but "interest in philosophy"; to speak of interest in general is not to describe experience directly; interest as experienced is specified. Thus I transform my interest in philosophy into a reason for studying philosophy.

In our culture "interest in philosophy" is accepted as a reason for studying philosophy. It is not, I suggest, unquestionably a sufficient reason and I am not now engaged in trying

to show that it is. I am concentrating on the transformation of this interest into a reason. How can a given interest in philosophy become a reason for studying philosophy?

The simple answer is the axiomatic, whether in its absolute or relative form: interest in philosophy is given -- absolutely or relative to a particular culture -- not simply as interest but as a reason. The relativist quarrel with the universalist is not that there are no given reasons but that the given reasons are cultural not universal. The suggestion put forward here is that there are no given reasons whether universal and absolute or cultural and relative.

We become reasonable by our own judgments and decisions but we do not choose to be the kind of beings of whom reasonableness is demanded. Were this demand absent, interest and desire would simply initiate action in appropriate circumstances -- as, indeed, they sometimes do.

I discover myself to be interested in philosophy, that is, philosophical questions appear to me not simply as questions that happen to be present in my culture but as questions that engage me. But is it reasonable for me to allow that initial engagement to direct my living? How does the intimation of worth or value become a value? Why should I judge it worthwhile to accept the engagement?

The axiomatic answer is that there is some already given criterion, whether universal and absolute or cultural and relative. The answer is perennially tempting for several reasons. One of these reasons is that some of our reason-giving experiences are quasi-axiomatic. If someone is asked why he is buying a ticket he may reply that he is doing so because he wants to be allowed on the train. Within the narrow compass of that discussion the desire to get the train serves as the reason for getting the ticket. The assumption is then made that all our reasons are like that.

But the axiomatic answer simply won't do, for whether the basic axiom is relative or absolute, cultural or universal, it can hardly be maintained that the worthwhileness of philosophy is an adequate reason for me to undertake the study. The practical question is not whether philosophy is worthwhile, whether it is valuable to study philosophy, but whether it is valuable for me to do so. Even were it given that the study of philosophy was worthwhile, it can hardly be claimed that it is given that it is worthwhile for a particular person to study it.

Besides the axiomatic answer there are versions of the arbitrary. I simply choose to study philosophy; I simply decide to accept the engagement. To study philosophy becomes a value simply because I, by my choice, make it one. This answer can easily accept intellectual and cultural history, actual possibilities, opportunities and so on -- the arbitrary is not wildly random -- but in the end the gap between discovered interest and decision is clear and complete. The proferred reason is in the end unreasonable.

The axiomatic answer looks for infallibility; the arbitrary is a counsel of despair. What is needed is another account of the manner in which we realize our reasonableness.

To accept my discovered engagement with philosophy without further ado would be arbitrary but this is not in fact what I do. I inquire into it; I try to discover where it would lead; I imagine the future as constituted in part by allowing interest scope; I wonder how its free operation in my life would develop me; I wonder about my place in the community when constituted by the dominant operation of that interest. And so on. To do all this -- and to do all this is not extraordinary -- is hardly arbitrary; indeed, it seems the reverse. But to do this is not to be determined by a clear rule: "do what interests you." And if I do formulate something like a maxim to do what interests me, of if my culture provides me with such a maxim, then that maxim is itself generated by the process described.

To take my interest as a reason for my action, that is, to accept responsibility for a life guided by discovered interest, is not to turn interest into an unquestionable criterion. What has been responsibly accepted can responsibly be reconsidered. My present will be guided by interest but, as well as the present ordering, there is the present material not, perhaps, entirely ordered; and as well as the present as yet to be ordered material, there is the underlying present orderer, the subject who asks for reasons, who takes responsibility for action.

