

# METHOD

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# METHOD

## *Journal of Lonergan Studies*

Volume 22

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*METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies*  
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BERNARD LONERGAN'S  
DRAFT PAGES FOR CHAPTER 3  
OF HIS DOCTORAL DISSERTATION,  
"GRATIA OPERANS:  
A STUDY OF THE SPECULATIVE  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WRITINGS OF  
ST THOMAS OF AQUIN"

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

**T**oward the end of the Editors' Preface for *Grace and Freedom*, volume 1 of Bernard Lonergan's *Collected Works*, Frederick Crowe writes:

At the end of his own bound copy of the dissertation Lonergan included 71 pages ... of what are obviously work notes for chapter 3 of the dissertation. The section numbers show they were drafted (and sometimes drafted twice) as developments of various topics: Aristotle's cosmic views, his hierarchy of movers, Thomas's theory of motion, causation by intellect, the idea of application, and so on. If these various drafts have any unity in themselves, it is probably to be found under the heading of God as an agent "per intellectum agens," and the advance made by Thomas over Aristotle under that heading. The editors, after some debate, decided not to add these notes to an already oversize volume, but they have no doubt about the value of the notes ..., and they remain to be studied by some future researcher.<sup>1</sup>

The pages mentioned in this quotation are edited and published below for the first time for the benefit of would-be researchers.

<sup>1</sup>*Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) xxii. I omit from this quotation a reference to Lonergan himself binding these pages in his personal copy of the dissertation, for Crowe's present position is that this cannot be verified from the available evidence.

Crowe's remarks about the "unity" of the "various drafts" effectively forewarn us against expecting to find in these pages a finished piece of writing to be read from beginning to end as if they formed continuous text with smooth transitions from one topic to the next throughout. It is true enough that the various discussions in the text in one way or another spiral round the core notion of God as an agent "per intellectum agens," and so on that basis one can affirm that a kind of loose unity pervades the discussions. At the same time, there is ample evidence of noncontinuity among the consecutively numbered pages. Thus, there are indications that sections are missing; although there are several series of consecutively numbered footnotes, the footnotes overall are not consecutively numbered; there are repeated, if sometimes slightly different, treatments of the same points; and on several occasions a text is repeatedly cited or quoted, sometimes in the space of a few pages. We catch a glimpse of the early Lonergan at work in these pages, as a set of ideas percolated in his mind, and he struggled to give them organized formulation. If one takes chapter 3 of *Gratia operans* as representing the outcome of this struggle, one can, I think, properly consider these pages as the surviving records of the struggle itself, as the various forays in formulation and organization of material that for one reason or another Lonergan eventually found wanting.

The text, then, with its indications of missing sections, with its repetition of points and of quotations, and with its footnotes not consecutively numbered throughout, reads as so many aborted attempts to treat a particular set of topics. The loose unity of the various discussions, then, is also an untidy unity. Even so, it is at least not unreasonable to infer from the mere fact that these pages have survived, and, it seems, survived only as physically coupled with the pages of the dissertation, that Lonergan regarded these aborted attempts as containing some sound and original points that were not expressed or not expressed in precisely the same way in the dissertation. If we suppose that this inference is correct for even some of the pages, and if on the basis of that supposition we further suppose that Lonergan is correct in what we are taking to have been his assessment of these pages, then from our perspective they are worth preserving and having in published form for

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reasons over and above the fact that they provide us with a glimpse of Lonergan working his way toward a satisfactorily organized formulation of his understanding of the idea of operation in St Thomas.

### 1 *Physical Description of the Pages*

As the quotation indicates, these pages are found at the end of what the editors of *Grace and Freedom* take to have once been Lonergan's own (carbon) copy of his dissertation. Just how the dissertation and these other pages originally came to be bound together is uncertain. But empty thread holes provide some evidence that they may have been bound together not once but twice.<sup>2</sup>

There is nothing that physically distinguishes these pages from the pages of the dissertation: the watermark is the same; and all the pages show similar signs of age.

