METHOD

Journal of
Lonergan Studies

Method aims, first, to promote original research into the methodological foundations of the sciences and disciplines; second, to further interpretive, historical, and critical study of the philosophical, theological, and methodological writings of Bernard Lonergan; and, third, to encourage interpretive, historical, and critical study of thinkers, past and present, who address questions, issues, and themes in a manner that brings to light the foundational role of the intentional subject of consciousness.

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Theological speculation, Lonergan remarks in the Introduction to his doctoral dissertation, has brought to light and formulated the organicity in revealed truth. The Introduction itself, published here for the first time, seeks to bring to light and formulate the phases in the development and unfolding of that articulation of a revealed organic wholeness. The form of speculative development that is exposed, Lonergan claims, "is capable of synthetizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthetizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena." To anyone familiar with Lonergan's later efforts to uncover the methodological invariants in human thought, this claim is an obvious harbinger of things to come. However, as F. E. Crowe suggests in his introductory Note, perhaps we should beware of letting our strong interest in the analysis of phases in the development of doctrinal clarity distract us entirely from the central doctrine in whose development the phases are discovered. For Lonergan states his own position unequivocally in the Introduction: "... <u>gratia operans</u> is the fundamental problem in the whole movement from St. Augustine to St. Thomas."

Book Reviews: Charles C. Hefling, Jr. reviews George A. Lindbeck's <u>The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age</u>. Lindbeck is probably right, Hefling asserts, that liberal theology's solution to the problem of modernity is inadequate. However, Lindbeck's own postliberalism, while an attractive alternative, lacks critical grounding.

A NOTE TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS

In Volume IV of <u>METHOD</u> *we shall continue to make available previously unpublished material from the Lonergan Centre in Toronto, in addition to scholarly articles, notes, and book reviews focussing upon issues and questions of concern to professors and students of philosophy and theology. Please renew your subscription now. A self-addressed envelope has been enclosed for your convenience.*

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A NOTE ON LONERGAN'S DISSERTATION
AND ITS INTRODUCTORY PAGES

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With this issue Method continues its outstanding service to students of Bernard Lonergan's thought by printing the introductory section, so long a magnet for our attention but never published by Lonergan himself, of the doctoral dissertation on gratia operans in Thomas Aquinas. Some remarks in aid of understanding these pages seem called for, to relate the introduction to the thesis and the thesis to the relevant history of the young Lonergan.

I begin with the latter, disciplining myself to keep within bounds, for not only are the sources on Lonergan's early years accumulating but also there is a fascination, difficult to resist, in that now nearly legendary time so fertile in ideas, so charged with enthusiasm, so bright with possibility. But I promise to be brief. Readers, then, will be aware that Lonergan was first destined for special studies in philosophy.[1] This was his own early interest developed during his years at Heythrop College in England; as he wrote, soon after arriving there, to a friend: "The theory of knowledge is what is going to interest me most of all."[2] Superiors in his religious family naturally had reservations about this brilliant young Scholastic in their midst and, when Bernard was already in theology at the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal, in the fall of 1933, his Provincial, Rev. William Hingston, paid him "a flying visit . . . .. I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy. He put the question, Was I orthodox? I told him I was but also that I thought a lot."[3] His statement seemed to satisfy his somewhat volatile Provincial; at any rate he was pulled out of Montreal and shipped to Rome for his theological studies, with the further purpose of working in epistemology.[4] Bernard's struggling young Province had only in 1930 opened a house of philosophical studies in Toronto, and one surmises that he was marked for a position on that faculty.

He remained in Europe for four years of theology (1933-1937) and for his Jesuit "tertianship" (at Amiens, 1937-1938), and did pastoral work in Ireland and England during the summer prior to beginning the assigned biennium. Meanwhile, however,

a new Provincial back home had 'donated' him to the Gregorian University for its faculty of philosophy,[5] at which point the Rector of the Gregorian, Rev. Vincent McCormick, wrote as follows:

> Fr. Lonergan has left a splendid record behind him here; and we shall be happy to see him back for further studies. I would suggest -- supposing his own preferences are not too strong for one field rather than the other -- that he devote himself to Theology. In that Faculty there are hundreds of English-speaking students, who will be needing his help in the future.[6]

I doubt that in that authoritarian era Bernard's preferences were seriously consulted but there is every reason to believe that, when Toronto went along with Rome and communicated the decision to him in England,[7] he was perfectly happy with the new status. We know his lifelong commitment to the symbiosis of philosophy and theology and there is evidence that this interest was not simply academic but entered deeply into his personal religious life.[8]

Thus was made a momentous decision, apparently accidental in its emergence but fateful in its consequences. So in the fall of 1938 Lonergan returned to the Gregorian University, now as familiar as his home grounds, for doctoral studies in theology. Already in tertianship he had talked with Jesuits in France about a possible director and had, its seems, settled on Fr. Charles Boyer.[9] That his field was now theology instead of philosophy would, I suppose, only confirm that choice. In any case Boyer agreed to serve as director, and it remained to find a dissertation topic. Why did Lonergan not choose something in the congenial area of faith/epistemology? Maybe he considered that topic too important to risk in what was, after all, the work of a student on the way to a professorship. He had already learned something of academic politics,[10] and in later years would tell his own students to get their union cards first and then, if they wished, set about reforming the world of thought.

His actual choice did have a 'political' angle but he did an end run around that by a strictly historical study of Thomas Aquinas himself,[11] leaving both Banez and Molina to marginal notes. Details of the choice are revealed in Latin notes he made five years later, in preparation for his doctoral defense. With Boyer, he relates, he had discussed and set aside a number of topics, when Boyer reached out for his _Prima Secundae_, opened it at the article on _gratia_

operans, and said (I translate freely): "Here is an article that I don't know how to interpret, one on which I've consulted authors and commentaries in vain, one that doesn't seem to lend itself to either a Molinist or a Banezian reading. Take this article, if you like. Study the loca parallela and the historical sources. See what light you can shed on the question."[12]

Apart from a few anecdotes that circulate among his students there is not much material on the history of Lonergan's biennium. He himself records the fact, that though he began as a Molinist, "Within a month or so it was completely evident to me that Molinism had no contribution to make to an understanding of Aquinas."[13] It does not seem that Boyer provided much more than the topic. Lonergan's thanks, at the end of his Preface, are not profuse. I myself have notes of a conversation I had with Boyer thirty-five years later. He remembered Lonergan's biennium and thesis, seemed disappointed in the line his student had taken, especially in regard to Augustine, but recognized Lonergan's liberty to interpret the data in his own way.

Meanwhile, midway through the biennium, war had broken out. But Lonergan finished his dissertation before the violence of May, 1940, was assigned an early date for his defense (there was a flurry of consultations over this, involving the Jesuit Curia in Rome), but left Rome two days before it was due (intervention again from the Curia), and arrived at New York on the Conti di Savoia on May 24.[14] From there he went to his teaching assignment at the College of the Immaculate Conception, Montreal, where after three years he was examined on his dissertation by his own colleagues on the faculty. It remained to submit fifty copies of "excerpta" from the thesis in order to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology, and this he achieved by sending to the Gregorian copies of the fourth in the series of articles in which he had rewritten for Theological Studies the body of the dissertation.[15]

Thus, the synoptic view of doctorate events, based mostly on records in the Gregorian University files, is as follows. The topic was approved on Dec. 6, 1938, under the title "A history of St. Thomas's thought on operative grace" (Catalogue I in the Gregorian file of dissertations); the dissertation is listed as written, that is, handed in to the Secretariate,

on May 1, 1940 (Catalogue II); and as published (the fifty
copies of excerpta) on Dec. 23, 1946 (Catalogue III). The
date of the defense, not given in these Catalogues, was June
8, 1943, but it was held in Montreal.[16] Finally, he is listed
among the "Doctores Renuntiati" in the Liber Annualis of the
Gregorian University for 1948, the volume showing those de-
clared doctor in the years 1946-1947. As for a synoptic view
of the forms the thesis took, there is the form in which it
was submitted in May, 1940; there is the considerably rewrit-
ten form it took in the articles of Theological Studies in
1941-1942; there is the fourth article of this series (provided
with minor corrections, an introductory "Note" [Appendix 2
in this publication], and an "Outline of the Argument") which
Lonergan sent to the university Secretariate in 1946; and
fourthly there is the book form of these articles, published
only in 1971.[17]

It is time to turn to the material details of the thesis
itself. The title, as it was submitted to the examiners, was
"GRATIA OPERANS: A Study of the Speculative Development in
the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," and the title-page bears
a text from Aquinas, used again (but only in part) at the
conclusion of Grace and Freedom: " . . . trahuntur etiam a
Filio, admirabili delectatione et amore veritatis, quae est
ipse Filius Dei." There follows the oddity of three listings
of the contents. First, there is a "List of Chapters" (p.
i, included as Appendix 1 with this publication); then, "Main
Divisions of Chapters" (pp. ii-iii); and, finally, the "TABLE
OF CONTENTS" (pp. iv-ix). There is a "PREFACE" (pp. 1-2),
and an "INTRODUCTION" (pp. 2-47). The main body of the thesis,
Chapters 2-5, run from page 48 to page 338, and the "BIBLIO-
GRAPHY" is appended (pp. i-ix).[18]

The Introduction has to be read, of course, in relation
to the main body of the thesis and the question of operative
grace in Aquinas, but the relation is twofold: direct and
immediate in the statements of Aquinas and his predecessors
on grace, but indirect and mediate in the statements of Loner-
gan on the form of speculative development which, as form,
he works out in its generality and would therefore expect
to find in the history of other doctrines as well. Each aspect
has its interest, and I hope that the particular interest
the second aspect derives from Lonergan's later work in method,
will not wholly eclipse the interest of the first.[19]

The reader, who rightly wants Lonergan firsthand, will wish to know what changes the editor has introduced. In general, I have been scrupulous about leaving Lonergan alone, even where his own later writings would suggest a change.[20] I have, however, adopted American spelling throughout, while leaving a word usage which sometimes reflects his years of study in England.[21] I have brought the style of the footnotes somewhat closer to uniformity, and corrected their numbering. They really were <u>foot</u>notes so the amount of text on a page varies with their varying length.[22] I have also corrected Lonergan's quotations from theological sources, whenever I have been able to check them,[23] but have left his misquotation of Shakespeare as he wrote it. The typos are fairly numerous, more maybe than would be acceptable today or in normal circumstances.[24] But it will be remembered that Lonergan, starting cold after the shift from philosophy, researched and wrote this thesis between Dec. 6, 1938, and May 1, 1940. Further, he may have typed the whole work himself, for it seems to have been done on his own typewriter: my untrained eye, at least, can detect no difference between the type used here and that used in the letters he wrote from Europe during those years. -- Here, then, is the Preface and Introduction Lonergan wrote for his dissertation, the first of his productions at the 'commencement' (in the university sense) of his career as doctor of theology.[25]

NOTES

[1] <u>A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J.</u>, eds. William F. J. Ryan, S. J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S. J. [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974], p. 266.

[2] Letter of Bernard Lonergan to Henry Smeaton, written from Heythrop College, England, June 20 [1927] -- in the Archives of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto (henceforth: Lonergan Archives).

[3] Letter of Bernard Lonergan to Rev. Henry Keane, Provincial of the Vice-Province of Upper Canada, written from Rome, Jan. 22, 1935 (Lonergan Archives).

[4] "I was supposed to be due for a biennium in epistemology," <u>ibid.</u> It does not seem, however, that this area, though a favorite of Lonergan, would have been his first choice. Thus, in a later letter to Fr. Keane, he writes: "As philosophy of history is as yet not recognized as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the biennium. I wish to ask your approval for maintaining my interest in it, profiting by such opportunities as may crop up, and in general devoting to it such time as I prudently judge can be spared" (written from Milltown Park, Dublin, Aug. 10, 1938 -- in the Lonergan Archives).

Further, there is evidence that an underlying interest in method goes back to a very early date, for in 1928 Lonergan wrote to Rev. John M. Filion (Fr. Hingston's precedessor as Provincial) asking permission to take the honors course in method and methodology at the University of London. -- From a conversation with Lonergan that I recorded on Dec. 3, 1973; the context was the discussion of the work Robert Doran was then doing on Jung and Lonergan, and the point was to illustrate the fact that there are early, not fully conscious, anticipations of later insights.

[5] A Second Collection, p. 266.

[6] Letter to the Provincial of the Vice-Province of Upper Canada (Henry Keane), written from the Gregorian University, Rome, July 20, 1938 (Lonergan Archives).

[7] The Jesuit General had exhorted the various Provincials assembled in Rome "to donate men to the Gregorian University. The Upper Canadian provincial at the time was a relief pitcher from England and he donated me. I was informed of this at the end of tertianship and told to do a biennium in philosophy. The following September, however, I had a letter from Fr. Vincent McCormick informing me that . . . I . . . was to do a biennium in theology" (A Second Collection, p. 266). If Lonergan's memory is right, the sequence of letters must have been: Canadian Provincial to the General "donating" Lonergan; Rector of the Gregorian to the Canadian Provincial suggesting the transfer to theology; the Canadian Provincial's affirmative reply (a surmise); then, the Rector of the Gregorian to Lonergan in England or Ireland. -- Two aspects of all this recall a world that is gone. One is the wheeling and dealing that superiors did without consulting their subjects. The other is the efficiency with which the postal systems in those 'primitive' times shuttled letters back and forth across seas and oceans, to get all this arranged in some three months.

[8] While Lonergan was in retirement at Pickering, Ont., but still mentally active, Robert Doran mentioned to him that Des O'Grady (of Milltown Park) was working on the topic of judgment. Lonergan remarked in reply that his own interest in judgment stemmed from questions about the act of faith, and that he had learned from Newman that ten thousand difficulties do not make a doubt. (The reference is to Newman's Apologia, p. 239 of the Longmans edition of 1900; Newman's phrase: "do not make one doubt.") A further piece of evidence on the religious side of the young Lonergan's thinking: in the summer before he began the formal study of theology, he read extensively in Augustine and "put together a 25,000 word essay upon the act of faith." (Letter to Henry Keane, Jan. 22, 1935 -- Lonergan Archives. The same letter mentions a 30,000 word essay on Newman he gave to Fr. L. Keeler, professor at the Gregorian University. Both essays, no doubt, are lost.)

[9] During his year in France, 1937-1938, Lonergan had asked who would be a good director in Rome, and been told: Boyer. Why? He's intelligent. And the grounds for that view? He's able to change, as he did on the question of the real distinction between essence and existence. -- From a conversation with Prof. Fred Lawrence, Dec. 7, 1984. (That Lonergan

was to work in philosophy was, perhaps, no hindrance to taking Boyer as director; the latter taught in the two faculties of philosophy and theology.)

[10] On one of his exams at the University of London (it may have been part of matriculation) Lonergan unfolded some of his burgeoning ideas -- with the unhappy result that he had to take the exam over, the examiner not happening to share those particular ideas. -- From conversations with Fr. Horatio Phelan, a classmate at Heythrop College, and Fr. Gregory Lonergan, Bernard's brother.

[11] The Introduction itself explains this in some detail.

[12] Lonergan Archives, Batch I-A, Folder 16 (temporary location). This "batch," with the folder containing the 26 pages of typed notes Lonergan made for his doctoral defense, was left behind when he was packing for Rome in the summer of 1953. Diligently preserved, it became years later the nucleus of the Lonergan Archives.

[13] Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972], p. 163.

[14] From a conversation I had with Lonergan in the summer of 1963.

[15] GRATIA OPERANS: A Study of Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Excerpta ex dissertatione ad lauream in Facultate Theologica Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae. The "Vidimus et approbamus" of Charles Boyer and Joseph de Guibert (the second reader) is dated at Rome, June 8, 1943; the "Nihil obstat" and "Imprimatur" are dated at Montreal, May 21, 1946. (The title shows a slight stylistic improvement over the original, dropping the article from "A Study of the Speculative Development . . ..")

[16] The News-Letter: Province of Upper Canada, Vol. 18, no. 6 (June, 1943), p. 45: ". . . the Gregorian University delegated the theological faculty of the Immaculate Conception to hear Father Bernard Lonergan's 'Experimentum coram' [a kind of trial lecture] and defence of his doctorate thesis, 'St. Thomas Aquinas on Gratia Operans'. The former took place on May 27th, the latter on June 8th." Lonergan's marks for the defense, I learn from fully reliable authority, were two tens and two sixes from the four-man board of examiners -- encouraging for all who fail to win a summa cum laude (see also note 10 above).

