METHOD

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A CALVINIST LEARNS FROM LONERGAN: REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY-FREEDOM DEBATE

Karen Petersen Finch

Gonzaga University

Seattle, Washington

It may be difficult for those who do theology in other Christian contexts to understand the intensity with which Reformed theology takes up the question of the relationship between God's sovereignty and human freedom. For a Reformed theologian, this question can feel like an invitation to revisit the polemical territory that gave birth to Reformed theology in the first place. Anyone whose theological instincts have been nurtured (as mine have been) in the cradle of *sola gratia* finds it hard not to skip immediately to the soteriological implications of the question, bristling at the possibility of "synergism" – a term that is usually pejorative in our context, and that describes any theological position that seems to present God and human beings as equal partners in salvation. Although some theologians in the Reformed tradition have taken a more moderate view, John Calvin laid down a powerful precedent in the sixteenth century when he rejected Philip Melanchthon's views on free choice in favor of the later Augustine's (and Martin Luther's) commitment to the bondage of the will.[1]

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[1]See Richard A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125. For a more moderate Reformed perspective on the sovereignty-freedom dilemma, see Karl Barth's comments in *Church Dogmatics* 4, no. 2, 483ff.

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Yet Calvin's response in no way settled the question for the Protestant community. Norman L. Geisler, who serves as the president of Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in a position to observe the longstanding debate between Arminian and Calvinist evangelicals regarding the nexus between divine election and human choice. Four years after the first publication of his popular book *Chosen But Free*, which attempts to present "a balanced view of divine election," Geisler's work continues to stir up angry responses from Reformed theologians who subscribe wholeheartedly to the anti-Arminian polemic of the Synod of Dort (1618-19) with its five affirmations: total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints.[2] Although Geisler writes with irenic intent and responds graciously to his critics, his work has raised the specter of the Reformation-era debate on God's sovereignty and human freedom in its most virulent form. The following comment aptly illustrates the flavor of the debate:

> When Martin Luther wrote his *Bondage of the Will* in response to Erasmus' *Diatribe on Free-will*, he pointedly addressed Erasmus in the Introduction, declaring that the book "... struck me as so worthless and poor that my heart went out to you for having defiled your lovely, brilliant flow of language with such vile stuff. I thought it outrageous to convey material of so low a quality in the trappings of such rare eloquence; it is like using gold or silver dishes to carry garden rubbish or dung." Sadly, as exhibited by Norman Geisler's *Chosen But Free*, Erasmus was not the last learned man to use his tremendous literary capacities for such ignoble purposes.[3]

Much of the Calvinist reaction to *Chosen But Free* revolves around the identification of Geisler's view as synergistic, and therefore, as a denial of the sovereignty of grace.[4] Yet these commentators fail to credit Geisler for

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[2] For a commonsense presentation of the various positions involved in this controversy, see Norman L. Geisler, *Chosen But Free* (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2001), chaps. 4-6 and app. 8.

[3] Bill Ascol, "Alpha and Omega Ministries: Christian Apologetics and Theology," 2004, by Calvary Press, Amityville, NY, http://www.aomin.org/TPF.html (June 1, 2006). Quotation is from a book review of James R. White's *The Potter's Freedom* (Amityville, NY: Calvary Press, 2000).

[4] Ascol, "Alpha and Omega Ministries."

his attention to biblical, patristic, and medieval sources that indicate a more complex relationship between sovereign grace and human freedom than is usually acknowledged by hard-line Calvinists. Geisler also takes seriously the tensions in Calvin's own work regarding the doctrine of limited atonement, tensions that are confirmed by the most rigorous studies of Calvin.[5] In other words, Geisler's intention is not to create a "Frankenstein-like creation" that is part-Arminian, part-Calvinist, but to honor the complexity of the issue by refusing to falsely resolve it in one direction or the other.[6] He is reaching toward a methodological position similar to the one described by Bernard Lonergan in section one of his doctoral dissertation:

> The dialectical position of the theologian is at once more radical and more coherent [than that of the physicist]. On the one hand, it maintains that different truths of faith – or doctrines of faith and certain conclusions of the human reason – cannot be contradictory. Truth is one, and God is truth. Hence, no matter how great the opposition may appear to be, it is always possible to maintain the negative coherence of noncontradiction. On the other hand, it maintains that at no point of time will the human understanding enjoy a full explanation of all the doctrines of faith. For ultimately theology deals with mystery, with God in his transcendence.[7]

Although Norman Geisler and Bernard Lonergan come from very different theological horizons, comparing and contrasting their work on the sovereignty-freedom question is revealing and instructive. Both writers build on a foundation laid by Thomas Aquinas. Both are aware of the theological dangers involved in emphasizing either divine sovereignty or human freedom at the expense of the other. Yet methodologically, their work is very different. The body of this article is an application of

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[5]The doctrine of the limited atonement indicates that Christ died only for the elect. The extent to which John Calvin taught this doctrine is debated. Richard Muller, for example, cites evidence that "Calvin did know and accept, with limitation, the medieval distinction between the 'sufficiency' of Christ's satisfaction for all sin and its 'efficiency' for the 'elect' or 'believers' alone." Muller, *The Unaccomodated Calvin*, 55.

[6]Ascol, "Alpha and Omega Ministries."

[7]Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 166.

Lonergan's fourth functional specialty, dialectic: laying out the differences between two theological perspectives in order that we might reduce those differences "to their roots."[8] I will argue that the root difference between the work of Geisler and Lonergan lies in their respective realms of meaning, for the former takes place in the world of common sense, the latter in the world of theory.

It is also important to acknowledge that the sovereignty-freedom debate divides some Protestants not only from one another but also from Roman Catholic and Orthodox believers. For Lonergan, one of the aims of dialectic is to indicate "how ... differences can be brought out into the open so that [persons] of good will can discover each other." [9] In that spirit we will end by moving from dialectic to foundations: from the analysis of two theologians' "abstractly apprehended cognitive activity" into "the concrete and sublating context of human feeling and moral deliberation, evaluation and decision."[10] On that level both Geisler and Lonergan display an attitude that is crucial for ecumenical encounter, and that could serve as a catalyst for deeper understanding and cooperation between Christians from historically separated communities.

GEISLER AND LONERGAN: TWO REALMS OF MEANING

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan highlights four distinct realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.[11] He emphasizes the fundamental contrast between the first two realms or "worlds" in a way reminiscent of chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight*. In the world of common sense, we perceive "persons and things as related to us"; in the world of theory "things are conceived and known, not in their relations to our sensory apparatus or to our needs and desires, but in the

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[8]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 270. By dialectic Lonergan intends "a generalized apologetic conducted in an ecumenical spirit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint and proceeding toward that goal by acknowledging differences, seeking their grounds real and apparent, and eliminating superfluous oppositions (130)."

[9]*Method in Theology*, 151.

[10]*Method in Theology*, 275.

[11]*Method in Theology*, 272.

relations constituted by their uniform interactions with one another."[12] A main characteristic of the realm of theory is that it produces and refines its own technical language. Yet the use of a technical language does not necessarily mean that the speaker is operating in the theoretical realm. It may happen that

> [w]ithin the culture and influencing its education there have been developed systematic views in logic, mathematics, science, philosophy. The systematic views have grounded a critique of earlier common sense, literature, religion. The educated classes accept such a critique. Their thinking is influenced by their cultural patrimony. But they themselves are not systematic thinkers. They may on occasion employ this or that technical term or logical technique. But their whole mode of thought is just the commonsense mode.[13]

We can characterize Geisler's investigation in *Chosen But Free* as a commonsense approach that employs the technical language of Aquinas without ever fully emerging into the realm of theory. Geisler's debt to Aquinas is considerable and is evident from the beginning of the book. He accepts the doctrine of divine simplicity as formulated by Thomas with its implication that "God's attributes are identical to His essence or nature."[14] God is "Pure Actuality" and first cause of all that happens in creation.[15] As first cause, God is independent from all other causes such that God's knowledge is always independent knowledge, never contingent upon the acts of creatures.[16] Furthermore, Geisler makes use of key elements of the Thomist doctrine of providence, such as the distinction between first and second causes and the related distinction between necessity and contingency.[17] With regard to sin, Geisler concurs with the early Aquinas that "sin in general is inevitable, but each sin in particular is avoidable – by the grace of God."[18] This last point is significant as it manifests Geisler

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[12]*Method in Theology*, 258.

[13]*Method in Theology*, 304.

[14]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 52.

[15]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 112.

[16]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 52.

[17]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 42.

[18]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 66. Note, however, that Geisler does not stress – as the later Aquinas does – the degree to which one sin sets the sinner on a trajectory from which it is

(who is a Calvinist) as preferring to take his stand with a medieval source rather than to accept an extreme view of sin as the complete destruction of human liberty. He recognizes that although such acceptance would appease his anti-Arminian critics, it would also falsely resolve the biblical tension between God's sovereignty and human freedom, treating salvation as compulsion – an irresistible act of God on the unwilling.[19]

Despite the fact that Geisler employs these and other technical terms from Aquinas, he does not elucidate their relations to one another – which is the main indication that he is operating in the commonsense mode. For example, Geisler's own summary of his solution to the sovereignty-freedom dilemma reads as follows:

> There is no contradiction in God knowingly predetermining and predeterminately knowing from all eternity precisely what we would do with our free acts. For God determined that moral creatures would do things freely. He did not determine that they would be forced to perform free acts. What is forced is not free, and what is free is not forced. In brief, we are chosen but free.[20]

Geisler's solution revolves around a commonsense understanding of the words *free* and *forced,* which in ordinary language are easily recognized as opposites; their relation is one of antithesis. Yet when both words are translated into corresponding technical words, their relationship is not nearly as straightforward. Does free mean "undetermined," and if so, how is it that God who leaves our action undetermined can still be described as sovereign? Similarly, if forced means "determined," then how can God's knowing predetermination leave the creature in a position to perform undetermined acts? Geisler's use of ordinary language gives the impression that his solution is both simple and effective, but hiding beneath the words forced and free is a relationship that remains unclarified.

In a footnote, Geisler makes some advance toward a technical definition of divine determination. "By 'determined' here," he explains that

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difficult to escape. For the development of Aquinas's teaching on moral impotence, see *Grace and Freedom,* 50ff.

[19]Geisler, *Chosen But Free,* 91-92.

[20]Geisler, *Chosen But Free,* 55.

we do not mean that the act is directly caused by God. It was caused by human free choice (which is a self-determined act). By "determined" it is meant that the inevitability of the event was fixed in advance since God knew infallibly that it would come to pass. Of course, God determined that it would be a self-determined action. God was only the remote and primary cause. Human freedom was the immediate and secondary cause.[21]

The word "only" is intended to limit God's determination even as Geisler asserts it, in order to make room for the exercise of human freedom. Yet it also reveals a perspective on instrument causality that is rooted in the commonsense realm – specifically in the analogy from motion. If we imagine player A hitting ball B and causing the motion of ball C, we might think that ball B is the "more direct" cause of the motion we observe in ball C, since B is the proximate cause of that motion. Yet, as Lonergan clarifies in *Grace and Freedom*, Aquinas did not view primary causation in this way.[22] Rather he considered it as a relationship of dependence of the effect on the cause. From this perspective the entire series of effects is actually dependent on intelligent agent A; moreover, the motion of ball C is actually more dependent on A for its occurrence than on ball B. To put it another way: B considered on its own is only an instrument and is not proportionate to producing effect C unless it has the power of the intelligent pool player working through it.[23] Therefore it is misleading to say that God is "only" a remote and primary cause, and it in no way removes the difficulty inherent in the claim that God could predetermine an undetermined action. What is needed is a way to define determination and freedom vis-à-vis one another such that we can imagine how they can coexist without each precluding the other, and that requires venturing more deeply into the realm of theory.

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[21]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 44 (italics mine).

[22]*Grace and Freedom*, 67.

[23]Bernard Lonergan, "On God and Secondary Causes," in vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 55. Lonergan uses the example of a typewriter, in which the intelligent typist is the principle cause (A), and the typewriter the mediate cause (B), of the printed page (C). See also J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 226.

At this point it is important to clarify that theology in commonsense perspective is not necessarily an intentional flight from theory. Geisler's motivation in *Chosen But Free* is the education of Protestant evangelicals who are confused by the endless polemic between Calvinists and Arminians, and who truly want to know whether salvation is wholly God's work or includes some element of grace-enabled human choice. For example, he dedicates the second edition of the book "To all my students who for the past forty-two years have asked more questions about this than any other topic." Yet the danger of theological work in the commonsense realm is its inability to frame a given question within an explanatory context.[24] Gaps in explanation between terms in the commonsense realm can be fertile ground in which misapprehensions of data, incoherence, and failures of judgment may thrive, thereby increasing the likelihood of an ongoing debate rather than forestalling it. As J. Michael Stebbins reminds us, others before Geisler have approached Thomas Aquinas from a commonsense perspective, with problematic results:

> If the blunders of Molinism and Bannezianism are any clue, then the greatest threat to the integrity of the Thomist speculative synthesis is the difficulty involved in measuring up to its specifically explanatory character. Both of the later systems are riddled with pseudo-theoretical concepts that amount to little more than glorified sense images...As a result of the unintentional substitution of sensible images for explanatory analysis, these systems cannot coherently explain, as Aquinas can, both the absolute efficacy of providence and the freedom of the human will; each side ends up appearing, in spite of itself, as if it is defending one doctrine at the expense of the other.[25]

In the end Geisler's desire to lay the ground for a widespread peace between Calvinists and Arminians is thwarted by the ordinary language in which he conducts his investigation, which cannot help but generate more polemic rather than less. Sadly, his response to archcritic James R.

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[24]For the difference between description and explanation, see Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 316-17.

[25]Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 295.

White at the end of *Chosen But Free* confirms that he is trapped in a discussion in which "argument and counter-argument can follow one another indefinitely" – the very state of affairs that his book intended to sidestep.[26]

It now remains to contrast Lonergan's own work on the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom with Geisler's in a way that demonstrates the former's theoretical character. We cannot here reconstruct the entire Thomist synthesis on providence as Lonergan interprets it. We can, however, take up an important problem which both Geisler and Lonergan address, and which provides a window into that synthesis: the problem of *deus causa peccati*. Geisler rejects the hyper-Calvinist viewpoint (with its extreme determinism) on the grounds that it implicates God as the author of sin.[27] Therefore he defends the philosophical position of self-determinism as more in keeping with the biblical witness. According to Geisler, "God caused the fact of free choice (by making free agents), but free agents are the cause of the acts of free choice."[28] In other words, when a free agent fails to will the good, she alone is responsible for her action.

However, Geisler recognizes that his formula cannot fully resolve the tension between sin's occurence and divine sovereignty, for sin and reprobation in any form seem to deny God's goodness or God's power – or both. Therefore he employs an implicit concept of divine permission to alleviate this tension. "Morally and spiritually," he writes, "responsible alternatives are set before human beings by God, leaving the choice and responsibility to them."[29] By this he means that God deplores sin and reprobation, but permits them. Yet because he is operating in the commonsense mode, Geisler does not specify how God's permission relates systematically to the divine essence in such a way that God's

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[26]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 252-63. The quotation is from Lonergan, "On God and Secondary Causes," as quoted in Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 295.

[27]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 24, 137-39.

[28]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 223. This is similar to Durandus's position. Note also that Geisler does not follow Aquinas in making a distinction between the act of willing a means, which is proportionate to the human will, and the act of willing an end, which is God's alone. Therefore, "God is the principle efficient cause of every actual instance of willing" (Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 245-48).

[29]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 34. See also pages 41, 54.

goodness is not impugned. His investigation lacks a metaphysical account of sin that could move the investigation "out of undifferentiated consciousness and into the theoretically differentiated consciousness of a Scholasticism."[30]

In *Grace and Freedom* Lonergan demonstrates how Aquinas employs the concept of divine permission as one element in an overall synthesis. Based on the biblical record, Thomas affirms "God's eternal knowledge to be infallible, His eternal will to be irresistible, and His action through intellect and will to be absolutely efficacious."[31] At the same time he concurs with Augustine that "God has revealed to us through his holy scriptures that there is free choice of will in [humanity]."[32] Rather than seeking a resolution of this apparent dilemma in the world of sensible images, Aquinas proposes a theoretical solution which Lonergan calls "the theorem of divine transcendence."[33] This construct is a metaphysical explanation of how God's absolute efficacy can be mediated through instruments (such as human wills) that are not perfectly efficacious. As Lonergan explains, ordinary efficacy "is grounded in a necessary causal nexus between cause and effect."[34] Yet in transcendent efficacy there is no necessary nexus between cause and effect, since God is the only ground of God's own acts. God is therefore free "to cause some effects to emerge necessarily and others contingently, according to the divine plan."[35]

In this way, the theorem of divine transcendence allows for contingent acts in such a way that human freedom emerges as a metaphysical possibility.[36] It is here that the concept of divine permission comes into play. Just as Aquinas has accounted theoretically for

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[30]*Method in Theology*, 277.

[31]*Grace and Freedom*, 103.

[32]Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, quoted in *Grace and Freedom*, 196. For biblical passages that underlie Augustine's conclusion, see for example John 15:22; Romans 1:18-20, 12:1; James 1:13-15; Proverbs 1:30, 19:3; and Ecclesiastes 15:11-17.

[33]The complete presentation of the theorem of divine transcendence is found in *De ente supernaturali*. I am relying on Michael Stebbins's helpful discussion in *The Divine Initiative*, 256ff.

[34]*De ente supernaturali*, quoted in Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 257.

[35]Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 258.

[36]For Lonergan's distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, see *Grace and Freedom*, 104-11, and Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, 258.

contingent human acts, so too he must account for the particular contingence of human sin in a way that affirms divine beneficence. Commonsense approaches to the doctrine of providence (like Geisler's) tend to go astray at this point by imagining sin to be a kind of "stuff," the existence of which threatens the "stuff" that is God's goodness. Instead Aquinas understands sin metaphysically as a privation of being. Sin is a failure on the part of human beings to will the good to which God's law testifies.

> Besides the positive objective truth of being and the negative objective truth of not-being, there is also the objective falsity of moral lapse ... For, obviously, the possibility of our understanding anything is ultimately due to the object's commensurability to the divine intellect; and in absolute objective falsity it is precisely this commensurability that is lacking. We can know sin as a fact ... but the metaphysical surd of sin cannot be related explanatorily or causally with the integers that are objective truth; for sin is really irrational, a departure at once from the ordinance of the divine mind and from the dictate of right reason.[37]

Sin as a metaphysical surd is not causally related to the divine being; yet sin "as a fact" occurs. One could still argue, therefore, that God is responsible for sin by not having acted to prevent it. According to Lonergan, this objection rests on an insufficiently theoretical framework that he calls the "two-lane highway": "along one lane is what God effects, and that must be; along the other lane there is what God does not effect, and that cannot be."[38] The identification of sin as privation actually posits a third level of finite reality, such that there is "what God wills to happen [bonum], what he wills not to happen [non bonum], and what he permits to happen [peccatum]."[39] Toward peccatum God exercises what Aquinas calls permissio prohibentis, "the permission of one who forbids."[40] Again, Lonergan affirms that divine permission does not produce sin, even

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[37]Grace and Freedom, 114-15.

[38]Grace and Freedom, 111. This is Banez's solution.

[39]Grace and Freedom, 112.

[40]Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 279.

indirectly; for "both cause and non-cause are instances of intelligible correlation, and the irrational cannot be so correlated."[41]

Lonergan's interpretation of the Thomist solution to *deus causa peccati* demonstrates the power of metaphysical definition to move theological discourse from the commonsense to the theoretical realm. By itself it does not answer the larger question that concerns Geisler and his critics: the question of how divine sovereignty relates to human freedom. To do so one would have to consider alongside it other dimensions of Aquinas' explanatory universe, above all his theory of the human will.[42] Yet our purpose here is dialectical: to identify the differences in horizon between two theologians who are working on the same controversial question, in order to imagine how those "differences can be brought out into the open so that [persons] of good will can discover each other." As we shall see, demonstrating the root difference between Geisler's investigation and Lonergan's enables us to identify an attitude that exists in both their horizons and that has implications for Christian ecumenical praxis.

FROM DIALECTIC TO DIALOGUE

With reference to the sovereignty-freedom debate among Protestants in its latest form, it is striking to this writer that there is significantly more scope for agreement between Geisler and Lonergan than between (for example) Geisler and his former Protestant comrade-in-arms, James R. White.[43] The latter two conduct their professional lives in overlapping theological circles, yet their horizons appear in at least some respects to be dialectically opposed. Lonergan observes that in the dialectical opposition of horizons,

> [w]hat in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation

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[41]*Grace and Freedom*, 116.

[42]See especially *Grace and Freedom*, 94-118; 316-83.

[43]In his response to James White, Geisler describes him as "a good brother in Christ with whom I have worked side by side in defending the gospel" (Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 252).

and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious.[44]

One has only to overhear White describing Geisler's work as "almost frightening" and "completely backward," while affirming his own solution as true "without question," to recognize how well the above description fits their encounter. [45] Yet the same description might also apply to the relationships between Roman Catholics and Protestants in diverse times and places since the sixteenth century.

Despite the fact that Geisler and Lonergan are members of historically separated Christian communities, I would argue that their horizons are not dialectically opposed, but complementary. "They live in a sense in different worlds. Each is quite familiar with his own world. But each also knows about the others, and each recognizes the need for the others."[46] If my judgment is correct, it accords with the experience of theologian and ecumenist G. R. Evans, who finds that church affiliation is not the sole – or even the most powerful – determinant of horizon. Reflecting on the second Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), Evans recalls how prior to ARCIC there had been a sense

> that "two sides" were trying to collaborate. ARCIC had by now [gotten] beyond that to a full working together. The setting out of "what Roman Catholics think" and "what Anglicans think" had been attempted by ARCIC at an early stage ... But it quickly became plain that the "sides" did not line up tidily. On any given point, Anglicans and Roman Catholics professed a mixed grouping of opinions. Doing [theology] together became natural as the 'sides' melted away.[47]

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[44]*Method in Theology,* 237.

[45]Geisler, *Chosen But Free,* 255, 262.

[46]*Method in Theology,* 236.

[47]G. R. Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology: The Lessons So Far* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 174.

As for the gap in horizon between Geisler and Lonergan, dialectic has revealed significant methodological differences between the two theologians with regard to the differentiation of consciousness. It has not, however, discovered any noticeable divergence on the essentials of the Christian message, or on the judgment of what sources from the past are authoritative for interpreting that message.[48] In fact, it is remarkable that despite their differences in horizon, both Geisler and Lonergan have concluded in this case that "truth is one, and God is truth. Hence, no matter how great the opposition may appear to be, it is always possible to maintain the negative coherence of noncontradiction."[49] Given the conflictual history of the topic in hand, this attitude amounts to a decision not to side with polemical approaches, however many advocates they may have, but instead "to await with serenity for the coherence of truth itself to bring to light the underlying harmony of the manifold whose parts successively engage one's attention."[50]

Evans identifies the attitude of "truth is one" as a crucial ingredient for success in ecumenical dialogue. She refers to it as a "twofold confidence that God has already provided a solution which we do not yet see, and that the opposition of positions is apparent not real."[51] In fact, for Evans a stance of this kind is "methodologically of the first importance."[52]

> Ecumenical method seeks to be non-adversarial and that again is something largely new; and is perhaps more than any other single factor constitutive of good ecumenical method. Moreover, it allows no place for hostility of polemic which distorts thinking as well as destroying mutual respect.

While it is conducive to mutual respect, other ecumenists agree that a methodological commitment to the unity of God's truth is not reducible to

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[48]"If affirming that God will not violate the free choice of any human being in order to save that person is an 'Arminian' view, then every major church father from the beginning, including Justin, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Clement, Tertullian, Origen, Methodius, Cyril, Gregory, Jerome, Chrysostom, the early Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas... were [sic] Arminians" (Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 54).

[49]*Grace and Freedom*, 166.

[50]*Grace and Freedom*, 144.

[51]Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology*, 27.

[52]Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology*, 27.

a feeling of respect or to simple "good will."[53] It is an intellectual conviction that I believe could only stem from a conscious or unconscious application of the transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.[54] There is no explicit mention of generalized empirical method in *Chosen But Free*; implicitly, however, it is everywhere at work. Geisler insists that a synthesis of divine sovereignty with free will makes better sense of the relevant data from biblical and historical sources, including (in his interpretation) the works of John Calvin.[55] He critiques certain doctrines of extreme Calvinism on the grounds that they are unintelligible, and that they flout reasonable judgment.[56] Finally, Geisler considers extreme Calvinism to be most problematic on the level of decision and action.

> Extreme Calvinism leads logically (if not practically) to personal irresponsibility: if our actions are good actions, they are such only because God has programmed us to do good; if evil, then we cannot help it, because we are sinners by nature and God has not given us the desire to do good ... If I am really not the cause of my actions, then why should I take responsibility for them?[57]

I am not concluding that Geisler's arguments are perfect, or that they perfectly indicate the presence of intellectual conversion. I am, however, suggesting that Geisler finds the pursuit of "the negative coherence of non-contradiction" more satisfying to "the eros of the human spirit" than the polemical alternatives that vie for his adherence.[58] It may also be that for Geisler, the pursuit of noncontradiction results from a judgment of value which, as Lonergan defines it, "is itself a reality in the moral order. By it the subject moves beyond pure and simple knowing. By it the subject

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[53]For example, John Pinnington recalls one discussion between Protestants and Roman Catholics in which "no amount of goodwill ... was going to make it possible to conceive of 'a little bit of infallibility'." "Symposium: Ecumenism and the Modern World," quoted in Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology*, 24, n. 23.

[54]*Method in Theology*, 53.

[55]On the biblical data: compare with Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 32. On patristic and medieval writers: 54. On John Calvin: 49.

[56]See Geisler's argument against Charles Spurgeon's defense of the doctrine of limited atonement (*Chosen But Free*, 212).

[57]Geisler, *Chosen But Free*, 137.

[58]*Method in Theology*, 13.

is constituting himself as proximately capable of moral self-transcendence, of benevolence and beneficence, of true loving."[59] Evans testifies that in ecumenical contexts, a commitment to the unity of God's truth across denominational boundaries quickly becomes a commitment to loving *persons* across those boundaries.

> In this changed atmosphere, there can be a powerful drive to unity even before disagreements are resolved and formal schemes for unity can be framed and implemented. Many have found that "the experience of 'being brethren' has been of such intensity that it has been and remains extremely difficult to direct and control."[60]

We may conclude that ecumenical theology is not a series of encounters or the documents produced by those encounters. More deeply, ecumenical theology is an ongoing process of Christians in historically separated communities "learning to do theology together."[61] It is this writer's hope that Evans and other ecumenists will discover Lonergan's transcendental method and the potential it has not merely to suggest new steps and structures for the ecumenical process, but also to objectify the shifts in attitude and horizon that make separated Christians willing and able to do theology with and for one another. After all,

> the basic idea of the method we are tying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. It is not an infallible method, for men [and women] easily are unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for [our] deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.[62]

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[59]*Method in Theology,* 37.

[60]Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology,* 225. Quotation is from Alan Clark, "The growing point of unity" (*One in Christ* 15 (1979): 2-10, 5).

[61]Evans, *Method in Ecumenical Theology,* 228.

[62]*Method in Theology,* 254.