Like the dissertation pages, these other pages are typed, but, typically, the typing on these pages is closer to the top and bottom edge of the page than is the typing on the dissertation pages—so close in several instances that parts of the typed letters or numerals are missing. Perhaps this indicates that less care was taken in the typing of these pages, which is what one would expect if they were merely work notes. On the other hand, in other respects too much care is taken in the discussion of topics and with the typing and the footnoting in these pages for them to be merely work notes. There is, for example, a conspicuous absence in the text of the kinds of abbreviation one would expect to find in mere work notes. The pages are, I think, more accurately described as drafts, preliminary sketches or rough forms of parts of chapter 3 of *Gratia operans*. While in the process of writing and rewriting these pages, Lonergan may not initially have thought of what he was writing as a draft. But that is what they became when he decided to discard them.

Unlike the majority of the pages of the dissertation, all of these other pages have been paginated by hand and with a lead pencil. Some of the

<sup>2</sup>The copy is held in the Archives at the Lonergan Research Institute as File A851. If the pages have indeed been bound twice, the second binding may be a library binding, for there are indications that the archives copy of the dissertation was once part of the collection of the Collegium Christi Regis Library in Toronto.

pages have been paginated twice. Pages 1 to 16, inclusive, have fainter consecutive pagination, 11 to 26, inclusive. Similarly, pages 36 to 55, inclusive, have fainter consecutive pagination, 61 to 80, inclusive. Again, pages 56 to 59, inclusive, have fainter consecutive pagination, 82 to 85, inclusive; there is no page with a detectable faint pagination of 81. And fainter pagination cannot be detected after page 59.

There is a further anomaly in the pagination. A mix-up occurs immediately after page 27: on the next page two numerals appear, with "29" seemingly corrected to "28"; two numerals also appear on the following page, but this time "28" is seemingly corrected to "29"; the next page, on which a new section begins, has a clear, uncorrected "29," and consecutive numbering resumes thereafter. The result of this mix-up is that two pages are assigned the numeral "29," which accounts for the fact that the last of these pages is assigned the numeral "71," even though there are actually 72 pages in all. I have indicated one of the factors that contributed to this mix-up in an editorial footnote in the text.<sup>3</sup>

Given that the pagination of these pages is not typed but added by hand in lead pencil, and that some pages have been paginated twice, there are three possibilities regarding who is responsible for their pagination. Either Lonergan alone is responsible, or both Lonergan and, at a later stage, some other or some others are responsible, or some other or some others alone are responsible. On the available evidence, the first alternative seems the most likely, but there is no way now definitively to exclude either of the other two alternatives.

Finally, the numerals dividing the sections are all typed except for those of sections 3.431, 3.432, 3.433, and 3.434, which are inserted by hand in ink.

All other significant physical features of the pages, such as hand-written insertions of sentences or of references, are noted in editorial footnotes in the text below.

<sup>3</sup>See draft discussion III, footnote 33.

## 2 *Dating the Pages*

How precise can we be in determining when this material was written? We are told in the introduction to *Grace and Freedom* (p. xviii) that "... Lonergan arrived in Rome in the late fall of 1938 without plans or proposals for the topic of his doctoral dissertation." The topic he eventually chose was approved under the title, "A history of St Thomas's thought on operative grace," on December 6<sup>th</sup> of the same year.<sup>4</sup> On p. xix of *Grace and Freedom* we are told that "... Lonergan submitted the typed work (ix and 338 pages, plus bibliography of ix pages) on 1 May 1940, less than seventeen months from the date of his topic approval." As these additional seventy-two pages were not included in the dissertation, and in that sense were written and discarded, and as the material covered in the pages belongs to what became the third chapter of the dissertation, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that they were composed sometime in 1939, perhaps in the first half of that year. On the available evidence, I do not think it is possible to date the pages more precisely.

## 3 *The Order of the Sections and the Numbering of Footnotes*

The ordering of sections and the numbering of footnotes from one section to the next, as these have come down to us in the consecutively numbered pages of the archives copy of the text, present us with some puzzles.

In tabular form, with the numbered and renumbered footnotes for each of the sections and the crossed-out sections also displayed, the order of the sections is the following:

<sup>4</sup>Frederick E. Crowe provides this information in his book, *Lonergan* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), 41. See also *Grace and Freedom*, xix, footnote 11.