[17] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J., Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971]. The "Editor's Foreword" carefully indicates the modifications introduced in this edition.

[18] The copy of the dissertation in the Lonergan Archives (his own) has 71 pages of further research-notes relevant to the study; these are surely not part of the submitted thesis, but are simply bound at the back of the author's copy for convenient reference.

[19] Of considerable interest would be a comparison of this Introduction with Lonergan's work, The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology, ed. and trans.

Conn O'Donovan [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976]. Loner-
gan's "Foreword" to the latter says: "Our purpose is to.move
on [from research, interpretation, and history, all three
of which specialties are presupposed] to a fourth, to a dia-
lectic that, like an X-ray, sets certain key issues in high
relief to concentrate on their oppositions and their inter-
play" (p. viii). Some readers, specialists in research, inter-
pretation, or history, but innocent of Lonergan's understand-
ing of these as presupposed in dialectic, could not make
head or tail of his X-ray treatment; the present Introduction
will at least show that he was thinking along similar lines
many years earlier.

[20] An example is the quite unecumenical footnote 7. The
Lonergan who wrote the final paragraphs of Method in Theology
would surely wish to rewrite that footnote now. But he wrote
it in 1938-1940, it is part of his history, and it ought
not to be deleted.

[21] This shift in spelling was a practical choice of Loner-
gan somewhere in mid-career; it can be made retroactive in
a way the ideas indicated in the previous note cannot.

[22] A slash will enable the reader to determine the ori-
ginal page numbers. That is, "give aid/2/and especially"
will indicate the transition from page 1 to page 2 of the
dissertation.

[23] In particular, I was unable to check Lonergan's refer-
ences to Scholastik 3 (1928) and 4 (1929), and to the 1929
edition of H. Lange's De Gratia; likewise, Lange's reference
to Didacus Deza.

[24] To be noted especially: some confusion in the numbering
of the footnotes. The numbers 17 and 23 are missing altogether.
The number 9 occurs twice, and this in both superscript and
notes. The number 25 occurs twice in the notes but only once
as a superscript. It will help to have the two sets of numbers
collated. As follows: numbers 1 to 9 are the same in Lonergan
and in my edition; his second number 9 becomes my 10; his
numbers 10 to 16 become my 11 to 17; his 18 to 22 are the
same as mine; his 24 to 25 are my 23 to 24; his second 25
in the notes is my 25, but I have had to surmise the location
of the superscript; finally, his 26 to 68 are the same as
mine.

[25] My editorial notes appear now and again among Loner-
gan's notes. Also various insertions in square brackets will
be recognized as editorial.

THE GRATIA OPERANS DISSERTATION:

PREFACE and INTRODUCTION

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PREFACE

Theologians have perhaps always been aware of the exis-
tence of a development in the theory of grace to be found
in the writing of St. Thomas Aquinas. But to determine its
precise character and significance was hardly possible until
a number of related investigations had been undertaken. Among
these, most notable are in the field of grace Dr. Artur Land-
graf's researches in the whole earlier period, Dr. Johann
Schupp's detailed study of Peter Lombard, Dr. Herbert Dom's
presentation of the thought of St. Albert the Great. The theory
of free will has been most patiently examined from St. Anselm
to St. Thomas and an important discovery in the order of St.
Thomas's works has been made by Dom Odon Lottin. Finally,
though from a negative viewpoint, an almost exhaustive study
of St. Thomas's theory of motion has been conducted by Fr.
Johann Stufler.

By an analysis of the idea of speculative development,
the present work systematizes the movement in the theory of
grace from St. Augustine to St. Thomas, and with the aid of
subsidiary investigations, arrives at the conclusion that
the problem of the relations of grace and liberty occupied
St. Thomas's attention from the De Veritate to the Prima Secun-
dae, that his thought underwent a more or less continuous
development, and that his ultimate position is a synthesis
in which the Augustinian or psychological theory of the need
of grace has an extremely significant role.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to R. P. Suermont,
O. P., President of the Commission for the Leonine Edition
of St. Thomas, who gave me exceptional information on the
MSS. authority for a conjecture in the De Veritate, to Fr.
Heinrich Lennerz, S. J., and Fr. Franz Pelster, S. J., both
ever ready to answer questions and give aid, and especially

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to Fr. Charles Boyer, S. J., who suggested the inquiry, di-
rected me in it, and despite the pressure of many duties
found time to read the manuscript.

INTRODUCTION

A study of St. Thomas's thought on <u>gratia operans</u> offers
a threefold interest. It reveals him working into synthesis
the speculative theorems discovered by his predecessors.
It brings to light the development of his own mind. It sug-
gests an attitude and direction of thought distinct from
the one resulting in the impasse of the controversy <u>De Auxiliis</u>.

It is necessary that the study move on the level of
this interest, not merely incidentally, but systematically,
not merely by way of a footnote expressing a judgment with
which the reader may be expected to agree in view of the
evidence adduced, but by way of a scientific conclusion in
which the inductive process of the whole inquiry terminates.
The grounds for this assertion are, perhaps, evident. Without
the integral unity so postulated, an inquiry would presuppose
that the unimportant issues can be settled scientifically
while the important ones are merely matters of personal opinion.
The effect of such a presupposition is only too well known.
In the question treated in these passages it is notorious
that for over three centuries theologians have been studying
St. Thomas's thought on grace, with Molinists uniformly con-
cluding that the medieval doctor would have been a Molinist
and Banezians with equal conviction arriving at the conclusion
that he was a Banezian. Unless a writer can assign a method
that of itself tends to greater objectivity than those hither-
to employed, his undertaking may well be regarded as superfluous.

It remains that, though a method which solves the problem
is possible, its use makes extreme demands on a reader. It
involves the exposition and use of a theory of the history
of theological speculation. It rules out the arts of presenta-
tion which by emphasis and selection make reading easy and
fallacy still easier. It postulates a capacity to see in
several hundred pages which discuss a great variety of points
a single argument with a major premiss in the theory of devel-
opment and a minor in a number of facts.

   While apologizing most sincerely for the use of so compli-
cated a procedure, we would point out that we have no alterna-
tive. A study of St. Thomas's thought on _gratia operans_ cannot
but be historical. An historical study cannot but be inductive.
An inductive conclusion, though it may be certain when nega-
tive, can for the most part be no more than probable when
positive. If that probability is to be, not an opinion, but
a scientific conclusion, no other method than the one we have
adopted appears available.

   Because the inquiry is historical, it does not open with
the _a priori_ scheme of current systematic theology with its
point of view, its definitions, its interests, and its problems.
That would be simply to ask St. Thomas a series of questions
which he did not explicitly consider -- had he done so, there
would be no need to ask them today -- and then work out the
answers from a consideration of St. Thomas's answer to ques-
tions which we do not explicitly consider. Patently such a
procedure would be fallacious: it would be deducing an extrapo-
lation from the thought of St. Thomas before taking the trouble
to find out what St. Thomas was really thinking about.

   On the other hand, though the inquiry is historical,
there is no acceptance of the principles of positivism. To
refute such principles lies outside the scope of this introduc-
tion. Suffice to say that even historians have intelligence
and perform acts of understanding; performing them, they neces-
sarily approach questions from a given point of view; and
with equal necessity the limitations of that point of view
predetermine the conclusions they reach. From this difficulty
positivism offers no escape, for as long as men have intelli-
gence, the problem remains, and were they deprived of intelli-
gence and became mere observers of fact like jelly-fish, then
they would be truly positivists but their positivism would
not be of any service to them.

   It remains that history can follow a middle course, neither
projecting into the past the categories of the present, nor pre-
tending that historical inquiry is conducted without a use of hu-
man intelligence. That middle course consists in constructing
an _a priori_ scheme that is capable of synthetizing any possible
set of historical data irrespective of their place and time,
just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme
capable of synthetizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena.

In the present work this generic scheme is attained by an analysis of the idea of a development in speculative theology.

The procedure provides a true middle course. On the one hand, it does not deny, as does positivism, the exigence of the human mind for some scheme or matrix within which data are assembled and given their initial correlation. On the other hand, it does not provide a scheme or matrix that prejudices the objectivity of the inquiry. The quantitative sciences are objective simply because they are given by mathematics an *a priori* scheme of such generality that there can be no tendency to do violence to the data for the sake of maintaining the scheme. But the same benefit is obtained for the history of speculative theology by an analysis of the idea of its development, for the analysis does yield a general scheme but it does so, not from a consideration of particular historical facts, but solely from a consideration of the nature of human speculation on a given subject.

To express more concretely the nature of this benefit, it will suffice to say that the argument will be able to proceed not from the twentieth century through the sixteenth to the thirteenth but from the fourth century through the twelfth to St. Thomas. So far from allowing the haunting figures of Dominicus Banez and Ludovicus Molina to dominate our investigation of St. Thomas's thought, we hope to make it continuously evident that these great theologians wrote three centuries after St. Thomas had ended his brilliant career.

Because the inquiry is historical, it cannot but be inductive. It is possible to construct *a priori* a general scheme of the historical process because the human mind is always the human mind. But there is no more a possibility of filling in the details of that scheme *a priori* than there is of predicting the future. Concretely, when commentators tell us that St. Thomas _must_ mean this or that, either they are misusing the word _must_ -- which connotes necessity -- or else they are claiming to demonstrate in a science that does not proceed by demonstration. It is possible to exclude any given interpretation with certitude, for then one merely has to produce evidence that St. Thomas contradicts it. But the only possible way to demonstrate an interpretation is to enumerate the entire list of speculative possibilities, demonstrate that the enumeration is complete (that is the difficult point), and then exclude all views except one.

For this reason we aim at certitude only in negative conclusions; in positive ones we are content with probability.

The degree of probability attained will appear from the structure of the induction to be made.

In the first place, all guessing is excluded by the method. The argument does not consist in proposing and then verifying hypotheses. Instead of hypotheses there is used the a priori scheme of speculative development, which is not an hypothesis but a demonstrable conclusion. Consequently, instead of assembling the data and guessing at their significance, the argument employs what strategists term a "pincer" movement. It does so in five distinct stages.

First, it determines the general form of the speculative movement on the nature of grace from St. Augustine to St. Thomas. The analysis of such a movement has revealed that there are seven phases in the normal evolution of an explanation by a compound theorem. It happens that the explanation of the necessity of grace in the Prima Secundae is a compound theorem and that each of the six earlier phases can easily be verified in earlier works. The procedure is essentially the same as when a mathematician works out an equation from general considerations and then a physicist evaluates the unknown coefficients by objective measurements. Just as the physicist obtains the formula for a natural law, so also by this means do we obtain the basic form of the development that extends from the fifth century to the thirteenth. Thus, without making any hypotheses on the nature of grace, we are able to correlate statements made by different people at different times merely in virtue of the assumption that the people in question were all men, all thinking, and historically interdependent in their thought.

Such is the first inductive movement. The second proceeds inversely from the particular to the general; it consists in assembling the explicit statements on the nature of gratia operans to be found in the writings of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas.

The third and fourth movements are incidental. In simpler sciences than the history of speculative theology, the "pincer" process from both general to particular and from particular to general would suffice to yield the conclusion. But it happens that speculative theology is a very peculiar science. Its problems have to do with the relations between the natural

and the supernatural orders. Inasmuch, then, as speculative
theology conceives the supernatural on the analogy of the
natural, it is necessary to make a special inquiry into St.
Thomas's idea of operation. Inasmuch as there is a natural
element within the field of the theological problem, it is
necessary to make another special inquiry into St. Thomas's
theory of the human will, its liberty, the limitations of
its liberty, and the general way in which God operates upon
it. Both of these inquiries are subsidiary, undertaken not
for their own sakes but principally to eliminate misinterpre-
tations of St. Thomas's position and to reveal that his mind
is far more resourceful than is commonly supposed.

     With this work accomplished, it is possible to return
to the main problem: the idea of operative grace. As it is
only in the Prima Secundae that St. Thomas posits an operative
grace that is not habitual but actual, and as none of his
predecessors had thought things out with such finesse and
precision as to be able to entertain, explicitly and formally,
that very complex idea, we are content briefly to treat his
position in the Sentences and the De Veritate -- where operative
grace is habitual grace -- and concentrate our attention on
the well-known I-II, q. 111, a. 2.

     Throughout the study of St. Thomas strict attention is
paid to the chronological order of his work, and our conclu-
sions are drawn mainly from the works whose sequence is known,
namely, the Commentary on the Sentences, the De Veritate,
the Contra Gentiles, the De Potentia, the Pars Prima, the
Quodlibetum Primum, the De Malo and the Prima Secundae. The
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and the Commentaries
on Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Peri Hermeneias,
form an extremely useful subsidiary source; I do not make
use of them in establishing the line of development of thought
on particular questions, but as far as their content goes,
they appear to be contemporary with the Pars Prima. As is
plain, the degree of importance to be attached to the chrono-
logical sequence varies in almost every question that is raised.
It is paramount with respect to the theory of grace, which
is well-known to have developed.[1] The same is true with respect
to the theory of free will. On the other hand, St. Thomas's
theory of divine foreknowledge is always the same, his theory
of premotion is always the same in itself, though naturally
it varies with the variation in the theory of the will. Finally,

with regard to opinions which St. Thomas never held, there
is no need to bother at all about the sequence of his writings.

So much then for the nature of the inquiry before us.
It may be well to add a statement of what we do not propose
to do.

We are not engaged in proposing a theory in speculative
theology. We are giving an account of someone else's theories.
And in that task we are not concerned with the implications
of his position, the ulterior development of his position,
or even the defence of his position. We ask what he said,
why he said it and what he meant in saying it.

Confined to the history of theological speculation, per
se the inquiry is confined to the thought of a single writer.
Discussion of anyone else's views or opinions is purely inci-
dental. Thus, earlier writers are considered because of the
influence they would exert on St. Thomas whether directly
or indirectly. Later writers are considered inasmuch as their
views provide a clear formulation either of what St. Thomas
meant or of what he certainly did not mean. As the earlier
writers are helpful because of their influence on St. Thomas,
so the later writers must be considered because of their influ-
ence on the reader. For this reason it has seemed unnecessary
to attempt any exposition of later opinions: for if the reader
has been influenced by them, he is already acquainted with
them; if he has not been influenced by them, then he will
find it simpler to grasp St. Thomas's thought by direct study.

Concerned solely with an account of the thought of a
single writer, we are concerned solely with that thought as
speculative. Dogmatic truths are one thing; their speculative
correlation and unification is quite another. A perfect expres-
sion of dogmatic truth, as when a child repeats his catechism,
or an eleventh-century theologian recites the creed, is no
evidence of a speculative position. On the other hand, specula-
tive deficiency is no proof of heterodoxy. The two are really
distinct, and this work presupposes that distinction. Moreover,
the two are disparate, so that no specialized inquiry can
possibly deal with both at the same time. Hence when we speak
of speculative development, we do not mean the development
of dogma: as far as our argument goes there need be no dogmatic
development whatever from St. Paul to the Council of Trent;
and the reason why there is no such need, is that speculative
development and dogmatic development are quite different;

for instance, there can be speculative decline, as in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; but I do not believe
one can speak of dogmatic decline within the Church.

This distinction is, of course, of primary importance.
The reason why certain writers are able to "demonstrate"
that St. Thomas in all his work held exactly their views
on actual grace, when in point of fact St. Thomas himself
did not hold the same view in all his works, is that they
argue from a dogmatic to a speculative continuity. Ex falso
sequitur quodlibet.

Finally, confined to the history of the speculation
of a single writer with other writers and other questions
all excluded, we are not aiming at writing a manual De Gratia
or even De Gratia Operante. We do not propose to offer any
systematic treatise or to show how a treatise might be de-
veloped from St. Thomas's thought. Thus, we are able to omit
entirely the question of the entitative perfection of gratui-
tous dispositions prior to justification. In a systematic
inquiry on operative grace, that question could not be omitted.
But in an historical inquiry one has to limit oneself to
what appears to be, not in the forefront of modern specula-
tion, but in the forefront of St. Thomas's thought.

1. The Form of the Development

The fundamental problem of the present inquiry is to
determine scientifically the unity and coherence of a vast
body of historical data. Evidently, a study of St. Thomas's
thought in its historical expansion and significance cannot
be objective if undertaken from the viewpoint of later ideas,
problems, and theories. What is required is a point of vantage
outside the temporal dialectic, a matrix or system of thought
that at once is as pertinent and as indifferent to historical
events as is the science of mathematics to quantitative pheno-
mena. For unless such a viewpoint is attained and maintained,
then of necessity the inquiry will reduce to a sterile compil-
ation of uninterpreted facts or else a fallacious projection
of current categories into a period in which they did not
exist.