On the euclidean, spinozaist, rationalist model of reason and responsibility there is no option but to go back to articulated first principles, given articulated, literally unquestionable values, absolute presuppositions, etc. The issue, then, is to put forward another model of rationality, reasonableness and responsibility. Put very simply, the model that I am suggesting is that the criterion of the reasonableness

of a value is the reasonable and responsible subject. In other words, the criterion is not a set of axioms and subsequent logical operations upon these, but the moral subject.

The minor premise of the practical argument was "And X is interesting". This is an empirical discovery about myself. How it comes about that I find philosophy interesting has to do with my culture, my education, my family, my early biography, my neuroses, my chance encounters, my opportunities and so on and on. All these are the material sources of value. The formal source of value is myself as responsible. The actual value is possibility responsibly transformed.

What I have said will and must remain profoundly unsatisfactory to those whose idea of reasonableness is axiomatic. And so I conclude with two remarks. First, most of us are profoundly axiomatic in theory; our version of reason is Euclidean geometry; our clearest exemplar is Spinoza. Secondly, our practice is not axiomatic. Our reasonable and responsible transformation of ourselves is not axiomatic. What I am trying to do is initiate an empirical study of human responsible action which will not lie easily on the various styles of procrustean axiomatic beds that are currently available [1].

NOTES

[1] This paper is a slightly modified version of a paper of the same title presented at the World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton, UK, August 1988.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
FROM BELOW UPWARD AND FROM ABOVE DOWNWARD

Maurice Schepers, O.P.
La Salle University

In the closing years of his life Bernard Lonergan increasingly employed the language of the two ways: development from below upward and from above downward. As a modest contribution to coherent thinking as regards this distinction, I should like to provide a note that relates it to a specific topic, namely, the experience of grace. To think about the distinction in this way amounts to asking how it happens that, in the unfolding of life's drama, the human subject is rendered conscious of being in love in an unrestricted fashion [1].

Such inquiry is appropriate to the third stage of meaning, and corresponds to what Aquinas intended, at the second stage, in raising the question, "Can one know oneself to be in the state of grace?"[2] In fact, the question about the experience of grace surfaces in the article, "Mission and Spirit" [3]. Moreover, in a slightly earlier piece, "Healing and Creating in History," Lonergan uses a supplementary vocabulary [4]. In the working out of this note, I have endeavored to coordinate the two usages. The task in hand is undertaken in two steps: (1) a summary description of the two types of development; (2) a topical application, namely, to the experience of grace.

Where the context is the conscious transition from the natural to the supernatural (an alternative way of expressing what is meant by "experience of grace" [5]) one might risk saying, in the first place, that there are just two kinds of experience. One pertains to human striving, the other to what might be termed the giftedness of life.

The striving is from below upward, so to speak, as it is creative. The appropriate image is of the gradual ascent of a mountain, on which the arrival at each succeeding plateau provides a broader, farther-reaching vista. Such effort begins with elemental experience regarding a basic situation, and normally rises through the various levels of consciousness (understanding, judgment, decision and action). Questions for understanding, for reflection, and for deliberation respectively generate an upwardly sublating flow of conscious acts,

in which each succeeding set of acts includes but transforms the contents of the previous set. The typically, albeit provisional term of this process is the creation of a new situation, upon which the cycle recommences.

The latter type of experience, named gift, is a thrust from above downward. It is at once healing and transformative (sanans et elevans). The corresponding image is of a cascade, in which the overflow from each higher plateau fills the pool below, until there is a continuous flow from top to bottom. The originating point of this development is the highest level of human consciousness, which Lonergan describes as "the peak of the soul, the apex animae" [6]; and the gift itself is religious conversion. As it permeates the human spirit, this gift generates new vision, new understanding, and a new field of data. The new vision consists in judgments about the real, as existent both within the subject and without, which are made in virtue of the "eye of love". The new understanding is constituted by insights concerning relations and systems that obtain in the new reality affirmed by faith. Finally, the new field of data is a transformed subject and a world to be grasped in terms of vertical finality [7].