Section	Footnotes	Section	Footnotes (continued)
§3.11	1-31	§3.2[ <i>bis</i> ]	---
§3.12	32-36	§3.21	48-65
§3.13	9	§3.245	108-112
§3.14	38-50	§3.246	113
§3.2	51-73(58-61← 86-89)	§3.5-	
§3.22	66-78	§3.51	141-151
§3.23	79-83	§3.52	152-167
§3.24	---	§3.53	168-179
§3.4	---	§3.54	180-199(186-189← 123-126)
§3.41	96-98	§3.55	202-206
§3.42	99-106	§3.56	---
§3.43	107	§3.561	---
§3.431	108-120	§3.562	207-208
§3.432	121-122	§3.563	---
§3.433	127-130		
§3.434	131-132		

Certain features of these pages stand out with greater clarity when displayed in this form, and we are able to see more easily how puzzling some of the features are.

First, there are puzzles connected with the numbering of the sections, and unfortunately the extant evidence is insufficient for resolving many of them with complete satisfaction. Thus, every section begins with the numeral "3," and one can conjecture that the reason for this is that even prior to the composition of chapter 3 of *Gratia operans*, Lonergan had envisaged that this material should belong to the third chapter of his dissertation. But supposing this to be correct, we cannot easily explain why the first section we have is numbered "3.11" and not "3.1," when other sections in these pages are numbered "3.2," "3.4," and "3.5."

There is one possible clue here however. The pages for §3.11 are numbered "1" to "6." But, as already mentioned, there are also faint indications of another numbering for these pages, namely, "11" to "16,"

which has been crossed out. The pattern continues in subsequent sections up to the beginning of §3.22.<sup>5</sup> Now, the crossed-out pagination suggests that at some earlier stage there were ten pages preceding §3.11. And among these pages there could well have been a no longer extant §3.1. However, unless it were an extensive introduction to the entire discussion, it seems unlikely that this putative §3.1 would have covered ten typed pages. But if it made up only some of the ten pages, the remaining pages would presumably have formed a prior section, or prior sections. But then it is difficult to see how "3" could have been the first numeral in the numbering of any prior section. And if a prior section did not begin with the numeral "3," then the previously mentioned conjecture as to why each section begins with the numeral "3" becomes unlikely. The clue, then, leads us to something of an impasse.

There are other, more important puzzles connected with the numbering of the sections. Thus, in the ordering we have of the sections there is a jump from §3.2 to §3.22. Again, after §3.434 a second §3.2 appears. It is followed by a section numbered "3.21," which, considered just as a numbered section, could fill the gap just alluded to between the first §3.2 and §3.22.<sup>6</sup> Again, there is a jump from §3.24 to §3.4, but nary a trace of §3.3 or of its possible subdivisions. Finally, there is a §3.245 and a crossed-out §3.246 immediately after §3.21, but no trace of §3.241, §3.242, §3.243, or §3.244.<sup>7</sup>

Second, there are puzzles connected with the numbering of footnotes. A first set of puzzles involves alterations in their numbering. Thus, in two sections, §3.2 and §3.54, some of the assigned numerals for

<sup>5</sup>§3.12 has a single page numbered "7," with a crossed-out "17"; §3.13 has a single page numbered "8" with a crossed-out "18"; §3.14 has two pages numbered "9" and "10" with a crossed-out numbering "19" and "20"; §3.2 has six pages numbered "11" to "16," with a crossed-out numbering "21" to "26." This pattern stops with §3.22, which has three pages numbered "17" to "19" and no crossed-out pages numbered from "27" to "29."

<sup>6</sup>For further discussion connected with this issue, see the next section of this introduction.

<sup>7</sup>Along with §3.246, the following section, §3.5, is also crossed-out. This feature is represented in the table, and subsequently in this introduction, by lines through "§3.246" and "§3.5." Also, to distinguish the two sections numbered "3.2" I have named the later §3.2 "§3.2 [bis]."

footnotes have been altered by hand—presumably by Lonergan himself. In §3.2 the footnotes numbered “58” to “61,” inclusive, were originally numbered “86” to “89,” inclusive; and in §3.54 the footnotes numbered “186” to “189,” inclusive, were originally numbered “123” to “126,” inclusive. In both instances, the effect of the alteration is to maintain consecutive numbering *within* each section.