With the aim of solving this problem, the present chapter
treats four points: the content of speculative theology;
the four elements in speculative theology; the manner in
which these elements combine to give the successive phases

of a speculative development; and, finally, the seven phases
in the speculative development extending from St. Augustine
to St. Thomas.

This "form" of the development automatically provides
a scientific viewpoint for the rest of the investigation.
It eliminates a host of impertinent questions which otherwise
would spontaneously be introduced into the inquiry to give
it a false bias and encourage a search -- too often successful
-- to find in an author what the author never dreamt of. Apart
from this essential negative benefit, it enables one who lives
in a later age to understand those whose thought belongs to
almost a different world, and it does so, not by the slow
and incommunicable apprehension that comes to the specialist
after years of study, but logically through ideas that are
defined, arguments that can be tested, and conclusions that
need only be verified. Thus, the finer fruits of historical
study are taken out of the realm of personal opinion and made
part of the common heritage of science.

1.1. The Content of Speculative Theology

Speculative theology does not exist in the pure state.
The ordinary textbook, for instance, contains a variety of
very different things. There are series of passages from scrip-
ture with here a longer and there a shorter exegesis. There
are extracts from the Fathers and, beside them, bibliographical
notices and summaries of the results of patristic study. There
are references to and quotations from councils and pontifical
pronouncements. Lists and discussions of the opinions of theo-
logicans combine with an ubiquitous maze of technical terms
and with sets of proofs of quite different natures. Finally,
dominating and uniting all else is the formidable array of
theses, each with its theological censure and its place of
importance anywhere between the summit of de fide definita
and the minimum of probabilior. Still, this multiplicity and
variety is anything but confusion. The whole has an unity
and cohesion more remarkable and less trivial than that of
the multiplication table. And it is theological speculation,
which is not confined to some part but penetrates the whole
structure, that has brought to light and formulated this organ-
icity in revealed truth.

It is necessary to insist that speculation is not confined
to what are termed "proofs from reason" or argumenta conven-

ientiae. The unity of the treatise, the very idea of a treat-
ise, the attempt to prove, to correlate, the array of these,
the technical terms that are to be found in the enunciation
of the thesis and still more in its definition and explana-
tion, the distinction of theological censures and of differ-
ent kinds of argument, all is a fruit of speculation. But
though speculation enters everywhere, it is also true that
everywhere its role is very subordinate. It provides the
technical terms with their definitions; it does not provide
the objects that are defined. It gives the arrangement and
order of the subject; it does not give what is arranged and
put into order. It reveals the unity and cohesion; but it
neither creates nor discovers what has the unity and is shown
to hang together. It is the work of the human intellect;
but what it works upon is the Word of God.

Thus the content of speculative theology is the content
of a pure form. It is not something by itself but the intelli-
gible arrangement of something else. It is not systematic
theology but the system in systematic theology. For the human
mind to grasp truth and make it at once an effective spring
and a higher form of action, there must be the process of
assimilation: a process of distinguishing and correlating
and organising; of drawing out implications, of discovering
their mutual coherence, and of constructing instances into
groups and groups into species and species under genera till
finally an ultimate unity is attained. The labor of this
process is with difficulty repeated in the four years the
seminarian has at his disposal. But that labor is negligible
when compared with the vast effort that was needed in the
first instance, when the men of Europe emerged from the chaos
of a broken empire and the distress of barbaric invasion,
and gave their leisure to the construction not only of cathe-
drals of stone but also of the more enduring cathedrals of
the mind.[2]

1.2. Elements in Speculative Theology

To define speculative theology with greater exactitude,
its four elements are now considered: theorems, terms, dia-
lectical positions, and technique.

A. Theorems

The "theorem" may be defined as the difference between a common notion and a scientific concept.

For example, the common notion of "going faster" and the scientific concept of "acceleration" partly coincide and partly differ. They coincide inasmuch as both apprehend one and the same objective fact. They differ inasmuch as the common notion apprehends no more than the fact, while the scientific concept elaborates it by understanding it. First, "acceleration" generalizes "going faster" to include "going more slowly." Second, it submits it to the subtle analysis of the calculus and enriches it with the endless implications of "$d^2 s/dt^2$." Third, it gives it a significant, indeed a fundamental, place in the general theory of natural phenomena.

Thus the "theorem" is the scientific elaboration of a common notion. It denotes, not the notion as elaborated, but simply the elaboration: not "going faster" nor even "going more slowly," but solely the generalization, the analysis, the enrichment with implication and with significance for a system of thought.

To turn to an example from theology, the term "supernatural" in the writings of St. Thomas is clearly a scientific concept. It is a technical term, and it is used profusely; it has an exact philosophic definition; the implications of that definition are worked out and consistently faced; finally, it has a significance for a system of thought, for in St. Thomas the "supernatural" is fundamental to his whole treatment of the order of grace.

Still, theology did not always possess this scientific concept.[3] In Peter Lombard, the "supernatural" is simply a common notion. He does not use the term, though he has about twenty more or less equivalent expressions.[4] He fails to note the disproportion between the order of nature and the order of grace, though he does state some related propositions.[5] And that this implies a defect in speculative development would seem to be proved from his unsatisfactory solution of an elementary difficulty in connection with the nature of merit.[6]

B. Terms

Terms are an obvious product of speculation.

Words denote aspects of reality that are significant

from a given point of view. The analytic processes of specula-
tive thought necessarily result in a complex transition from
the latent to the evident, from the vague to the definite,
from the implicit to the explicit, from the naked fact to
its scientific elaboration. Parallel to this process and
its necessary consequent, there is another process in which
old words received more precise meanings and new words are
introduced.

    To give two examples: "sacrament" is an old word that
received a precise definition; "actual grace" is a new term
which does not occur even in St. Thomas; he speaks of the
auxilium divinum.

    The consequent problem for dogmatic thought is well
known: the theologian must ever bear in mind the distinction
between the language of dogmatic sources and the language
of scientific thought. But it is less clear that historians
have attended sufficiently to a similar problem of their
own; not only must they distinguish between the language
of the sources and the scientific language of their own day;
they must also take into account the scientific language
of the period they are treating.

    C. The Dialectical Position

    Scientists have what may be called a "methodological
position." They will maintain incompatible theories simul-
taneously: because of general phenomena, light has to be
an undulation; because of special problems, it is an emission
of particles. The basis of this position is that at present
the scientist is ignorant of the truth but in the future,
as far removed as you please, he will possess the complete
explanation of all phenomena.

    The "dialectical position" of the theologian is at once
more radical and more coherent.

    On the one hand, it maintains that different truths
of faith -- or doctrines of faith and certain conclusions
of the human reason -- cannot be contradictory. Truth is
one and God is truth. Hence, no matter how great the opposi-
tion may appear to be, it is always possible to attain the
negative coherence of non-contradiction.

    On the other hand, it maintains that at no point of
time will the human understanding enjoy a full explanation
of all doctrines of faith. For ultimately theology deals

with mystery, with God in his transcendence. Speculation may construct the terms and theorems apt to correlate and unify dogmatic data; but the unification it attains cannot be explanatory in its entirety; the mind attains a symmetry, but its apex, the ultimate moment and the basis of its intelligibility, stands beyond the human intellect.

Thus the "dialectical position" is the assertion of the negative coherence of non-contradiction but the simultaneous denial of the positive coherence of complete understanding.

D. Technique

The necessity of a speculative "technique" is threefold. The whole field of data must be envisaged, or thought is unbalanced. The natural element in problems must be accurately analyzed, or thought is vague. Questions must be taken in their proper order, or the conclusion will be no more than the reemergence of the initial problem in a more acute form.

Philosophia ancilla theologiae: it supplies the necessary breadth of view; it is the accurate analysis of the natural element in theological problems; its method is also a method for the systematic treatment of the question of theology.[7]

It is to be observed that technique not only gives the form but also influences the content of speculative thought.

First of all, the philosophic analysis of the natural element in a theological problem (for instance, the analysis of free will in the problem of grace and liberty) obviously determines part of the solution of that problem. In the second place, there is influence by analogy. Nature is a theophany. So also, on a higher mode, is revelation and the economy of the supernatural order. It follows that an analogy exists between the field of philosophy and that of theology, and that philosophic analysis reveals distinctions and relations which may be transposed in some fashion into theological theorems.

This influence does a great deal to explain certain problems in the history of theology. But it will be preferable to consider here, not any actual instance, but a purely fictitious one; for we wish simply to make an abstract point and so had best avoid the complexity of concrete instance. Let us suppose some speculator at a period prior to the elaboration of the scientific definition and divisions of grace; let us also suppose that he derived his technique from Platonic

thought, in particular, from the Liber de Causis, which may
be by Al-farabi. For him, then, motion would be caused by
Life, and life by the Absolute Life; further, he would have
some vague distinction between substantia and actio, but this
would still be awaiting development into a distinction between
substance and accident. Now not only is it most probable that
our hypothetical thinker would be likely to conceive grace
in terms of life or perhaps intelligence on the analogy of
his system of philosophy. What is more important is that it
would not occur to him to ask whether or not grace is an acci-
dent in the soul, and, if an accident, whether there are graces
entitatively distinct, and, if that is so, whether some of
these are habitual gifts and others transient. The whole range
of such questions lies entirely outside his field of vision.
Not aware of such distinctions in the natural order, he will
not make his first discovery of them in the supernatural.
He does not deny them, certainly not. The point is that he
simply fails to think of them. A person who has never heard
of De Moivre's theorem cannot be accused of the error of re-
jecting that theorem; and no matter how exact and familiar
his knowledge of Euclid, that is no proof that he would refuse
to consider the employment of complex numbers. His position
on the point is a pure "futurable:" what would take place
under circumstances that do not exist. Similarly with regard
to the hypothetical disciple of Al-farabi; his speculation
is defective. But the theological defect, provided it involves
no rejection of what is explicit in the dogmatic sources,
is the defect not of error but of ignorance or even of nescience.[8]

1.3. Phases in the Development of Theological
Speculation

The next point is the correlation of the elements: theor-
ems, terms, dialectical positions, technique. As these may
be combined in different ways and as some combinations are
naturally prior to others, the result of this correlation
is a succession of different phases.

The term "phases" is used in an analogous sense. Phases
in development are not functions of the variable "time," like
the phases of the moon, but complex functions of two principal
variables, "theorems" and "technique." Accordingly, what we
hope to establish is not any a priori form of history but

mere sets of abstract categories that have a special reference
to the historical process.

It will be well at once to summarize what follows.

First is outlined the PRELIMINARY PHASE. It is collection
and classification of dogmatic data relative to speculative
problems. Such collection and classification is found, relative
to particular questions in the controversial writings of the
Fathers, relative to all questions in a Book of Sentences.

Second are contrasted the INITIAL AND FINAL DIALECTICAL
POSITIONS. Theological speculation never explains mysteries, but
it does advance from an initial position, in which the mystery
is not distinguished from adjacent merely philosophic problems
and the connection between the different mysteries is not
defined, towards a final position in which the pure element
of mystery stands in isolation from all else.

Third are studied the INTERMEDIATE PHASES. These are
of two kinds: either the speculative development arises from
external influences or it arises from the attainment of inter-
nal coherence.

If development arises from external influences, it sets
up INTERMEDIATE PHASES FROM DEVELOPING TECHNIQUE. Such develop-
ments are of three kinds: first developments in philosophy
itself, such as the substitution of Aristotelian thought for
Platonic; second, philosophic clarification of the natural
element in the dialectical positions, for instance, coherently
maintaining a philosophic definition of human liberty and
not defining liberty as the capacity to do good when one has
grace; third, the introduction of philosophic analogies into
the theological field, for instance, affirming the grace of
justification to be habitual.

If on the other hand development arises from the specula-
tive attainment of internal coherence, it sets up INTERMEDIATE
PHASES FROM DEVELOPING THEOREMS. Thus, in the simplest case
of any complexity, namely the correlation of two theorems
related as species and genus, there are no less than seven
phases.

1.3.1. The Preliminary Phase

Since speculative theology is the systematic element
in the presentation of dogmatic truths, its preliminary phase
will consist in the first movements towards an explanatory
unification of the data to be found in the dogmatic sources.

Thus, a commentary on holy scripture is, of its nature,
a pre-speculative work. Such were the commentaries written
by the Fathers, the medieval Glossa,[9] St. Thomas's Catena
aurea. The same is true of St. Thomas's commentaries on St.
Paul which rather make use of speculative knowledge than raise
speculative questions.

On the other hand, the controversial works of the Fathers
and the medieval Books of Sentences evidently constitute an
initial phase in speculative thought. The Fathers collect
numerous passages from scripture to bear on a single point:
for instance, St. Augustine weaves together an array of texts
on grace in vigorous polemic against the Pelagians. Similarly
a Book of Sentences collects and classifies dogmatic data
in their relation to series of speculative questions. In nei-
ther case is an explanatory unification of the data the delib-
erate object of the work. In both cases there is a manifest
preparation for the pure speculative effort: for one cannot
speculate without having something to speculate about.

This would seem to be the reason why innumerable specula-
tive theologians wrote commentaries on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard.

In the first place his work was eminently suited to be
the basis of speculative thought. He belonged to the reaction
against the excesses of Peter Abelard. He wrote to refute
the heretical tendencies of his day. But his refutation was
not by argument but by appeal to authority: he proposed to
present the teachings of the Fathers adding but little of
his own, to oppose the heretical placitum, the satisfaction
of the understanding, with the verum of dogmatic truth. And
to this avowed positive tendency he adds the advantage of
a classified collection of data.[10]

In an article already mentioned Fr. Pelster has drawn
attention to this significance of Books of Sentences. So far
from putting an end to the placita of speculation, Peter Lom-
bard seems simply to have provided speculation with a solid
basis: the scandalised Prior at Worcester attributes the evil
spirit of his day to the similar Sentences of Peter of Poitiers;
later Richard Fishacre tells his pupils at Oxford that modern
masters teach only moral theology directly from scripture;
the discussion of dogmatic questions is based on a Book of
Sentences.[11]

A final point in this connection is the loose relation between the Book of Sentences and its later commentaries. Fr. Pelster generalizes: "Je weiter man sich von der Zeit des Lombarden entfernte, um so loser wurde die Verbindung zwischen seinem Text und der behandelten Frage. Immer aber bis zum 16. Jahrhundert blieb diese materielle Verbindung zwischen Sentenzenvorlesung und theologischer Spekulation bestehen."[12] The point that concerns us is the fact of development which imposes this ever looser connection between Sentences and Commentary. To take the example of operative grace, Peter Lombard makes it the fundamental and practically the sole topic of the 26th distinction of his second book; St. Thomas has six articles on this distinction, but operative grace does not enter into consideration until the fifth article; the development between Peter and St. Thomas had raised four prior questions that had to be settled before the operative character of grace could be considered.

1.3.2. Initial and Final Dialectical Positions

Theorems develop, terms change, technique increases, but the dialectical position always remains. Thus it is this position that is the constant element and, as it were, constitutes the identity of any particular development in speculative theology. Nonetheless, there is a difference between the initial and the final dialectical position.

Initially there is simply the affirmation of two apparently opposed truths. Grace is necessary; but the will is also free. Scripture asserts both; scripture is the Word of God; therefore, both are true.

On the other hand, the final dialectical position by the use of technique and the development of theorems has eliminated all but the essence of the mystery. It leaves to faith not human problems, nor the human element in religious problems, but the pure formulation of the point that cannot be encompassed by the human understanding. Before appealing to the dialectical position, it settles the prior questions. Grace is necessary: but what is grace, what are its divisions, what is the mode of its action, what is its efficacy, what is the difference between this efficacy and the certitude of divine providence, the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, the irresistibility of divine will? And the will of man is free: but what is the will, what is its act, what are

the conditions and the causes of that act, what precisely
is freedom, what are the limitations of freedom, what is
the connection between the limitations of human freedom and
the necessity of grace? If the problem is a mystery in the
strictest sense of the term, as is the mystery of the Blessed
Trinity, then, even after all these questions have been satis-
factorily settled, it will still be necessary to frame the
conclusion in the dialectical position. But there is a mani-
fest difference between this final dialectical position and
the initial position that simply asserts the compatibility
of grace and free will.

1.3.3. Intermediate Phases from Developing Technique

One cause of the transition from the initial to the
final dialectical position is philosophic development. It
will have this influence partly because it provides the analo-
gous basis for theorems and partly because it defines the
natural element in the initial dialectical position. But
before treating these two points, it will be well to say
something on philosophic development itself.