LONERGAN AND THE CLASSICAL AMERICAN TRADITION

Michael Forest

Canisius College

Buffalo, New York

L ONERGAN'S WORK IN *Insight* bears striking resemblances to the thought of the classical American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce,[1] as well as to thinkers he influenced such as Josiah Royce and John Dewey. Further, Lonergan's ideas have been assimilated into the Classical American mix by several scholars, including American Jesuit philosophers familiar with Lonergan, Peirce, Royce, and Dewey. This paper will explore some of that literature, demonstrating how Peirce and Lonergan express a similar basic position, and how they have been utilized separately and together as antidotes to the counterpositions of this tradition.

In broad outline, both philosophers were theists concerned with grounding metaphysics in cognitive theories exhibited in the practices of the sciences and of common sense. Each was deeply conversant with the entire history of philosophy, but both thinkers were most profoundly affected by a prolonged and intensive study of the scholastic tradition. Reoriented by that tradition, they both sought to integrate scholastic realisms with the evolutionary sciences and historically oriented scholarship of their times. In short, both were exploring the consequences of the notion of development while holding firmly and optimistically to critical realisms rooted in the isomorphism of their cognitive models.

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[1]As Vincent Potter remarks, "In many respects the views of Bernard Lonergan and Charles Peirce concerning world process are strikingly similar." "Objective Chance: Lonergan and Peirce on Scientific Generalization," in *Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 124.

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I. A PATTERN OF STRIKING CORRELATIONS

Both Peirce and Lonergan treat cognitional theory as the foundation for all other departments of knowledge, although neither considers the foundation to be the starting point of inquiry.[2] Although their cognitional theories are not strictly identical, both theories are presented in opposition to very similar counterpositions. For Lonergan, the threefold analysis of experience, intelligence, and reasonable affirmation contrasts to skepticism and to the naïve realism of the empiricist view that knowledge is a kind of looking. In effect, knowledge as looking skips the second level of cognition of intelligent inquiry rooted in the act of insight and proceeds immediately from some variant of sense experience to an equally immediate judgment. For Peirce, the triadic or three-termed sign-relation follows from the rejection of Cartesian or modern epistemologies that ground all knowledge in a direct, intuitive act of immediate relation between the mind and the object. In a single act, one simply perceives the object and knows it. Whether this is the Cartesian self, or the phenomenal appearances of primary and secondary qualities in sense experience, there is no thinking involved by drawing in the elements of information. Lonergan labels this view of a counterposition of knowledge as the "already out there now real," and frequently as "extroversion." Peirce calls it dyadic. Each rejects this position in favor of a process of inquiry that requires, alternately, questions for intelligence and reflection and ongoing interpretation.

Further, each finds that metaphysics rests not only on the coextension of cognition and being, but also on the isomorphism of cognition and being. For Lonergan this involved the correspondence between the elements of cognitional structure: experience, intelligence, and judgment; for Peirce this involved recognition that the elements of the

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[2]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), "Bluntly, the starting point of metaphysics is people as they are," (422); similarly Peirce writes that "We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy." In *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 1-6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; vols. 7-8, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1934-1958), 5.265 [numbers refer to the volume and paragraph number in the *Collected Papers*].

sign-relation: object-sign-interpretant constituted a general type, called semiosis, with a specific token in human inferences, called semiotic.

Because Peirce rejects such immediacy in knowledge, ongoing inquiry becomes a necessary condition for progressive development in any branch of knowledge. Ongoing interpretation thus delays pronouncements on the content of inquiry until the indefinite future when the community of inquirers has no more questions to ask.[3] This notion prescribes normative rules for inquiry: Peirce's first rule of reason is "that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think." Peirce's second rule of reason was "do not block the way of inquiry."[4] This correlates with Lonergan's position in *Insight* that inquiry comes to an end when reflective consciousness is satisfied that no further questions or answers would effect the virtually unconditioned. Thus we make reasonable affirmations. As Lonergan notes about concrete situations, "As the mere absence of further questions in my mind is not enough, so it is too much to demand that the very possibility of further questions has to be excluded. If in fact there are no further questions, then in fact the insight is invulnerable, then in fact the judgment approving it will be correct."[5]

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[3]Peirce states in 1878, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real" (*Collected Papers*, 5.407). How would we know when inquiry has come to an end? Our failure to formulate relevant questions and the absence of doubt are the key indicators: "when doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and if it did go on, it would be without purpose, except that of self-criticism" (*Collected Papers*, 5.376). Peirce's overwhelming concern is with empirical hypotheses and scientific inquiry. This colors his discussions such that he emphasizes the in principle revisability of every statement and hypothesis. Lonergan notes the same about empirical hypotheses of both classical and statistical laws. See *Insight*, 326-29. Lonergan's emphasis on judgments of fact especially regarding the self-affirmation of the knower leads to an unrevisability absent in Peirce.

[4]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.135 (from 1905).

[5]*Insight*, 310. Later on that same page Lonergan notes how "one has to give further questions a chance to arise" by which he means "that something equivalent is to be sought by intellectual alertness, by taking one's time, by talking things out, by putting viewpoints to the test of action." This requirement to "talk things out" is part of what later in *Insight* Lonergan terms the *remote* criterion of truth. As the *proximate* criterion of truth is simply reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned, the "remote criterion of truth is the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know" (573). This is required because the content of our reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned

II. ROYCEAN DEVELOPMENTS

Peirce influenced the American tradition profoundly, but the consequences of his influence did not always meet his own approval.[6] Peirce's project is in some aspects developed by those traditionally dubbed the pragmatists, but a special place may be reserved for the development of Peirce's ideas in the social and religious thought of Josiah Royce (1855-1916). Royce was maybe the only competent interpreter of Peirce's thought during his lifetime. Scholarly dialogues between Peirce and Royce go back at least as far as Peirce's review of Royce's *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* and were furthered in Peirce's ambivalent review of Royce's published Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*. Royce's

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judgment rests on the contents of many other such judgments. So for full clarification all such contents must be clarified adequately. Further, in judgments of probability we have certitude in degrees. "A subject may grasp the virtually unconditioned and yet may ask whether that fulfillment of the proximate criterion of truth has been vitiated by subjective bias. Then there arises the question of the remote criterion.[...] Hence, certitude may be strengthened by the agreement of others, and this strengthening will vary with the numbers of those that agree, the diversity of their circumstances, the consequent virtual elimination of individual and group bias, and the absence of any ground for suspecting general bias" (574). If we operate on a large enough scale, as the practice of science and even common sense does, this requires an entire community to establish what for any given individual at any given time can only be accepted as the community's belief: "for the evidence that really counts for any theory or hypothesis is the common testimony of all scientists that the implications of the theory or hypothesis have been verified in their separate and diverse investigations. In plainer language, the evidence that really counts is the evidence for a belief. Because collaboration is a fact, because it is inevitable, because it spreads into a highly differentiated network of interdependent specialties, the mentality of any individual becomes a composite product in which it is impossible to separate immanently generated knowledge and belief" (727). I take it that this is what Lonergan earlier compressed into "talking things out," and this converges perfectly with Peirce's notion that the community of inquiry is required for the adequate clarification of particular judgments. See *Collected Papers*, 5.407; 5.311; and 2.654 connects this with the doctrine of chances and probability which lays down the normative requirement that "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle." More needs to be said about this connection, but I fear that I may have taxed the reader sufficiently.

[6]Peirce had formulated the pragmatic maxim as a method for specifying the meaning of certain abstract words. He objected to its use by William James, F. C. S. Schiller, and others as a criterion for truth. In 1905 he disavowed use of the term and "begs to announce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism' which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" (*Collected Papers*, 5.414).

The Problem of Christianity represents the flowering of Peirce's thought in terms of a religious and social metaphysics that Peirce likely could never have produced.

Peirce's relationship with Royce began contentiously. In his 1885 work *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Royce took aim at Peirce's view that truth is "the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate."[7] For Royce, behind appearances, what gives reality to something is that it is thought by God. Royce comes to this by the argument that in order for error, and hence truth, to be a real possibility, one must admit that there is an omniscient mind which guarantees the ultimate correspondence of our opinions to reality: "Either there is no such thing as error, which statement is a flat self-contradiction, or else there is an infinite unity of conscious thought to which is present all possible truth."[8] Royce goes on to unfavorably characterize Peirce's view:

> If our argument were a Platonic dialogue, there would be hereabouts an interruption from some impatient Thrasymachus or Callicles or Polus, who would have been watching us, threatening and muttering, during all the latter parts of our discussion. ... he would spring upon us and say: " ... an error is an error, neither to the thought that thinks it, nor of necessity to any higher inclusive thought, but only to a *possible* critical thought that should undertake afterwards to compare it with its object. An error is a thought such that *if* a critical thought *did* come and compare it with its object, it *would be* seen to be false. And it has an object for such a critical thought. This critical thought need not be real and actually include it, but may be only a *possible* judge of its truth. Hence your infinite all-knower is no reality, only a logical possibility; and your insight amounts to this, that if all *were* known to an all-knower, he *would judge* the error to be mistaken.[9]

This seems a fairly accurate if incomplete portrayal of Peirce's account of truth as the opinion destined to be held by the community in the long run. Royce, in 1885, rejects this and reasserts the necessity of the Absolute: "No

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[7]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.407 (from 1878).

[8]Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (Boston: Riverside Press, 1885), 424. The crucial essay is chap.r 11, "The Possibility of Error," 384–435.

[9]Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 426.

barely possible judge, who would see the error if it were there, will do for us. He must be there, this judge, to constitute the error."[10] Peirce counters "that the thing which God imagines, and the opinion to which investigation would ultimately lead him [that is, Royce, or any inquirer], in point of fact, coincide."[11] Thus the difference between an omniscient knower and the final community of inquiry is a distinction that serves no legitimate function.

But Peirce maintained a great admiration for Royce, calling him "the greatest of living metaphysicians."[12] In Peirce's review of Royce's Gifford Lectures published in 1900 as *The World and the Individual,* he was full of praise for Royce's work: "Royce's conception in *The World and the Individual . . .* comes nearer to the genuine upshot of pragmaticism than any exposition that a pragmatist has given, – that any *other* pragmatist has given."[13] But Peirce ultimately thought Royce needed more training in logic:

> The volume has cut off a big piece of the road that it remains for philosophy to travel before she will join company with the rest of the peaceable sciences. That junction must be made or philosophy is a humbug. Your best years of philosophic reflection are still before you. The time is ripe and you are the very man to accomplish the great achievement of covering that distance. Yet you could not do it with your present view of logic, antagonistic to all that is possible for progressive science. My entreaty is that you will study logic.[14]

Peirce's entreaty was successful, and Royce embarked on fourteen years of in-depth study of formal logic. By 1902 Royce had begun to reread some of Peirce's early papers, especially the "cognition series" articles of 1868,

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[10]Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,* 427.

[11]Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 8.41. Peirce wrote a review of Royce's work, probably in 1885, but it was not accepted by *Popular Science Monthly.* It is published in *Collected Papers,* 8.39-54.

[12]Peirce, MS 284:92.

[13]Peirce, MS 284:5.

[14]Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 8.117, n. 10. From a letter dated May 27, 1902 with the salutation "My Dear Professor Royce." Peirce's reviews for *The Nation* were frequently cropped by the editor, William Lloyd Garrison, and Peirce sent the full review to Royce in order to have his full view expressed.

which rejected intuitive knowledge in favor of a system of semiotic interpretation.[15]

By 1912 Royce had his "Peircean insight," which was to significantly transform his philosophy.[16] Royce was already very close to Peirce's position in that he had long held a pragmatic and voluntaristic view of cognition, consciousness, and personal identity. This lead Royce to reevaluate his own position within the context of a community of interpretation. Royce developed this notion into the Beloved Community, the religious goal where the lost individual finds salvation and wholeness. In 1913 Royce published *The Problem of Christianity* in two volumes. This work is the ethical and religious extension of Peirce's theories of truth, reality, semiotic interpretation, and community. In the preface Royce reveals that

> the present work contains no mere repetition of my former expressions of opinion. There is much in it that I did not expect to say when I began the task here accomplished. As to certain metaphysical opinions which are stated, in outline, in the second volume of this book, I now owe much more to our great and unduly neglected American logician, Mr. Charles Peirce, than I do to the common tradition of recent idealism, and certainly much more than I ever have owed, at any point in my philosophical development, to the doctrines which, with technical accuracy, can be justly attributed to Hegel.[17]

In this work, Royce's Absolute gives way to the community of interpretation which assumes a larger role as the guarantor of truth and falsity.[18]

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[15]In 1867-68 Peirce published a series of articles in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* sometimes called the "cognition series" or the "anti-Cartesian essays" in which he tried to develop a triadic cognitional theory adequate to ground science and knowledge.

[16]The term "Peircean insight" comes from Frank M. Oppenheim, "Josiah Royce's Intellectual Development: An Hypothesis," *Idealistic Studies* 6 (January 17, 1976): 85-102.

[17]Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1913), xi.

[18]The relative infrequency of the Absolute in Royce's later works is the subject of some discussion among Royce scholars. See, for example, Peter Fuss, *The Moral Development of Josiah Royce* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); and Robert R. Williams, "The Absolute, Community, and Time," *Idealistic Studies* 19 (1989): 141-53.

In Royce's later works, Peirce's ideas fell on fertile ground and were developed with a religious and rhetorical fervor that Peirce was willing but incapable of infusing into them. The connection between Peirce and Royce was possible because both were idealists, pragmatists, religious, and committed to metaphysics as a science. They form a pair, in some ways, over against the nominalistic strand of pragmatism represented by James and Dewey.

III. PRAGMATISM DIVIDES ITSELF

The work of James and Dewey led the American tradition down a different path toward more nominalistic, instrumentalist, and historicist directions. James's use of the pragmatic maxim made Peirce recognizable to a wider audience, but eventually coopted the term "pragmatism" such that it came to mean something quite different from Peirce's formulation: ". . . one of the faults that I think they [the new pragmatists] might find with me is that I make pragmatism to be a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle of speculative philosophy."[19] Peirce proposed that the goal of inquiry was the establishment of a belief, which was a habit of thinking that would progressively embody the idea of reasonableness, whereas the pragmatists tended to see the end of inquiry as action. But action is individual (what Peirce calls a "second") while habit is general (what Peirce calls a "third"). James's emphasis is frequently on the individual, but Peirce pursues a goal much wider than both the individual and action:

> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense. Individual action is a means and not our end. Individual pleasure is not our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at – that which the generations are working out. But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what it will consist in.[20]

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[19]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.18. (1903)

[20]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.402, n. 2. The passage is on the so-called pragmatic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." That passage was published in 1878. Peirce had a lifelong habit

Besides Peirce's goal of preventing the collapse of the purpose of reason into action, was his goal of preventing the collapse of truth into the notion of the successful. James develops the pragmatic view in an individualistic manner, originally applied to the problem of fixing metaphysical and religious belief upon insufficient evidence, such that what is true for you may not be true for me. As James explains it, "'The True' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, . . . Expedient in almost any fashion."[21] Such a view endorses cognitive relativism, denying an objective truth independent of our interests. Peirce decisively separated himself from the pragmatists by the symbolic act of disassociating himself from the very theory he was said to have founded:

> So then, the writer, finding his bantling "pragmatism" so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word "pragmaticism" which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.[22]

However, the obscurity into which Peirce's ideas were to fall lost the day to the popular, lively, and energetic pragmatists.

John Dewey learned much from Peirce, although key differences separate them. His notions of experience and thought,[23] method in science and common sense, as well as the general orientation of this thought toward the community, owe much to prior work by Peirce and Royce. But

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of going back into his old manuscripts and adding notes and commentary. Note 2 was added in 1893 and was meant in part to distinguish his position from the later pragmatists.

[21]William James, *Pragmatism* [1907] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), 100. Some more of James's characterizations are "You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing," 93; "'truth' in our ideas and beliefs . . . nothing but this, *that ideas (which are themselves but parts of our experiences) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience*" (30).

[22]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.414 (1905).

[23]For instance, see Dewey's self-assessment in "The Development of American Pragmatism" (originally written in French in 1922), in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 41-44; for Dewey's defense of Peirce's view of experience against criticisms by Thomas A. Goudge, see "Peirce's Theory of Quality" *Journal of Philosophy* 32 (1935): 701-708.

Dewey rejected the separation between theoretical and practical, finding the distinction riddled with class hierarchies from the ancient world.[24] Similarly, Dewey replaces teleology with sequences or histories:

> . . . all directional order resides in the sequential order. This no more occurs for the sake of the end than a mountain exists for the sake of the peak which is its end. A musical phrase has a certain close, but the earlier portion does not exist for the sake of the close as if it were something which is done away with when the close is reached. And so a man is not an adult until after he has been a boy, but childhood does not exist for the sake of maturity.[25]

This sense of stopping with the sequential order bothered Peirce, and in his criticism of Dewey's writings on logic he emphasizes the danger of Dewey's procedure, like that of many German logicians of the day, "as entirely irrelevant, because they make *truth*, which is a matter of fact, to be a matter of a way of thinking or even of linguistic expression."[26] Such a natural history, not rooted in judgments of fact, fails to establish logic as a normative science capable of pronouncing some sequential orders of thought valid and sound and others not.[27] Further, as Antonia Galdos points out, Dewey's rejection of the theory-practice distinction undercuts or blocks off inquiry into pure possibilities. For Peirce, such a view is both a block on the road to inquiry as well as damaging to the study of pure theoretical norms necessary for governing all inquiry. As she points out, Peirce's position dovetails into Lonergan's view that "the pure desire to know makes possible a suitably complex account of the subject which includes biological sensitivity, instrumental practicality, and pure theoretical inquiry. Without a positive affirmation of an internal desire to know, Dewey's position is theoretically unavoidable."[28]

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[24]See, for instance, *Experience and Nature* [1929] (New York: Dover Publications, 1958); chap. 4: "Nature, Ends and Histories," esp. pp. 91-94.

[25]Pierce, *Experience and Nature*, 99.

[26]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 8.190.

[27]About 1905 Peirce sent some rather sharp and dismissive letters to Dewey on his logical writings that emphasize similar points. See Pierce, *Collected Papers*, 8.239-44.

[28]Antonia Galdos, "When Pragmatism and Instrumentalism Collide: Lonergan's Resolution of the Peirce/Dewey Debate on Theory and Practice in Science," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000): 121-22.

We can then characterize the views of both James and Dewey as firmly rooted in the reduction of theoretical or pure reason to practical or instrumental thought. What is to be preserved and valued is that which helps us negotiate experience, and this will not be constant across historical periods, cultures, or necessarily individuals. The idea that reason is ordered to the discovery of truth or operates from the pure desire to know is part of a "world well lost."

The relation between Peirce and Dewey, as characterized here, corresponds to Lonergan's portrayal of the basic position and the counterposition. The counterposition, pursued to its end, invites its reversal back to the basic position.

IV. PRAGMATISM AS A COUNTERPOSITION

Historically, pragmatism held its ground longer than idealism, which appeared to be one of the casualties of the Great War. John Dewey gained a social and cultural prominence in the 1930s rarely rivaled before or after by an American academic philosopher.[29] But various forms of realism arose with aspirations toward being more scientific, insofar as they conceived science. The rise of logical positivism's antimetaphysical program swept away idealism and by its ideal of precision dismissed pragmatism as vague. However, the stunning failure of logical positivism and its implosion from within lead to an unexpected rebirth of pragmatism. Quine's radical nonfoundational holism led to the conclusion that "physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries – not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer."[30] Despite this radical epistemology, Quine makes an ontological commitment to physicalism. Physicalism is justified by the rational, pragmatic, scientific heritage that adequately explains our useful concepts in managing sensory input.

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[29]See, *inter alia*, Bruce Kuklick, A *History of Philosophy in America: 1700-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 196-97.

[30]Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 44.

To many interpreters, however, Quine's ontological commitment to physicalism amounted to little more than a prejudice.[31] Why privilege the physicist's description of objects over and above the multitude of useful descriptions? Many contemporary philosophers have rejected this approach as a mere update of scientism. But besides the scientism, Quine's epistemological holism also contributed to the skeptical unmooring of philosophical discussion from its traditional inquiry into reality. And one of the major figures in that skeptical, antirealist movement is Richard Rorty. Rorty is also frequently portrayed, and often portrays himself, as the inheritor of the American pragmatic tradition. Thus it is instructive to look at Rorty's view since he was both taken seriously by many, and taken by many to be the latest spokesman for the pragmatic perspective.

While there is some disagreement about whether Rorty is an anti-realist, critics claim that "there is an aura of anti-realism about Rorty's discussion" and he is "usually regarded as an anti-realist."[32] Rorty exerted a powerful hold over contemporary thought precisely because his work led to the growth and development of anti-realism.[33] From a Lonerganian view, this is a clear counterposition of the basic position developed by Peirce and Royce. Rorty's 1979 *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is a brilliantly written synthesis that delineated and rejected the aims and methods of philosophy since Descartes, but specifically singled out the contemporary analytic tradition as a target.[34] Rorty's pragmatism, rooted mainly in Dewey and James, founds the analysis as a "natural history" of modern ideas that were regarded not as problems to be solved but rather dissolved or forgotten.[35] Just as Darwin's natural histories of organisms

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[31]For a few interpretations from a neopragmatic perspective, see Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 187-89; Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 192 ff. esp. 201-204; David Depew, "Introduction," in *Pragmatism: From Progressivism to Postmodernism*, ed. Robert Hollinger and David Depew (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 115.

[32]Michael Devitt, *Realism and Truth*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 204.

[33]For instance, see the overview by Michael H. McCarthy, *The Crisis of Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

[34]It goes without saying that, in the viewpoint under consideration, premodern philosophy has nothing substantial to offer us.

[35]For instance, see John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 2nd ed. [1925] (New York: Dover, 1958), "It is pertinent, however, to recall the source of the problems; and to register the

corroded belief in biological essences, so Rorty hopes his cultural history of modern epistemology will dissolve our obsession with the essence of nature and mind.

The primary attack in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* bangs away at the "picture" of the philosopher as one who correctly "mirrors" nature by first attaining clarity about the essential nature of mind: in this picture, once we understand what the nature of mind is, we differentiate between correct and incorrect cognitive operations; and using this as a foundation, we can correctly represent nature, as a mirror clearly represents the object it reflects. In this version, philosophy asserts a foundational primacy over all other disciplines. Artists and scientists must wait for the philosopher to pronounce an epistemological blessing on their findings before these inquiries can be called legitimate. This role of the rationalistic knight is thrust upon the philosopher because the dragon of skepticism always haunts our wanderings, preventing us from crossing over into the land of the eternally True, Good, and Beautiful. Consonant with much in pragmatism, Rorty portrays Plato and Descartes as the evil sorcerers in this tale. Like the magician's apprentice who unleashes what he cannot control, Descartes instilled in the modern era an obsessive fetish for absolute certitude. This Cartesian project updates the Platonic desire to get behind appearances to the real object. This preoccupation with overcoming skepticism and mere appearance narrowly focused the aims and concerns of philosophy. Instead of elucidating ordinary experience, amplifying connections between different arts and sciences, philosophers sought an abstract knowledge shielded from all possible uncertainty. Descartes sought truth in the clear and distinct conception of an object by an individual mind. By excluding any unnecessary intrusion into clear mental states, the Cartesian sought a foundation for all future knowledge in direct contact with the bare object. Rorty depicts the project as one in which

> We will want to get behind reasons to causes, beyond argument to compulsion from the object known, to a situation in which argument would be not just silly but impossible, for anyone

statement that without the underlying dubious assumption, we are not called upon to find solutions; they cease to be perplexities as certain premises are surrendered" (135).

gripped by the object in the required way will be unable to doubt or to see an alternative. To reach that point is to reach the foundations of knowledge. For Plato, that point was reached by escaping from the senses and opening up the faculty of reason – the eye of the soul – to the World of Being. For Descartes, it was a matter of turning the Eye of the Mind from the confused inner representations to the clear and distinct ones. With Locke, it was a matter of reversing Descartes's directions and seeing "singular presentations to sense" as what should "grip" us – what we cannot and should not wish to escape from.[36]

Rorty thinks that the impetus behind this extreme foundationalism emanates from a bewitchment by "perceptual metaphors,"[37] especially those metaphors rooted in vision.

In order to cure us of our bewitchment by the modern picture of philosophy, Rorty recounts the failed history of modern epistemology from Descartes to Kant, and from Kant to the post-Quinean present. With this story, Rorty hopes that philosophers will experience a therapeutic recovery from the neurosis of modern thought. This process of healing can be aided through the recounting of the failed project of epistemology because through the historical connections we recognize the illusion of acontextual or ahistorical thought. The philosopher may believe that he or she meditates on the real world beyond appearances, beyond time and place, and thus comes to grips with the timeless "real world." But the only world available to us, claims Rorty, is the world of appearance. It thus appears folly to attempt some transcendence of our shared, situated experience in order to peer into the ineffable world:

> Even when we have justified true belief about everything we want to know, we may have no more than conformity to the norms of the day. They [James, Dewey, Wittgenstein, and others] have kept alive the historicist sense that this century's "superstition" was the last

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[36]Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 159.

[37]Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 159. The language comes to Rorty from Wittgenstein who saw philosophy as a conceptual therapy that liberated us from the bewitchment of metaphors and pictures. This was a relatively humane position. Previously the positivists had treated philosophers (or "metaphysicians") as *criminals*, good only for ridicule and expulsion from the academy. Wittgenstein rather treats philosophers as *deranged*, troubled souls redeemable with some help.

century's triumph of reason, as well as the relativist sense that the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, but be just another of the potential infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described.[38]

This historicism and relativism shifts emphasis from our attempts to purify language such that it structurally "mirrors" and referentially "hooks onto" the real world toward a postphilosophical or posttranscendental culture that relates propositions only to other propositions, ad infinitum. We do not mirror the world but hop from one language game to another. This relativist directive to disavow once-and-for-all explanations gains force from the conclusions of contemporary anti-foundational epistemology:

> When Sellars's and Quine's doctrines are purified, they appear as complementary expressions of a single claim: that no "account of the nature of knowledge" can rely on a theory of representations which stand in privileged relations to reality. The work of these two philosophers enable us to unravel, at long last, Locke's confusion between explanation and justification, and to make clear why an "account of the nature of knowledge" can be, at most, a description of human behavior.[39]

We thus do not describe the essential structure of knowledge that mirrors the world. Rather we project our behaviors (current linguistic habits and metaphors, patterns of social relations, and so forth), conditioned by current accepted theory, and unwittingly delude ourselves into the belief that we have uncovered timeless structures.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is an amalgam of arguments in traditional logical form and also of a general argument embedded in the historical narrative. However, Rorty realizes that to engage philosophers in the standard, argumentative manner may win battles but loses the war. In order to finally bury the transcendental obsessions of the West, we must simply abandon the questions that evoke transcendentalist

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[38]Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 367.

[39]Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 182.

responses.[40] Rorty's solution is a postphilosophical culture in which no ultimate questions about meaning, existence, and truth are raised; rather, we redirect intellectual energies toward social problems to reduce human suffering. For professors of philosophy, Rorty prescribes two directives: first, we treat the philosophical tradition as a "literary" tradition, a purely historical conversation, and not as an acontextual attempt to achieve ultimate Truth;[41] second, when students begin to follow transcendentalist lines of thought the good professor suppresses these intimations of ultimacy and channels the students back toward social issues.[42]

Rorty claims he is not antirealist, rather he just considers the problem to be a colossal bore. The whole skeptical problematic is believed to be a waste of time and energy. Some of Rorty's more famous dictums fall from this "higher dismissiveness"[43] such as: "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"[44] and "pragmatists keep trying to find ways of making antiphilosophical points in nonphilosophical language."[45]

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[40]Rorty surely grasps the futility of the skeptic's problem. One must simply not talk of such things to avoid being drawn into the orbit of these discussions again. See *Insight*, 353-54.