The intimation of grace in the first, creative and upwardly moving type of development is mediated by desire, both as realized and as frustrated, the experience of which, in its totality, raises profound questions. To explain schematically how this works, one might begin by observing that, among the desires that give impetus to our lives, one of them proves, in the end, to be radically irrepressible, namely, the pure and unrestricted desire to know all there is to be known. Notwithstanding the pervasive presence of this desire, however, its fulfillment is obviously quite limited; and the components of such limitation are twofold. Objectively, there is the building up of blockage in the world, as it is distorted by sin, and thus rendered in part unintelligible. Subjectively, there is the blocking of the upward thrust of conscious intentionality, by the various kinds of bias, which adds up to the refusal consistently to turn away from evil. A certain ambiguity results from both the objective and the subjective confusions. And so questions arise concerning the meaning not only of the irrepressible desire, but also of the frustration generated by its apparent denial. How is the desire sustained and how is it to be satisfied? As to the denial, how can it

be effectively countered? These are questions about grace, or the transition from the natural to the supernatural.

The intimation of grace through the giftedness of life occurs when, in fact, the human heart is found to be flooded by love, in spite of objective and subjective setbacks. As evil runs its course in one's life, the desire to know the mystery, in which one is to find one's place, is intensified, rather than diminished. In addition, the scene in which life unfolds gradually shifts, and one finds that inner dispositions have undergone more or less subtle modifications. Gradually too the cast of people with whom one portrays life's drama changes, and old routines have to be given up for new ways. In the midst of all these modifications there may erupt that change of heart, the cause of which one can scarcely identify.

The conscious transition from the natural to the supernatural has a social as well as individual dimension. From a social point of view, those who experience an intimation of transcendent being in their deepest desire, who find themselves stymied as they are drawn toward the mystery that seems to be their destiny, yet remains out of reach and even alien, and whose hearts are in the end flooded by love -- such as these tend to come together. Where hearts are changed, the need for mutually self-supporting rationalization is less imposing. Openness and honesty can be given a chance, and what was once thought to be a determined necessity is now subject to deliberative dialogue. Estrangement and alienation need not prevail; they are countered by reconciliation. Together men and women can reap the fruits of the Spirit that are joy, peace, etc. (Gal. 5:22). This entire experience takes on definitive meaning, when the inner gift of the Spirit is confirmed by the outer gift of revelation, which becomes tradition, thus forming the basis for a structured community, such as is the case with the Christian Church.

Thus, in conclusion, we find that the experience of grace occurs in both the creative and the healing/transformative phases of human development, where the former unfolds from below upward and the latter from above downward. In the case of creative development the experience is mediated and indirect, terminating in questions having implicitly to do with grace, without prejudice to its percolating presence all along in the sustaining of the mediating desire, and the overcoming of all that blocks the fulfillment thereof. As regards healing/transformative development, the experience is mediated to

be sure, but direct. Moreover, the entire range of intimations is contextualized by a social or communal aspect, which we have come to name Church. Finally, there seems to be no need for modifying, in any substantial way, the well-publicized conclusions Aquinas reaches on the question concerning the possibility of knowing oneself to be in the "state of grace". Thus, the sense of employing the term, intimation, throughout the discourse.

NOTES

[1] Lonergan, Method in Theology [1972], pp. 105ff.

[2] Summa theol., I, II, 112, 5: Utrum aliquis possit scire se habere gratiam.

[3] Lonergan, A Third Collection [1985], pp. 23-34; first published in 1976 in Experience of the Spirit, eds. Huizing and Bassett [Concilium, Vol. IX, n. 101]: 69-78.

[4] Ibid., pp. 100-109; first published in 1975 in Three Lectures [Montreal: Thomas More Inst. Papers].

[5] Cf. Lonergan, A Third Collection, p. 23.

[6] Lonergan, Method in Theology, p.107.

[7] Lonergan, A Third Collection, pp. 26ff.