A. The Development of Philosophy

A distinction has to be drawn between the endless vari-
ety of philosophic schools that succeed one another in ever
growing confusion and, on the other hand, the development
of the philosophy that is the philosophia perennis.

Philosophy as philosophia perennis is man's apprehension
of the eternal and immutable. Like all limited being, it
is potentiality and achievement, dunamis and energeia, po-
tency and act. Its potency is the love of wisdom: it is de-
tachment, orientation, inspiration. Its act is the triumph
of the reason systematically revealing the light of the eter-
nal in the light of common day. For all time the potency
is represented by Plato, the act by Aristotle. And so from
the nature of the case the development of the philosophia
perennis is rectilinear; it can embrace differences as wide
as those that exist between the pagan from Stagira and the
Christian saint of Aquino; yet, however great such differences
may appear outwardly, it remains that they emerge only to
make more systematically certain and secure a position that
is unique because it is central.

The existence of a <u>philosophia perennis</u> is not refuted but confirmed by the flux of the philosophies. For it is only too apparent that if philosophy's goal is the eternal, still philosophers are forever succumbing to the spirit of their age, becoming part of its limited culture, turning their thoughts to its crises and problems. This influence of the Platonic "unreal" is the supreme obstacle both to philosophic achievement and to the conservation of what has been achieved; nor does the emergence of the perfect thinker suffice; the environment also must ring true, and the time must be propitious. It needed an Athens that could boast in the tone of the Funeral Oration, if Socrates was to discuss instead of simply teaching as did Gautama, if Plato was to perpetuate a vision of an ideal polity instead of crystallizing a code of manners as did Confucius. On the other hand the shadow of infelicity hung too heavily over the Empire for thinkers to be balanced; they were too much of the world and Epicureans, or too much against it and Stoics, or too eager to escape it and Neo-Platonists. As for the febrile modern mind demanding perpetual change yet horrified by the monsters it begets, let Touchstone ask, "Shepherd, hast thou any philosophy?".

B. <u>Developing Technique and the Dialectical Position</u>

The essential moment in the transition from the initial to the final dialectical position is the emergence of a systematic distinction between reason and faith. It is to be observed, however, that this distinction must not only be enunciated in general but also applied to each particular problem. The only way to make clear the difficulty of such an application is to give an example. We consider the definition of human liberty.

The condemnation of Peter Abelard's proposition, <u>Quod liberum arbitrium per se sufficit ad aliquod bonum</u>,[13] quite possibly led to the peculiar definition of liberty to be found in Peter Lombard.[14]

> Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum, gratia assistente, eligitur, vel malum, eadum desistente.[15]

Plainly this is to assert the dialectical position on the relation between grace and liberty at the very moment one defines liberty: it makes it impossible to find any opposition between grace and liberty as defined,[16] though it leaves it very doubtful that the definition is correct.[17] In fact, when

the Lombard wished to make clear the nature of liberty, he
turned to the definition of Boethius[18] and wrote:

> (Liberum arbitrium) philosophi definientes dixerunt
> liberum de voluntate iudicium, quia potestas ipsa et
> habilitas voluntatis et rationis . . . libera est ad
> utrumlibet, quia libere potest moveri ad hoc vel ad illud.[19]

The speculative defect of the position in the Sentences is
that this definition cannot be consistently and coherently
maintained.

On the other hand, speculative development will consist
precisely in making possible the coherent use of a philosophic
definition of liberty. The problem is not that we do not know
what liberty is, or that we do not know what grace is; what
we do not know is how to reconcile the two. But this third
question is not to be confused with the others.

To put the same point in different terms: science and
truth are not formally identical. Science is knowledge of
a thing in its causes, formal, material, efficient, final.
Truth is simply the equation of judgment and the objective
field. It follows that all truth is not science, that not
any truth can be laid down as a first principle, and that
least of all can a theological dialectical position be made
the initial premiss of a speculative elaboration.

It is in these intricacies of the distinction between
faith and reason, and not merely in the general enunciation
of the distinction, that theology prior to St. Thomas was
involved.[20]

C. The Theorem and Developing Technique

Not only does speculative theology derive from philosophy
the clarification of the natural or human element in its prob-
lem. It also finds in the natural order, as philosophically
analyzed, the analogies necessary for the scientific conception
of purely theological data.[21]

We have already given an abstract and hypothetical illus-
tration of the influence philosophy may exercise in this
fashion.[22] It will be well to consider here a concrete example.
For the use of such analogies seems an extremely simple matter.
In point of fact there is nothing more complicated and diffi-
cult than their first emergence. The great discoveries of
men are not too numerous, and the greater they are, the more
incredibly simple they appear. We are apt to be surprised,
not that Columbus thought of sailing west to the Indies, but

that no one else did it before him; not that Newton, according to the legend, associated the falling apple with the falling moon, but that there could have been intelligent men before him who did not. It will serve then both to enforce a true historical perspective and to introduce the subject of operative grace, if we outline the history of the view that grace is a _donum habituale_.

There is _prima facie_ a difficulty to this position. Scripture attributes the forgiveness of sin and justification to conversion, faith and charity. These seem to be not habits. But infant baptism is immemorial and its reason recognized to be that it opens the gates of heaven. No great reflection or profound thought should be necessary to arrive at the following conclusion: the baptized infant is heir to the kingdom of heaven; the heir to the kingdom is justified; and accordingly justification, in its essence, lies not in acts but in the habitual order. But in point of fact, the effect of infant baptism could not be satisfactorily determined by the early scholastics. Though hardly a canonist or a speculative writer failed to raise the question, it remained unsolved until the first half of the thirteenth century.[23]

It would be a gross oversimplification to fancy that the whole difficulty was unfamiliarity with the Aristotelian concept of the habit. It is true that this is part of the difficulty. But there were two different and far profounder difficulties.

In the first place a thoroughgoing scientific attitude was a prerequisite. Many authors were content simply to quote St. Augustine's remark: the baptized infant does not make an act of faith but it does receive the sacrament of faith.[24] That, of course, is perfectly true. But _redit quaestio_, What precisely is it to receive the sacrament of faith?[25]

In the second place there was the distortion of the speculative field by what we later shall term the "third phase."[26] The idea of the supernatural became a scientifically elaborated concept with Philip the Chancellor. Speculators prior to this development, the key position to the whole theory of grace, were like men at sea without a compass. Lacking a metaphysical framework in terms of _natura_, they naturally tended to understand grace psychologically. Thus sin and especially original sin was conceived as a darkening of the understanding and a weakening of the will.[27] Similarly, grace and justification

were in the main conceived as the opposite states, the enlight-
ened intelligence of faith and the comforted will of charity.[28]

St. Anselm pushed this psychological interpretation of
grace to the extreme limit by defining justice as _rectitudo
voluntatis propter se servata_.[29] More than this, he also gave
the problem of infant baptism a solution, which, if brilliant
and containing an essential element of truth, nonetheless
tended to postpone indefinitely the true solution. Briefly,
his position was this: the infant cannot have justice, for
it elicits no act of will; but this incapacity is sinful before
baptism because of Adam's sin; on the other hand, because
baptism removes the _culpa_, the infant's incapacity becomes
excusable.[30]

Combining with this false orientation of the issue was
the lack of agreement on the nature of virtue. Peter Lombard
gives the two opinions: first, that the virtue is a habit
and not an act; second, that the virtue is not a habit but
an internal as opposed to an external act.[31] Though he obviously
inclines to the former view, he does not venture to decide
the question.[32] In fact, there seem to have been a good number
of theologians who assumed or maintained that a virtue which
is not an act is inconceivable;[33] and this perhaps, led to
the explicit distinction between the remission of sins and
the infusion of grace.[34]

Finally it is to be observed that when obscurity was
ended by the influence of the manifestly heretical demand
of the Waldenses and Cathari for the rebaptism of adults bap-
tized in infancy and, as well, by the Aristotelian concept
of the habitual state,[35] even then the solution did not consist
in an immediate identification of grace with justification.
Philip the Chancellor distinguished four elements in our parti-
cipation in the life of Christ: _vivificari_ which is grace
and regards the soul itself; _illuminari_ which is faith and
regards the intellect; _uniri_ which is charity and regards
the will; _rectificari_ which is justice and regards the whole
man.[36] This influence of the psychological analysis of the
nature of sin and grace is clearly to be found in St. Thomas's
analysis of the process of justification.[37]

To conclude we may cite the decision given in connection
with the errors of Petrus Ioannis Olivi:

> Verum quia quantum ad effectum baptismi in parvulis
> reperiuntur doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias
> habuisse, quibusdam ex ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem

baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri, aliis econtra asserentibus, quod et culpa iisdem in baptismo remittitur, et virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum: Nos autem attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit, tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tamquam probabiliorem, et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante Concilio duximus eligendam.[38]

1.3.4. Intermediate Phases from Developing Theorems

In the last section we considered the relations between philosophy and theological speculation. Here are to be considered the interrelation of different theorems within the theological field itself. We begin with a few distinctions and then enumerate typical phases of a speculative development. With this the analysis of a speculative development will be complete.

A. The Set of Cognate Theorems

One scientific concept is not a science. The analysis of motion, for instance, calls for the following: distance, time, velocity, acceleration, mass, momentum, energy. Together they may be said to constitute a set of cognate theorems. Similarly, any object of scientific thought will require more than one theorem for a full account of it. And, to give an example that we propose to use throughout the next section, the theory of the necessity of grace is based on two theorems: first, the theorem of the supernatural; second, the theorem of the different states of man. One must have grace both because eternal life is a supernatural state and because fallen man cannot avoid sin without grace: no small part of the difficulties occasioned by Pelagianism arises from the fact that it is not one error but two; it denies outright the necessity of grace and so denies both the supernatural character of eternal life and the effects of original sin.

B. The Relation of Cognate Theorems

In the mathematical sciences the relation of different theorems is simply the difference of their elements: if distance is "s" and time "t" and mass "m," then velocity is "ds/dt," acceleration "d^2s/dt^2," momentum is "$m.ds/dt$," and energy "$\int m.v.dv$," where "v" is "ds/dt."

In a purely rational science there is only the combination of genus and species. In the instance of the necessity of grace, the necessity from the supernatural end is generic, for it regards man simply as a creature; on the other hand, the various states of man are specifically different initial positions with regard to the attainment of eternal life.

C. The Order of the Development of the Theorems

The general law is perfectly simple. The mind begins from the particular and works to what is most general; it then returns from the most general through the specific differences to the particular.

But that is just the general law. For what we are dealing with is not the discovery of some one theorem but the discovery of a set of cognate theorems.

Now each theorem in the set has four distinct elements: first, analysis; second, generalization; third, unfolding of implication; fourth, systematic significance.

On the other hand, while analysis and generalization regard the single theorems, systematic significance regards not each single theorem in itself but each one in its relations to all the others. Further, while the unfolding of implication logically follows from the analysis, in point of fact it is extremely difficult for the implications to be explicitly grasped before the systematic significance has been determined. The reason may be that implications are endless and only the systematic significance of the theorem will reveal which implications deserve attention.

So much for preliminaries. Let us now ask in what order theorems are discovered and what are the implications of that order.

From the general principle that the mind moves from the particular to the general, it follows that the specific theorem is discovered before the generic.

The implications of this order are as follows:

First, the specific theorem is adverted to and analyzed: it is seen to explain something.

Second, the specific theorem is generalized: all parallel differences are considered and coordinated.

Third, its implications are worked out and there will be a tendency to give it the systematic significance of alone constituting the solution to the whole problem.

Fourth, the insufficiency of the specific theorem to account for the whole problem leads to the discovery of the generic theorem.

Fifth, the generic theorem is analyzed, generalized, has its implications worked out.

Sixth, there is a tendency to make the generic theorem serve as the full solution of the problem. The reason for this is complex: on the one hand the "third phase" resulted in a distortion of the speculative field by attempting to explain everything in terms of the specific theorems; on the other, the discovery of the generic theorem leads not only to its generalization and to the unfolding of its implications but also to the development of cognate theorems that had been obscured in the third phase.

Seventh, the insufficiency of the generic theorems is adverted to and there follows the rediscovery of the specific theorem in a new setting. This gives the synthesis of generic and specific theorems.

If it happens that there is one or more intermediate species, the course of the development is vastly complicated. The principles remain the same.

To illustrate the seven phases is too large a task to be carried on in a corner, and so the reader will find it in the next section. There it will be seen that the speculative movement from St. Augustine's De Correptione et Gratia to the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas is fundamentally a function of the generic and specific theorems on the necessity of grace.

1.4. General Antecedents of St. Thomas's Doctrine on Operative Grace

At first sight it appears to the investigator of the thought of St. Thomas's predecessors that operative grace is just a name floating aimlessly on the current of early medieval speculation and now given one meaning, now another entirely different. Closer scrutiny reveals that this would be a very superficial interpretation of the facts, for operative grace is not merely a name floating on the surface but also the very shape and inclination of the riverbed hidden beneath. The fundamental data of the necessity of grace and of the liberty of the will, so unequivocally asserted by St. Augustine, are also the fundamental data of early speculation on the nature of grace, and it is the unresolved problem of

their reconciliation that deeply and obscurely yet ever effec-
tively sets the stage and drives forward the movement of thought.

To establish the point, we ask and then answer seven
questions suggested by the analysis of a speculative develop-
ment. St. Thomas explains the need of grace, generically by
the theorem of the supernatural, specifically by fallen nature.
How precisely was this explanation discovered?

First, then, is the discovery of the specific theorem.
Who first explained some aspect of the necessity of grace
by distinguishing between the need of our first parents before
the fall and, on the other hand, our need subsequent to the
fall?

Second, there is the generalization of the specific theorem.
Who formulated the doctrine of the different states of man,
omitting consideration of <u>natura pura</u>?

Third, there is the <u>tendency</u> to use the specific theorem
as the sole explanation of the need of grace. What historical
evidence is there for the existence of such a tendency? Note
that the question does not apply to thinkers such as Baius
and Jansenius who explicitly rejected the theorem of the super-
natural. It applies to thinkers who <u>tended</u> to positions <u>resem-</u>
<u>bling</u> those of Jansenius, not because they rejected the idea
of the supernatural but because they did not grasp its signifi-
cance in a theory of grace.

Fourth, there is the discovery of the generic theorem.
Who first formulated the theorem of the supernatural and for
what reason?

Fifth, there is the generalization of the generic theorem.
What are some instances of this generalization?

Sixth, there is the <u>tendency</u> to use the generic theorem
alone in solving the whole problem. Who <u>tended</u> to deny a dif-
ference between the different states of man, to overlook the
fact of moral impotence?

Seventh, there is the synthesis of generic and specific
theorems. Who made that synthesis for the first time?

Such is our <u>a priori</u> scheme. It may be mistaken, but
at least it is something tangible that can be refuted. It
is not an intuition, analyzed, unproved, asserted. It is not
merely a habit of mind prejudicing the issue, but something
above the issue that will lead to its solution. We now turn
to the facts beginning with the <u>primum quoad nos</u> and working
backwards.

A. The Seventh Phase

The synthesis of the generic and specific theorems on the necessity of grace is to be found in the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas.

> Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale. Sed in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo: scilicet ut sanetur; et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium. Ulterius autem in utroque statu indiget homo auxilio divino ut ab ipso moveatur ad bene agendum.[39]

The synthesis could not be clearer or more explicit. But what is the point of mentioning the need of divine providence?

B. The Sixth Phase

Prior to the ultimate synthesis there is a tendency to make the generic theorem alone suffice. An article in the De Veritate, parallel to the article just cited, explains why St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae sharply distinguishes between the need for grace and the need for providential assistance. For in the earlier article his thought clearly turns on two points alone: the supernatural and providential assistance. It is too long to cite in its entirety but the essential moment is the following.

> Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est supra naturam humanam, constat liberum arbitrium non posse sine gratia; quia, cum per huiusmodi bonum homo vitam aeternam meretur, constat quod sine gratia homo mereri non potest.
> Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere ....
> Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo ....[40]

A clearer case of the tendencies to an excessive use of the generic theorem is to be found in the treatment of the problem of moral impotence. This problem has its definitive solution already in the De Veritate[41] but an earlier stage of thought is to be found in St. Thomas's and in St. Albert's commentaries on the Lombard. Both attempt to reduce the non posse non peccare to the sinner's inability to obtain the remission of his sins without grace.[42]

C. The Fifth Phase

This phase, the systematic generalization of the generic theorem, lay in working out the application of the idea of the supernatural. Thus, Alexander of Hales used the idea to

solve the otherwise insoluble problem of merit in our first
parents.[43] St. Albert the Great's development of the theory
of sanctifying grace is known[44] and the systematic elaboration
of St. Thomas is familiar.[45]

D. The Fourth Phase

The discovery of the generic theorem is the emergence
of the scientific concept of the supernatural.