A second set of puzzles involves breaks of continuity in the numbering of footnotes. The first break in continuity, which occurs with the footnote assigned the numeral “9” in §3.13, is, I suggest, of marginal significance. For this is a single and not an extended break in continuity. §3.13 is a single page on Avicenna’s cosmic hierarchy; it fits neatly and naturally into the discussion of cosmic hierarchies and has a single footnote on the page. This break could be accounted for plausibly if Lonergan had transferred this single page from some other sheaf, in which there were eight preceding footnotes, and then neglected to alter the numeral.<sup>8</sup>

Another break in continuity in the numbering of footnotes, namely, that between §3.432 and §3.433, can, I think, be accounted for adequately from internal evidence, though the account itself gives rise to further questions.<sup>9</sup>

A further break in continuity occurs between §3.54 and §3.55. It seems two footnotes are missing here. But, again, I suggest that this break, while puzzling and not easily explained, is of marginal significance. For it is evident from the text and not just the numbering of the sections that §3.55 follows on quite naturally from §3.54.

More significant breaks in continuity occur between §3.2 and §3.22, somewhere between §3.23 and §3.41 (probably between §3.24 and §3.4),

<sup>8</sup>There is another piece of evidence that this single page has been transferred from some other sheaf. In the archives copy of these pages, the original numeral for the section, “3.12,” has been crossed out, presumably by Lonergan himself, and corrected by hand to “3.13.” If this is not just Lonergan correcting a typo by hand, it could very well indicate that he transferred this page from some other sheaf in which “3.12” was the appropriate numeral for the section.

<sup>9</sup>For an account of the reason for the break in continuity here, and a presentation of the evidence in support of the account, see editorial footnote 33 in draft discussion III in the text. Note that the account also explains the alteration in the numbering of four of the footnotes of §3.54.

somewhere between §3.434 and §3.21 (probably between §3.434 and §3.2 [bis]), and between §3.21 and §3.245. Finally, there is the disruption that occurs between §3.245 and §3.51. In all, then, there are five more or less significant breaks of continuity in the numbering of footnotes.

#### 4 *Arguing for a Minor Reordering of the Sections*

In an unpublished report of his examination of these pages, Frederick Crowe has presented a case for rearranging the order in which the sections were bound at the back of Lonergan's own (carbon) copy of *Gratia operans*. In particular, he argues that §3.2[bis] and §3.21 (pp. 29[bis]-33 in the archives copy of these pages),<sup>10</sup> which in the ordering that has come down to us follow §3.434, are misplaced and should be placed immediately prior to §3.22. Further, he argues that §3.245 (pp. 33-35), which in the ordering that has come down to us follows §3.21, should be moved to follow immediately upon §3.24.

Crowe's reasoning, as I understand it, is as follows. §3.2[bis] and §3.21 together form a unit, and so if a case can be made for moving §3.2[bis], it would apply equally to §3.21. Now, if these sections were to be placed immediately prior to §3.22, the result would give a greater degree of order to the given numbering of the sections. And as §3.2[bis] and §3.21 together form a unit, there would no longer be a jump from a §3.2 to §3.22 to account for. Admittedly, §3.2[bis] would then follow immediately upon §3.2. But this hardly creates more of a problem than what already exists with two sections numbered "3.2." Moreover, one of the breaks in continuity in the numbering of the footnotes would be removed. For the first footnote of §3.22 is assigned the numeral "66" and the last footnote of §3.21 is assigned the numeral "65."

Thus, the insertion of §3.2[bis] and §3.21 immediately after §3.2 does not result in consecutively numbered footnotes from §3.2 to §3.2[bis]; indeed, given that these two sections are each numbered "3.2," it would be surprising and merely accidental if there were consecutively numbered footnotes from the first §3.2 to the second. However, the insertion of

<sup>10</sup>As previously mentioned, in the archives copy of these pages, there are two pages numbered "29." I follow Crowe in distinguishing them as "29" and "29[bis]."

§3.2[*bis*] and §3.21 immediately prior to §3.22 *does* restore consecutively numbered footnotes from §3.21 to §3.22.

A second set of considerations in support of inserting §3.2[*bis*] and §3.21 immediately after §3.2 and before §3.22 derives from the text. The heading for §3.2[*bis*] is "St Thomas's Theory of Motion." Under this heading, Lonergan says he will treat four points: (1) development in the idea of the first mover; (2) development in the cosmic hierarchy; (3) theorems regarding hierarchy; (4) the operation of God in the operation of nature. It is evident from the heading of the section that the first point is treated immediately in §3.21. But if we stay with the given ordering of the sections, we notice that the other three points are not treated under those headings in any of the subsequent pages. However, if one glances back to earlier sections, we find the heading for §3.22, "Development in the Idea of Hierarchy," and the heading for §3.23, "Limitation of the Idea of Hierarchy." Both of these sections, one can plausibly argue, correspond with point (2) above. Further, the heading for §3.24 is "Development by Theorems," and one can argue plausibly that this section corresponds with point (3) above. A case can be made, then, for saying that these three sections fulfill the second and third part of the promised treatment of four points.