[41]See Rorty's essay "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing" reprinted in *Consequences of Pragmatism*; for instance, "Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a family romance involving, for example, Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida" (92).

[42]Rorty here builds on Dewey's frequent invective against the problems of philosophers in favor of the problems of poverty, democracy, and so forth.: "Indulge for a moment in an imaginative flight. Suppose that men had been systematically educated in the belief that the existence of values can cease to be accidental, narrow and precarious only by human activity directed by the best available knowledge. Suppose also that men had been systematically educated to believe that the important thing is not to get themselves personally 'right' in relation to the antecedent author and guarantor of these values, but to form their judgments and carry on their activity on the basis of public, objective and shared consequences. Imagine these things and then imagine what the present situation might be." John Dewey, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 387. The passage comes from the second chapter of *The Quest for Certainty* (1929).

[43]This is Anthony Gottlieb's quip for Rorty's posturing, quoted in Susan Haack's "Philosophy/philosophy, an Untenable Dualism," in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (summer 1993, vol. 29, no. 3), 426, n. 10.

[44]Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, xiii.

[45]Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, xiv.

V. LONERGAN AND PEIRCE AS ANTIDOTES

At this point, I would like to indicate how Lonergan's view has been assimilated within the American tradition in some of the secondary literature precisely as an antidote to this wayward direction.[46] Such considerations have not gone unnoticed from those who have considered the views of Lonergan and Peirce. Patrick Madigan, S.J. uses Lonergan's view of the self to counter Rorty's plethora of language games: "Without insight or intentionality we have no way of explaining how new language games arise which are embraced enthusiastically by large segments of the population, nor the powerful hold they exercise over their devotees after they have overcome sometimes formidable resistance."[47] As such, the direction towards intelligibility is structured by preconceptual desires and the framework of cognitional activity in the recurring scheme of experience, understanding, and judgment. Whatever contingent language of description we opt for, we either do so based on intelligent explanations of the data or we fail to intelligently explain the data. Either way, our descriptions follow the invariant structure that points beyond itself toward reasonable judgment, whether or not it conforms to the normative objectivity of reasonable affirmation.[48]

While Madigan finds much in Dewey to support an adequate view of the self, aspects of Dewey's thought return us to the counterposition that the legitimate goal of all inquiry is exclusively the resolution of the problematic situation, as we have previously seen from a contrast between Dewey's instrumentalism and Peirce and Lonergan's distinction between theoretical and practical sciences on the road of inquiry. So here again we can note how the instrumentalist position returns to the basic position of the pure desire to know and the norms that follow.

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[46]For instance, see Patrick Madigan, S.J. "Lonergan and the Completion of American Philosophy," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 19 (2001): 85-100; Antonia Galdos, "When Pragmatism and Instrumentalism Collide: Lonergan's Resolution of the Peirce/Dewey Debate on Theory and Practice in Science," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000): 123-44.

[47]Madigan, "Lonergan and the Completion of American Philosophy," 95.

[48]We may be reminded here of Peirce's criticism of Dewey's replacement of logic as a normative science with logic as a natural history. The same criticism of an identical move recurs when Madigan (or McCarthy) criticizes Rorty's replacement of normative inquiry with a natural history of contingent descriptions.

VI. ANTICIPATIONS IN ROYCE

Josiah Royce's portrayal of metaphysical idealism was partly rooted in his epistemological realism, and Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J. has referred to Lonergan in the context of Royce's religious metaphysics, specifically in his 1987 monograph *Royce's Mature Philosophy of Religion*.[49] While most of Oppenheim's references are *in passim* or footnoted, the correlations are important and show a privilege to Lonergan's thought. For although Oppenheim appears a deeply rooted Royce scholar, any number of other thinkers may be brought to mind when one mines through another's work. That Lonergan frequently pops up is testimony to both the correlation between Royce and Lonergan as well as the fact that Lonergan has lodged a residence in Oppenheim's consciousness.

Most of Oppenheim's references correlate a methodological similarity between Royce and Lonergan. In explicating Royce's methodology, Oppenheim develops Royce's germinal ideas on interpretation by interposing Lonergan's fourfold schema: "Royce foreshadows Lonergan's insistence on inserting and maintaining order in philosophizing. One is first to experience, then understand, then judge critically, and finally, decide by embodying the truth in a practical choice."[50] Oppenheim then directly refers to the introduction of *Insight* to situate the three levels in Lonergan's cognitional project, with the further level of the action of personal appropriation.[51] Oppenheim considers Royce's work to independently anticipate and therefore function as evidence for Lonergan's approach:

> During much of my reading of Royce, Lonergan's four levels of human questioning were in my mind. [. . .] This fourfold pattern also appears frequently in Royce's late writings. In Royce, the second step (understanding) apparently includes more spontaneous valuations that Lonergan described in his relatively

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[49]See Frank M. Oppenheim, *Royce's Mature Philosophy of Religion* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

[50]Oppenheim, *Royce's Mature Philosophy of Religion*, 237.

[51]Oppenheim later refers to Royce's "greatest achievement" in the methodology of the philosophy of religion as anticipating the four initial special functions of Lonergan's eight functional specialties. *Royce's Mature Philosophy of Religion*, 330. Oppenheim refers to *Method in Theology*, 2nd ed. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973), 125-48.

early work *Insight*. On the other hand, Royce's independent fulfillment of this fourfold pattern provides yet another confirmation of the general accuracy of Lonergan's analysis of human intentionality.[52]

Here then we see how Royce's ideas anticipate their fuller expression in Lonergan's *Insight*. These independent but parallel discoveries support each other, and at the same time allow a scholar such as Oppenheim to uncover neglected aspects of Royce precisely because he has understood a similar if not identical structure in Lonergan.

VII. GELPI'S CURIOUS SYNTHESIS

Donald Gelpi, S.J. has frequently brought Peirce's philosophy to bear on aspects of Lonergan's theological method.[53] In a plethora of publications across several decades, Gelpi presents the most sustained juxtaposition and interrelation of the works of Peirce and Lonergan. The dominant focus of Gelpi's theological work seems to be the role and explanation of religious conversion. He develops the notion of culture from Lonergan to elaborate a method of explicating Christian conversion in a North American context. In *Peirce and Theology*, Gelpi hopes to ground Lonergan's theological method of the eight functional specialties with Peirce's logic and semiotic realism. Gelpi works to positively fuse Peirce's scientific method with Lonergan's theology and adapts Peirce's view of inductive verification by examining how specifically religious conversion can help to authenticate Christian doctrine.

But Gelpi prefaces *Peirce and Theology* with an explanation of his own intellectual path, which includes the rejection of Lonergan's philosophical grounding in favor of Peirce's. Gelpi there refers to his 1988 work *Inculturating North American Theology* in which he believes that he successfully argued the following theses:

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[52]Oppenheim, op cit., 385, n. 10.

[53]See, for instance, of Gelpi's many publications, *Peirce and Theology* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), *The Turn to Experience in Contemporary Theology* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994), *Inculturating North American Theology: An Experiment in Foundational Method* (Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1988), *Experiencing God: A Theology of Human Emergence* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).

(1) Lonergan had failed to provide an unrevisable starting point for philosophical thinking, despite his claims to the contrary. Both his logic and his epistemology in fact need serious revision. (2) In contrast to Peirce, Lonergan failed to credit the realistic claims of imaginative, intuitive forms of knowing, whereas in fact the human mind grasps reality in two kinds of judgments: inductive inferences and judgments of feeling. (3) One needs to expand Lonergan's construct of conversion until it includes five different kinds of conversion – affective, intellectual, personal moral, sociopolitical, and religious – and to recognize seven dynamics and counterdynamics within the process of initial and ongoing conversion. (4) One also needs to replace Lonergan's Kantian turn to the subject with Peirce's turn to the community. (5) Finally, one needs to ground Lonergan's theory of functional specialties not in the fatally flawed transcendental logic of Immanuel Kant but in the mature logic and metaphysics of Charles Peirce.[54]

That seems quite a list of damning foibles, but it remains to be seen what precisely they could mean before we ask whether they are accurate.

In theses 1 and 5 above, Gelpi denies the unrevisability of Lonergan's cognitive structure and opts for Peirce's instead. Gelpi offers the objection that Lonergan's theory is revisable without self-contradiction. His strategy is curious in that he believes that if one changes the words used in the description of human cognition, for instance replacing Lonergan's words with Peirce's, then one is operating under an altogether different schema:

In point of fact, anyone can legitimately challenge Lonergan's account of the normative pattern of operations that allegedly "underlies" all human cognition and can do so without contradiction, as long as one does not repeat the cognitive operations Lonergan describes *in the precise terms in which he describes them.* One will achieve this allegedly impossible feat by the simple expedient of offering a more accurate account of human cognition and by exemplifying it on one's own thought process.[55]

I repeat that Gelpi's objection appears curious. Prior exegesis shows Gelpi to have grasped the threefold pattern of (1) data to be explained, (2)

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[54]Gelpi, *Peirce and Theology,* 4.

[55]Gelpi, *Toward an Inculturated North American Theology,* 17.

intelligent understanding, and (3) reasonable affirmation. Further, he seems to me at least to exemplify that same pattern in the very refutation. Also, the Peircean scheme that Gelpi uses as a replacement, the structure of hypothesis-deduction-induction, appears in no way hostile to Lonergan's threefold pattern. For, we ought to ask "What is the hypothesis about?" which would indicate data or presentation; "What is the hypothesis and its deductions?" which are questions for intelligence;[56] finally, "Is the hypothesis and its deductions inductively verified?" which is a question for judgment. Rather than serve as an objection to Lonergan's view, Peirce's view about scientific method further corroborates the analysis presented in *Insight*.

But according to Gelpi, Lonergan has committed the errors of supposing that his cognitional structure is unrevisable when all hypotheses are fallible,[57] and supposing that his "attempt to interpret reality transcends culture."[58] Now Peirce *is* a fallibilist and so believes that all statements are *in principle* revisable by the ongoing research of the future community of inquiry. But I think that Lonergan shows Peirce to be wrong here, for in the first place any future revisability of present judgments would only reinforce the invariant pattern; and in the second place, the invariant pattern is based on the concrete judgment of fact "I am a knower" which to deny would involve a self-contradiction. And as such,

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[56]In mental action, Peirce proposes hypothesis as the generator of unified conceptualizations. This serves the same purpose in his epistemology as the act of insight does for Lonergan. In terms of their more direct correspondence and complementarity much more would have to be explored before an adequate judgment could be made. However, consider the following text from *Collected Papers*, 5.276: "The function of hypothesis is to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or perhaps a small number) which involves them all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite number of others. It is therefore also a reduction of a manifold to unity."

[57]This assertion is itself problematic for the fallibilist must, on pain of self-contradiction, maintain the fallibility of fallibilism. Every good fallibilist must be ready to revise or drop a belief if it turns out false. As I interpret Lonergan's self-affirmation of the knower as an infallible judgment, fallibilism should be dropped as a universal and necessary hypothesis.

[58]Gelpi, *Toward an Inculturated North American Theology*, 17. It is frequent source of amusement when statements such as "No human attempt to interpret reality transcends culture" are asserted. For one wants to ask the asserter "whether the truth of that statement transcends culture or is bound by some particular one?"

the performance. of the self-affirmation of the knower is in principle unrestricted to any particular culture, time, or place.

Regarding Gelpi's second and fifth objections above, that Lonergan fails to credit noninferential judgments in contrast to Peirce, and that therefore Peirce's semiotic realism is to be preferred, there appears some misunderstanding. Gelpi appears to favor some variant of intuitive knowledge. He uses the terms "intuitive perceptions of reality," "habits of intuitive or imaginative thinking," "intuitive beliefs," and "intuitive judgments."[59] It is unclear what precisely he means by this term, but since it is used as a contrast to inference, I conclude that it denotes some immediate direct knowledge, as opposed to the mediated inferred knowledge of discursive thinking. It is curious to run to Peirce when one wants to flee a universal commitment to inferential thinking. Peirce is maybe *par excellence* the rejecter of any kind of noninferential thought, judgment, or knowledge.[60] At the very core of Peirce's triadic, or three-term, sign theory is a rejection of any dyadic, or two-termed, relations as sufficient for any knowledge claim. This move rejects any kind of intuition, which Peirce defines as "premiss, not itself a conclusion."[61] There is no direct relationship between the mind and the object of knowledge sufficient to ground a judgment or any knowledge claim. Between the mind and its object are always third things, the signs from which we make our inferences and without which thinking is impossible. One may prefer a theory because it accommodates intuitive knowledge, although I counsel against that, but one cannot do so by invoking Peirce as a guide. It is not that Peirce rejects feelings, sensations, or emotions as part

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[59]Gelpi, *Peirce and Theology*, 19, 20-21.

[60]For instance, in Peirce's early cognition essays of 1868, which he bade Royce study near the turn of the century, he explicates the principle that "We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions" (*Collected Papers*, 5.265), with the following analysis: "We must begin, then, with a process of cognition, and with that process whose laws are best understood and most closely follow external facts. This is no other than the process of valid inference, which proceeds from its premiss, A, to its conclusion, B, only if, as a matter of fact, such a proposition as B is always or usually true when such a proposition A is true. It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid reasoning" (*Collected Papers*, 5.267).

[61]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.213.

of the data from which one draws inferences. On the contrary, Peirce grants great authority to the affections he calls the "natural judgments of the sensible heart."[62] But once divorced from an intuitive theory of knowledge, it is harder to distinguish Peirce's position from one capable of being developed from Lonergan's view in *Insight*.

In regards to the fourth and fifth objections, that Lonergan has illegitimately rooted his cognitional theory in a turn to the subject that relies on transcendental method, we may say a few words. I suppose that of all the objections, this one is the most common, and responses have been formulated by many interpreters of *Insight*. Gelpi later reveals that transcendental logic recognizes only deductive inference. This is the basis of Kantian philosophy and its turn to the subject. Its failure is to suppose that it can "deduce *a priori* the conditions for the possibility of scientific knowledge, morality, and aesthetic experience."[63] Gelpi sees this as the failure of Transcendental Thomism generally. Since Lonergan is likewise construed as following Kant's turn to the subject, and as operating from transcendental logic, it follows that Lonergan similarly fails.[64] But if Lonergan's analysis of cognitional structure follows with necessity from the self-affirmation of the knower, this circumscribes only the conditions for the possibility of knowledge and is not the method to be followed in the pursuit of knowledge in empirical science or common sense.

Ultimately, I think that Gelpi's criticisms follow from a hasty review of Lonergan's rather painstaking cognitional theory. Where distinctions can be made for deeper understanding of Lonergan's actual view, they tend to be glossed. Where further investigation is called for to grasp nuances and qualifications, there seems a rush to judgment. This seems unfortunate for further work can be done in terms of the complementarity of Peirce's and Lonergan's cognitional theories. On Gelpi's use of Peirce and Lonergan for the theology of conversion I am not qualified to render a

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[62]Peirce *Collected Papers*, 6.292. This is Peirce's doctrine of "sentimentalism" from the 1893 essay "Evolutionary Love." It conveys his attack on social Darwinism and egoism in favor of a sentimentalist ethic that embodies at the center of its evolutionary cosmology the ideal of love found in the Gospel according to John, whom Peirce calls "the ontological gospeller"(*Collected Papers*, 6.287).

[63]Gelpi, *Peirce and Theology*, 29.

[64]Stunningly, this implies that Lonergan, as explicitly stated of Marechal and Rahner, is not intellectually converted. See *Peirce and Theology*, 31. I prefer a humbler approach.

sufficient account. However, it is significant that such a synthesis and intermingling has occurred. For Gelpi, this is a function of taking seriously the maxim that good theology operates and emerges within a specific culture. For Catholic theology, a serious and constructive dialogue with American philosophical traditions is a positive move, if we advance carefully.

VIII. POTTER'S SUSTAINED ASSIMILATIONS

In contrast, Vincent Potter, S.J. has irenically and I think rather judiciously weighed and assimilated some of the positive contributions of both Lonergan and Peirce in a variety of publications.[65] Potter also sets Peirce over against the traditional or even stereotypical view of American philosophers. Peirce's "un-American" traits include advocacy of scholastic realism over nominalism and positivism, the separation of theory and practice, and that "pleasure, success, better living, are not properly and specifically human goals at all."[66] These traits are tongue-in-cheek "un-American," both because there is an American cultural sensibility of bottom-line business that eschews mere theory in all its manifestations, and because the nominalistic and instrumentalist versions of pragmatism proposed by James and Dewey more clearly defined the American intellectual milieu. Peirce's "un-American" traits correlate well to Lonergan's views in *Insight*.

We have already peeked at the theory-practice distinction when portraying Dewey's theory as a counterposition. Dewey's view kept reason close to problematic situations and their possible successful resolutions. In contrast, Potter quotes Peirce that "As such it [science] does not consist so much in *knowing*, nor even in 'organized' knowledge, as it does in the diligent inquiry into truth for truth's sake, without any axe to

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[65]See Vincent G. Potter, *On Understanding Understanding: A Philosophy of Knowledge* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994); *Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996).

[66]Vincent Potter, "Charles S. Peirce: Action through Thought – The Ethics of Experience," in *Doctrine and Experience: Essays in American Philosophy*, ed. Vincent G. Potter (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); 88.

grind, nor for the sake of the delight of contemplating it, but from an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things."[67]

This impulse to penetrate into the reason of things is strictly identical with Lonergan's pure desire to know. Peirce calls this instinct to reason "il lume naturale," and it grounds abduction and scientific inquiry. Potter describes this quite well when he says that

> . . . all scientific inquiry supposes a Realism, in the sense that the Real is coextensive with the Knowable. [. . .] If this is so, the Real constitutes a network of relations such that everything is connected with everything else, or to put it another way, the Real is everywhere continuous. *Natura non facit saltus.* This continuous real is systematically explored through abduction, deduction, and induction. But, since neither deduction nor induction adds any new knowledge about the Real, abduction is the heart of all discovery. But, according to Peirce, abduction is nothing but instinctive reason.[68]

Such an instinctive reason may be frequently wrong about its abductions, but it is correct enough to discover the systematic relations we call laws of nature.

Now Potter develops Peirce's view that abduction and discursive reasoning function as the foundation for an adequate view of knowledge, but does so with a Lonerganian proviso. To start, the rejection of all intuitive, immediate, direct knowledge requires that we reconsider our approach to first principles and the very idea of foundations. Potter reconstructs Peirce's view and grounds it in his three notions of truth, reality, and the notion of community. Truth is independent of whatever anyone happens to think it is. It is the opinion that is destined to be upheld by the community of inquirers in the long run. But this view requires a strong realism, for it is not the agreement that makes it true, but the agreement is a convergent opinion brought about by engagement with an independent reality.[69] As such, that implies the third notion – a

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[67]Potter, "Action through Thought," 94; the quotation is from Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.44.

[68]Potter, "Action through Thought," 100-101.

[69]While we have not focused on this aspect, it follows from Peirce's rejection of Kantian noumena – what Peirce calls the "inherently incognizable." As to the

community of inquiry committed to investigation by a self-correcting process. Such a community has no definite limits in time, place, or number for no literal end can delimit investigation except the ideal limit of having no more relevant questions to be answered. Potter also points out that since the process operates through abductive and inductive inferences, and since these are basically statistical generalizations irreducible to deduction, it further requires that the principles themselves be grounded in the long run through such a continuous process. Thus the first principles of cognition are not abstractly conceived as the foundation of cognition by something other than the long run of inferential cognitive activity.

Such views led Peirce, in direct contrast to James and Dewey, to denigrate the role of the individual in the process of knowledge. The rules of cognition and inquiry guiding the pure impulse to find the reason in things leads away from the individual towards the indefinite and on-going community of investigation. This helps explain Peirce's 1868 statement "ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception."[70] And likewise his statement from 1891: "everybody will admit that a personal self exists in the same sense in which a snark exists; that is, there is a phenomenon to which the name is given. It is an illusory phenomenon but it is still a phenomenon."[71] Such a negative characterization of the individual is partly explained by Peirce's hyperbole in counterbalancing James's nominalistic individualism, but it is also partly explained by his view that continuousness in cognition equally undermines the uniqueness and contribution of the individual knower.

Here Potter inserts the Lonerganian proviso. After noting that Peirce and Lonergan hold the same basic position, he explains that Lonergan's attention to the foundational cognitive operation of insight can complement and thereby rescue Peirce's view of cognition:

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convergence of opinion in Peirce and its connection to Lonergan's idea of the remote criterion of truth, see note 5 above.

[70]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.235.

[71]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 8.82.

His helpful proposal is that what grounds the process of cognition (continuous as it is) is intelligence *in act*. The "foundation" of knowing is not itself an *abstract* knowing, but rather the concrete seizing of intelligence in action by the intelligent knowing agent.[72]

Potter goes on to characterize the nature of first principles in *Insight* and presents Lonergan's distinction between analytic propositions and analytic principles that are grasped and existentially instantiated. In this act the knowing subject finds sufficient evidence and attains grounds to prevent the rejection of these principles against the performative contradiction of one who claims to reject the principles while using them. He concludes that

> These concrete principles grasped in the act of knowing are the conditions of possibility of the act, not abstractly and tautologously enumerated, but grasped as fulfilled in the act of knowing itself. Hence, they are *a priori* but not outside the conscious appropriation of the act of knowing. They are *transcendental*, not in the Kantian sense of an object ever beyond the knowing experience, but in the sense of the immanent structure of every act of knowing.[73]

This complementarity strikes me as an ideal example of a scholar irenically building a coherent view from the same basic position described by Peirce, Lonergan and others. Potter's scholarship instantiates both Peirce's ongoing community of inquiry and Royce's Beloved Community in which we all do our part in the greater project of our common history and pursuit. This is evident in Potter's summation:

> I would suggest that the essential role of the community in Peirce's understanding of human inquiry rejoins Lonergan's insistence on the need for a series of personal conversions in order that there be any members of such a community dedicated to searching for the truth. This includes what for Lonergan is the final and perhaps most important conversion, "falling in love." Peirce indeed could have written the following: "When he pronounces a project worthwhile, a man moves beyond consideration of all merely

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[72]Vincent Potter, "Peirce on 'Substance' and 'Foundations,'" in *Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 112.

[73]Potter, "Substance and Foundations," 112-13.

personal satisfactions and interests, tastes and preferences. He is acknowledging objective values and taking the first step towards authentic human existence."

Much of what Peirce proposed may be of real help in overcoming the seeming bankruptcy of contemporary thought by shifting it away from the paralyzing self-doubt of skepticism. I would like this essay to be a small contribution to that project.[74]

IX. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

One aspect of Peirce's pragmatic maxim is that to discover what something is we must assess it by the effects that it has on subsequent activities and future interpretants. *Insight* pragmatically considered as the sum of its interpretants, which is fully revealed only in the long run, has already determined various activities and interpretations even in the classical American tradition, which by many accounts would be alien territory for a Canadian Jesuit. But we have indicated the impact Lonergan's views have had on historical scholarship, on the use of Peirce in theology, on the complementarity with Peirce's view that approximates to a shared basic position and as a useful antidote to counterpositions that developed out of the American stream of thought. American thought is frequently caricatured as congenitally optimistic. Peirce shared that hopeful optimism. As to the future, according to Peirce, if it is true it will win out eventually. Peirce himself labored in obscurity and academic exile for most of his life, and his work was crated and dumped into the basement of Harvard's library, forgotten for decades. But as Peirce himself had remarked "Truth crushed to the earth shall rise again."[75] Lonergan may not be quite as optimistic as Peirce, but the influence of *Insight* on American philosophy may still have a long run before it.

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[74]Potter, "Substance and Foundations," 113-14. The quotation from Lonergan is cited in "The Future of Christianity," *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.*, ed. W. Ryan. S.J., and B. Tyrrell, S.J. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 152.

[75]Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.408.

"INSIGHT INTO THE BETTER ARGUMENT" CONSCIOUSNESS, COMMUNICATION, AND CRITICIZABILITY IN HABERMAS AND LONERGAN

Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer

Regis College

Toronto, Canada

I. INTRODUCTION

In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, Jurgen Habermas develops his proposal for a communicative rationality partly in response to the insurmountable errors that, for him, plague the philosophy of consciousness. Though Bernard Lonergan advocates a philosophy of consciousness, his cognitional theory avoids the legitimate criticisms voiced by Habermas while preserving the genuine achievements of thinkers, such as Descartes and Kant, associated with the "turn to the subject" in modern philosophy.

In what follows, I aim to show that a complementary relationship exists between Habermas's communication model of rationality and the subject-centered philosophy of Lonergan. The majority of the paper focuses upon an explication of key themes in the theory of reason put forth by Habermas in order to clarify the specific ways in which he believes his work overcomes the traditional problems of idealism and metaphysics. In the first major section, then, I set out to establish the thesis that the notion of criticizability provides the key to the concept of a properly communicative rationality articulated in terms of the

reconstructive analysis that Habermas calls, "formal pragmatics."[1] The final discussion demonstrates both the uniqueness of the philosophy of consciousness that Lonergan names "critical realism," and the supplementing complement that it offers to Habermas's proposal.

II. BEYOND CONSCIOUSNESS: COMMUNICATIVE REASON AND CRITICIZABILITY

In the first several pages of his major work, Habermas points out that the notion of criticizability, when narrowly confined to statements admitting propositional truth, insufficiently characterizes the concept of rationality.[2] With this claim, Habermas sets up a contrast between two basic types of reason. On one side, Habermas identifies the cognitive-instrumental core of a purposive rationality restricted both *practically* to strategic interventions in an objective world – presupposed as a totality of states of affairs – and *epistemically* to a cognitive activity of representation. Particularly since Kant, the objectivating activity of the self-referential subject has provided the basis for an overly abstract and narrowly conceived concept of reason. Though Habermas traces the dominant characteristics of this problematic notion of rationality through its diverse philosophical manifestations, he seems to attribute a kind of paradigmatic status to the basic error written into the very point of departure of the philosophy of consciousness. With subject-centered reason, preoccupied by the observer attitude of the third person, "rationality is assessed by how the isolated subject orients himself to representational and propositional contents."[3]

On the other side of the contrast, Habermas defines a concept of communicative rationality in terms of the formal pragmatic presuppositions of speakers and hearers oriented to reaching

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[1]"Reconstructive," because it clarifies the scope of possible communication within a given worldview according to the universal conditions for communication presupposed in the interactions of speakers and hearers oriented to reaching understanding. "Formal pragmatics" specifies precisely these communication conditions.

[2]Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 10.

[3]Jurgen Habermas, "An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 314.

understanding through the linguistic practice of mutually raising criticizable validity claims. The communication model focuses upon processes of interpretation undertaken by participants who have adopted the performative attitude of an "I-you" relationship in order to coordinate their actions according to the mechanism of mutual understanding. Habermas emphasizes that with ordinary linguistic practices, actors presuppose that their communication occurs and develops without undue constraints, force, or coercion, and that discourse follows only the cooperative quest for truth.[4] The counterfactual element of the ideal speech situation underscores the inherent telos for consensus in communicative action and enlivens an overall project guided by a critical interest in emancipation from distorted forms of communication extending to the entire community.