Prof. Landgraf has shown that the discovery was the work
of Philip the Chancellor and that it arose not from studying
the idea of grace, nor from distinguishing the natural and
the infused virtues, but from the distinction between natural
and meritorious love of God. The existence of the problem
had been denied by St. Bernard of Clairvaux and Hugh of St.
Victor[46] but was reestablished by William of Auxerre who af-
firmed a natural amor amicitiae erga Deum.[47] Philip distin-
guished natural and rational appetite; asserted the former
to be self-regarding, the latter to tend absolutely to the
honestum; and then subdistinguished two rational appetites,
one following reason, another following faith; the former
of these is dilectio naturalis, the latter is charity.[48]

Forerunners were Praepositinus who had argued that the
naturalia were in a different category from the gratuita be-
cause reason was the highest thing in nature and faith was
above reason,[49] and Stephen Langton who had seen the connection
between gratuitum, gratum faciens and meritum.[50] Still neither
attained to Philip's idea of an entitative disproportion be-
tween nature and grace.[51]

E. The Third Phase

The third phase was the inadequacy of the specific theorem
alone: the modern theologian can well understand that specula-
tion on grace without the basic theorem of the supernatural
was in hopeless difficulties. A few of the manifestations
of the unsatisfactoriness of the third phase are:

First, the doctrine of merit hangs in midair without
any speculative support. This, of course, in no way interferes
with the enunciation and affirmation of the doctrine; but
it does make the solution of difficulties impossible.[52] It
is of importance to remember always that the origin of the
scientific concept of the supernatural was the problem of

merit: this fact explains points in St. Thomas that might
otherwise be obscure.[53]

Second, there could be no satisfactory distinction between
the _naturalia_ and the _gratuita_: Radulfus Ardens is simply
yielding to the logic of the third phase when he states that
originally all the virtues were natural but that now they
are gratuitous because they were lost by original sin.[54] The
effect of this speculative tendency was not to deny the _gratu-_
ita but to deny the _naturalia_: as late as the early thirteenth
century one can find a writer to maintain that without divine
charity there are no virtues.[55] In the same category falls
Peter Abelard's disjunction of charity and cupidity and St.
Bernard of Clairvaux's assertion that nature in itself is
crooked.[56]

Third, it was impossible to have a satisfactory definition
of grace. Here again this involved no obscuration of the dog-
matic fact: universally it is asserted that grace is what
is due to God's free gift and not due to man's desert.[57] The
difficulty was to find something that was not grace in the
strict sense of the term.[58]

Fourth, we may recall the tendency to a purely psycho-
logical interpretation of the nature of grace that we illus-
trated above when treating the emergence of the idea of habi-
tual grace.[59]

Fifth, a further consequent of the purely psychological
interpretation of the nature of grace was the difficulty in
holding a clear theory on human liberty. This point has already
been illustrated from Peter Lombard.[60] But immediately a further
point may be made; because the lack of the scientific concept
of the supernatural made a scientific concept of liberty impos-
sible, the emergence of the former concept would release specu-
lation on liberty. Thus we find speculation on the nature
of liberty beginning with Philip the Chancellor.[61] When it
is grasped that the nature of liberty was for the first time
undergoing systematic development simultaneously with the
first extension of the scientific concept of the supernatural,
it is not at all surprising that St. Albert and St. Thomas
in their early writing find the doctrine of moral impotence
too anomalous for assimilation.[62] But the full explanation
is only had when the formulation of the specific theorem in
the second phase is taken into consideration.

F. The Second Phase

    The   second   phase   is   the   systematic   generalization   of
the   specific   theorem: in   the   example   under   consideration,
it is the systematic generalization of the difference between
our first parents and ourselves in the need for grace. Accord-
ing to Prof. Landgraf[63] Peter Lombard gives the final formula-
tion of the distinction between the four states of human lib-
erty.[64] That the need for grace is expressed in terms of human
liberty is easily understood in a period prior to the theorem
of the supernatural.

G. The First Phase

    Alone the first phase remains to be illustrated. It is
the emergence of the specific theorem, the first apprehension
of the significance of a difference, with regard to the need
of grace, between Adam and ourselves. Clearly this should
be attributed to St. Augustine. It is easy to select a series
of phrases from his speculative De Correptione et Gratia that
not only bear on the point but also foreshadow future develop-
ment.[65] To suppose that this first essay in speculation consti-
tutes "all you know and all you need to know" on the nature
of grace, perseverance, predestination and human liberty has
been the source of not a few "vertical invasions" of the bar-
barian. The monumental work of Cornelius Jansen[66] is but the
full flower of a far more universal tendency: to seek a specu-
lative system, complete in all its parts and details, where
no such system exists or, at most, exists only in embryonic
form. To know and unequivocally to state the doctrine of grace
is one thing; it is quite another to ask what precisely is
grace, whether it is one or many, if many, what are its parts
and their correlation, what is its reconciliation with liberty,
what is the nature of its necessity. These speculative issues
St. Augustine did not offer to treat, and it is a question
without meaning to ask his position on them. To illustrate
the point with the hardy perennial, the supernatural, it
is easy to show that St. Augustine flatly denied grace to
be nature. It is easy to understand that, when writing to
the monks of Hadrumetum, he thought of comparing the elect
in Christ with Adam but did not think of comparing both with
the philosophic abstraction termed natura pura. But to ask
whether or not the scientific concept of the supernatural
is according to the mind of St. Augustine is like studying

Euclid's elements to find out the truth about multidimensional geometries: in both you find the data that lead to the later conclusion; in neither is the later theorem explicitly formulated.

H. Conclusion

How, then, does this sketch show that gratia operans is the fundamental problem in the whole movement from St. Augustine to St. Thomas?

To answer this one need only observe that the problem of gratia operans is the problem of good will: grace operates the goodness of good will.

Now in the period of the specific theorem, there is no explicit distinction between the two senses of this goodness: the goodness of moral action, and the goodness of supernatural elevation. There follows a twofold consequence. First, since the aspect of moral goodness is the one explicitly understood, the theory of grace tends to a psychological form. Second, since the aspect of supernatural elevation is not explicitly grasped by theory, the whole weight of the doctrine of the necessity of grace presses down on liberty: this forces the dialectical position into the concept of liberty itself.

Next in the period of the generic theorem -- about twenty years elapsed between the death of Philip the Chancellor and the De Veritate of St. Thomas -- there is intense speculative activity. The psychological concept of grace combines with the supernatural aspect to give the infused virtue: but the distinction between general divine assistance and actual grace is not immediately grasped.[67] Similarly the supernatural seems to express the total reason for the necessity of grace.[68]

But this defect has its compensation, for the idea of liberty is released and receives a purely speculative development. After some hesitation between the opposed views that liberty is a habit and liberty is a potency, the former view, which results from placing the dialectical position in the definition of liberty, is eliminated, and a purely philosophic concept is accepted.

This indeed sets the problem of the necessity of grace despite the existence of liberty in all its acuteness. How St. Thomas meets this issue is the topic of the four chapters to follow.

1.5. The Methodological Conclusion

It has been shown that speculative theology consists in four elements, theorems, technique, terms, and a dialectical position. Of these the essential speculative element is the theorem.

Now it is plain from the distinction between the common notion and the theorem, that a common notion cannot be used to prove the existence of a theorem. The latter is a reflective addition to the former, and it takes place only in conscious and deliberate reflection.

This fact has a most important methodological implication, namely, that the so called "implicit speculative position" is an impossibility. Either a speculative position exists explicitly or else one merely has common notions. Such notions have no doubt an exigence for speculative elaborations, but that exigence does not prove that any given thinker met the exigence.

Hence, throughout the argument to follow, "implicit speculative positions" have to be disregarded. They can be nothing but a fiction, the projecting of the categories of later thought into the writings of an earlier period.

NOTES

[1] The existence of a development in St. Thomas's thought on grace is explicitly affirmed by Capreolus (In II Sententiarum, d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, #4, in fine), Didacus Deza Hispanensis (2, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, not. 1, in fine), Cajetan (In Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 109, a. 6), Dominicus Soto (De natura et gratia, lib. 2, c. 3). The pertinent remarks they make are quoted by Hermann Lange, De gratia (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1929), pp. 91 (note 2), 146 (note 1). -- Editor: I have not been able to check the 1929 edition of Lange; in the second edition (Valkenburg, Holland, 1926) Capreolus and Didacus Deza are found on page 69, note 2, Cajetan and Soto on page 110, note 1.

[2] On the manner in which speculative theology was conceived in England in the first half of the thirteenth century and the unmitigated distrust of Books of Sentences some fifty years earlier, see Franz Pelster, "Die Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung für die theologische Spekulation des Mittelalters," Scholastik 2 (1927): 250-255. -- Editor: Scholastik has become Theologie und Philosophie.

[3] Cf. Artur Landgraf, "Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik," Scholastik 4 (1929): 1-37, 189-220, 352-389; August Deneffe, "Geschichte des Wortes 'supernaturalis'," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 46 (1922): 337-360. -- Editor: Landgraf's series of articles have become ch. 5 of his Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik. Erster Teil: Die Gnadenlehre. Band I (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1952).

[4] Cf. Johann Schupp, <u>Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus</u> (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), pp. 20-22.

[5] Ibid., p. 23.   [6] Ibid., p. 65.

[7] It is not infrequently implied that theological speculation is a particularly odious vice peculiar to Catholics. What must be meant is not that Catholics speculate while non-Catholics refrain, but that Catholic speculation is systematic work and the result of centuries of collaboration, while the non-Catholic, as he is his own prophet and pope, thinks it a slight matter to be his own theologian as well. Anyone who reflects on religious doctrine enters the field of theological speculation: the question of the child, the difficulties of the adult, the flood of books and articles on the "religious problem" -- all are essentially speculative. Reflection and speculation are irrepressible in man. Non-Catholics, so far from attempting to repress these natural tendencies, allow them the free play of tropical vegetation.

[8] On the distinction, cp. Aquinas, <u>De Malo</u>, q. 3, a. 7.

[9] On the composition of the <u>Glossa</u>, see B. Smalley, "Gilbertus Universalis, Bishop of London (1128-34), and the Problem of the 'Glossa Ordinaria'," <u>Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale</u> 7 (1935): 235-262, 8 (1936): 24-60.

[10] On the general character of Peter Lombard's work, see Schupp, op. cit., pp. 289-298. On the purposes of his <u>Sentences</u>, see Peter's Prologue. Noteworthy are the remarks: "Sicubi ... parum vox nostra insonuit, non a paternis discessit limitibus" and "'Non ... debet ... labor ... videri superfluus, cum multis ... sit necessarius', brevi volumine complicans Patrum sententias, appositis eorum testimoniis, ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere, cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore." -- Editor: I have corrected Lonergan's quotation from the edition he lists in his bibliography, Petri Lombardi <u>Libri IV Sententiarum</u> (Ad Claras Aquas prope Florentiam: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1916). The quotation within the quotation, according to Peter's editors, is from Augustine.

[11] See Pelster, "Die Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung ...," <u>Scholastik</u> 2 (1927): 250-254. Note that Peter of Poitiers' <u>Sentences</u> are based on the Lombard's, ibid., p. 251. The passage from Richard Fishacre reads: "Verumptamen tantum altera pars sc. de moribus instruendis a magistris modernis, cum leguntur sancti libri, docetur; alia tamquam difficilior disputacioni reservatur. Hec autem pars difficilior de canone sanctarum scripturarum excerpta in isto libro, qui sentenciarum dicitur, ponitur," ibid., p. 255.

[12] Denzinger-Bannwart, <u>Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum</u>, #373. -- Editor: Lonergan almost certainly used one of the many editions of Denzinger prepared by J. B. Umberg (i.e., editions 13-27, 1921-1951), who followed C. Bannwart as editor. The 33rd edition (Barcelona: Herder, 1965), edited by A. Schönmetzer, numbers the relevant passage 725.

[14] Dom Odon Lottin has shown that this definition appeared for the first time after the Council of Sens (1140) in the <u>Sententiae Divinitatis</u>; see his article, "La 'Summa Sententiarum' est-elle postérieure aux sentences de Pierre Lombard?" <u>Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie</u> 28 (1926): 284-302. Reprint, pp. 3-10. Cf. Schupp, op. cit., p. 107, n. 6. -- Editor: Lottin's first section, pp. 286-293, treats of the definition of free will; see p. 290 for Lonergan's precise point.

¹⁵Libri IV Sententiarum, lib. II, d. 24, c. 3. [Henceforth cited as Sentences.]

¹⁶This device is the essence of the argument in St. Anselm's and St. Bernard's treatment of the problem. See Migne's Patrologia (Latina), 158, cols. 491 ff., and 182, cols. 1001 ff. Their dialectical definitions of liberty are at the root of the complexity, variation and unsatisfactoriness described by Dom Lottin, La théorie de libre arbitre depuis s. Anselme jusqu'à s. Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain: Abbaye de Mont-César, 1929. Reprinted from Revue thomiste, 1927-1929.) The reader will find the complementary complexity, variation and unsatisfactoriness recounted by Prof. Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 55 (1931): 177-238, 403-437, 562-591. -- Editor: Landgraf's articles have become ch. 4 in his Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, I, 1.

¹⁷It does not occur to Peter Lombard to exploit the possibilities of such a definition. His interests are not speculative enough for that. He affirms "non potest non peccare" (Sentences, II, d. 25, c. 6) and also "et peccare et non peccare posse" (ibid., d. 28, fin.). His distinction between libertas a necessitate and libertas a peccato (ibid., d. 25, c. 7 ff.) is wholesome but purely dialectical. (See Schupp, op. cit., pp. 105-115.)

¹⁸Boethius, In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione ..., Editio secunda, lib. 3; Patrologia latina 64, col. 492.

¹⁹Sentences, II, d. 25, c. 1. The definition is developed by St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1.

²⁰A detailed discussion of the point cannot be undertaken here. But I believe the reader will find ample and convincing evidence in the works of Dom Lottin and Prof. Landgraf cited in note 16.

²¹Cp. [the First] Vatican council, Sess. III, c. 4, Denzinger-Bannwart, #1796 [#3016 in Denzinger-Schönmetzer]. -- Editor: Lonergan had written #1794, but that seems to be an error.

²²Vide supra, 1.2. D, pp. 21-22.

²³A. Landgraf, "Grundlagen für ein Verständnis der Busslehre der Früh- und Hochscholastik," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 51 (1927): 170.

²⁴Cp. Denzinger-Bannwart, ##410, 483 [##780, 904 in Denzinger-Schönmetzer].

²⁵A. Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," Scholastik 3 (1928): 40. -- Editor: This article has become ch. 6 in Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, I. 1.

²⁶Vide infra, 1.4. E, pp. 36-37.

²⁷Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachenden Gnade ...," Scholastik 3 (1928): 30.

²⁸Landgraf, ibid., pp. 31-38.

²⁹Cp. St. Anselm's De Veritate, c. 12 (Patrologia Latina 158, cols. 480 ff.); De Conceptu Virginali ..., c. 4 (ibid., cols. 436 ff.). It is worth noting the parallel definition of free will: "liberum arbitrium non esse aliud, quam abitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem," De Libero Arbitrio, c. 3 (ibid., col. 494). -- Editor:

The phrase in Lonergan's text quoted from Anselm's De Veritate is found in col. 482B.

[30] De Conceptu Virginali ..., c. 29 (Patrologia Latina 158, cols. 462 ff.). See for a fuller presentation together with an account of the influence of this position, A. Landgraf, "Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des hl. Anselm von Canterbury und seine Bedeutung für die Theologie der Frühscholastik," Divus Thomas (Freiburg, Switz.) 5 (1927): 155-177. -- Editor: This article has become ch. 3 in Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, I, 1.

[31] Sentences II, d. 27.   [32] Ibid., c. 12, in fine.

[33] Instances are Abelard and Peter of Capua. See Landgraf, "Die Gerechtigkeitsbegriff ...," Divus Thomas 5 (1927): 169; "Grundlagen für ein Verständnis der Busslehre ...," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 51 (1927): 186.