With the turn from the monological subject to the dialogical paradigm of mutual understanding, rationality encompasses three formal world-relations. Actors engage in communication with an interest in coming to an understanding not only about the objectively described world of states of affairs, but also about the normatively regulated domain of the social world, and about the expressive world of subjectivity. The primacy of the objective world as an ontological presupposition in the cognitive-instrumental model of reason yields to the primacy of the conditions for communication under which "the world gains objectivity" as an achievement against the common background of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld.[5] Though this paper does not address the lifeworld concept in detail, I would like simply to point out that communicative action both relies upon the lifeworld for a linguistic reservoir or common fund of implicit meanings and enables reproduction of the lifeworld through communicative achievements.

Habermas establishes three basic types of validity claims characteristic of communicative utterances: propositional, normative, and expressive.[6] Speakers appeal to "normative contexts recognized as

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[4]For a concise discussion of the "ideal speech situation," See, by way of comparison, Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 25.

[5]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 12-13.

[6]The reader may also note that Habermas distinguishes two other types of claims in addition to the three basic categories listed. He points to evaluative claims that represent

legitimate" in making claims to normative rightness for particular actions, or they appeal to subjective manifestations in making claims to the truthfulness or sincerity of expressions. In either case, the knowledge embodied in these distinct types of validity claims "does not refer to the existence of states of affairs but to the validity of norms or to the manifestation of subjective experiences."[7] Habermas introduces notions of normative rightness and subjective truthfulness as "truth-analogous" concepts in order to speak of validity claims of the normative and expressive type as properly "criticizable," that is, as supported by reasons and open to the "yes" or "no" position of a hearer.[8] Because each validity claim specifies a corresponding formal world-relation, the type of validity attached to a respective claim varies with the semantic form of a given sentence. In other words, the process of "grounding" a particular speech-act with reasons changes, depending upon the semantic need for a description of facts, a recognition of the legitimacy of norms, or an affirmation of the speaker's sincerity.[9]

In opposition to the reliance of teleological actions upon strategic force, actions coordinated by a properly communicative rationality depend upon the *rationally motivating force* of the better argument. Communicative actions presuppose discursive collaboration for "achieving, sustaining, and renewing ... a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims."[10] Habermas aligns the concept of communicative rationality with a theory of

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a type of expressive utterance distinct from self-presentations; and he recognizes that participants can rationally criticize linguistic usage itself, that is, "the comprehensibility, well-formedness, or rule-correctness of symbolic expressions." See, by way of comparison, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 1, 16, 22.

[7]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 1, 16.

[8]For a more detailed account of "truth-analogous" concepts, see, by way of comparison, Jurgen Habermas, "Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning," in *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 75-76. By way of refinement, Habermas also points out that though evaluative and expressive speech-acts are not directly invested with clear-cut validity claims, they nevertheless "satisfy the central presupposition of rationality: they can be defended against criticism." See, by way of comparison, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 1, 16.

[9]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 1, 39.

[10]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 1, 17.

argumentation on the basis of the essential experience of rationally motivated agreement. Argumentation provides the link to the experience. In fact, the binding force of communicative utterances originates not with the "validity of what is said" but with *the coordinating effect of the warranty*" offered in the speech act, that is, with the capacity "to redeem [with reasons], if necessary, the validity claim raised with [the] speech act."[11] Despite the insufficiency of the cognitive-instrumental model, the capacity for criticizability in argumentative speech remains central to rational assessment in the paradigm of communication theory.

III. THE INTERNAL RELATION OF MEANING AND VALIDITY

Habermas recalls Karl-Otto Apel's recognition of the peculiar way in which the ideal communication community and the real one become "entwined" with the doubled character of validity claims. Participants in interaction presuppose, for communication, not only the absence of deceit, manipulation, and force, but also the universal acceptability of the reasons grounding the validity of their claims. Validity claims *qua claims* retain a transcendental moment that exceeds the borders of particular localities, but *as raised*, they pertain to their relevant contexts and obtain "the social currency of a de facto established practice."[12]

This brings us to an important point with regards to the counterfactual of the ideal speech situation. As a formal-pragmatic presupposition, the counterfactual stands as a universal condition for communication. As theoretically significant, it allows us to speak of rationality in the *singular* – that is, it signifies a general, invariant feature of discourse – and it serves to show that the consensus-building force of rationally motivated agreement originates with an exigency not solely for consensus itself, but for (intersubjective) recognition of *validity*. Communicative rationality presupposes that speech situations, driven by the cooperative quest for truth and liberated from systemic distortions, will arrive at their precise goal: truth (cooperatively achieved). Again borrowing from Apel, Habermas points to the performative contradiction

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[11]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 302.

[12]Habermas, "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," 322-23.

necessarily involved in any attempt to deny or disprove the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of communication. In arguing against these general features of discourse, one inevitably supposes that a universal communication community, freed from distortive pressures, could corroborate the validity of the claim, in view of the fulfillment of its conditions, through a common affirmation of reasons.

Given that understanding and agreement depend upon the rational force of reasons, questions of meaning stand inseparably tied to questions of validity. Habermas takes over this "crucial insight" from the propositional semantics of Frege, and attributes to it "the key" to a theory of meaning.[13] For Habermas, however, the internal relation of meaning and validity grounds the range of linguistic forms, including propositional, normative, and expressive utterances. Across this range the "formal-pragmatic explanation of meaning" brings together three interrelated and indispensable concepts: understanding, validity, and agreement. Understanding a speech-act implies not only a comprehension of the reasons inherent to its meaning but also knowledge of "how one can make use of it in order to reach an understanding with somebody about something."[14]

Habermas emphasizes that linguistic utterances serve the purpose of bringing about an agreement, and, moreover, an agreement defined by its validity. If the telos of communicative rationality heads toward consensus, we must understand this orientation in light of the strong emphasis upon the internal relation of meaning and validity. This brings us to important questions regarding the nature of the relation between language and the world(s), validity and the real, meaning and knowing.

> We understand a speech act when we are acquainted with the kind of reasons that a speaker could cite in order to convince a hearer that he (the speaker) is entitled under the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance. For this reason, familiarity with a language is interwoven with knowledge of how things do actually stand in the (linguistically disclosed) world.

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[13]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 61-62.
[14]Habermas, "Toward a Critique, " 78.

Perhaps knowledge of the world merely depends upon a longer chain of reasons than knowledge of language [italics mine].[15]

The word *"perhaps"* in the final sentence of the quote above should draw our attention to an ambiguity lingering in a theory of meaning developed from the philosophy of language (-with-a-pragmatic-turn). Habermas underscores the inseparability of language and the world, but he neglects to give an explicit account of how these two finally meet within the internal relation of meaning and validity. If validity depends upon acceptable reasons, what makes the reasons themselves valid, presuming the uncoerced quality of the discourse? How does one identify the fulfillment of conditions of validity? What is the status of an affirmation of a criticizable validity claim qua affirmation (be it propositional, normative, or expressive)?

To be sure, when Habermas takes over Frege's insight that "facts are what *make* assertoric sentences *true*,"[16] he also criticizes this model, as well as the truth-semantic conceptualization worked out by Searle, on grounds that they narrowly confine meaning and validity to the propositional content of speech-acts. Habermas introduces the "truth-analogous" concepts of normative rightness and subjective truthfulness in order to expand the scope of the theory of meaning and to account for the formal semantic differences entailed by these distinct types of validity claims. He readily admits the centrality of validity for the relation between language and the world(s). However, his shift to a pragmatically oriented theory of language seems to release him from any need to explain concepts such as "objectivity," which would clarify words such as "facts" and "truth." Could these suspiciously bracketed terms not pertain to all three formal world-concepts? Or is this, in fact, Habermas's goal? We will return to these questions at a later point.

With the extension of the internal relation of meaning and validity into normative and expressive domains, our assessment of rationality moves further away from the fallacies of the philosophy of consciousness. Habermas repeatedly criticizes the consciousness paradigm for restricting

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[15]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 78.
[16]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 61.

its epistemic criteria to truth and its practical criteria to success.[17] The priority of the subject relating to itself, as it would to an objective entity in the world, leads to an internally disturbed model of rationality confined to the cognitive-instrumental dimension of reason. Habermas gives the philosophy of consciousness a diagnosis of exhaustion.[18] He emphatically states that consciousness has exhausted itself in the "transcendental gap between the intelligible and empirical worlds"; the self-referential subject endlessly labors against the tension between these two poles within the mediating activity of an idealizing synthesis (Kant).[19] Representation and manipulation offer themselves as the only activities available at the disposal of subject-centered reason.

IV. COMMUNICATIVE VERSUS STRATEGIC ACTION

The reconstructive science of formal pragmatics focuses upon "the pretheoretical grasp of rules on the part of competently speaking, acting, and knowing subjects."[20] The task of mutual understanding – at times precarious and always risky – interrupts the success orientations of teleological actions defined by exertions of influence on someone or some objective entity or state of affairs. For Habermas, strategic and communicative actions not only differ analytically, but also, from the shared perspective of participants in communication, these actions exclude each other *as types of interaction*.[21] Habermas emphasizes that communication serves the purpose of mutual understanding. Within communication, participants cannot pursue instrumental actions aimed at causally influencing something in the external world and simultaneously achieve rationally motivated agreements. For this reason, Habermas opposes illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

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[17]Habermas, "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," 314.

[18]Jurgen Habermas, "The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices," in *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 142, 117.

[19]Habermas, "Unity of Reason,"117.

[20]Habermas, "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," 297-98.

[21]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 81.

Borrowing terminology from Austin, Habermas defines locutionary acts as propositions, illocutionary acts as performative utterances that establish the mode of a sentence and, in the process, secure an intersubjective relation with an addressee, and perlocutionary acts as the effects or consequences of the speech-act.[22] Habermas characterizes the three acts as follows: "to say *something*, to act *in* saying something, to bring about something *through* acting in saying something."[23] We may notice that the italicized "through" preceded by the "to bring about" intention of perlocutions, places these kinds of acts in the strategic context of manipulation that Habermas opposes to communicative action. Without getting into a detailed explication of the controversial relation between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, I simply want to indicate two points at which Habermas distinguishes his understanding from that of Austin.

First, Habermas differentiates (where Austin failed to) between *interactions* governed solely by the pursuit of illocutionary aims and the type of interactions characterized by the parasitic presence of perlocutions.[24] For example, a host who drags out a story with the explicit purpose of preventing guests from leaving early pursues perlocutionary aims within the performative (illocutionary) act of storytelling. Again, Habermas sharply separates illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The latter aims require concealment and thus imply deceit, whereas the former aims *must* make themselves fully known. Illocutions by nature are "self-identifying"; they openly express the communicative intent of the speaker, that is, how the speaker wants the hearer to understand the speech-act offer.[25] Whether as a command, promise, confession, or explanation, the illocutionary act secures the intersubjective relation. By contrast, Habermas regards perlocutions "as a special class of strategic interactions

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[22]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 288-89. We should also note that "sentences" and "speech-acts" seem to differ, for Habermas, according to the generality of the former and the relative specificity of the latter. Sentences may take on different structures and contents in a multiplicity of forms *and* may also be *analytically* restricted to a monological treatment. *Every* speech-act, however, incorporates an illocutionary component, regardless of the type of validity claim brought forth in the speech-act, and therefore serves a more *pragmatic* function.

[23]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 289.

[24]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 294.

[25]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 290-92.

in which illocutions are employed as means in teleological contexts of action."[26] Though speakers can employ speech-acts for strategic purposes, perlocutions obtain nothing more than a parasitic status, because they depend upon the rational structure of communicative action. Only the unrestricted and *singular* pursuit of illocutionary aims, by which "*all* participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another," signifies for Habermas, "the original use of language," and characterizes the type of interaction he calls, "communicative action."[27]

Furthermore, actions coordinated through the mechanism of mutual understanding do not count as perlocutionarily achieved effects. Habermas writes, "Whether the expected consequences [of rationally motivated agreements] actually come to pass or not has no effect on the illocutionary success of the speaker."[28] Habermas identifies the performance of these action-expectations with "the fulfillment of an obligation the addressee *[takes] upon himself* with his 'yes' to a speech act offer" [italics mine].[29] Thus, illocutionary success may entail *expectation*, but does not in any way take the action itself as a measure. Actions per se represent a *further step* beyond the coordinating function of mutual understanding.

A second point with which Habermas distinguishes his theory from Austin's pertains to the primary significance of illocutionary aims for speech-acts. Austin early on regarded what he called the "illocutionary force" of a speech act as its "literally irrational component."[30] He limited the rational content of the sentence to the assertoric part, which he identified with the locutionary act. Habermas, however, denies that these descriptors ("rational" and "irrational"), attached respectively to locutions and ("misleadingly named") illocutions, follow from what amounts to no more than an analytic difference. Austin picked up on this point but failed to develop sufficiently the important observation behind it, namely, that all speech-acts incorporate a double structure composed of two acts, which are separable only *analytically*. "In general, the speaker carries out

[26]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 293-94.

[27]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 293-94.

[28]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 291.

[29]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 291.

[30]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 70, 74.

an illocutionary act *by saying something.*"[31] The double structure of all speech-acts exposes the error in the opposition between (illocutionary) "force" and (locutionary) "meaning." Not only do performative sentences "obviously have just as clear a meaning as assertoric sentences," but the latter also "exhibit the same illocutionary-propositional double structure as all other speech acts."[32] For example, the performative sentence, "I thee wed," has a clear "meaning" that belongs to a specific normative context without needing to conform to an assertoric statement for achieving comprehensibility. Also, Habermas points out that descriptions, explanations, and assertions, "can be infelicitous in a way similar to other illocutionary acts: one can make such a mess of a story that it 'is no longer a tale,' or discuss a delicate matter so bluntly that those present 'will not tolerate any further discussion of it.'"[33]

Habermas argues that when we revoke the "special status" that accrues to locutionary acts identified as keepers of the rational content of communicative utterances, and thus accord primacy to illocutions,[34] we discover the linguistic space for other types of speech-acts (that is, normative rightness and expressive truthfulness). In fact, every speech-act, considered as a whole, presupposes all three formal world-relations and can thus "be criticized as invalid from three perspectives": states of affairs, legitimacy of norms, or truthfulness of expressions.[35] The *thematization* of an individual speech-act, however, emphasizes a particular type of validity claim, intensifies a corresponding formal world-relation, and finally defines the illocutionary act. Moreover, the illocutionary mode not only establishes the communicative intent of the speaker (that is, how the hearer should receive the speech-act offer, for example, as a warning, an explanation, and so forth), but also creates the

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[31]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 70.

[32]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 70.

[33]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 70.

[34]Though Habermas surely states that, "everything that can be said at all can be said in assertoric form," he underscores the pragmatic importance of illocutions for communication. Performative sentences account for the speaker-hearer relationship. See, by way of comparison, Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,* trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 64-70.

[35]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 77.

linguistic space for criticizability. In other words, the illocutionary force of a speech-act expresses "the speaker's demand that the hearer *ought* to accept a sentence as true or sincere," or, of course, legitimate.[36]

With the pragmatic turn, the distinct *type* of claim raised in a speech-act offer through an illocutionary act binds the speech-act to the validity claim, the conditions of its validity, and the reasons given in its support.[37] Validity claims serve as the "stewards of a rationality" that resides in the capacity of the linguistic structure of speech-acts for criticizability. "The home of rationality" thereby shifts "from the propositional to the illocutionary component."[38] The pragmatic and fundamental role of the illocutionary act secures the primacy of intersubjectivity given within a linguistic capacity for criticizability. Thus, for Habermas, "the smallest independent unit" of ("explicitly linguistic") processes of reaching understanding includes not only an elementary speech-act attached to at least one validity claim but also the "yes" or "no" response of the hearer.[39] The primacy of illocutionary components stems from the telos immanent in communication oriented to the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims. As Habermas writes, "Mutual understanding aims at consensus formation."[40]

We will return to the inseparable relation Habermas draws between criticizability and intersubjectivity in our discussion of posttraditional identity structures. But first, we may recall that Habermas opposes strategic and communicative actions and connects the assumptions of the former with the ingrained fallacies of the philosophy of consciousness. Communicative action embraces three formal world-relations and their corresponding types of validity claims. The ontological presuppositions of idealism turn into "trivial suppositions of communality" in everyday language use, providing the purely heuristic scope of linguistic possibilities.[41] The pragmatic orientation to reaching understanding supplements the *objectivating attitude* of the third-person perspective with

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[36]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action,* vol. 2, 69.

[37]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 74.

[38]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 75.

[39]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 74.

[40]Habermas, "Toward a Critique," 74.

[41]Habermas, "Unity of Reason," 142.

the *expressive attitude* of first-person presentations and the *norm-conformative attitude* adopted in the second person for social contexts defined by legitimacy-expectations.[42]

V. POSTTRADITIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION

Habermas concentrates his analysis upon the linguistic structure of communication and upon the performative perspective of the "I-you" relationship taken up by participants attempting to convince one another of the validity of their claims. The interlocking system of personal pronouns takes on a double significance for Habermas in this regard.

As just mentioned, the system of personal pronouns corresponds to attitudes adopted in conjunction with particular types of validity claims raised by participants in communication. Reason expresses the diversity of its voices through the grammatical transitions that make possible these different attitudes within discourse (objectivating, norm-conformative, and expressive). Recall, however, that although every speech-act raises a distinct type of validity claim, hearers can criticize speech-acts on all three levels (for example, the sincerity of the speaker, the truth of the statement, the legitimacy of the norm or action). The unity of reason asserts itself within the formal-pragmatic relations presupposed by communication-participants, who have sufficient mastery of a language. In other words, actors engage all three formal world-relations with their speech-acts and transition between attitudes in discourse without difficulty. In the balanced tension between the inner logic of the dominant form of argumentation appropriate to a distinct type of validity claim and the grammatical transitions that connect the various moments of reason throughout discourse, the unity of rational inquiry asserts itself in the diversity of many voices.

We come here to a major intersection for the themes of intersubjectivity and criticizability. The second important point that Habermas makes in regard to the grammatically inter-linked personal pronouns concerns the role of this system in what he calls post-traditional identity formation. Drawing on the writings of G. H. Mead, Habermas

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[42]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 309, 236-37.

argues that the process of individuation coincides with the process of socialization. For Mead, these linguistically mediated processes occur in communication contexts and conform to the linguistic structure of interaction. Only when ego develops the capacity to relate to alter in the second person ("you"), does the ego's identity begin to form around a "me" capable of internalizing alter's expectations. The process of socialization occurs in the interactive context defined by the ego's offer of the "me" to alter, by which ego comes to an understanding of what alter *expects of me, promises me, that alter pleases me, angers me, likes me,* rejects *me.* [43]

The individuating effects of this process arise concurrently. Habermas underscores the impossibility of erasing the space for freedom etched into the linguistic structure of the socialization process. The interpersonal relation between the first and second persons requires that the former take responsibility for responding to alter. And ego's accountability in this interaction depends upon the presupposition that "I" can take a "yes" or "no" position with regards to alter's speech-act offers. In this way, the linguistic structure of intersubjectivity generates an unavoidable necessity for the "I" to emerge in particularity and uniqueness; one is, in a sense, forced to be *oneself.* "Thus in the socialization process an 'I' emerges equiprimordially with the 'me.'"[44]

Moreover, ego develops the capacity for a reflective relation to self within the linguistic space for freedom. By adopting the perspective of alter, in anticipation of alter's response to ego's speech-act offer, ego can rationally assess validity claims within a reflective and interior forum for argumentation. The achievement of "internalizing the role of a participant in argumentation" releases ego's capacity for self-criticism.[45]

Grammatical transitions inherent to linguistic structure make possible a general interpersonal relation within an orientation to mutual understanding. And here we directly encounter the double significance of the system of personal pronouns. The performative attitude of the "I-you" relationship conforms to the linguistic structure of the first and second

[43]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, 58-59.

[44]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, 59.

[45]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, 74-75.

persons. In turn, the performative attitude provides the basis for speakers and hearers to utilize the system of personal pronouns for mutually raising criticizable validity claims.[46] As a participant, ego can raise validity claims within distinct attitudes, at distinct levels of argumentation, in respect to distinct formal world-relations. Ego has no problem here and does not assume three distinct selves for three different attitudes (objectivating, norm-conformative, expressive). But these transitions rely upon a prior and more general relation secured in the *performative attitude* of participants. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity are coeval; and the interpenetration of these structures of identity formation relies upon the presupposition of criticizability.

For Habermas, this notion of identity formation, taken over from Mead, overcomes a serious error in the philosophy of consciousness. In the subject-centered model, the isolated reflection of the knower, relating to itself through the gap of an objectification, struggles against the inevitable loss of originality. Cognitive activity remains confined to the observer attitude of the third person with which the subject relates to everything, internal and external, in an objectivating manner. The switch to the interactive context of mutual understanding escapes this familiar aporia of the consciousness paradigm by focusing upon the formation process of an identity that emerges within an interpersonal relationship. The original relation to self survives within the performative attitude adopted by ego in assuming the perspective of alter. The fluidity of the interaction holds together the spontaneous originality of knowing acts within the reflective relation to self, that is, through "a recapitulating reconstruction of knowledge already employed."[47] Habermas clearly

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[46]The autonomy and accountability inherent to an identity made possible by the individuating effects of socialization processes rely, in the linguistic medium, strictly upon the *performative* use of the first person pronoun employed in the "I-you" relationship. Habermas cautions against confusion here, "But these identity claims aiming at intersubjective recognition must not be confused with the validity claims that the actor raises with his speech acts. For the 'no' with which the addressee rejects a speech-act offer concerns the validity of a particular utterance, not the identity of the speaker." See, by way of comparison, Jurgen Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity," in *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, tran. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 190.

[47]Habermas, "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," 297.

argues that the aporia of the philosophy of consciousness simply ceases to apply:

> If, namely, the self is part of a relation-to-self that is performatively established when the speaker takes up the second-person perspective of a hearer toward the speaker, then this self is not introduced as an object ... but as a subject that forms itself through participation in linguistic interaction and expresses itself in the capacity for speech and action.[48]

Given that the cognitive-instrumental model simply fails to account adequately for individuality, Habermas contends that the pragmatic turn, which emphasizes the link between "the 'I' of the illocutionary act" and the personal accountability presupposed by autonomous actors in communication, allows us to overcome "this final and most difficult of the problems left behind by metaphysics."[49]

VI. COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY
AND THE QUESTIONS OF COGNITION AND OBJECTIVITY

Let us recap, then, the basic problems of the philosophy of consciousness. In the following paragraph, Habermas summarizes its errors:

> The relationship of the human being to the world is cognitivistically reduced: Ontologically, the world is reduced to the world of entities as a whole ... epistemologically, our relationship to that world is reduced to the capacity to know existing states of affairs or to bring them about in a purposive-rational fashion; semantically, it is reduced to fact-stating discourse in which assertoric sentences are used – and no validity claim is admitted besides propositional truth, which is available *in foro interno*.[50]

In opposition to these errors, and in response to them, the theory of communicative action supplements the human relation to the (objective) world with relations to domains of expressive subjectivity and regulated

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[48]Jurgen Habermas, "Metaphysics After Kant," in *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 25.

[49]Habermas, "Unity of Reason," 144.

[50]Habermas, "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," 311.

normativity; it embraces the range of linguistic possibilities opened up by three formal world-relations and specifies the corresponding (basic) types of validity categories; finally, communicative action privileges the linguistic intersubjectivity inherent to processes of interpretation through which participants coordinate their actions with the achievement of mutual understanding against the common background of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld. Through our analysis, we have seen the central role that criticizability – now expanded to encompass each world-relation distinctly – assumes in a concept of communicative rationality.

However, given the internal relation of meaning to validity in the formal-pragmatic theory of meaning, the question arises: What relation exists between meaning and meant? Philosophy inevitably faces the question of knowing. In raising or accepting criticizable validity claims, how do participants in communication actually *know* what they mean? Habermas recognizes that the "yes" or "no" positions taken by hearers with respect to proposed claims, "are the expression of *insight or understanding* [*Einsicht*],"[51] but a strong aversion to idealism and metaphysics leads him to propose a theory of rationality that simply seems to ignore the essential philosophical question of cognition. Resultantly, he fails to adequately address the related issue of objectivity.

In a collection of articles titled *Truth and Justification*, Habermas acknowledges his neglect of these theoretical issues and attempts, as it were, to fill in the gap. However, his treatment seems, if not vague, at least incomplete and unsatisfying. For example, in defining cognition as "a process of intelligent, problem-solving behavior that makes learning processes possible,"[52] he fails to explain exactly what such "problem-solving behavior" entails. Is that intelligent process characterized by a normative pattern, or not? Is that problem-solving behavior the same for all speaking, acting, and knowing subjects, or not? A proper philosophical treatment of cognition must include a fully explanatory account of the intelligent process *that "cognition" is.*

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[51]Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, 38.

[52]Jurgen Habermas, "Introduction: Realism after the Linguistic Turn," in *Truth and Justification*, ed. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 26.

A similar ambiguity arises when Habermas articulates his pragmatic account of objectivity. He recognizes that words such as "facts" and "truth" generally denote statements *about* objects in the world or discursive achievements. These general definitions follow from his decision for a nominalist conception of the world as a "totality of things, not of facts."[53] This decision remains "supported by the grammatical evidence that we cannot locate facts, in contrast to things or events, as something existing or occurring in the world;"[54] and it allows for an explanation of the ways in which experience contributes to the revision of language.

Though Habermas preserves a realist notion of truth and maintains the concept of an objective world independent of language – a formal anticipation, or "trivial supposition of communality," shared by participants in discourse, which secures continuity of reference among participants (that is, speakers can "refer" to the same language-independent "objects" from different perspectives) – he fails to explain the connection between language and the world. Beyond pointing out that "facts" and "truth," though justification-transcendent, are not structurally homologous with the objective world, he neglects to offer an explanatory account of how a nominalistically conceived world of objects corresponds to a realist portrait of knowing. In other words, he simply does not clarify exactly how linguistically mediated facts are cognitively *obtained* with respect to their language-independent referents. This failure, an inevitable consequence of an obscure account of cognition, produces paradoxical relationships between truth and justification.

In raising criticizable validity claims, speakers aspire to a truth beyond the success of their reasons (that is, a truth independent of what we agree upon now), but their discursive achievements nevertheless remain unavoidably connected to the fallibility of their justifications.[55] Actors, on the other hand, presuppose the infallibility of their beliefs about the world in order to act with certainty. Habermas struggles to articulate the rational basis for switching from the fallibilistic sensibility of

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[53]Habermas, "Introduction: Realism," 31-33.

[54]Habermas, "Introduction: Realism," 31.

[55]Habermas, "Introduction: Realism," 40.

a speaker to the perspective of certainty adopted by an actor; he struggles because his pragmatic account of objectivity suffers from insufficient explanations of (1) the relationship between language and the world, and (2) the corresponding question of cognition.

In the following discussion, we will draw from the philosophy of consciousness developed by Bernard Lonergan in order to demonstrate summarily its unique accomplishment, its supplementing complementarity with the theory of communicative action, and its correction to the errors that Habermas appropriately rejects in the legacy of idealism.

VII. PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS REVISITED

For Lonergan, consciousness has both cognitive and constitutive aspects. Understanding the distinction and relation between these two aspects of consciousness will provide the key to our discussion.

We begin with the process of knowing, which includes diverse intellectual operations of, "attending [to data], inquiring, understanding, conceiving, doubting, weighing the evidence, judging."[56] These knowing acts, however, not only indicate cognitive functions but also *consciously* cognitive functions. This final addition points to the constitutive aspect of consciousness alongside the cognitive. In other words, we are conscious of ourselves unreflectively through or in the multifarious ways in which we come to know another. These multifarious ways signify intellectual and sensitive operations, and such operations – that is, cognitive acts – include an immanent conscious quality. That immanent conscious quality defines the act itself as conscious; thus, for example, a person who sees a red object is also conscious of seeing a red object. As a quality of the cognitional act, consciousness differs at different levels of the cognitional process, but remains ever an "identity immanent in the diversity and

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[56]Bernard Lonergan, "Christ as Subject: A Reply," in *Collection*, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 166, n. 14.

multiplicity of the process."[57] Consciousness constitutes, therefore, the unity of the psychological subject qua subject as the dynamic field within which diverse sensitive and intellectual operations occur.

The inclusion of the psychological subject within knowing acts distinguishes Lonergan's notion of consciousness as experience from the idealist and naïve realist notions of consciousness as perception or confrontation. Lonergan repeatedly criticizes the latter models for conceiving the process of knowing on the analogy of ocular vision, that is, knowing as taking a good look. His critique incidentally falls in rhythm with Habermas. He argues that the model of perception presupposes contact with direct and reflexive objects of knowledge through an _objectivating_ activity that simply misses altogether the constitutive aspect of consciousness. Though Habermas wants to show philosophy a complete and emergency exit from the conceptualism associated with these kinds of problems, Lonergan's intentionality analysis offers a resolution that complements a universal pragmatics.

Lonergan pinpoints the mistaken principle at the basis of the theory of consciousness as perception:

> The alternative, I suggest, is to deny that consciousness is a matter of knowing an object; the alternative is to deny that only objects are known, the alternative is to reject the tacit assumption that _unumquodque cognoscitur secundem quod est obiectum_ [everything (that is known) is known insofar as it is an object], and to put in its place the familiar axiom that _unumquodque cognoscitur secundem quod est actu_ [everything (that is known) is known insofar as it actually is (or, is in act)]. On the basis of this axiom, one can assert that whenever there is a _sensible actu_ [sensible in act] or an _intelligible actu_ [intelligible in act], an object is known; and whenever there is a _sensus actu_ [sense in act (referring, of course, to the faculty)] or an _intellectus actus_ [intellect in act (referring to the faculty)], the subject and his act are known.[58]

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[57]Bernard Lonergan, _Insight: A Study of Human Understanding_, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 344-52.

[58]"Christ as Subject," 165.

In other words, through or in an act, whereby an object becomes known, one is constituted as present to oneself; and such self-presence *is not* an objectivating activity, but rather a performative immediacy intrinsic to cognitional acts. Sensitive and intellectual operations involve an unreflective self-awareness or self-presence: the conscious subject as the performative center of distinct cognitional activities. Whether the object of an insight refers to the data of sense (as in direct knowing) or to the data of consciousness (as in reflexive knowing), the intellectual operation itself includes unreflective knowledge or awareness of the subject as subject. As Lonergan writes, "Now by *both* direct and reflexive operations the subject in act is constituted and known, not as object, but as subject; this constitutive knowing and being known is consciousness."[59]

When Lonergan coins the term *conscientia-experientia*, he underscores the constitutive aspect of consciousness and satisfies the cognitive aspect without freezing its activity within the observer perspective of the third person. For our purposes, we will discuss two important points that follow from the notion of consciousness as experience.

First, the notion at hand retains the originality of spontaneous knowing acts declared lost by a Kantian epistemology. Frederick Lawrence has commented on the connection between Habermas and Lonergan with respect to this point.[60] Consciousness understood to involve some immediate knowledge of the subject as subject prompts Lawrence to emphasize the *performative* nature of this knowledge, or, what he calls, "knowledge in an improper sense of the word."[61] For Lonergan, the proper sense of knowledge involves the compound of potential, formal, and full acts of meaning corresponding to the normative pattern of intelligent operations in experiencing, understanding, and judging.[62] By emphasizing the performative character of potential self-knowledge as

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[59]"Christ as Subject," 166, n. 14.

[60]Frederick G. Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other," in *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1993), 186-88.

[61]"Christ as Subject," 187.

[62]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 74.

"the experienced," Lonergan avoids confining the subject as subject to an objectification.

Recall that the constitutive aspect of consciousness pertains to the constitution of the intelligent and rational subject as self-present center of intelligent and rational acts. In this sense, reflexive knowing begins with an insight into the *experience* of the cognitional performance that produces insights, generates definitions in concepts, and achieves *full knowing* in acts of judgment. As a conscious subject, I can experience my experiencing, understanding, and judging; I can understand the experience of my experiencing, understanding, and judging, and so on. Lonergan writes, "one must begin from the performance if one is to have the experience necessary for understanding what the performance is."[63] In reference to this citation, Lawrence connects Lonergan's emphasis upon the performance of cognitional process with the primacy of the performative attitude insisted upon by Habermas. Though the cognitional performance of knowing remains distinct from self-knowledge in the proper sense, the latter obtains a methodological primacy. This route seems to complement rather well the task of articulating the formal-pragmatic features of communication – features invariably presupposed in any instance of communication, whether reflected upon or not. Because the performance does not indicate an antecedent necessity but reveals and establishes the contingent facticity of the normative pattern of knowing, Lawrence observes that,

> inasmuch as [self-knowing] involves using our ordinary language to inquire, grasp, and formulate and then to check out and judge whether articulations of possibly relevant relationships are contingently verifiable in the experiences themselves, such self-knowledge has the quality of what Habermas, borrowing from Piaget, calls reconstruction.[64]

The second important point I would like to raise in conjunction with the notion of consciousness as experience regards the absence of any attempt to suppose an epistemic bridge between knower and known in the analysis of cognitional process. The axiom to which Lonergan referred

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[63]"Christ as Subject" 174.
[64]Lawrence, "Fragility of Consciousness," 188.

in the earlier citation also indicates the primary and essential terms in which the Aristotelian conceives the event of knowing. Contrary to the conceptualist, who conceives knowing as primarily a matter of confrontation with objects, the Aristotelian regards knowing as primarily and essentially a matter of identity, perfection, or act: "Sense in act is the sensible in act. Intellect in act is the intelligible in act."[65] The normative pattern of cognition indicates a process of enrichment that consists in a successive series of conscious acts and corresponding contents. "On this view the subject in act and his act are constituted and, as well, they are known simultaneously and concomitantly with the knowledge of objects."[66]

Habermas correctly identifies the exhaustion of a paradigm that struggles against the transcendental gap between the intelligible and empirical worlds. The essential Kantian element of *Anschauung* sets up an irreconcilable dilemma between the categories of understanding and the manifold of objects known in the world of mere appearances. Because cognitional operations rely solely upon intuition for their objective reference, the inaccessibility of the *noumenon* relegates *Anschauung* to the shell of phenomenality and abandons the objectivity of knowing to the obscurity of illusion.

Lonergan, on the other hand, puts in place the principle stating that the intelligible in act is the intellect in act. Insight prescinds from a supposed primordial distinction between subject and object; the distinction between meaning and meant, or between knower and known, arises only subsequent to the initial act of understanding;[67] and, therefore, the critical problem of Kantian epistemology remains thoroughly absent.[68]

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[65]Bernard Lonergan, "Imago Dei," in *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,* vol. 2 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 192-93.

[66]"Christ as Subject," 165.

[67]For Lonergan, insight, prior to its expression in the inner word of understanding (that is,. a concept or definition), signifies a potential act of meaning; the distinction between meaning and meant has not yet emerged. See, by way of comparison, *Method in Theology,* 74.

[68]Why the Kantian problem remains absent pertains to the issue of objectivity or the fundamental relation of knowing and being. We will discuss this issue soon, but its relevance is felt here and in the note below.

The principle under discussion focuses the analysis of intellectual knowing in terms of intelligence itself rather than in those of sense or perception;[69] and it has the dual effect of clarifying the performative character of conscious knowing, as we have seen, while specifying distinct *a posteriori* intelligible and sensible acts. Insight grasps the intelligibility immanent in the data of sense but not given with sense. An act of understanding adds to the object of sense an element proper to intelligence: the intelligibility of the sensible. And yet "insights are a dime a dozen," because the absolute affirmation of intelligibility requires a judgment of fact. Knowing involves a process of incremental achievements – pertaining to distinct objects of experiencing, objects of understanding, objects of judging – headed towards the realization of its final goal, the proper object of knowledge achieved in the term of rational judgment: being. From a theoretical standpoint concerned with the elements of cognitional process, the formal identity of insight makes possible the crucial level of judgment in critical realism. The supposition of an epistemic bridge appears altogether misplaced and unnecessary in light of the act of understanding, which ensures that, "by their very genesis concepts are united with data."[70] And from concepts, we move to rational reflection in anticipation of the reflective insight that grasps a virtually unconditioned, that is, a conditioned defined by verifiably fulfilled conditions.[71] Lonergan says of the virtually unconditioned that,

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[69]Lonergan makes a related and important point on the issue of objectivity in a treatment of the dynamism of questioning. Though an "analysis of questioning forces one to conceive human intelligence, not on the analogy of sense, but properly in terms of intelligence itself," it remains that the cognitional principle under discussion allows us to explicate the relation between intelligibility and data on the level of intelligence without struggling (on some imagined bridge) between distinct sets of contents: sensible and intelligible. We will turn to the analysis of questioning later in the text.. See, by way of comparison, Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection*, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 201. To be sure, for Lonergan, concepts are always *a posteriori*; only the "operative intelligibility of understanding," is *a priori*. For an excellent discussion of the differences between Lonergan and Kant, see, by way of comparison, Giovanni B. Sala, *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge*, trans. Joseph Spoerl, ed. Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

[70]*Insight*, 364.

[71]For more on the virtually unconditioned, see, by way of comparison, *Insight*, chap. 9.

once that grasp has occurred, one cannot be reasonable and yet fail to pass judgment. Again, the third level is alone decisive; until I judge, I am merely thinking; once I judge, I know; as insight draws the definite object of thought from the hazy object of experience, so judgment selects the objects of thought that are objects of knowledge.[72]

Lonergan's emphatic description of judgment as "alone decisive" complements Habermas's insistence on criticizability as the central presupposition of rationality. Where the latter emphasizes the "yes" or "no" response of a hearer in communication, the former draws our attention to the interior "yes" or "no" that answers a question for reflection ("Is it so?") at the basis of reflective understanding. Complementing the focus of communicative rationality on the linguistic medium of intersubjectivity, Lonergan suggests that language in effect *releases* consciousness by the integral role it comes to play in cognitional activity – in the sense that the scope for the kinds of possible judgments increases with linguistic ability.[73] Without taking away from its world-structuring function, language remains, for Lonergan, an instrumental act of meaning; it expresses the cognitional achievements of knowing subjects.[74] If Habermas understands the reproduction of the lifeworld to occur in a circular process, then the communicative achievements of participants must, in the final analysis, retain some independence at the level of cognition – even though those achievements occur against the background of the intersubjectively shared lifeworld. Similarly, the individuating effects of the linguistic structure of communication require some account of the prior cognitional performance that allows for independence and creativity *within* language.

William Rehg points out that formal pragmatics and cognitional theory mutually supplement each other on these issues of judgment and intersubjectivity. When Lonergan identifies the conditioned of the

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[72]*Insight*, 364.

[73]Lonergan writes, "By its embodiment in language, in a set of conventional signs, meaning finds its greatest liberation." See, by way of comparison, *Method in Theology*, 70.

[74]Lonergan articulates this point with a distinction between "original meaningfulness" and "ordinary meaningfulness" and thereby distances his position from the use-theory of language proposed by Wittgenstein. See, by way of comparison, *Method in Theology*, 254-57.

virtually unconditioned as the prospective judgment, he says, "At once it follows that the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further pertinent questions."[75] Rehg argues correctly, I believe, in suggesting that formal pragmatics can aid in further exploiting the intersubjective dimension of reflective insight inasmuch as one relies upon others for calling to mind the range of questions pertinent to the affirmation of a particular judgment.[76] Though Lonergan acknowledges the need for "talking things over," he spends little time developing the importance of this fact.[77] On the other hand, Rehg suggests that when Habermas speaks of "insight into the better argument," he seems implicitly to presuppose the kind of reflective insight to which Lonergan attributes full knowing. Simply put, the linguistic practice of raising criticizable validity claims *must* refer to knowing, speaking, and acting *subjects.*

We have discussed the identity of the intellect in act and the intelligible in act and have placed the final term of knowing at the level of judgment, but we have yet to discuss explicitly the identity of knowing and being. The fundamental relation of cognitional activity to reality resides in intellectual curiosity, the dynamism of questioning, Aristotle's wonder. In fact, the normative pattern of conscious intentionality – experiencing, understanding, judging – follows the distinct types of *questions* that initiate the operations at each level and lead to corresponding contents. For example, a question for intelligence, "What is it?" leads to insight, and a question for reflection, "Is it so?" leads to a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Prior to an act of understanding, the intellect in potency wonders, asks questions, desires intelligibility, truth, being. Lonergan refers to this basic yearning, this desire to know, as the *notion of being,* because of the unrestricted horizon of its intention. As an anticipatory desire, the notion of being always already intends its objective: being. But the capacity to inquire about anything whatsoever differs significantly from actually arriving at the goal of conscious

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[75]*Insight,* 309.

[76]William Rehg, "From Logic to Rhetoric in Science: A Formal-Pragmatic Reading of Lonergan's *Insight,*" in *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age,* ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1993), 166.

[77]*Insight,* 310.

intentionality. Lonergan offers a clear definition, "Being is what you desire to know when you inquire; it is what you are trying to conceive when you conceive; and it is what you know when you affirm it."[78] The key to critical realism, though, lies in the recognition that the notion of being "functions in knowledge as a finality";[79] it underpins, guides, and makes possible the knowing process that culminates in "the transition from intelligibility to being" with the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Quite simply, "knowing is knowing being."[80]

Not only does the Kantian supposition of the epistemic bridge appear misinformed to the Aristotelian, who prefers the primacy of perfection or identity, but also *the need* for a bridge never arises for the latter for the simple reason that the problem never presents itself. The sting of the critical question in idealism – "How does a knower get beyond herself to the known?" – disappears when the analysis of knowing begins with the *performance* of questioning and moves towards a set of rational affirmations: knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others as others.[81]

One does not need to get beyond a known knower. Rather, in heading for being, the knowing subject discovers both itself and everything else it could possibly wonder about. As Lonergan writes, "questioning not only is about being but is itself being, being in its *Gelichtetheit*, being in its openness to being, being that is realizing itself through inquiry to knowing that, through knowing, it may come to loving."[82]

The vertical finality of the dynamism of questioning characterizes subjectivity; it stands as the sole *a priori*. The fundamental relation of knowing and being allows Lonergan to identify the real with being and objectivity with the real. For Lonergan, "objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity."[83] The finality of human knowing

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[78]Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being,* vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 156.

[79]*Understanding and Being,* 169.

[80]*Understanding and Being,* 160.

[81]This set of judgments yields the principal sense of objectivity. See, by way of comparison, *Insight,* 401.

[82]"Metaphysics as Horizon," 192.

[83]*Method in Theology,* 265.

signifies a movement of self-transcendence headed towards an affirmation of reality.[84] Lonergan thus articulates the transcendental precepts as the immanent norms of cognitional process, the interior call to authenticity: "Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible."[85]

Knowing correctly depends upon the availability of the data and the genuineness of the subject. Though formal pragmatics certainly clarifies the universal conditions for communication, it is one thing to say what actors presuppose for linguistic practices and quite another to articulate the normative exigencies of intelligent and rational consciousness. If an original instance of language involves the participants' presupposition that force and constraint remain absent while only the cooperative quest for truth issues its demands upon discourse, then this presupposition must *compel* participants internally. An interest in the truth can only originate with the knowing, speaking, and acting subject who claims to have achieved it in raising a criticizable validity claim. Furthermore, the binding force of speech-acts depends upon the coordinating effect of the warranty offered on their behalf, because mutual understanding and agreement follow only upon a true affirmation. A concept of rationality guided by a telos for consensus remains deficient as long as it lacks an articulation of that upon which its goal, in fact, stands: truth.

Granted, truth can mean different things. But this does not take away from the fact that participants in communication presuppose that the validity of their claims expresses a grasp of what actually *is* the case – whether the validity of a claim pertains to normative rightness, subjective truthfulness, or propositional truth. It does not take away from the fact that participants ask questions and questions precede all validity claims.

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[84]For the sake of the comparison between Habermas and Lonergan, I have focused strictly on the intellectual operations of experiencing, understanding and judging, with no mention of the fourth level of responsible decision. This impoverishment is felt more intensely in discussion of vertical finality. In clarification of the text above, the vertical finality of human subjectivity rests only in the inexhaustibility of unrestricted love. With the fulfillment of conscious intentionality in a state of unrestricted loving, the level of responsibility becomes the conscious ground of the existential subject. A proper treatment of these topics in a comparison with the work of Habermas would require another paper. See, by way of comparison, *Method in Theology*, chap. 4.

[85]The final precept corresponds to the transcendental notion of the good of value and pertains to the conscious-intentional level of responsible decision. See, by way of comparison, *Method in Theology*, 53.

"There is wondering: What? Why? How often?"[86] And these questions pertain to anything that knowing, speaking, acting subjects can ask about, anything that can enter into argumentation. "Then there is another type of question, the critical attitude with respect to the formulation: Is that right?"[87] And this question follows upon any insight into the particular (normative, expressive, objective) situation asked about. "Finally, there is grasping the unconditioned and judging."[88] And having made this affirmation truly, participants reach the absolute objectivity of judgment, true knowledge of reality, being. "There is nothing outside being that can take a look at it and have being as its object. If it is outside being, it is nothing. You move through judgment, through the unconditioned, to an absolute realm, and in that realm you find not only objects but also yourself."[89] Truth can mean different things, but if one truly desires consistency between one's cognitional performance and one's judgments, then one identifies truth with being.[90]

VIII. CONCLUSION: ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Where Habermas simply neglects the fundamental question of cognition presupposed by the issue of objectivity in reaction to the Kantian model of perception, Lonergan overcomes the errors of idealism without denying its achievements. The relation of cognitional activity to reality relies first and foremost not on sense perception but on the question. In its

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[86]*Understanding and Being*, 163.

[87]*Understanding and Being*, 164.

[88]*Understanding and Being*, 164.

[89]*Understanding and Being*, 172-73.

[90]The reader may note that, in addition to his emphasis upon the objectivity of judgment, Lonergan also insists that one cannot absolutely rule out the emergence of further relevant questions in light of an otherwise satisfactory grasp of the sufficient evidence grounding a particular judgment. But note here also that this proviso of fallibility need not in any way problematize the ontological status of a correct judgment: when the analysis of knowing begins with the (empirically verifiable) dynamism of questioning (that is, the notion of being), it ends or arrives at its full term with a correct judgment or an affirmation of the virtually unconditioned, that is, an instance of being, the object of anticipation. Accordingly, an incorrect judgment is precisely that: incorrect. Fallibility and objectivity are not opposed or competing terms. See, by way of comparison, *Insight*, 308-12.

immediate intention of being, questioning provides "the constitutive principle of objectivity."[91]

In his theory of communicative action, Habermas: (1) articulates the unavoidable presuppositions of communication as the basis of a concept of rationality that embraces the range of linguistic possibilities, (2) focuses the internal relation of meaning and validity within a pragmatic orientation to mutual understanding, (3) recognizes the doubled character of validity claims, and (4) emphasizes the intersubjectivity of linguistic practices. In privileging the performative attitude of communication-participants, communicative rationality surrenders objectivistic foundations for a scientific and fallible sensibility.

Though Habermas argues that the reconstructive science of formal pragmatics marks a definitive break with "the aspiration of first philosophy in any form,"[92] Lonergan identifies a total and basic horizon in the unavoidable operations of conscious intentionality. And with this identification, first philosophy finds its redemption not in a totalizing conceptualism, but in the self-appropriation of knowing, speaking and acting subjects. We find the foundations for communication within the consciousness of the subject who desires to know, inquires, and asks questions. Communication depends for its condition of possibility upon the yearning that the human being *is*.

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[91]"Metaphysics as Horizon," 203.

[92]Jurgen Habermas, "Questions and Counterquestions," in *Habermas and Modernity*, ed. Richard J. Bernstein (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 196.

A SPACE FOR DIFFERENCE:
APPRAISING FOUCAULDIAN
HYPERVIGILANCE

Jim Kanaris

McGill University

Montreal, Canada

T HE SONS AND daughters of the masters of suspicion ("experts of suspicion" as I like to call them) are getting better press these days. Among students they trigger a sense of familiarity and solidarity. Alarmist interpretations are abating. My own students, for instance, gravitate almost immediately to individuals such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, even if challenged by their arcane style and unfortunate life choices. Their progenitors such as Nietzsche and Marx (and to a certain extent Kant and Hegel) help students to identify with their style and concerns. Allow me to draw from this paltry demographic the suggestion that the basic assumptions of contemporary Continental thought form the common sense. Once one overcomes the barrier of abstruse language (and I admit Derrida's books rarely make it to my bedside), the barrier between common sense and scholarly understanding begins to collapse. While impartial colleagues continue to extricate themselves from the view that all poststructuralism is, as Caputo scoffs, "nothing more than a quagmire of relativism and nihilism,"[1] students readily embrace it as a newly found lover. For sympathizers, this can be as heartening as it can be disturbing. There is much reward in nuancing the insights of common sense. Careful readers, for instance, pick up that the will to power does not consist in the eradication of other

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[1]John D. Caputo, Forward to *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, ed. Jim Kanaris and Mark J. Doorley (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), xi.

drives, the will to truth for example. It consists in interpreting such drives vis-à-vis focused, historically relative insights. The reaction is in response to a perceived tyranny, of reason, of morality, of religion – and this all in the name of what is commonly prized: life, creativity, imagination, profundity, futurity, moxie. My unease arises over the reflex that disdains seemingly dated methods and insights, this being the case despite the fact that these newer "methods" are forged on the backs of older methods. And so because particular notions such as subjectivity, objectivity, faith, reason, and God have been deconstructed and genealogized, the temptation is to reject the possibility that difference (never mind "authenticity") may well reside in this stock of notions. Too often lip service is paid to the truism that different thinkers think nominally similar things differently. At any rate, such disdain is what is infectious about what I will name the *"hypervigilant"* strategies of Foucault and Derrida. It's characteristic of most conversions. Exuberance tends to breed truncation.

In this paper I wish to identify the driving force of this inclination motivated by the larger question of whether hypervigilance is always desirable. Seeing as my field is philosophy of religion, my interest centers on the philosophic contributions of poststructuralists to religious studies and theology. Derrida's contribution in this regard is weightier than Foucault's, although Foucault scholars are probing the connections more deeply.[2] The religion connection is interesting for the way in which it helps one to gauge the relevance of differing philosophic positions weighing on matters of faith. Lonergan is helpful here. He provides an intriguing balance of rigorous thought and a faith dynamic that airs on the side of wonder. Interesting, too, is his sober appreciation of the ubiquity of bias. Vigilance suffers no less in his work, even if the prefix "hyper" would be bowdlerized (as we are about to see) for philosophic, rather than moral or political, reasons.

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[2]James Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ : Humanities Press, 1990); J. R. Carrette, *Foucault and Religion: Spiritual and Corporality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). For more see Michel Foucault, *Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault,* selected and edited by J. R. Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), 3-4, n. 10.

I limit myself here, the first part of a larger project, to Foucault since consideration of his form of hypervigilance provides a smoother segue into Derrida's significantly subtler form. Foucault is also more tenacious, which means his intentions are clear, less challenging to probe

PART I: FOUCAULDIAN HYPERVIGILANCE

The Contours of a Defiant Gesture

Not always accurate or reflective of the subtleties of a treatise, interviews nonetheless provide insight into the thoughts and motivations of the interviewee. For this reason I have selected a few such statements to launch into the discussion with relative ease.

Six years before his death Michel Foucault reminisces about the political situation that led him and his contemporaries from French Hegelianism and phenomenology to avant-garde philosophies.

> For me, politics was the chance to have an experience in the manner of Nietzsche or Bataille. For someone who was twenty years old shortly after World War II ended, who had not been drawn into the morality of the war, what could politics in fact be when it was a matter of choosing between the America of Truman and the USSR of Stalin? Between the old [French Section of the Workers' International][3] and Christian Democracy? To become a bourgeois intellectual, a professor, a journalist, a writer, or anything of that sort seemed repugnant. The experience of war had shown us the urgent need of a society radically different from the one in which we were living, this society that had permitted Nazism, that had lain down in front of it, and that had gone over en masse to de Gaulle. A large sector of French youth had a reaction of total disgust toward all that. We wanted a world and a society that were not only different but that would be an alternative version of ourselves: we wanted to be completely other in a completely different world. Moreover, the Hegelianism offered to us at the university, with its model of history's unbroken intelligibility, was not enough to satisfy us. And the same was true of phenomenology and existentialism, which maintained the primacy of the subject and its fundamental value.

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[3]SFIO: Section française d'internationale ouvrière.

> Whereas the Nietzschean theme of discontinuity, on the other
> hand, the theme of an overman who would be completely
> different from man, and, in Bataille, the theme of limit-experiences
> through which the subject escapes from itself, had an essential
> value for us. As far as I was concerned, they afforded a kind of
> way out between Hegelianism and the philosophical identity of
> the subject.[4]

The Nietzschean chorus of interruption resounds. It is roused by a
political malaise against which, in Foucault's estimation, the then
available theories were relatively powerless. At best such theories
provide, for him, short-term remedies that are finally ineffective; at worst
their rationally based remedies might feed the malaise. His famous
interview statement concerning social Darwinism and Nazism is apropos:
"One should not forget – and I'm not saying this in order to criticize
rationality, but in order to show how ambiguous things are – it was on the
basis of the flamboyant rationality of social Darwinism that racism was
formulated, becoming one of the most enduring and powerful ingredients
of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality that
was at the same time, after all, a certain form of rationality."[5]

These themes of an unbroken historical continuity and subjective
primacy, the inherent dangers of them, drive Foucault and are largely
responsible for putting him on his philosophic guard throughout his
career. The riposte, rooted in Nietzschean genealogy and Heideggerian
ontology, is familiar:[6] not an unbroken dialectical cacophony of positions
continuously reconciled through the march of time; not a present that is
animated secretly by predetermined forms of the past; not a discovery of

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[4]Michel Foucault, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-*,
1984, vol. 3, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New York Press, 1994), 247-48.

[5]Foucault, *Power*, 358.