[34] Thus, Magister Martinus: "Spiritus sanctus datur dupliciter: aut quantum ad peccati remissionem prout datur parvulis; aut quantum ad virtutum collationem prout datur adultis." Cited from Langraf, "Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachenden Gnade ...," Scholastik 3 (1928): 46. See the following pages.
    It is to be noted that in the letter, Maiores Ecclesiae causas, written at the end of 1201, Pope Innocent III in citing the solutions of the theologians to the problem of infant baptism gives in first place the view that distinguishes between grace and the remission of sin. The view that the virtues are infused quoad habitum non quoad usum appears in second place and is introduced with "nonnullis vero dicentibus." See Denzinger-Bannwart, #410 [Denzinger-Schönmetzer, #780].

[35] Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachenden Gnade ...," Scholastik 3 (1928): 42, 64.

[36] Ibid., p. 61. Cp. pp. 56-62.

[37] E.g., Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 113.

[38] Denzinger-Bannwart, #483. Cp. #410 [Denzinger-Schönmetzer, ##904, 780].

[39] Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

[40] De Veritate, q. 24, a. 14. It is to be noted that the problem of synthetizing the generic and specific theorems is here complicated by the absence of a clearly formulated category of actual grace. The formulation of the idea of habitual grace has already been described: the discovery that the definition of a habit meant a grace that did not completely satisfy the requirements was not immediate; further, to find the complement to the habit was not easy, for, as we shall see later, St. Thomas had to transform Aristotle's physical theory of motion into a metaphysical theory. Passages that clearly show an absence of the distinction between actual grace and general providence are: De Veritate, q. 24, a. 15; In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, aa. 1-4. In St. Albertus Magnus: Summa de Creaturis, Secunda pars, q. 70, a. 5; also his Commentarii in II Sent., d. 25, a. 6. For St. Bonaventura, see Franz Mitzka, "Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 50 (1926): 27-72, 220-252. -- Editor: The passages referred to are often long, and checking them is difficult, especially when we are looking for an "absence." I suggest, for the commentaries on the Sentences, that the reader consult Thomas's article 4 (init.) and Albert's article 6.

[41] St. Thomas Aquinas, <u>De Veritate</u>, q. 24, a. 12; cp. <u>Sum. Theol.</u>, I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

[42] For St. Thomas, see <u>In II Sent.</u>, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2. St. Albert is similarly in difficulty in <u>In II Sent.</u>, d. 25, a. 6, and in <u>Summa de Creaturis</u>, Secunda pars, q. 70, a. 5. Where before the difficulty was complicated by the lack of a clear distinction between general providence and actual grace, there the difficulty is obviously the reconcili- ation of <u>non posse non peccare</u> with liberty. In his early <u>Summa</u> (the later corrects -- see <u>Summa Theol.</u>, II, q. 100, mem. 2, 3, 4) St. Albert insists that the Lombard did not mean to deny <u>libertas de necessitate</u>. He derives his solution from an appeal to St. Augustine, who had said <u>peccatum habendi dura necessitas</u>; this he rightly interprets as regarding the remission of sin, but falsely supposes to cover the whole issue. St. Thomas simply repeats this position in his earliest work: taking it over from his master, he is at first much more downright about it; more brilliant, he solves the point definitively in his next work. In this connection it has been pointed out to me by R. P. Henri Bouillard, who is inves- tigating the matter, that the medieval theologians do not seem to cite the Second Council of Orange. This makes the speculative defect less surprising than it appears at first sight. See also on the question, H. Lange, <u>De Gratia</u> (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1929), pp. 140-151. -- Editor: Bouil- lard's point has now been made in print; see his <u>Conversion et grâce chez s. Thomas d'Aquin</u> (Paris: Aubier, 1944), pp. 94-95, 97, 98-102, 114-121 (references as in the book's index).

[43] Landgraf, "Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen ...," <u>Scholastik</u> 4 (1929). See p. 385.

[44] See, for instance, Herbert Doms, <u>Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus</u> (Breslau: Müller & Seiffert, 1929).

[45] <u>Summa conra Gentiles</u>, III, cc. 52, 147-163.

[46] Landgraf, "Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen ...," <u>Scholastik</u> 4 (1929): 374.

[47] Ibid., p. 377. [48] Ibid., pp. 381-384. [49] Ibid., p. 214.

[50] Ibid.   [51] Ibid., p. 219.

[52] Thus, the Lombard accurately describes the need of grace in our first parents (<u>Sentences</u>, II, d. 24, c. 1): creation was enough to enable man to avoid sin, but not enough to merit eternal life; for that another grace besides creation was needed. But he goes wrong when he tries to explain why the avoidance of sin by our first parents in the period prior to the infusion of grace would not be meritorious: he admits we merit when we merely avoid sin, but always [maintains?] that that is because we have difficulty; in the state of original innocence there was no difficulty and so no merit. In commenting on this passage St. Albert cannot understand the Lombard's position; he was not aware of the intervening development (see his <u>In II Sent.</u>, d. 25, a. 6). This provides a perfect illustration of misinterpretation due to ignorance of development. For a rich collection of twelfth-century positions regarding our first parents, see Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade ...," <u>Zeitschrift für katho- lische Theologie</u> 55 (1931): 403-422.

[53] See, for example, his <u>Sum. Theol.</u>, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad lm.

[54] Landgraf, "Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen ...," <u>Scholastik</u> 4 (1929): 212.

[55]Ibid., p. 191.

[56]Ibid., pp. 195, 374. See whole section, pp. 352-389.

[57]Ibid., pp. 9-13.

[58]Ibid., pp. 14-28. Cardinal Laborans defined grace in the strict sense (veri nominis) as everything one has at birth or receives afterwards; he admits then two narrower senses, first, everything the elect have at birth or receive afterwards, and second, the virtues of the elect. The example should provide a realization of the difficulty of defining grace in the third phase. It is to be found in Landgraf, ibid., pp. 20 ff.

[59]Vide supra, pp. 28-31.   [60]Vide supra, pp. 27-28.

[61]Cp. Lottin, La théorie du libre arbitre ..., 1929. (Reprint from Revue thomiste, 1927-1929.) A few citations will emphasize the point: 'Le chancelier Philippe a le mérite d'avoir-introduit les questions relatives à la nature du libre arbitre .... Toutefois l'ordonnance de ces trois questions est voilée dans l'exposé du chancelier. Mais Alexandre de Halès a su les distinguer soigneusement. Et ces mêmes questions seront reprises, avec quelques variantes, par Albert le Grand, Odon Rigaud et saint Bonaventure ...." "Alexandre de Halès ... Odon Rigaud ... s'efforcèrent de scruter la raison foncière du libre arbitre, posant ainsi les premiers fondements de la doctrine philosophique de la liberté."
In other words, speculation on the nature of liberty has its obscure beginning in Philip. The philosophic basis of liberty is worked out by Alexander of Hales and Odon Rigaldi. After early attempts to harmonize the definitions of Boethius, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and the one attributed to St. Augustine by the Lombard, "saint Bonaventure trouvait, à juste titre, pareil travail assez stérile." The citations are from Lottin, Revue thomiste 34 (1929): 266, 266-267, 267 [La théorie ..., pp. 125-126, 126, 126]. The italics (underlined) are our own.

[62]Vide supra, 1.4. B, p. 35, note 42.

[63]"Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade ...," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 55 (1931): 425; cp. pp. 422-437, 562-575. -- Editor: Landgraf's reference on page 425 is to Hugh of St. Victor rather than to Peter Lombard. Peter's debt to Hugh can be judged from Lonergan's note 64.

[64]Sentences, II, d. 25, c. 6:
"'Et possunt notari in homine quatuor status liberi arbitrii.
'Anti peccatum enim ad bonum nil impediebat, ad malum nil impellebat'; ... tunc sine errore ratio iudicare, et voluntas sine difficultate bonum appetere poterat.
'Post peccatum vero, ante reparationem gratiae, premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur ... potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam damnabiliter.
'Post reparationem vero, ... premitur a concupiscentia, sed non vincitur ... ut possit peccare propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et possit non peccare ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem ....
'Post confirmationem vero ... nec vinci nec premi poterit, et tunc habebit non posse peccare'."
Two points are to be observed: first, the tendency to conceive grace psychologically, the illumination of the intellect and the strengthening of the will; second, the fact that the need for grace was so explicitly conceived in terms of

moral impotence naturally tended to eclipse the idea of moral
impotence when the need for grace was seen to lie in the super-
natural character of eternal life. -- Editor: the quotations
within the quotation from the Lombard are attributed by his
editor to Hugh of St. Victor; the underlining is Lonergan's.

[65] St. Augustine, De Correptione et Gratia: "Quapropter,
bina ista quid inter se differant, diligenter et vigilanter
intuendum est; posse non peccare, et non posse peccare" (c.
12, #33, Patrologia Latina, 44, col. 936). "Primo itaque ho-
mini, qui in eo bono quo factus fuerat rectus acceperat posse
non peccare ..." (ibid., #34, col. 937). " ... praedestinatis
non tale adiutorium perseverantiae datur, sed tale ut ei per-
severantes esse non possint, verum etiam ut per hoc donum
non nisi perseverantes sint" (ibid.). "Maior quippe libertas
est necessaria adversus tot et tantas tentationes, quae in
paradiso non fuerunt .... Illi (Adae) ergo sine peccato ullo
data est, cum qua conditus est, voluntas libera, et eam fecit
(Ada) servire peccato: horum vero (praedestinatorum) cum fuis-
set voluntas serva peccati, liberata est per illum qui dixit,
Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis (Ioan.,
VIII, 36) .... Huic peccato (impoenitentiae finalis) ultra
non serviunt, non prima conditione, sicut ille, liberi; sed
per secundum Adam Dei gratia liberati, et ista liberatione
habentes liberum arbitrium quo serviant Deo, non quo captiven-
tur a diabolo. Liberati enim a peccato servi facti sunt ius-
titiae (Rom., VI, 18), in qua stabunt usque in finem" (ibid.,
#35, cols. 937-938). -- Editor: the bracketed inserts in the
quotations are Lonergan's.

[66] For a close analysis of De Correptione et Gratia, see
Charles Boyer, "Le système de saint Augustin sur la grâce.
Paraphrase du 'De Correptione et Gratia'," Recherches de sci-
ence religieuse 20 (1930): 481-505. On Jansenism, see the
article in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique [by J. Carretre,
Vol. 8, 1, cols. 318-529, with Imprimatur in 1923]. A summary
of the Augustinus [of Jansenius] is to be had in English;
see Nigel Abercrombie, The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford: At
the Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 126-153. It is worth noting
that in their third phase the medieval thinkers moved uneasily
in the limited orbit of Baius and Jansenius's thought, but,
as soon as they could, escaped from it.

[67] Thus, St. Albert, In II Sent., d. 25, a. 6 [ad obiect.
1]: "auctoritates non probant neque dicunt quod sine gratia
non possit aliquis resistere (tentationi) sed quod non potest
sine Deo. Et hoc plane verum est, quia in Deo vivimus et move-
mur et sumus; et nisi ipse continue contineat, et salvet,
et moveat, nihil possumus esse et operari. Sed hoc non ponit
gratiam specialem." -- Editor: again the bracketed inserts
are Lonergan's, as is also, it seems, the underlining.

[68] Ibid., Solutio: "Si tamen ponatur (homo) habere solum
liberum arbitrium, videtur mihi quod adhuc potest resistere
tentationi." [Bracketed insert by Lonergan.]

APPENDIX 1

LONERGAN'S "LIST OF CHAPTERS"

Page i of the Dissertation
and its most concise outline

List of Chapters.

NOTE PREFIXED TO "EXCERPTA" FROM THE DISSERTATION

Sent to the Gregorian University in 1946

NOTE

The paging of this slim brochure may cause surprise, for the pages are numbered from 533 to 578. The fact is that, besides being an excerpt from my doctoral dissertation, what follows also is the last of a series of articles that appeared in the periodical, Theological Studies, in the years 1941 and 1942. To give the same matter two entirely different series of page numbers would be just ground for annoyance and a very probable cause of confusion. It seemed wiser, then, to retain in this reprint the same page numbers as are found in the article.

The reader will grasp the general nature of the argument most readily by glancing over the series of section headings appended at the end of this publication. The aim has been historical. The antecedents of Thomist thought were learnt from the well-known series of articles of Dom Lottin on the liberty of the will and of Dr. Landgraf on medieval thought on grace; the latter's far-reaching work was supplemented by the monographs of Dr. Schupp on the Gnadenlehre of Peter Lombard and of Dr. Doms on that of St. Albert the Great. My own main task was to apply the method of intensive study of parallel passages propounded by the late Fr. de Guibert in his celebrated Doublets de Saint Thomas d'Aquin.

The manner in which this method worked out is, perhaps, of interest. It was soon discovered that the commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard of the three great medieval doctors, St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas, held in common the surprising view that in one man there can be only one grace and that grace is the supernatural habit. This position seemed due to the fact that theoretical analysis of supernatural habits was of recent origin when the Commentaries were written and that, as yet, it had not been perceived that habitual grace along with external providence was insufficient to account for the dogmatic data. In any case in the

De Veritate of Aquinas one finds a reversal of the position
of the Commentary on the Sentences: in one man there is more
than one grace in a strict sense; besides the supernatural
habit, which is both operative and cooperative, there are
cooperative gifts of good thoughts and holy affections. The
Summa Theologiae develops this position further by dividing
both habitual and actual grace into operative and coöperative.

     This general movement of thought set the problem. Within
the writings of Aquinas there developed the precise notion
of an operative, actual grace. What was it? Towards settling
the issue, three subsidiary lines of inquiry were initiated:
first, what was meant by dividing habitual grace into operative
and coöperative; secondly, what seems to have been the under-
lying theory of operation; thirdly, what seems to have been
understood by divine motions within the human will. In the
light of the answers obtained to these subsidiary questions,
the central issue was attacked.

     The present excerpt omits the earlier parts of the disser-
tation on the historical background, the determination of
the historical problem, the analogy from habitual grace, and
the general theory of operation. It contains the subsidiary
investigation on divine motions within the will, and the prin-
cipal discussion of the development in the writings of St.
Thomas of a grace that at once is actual and operative. There
seems no reason why I should summarize here the summaries
that the reader will find on pages 552 f. and 572 ff. Similarly,
I see no reason for repeating in a bibliography the titles
of the few works drawn upon in this section of the essay.
But I do wish to profit by the occasion to thank my professors
at the Gregorian, and in particular Fr. Charles Boyer, for
their lessons and their kindness.

BOOK REVIEWS

TURNING LIBERALISM INSIDE-OUT

Charles C. Hefling, Jr.
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The nineteenth century, according to Karl Barth's famous dictum, belongs to Schleiermacher. But the same might be said of the twentieth, Barth himself excepted; and said, moreover, not only about Protestant theology but about more and more of Roman Catholic theology as well. The program inaugurated nearly two hundred years ago by the Speeches on Religion is still being carried out, partly and perhaps largely because theologians today, whatever their confessional loyalty, still do their thinking and writing within a cultural environment to which Schleiermacher's way of understanding religion is very well adapted. That all religion is founded on an experi- ence, or a dimension of every experience, with which virtually everyone has some acquaintance and which has come to be ex- pressed in a variety of rites and symbols, stories and doc- trines -- that, or something like it, is a theme which har- monizes nicely with the privatism that is modernity's leitmotif. It allows different Christian denominations, not to mention different non-Western traditions, to be regarded as so many brands of the same generic product, so many ways of naming, describing, and thus sharing what is essentially an inward and subjective matter. Not surprisingly, then, variations on this theme make up the standard repertoire of religious professionals, clergy and academics alike. It is, after all, what the audience likes to hear.

Even so, not everyone is playing it. The predominance of what he calls the 'experiential-expressive' approach to religion is the background, and the target, against which

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George A. Lindbeck has written a book far more important than
its size might suggest. The Nature of Doctrine[1] lives up to
its title by proposing a theory about doctrinal statements,
developed with a view to Christian ecumenical discussion;
but Lindbeck is aware that any pronouncement on what doctrines
are implies and is implied by an account of what religion
is. Hence the subtitle: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age. 'Postliberal' is Lindbeck's shorthand for his own posi-
tion, which he sets out as an alternative to the reigning
experiential-expressivist view, but also to the one that liber-
alism has by now dethroned. This older, preliberal or 'propo-
sitionalist' viewpoint would have it that religion is a kind
of philosophy or science; doctrines, accordingly, are to be
thought of as 'truth claims' or vehicles of cognitive inform-
ation. Such was the stand taken by classical orthodoxies,
and its demise is a twice-told tale. Once Kant and historical
criticism between them had undermined the foundations for
interpreting doctrines discursively, they had to be interpreted
otherwise, first as "accounts of the Christian religious affec-
tions set forth in speech," to quote Schleiermacher,[2] and
then along the lines of later Protestant liberalism and Roman
Catholic modernism. Lindbeck takes yet a third approach. His
proposal rests on understanding religions as "comprehensive
interpretive schemes ... which structure human experience
and understanding of self and world" [32], and within which
the function of doctrines is neither cognitive nor expressive
but regulative. Christian doctrine provides as it were the
grammatical rules for using Christian language, broadly con-
ceived as the whole shared pattern of thinking and acting
that confers on Christians their identity, informs their hori-
zon, and constitutes their Lebenswelt.