[6]Heidegger's influence on Foucault is often eclipsed by the Nietzsche connection.
However, Foucault himself notes that Heidegger had a determinative impact on him:
"My entire philosophic development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. My
knowledge of Nietzsche is certainly better than my knowledge of Heidegger.
Nevertheless, these are the two fundamental experiences I have had. It is possible that if I
had not read Heidegger, I would not have read Nietzsche. I had tried to read Nietzsche
in the fifties but Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me – whereas Nietzsche and
Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock!" (Foucault as quoted in Niel Levy, *Being Up-
To-Date: Foucault, Sartre, and Postmodernity* [New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2001], 28).

truth that lies at the root of our knowledge and self-knowledge. Foucault's alternative, a genealogical analysis of descent (*Herkunft*), distills this quest for seamlessly woven sequences of events and intelligibilities. In the shadow of Hegel – not to revive an imagined supremacy of Kant – something of a transference takes place. Our quested objects are cathected with ideas of noumenality. Overtaken by a desire for intrinsic reality, we demote and to a certain extent ignore the sloppy, phenomenal reality we inadvertently conjure, exist in, know, and value.

A brief disclaimer. Neither Foucault nor Nietzsche offer their diagnoses in these terms. The portrayal is informed by Lonergan's diagnostic of a "new immanentism."[7] This is suggested by the qualification made earlier that Kant's supremacy is not revived by the alternatives of Nietzsche and Foucault. Even so, the ghost of Kant lingers. The attacks made on Kantian reason intend to overturn its basic assumptions; they do not annihilate or fully exorcise them.[8] Part of the reason is wedded to the attack itself. Why iron out the wrinkles when the supposed certainty provided by reason is but a function of our desires and needs and not anything intrinsically true?[9] The stance is thoroughly pragmatic focused on engaging basic presuppositions. It leaves the business of recovery to those who believe philosophy can be more than diagnostic, which for Foucault borders on the naïve.[10] Perhaps this is what lies at the basis of Fred Lawrence's observation that "[a]lmost all Continental philosophy and theology take Kant for granted."[11] They take Kant for granted in a way that someone like Lonergan cannot. Philosophy for Lonergan must indeed be more than mere diagnosis. At any rate, the principle issue for me is one of foundations, which I will get to later.

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[7]Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection*, ed. W. F. J. Ryan and B. J. Tyrrell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 69-86.

[8]For a more detailed treatment of this argument, see Kanaris, "To Whom Do We Return in the Turn to the Subject? Lonergan, Derrida, and Foucault Revisited," in *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, 33-52.

[9]See the famous passages from *The Gay Science*, 110-11.

[10]See Michel Foucault, "Who Are You, Professor Foucault?" in Michel Foucault, *Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault*, 91, 96-97.

[11]Fred Lawrence, "Lonergan's Postmodern Subject: Neither Neoscholastic Substance nor Cartesian Ego," in *In Deference to the Other*, 118, n. 4.

To return to the outline, Foucault insists that no prescriptive, humanistic philosophy that smacks of Hegelian, Husserlian, or Marxist assumptions guarantees "authentic" knowledge of reality. He opts for a strategy of reading that possesses a keen sense for messy details. Foucault says this in several places. Ready to hand is an excerpt from the famous essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1971):

> [T]o follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover ... the exteriority of accidents.[12]

A couple of years earlier, in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), Foucault spells out a rather calculated method for tracking these "faulty calculations." Not only does his *Archaeology* underline the fragility of this process, it also renders the commonsense tenor of his earlier comment less bewitching. It is a method, like any other good method, involving a complex set of relations and correlations that yield particular results. In Foucault's case, the method is for tracking emergence (*Entstehung*) whose connotation is Nietzschean. It signals random occurrence, dispensing with the simple cause-effect relationship between events that instill the belief that events are destined or necessarily continuous. Obviously, then, the transaction that takes place for genealogy is not attributable to a subject or a collective. For emergence "is a 'non-place,' a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common space. Consequently, no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice."[13]

This question of the spatiality and agency of *Entstehung* raises important issues with which Foucault grapples especially in his earlier work; they give his hypervigilant strategy the hue one has come to recognize. The basic move is to upset a form of existence founded on the

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[12]Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 81.

[13]Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, 85.

intellectual space dominated by what he calls the sovereign subject, holder of the blueprint of life. Foucault's preference, nurtured in him through protracted study of avant-garde thinkers such as Pierre Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot, and George Bataille, is for the liminal, that which "lies outside and defines the limits of the known, that which is exterior and foreign."[14]

The Space of Hypervigilance

The "non-place" of emergence, of history, of anything really, has (like most things) a history. It's a theme that pervades the writings of Derrida and Foucault. In Derrida we encounter it as *chora* ("space"), a notion taken from Plato's *Timaeus*.[15] Foucault does not, to my knowledge, mention *chora* by name but his discussion of spatiality ties in nicely with it. More than Derrida Foucault is preoccupied with the occupancy and vacancy of space, a kind of presence-absence I suspect Derrida would be eager to deconstruct. In any case, Foucault no less than Derrida views "space" as a notional placeholder. As a historian, Foucault naturally fixates on historical positivities. Cautioning about the variety of meanings of the death of God, he makes the following claim – again from an interview (1966):

> For Hegel, Reason takes the place of God, and it is the human spirit that develops little by little; for Feuerbach, God is the illusion that alienates Man, but once rid of this illusion, it is Man who comes to realise his liberty; finally, for Nietzsche, the death of God signifies the end of metaphysics, but God is not replaced by man, and the space remains empty.[16]

The space remains empty for Foucault too, but it expands and contracts with emergent discursive objects. Discourse masks several different functions. The early Foucault took special interest in discourse as that which constitutes experience of the limits of existence. Where "God" and

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[14]C. O'Farrell as quoted in J. R. Carrette, *Foucault and Religion*, 51.

[15]Plato, *Timaeus*, 50b-51b, 52a-d; see also Jacques Derrida, *On the Name*, ed. Thomas Dutoit, tran. David Wood and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 88-127.

[16]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 85

"Man" once provided as limit discourses for such experience, their cultural demise positioned sexuality (thanks to Marquis de Sade and Bataille) as the alternative that heralds their very absence: "the language of sexuality has lifted us into the night where God is absent, and where all of our actions are addressed to this absence."[17]

Structuralism served as catalyst. It realized, according to Foucault,

> that all human knowledge, all human existence, all human life, and perhaps even the biological heredity of man, are contained within structures, that is to say within a formal set of elements which obey relations anybody could describe, man ceased, so to speak, to be his own subject, to be simultaneously subject and object. [It is discovered that what makes man possible is in fact a set of structures, structures which he can admittedly, conceive and describe, but of which he is not the subject, or the sovereign consciousness. This reduction of man to the structures within which he is contained seems to me characteristic of contemporary thought. This is why the ambiguity of man as both subject and object no longer now seems to me a fruitful hypothesis, a fruitful theme for research.]."[18]

What Foucault does judge as fruitful, on the other hand, is a close examination of historical positivities constituted by language (read: not by subjects). This is the warp and woof of genealogy as well as its problematic. As a diagnostic, genealogy is a player in the game of discursive formations. It is guided by the sober judgment that that of which it is a diagnosis informs the diagnosis itself. No doubt this is why Foucault insists that the role of philosophy is nothing more than diagnosis. One gathers that language is simultaneously our problem and our liberator, depending on its use of course. It is our "problem" in the sense that intelligent beings cannot escape language, used as they are by it. Nevertheless, no problem is said to exist because this *is* the human condition. The realization is supposed to be both ominous and liberating: we face an abyss free from anxiety about following or concocting a (meta)language that promises liberation. We are freed, in a word, from the

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[17]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 58.

[18]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 93.

tyranny of our self-importance. The impact is somewhat analogous to the Copernican revolution.

The space qua space forever evicts would-be permanent residents. Prisoners of language, we use language to diagnose and critique extant discursive forms which in turn occasions new forms. A largely combative procedure, the process and results aren't always translucent. This explains cryptic statements like the following: "[T]hought should not be directed towards establishing a kind of central certitude, but should be directed towards the limits, the exterior – towards the emptiness, the negative of what it says."[19]

Is this simply exaggerated belief in language? Obviously it isn't for Foucault. He joins the ranks of those who wish to overcome what Nietzsche diagnosed as "belief in grammar." The significance of Nietzsche's statement concerns the ontologizing power of language, that is, that language gives reality to the things we utter. Reality, in this sense, refers to a construction of a particular social arrangement. As a consequence, one finds Foucault tackling every issue strictly sociopolitically.[20]

The greatest buffer of this line of reasoning is arguably the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The vote is usually given to the least cumbersome belief, opinion, or concept about the constitution of things. Although phenomenology, particularly Lonergan's version, is arguably less cumbersome, the premise upon which fundamental ontology and certain forms of poststructuralist theory are based tends to procure greater support. Thus the Nietzschean stance is tricky to argue against, with the rules allowing for judgment being completely redefined.

For Foucauldians, then, a pressing issue is the diagnosis of language referents, their function and sociopolitical condition of possibility. This is supposed to provide: (1) a handle on the power dynamics of a given

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[19]Michel Foucault, "La Pensée du dehors," *Critique* (1966): 528, as quoted in Carrette, *Foucault and Religion*, 51.

[20]See, for example, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 298, where he attributes the belief to a practice at the end of the eighteenth century, a major concern of which was to fix the frontiers of knowledge. He then further roots the belief to the practice of Port-Royal grammarians in the seventeenth century. Theirs was a concern to grant their mode of inquiry the status of a science, "the objectivizing of the speaking subject" (Foucault, *Power*, 326).

discourse; (2) a means by which to disarm a discourse's totalistic claims; and (3) a way to eventuate alternative discourses. Providing for this is the so-called death of God and the death of the subject. The space they once filled is (or ought to remain), one can only presume, "empty." Thus different languages are able to enter the are(n)a and vie for a hearing. However, because the space is still occupied by discourses that only seem to be open to difference and contradiction[21] and, furthermore, because these discourses often set the agenda, new, preferably subversive languages, are required to ensure variation. Because this is so difficult and Westerners seem hardwired to think linearly, Foucault enlists "extreme forms of language" that disrupt the process. As noted earlier, Bataille's extravagant thought experiments served as catalyst.

In one particular piece, rife with artistic patterning, Foucault works through Bataille's notion of transgression. Transgression is a pragmatic gesture or action that simultaneously involves and crosses (out) limits – horizons, if you like. As Foucault describes it: "Transgression carries the limit right to the limit of its being; transgression forces the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes ... to experience its positive truth in its downward fall."[22] Once it does this the transgressive language finds its space only to cross newly instituted boundaries. An important function of transgression, then, is to rupture the limit set by discourses that safeguard limitless concepts. Of relevance here is what Foucault says about God and the subject, namely, their cultural demise and the opportunity this presents for a new space:

> Not that this death should be understood as the end of his historical reign or as the finally delivered judgement of his non-existence, but as the now constant space of our experience. By

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[21]A case in point is an early statement by Foucault that "dialectics took the place of the questioning of being and limits the play of contradiction and totality" (*Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault*, 63). The way dialectics does this is by viewing contradiction as a necessary by-product of the developing spirit. It limits the play, not simply by eradicating contradiction by *Aufhebungen*. For developing spirit sublates, incorporates, the contradiction qua contradiction. But it limits it by viewing it as necessary for developing reason; it sees it as a necessary reasonability. Contradiction is something that comes under the categories of knowledge. In this way contradiction is managed and made manageable by the totalizing development of spirit, rationality.

[22]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 60.

denying us the limit of the Limitless, the death of God leads to an experience in which nothing may again announce the exteriority of being, and consequently [Foucault now turns to the death of the subject] to an experience which is *interior and sovereign*. But such an experience for which the death of God is an explosive reality, discloses as its own secret and clarification, its intrinsic finitude, the limitless reign of the Limit, and the emptiness of those excesses in which it spends itself and where it is found wanting ... The death of God does not restore us to a limited and positivistic world, but to a world exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which transgresses it.[23]

The creative aim is clear. The means to it are equally clear. Foucault rather belligerently describes it as "destroy[ing] syntax," "shatter[ing] tyrannical modes of speech," "turn[ing] words around in order to perceive all that is being said through them and despite them."[24] Lonergan affords a congenial interpretation of this surrealist predisposition. Like fundamental ontology, genealogy as anti-nihilistic represents a thinking that is experientially artistic. The objective is to get us past our accepted modes of speech into a spatiotemporal place forever future. I will say a little more about this later. [25] Where the congeniality breaks down is with Foucault's antinihilistic form of affirmation. It is a form that breaks with the common view, according to which affirmation is *of* or *toward* some positive content. In contrast the genealogical alternative hypervigilantly "affirms nothing"[26] (that is, not an objectified referent of meaning and certainly not a transcendent referent of meaning). Foucault links this to a principle of Maurice Blanchot called "contestation." Contestation is "a radical break of transitivity." Nothing negative, it signals an act carrying all existences and values "to their limits and, from there, to the Limit

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[23]Foucault, *Religion and Culture:*, 59.

[24]Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 298.

[25]The connections have been made before. See Kanaris, "Calculating Subjects: Lonergan, Derrida, and Foucault," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 15, no. 2 (1997) 135-50; "Lonergan and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion," in *Explorations in Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Deane-Peter Baker and Patrick Maxwell (Amsterdam and New York: Editions Rodopi, 2003), 65-79; "To Whom Do We Return in the Turn to the Subject? Lonergan, Derrida, and Foucault Revisited," in *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, 33-52.

[26]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 61.

where an ontological decision achieves its end; to contest is to proceed until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit defines being. There, at the transgressed limit," Foucault concludes, "the 'yes' of contestation reverberates, leaving without echo the hee-haw of Nietzsche's braying ass."[27]

Foucault's hypervigilant perspectivism harbors a spirit of defiance driven by the belief that an irresolute contestational stance is ineffective against potentially dangerous ideologies and teleologies. This Zarathustrian tenacity is nowhere more relevantly expressed than in a 1967 interview with Paolo Caruso entitled "Who are you, Professor Foucault?" In the interview Foucault basically rejects the suggestion that genealogy can harbor any form of humanism. "I simply say we can seek to define politically, the best conditions for the functioning of society" without appealing to the human [let alone the divine].[28] Things, he continues, simply function. "They function in a very ambiguous way, in order to live but also in order to die, since it is well known that the functioning which makes life possible is a functioning which constantly wears matter out, in such a way that is precisely that which makes possible life which at the time produces death. Species do not function for themselves, nor for man, nor for the greater glory of God; they confine themselves to functioning."

PART II: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Spacing Differences

While I find certain aspects of Foucault's hypervigilant strategy laudable, I am nonetheless wary of it for reasons I like to believe are as valid as those that line Foucault's circle of reasoning. Our preferences are so closely knotted to our experience that I find it no less dangerous psychologically to dismiss personal experience as to accept everything that informs it. Foucault is very insightful when locating the social conditions that direct the power dynamics of our common consciousness. However, even he

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[27]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 62. The reference to Nietzsche's braying ass, a post- and antinihilistic gesture, is to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part Four, "The Awakening."

[28]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 101.

must appeal to personal experience that directs his research choices. "You can never prove a horizon," Lonergan so wisely said. "You arrive at it from a different horizon, by going beyond the previous one, because you have found something that makes the previous horizon illegitimate."[29] Foucault has contributed enormously to the negotiation of my own horizon. What has failed to result, however, is the need to jettison every aspect of it. Perhaps this is a required discontinuity whose absence does not make me a very good Foucauldian. In any event, I like to believe we are on a level playing field making horizonal choices, some of the reasons for which we are aware and others of which we are not.

I would like to register my reckless appreciation of genealogical hypervigilance as owing to deep "foundational" differences. The notion is borrowed from Lonergan. In *Method* foundational reality is equated with religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Irreconcilable oppositions of a religious, moral, and intellectual nature are rooted in the lack or presence of the relevant conversion. The scope of conversion operates in Lonergan on implicit and explicit levels. Its explicit operation, as coterminous with the expression of foundational reality, reserves, it seems to me, a technical significance to conversion, namely, as a rationally self-conscious activity. Intentionality analysis is offered as the discourse to gauge authentic and inauthentic horizons.[30] The technical sense I wish to attribute to conversion centers on this last point. But as distinct from the expression of foundational reality, the implicit operation of conversion may be seen as pertaining to the negotiation of different and perhaps irreconcilable horizons, and this without an appeal to an "explicit, established, universally recognized criterion of proper procedure."[31] Lonergan recognizes the possibility for the negotiation of "authentic" being at both levels, although his meta-methodological interests and horizonal commitments favor the more robust option of intentionality

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[29]Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophy of God, and Theology: The Relationship Between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty, Systematics* (London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 41.

[30]In chap. 11 of *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), Lonergan discusses, accordingly, the issue of conversion vis-à-vis the authentic functioning of the mediating and mediated phases of functional specialization. I wish to discuss the matter of conversion more generally here with reference to, though bracketing, intentionality analysis. See note 32 below.

[31]*Method in Theology*, 268.

based conversion. Since my concerns are more general I would like to locate the discussion at the implicit level of foundational negotiation with respect to intellectual and religious horizons.[32]

A Restrictive Intellectual Horizon

Foucault admits a great deal into his horizon and yet his hypervigilance causes him to reject a great deal as well. At times he can be eclectic and recognize the legitimacy of positions about which he himself is noncommittal. At other times, when provoked by an alternative philosophy, his adamant perspectivism gets the best of him. One of the unsettling consequences is that his discourse takes on a dogmatic air and can be rather shortsighted.[33] Highlighted, too, on account of the growing popularity of holism, is the reductionist tenor of his procedure: things simply function; our role is merely to diagnose how and why. Foucault's training as a historian and philosopher guides and, at times, even forces the issue. Perhaps he is within his epistemic rights to do so. I mention it here as an example of what compels me to pick and choose with respect to his philosophy.

Intellectually the issue for me hinges on Foucault's truncated vision, not of intellect per se but of the different experiences of intellect. There are reasons for this, as I have outlined, but I refuse to believe they are decisive. A greater appreciation of other thought forms would remedy the problem. Recently Caputo has almost suggested this very thing.

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[32]The distinction between implicit and explicit levels of foundational engagement is a means of discriminating between the negotiation of horizons at a general, experiential level of orientation (implicit) as opposed to one that is technical, assuming a specific language (explicit). Because Lonergan's language is problematic to poststructuralists who stop their ears at oncoming phenomenological sound waves, I find the distinction helpful as a means of avoiding tangential expositions of Lonergan's meaning. To be clear then, both foundational aspects are wholly matters of conversion. In other words, the distinction is not invoked in order to avoid taking sides; it's always a matter of taking sides. It may also be helpful to note that this paper is largely about settling differences with Foucault, assuming Lonergan's general categories. It is not, strictly speaking, a comparative analysis. The distinction, then, between implicit and explicit foundational engagement functions here as a loophole to argue my case without delving into technical exegetical matters, the delicacy of which would require a book-length treatment.

[33]Gary Gutting describes it fittingly as "the imperial tone of Foucaultian rhetoric" ("Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 14).

Poststructuralists have basically bypassed mathematical and scientific rationality. What forms their consciousness is far more "political" in nature doused by the concerns of literary-critical and psychoanalytic theories. In response Caputo charitably suggests that Foucault, among others (he names Derrida), has something to learn from the seriousness with which someone like Lonergan treats mathematics and science.[34]

My hunch as to what might be learned is, admittedly, pessimistic; I take the learning curve to be slight. On a good day Foucault would judge the seriousness exemplified by Lonergan as part of a culturally important social practice that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of possible self-knowledge. The knowledge gained, he might continue, is of an order whose emergent reality is decided through its particular enunciative modality. What is perceived to be significant is the social constituents and function of the practice, not any presumed "truth" regarding its prescriptions. As an alternative, Foucault would offer his own strictly diagnostic hermeneutics of the self that "seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves."[35] Foucault's programmatic of transformation is ostensibly different in that its enunciative modality is strictly diagnostic; it concerns functioning and not the creation of a discourse that appears to legitimate a particular form of functioning. This is on good day! On a bad day, when tested, say, by "the Aristotelian prescription of getting the sceptic to talk,"[36] Foucault would find confirmation of his idea that practices grounded by the type of seriousness exemplified by Lonergan are but a mere rehabilitation of the nineteenth-century "idea of man." The idea may have a perceived necessary function but, given Foucault's philosophic horizon, it is incongruous with the claims of the discourse itself.

This kind of predisposition is difficult to argue against phenomenologically. One might poke holes here and there but, unless the paradigm that sustains it shifts, I suspect little will change as a result. Again, this is only a hunch. What *could* be learned from Lonergan, on the

[34]Caputo, "Foreword," in *In Deference to the Other*, xi.

[35]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 4, n. 4.

[36]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 354.

other hand, pivots on a horizonal element that Foucault seems almost hardwired to reject: a multidimensional expansive viewpoint.[37] Foucault doesn't exclude other viewpoints per se; his scope is enormous. However, the elbowroom he grants them is circumscribed to a space of functioning that coalesces with the genealogical mien. The heuristic is highly parsimonious, more than Foucault lets on. There is a difference, then, between a heuristic that resolutely guards the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject (Foucault), and one that masters the various means by which such possibilities become, like it or not, quite definite and/or probabilistic (Lonergan). The space inhabited by both heuristics is disproportionate, although not necessarily so. A programmatic as Foucault's is powerful when cognizant of a limit reached by its manner of questioning. It is less so when extended to other fields as though decisive or directly pertinent. In this respect the space within which Foucauldian hypervigilance operates is, in my opinion, suffocative and can and often does produce results that it means to impede. As a ruse against what seems familiar and dangerous a hypervigilant strategy may in fact block the way to what is different and liberating. The problem has been well diagnosed by Fred Lawrence:

> The brilliant sensitivity for disjunctions, slippages, and the discontinuous in general can also be used as an excuse for not properly acknowledging higher viewpoints that emerge inasmuch as the mind comes to terms with discontinuities and leaps in being that are not explicable in terms of the logical expansion of the lower viewpoints.[38]

The space simultaneously tapped into and carved out by Foucault's transgressive gesture contains a limit that is ignored or discounted because of a well-meaning but finally monochromatic hypervigilance. A broader appreciation of how diverse intelligibilities relate would reduce this hypervigilant tendency to limit diverse intelligibilities to mere

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[37]I use "expansive viewpoint" to avoid imagined evaluative connotations attached to the term "higher" in Lonergan's usage.

[38]Fred Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other," in *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, ed. Thomas J. Farrell anf Paul A. Soukup (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1993), 197-98.

functioning and their analysis to mere diagnosis. It is rooted in Foucault's methodological emphasis on the discontinuous and accidental underpinned by the belief that every alternative, say, one that appeals to continuity, merely reinstates "the search for an original foundation that would make rationality the *telos* of mankind, and link the whole history of thought to the preservation of this rationality, to the maintenance of this teleology, and to the ever necessary return to this foundation." It is a theme, he writes, that "has played a constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism."[39]

The claim broadsides any qualification prone as the claim is to the genetic fallacy. Whatever Foucault's reasons – and he does offer many good ones – it is untenable to lump all thinking on the subject as irredeemably Hegelian or Cartesian. Foucault's tenacity, warranted perhaps by his intellectual milieu, is not really sufferable in a context that has excised the "ghost in the machine." He is unequivocal for the same reason many are when charting a new course: he desires to be heard and to avoid innocuous assimilation, to wit, the classification "mere corrective." The reasoning goes like this: if continuity is the dominant theme that reinforces the sovereignty of the subject, it stands to reason that emphasizing discontinuity could provide the needed leverage to unmake future storylines. Not inherently bad as such, future storylines for Foucault are undesirable when grounded in the cultural trigger mechanism of continuity always already ripe for prescriptive know-how, for knowledge whose dictates are animated by a reach that far exceeds its grasp.

Foucault's hypervigilance toward rationality is, I suggest, supported by a fixation on a view of scientific inquiry modeled on classical method. According to Lonergan, classical method is a parsimonious heuristic structure that probes ideally constructed systematic processes. The processes are ideally constructed in the sense that their organization is ascertained through selective inquiry and not arbitrary or passive knowledge. Furthermore, they are systematic in that creative intelligence,

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[39]Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, tran. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 1972), 13, 12.

through determinate principles such as similarity, grasps a pattern in a matrix of otherwise coincidental spatial-temporal events. Form is harnessed through insight into matter, the general taking precedence over particular occurrence.[40]

In Foucault such a method extends, but is not limited, to modern systems of philosophy. He calls them "cultural totalities" that deny themselves "the use of discontinuity, ... the description of specific series, the uncovering of the whole interplay of differences."[41] Foucault doesn't pull any punches as to why this is: to "guarantee that everything that has eluded [the subject] may be restored to him; ... to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode."[42] Lonergan's description of classical method is much more amiable, although he fully recognizes the limits of classical method, especially when isolated from concerns that resemble Foucault's. Lonergan does this by contrasting the primary difficult task of classical method to that of statistical method. Even if the contours of statistical method are obtained from statistical scientific inquiry, which interests Foucault only remotely,

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[40]See *Insight*, 60-71.

[41]Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 15, 13.

[42]Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12. In his later work Foucault broaches the issue more constructively by devising a hermeneutics of the self. His modus operandi is to unearth the ancients' appreciation of selfhood eclipsed by the Cartesian overemphasis on self-knowledge as the founding moment of legitimate philosophical method. Foucault mounts the case that *epimeleia heautou* ("care of the self"), not *gnōthi seauton* ("know yourself"), is the indispensable clearing ground for truth in the ancients. On this reading, access to truth is made possible, not through disinterested inquiry and a foundational self, as inaugurated by the Cartesian appropriation of the Delphic precept, but through complex practices (purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions, and so forth) intended to transform the subject. Foucault is not saying that the one perspective is necessarily better than the other. His point rather is that something important has been lost in the Cartesian desire to offset early technologies of the self with a positive, theoretical and practical, alternative. For Christian technologies in particular, which Foucault regards as very valuable, there was "no truth about the self without a sacrifice of the self" (Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 180). This flies in the face of so much thinking on the subject after Descartes. See Foucault, *The Care of the Self*, vol. 3 of *The History of Sexuality*, tran. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1986) and more recently *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982*, tran. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005).

Lonergan's preoccupation with the nonsystematic bears immediate relevance.

Classical method assumes a single intelligibility that, in every event of a systematic process, corresponds to a single insight or single set of unified insights. Things are different with nonsystematic process:

> There will be no single insight, or single set of unified insights, that masters at once the whole process and all its events. The only correct understanding will be either a set of different insights or else a set of different unified sets. In the former case the different insights will not be unified intelligibly, and so they will not be related to one another in any orderly series or progression or grouping whatever. In the latter case the different sets of unified insights will have no higher intelligible unity, and so they will not be related to one another in any orderly series or progression or grouping whatever.[43]

The process consists of an event or series of events that diverge nonsystematically from ideal frequencies (that is, systematic process) that are formulated into general laws. Lonergan flags such events as "coincidental aggregates." Coincidental aggregates elude unification of any kind. Unlike determinate aggregates of ideal frequencies, coincidental aggregates are actual frequencies that simply happen to be.[44] They pertain to the "empirical residue," matters of fact with no immanent intelligibility.

Foucault's insistence on seemingly incidental historical details for alternative views of history (log books, disheveled notes, and other obscure writings); his acute reading of conventional bodies of literature to unearth the social practices that constitute normative history is analogous to the statistician's preoccupation with the nonsystematic. It cuts across the propensity for the continuous, the focal point being the particular. As a result the general is decentralized through a selection of events that diverge nonsystematically from ideal frequencies that reinforce the preconceptions of historians and philosophers.

Being categorical about the particular can serve as a catalyst for new meanings. As Lonergan himself has noted: "nonsystematic process can be

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[43]*Insight*, 72.
[44]See *Insight*, 639.

the womb of novelty. For the possibility of leaping deductively from any situation of a systematic process to any other situation rests on the fact that a systematic process is little more than a perpetual repetition of essentially the same story."[45] Foucault bears this out in his inventive (which is not to say uncontested) historical treatments of madness and sexuality and of time-honored institutions as the penal system and the human sciences. Problems arise on account of, inter alia, a strained methodological predilection.

I agree with Lonergan that the reduction of a potential intelligibility attained by one line of questioning to the limit questions of another amounts to a failure of understanding. Instead of acknowledging an inability to modify an "otherwise coincidental manifold of events," serviceably reached by genealogy, Foucault precludes the possibility. Genealogical insights are then extended to other forms in order to secure the manifold of events as forever coincidental. The natural outcome is that "intelligibility" is confined to its order of functioning. What he lacks is a framework of complementarity better served by a broader perspective like Lonergan's, one that recognizes the full merits of the nonsystematic alongside the systematic, developmental, and dialectical.

Lawrence nicely summarizes the key elements that make the horizon entertained by Lonergan's fourfold integral heuristic structure more appealing in this respect:

> Lonergan explains how diverse classical higher viewpoints are related intelligibly, but not logically; and how statistical methods are complementary to classical, as we gradually come to understand concrete states, trends, groups, and populations of beings. If the other happens to be an instance of "systems on the move," it does no service to reduce the intelligibility proper to genetic method into simply another case of classical intelligibility, thereby obviating intelligible accounts of the continuity-in-discontinuity involved in dynamics of development.[46]

The contestational dynamic of the Foucauldian horizon is not surprisingly prone to this reduction. I say this because the horizon is one that is *fully*

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[45]*Insight*, 75.
[46]Lawrence, "Fragility of Consciousness," 198.

absorbed by an artistic pattern of reasoning. The objective is to lock into a pattern that is experientially "pure," that is, which excludes alien patterns instrumentalizing experience. The means to it, namely to what Lonergan calls elemental meaning, is through subversive forms of language that distil accepted (now asphyxiated) forms. The dynamism is one in which objectification, representation, is programmatically shunned, all in the name of some more basic or primordial, spontaneous meaning.[47] This earmarks beautifully, it seems to me, the advances made especially by the early Foucault to radically break with so-called transitivity. I have already discussed its bane. My use for Foucault is therefore selective. I stop where I believe the usefulness of Foucault's reasoning stops. The potential for greater insight is contained in Foucault's instantiation of the artistic pattern. The problem is that it is ripe for oversight when excluded from a broader horizon afforded by something like generalized empirical method, which shows greater appreciation for how diverse patterns of experience and their respective methods and contents interrelate.

The Absence of the Faith Horizon

The so-called death of God has been driven down a variety of philosophic paths. In some circles it is a gesture of utmost respect paid to the deity. Caputo is fond of quoting the profound utterance of Meister Eckhart, "I pray God that you rid me of God." Jean-Luc Marion also enlists the Pseudo-Dionysian gesture as iconoclastic and as a means of making biblical revelation shine. Another notable doing something similar is Gabriel Vahanian whose recent book, *Anonymous God* (2001), has been described as "a fearless poetic exploration of the utopianism of our humanity in trinitarian terms."[48] More could grace this list.[49] I hazard the guess that while the pattern has mystical underpinnings the thinking is

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[47]See Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education,* vol. 10 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 208-32.

[48]Darrell J. Fasching, review of *Anonymous God, Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* 5, no.1 (2003): 144-48.

[49]To name only a few: Edmond Jabes, Immanuel Levinas, Paul van Buren, Thomas J. J. Altizer, William Hamilton, and Hans Urs Von Balthasar.

characteristically artistic. The diagnostic of Vahanian's treatment as a "poetic exploration" is hardly incidental.

The condition of the possibility of the contemporary expression of the death of God was provided for by Nietzsche.[50] Heidegger, of course, gives Nietzsche's idea an ontological twist with the calculated result that his god-less form of thinking is, as he says, closer to the divine God than ontotheologic would like to admit.[51] Room is made, in other words, whether well furnished or not, for the science of faith.[52]

My point is simply that the empty space Foucault chooses to inhabit, particularly with respect to matters of faith, admits of a richer hue than his hypervigilance allows. In no way is this to disparage the value of his work. The quibble is more personal. It comes from an admirer but also (I like to think) person of faith. I can listen to Foucault's memorial chant cordially from the sidelines. Joining in the chorus, however, is unlikely; the rhythm leaves me cold. But perhaps it is not scholarly fitting to demand more from someone honest enough to assert that his method has little use for faith. "Faith," Foucault once exclaimed facetiously, "what is that?"[53] Nonetheless, I am addressing the issue of foundations, and Foucault is equally open about the way in which his horizon delimits the relevance of such questions. "The philosopher's role ... perhaps today

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[50]Lonergan captures nicely the moral significance of Nietzsche's observation: "[T]he fundamental idea ... is that God is dead, in the sense that he is not living in the minds and hearts of people in the nineteenth and twentieth century: not as God of people of culture in the nineteenth century, and not as god of the general population today. Because God is dead, because he is not a force in human living, the whole morality that Western culture has inherited from Christianity has lost its foundation, and we have to think out a new morality" (*Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip J. McShane [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001], 231).

[51]Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 72.

[52]See Heidegger's important essays, "Phenomenology and Theology" and "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," which have been reprinted in *The Religious*, ed. John D. Caputo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 49-66, 67-75.

[53]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 107. Derrida is far more congenial with respect to the possibility and relevance of doxological faith vis-à-vis his own non-doxological conception of *religio*. See J. Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone," in *Religion*, ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1-78.

consists in demonstrating that mankind is starting to discover that it can function without myths. No doubt the disappearance of philosophies and religions would correspond to something of that kind."[54] The remark, though casual, is not incidental. It captures the élan of Foucault's method, not only as a relevant, focused treatment of religion as "a political force" and "a superb instrument of power for itself," but also as a means of delimiting relevance to such a focus. The debate is an old one, and it appears to be decelerating in religious studies.[55] In this respect the horizon that informs Foucault's canon of parsimony requires a makeover.[56] Perhaps we shouldn't expect more from genealogy. And yet perhaps genealogy should learn to say less?

The relevance and profundity of Foucault's horizon for religious faith is an open question. Unless one reduces faith to power, finding an application beyond the political is the result of creative intelligence and not anything Foucault himself could own. Jeremy Carrette's discerning study of Foucault and religion corroborates the claim, albeit indirectly.[57] With respect to similarities between Foucauldian archaeology and negative theology Carrette is guarded. He narrows it down to the theme of negation. The upshot is that the discourses are merely similar in form, in their cryptic negations of positive (analogical) knowledge. The

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[54]Foucault, *Religion and Culture*, 103.

[55]See Linell E. Cady and Delwin Brown, eds., *Religious Studies, Theology, and the University: Conflicting Maps, Changing Terrain* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002); Ninian Smart, "Some Thoughts on the Science of Religion," in *The Sum of Our Choices: Essays in Honour of Eric J. Sharpe*, ed. Arvind Sharma (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996) 15-25; *The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Dale Canon, *Six Ways of Being Religious: A Framework for Comparative Studies of Religion* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996). Lonergan's works on religion are also relevant here. See for example Lonergan, "Prolegomena to the Study of Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985) 55-73; "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 12, no.2 (1994): 125-46. For a comprehensive overview of Lonergan's philosophy of religious studies, see Jim Kanaris, *Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).

[56]For examples of contemporary sociologists of religion whose work may not be as exhilarating as Foucault's but are nonetheless more circumspect in this regard, see the works of Ronald L. Johnstone and Robert Bellah.

[57]Carrette, *Foucault and Religion*.

differences, which are more significant, are rooted in the diverse contexts and interests of each discourse. Foucault's is archaeological and decidedly nontheological, post death of God and Man. The discourse of Pseudo-Dionysius, featured in Carrette's discussion, is theological and faith affirming. Foucault underwrites a perspective Carrette names "radical immanence," a deconstructed self without remainder. Earlier I remarked how Foucault is given to an exteriority that defines the limits of the known. Radical immanence circumscribes this exteriority. The "outside," the "exterior," the "foreign" – these are metaphors of difference for Foucault, not transcendence. Pseudo-Dionysius, by contrast, endorses "religious transcendence," a strategy outfitted to guard the radical alterity of the divine. According to Foucault and others of similar constitution (for example, Derrida), negative theologies, while radical in certain respects, finally negate negation; they negate with a view to affirming a preestablished horizon of beliefs. The fundamental task of archaeology is to challenge such moves, "to create a free space to observe 'statements', to allow them to be held in their moments of 'irruption' and 'occurrence' without fabrication ... to hold 'dispersion' and 'discontinuity' without any 'reduction' to a 'pre-established horizon'."[58]

Foucault would react similarly to contemporary radical theologies that seek to maintain ties, however tenuous, to transcendence. Like the artistic patterning of radical theology, Foucault's appropriation of the death of God protracts the nonobjectifying gesture. Unlike radical theology, Foucault's rejection of ontotheologic entails, it seems to me, the reduction of profundity to artistry. Incidentally, I am not convinced that perpetually pushing the envelope is always constructive or sustainable. At any rate, the horizon nestling radical theologies really does seem quite different from its Foucauldian cousin. Tempting is a congenial comparison to Buddhism which rejects metaphysical speculation about God as anything more than potentially insightful for moral instruction.[59] Anatman, the idea of "no self," also bears relevance. Although I am not committed to Lonergan's broad characterization of Christian and

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[58]Carrette, *Foucault and Religion*, 96.

[59]Masao Abe, "Buddhism," in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 78.

Buddhist mysticism in terms of theistic and atheistic counterparts, I nonetheless find his comparison of their potential for dialogue qua mystical patterns key to understanding the difference between Buddhist horizons and Foucault's own.[60] While expressions of the Buddhist and Foucauldian "movement to the unknown" may be similar in that they are both examples of nontheistic unobjectified experience, I doubt Foucault's articulation approximates Buddhist religious orthopraxy.[61] These "worldviews" are dominated by qualitatively distinct patterns of experience. Their overlap is misunderstood when fixating on the coincidental similarities of their content and not on the particular rhythm of their gesture. As a Westerner and one who, like Lonergan, gravitates to the personalistic interpretation of mystical experience, I believe a complementarity can exist between personalistic objectified mystical experience and nonpersonalistic unobjectified mystical experience. I also believe a less obvious complementarity may obtain between mystical experience (whether objectified or not) and unobjectified experience of the artistic order. Such an achievement is far more difficult than it sounds. Nevertheless, its possibility is afforded more by the integral heuristic structure Lonergan discusses than what is readily available in genealogy alone.

Faith may indeed be the centered act required to negotiate an ever precarious equilibrium. Without faith, the world is too evil to be good, to paraphrase Lonergan.[62] Without faith, the night of hypervigilance appears perpetually dense, even if peals of laughter echo in it.[63] As a centered act, faith provides for the salutary functioning of creative and healing development. By faith the propensity to be hypervigilant can accede to moments of relief through insight and grace. But this is to discuss in the

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[60]See Vernon Gregson, *Lonergan, Spirituality, and the Meeting of Religions* (Langham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 70-71.

[61]See Abe, "Buddhism," 78-79.

[62]See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 117: "Without faith, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist."

[63]For an analysis of the various nuances of "postmodern" laughter, see Ronald H. McKinney, "Lonergan and the Ambiguity of Postmodern Laughter," in *In Deference to the Other*, 141-64

order of Hare's *blik*.⁶⁴ What is interesting about *bliks* is that they sustain but do not consist in philosophic assertions or systems of them. Although "it is very important to have the right *blik*," rarely is the way to it through philosophic argument.

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⁶⁴Richard M. Hare, "Theology and Falsification," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), 99-103.

THE OPENNESS OF THE SCIENTIST: GENERALIZED EMERGENT PROBABILITY AND THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

James R. Pambrun

St. Paul University

Ottawa, Canada

FOR THEOLOGIANS WHO have committed themselves to a positive dialogue between faith and the natural sciences, one of the principal challenges in promoting such a dialogue is how to open lines of communication with scientists. One of the strategies adopted by theologians is to listen to scientists. Such listening is guided by two premises. First, listening will take the theologian beyond superficial stereotypes of the findings of scientists. For example, what do scientists really mean by evolution and what are the limits of such a theory, given the specific questions that scientists are exploring and asking? Second, listening is engaged in the confidence that science as an exercise of reason is open. That is, in its act of understanding, natural science is fundamentally open to other dimensions of reality that are investigated by other disciplines, for example, the human and social sciences, philosophy, and theology. Without this possibility, any hope of a positive dialogue ends.

This paper wishes to address and to flesh out the second premise. I wish to identify how Lonergan's notion of emergent probability and his appeal to generalized emergent probability can offer theologians, and anyone interested for that matter, in a dialogue with modern science, a framework for appealing to and expressing confidence in such an openness on the part of science. The virtue of emergent probability is that it identifies and brings to the surface certain assumptions that are

operative in scientific investigation. The basis of Lonergan's own strategy was, as is well known, an appeal to the act of understanding and an invitation to any of his readers to advert to this act in themselves as knowers. Emergent probability limited itself to the assumptions operative in the investigations of the natural sciences.[1] These assumptions concerned the implicit notion of order investigated by classical science and the implicit notion of probability and indeterminacy investigated by statistical science. Together, these help explain the emergence of living systems in terms of events, fulfilling conditions for such events, sequences or schemes, and the replication of these sequences in relation to environments. These assumptions, once identified, became the basis upon which Lonergan in turn identified emergent probability to be a world order or design.

To identify these sets of assumptions of scientific investigation and to name such a world order bear enormous potential for a dialogue with the scientist. For, increased clarity derived from an understanding of these sets of assumptions and from an understanding of emergent probability as world order, will contribute in no small way to clarifying the scope and horizons of scientific investigation as a whole. But even this realization does not yet constitute a case on behalf of the openness of scientific reasoning. For fundamentally the openness is not found in the contents of science itself. It is found in the scientist. Two reasons suggest this in Lonergan's own strategy. First, an elucidation of the act of understanding was accompanied by an appeal by Lonergan that we advert to this act as an experience in our own experience of learning and understanding. Without the turn to our own experience of consciousness, the full implications of Lonergan's proposal would come up short. Second, with respect to emergent probability, Lonergan further radicalized this notion by appealing to generalized emergent probability. In my judgement, this further radicalization was intended to identify and to bring into play the

self-understanding of the genuine scientist in the act of scientific investigation. Emergent probability, as we have just indicated, was constructed on the basis of an insight into the complementarity of the classical and statistical methods. With a clarification of this complementarity, Lonergan completed chapter 45 of *Insight*[2] and defined the principal features of the heuristic of emergent probability. However, following Lonergan's later chapters of *Insight* in which he elaborated upon our self-affirmation as knowers, Lonergan referred in a number of limited places to the notion of generalized emergent probability.[3] Where emergent probability integrated the complementarity of the classical and statistical methods, generalized emergent probability integrated four methods, not only classical and statistical method, but also genetic and dialectical method.[4]

A remarkable deepening of the notion of emergent probability occurred at this point, one that would deepen our understanding of the implicit presuppositions of modern science and which, in my judgement, can help clarify the point of openness of modern science to other disciplines, particularly theology. By integrating genetic and dialectic method, Lonergan did two things. First, with genetic method he introduced explicitly the notion of development within modern science. But he did not do this simply in such a way as to suggest that any one of the modern sciences, be it physics or chemistry, progresses in knowing. More than this, Lonergan drew our attention to the emergence of distinct and higher order disciplines within the development of modern science as a whole. For example, he laid the basis for understanding why modern biology took form as a discipline, and he explained how this discipline drew upon the findings of physics and chemistry without simply being an

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[2]Indeed, Lonergan argued that, subsequent to chapter 4, emergent probability would need be complemented by remarks on the thing and objectivity, both notions treated in later chapters of *Insight*. Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. (New York: Longmans, 1958), 139. Note, at the same time, Lonergan's question, "whether there is an emergent probability of things as well as of schemes of recurrence," to which he offers "an affirmative answer" (*Insight*, 259).

[3]Explicit reference to generalized emergent probability can be found in Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Longmans, 1958), 263, 265, 462, 479, 485-86, 510.

[4]*Insight*, 485-86.

extension of either one or the addition of both of these disciplines. Further, this growing configuration of modern science, in the form of these diverse disciplines, reflected intelligence in act and how such intelligence defined new forms of investigation for itself. These forms, taken as a whole, corresponded, as a moving viewpoint, to our refined understanding of the order of the universe. It is a marvellous thing to see how modern science can anticipate the emergence of new disciplines as part of its own self-constitution. A new discipline is not just a new theory. Rather, it is a newly organized set of theories and practices that are not reducible to the earlier ones.[5] Modern science reflects remarkable novelty in the development of the structure of its theories, and it reflects a remarkable expression of the inner dynamism of the act of understanding on the move.

However, if this is to be successful, genetic method has to lend itself to dialectical method. Dialectic method addresses the openness, authenticity, and bias of the scientist as one who asks questions. Here is where the need for the scientist's self-understanding becomes crucial. Genetic method may at first appear to testify to a line of progress. But we know from our own historical experience that progress is anything but a neat unfolding of new directions. Progress defines new questions and develops responses to these questions. But even more, progress is a hard-won battle that is waged against bias and false consciousness. A huge number of factors are involved in identifying bias. These may not only involve the pride of the scientist, distorted goals, oversights, and so on. Bias also can come from the community of scientists, the bias of these communities, their inattention to value, and the good of order. Bias, distortion, and decline can come from the failures in the meanings and values promoted by cultures. Chapters 6 and 7 in *Insight* give us ample data on these topics. However, dialectic as a method names this problem and it identifies, as Lonergan writes, that there is no pregiven intelligibility that will link the shift from one moment to the next in the

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[5]Lonergan refers to the distinction among physics, chemistry, and biology in terms of "a new set of basic concepts and laws" (*Insight*, 255).

development of progress in understanding.[6] An issue of human freedom comes to the fore.

Lonergan's naming of dialectic method, within the framework of generalized emergent probability, is a key moment in our attempt to identify how openness is an intrinsic feature of scientific understanding and how the scientist's self-understanding is necessary for understanding the precise form of this openness. If this can be named with adequate clarity in relation to the other presuppositions of scientific understanding that inform what Lonergan called a world view, namely, emergent probability, I believe that we shall have identified an avenue for positive dialogue between theologians and natural scientists. In order to realize this goal, this article will be organized in three steps. These three steps take their cue from Lonergan's notion of generalized emergent probability and its integration of the four methods. Each step will appeal to these methods: first the complementarity of classical and statistical, second, genetic method and, finally, dialectical method. As a whole all three steps represent a deepened understanding of the presuppositions and inner dynamic openness of modern scientific investigation. The full force of the inner openness of modern science will appear, in particular, when we address dialectical method. This method brings the scientist and his or her self-understanding as scientist committed to genuine knowing to the foreground. Further, it shows how a correlation exists between the self-affirmation as knower and the objectification of a world order. For, progress in the way we ask questions reflects, at the same time, a refined understanding of the world and the order of this cosmic world in which we live.

EMERGENT PROBABILITY AND THE COMPLEMENTARITY
OF CLASSICAL AND STATISTICAL METHOD

My purpose in exploring Lonergan's notions of emergent and generalized emergent probability is to account for the openness intrinsic to scientific investigation. My contention is that generalized emergent probability

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[6]Dialectical method will direct our attention to the lack of intelligibility in the "relations between successive stages of changing systems" (*Insight*, 485).

advances an understanding of this openness by deepening our understanding of the assumptions immanent in emergent probability as a heuristic of world order or design. Thus, in order to present the virtues of generalized emergent probability, it is important to attend to features of emergent probability that are at the basis of the notion of generalized emergent probability, namely, i) the duality in scientific investigation of classical and statistical methods; ii) recurrence schemes; iii) the notion of a thing.

Duality of Classical and Statistical Method in Science

Lonergan's presentation of the complementarity of classical and statistical methods begins by identifying a particular problem. The problem is the desire on the part of science for a unity of understanding or for a comprehensive understanding of the world. However, in spite of this desire, modern science demonstrates a duality, the duality of classical knowing and statistical knowing. The difficulty is how to hold both the quest for unity and the fact of the duality of these methods together. It is in responding to this difficulty that Lonergan's reflections on the complementarity of classical and statistical method can be shown to reveal an operative premise of scientific investigation. The premise identifies at once both the limits and the possibility of classical method. Classical method anticipates systematic understanding whereby any reality is to be known by virtue of a set of laws that relates things to one another. The application of these systematic laws prescinds, however, from what classical method considers to be residual data, and it further prescinds from having to account for the nonsystematic conditions by virtue of which any particular event has occurred. Classical method implicitly affirms its laws and systems in view of "other things being equal."

But not all things are equal, and scientific investigation would fall short of its desire for full comprehension of the world were it to limit its investigations to laws and systems as the sole ideal of scientific intelligibility. Statistical method anticipates an intelligibility about order that is quite distinct from the anticipation of classical method's commitment to systematic order. Statistical method addresses the occurrence of events as events. It deals with the frequencies with which

events occur, what Lonergan has referred to as the "non-systematic deviation from an ideal norm." In so doing, statistical method seeks probabilities of the occurrence of events as an intelligibility in its own right."[7]

But what is critical here with respect to scientific understanding and the validity of classical method is not just the added insights of statistical method as such. More profoundly, the development of statistical method has clarified the scope of classical method itself. Failing this development, that is, how statistical method accounts for a nonsystematic intelligibility within the order of scientific investigation, modern science would have continued to run up against an increasing number of irresolvable difficulties. Classical method studies a particular event or thing as a systematic reality. It prescinds, as I indicated above, from studying this event in terms of the occurrence of the event as event. What in fact has freed the classical method to continue to pursue its own work is the discovery that the nonsystematic occurrence or randomness does not invalidate classical method. In other words, classical method does not have to account for the full intelligibility of order, features of which intelligibility cannot fit the presuppositions of classical method.[8] Rather, it implicitly leaves room for another kind of intelligibility of order, one that is governed by the notion of probability. Without an act of conversion on the part of classical scientists by which they transpose, heighten, and differentiate their interpretation of order, we could not speak of the progress in scientific investigation.

Still, this clarification and transposition do not by themselves fully resolve the original problem of holding together the duality of methods and the anticipated unity of scientific comprehension. Emergent probability builds upon this clarified complementarity by adding a further, distinct intelligibility of a world order or design. Yet this does not arise by merely adding together the two distinct intelligible orders. For classical and statistical methods do not deal with different things. They

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[7]"Probability is an ideal norm that, for all its ideality, is concretely successful in the long run. Chance is merely the non-systematic divergence of actual frequencies from the ideal frequencies named probabilities" (*Insight*, 114).

[8]In my judgement, the insights into a fuller understanding of order is the genius of Philip McShane's *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970).

deal with the same reality under different aspects. But what do we mean by the "same reality?" If we are to deepen our exploration of the openness intrinsic to modern science, we must take a step further and show how this duality of methods is compatible with the desire for a comprehensive understanding. In order to show this, I turn to Lonergan's employment of the notion of recurrence schemes.

Recurrence Schemes

The notion of recurrence schemes involves an understanding of reality that benefits from an appropriation of the complementarity of classical and statistical methods. It challenges the assumption that an understanding of modern science can carry on as if scientists can happily apply the two distinct methods independently of one another or parallel to one another without accounting for why both contribute to an integrated understanding of our cosmic world. At some point, the unity of the intelligibility of scientific investigation returns as a question in its own right and the recurrence scheme is the place where an interpretation of that unity is mediated.

In brief, recurrence schemes refer to the occurrence of events, the linkages of events and the stabilization of these linkages in relation to the wider environmental conditions that sustain these events. An event occurs due to the fact that there is a further set of events which, taken as an interactive unity, act as a scheme enabling a particular event to take place. When a stabilizing scheme of related events emerges as a scheme in its own right, then we can anticipate the recurrence of the event that relies on this fixed scheme. Any thing that exists and is identified as a unity, identity whole, by virtue of a scheme of events or a stable scheme of events, can be studied by classical laws. But this does not begin to account for the full comprehension desired by science as an intelligibility of world order. Beyond the occurrence of fixed schemes of linked events, there is also an environment in relation to which the schemes of recurrence function. This relation directs our attention not only to the recurrence of an event but, given the relation of schemes to their background environments, to the survival of schemes. Statistical intelligibility attends to both relationships, the interlocking schemes together with the schemes

and their background environments. As Lonergan argues, in addition to the probabilities for the emergence of schemes, there is also the probabilities of their survival. Probability is grasped by an insight into the emergence of order by means of the relations among such schemes and "[emergent probability] results from the combination of the conditioned series of schemes with their respective probabilities of emergence and survival."[9]

Why is the notion of emergent probability significant with respect to bringing to the fore an implicit intelligibility with respect to order and design? The answer, I believe, relates to the range and scope of scientific explanation.[10] Lonergan keenly observes that, among other things, scientists seek explanations answering to questions regarding "spatial distribution, absolute numbers, long intervals of time, selection, stability and development."[11] What is significant here is how neither classical laws nor statistical laws on their own can account for all the features of order sought in these questions. Classical method prescinds from the questions concerning the occurrence of event as event. Statistical method cannot answer what the specific kind of event is or why it relates to the other event. While the classical identifies regularities in the relationship of things to things, we must be careful not to fall prey to a notion of order that is governed by classical assumptions about total systematic representation. By contrast, the virtue of the statistical is that it attunes us to a degree of openness in the occurrence of events. Still, probability, as a statistical intelligibility of order, adds a refinement to this openness. There is a clear distinction, writes Lonergan, between chaos and probability. Probability relates randomness to the potential emergence of some concrete instance of order. It may not be fixed, it may not be predictable, but "spatial distribution, absolute numbers, long intervals of time, selection, stability and development" anticipate that something will recur. The question about the intelligibility of order requires that both intelligibilities be drawn upon.

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[9]*Insight*, 122, 259. "Emergent probability is the successive realization of the possibilities of concrete situations in accord with their probabilities" (*Insight*, 171).

[10]*Insight*, 124.

[11]*Insight*, 122, 261.

In adverting to an implicit intelligible order by way of his notion of emergent probability, Lonergan has identified a generic and methodological feature intended by scientific inquiry as a unitary dynamism of inquiry. The basis for this premise is not just that we assume that there is one world. The basis is, as Lonergan states, the premise of a unified intelligibility of our world experience that is implicit in the "dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence."[12] The explanatory power of emergent probability speaks to the experience of a promise of understanding and to the commitment on the part of the scientist. Emergent probability identifies generically what is to be known as "the objective implications of the use of both classical and statistical procedures."[13] There is a further critical point in all this, a further premise operative in these remarks on the intelligibility of order. Scientific investigation implies that the natural sciences study this world as it actually is. If we relate this concrete focus to emergent probability as a heuristic of scientific investigation, then we realize quite a remarkable thing. A whole range of initial conditions can lead to unexpected actualizations. Still, if there is the unexpected, the vehemence with which scientific investigation seeks a comprehensive interpretation of the world is based on the anticipation that something emerges and that what does emerge is not arbitrary. The operations of scientific investigation imply a remarkably sophisticated commitment to intelligibility in the concrete, yet an intelligibility that is compatible with an ongoing actualization that is inherent in the universe. A further refinement of this premise, one which attends to scientific understanding of the concrete while anticipating openness, can be discerned in the way Lonergan appeals to the polymorphic character of human knowing. In order to develop this I turn to a comment on the third and final element, the notion of a thing.