On this 'cultural-linguistic' model, the idea that differ-
ent religions are interchangeable ways of talking about the
same thing becomes highly dubious, for not only do specifically
religious languages differ enormously, but so do the cultures
in which they are embedded. That, however, is only the most
general implication Lindbeck draws. Applied to Christianity
in particular, his model calls for a rewriting of both theolog-
ical and ecclesial agendas. Apologetics, which from the exper-
iential-expressivist viewpoint belongs to the center of theo-
logy, is a prime example. As Schleiermacher invited the heirs
of the Enlightenment to acknowledge in themselves a reality

prior to knowledge and morals, so latter-day liberals hope
to get a hearing by 'translating' Christian doctrines into
some other, more intelligible contemporary language. But if
Christianity is a language, then being a Christian -- thinking
and speaking and behaving Christianly -- can no more come
about through translations than being a German can. You have
got to learn the original language, not as a mere set of ex-
trinsic signs but as a specific way of looking at and living
in the world. Hence for Lindbeck the first order of theological
business should not be to find and cultivate the common exper-
ience on which both secular and religious faith are allegedly
built, but rather to articulate the specifically Christian
pattern of meaning and value. Similarly, the churches' job
is to inculcate that pattern, not to accommodate themselves
to culture at large. Since modern sensibilities will most
likely be offended by the very idea that being religious is
a matter of acquiring specific, non-optional linguistic skills,
postliberal Christian communities may have to buy their iden-
tity at the price of a certain 'sociological sectarianism' [22,
78], yet this does not mean that the churches should simply
abandon a secularized culture to its own self-destructive
devices; in the long run, their withdrawal might well be for
the sake of return. The "viability of a unified world," Lind-
beck writes, "may depend on communal enclaves that socialize
their members into highly particular outlooks" [127], if those
outlooks are such as to counteract the individualism of which
liberal theology is a symptom and nihilism, perhaps, the in-
evitable outcome.

All of this definitely puts Lindbeck out of step with
the theological parade. At the same time, he points out that
except in seminaries and divinity schools, where experiential-
expressivism continues to go from strength to strength, models
of the sort he sets out in The Nature of Doctrine are used
already in the academic disciplines most closely allied with
the study of religion. If theologians too were to adopt a
cultural-linguistic approach, they would find allies among
the many sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers of
language who reject 'raw,' uninterpreted experience, the inno-
cent eye, the tabula rasa, and who insist, conversely, on
the priority of public discourse, on socially constructed
reality, theory-laden data, the Sprachlichkeit der Welt, and
so on. For his own part, Lindbeck does not stop with arguing

that experience invariably has a shape; that it is always,
as a matter of fact, patterned and pigeonholed according to
some interpretive scheme. That in itself would raise no eye-
brows. He takes the further step of suggesting that where
the appropriate linguistic categories are lacking, no determin-
ate experience is possible. It is not simply that members
of a certain much-debated tribe, whose language has no separate
words corresponding to 'blue' and 'green,' do not discriminate
experientially between colors in the way English-speakers
do. Lindbeck is inclined to think they cannot. Nor is religious
experience essentially different; it too depends on inherited
mental equipment. "The sense of the holy of which Rudolph
Otto speaks can be construed," according to Lindbeck, "as
the tacit or unthematic awareness of applying a culturally
acquired concept of the holy in a given situation" [38].

So much for the feeling of absolute dependence, for being
grasped by ultimate concern -- and for falling unrestrictedly
in love.

                               II
It will interest readers of this journal that much of
The Nature of Doctrine first took shape as lectures in Gonzaga
University's St. Michael's series, which began in 1972 with
Lonergan's Philosophy of God, and Theology. Each subsequent
lecturer has been invited to engage in conversation with his
predecessors, and although Lindbeck notes that "only traces
remain" of his own response to Lonergan, the traces are signi-
ficant enough to take notice of here, especially as coming
from one of the very few Protestant theologians who have given
Lonergan's work serious consideration at all. Lindbeck was
assessing its ecumenical possibilities as early as the 1970
Lonergan Congress in Florida, where he delivered a paper that
bears on his position today, for reasons I will return to
in the next section. At that time, however, the 'Background'
chapters of Method in Theology had yet to be completed, and
it is one of these, the chapter on religion, that is given
explicit attention in The Nature of Doctrine. In fact, Loner-
gan's is the theory of religion Lindbeck presents as the foil
to his own cultural-linguistic model.

Not that he portrays Lonergan as an experiential-expres-
sivist pur sang. Method in Theology is presented as a hybrid,
the result of attempting to mate liberalism's characteristic

emphasis on religious experience with the older, propositional-
ist emphasis on cognitive truth. But since Lindbeck is not
convinced that such cross-breeding works -- it involves, in
his opinion, "complicated intellectual gymnastics" that render
it unpersuasive -- he prefers to subsume 'two-dimensional'
approaches, including Lonergan's under propositionalism or
experiential-expressivism according to circumstances [16-17],
and for purposes of clarifying the cultural-linguistic model,
it suffices that what is most typical of liberal theologies
is also axiomatic for Lonergan, namely, that a core experience,
conscious though not reflectively known, transculturally con-
stant though variously symbolized, is what makes religions
religious [31].[3] What, then, of Lonergan's hint that the 'outer
word' of tradition can be, and for the biblical religions
is, something more and other than an objectification of reli-
gious experience? Lindbeck construes this as meaning simply
that revelation provides what those who accept it take to
be a normative way of expressing the 'inner word' of grace.
Hence Lonergan, like Rahner, is committed to holding that
all grace is the grace of Christ, in the sense that Christ
is "the only fully and finally appropriate objective correlate
of [the] inner experience of salvation" [57].

It may be that the need to say something about Lonergan
in the original lectures kept Lindbeck from picking a better
representative of experiential-expressivism; it may be that
his typology itself is too simplistic; the result, in any
case, is something less than an accurate assessment of Loner-
gan's views. On the theological question of whether and in
what sense all grace is the grace of Christ -- to which an
affirmative answer does entail positing 'anonymous Christians'
or something equivalent -- there is no explicit statement
in Lonergan's later work; certainly not in Method, which de-
liberately leaves open theological questions as such. There
is, arguably, an implicit answer, but not the one Lindbeck
suggests. That for Lonergan all grace is the grace of God
is true enough; but as Frederick Crowe has elaborated in sev-
eral papers,[4] the distinction Method draws between an 'outer'
and an 'inner' word has its theological counterpart in Loner-
gan's Trinitarian theory, specifically in the missions of
the Son and the Spirit respectively, and only the latter does
he ever identify with operative grace. It remains a further
question whether the mission of the Son adds anything, above

and beyond a possibly definitive way of talking about the
mission of the Spirit; but here the clearest indications
of an answer appear not in Method's chapter on religion but
in the one on doctrines.

No doubt these are rather technical issues. Yet on their
resolution hangs the far from irrelevant question of how
Christian theologians should regard other religious traditions
-- a problem of some moment for Lindbeck. His own way of
answering it will come up in another connection below; for
now, the point to be noted is that if his reading of Lonergan's
approach is, as I have suggested, wide of the mark, the reason
lies in his having treated as the whole of Method's 'theory'
of religion what is really only a part. Certainly religious
experience adds a specifically theological component to Loner-
gan's generalized empirical method. But for just that reason
the explanatory context in which chapter 4 of Method intro-
duces religious experience is a set of distinguished and
related operations -- questions -- that goes back to the
first chapter and beyond that to Insight. And certainly relig-
ious conversion, the operation of grace, lays the foundation
on which answers to any particular question about God make
sense; that is the point of Philosophy of God, and Theology.
Yet it is by no means to concede, as Lindbeck would have
it, that the experience of surrendering to an unrestricted
love "alone among inner, nonsensory experiences seems to
be prior to all conceptualization or cognition" [32]. The
same is true of insight. The priority of the act or operation
of understanding to conceptual articulation is perhaps the
most pervasive and important theme in Lonergan's work, from
the Verbum articles to the economics manuscript, and the
one which in the long run distinguishes him both from experi-
ential-expressivists as Lindbeck characterizes them and from
Lindbeck's own conceptualism.

More on that presently. Here let it be admitted that
as far as the main argument of The Nature of Doctrine goes
it does not matter much whether Lonergan can or cannot play
Schleiermacher to Lindbeck's Barth. There are plenty who
can. And despite his disagreement with what he takes to be
Lonergan's concession to liberalism as regards the nature
of religion, Lindbeck finds himself agreeing with him, at
least in part, on the nature of doctrine.

III

Doctrines of the kind Lonergan calls church doctrines, as distinct from the teachings of this or that theologian, are the chief concern of Lindbeck's book. As I have already mentioned, he argues that they function regulatively. Dogma stands to Christianity as grammar stands to language: directly, it governs the linguistic behavior of Christians; indirectly, it therefore shapes Christian personality, identity, and community.

There is reason to think that this aspect of Lindbeck's theory has been influenced to some extent by his engagement with Lonergan's work. In his paper for the Florida congress Lindbeck set himself the question whether _Insight_'s cognitional theory is "confessionally neutral" and consequently open to adoption by a theologian committed to remaining "dogmatically a Protestant." The answer, he argued, depends on whether Lonergan's position requires that dogmatic development be regarded as irreversible in a sense that would conflict with the sola scriptura principle of the Reformation. To this further question the paper replied with a somewhat hesitant no: Lonergan's interpretation of doctrines such as those framed at the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon "makes them far more 'formal' and therefore less culturally conditioned than most historians have supposed they were," so that even if they do represent an "unrepealable advance in understanding" they do it "by identifying formal rules of right belief and speech" -- not, or at least not necessarily, by replacing the content of scripture.[5]

Fifteen years have passed, and The Nature of Doctrine shows that Lindbeck would now approach these issues somewhat differently. Scripture _versus_ development of doctrine no longer provides the starting point for his ecumenical inquiries, partly because he has come to regard the scripture principle itself as a formal and so, possibly a dispensable rule. Like the classical Catholic doctrine of the church's teaching authority, classical Protestantism's sola scriptura has the regulative function of specifying where right doctrine is to be found. But rules that are appropriate and even necessary in one set of circumstances may not be so in others; moreover, a cultural-linguistic view of religion suggests that issues regarding Christian doctrine ought to be referred neither to scripture nor to an institutional magisterium but to the

whole community of those who competently speak Christianity's language: lex orandi lex credendi. And though such an appeal has been impossible at least since the sixteenth century, it is not impossible in principle. A reunited church might acknowledge the sensus fidelium as its doctrinal form, in which case any doctrine that 'localizes' doctrinal authority, whether in scripture or in an ecclesial office, would in effect be superseded.

This approach to one notorious ecumenical impasse suggests that if Lindbeck formerly had misgivings about Lonergan's way of construing at least some dogmas as 'formal rules of right belief and speech,' he has them no longer. That, according to The Nature of Doctrine, is how church doctrines are to be construed right across the board. Such a proposal needs testing, however, and before seeing whether it illuminates the further ecumenical difficulties posed by the Marian and infallibility dogmas, Lindbeck turns to the classical doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. As might be expected in light of his earlier paper, he accepts the argument that the only hellenization of Christianity at the early councils consisted in learning from Greek culture the technique of operating on propositions, not in importing wholesale an alien metaphysical philosophy. Citing Athanasius's explanation of consubstantiality as meaning that what is said of the Father is said of the Son as well, the name 'Father' excepted, Lindbeck writes that "the theologian most responsible for the triumph of Nicaea thought of it, not as a first-order proposition with ontological reference, but as a second-order rule of speech" [94]. To accept the Nicene decree, then, is to adopt a manner of speaking, but the terminology of the decree is itself neither here nor there. If 'consubstantial' were to vanish from Christian preaching and devotion, they might still retain its meaning, so long as the linguistic rule for which the word originally stood continued to be observed.

All of this sounds so much like Lonergan that one wonders why, elsewhere in The Nature of Doctrine, he is numbered among the experiential-expressivists rather than enlisted as a supporter of postliberalism. Lindbeck is in fact drawing here on the other half of Lonergan's 'hybrid' position, but even so the resemblance between their interpretations of the early councils does not run very deep, even on the meaning

of Athanasius's rule. It is true that the rule can be general-
ized, and was, to cover everything Christians should say and
believe about the Father and the Son. Athanasius, however,
first presented it as a way of summing up what scripture does
say: the meaning of 'consubstantial' is the same as what can
be gathered by comparing two sets of scriptural quotations,
namely that the same things are said about Father and Son
alike. But if the rule as originally formulated is thus an
implicit and heuristic statement of what it is that scripture
states, the question is whether scripture itself states any-
thing, directly and explicitly, in the first place. And while
there is no reason to suppose that Athanasius himself thought
of scripture in terms of 'ontological reference,' there is
every reason to surmise that he and his opponents alike were
none the less committed to what Lonergan in The Way to Nicea
calls 'the word as true.' Had they not been, it is hard to
see how their argument could have proceeded along the lines
it did.

Lindbeck, however, for reasons I will come to presently,
is extremely reluctant to allow that what he calls proposition-
alism and Lonergan calls dogmatic realism was at work in the
development of early conciliar dogma. As presented in The
Nature of Doctrine, the way to Nicea was a process by which
three 'regulative principles' -- that there is one God, that
the man Jesus really lived and died, and that every possible
importance is to be ascribed to Jesus -- were adjusted to
each other so as to allow Christian discourse to follow all
three at once [94-95]. Thus, in Lindbeck's view, what 'consub-
stantial' stands for, as interpreted by Athanasius's formula,
is less a proposition about propositions, themselves regarded
as true, than it is a rule about rules. While he agrees with
Lonergan in that the Nicene decree, like the other early
Christological doctrines, is an indirect mediation of meaning,
he contends that the meaning it mediates is what Lonergan
would call constitutive, not cognitive, meaning. Nicea may
permit a certain range of truth claims: it does not encourage
such claims, and certainly it makes none of its own.

Since the novelty of The Nature of Doctrine lies in its
proposal that all church doctrines are to be included under
the rubric of second-order regulative principles [19], it
is worth asking what sort of truth claims it is possible for
Christian language, thus regulated, to make. From the experiential-

expressivist standpoint, obviously, truth in the sense of
correspondence to reality is not even in the running, and
propositionalists, whether fundamentalist Protestants or tradi-
tionalist Roman Catholics, would probably insist that 'truth'
in any other sense is no truth at all. Lindbeck endeavors
to keep the best of both worlds by opting for a sort of non-
ontological correspondence theory. In the first place, he
argues, church doctrines in themselves make 'intrasystematic'
truth-claims only. They function entirely within the religion
-- that is, the langauge -- for which they supply the grammar.
If anything can be thought of as 'corresponding' to reality,
it is the complete system of words and rules together. As
in natural science (according to Lonergan) a system of inter-
locking correlations and laws, not this or that particular
law or correlation, is what expresses intelligibility that
can be judged true or false, so on Lindbeck's view "a religion
thought of as comparable to a cultural system, a set of lan-
guage games correlated with a form of life, may as a whole
correspond or not correspond to what a theist calls God's
being and will" [51].

There is much to be said for this aspect of Lindbeck's
position. It is vastly preferable to supposing that the Apos-
tles' Creed, say, can be taken to pieces and 'verified' (or
'falsified') article by article. But if The Nature of Doctrine
is right, in the second place, any correspondence there happens
to be between human religion and divine reality will be a
performative rather than an ontological correspondence. To
use Lindbeck's simile, religions are like maps. They convey
know-how, not knowledge; directions, not topography. Hence
they become true assertions in so far as they are used to
get somewhere. Basic utterances, such as 'Jesus is Lord' and
the three regulative principles of Christology mentioned above,
are landmarks to guide the Christian pilgrimage; creeds, which
are utterances about these utterances, tell pilgrims how to
take their bearings; theologians, to complete the picture,
make up a sort of travel bureau. What the destination might
be, whether it is one or many -- these difficult but inescap-
able questions had best be postponed to the next section.
The important thing just now is that doctrines, construed
as rules about rules, are more appropriately obeyed than inter-
preted or translated. Lindbeck considers that "language idles
without doing any work" when systematic theology is taken,

as these days it generally is, to be the more or less specula-
tive reinterpretation of whatever doctrines a given theologian
deems authoritative. In his own proposal, on the other hand,
"the gears mesh with reality and theological reflection on
doctrine becomes directly relevant to the praxis of the church"
[107] -- the church being that community which is constituted
in part by the pragmatically interpretive system within which
theologians do their reflecting.