The Notion of a Thing

Our remarks on the complementarity of classical and statistical methods along with those on recurrence schemes represent a reflection on scientific

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[12]*Insight*, 116.
[13]*Insight*, 259.

investigation that is generic in character. But, as Lonergan writes, "Scientific thought needs not only explanatory systems, but also descriptions that determine the data which explanations must satisfy."[14] It is quite intriguing that after leading us through the complexities of the heuristics involved in empirical method, Lonergan turns to the notion of a thing and states, "the thing is the basic synthetic construct of scientific thought and development."[15] Implicit in the intelligibility of world order is the affirmation of things.

In order to develop this relationship between things and emergent probability, Lonergan refers to a thing as a concrete unity, identity, whole, and he refers to how such unities change. The notion of schemes of recurrence earlier developed by Lonergan is now applied to the meaning of concrete things. A thing is a unity whose data are intelligibly related to data on other things by means of the ordered pattern of relations of a set of schemes. More and more can be known about the concrete, and science can always anticipate more data and a development of its theories. Nonetheless, the unity, identity, whole of a thing persists. Now, given such explanatory interpretation by way of schemes of recurrence, it is also possible to refer to a sequence in the successive emergence of further integrations of schemes of recurrence. For example, while chemistry might study molecules, it leaves to biology to study the integration of chemical patterns as these contribute to the distinct and emergent organic form. As we move through the different sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology, at each level, a new form of a unity, identity, whole is considered that is irreducible to simply the sum of lower ordered manifolds. A notion of development also emerges and with it the successive order of schemes. The importance here is twofold: that the total concrete set of events accounted for by schemes of recurrence lead to our understanding of the thing, and that the thing, the unity, identity, whole, is only known in an explanatory way by means of the total set of such relationships among

[14]*Insight*, 247.
[15]*Insight*, 248.

events.[16] The full concrete truth of a thing is known by way of the set of schemes that build upon one another and interact with one another.

The key assumption throughout these remarks on a thing is the transposition in the intelligibility of the known. For his part, Lonergan draws our attention to the difference between a body and a thing. But what is the methodological point in all this? I believe it consists of Lonergan's distinction between elementary descriptive knowing and explanatory knowing, and in knowing the difference when one appeals to one form of knowing or the other. At the same time, it is not enough simply to advert to the distinction between the descriptive and the explanatory. Both continue to be part of any subject's interaction with the world. The appeal to recurrence schemes and their development does not sever a relationship to data that are described. Indeed, the aim of scientific investigation is to return to the data and to affirm whether this thing exists. Still, this is not a return to the concrete as descriptive. Rather, it is a return to the concrete via the explanatory conjugate forms that allow us to affirm that something is. Thus, a couple of key features come to the fore in our understanding of the premises of scientific investigation.

The first is that science never severs its relationship to the concrete, empirical reality. Conjugate form intends verification in the concrete, unity, identity, whole. Second, the appeal to explanatory forms breaks with an assumption that what we see as a body, "the already out there now," is what is affirmed as known. The basis of the break with common sense or ocular viewpoint is found in how science goes about its investigations. Yet, the descriptive common sense approach is not abandoned. It continues to function in common sense realm of meaning. The point is to distinguish between the common sense and the explanatory and to be able to advert to the difference in the course of communication and understanding. For this reason, Lonergan refers to the polymorphic character of human consciousness.[17] This, in turn, has implications for our understanding of order, for order is based neither on

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[16]On this point see, Joseph Flanagan, "Body to Thing," *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan,* ed. Matthew L Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981), 500.

[17]See, in particular, Lonergan's comments on "Undifferentiated Consciousness in the Later Stages," in *Method,* 97-99. See also p. 268.

the model of ocular perception nor on the singular intelligibility of classical method. Rather, it is based on a notion of unity informed by the complementarity of classical and statistical laws and how such understanding appeals to a differentiation of consciousness. In short it will be the flexibility and generosity on the part of the knower who adverts to this polymorphic character in his/her own experience of knowing which will be the basis upon which further understanding in scientific investigation is possible. We shall see later in our comments on dialectical method how important this act of appropriation is when we appeal to the act of authenticity in knowing. While scientific manuals may not make this a subject of investigation in the elaboration of scientific theory, it is no less relevant to the very success of those very operations and their claim to understanding promoted and promised by these same manuals.

Concluding Remark

Our aim was to identify the inner openness of modern natural science. Since Lonergan conceived emergent probability as a heuristic of world order that discloses the immanent intelligibility of scientific investigation, a reflection on some of its key methodical elements has been instructive. As a result, I have identified the openness intrinsic to scientific investigation through a series of steps that begin with the problem of unity and duality and extend through to the affirmation of things as a unity, identity, whole. In the course of this series of steps I have shown that the success of classical method lies in its openness to statistical method. I have shown that the complementarity of both, when informed by the notion of recurrence scheme, consists of an intelligibility of science given an openness to unexpected actualizations of life that constitute, as the object of modern science, the actual universe. Finally, I have shown the openness of modern science in the emergence of higher order disciplines that lead to a refined understanding of the concrete unity, identity, whole that is a thing. All three steps, in turn, have increasingly intensified our appreciation of the knower in act through the appeal to the intelligibility of order in our own desire to understanding and in the polymorphic character of human knowing. All three bring us to a threshold which

invites us to introduce the role of intelligence in order to advance and deepen our understanding of emergent probability. The immanent intelligibility of scientific investigation leads us to acknowledge intelligence in act.

At this juncture, we have a pivot on which to shift from the known world to the spiritual act of knowing. There is a shift to the emergence of meaning as a topic for investigation in it own right. In my judgement, it is precisely this shift in the assumptions regarding scientific intelligibility of world order and design that allows Lonergan to identify and appropriate further considerations, now not simply on the side of what is known, but more on the side of the constitutive roles of meaning and intelligence. What happens when intelligence becomes part of the object of investigation in the elaboration of the immanent intelligibility of scientific investigation? The answer to this is the deepening of emergent probability in the notion of generalized emergent probability. For the first part of this reflection, we took our clue from the integration of classical and statistical methods that are the basis of the notion of emergent probability. The second part of my reflection will take its cue from the integration of genetic and dialectical methods into the picture. The value of genetic method is that it makes intelligence in act a topic in so far as it signals the development of higher order viewpoints within scientific investigation. The value of dialectic will be the manner in which it appeals directly to the self-understanding of the scientist in his/her own authenticity and generosity as a scientist. To an account of these two topics we now turn.

GENETIC METHOD AND GENERALIZED EMERGENT PROBABILITY

Genetic method holds an intriguing place in Lonergan's account of both emergent probability and generalized emergent probability. Genetic method is the form of scientific investigation devoted to the study of development. Development itself is a sequence, that is to say, a sequence of a series of schemes of recurrence. This topic of development was already implicit when Lonergan dealt with the notion of a thing. Key to the notion of thing is the identification of central form, that is, the central form of a unity, identity, whole that holds over a period of time. This central form not only holds over a period of time; it also constitutes a

living organism through a period of development. A good example of such development is the child's ongoing mastering of a set of motor skills (that is, schemes), as she or he grows up. A child begins with basic and rudimentary skills and progressively learns through youth, adolescence, and adulthood to master a whole range of motor and intellectual skills. One and the same person exhibits this progression and thereby develops and matures. Development represents not only a greater facility in the use and command of certain skills (for example, writing), but also signals the increasing flexibility with respect to different environments. To understand a thing fully, as Joseph Flanagan has indicated,[18] is to understand the unity in the total set of schemes of recurrence. Hence, Lonergan claims that as there is an emergent probability of recurrence schemes, so too is there an emergent probability of things. The one is an extension of the other.

Genetic method does not abandon the insights that arise from the framework of recurrence schemes. It is therefore not only an extension of emergent probability but also, I would argue, a radicalization of the implications and assumptions of emergent probability. The notion of development draws upon schemes of recurrence and the emergence of higher ordered flexible schemes and their systematization. It is completely consistent with the notion of probability introduced by statistical method. In my judgement, this is the reason why many Lonergan scholars who have studied emergent probability or drawn upon it in order to resolve different issues in different contexts introduce within their analysis elements that are specific to genetic method.[19] But with genetic method, Lonergan is also introducing a further consideration. As an understanding of a thing that incorporates a distinct set of explanatory genera, genetic method examines the relationship among these explanatory genera in terms of the notion of sequence itself. Sequence suggests more than a chronological series. It implies a continuity and discontinuity in the relationship among the flexible ranges circles of schemes of recurrence. What from the perspective of one discipline (for example, chemistry) is

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[18]Flanagan, "Body to Thing," 550.

[19]See, especially, Kenneth Melchin. *History, Ethics and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 97-117.

merely an unsystematic manifold of schemes of recurrence, comes to be
understood as a more complex, more complexly organized series of
schemes within a higher order system understood by another discipline
(for example, biology). For this reason, Lonergan's ideas of development
and sequence demand a new kind of understanding. This understanding
calls for a set of categories and terms that address the notion of
development itself, more specifically, integrators and operators.

"Integrator" refers to the systematization of any set of stable schemes
of recurrence. "Operator" refers to the fact that stability is ephemeral,
insofar as such circles of schemes themselves effect the open possibility of
the emergence of more complex and more systematic and flexible circle of
schemes of recurrence. With respect to the immanent intelligibility of
scientific investigation something new has been introduced here. It
concerns explanatory genera and the ordered pattern of scientific
disciplines. Explanatory genera, we saw, identifies distinct disciplines
with a distinct set of explanatory theories. The higher order disciplines
draw upon but are not reducible to the lower order disciplines. Thus
biology draws upon physics and chemistry but is not reducible to the
simple combination of physical and chemical laws. Further, explanatory
genera signal an advance in the order of intelligibility beyond that
exposed by schemes of recurrence. But what is that intelligibility? It is an
intelligibility that is inherent in the order of nature. Hence Lonergan
speaks of the "immanent intelligibility" of scientific investigation.
However, it is not an intelligibility that can be explained by the classical
and statistical sciences above. In order to analyze development, Lonergan
could not simply extend the elements of classical or statistical method.
Nor could he restrict himself to recurrence schemes, because recurrence
schemes could not explain what was happening as a sequence when
emergence schemes became a new "flexible circle of ranges of recurrence
schemes."[20] Finally, he could not simply expand his notion of a thing,
because the issue was development and not a thing as a unity, identity,
whole. Development has to do with the intelligible, sequence of
emergences of new conjugate forms as they account for different aspects
of a unity, identity, whole.

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[20]*Insight*, 460.

In order to deepen the account of scientific intelligibility, therefore, Lonergan had to draw upon a different set of categories. These categories were related to an account of cognitional acts.[21] He had to draw upon a set of categories that related both to an intelligibility in the order of the universe and one in the order of human understanding. Those familiar with *Insight* will recognize these categories to be act, form, and potency. They will also recognize that as these are applied to development, they create a framework for Lonergan to identify integrators and operators, those elements in virtue of which a higher form of life is actually systematized. Yet this systematization is but a moment in its own going beyond, that is, the role it plays in the possible emergence of a higher form of life.

Finally, this going beyond, in the sense in which we have described it, Lonergan calls "finality." Finality implies direction. Still, it does not imply that a blueprint has already been set and is being worked out. Finality implies an indeterminacy with direction. Lonergan's remarks on the statistical, the notion of probability, and recurrence scheme continue to inform his understanding here. Probability anticipates a certain order and its emergence. It does not predict what that order will actual be until it actually occurs. Nonetheless, given the full range of spatial extensions and the full scope of temporal durations, probability signals emergent possibilities that correspond to an intelligibility of order. But because the actual emergent order depends on a set of manifold conditions, it is limited by the inherent possibilities of underlying manifold conditions. Yet, the underlying manifold conditions do not explain the emergence of a higher order system. Rather, it is the reverse. Once the higher order system emerges, then it is possible to recognize what is at first regarded merely as a set of underlying manifold conditions as the potentiality for that higher system.

In other words, by introducing his metaphysical categories, Lonergan generalizes insights about recurrence schemes as these relate to development. He draws our attention to the fact that he is still talking about an immanent intelligibility in scientific investigation itself. This is

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[21]The basis of this was his study of Aquinas's attention to rational psychology. *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquina*, vol. 2 of The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1997 [1957]).

because in doing science, in the act of understanding life on the move or the development of a living organism, scientists actually engage in remarkable acts of synthesis. Scientific understanding is open; it leaps ahead. While such direction is intelligible at the level of the intelligibility of the universe, there exists a remarkable correspondence of this development in the order and sequence of the conjugate forms themselves by which understanding is developed. Within the order of scientific investigation, we witness the emergence of distinct orders and the sequence of order among disciplines. I believe this is why Lonergan wrote the following when he considered finality in the context of critical metaphysics: "in terms of the implications of scientific method, the field may be described more precisely as a generalized emergent probability."[22] Generalized emergent probability identifies a scientific intelligibility that can anticipate the intelligibility of development in the order of the universe. But where scientifically is this intelligibility identified? It is identified in the ordered pattern and development of the scientific disciplines themselves. Science is not just one thing. It is different sets of flexible schemes of recurrence of understanding and their development. Genetic development still concerns the order of the universe, but it has introduced at this point the empirical fact of the order of and appearance of intelligence as an integral part of the emergent order in the universe. Science, therefore, needs genetic method in order to reflect upon itself as a special instance of intelligence in the natural order and as a place of openness, novelty, and emergence in the order of the cosmos.

Genetic method serves to bring forward new features of scientific investigation about the universe. One of the remarkable features of the idea of development is that it makes consciousness itself a subject of investigation. Here, however, a tension emerges in the course of development that is not mastered by genetic method. Intelligence is an instance of a different kind of intelligibility in the order of the sequence. It invites us to advert to the act not only of science but also of the scientist, and therefore to advert to tensions specific to the human condition.

[22]*Insight*, 462. Similarly, "The existence of a series of such major changes is the biological content of the sequential postulate of generalized emergent probability" (*Insight*, 263).

Scientific investigation of such tensions become the concern of dialectical method.

DIALECTICAL METHOD AND THE INTRINSIC OPENNESS OF THE SCIENTIST

Within his account of development, Lonergan refers to the movement from organic to psychic to intellectual development. Lonergan cautions: "the higher system of intellectual development is primarily the higher integration, not of the man in whom the development occurs, but of the universe that he inspects."[23] Consciousness emerges on the scene; still its emergence is in the universe that is the object of scientific investigation. In other words, when we refer to intelligence, there is a continuity with the intrinsic development of world order. That continuity has to do with a tension inherent in the order of the universe that gives rise to development. That tension reflects both limits and possibilities that are realized in the movement from potency to form to act.

With the emergence of human intelligence that tension itself becomes an object of consciousness.[24] As a "unity, identity, whole," the human person is still related to "the organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugate forms," whereby an entire new range of activity is possible.[25] What for classical, statistical, and genetic method was just an immanent intelligibility of order now becomes an order as adverted to. Furthermore, human beings can decide to promote such intelligibility or to ignore it. In this context, Lonergan introduced in *Insight* the notion of genuineness.[26] With genuineness the conscious self comes into the picture. Genuineness has to do with how the self understands himself or herself in relation to the process of development in the universe. All the previous terms, development, integrators, operators, finality, all are integrated in a new "flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence."[27] But, with genuineness, another tension is introduced, namely the tension between what consciously promotes development and what unconsciously

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[23]*Insight*, 469.

[24]*Insight*, 473.

[25]*Insight*, 470.

[26]*Insight*, 475.

[27]*Insight*, 476.

promotes illusion about one's self and one's role in promoting development. "Genuineness is the admission of that tension into consciousness."[28] At core, argues Lonergan, lack of genuineness is a desire to escape the tension of finality at the basis of which is the further tension between limitation and transcendence. While these comments are raised within Lonergan's reflection on genetic method, they lead us to the threshold of dialectical method.[29]

Not much is said about dialectical method itself in *Insight*. To be sure, in chapter 17 Lonergan returns to the topic of dialectics, but he does so in the context of a general hermeneutics and the promotion of a notion of the universal viewpoint. A more developed and critical account of dialectics as method is taken up in *Method in Theology* as the fourth functional speciality.[30] Still, even in *Insight*, dialectical method begins to bring forth the scientist as a self and the role of self in the self-understanding in the act of scientific investigation.

Without a dialectical method, scientific investigation as such does not address this issue. But the issue is nonetheless relevant. For scientific investigation is an instance of intelligence in act. Further, once intelligence becomes a subject of study by genetic method, then the scientist him/herself becomes a topic for discussion. This topic addresses, more specifically, the way in which scientists asks questions. Questions, as Lonergan argues, become operators in the course of the emergence of higher order scientific explanation. Scientists are locked in an ongoing struggle as to whether to pursue or avoid questions that reflect an attunement to the inner and intrinsic development of world order. For this reason, it is helpful to bring this presupposition to the fore to say a word

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[28]*Insight*, 477.

[29]*Insight*, 478.

[30]Significant structural parallels can be discerned when comparing chapter 17 of *Insight*, "Metaphysics as Dialectic," and "Dialectic" in *Method*, 235-66. Both texts focus on positions and counterpositions; both texts advert to the source of conflict in the interpreter and genuine subject; both texts explore polymorphic consciousness and the self-appropriation of the interpreter or self; both attempt to resolve the conflicts, not by opting for one or other position, but by adverting to the source of the difference. A good account of the development of dialectic in Lonergan, especially as it relates to the movement from universal viewpoint, can be found in Ivo Coelho. *Hermeneutics and Method: The "Universal Viewpoint" in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

about dialectics as method. Consistent with Lonergan's statement that "genuineness is the admission of that tension into consciousness," is Lonergan's statement in *Method* that dialectic makes conversion a topic and addresses it.[31] Hence, I shall draw upon Lonergan's elaboration based on his reflections on dialectic in *Method*.

Fundamentally, conversion brings forward an objective knowledge of self as this knowledge relates to an objectification of horizon.[32] Scientists implicitly work with such horizons of meaning. When such horizons of meaning are cast in imaginative terms, they can become cosmological "myths."[33] When expressed in terms of explanatory systems, they become philosophies of nature, the implicit intelligibilities of order and world design. Implicitly, ongoing scientific investigation constantly engages each pole of this hermeneutical relationship: on the one hand, the objective knowledge of self, on the other hand, the objectification of one's horizons. So, genuineness and authenticity summon the self both to objectify his or her horizon and to identify his or her starting point and orientation within such a larger account of order. The challenge of conversion comes to the surface when any scientist confronts a counter position. Counterpositions are not simply disagreements. Counterpositions are defined by their opposition to the normative direction immanent within scientific investigation itself. Counterpositions oppose the very appeal to the normative drive for understanding assumed by scientists in their very acts of scientific inquiry. Dialectic asks, does this position promote understanding and contribute to the direction and intelligibility implicit in world process or does it not? Such a question entails a confrontation both within oneself and between oneself and others. For this reason, Lonergan does not conceive the dialectic of positions and counterpositions as simply opposing or confronting arguments. The value of bringing to the surface positions and counterpositions is to advert to the reasons why such conflicts exist and

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[31]*Method in Theology*, 253.

[32]*Method in Theology*, 235-37.

[33]Mary Hesse "Cosmology as Myth," *Concilium* 186 (1983): 49-54 and "Physics, Philosophy and Myth," in Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J., and George V. Coyne, S.J (eds.), *Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding* (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988).

what are their bases. The answer to this question is not to work out the logic or argument of one over the other. The difficulty is much more fundamental. It resides in acknowledging tensions in the polymorphic consciousness of the scientist. Moreover, the basis of a response comes from attending to the form of a heightened awareness to the differentiated acts of understanding as these occur in one's own acts of understanding.

Lonergan remarks that "the understanding that enables one to teach adds identification to insight."[34] This involves an appropriation of insight as it occurs in oneself. This requires the ability to advert to the polymorphic character of human consciousness by virtue of which different expressions correspond to different levels of understanding. Counterpositions occur when there is confusion with respect to levels of understanding. For example, confusion results from the inability to distinguish between the commonsense knowing of a body "already out there now," and the explanatory knowing of the conjugate relations of things to one another.

Attending to the differentiation of understanding as it occurs in oneself is a shift from theory (insight) to identification (interiority). Once one identifies the emergence of insight in oneself that attends to the distinction among common sense, theory, and interiority, one is in a position to begin to identify the source of the tension between positions and counterpositions in one's own dramatic pattern of experience. It is in this respect that Lonergan argues in *Method* that dialectic makes conversion a topic and promotes it.[35] The key feature of dialectical method is that the knower first discovers this world mediated by meaning and adverts to its tensions present in him/herself. It is an understanding of the world mediated by meaning such that the subject him/herself has appropriated the differentiation of consciousness in him/herself that occurs when one enters the realm of interiority. But interiority is not reducible to an inner logic of either theory or common sense. Conversion is an about-face. In the reversal of positions, one discovers within oneself what it means to learn, that is, to admit error, revise positions, and advance new positions. And through each conversion a fuller self, a self of

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[34]*Insight*, 559.
[35]*Method in Theology*, 253

"greater depth and breadth and wealth" emerges.[36] There is "a new understanding of one self and one's destiny."[37]

The significance of this approach for the scientist is further enhanced when we consider the scientific community in act. Lonergan regards dialectics as a means of creative collaboration. He remarks that this ability to discover the resolution of the dramatic conflict of positions and counterpositions in ourselves becomes a source of attraction for others.[38] The source of the attraction is the integrity of self and the self's authenticity. Thus, Lonergan notes that those who have shifted to interiority, who increasingly master the ability to advert to the tension in themselves and its increasing resolution in differentiated consciousness, those who have done so are able to reach others.[39]

There is a final point with respect to dialectics. I have just been emphasising the moment of interiority. However, emergent probability and generalized emergent probability are not solely about the self. While they advert to intelligence and genuineness, they are primarily about world order and design, the immanent intelligibility of scientific investigation. Generalized emergent probability still is directed to the emergence of a world. While focusing on conversion, Lonergan will not identify the subject as originating value. The world remains gift and as gift gives itself over to our questioning.[40] Once again, this sets the subject within a wider world that decenters the self from self. Most fundamentally, then, the distinction between positions and counterpositions is the degree to which one is consistent with and promotes self-transcendence and the other does not. The self is known as knower to the extent to which one gives oneself over to a world that

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[36]*Method in Theology*, 238.

[37]*Method in Theology*, 251.

[38]*Method in Theology*, 254.

[39]*Method in Theology*, 247, 252.

[40]Worth noting, especially where Lonergan refers to religious conversion, is his emphasis on the universe as "terminal value (*Method* 116)." Corresponding to this, the originating value is God. "Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe" (*Method* 116). "... all human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose ... " (*Method* 242).

transcends oneself. Acts of understanding that promote positions and reverse counterpositions are acts that testify to a "detached and disinterested desire to know."

Consequently, Lonergan's understanding is of a fuller world that realizes itself and the corresponding enriched understanding of self. Generalized emergent probability introduces the self within the wider and fuller world of a community of selves and their commitment to the good of order. The enriched self is a collective self, a social and historic self. The source of a new sequence in the "full circle of flexible schemes," becomes a community in its own detached and disinterested desire to know. Here we come upon questions relevant to communities and their histories and the shift from metaphysics to ethics that Lonergan began in *Insight*. Still, the immediate reference of emergent and generalized emergent probability remains the known universe of proportionate being.

Concluding Remark

The objective of this article has been to clarify Lonergan's notions of emergent probability and generalized emergent probability in order to make them available for current efforts of dialogue between theology and science. Both notions involve a radicalization of the assumptions inherent in the intelligibility of scientific inquiry. I drew upon these notions in order to explore how this intelligibility discloses an intrinsic openness that governs scientific investigation. If theology can identify this openness, it will have a foundation upon which to advert to the potential gains of an authentic dialogue. This said, what more specifically is the theological contribution in adverting to this openness?

The answer to this question is that theology promotes a further radicalization of inner dynamism of scientific investigation itself. I argued that dialectics brings to the level of an explanatory account the relationship between a self and a world. However, the world to which the theologian refers is the world of God's Love that traditionally has been referred to as the supernatural. So the question arises, in what ways can the intrinsic openness of scientific investigation provide a basis upon which it is possible to advert reasonably to such a world?

The key to answering this question is already present in the movement from classical and statistical methods and on to genetic and dialectical methods. The very logic of this movement demonstrates the ways in which modern science is not only open to higher viewpoints but is open to them in such a way as to anticipate a higher order organization of reality grounded in that reality's own explanatory laws. Thus modern science is made up of a number of disciplines that do not all operate on the same explanatory level. Within the pattern of the natural sciences, there are those that anticipate higher order patterns of organization and development whose laws exceed those of the lower disciplines. For example, the laws of physics and chemistry give way to and are sublated within the higher explanatory science of biology.[41]

The notions of emergent probability and generalized emergent probability lead to the exploration of the inner dynamics of these explanatory system and end up by bringing to the fore the relationship between the scientists as learner and his/her openness to horizons of meaning. The fact of this relationship may not be the typical object of scientific investigation, but it is intrinsic to the ongoing progress and understanding fashioned by modern science. Thus, we saw how conversion is intrinsic to the creativity of modern science. One may further radicalize this relationship between self and horizon by adverting to the underlying dynamism of self-transcendence, which enables us to explore more radically what is implied in the real success of modern science.

The next step further specifies the full and deepest meaning of the relationship between self and world. The entrance of theology as a dialogue partner suggests something more radical still. First, it suggests that the movement of self-transcendence internal to scientific investigation may well anticipate a novelty that is of the nature of encounter. That is, in its movement to explore the present universe and its laws, it can anticipate the limits of this world with respect to an encounter with the utter novelty

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[41]For a detailed account of these relationships see, Jean Ladrière, "la Science, la philoosphie et la foi," in *Articulation du sens I: Discours scientifique et parole de la foi* Coll. Cogitatio Fidei, 124 (Paris: Cerf, 1982 (1970)) 161-190. ["Science, Philosophy and Faith," *Language and Belief*, tran. Garrett Barden (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 117-48.]

of a higher order existence. Nature meets the supernatural. Human initiative and its desire encounter God's initiative and God's own effective desire.

Second, the nature of this encounter is anything but arbitrary or fanciful. In this regard, we return to the explanatory foundation and potential of modern science. We are saved from arbitrariness in the encounter between theology and science due to the very work of modern science that offers an analogy of an explanatory potential for higher orders of understanding. Is not the entire explanatory pattern of higher viewpoints grounded, as Lonergan has shown, in acts of understanding that give every hope of the possibility of a dialogue between science and theology? An exploration of the implicit assumptions of modern science has brought to the fore the bond between self-understanding and horizons of meaning. The theologian radicalizes this very relationship by bringing to the fore the bond between a self-understanding enriched by the horizon of God's Love. Doing so, in the context of a dialogue with modern science, does not add to the findings of modern science. It does, however, radicalize further that very openness by virtue of which modern science carries on its investigations. It is the merit of Lonergan's notions of emergent probability and generalized emergent probability to name in an explanatory fashion that very openness.

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