The cartographic image only goes so far, but to speak
of pilgrimage does suggest that Christian living has a narra-
tive shape. Persons and communities live by living out some
more or less coherent story, and from this it would follow
that to be a Christian is not, in the first instance, to sub-
scribe to certain creedal assertions but rather to conform
oneself with whatever story it is that creeds and other doc-
trines tell the church how to tell. For Lindbeck, whose argu-
ment runs along these lines, Christianity has the narrative
shape of the Bible. The intrasystematic truth with which
Christian theologians are concerned therefore coincides with
what he calls intratextual meaning: "theology redescribes
reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating
Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text,
so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world
the text" [118]. That is why Lindbeck is chary of cognitive,
propositional meaning: what the Bible does, not what it says
-- praxis, not theoria -- is the sum and substance of Christianity.

Broadly speaking, then, the complement to a cultural-
linguistic model of religion is a 'narrative' theology. Lind-
beck admits that theology in a narrative mode is something
that many have called for but few have chosen, and that conse-
quently it remains to be seen just how a postliberal dogmatics
might proceed. Presumably, however, one of its effects would
be a much-needed bridging of the chasm that has long separated
systematic theologians from those whose specialty is scripture.
Thus it is of some interest to find that at least one biblical
scholar has already responded from the other side of the chasm
--Lindbeck's colleague Brevard Childs, who has included an
excursus on The Nature of Doctrine in his recent book The
New Testament as Canon.

Childs has been arguing for some time that the 'canonical
shape' of individual books and of the Bible as a whole is
the relevant context for interpreting scripture as scripture--

a thesis congruent, on the face of it, with Lindbeck's emphasis
on intratextual meaning. Childs, however, despite a measure
of agreement, concludes that The Nature of Doctrine does less
than full justice to the nature of scripture. Besides a regu-
lative meaning, which he fully acknowledges, the Bible has
both an experiential and a cognitive dimension. As to the
former, "How can one understand the Psalms apart from the
experience of God's forgiveness?"; as to the latter, "Christ-
ians have always understood that we are saved, not by the
biblical text, but by the life, death, and resurrection of
Jesus Christ who entered into the world of time space." That
the only canonical function of this belief is to exhort Christ-
ians to behave as if they were saved, Childs for one cannot
accept. When every allowance has been made for the crudeness
of the way in which the Enlightenment collapsed narrative
meaning to historical reference, it remains that "the New
Testament bears witness to realities outside itself."[6] Athana-
sius would perhaps agree.

        Yet Childs's objections, significant though they are,
do not get at the roots of Lindbeck's position, from which
it would be quite possible to counter them. Or co-opt them,
rather, for what The Nature of Doctrine calls inserting the
world into the biblical story is an elastic procedure. It
can be stretched to include not only Augustine (an obvious
candidate) but also "an apparent propositionalist, such as
Aquinas, or an undoubted experiential-expressivist, such as
Schleiermacher" [123; cp. 117]. What is more, Lindbeck does
not think that "the modest cognitivism or propositionalism
represented by at least some classical theists, of whom Aquinas
is a good example" is necessarily excluded -- though certainly
it is not implied -- by the theory of religion and doctrine
he sets out. A cultural-linguistic understanding of religions,
it would seem, is capable of embracing just about everything
that goes by the name of theology.

        But that cuts both ways. Augustine, Thomas, and even
Schleiermacher, not to mention Lindbeck himself, stand pretty
squarely in the main stream of Christian thought. Yet there
does not seem to be anything to stop cultural-linguistic foun-
dations from being used in a less orthodox manner. They have,
in fact, been so used. Gordon Kaufman fully accepts the pri-
ority of language summed up in Wittgenstein's aphorism about
"theology as grammar," but his own prolegomena to any future

theological endeavor offers a program so constructive, so
thoroughly cut loose, that is, from doctrinal authority, that
it is hard to see why Christ is included among the symbols
to be reconstructed.[7] Then there is Don Cupitt, who likewise
has no doubt that interpretive categories generate religious
experience, not *vice versa*, and who presents a theology with
a clearly narrative shape -- the shape of the Prometheus story,
or possibly of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*.[8] Since Lindbeck makes
it clear that *The Nature of Doctrine* is not a theological
performance but a framework for discussion, it is beside the
point whether or not he would himself find either of these
examples congenial. They do suggest that so protean a model
as the one he advocates is worth further scrutiny.

IV

Lindbeck's is not, in his own estimation, a 'theologically
neutral' position. It excludes what it cannot assimilate from
the other two models he discusses. He does hold that it is
both doctrinally and religiously neutral, however, in the
sense that accepting it would entail no commitment either
to a particular religious language or, within any of those
languages, to a particular doctrinal grammar. Yet it is mani-
festly not a philosophically neutral position, and keeping
theology out of philosophy is as nearly impossible as, notor-
iously, keeping philosophy out of theology is. Indeed, it
could be argued on the basis of Lindbeck's theory of religion
that the theory itself must have been shaped by some theologi-
cal tradition. Which, in fact, it has. *The Nature of Doctrine*
acknowledges a number of proximate influences, notably Barth
and Wittgenstein, but it bears all the marks of a more distant
and perhaps more estimable lineage: Luther as philosophized
by Kant. Not all of Luther, perhaps. Luther in this case is
the Luther associated with the *verbum externum*, the preached
word that comes from without; with *sola fide*, provided that
fides is construed not experientially but as *fides ex auditu*;
with *scriptura sui ipsius interpres*, scripture the interpreter
of scripture -- and, for Lindbeck, of everything else; even,
it seems, the Luther of imputed rather than imparted grace
[60]. As for Kant, it is more the Kant of the second than
of the first *Critique* who makes his presence felt, albeit
with modifications. Doctrines resemble his categorical impera-
tive inasmuch as they are rules *about* rules, but differ

inasmuch as they are not categorical; because their _a priori_
status is culturally given rather than logically deduced,
they are not necessary but only contingent.

This last is the crucial point. Church doctrines for
Lindbeck are not contingent in the sense that they change;
that would vitiate the ecumenical advantages of his rule theory.
A distinction between "abiding doctrinal grammar and variable
theological vocabulary" [113] is the very thing that allows
him to attribute at least a conditional permanence and even
infallibility to dogma without committing himself to a propo-
sitional view of its meaning. Doctrines are, however, contin-
gent in the sense that while the conceptual and symbolic frame-
works of language which doctrines regulate are the necessary
conditions of the possibility of religious experience and
behavior, there is no necessity attached to becoming religious
in the first place. Other worldviews, other all-encompassing
narrative languages, are available, for the purpose of be-
stowing coherence, meaning, and value on human existence as
a whole. Social scientists, of course, have been saying as
much for so long that it scarcely needs to be said. When socio-
logical fact is elevated to the status of epistemological
theory, however, problems begin to arise.

They arise at several places in The Nature of Doctrine,
nowhere more clearly than in its treatment of interreligious
dialogue. Here experiential-expressivism might seem to have
a clear advantage, in that it offers Christians a way of under-
standing how salvation can be universal; whereas to insist
with Lindbeck on _fides ex auditu_ appears to rule out the possi-
bility of saving belief on the part of anyone who does not
happen to be conversant with that cultural _a priori_ which
is the language of Christian religion. Lindbeck admits the
difficulty. In order to palliate it he makes salvation a wholly
future, eschatological condition, so that in comparison with
what lies ahead, everyone, Christian or not, is a toddler
just beginning to understand what words mean. It may turn
out that only one language is spoken in heaven, as it were;
but which of us is speaking it now, while we are yet pilgrims
walking by faith not by sight, we simply cannot tell. In this
present life, therefore, Christians can and should abandon
pretentiousness and imperialism as regards other religions,
yet they need not abandon the regulative principle that bids
them speak of salvation through Christ alone [59-61].

What makes this a less than satisfactory maneuver is not Lindbeck's admittedly speculative solution -- though whether it does more than deny that a solution can be had is doubtful -- so much as the way he defends it against a possible objection. His cultural-linguistic alternative to anonymous Christianity, based as it is upon something like the traditional doctrines of immortality and judgment after death (one thinks again of the Critique of Practical Reason), is apt to seem "mythological or unreal to those who think science or philosophy makes it impossible to affirm a temporally and objectively future eschaton" [62]. This would seem to call for some comment as to how it is possible to affirm such an eschatology; some conversation, that is, with philosophy or science or both. Perhaps because that would be too much like liberal apologetics, Lindbeck is content to reply with a tu quoque: the anonymous-Christian solution of liberalism, he counters, is itself thoroughly mythological and unreal to those who share his own cultural-linguistic stance. In any case, mythic narrative is an ineradicable element of all religion, and hence the score is tied; which myth you prefer, if either, is not going to depend on science or philosophy, but on what your socially-constructed world allows you to accept as plausible.

Fair enough. Everyone does live in a world of inherited meanings, and what counts as real does depend on language in the broad sense -- for everyday purposes, at least, and perhaps even for most intellectual ones. Nevertheless, one may ask whether these worded worlds are ever altered or expanded; whether it is possible for the same person, at the same time, to play both the Christian language game and some other one; whether any sort of transition can be made from one contingent, cultural a priori to another. That Lindbeck's answer would be no is implicit in his verdict on liberalism's usual apologetic strategy. Theology as translation does not work, and cannot, because there is no supralinguistic standpoint from which to assess the equivalence of different expressions that (supposedly) refer to the same reality. To be sure, religious traditions do change. They change because anomalies appear in religious praxis; one such anomaly, in the contemporary praxis of ecumenism, prompted Lindbeck to write The Nature of Doctrine itself by way of groundwork for a further book on specific Christian doctrinal agreements and disagreements [8].

Pragmatic anomalies, in turn, result from "the interaction of a cultural-linguistic system with changing situations" [39]. But that only pushes the question one step back: why do 'situations' change? Are they, somehow, independent of the reality that has already been socially constructed? If they are, presumably they would go unnoticed, like the difference between blue and green in the example mentioned earlier; if not, presumably there is no call for adjusting the interpretive system as it stands.

Faced with such a paradox as this, some have argued that historical changes of the kind now referred to as paradigm shifts are simply illogical and, in that sense, irrational. Citing T. S. Kuhn, among others, Lindbeck himself accepts the impossibility of a theoretical criterion for deciding between competing paradigms. Nevertheless there are, he submits, identifiable criteria, consonant with a non-ontological correspondence theory of truth, for making such decisions: that paradigm will eventually be accepted which best exhibits pragmatic fruitfulness. This is as close to truth as we can get. Reality, natural or supernatural, is an incomprehensible thing-in-itself; it cannot be known, but it can be talked about, and the talk is 'true' in so far as it is useful. Yet the paradox cannot be dispelled so easily. On one hand, to return to the question of salvation through Christ, Lindbeck's 'eschatologically futurist' perspective will be able to claim superiority if and when its adoption promotes an interreligious praxis marked by openness, understanding, and goodwill. But why, on the other hand, should anyone adopt that perspective unless it _has_ shown its superiority?

If in the long run Lindbeck seems to be left with perspectives that change because they change and paradigms that are accepted because they are accepted, the proximate theoretical reason is not far to seek. Thoroughly Kantian in other respects, The Nature of Doctrine does not follow Kant to the point of postulating at least some interpretive categories that are universal. Consequently the spectre Kant sought to exorcize -- Hume's conventionalism -- returns to haunt Lindbeck, who is led in spite of himself to the threshold of the very relativism and privatism ('you have your paradigm, I have mine') which he rightly deplores [128-130] but from which he can save his position only by stressing the sheer givenness of cultural languages in general and of the biblical narrative

in particular. To his credit, he is consistent enough to add
that what holds for worldviews and paradigms also holds for
theories about worldviews and paradigms, including his own:
in the long run they are incommensurable. By saying that The
Nature of Doctrine "is concerned simply with the availability,
not the superiority, of a rule theory of doctrine and the
associated cultural-linguistic view of religion" [91-92],
Lindbeck is not being modest or diffident; he is acknowledging
that, on his own terms, what his readers are going to regard
as a convincing argument depends on the theoretical frameworks
they are already operating in. But as experiential-expressivism
is by far the most widely available framework at present,
no alternative is likely to get a sympathetic hearing, much
less win theologians en masse for postliberalism. Thus the
final chapter of The Nature of Doctrine "ends on an inconclu-
sive note" [134], and not a very hopeful one. If doctrine
is religious language of the second order, a theory about
doctrine is third-order language. What Lindbeck is doing,
then -- and doing quite persuasively given his philosophical
commitments -- is talking about talking about talking relig-
iously. What he cannot do, given the same commitments, is
say why anyone should listen.

This raises a further question. Lindbeck's postliberalism
is 'antifoundational' in the sense of rejecting transcultural
invariants on the ground that "all symbol systems have their
origin in interpersonal relations and social interactions"
rather than in mental acts, which, as experienced, are already
structured linguistically [38]. That is why theologians ought
to forego 'translation' and content themselves with pursuing
what can only be an in-house project, a sort of higher cate-
chesis concerned with the intelligibility of Christian doc-
trines as they are related to each other, but not in their
relation to anything else. The question is whether that is
enough. It may well be that for anyone steeped in the canonical
writings of a religious community "no world is more real"
than the one those writings create [117]. But scripture does
not, except in a figure of speech, absorb the universe. Men
and women do. And even if they do it by construing all that
is, seen and unseen, within the biblical narrative, it remains
that what there is to be construed is a world that is also
and in many respects quite differently construed by philoso-
phers and natural scientists. It will not do simply to dismiss

these alternative constructions, as Lindbeck tends to do,
as long as more or less popularized versions of them continue
to inform the conceptual frameworks with which everyone today
is indoctrinated. Liberal theologians no doubt went too far
in solving the problem of modernity by selling their scriptural
birthright for a mess of Enlightenment pottage. But Lindbeck's
postliberalism, although it offers a clear and in many ways
appealing alternative, does not offer a base from which to
criticize dominant beliefs and values; and without such a
critique it is hard to see how the modern world can ever be
absorbed into the biblical story. Christianity and culture
will have to go on, as Barth put it, "marching along side
by side but really having nothing much in common."[9]

The real issue is judgment, that much-neglected stepchild
of epistemology. If all we can know are the conceptual grids
that our minds clamp onto experience (or that clamp themselves
onto our minds; Lindbeck does not make it entirely clear which
of these holds in the case of the Bible); and if there are
no necessary or even privileged grids, then we can never utter
an unconditional 'yes' or 'no,' and there is really nothing
to prevent a dissolution of all grids, all meaning, such as
deconstructionism philosophers, now joined by theologians,
are trying to effect. Yet however 'neutral' he claims to be,
Lindbeck does make judgments. His book is full of them. If
he means what he says, the question worth asking is what he
was doing as he arrived at those judgments, some of which
are original, provocative, and moreover (I would say) correct.
Was he merely imposing a prefabricated set of concepts on
the theological scene as he found it? Or was he in fact doing
something that, according to his own theory, never happens?

NOTES

[1] The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a
Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984).
Page references will be given in the text.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1928), §15, p. 76.

[3] Lindbeck bases his assessment on a list of six theses,
for which he cites ch. 4 of Method in Theology. None of the
six is inaccurate, but to the best of my knowledge there
exists no such 'summary' of Lonergan's 'theory of religion.'

[4] Most recently, in "Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions: The Contribution of Bernard Lonergan to the Wider Ecumenism" (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1985), the Chancellor's Address delivered by Crowe on the day of Lonergan's death.

[5] George A. Lindbeck, "Protestant Problems with Lonergan on Development of Dogma," Foundations of Theology: Papers from the International Lonergan Congress 1970, ed. Philip McShane (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 122.

[6] Brevard S. Childs, The New Testament as Canon: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 545.

[7] Gordon D. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, revised edition (American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion 11; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979); see especially pp. 8-10.

[8] Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1980); see especially p. 30 and chapter 10, "Faith as an Act of the Will," pp. 122-139.

[9] Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. by Ian W. Robertson (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960), p. 65.