Thus, it seems plausible to conclude that the "natural location" for §3.2[*bis*] and §3.21 is not their present location, that is, after §3.434, but prior to §3.22. Now, §3.2 is in its "natural location" after §3.14. For each of the sections preceding §3.2 deal with cosmic hierarchies in various authors, and §3.2 deals with the systematization of hierarchy. Thus, the more precisely specified "natural location" for §3.2[*bis*] and §3.21 is prior to §3.22 and after §3.2.

Turning next to §3.245, Crowe suggests that it should be placed immediately after §3.24. Its present position is anomalous as regards continuity in content with the preceding §3.21, its numbering as a section, and the numbering of its footnotes. There is, in short, no logic to its position. On the other hand, these anomalies would be at least mitigated if one were to place §3.245 after §3.24. Thus, considering just the given numbering of the sections, §3.245 fits most appropriately after §3.24. Moreover, despite the absence of the implied sections, §3.241 to §3.244,

there remains a discernible logic in the sequence from §3.24, "Development by Theorems," to §3.245, "Theorem of Causation by Intellect." For the last paragraph of §3.24 signals a shift in consideration from development by the introduction of new elements to development by theorems, and §3.245 (and the crossed-out §3.246) fall naturally within the scope of this shift in consideration. Moreover, one can plausibly argue that the material covered in §3.245 is part of what Lonergan said would be considered under point (4) above. Finally, while consecutively numbered footnotes do not result from placing §3.245 immediately after §3.24, the gap implied from the numbering of these sections effectively precludes an expectation of that result. And nothing prevents one from conjecturing that the missing 24 footnotes belonged to the absent sections, §3.241 to §3.244.

After some initial reluctance to tamper with the order of the sections as they have come down to us, I have come to appreciate the strength of Crowe's reasoning. Indeed, I think another consideration can further strengthen his position. In the order of pages as they have come down to us, §3.22 follows immediately upon §3.2. The footnotes, however, cease to be consecutive at this point. Moreover, the quotation from *In VI Metaphysics*, lecture 3, Cathala §§1207-1209, which concludes §3.2, is quoted *again* in the second paragraph of §3.22, as if for the first time.<sup>11</sup> Now, the discussion of rigidity in the conception of the cosmic hierarchy is the evident bridge between §3.14 and §3.2, and there is no break in continuity in the numbering of footnotes between these two sections. Indeed, Lonergan even says in the last sentence of §3.14 that the discussion of rigidity in St Thomas's hierarchy is what he will "turn [to] in the next section." If these features are taken together, they provide strong internal evidence that while the sections from §3.11 to §3.2 form a continuous unit, §3.22, at least in its present form, did not originally follow upon §3.2.

The case for a minor rearrangement in the order of the sections, then, is quite strong. Accordingly, I have incorporated Crowe's suggestions in

<sup>11</sup>In the following section, I shall argue that repetitions of quotations are one part of the evidence for claiming that these pages actually put together four different attempts by Lonergan to treat a similar set of topics.

the editing and publication of these pages. I have also included the two sections, §3.246 and §3.5, that are crossed out in the archives copy of these pages. The text for each of these sections appears below with a line through it to indicate their status in the archives copy. Finally, note that ~~§3.246~~ was in evident continuity with §3.245 before it was crossed out. So along with §3.245 it has been placed after §3.24.

For ease in comparison with the original ordering of sections in the archives copy of these pages, the amended ordering, with the footnotes for each of the sections indicated, is presented in tabular form below:

Section	Footnotes	Section	Footnotes (continued)
§3.11	1-31	§3.431	108-120
§3.12	32-36	§3.432	121-122
§3.13	9	§3.433	127-130
§3.14	38-50	§3.434	131-132
§3.2	51-73(58-61← 86-89)	<del>§3.5</del> —————	
§3.2[ <i>bis</i> ]	---	§3.51	141-151
§3.21	48-65	§3.52	152-167
§3.22	66-78	§3.53	168-179
§3.23	79-83	§3.54	180-199 (186-189← 123-126)
§3.24	---	§3.55	202-206
§3.245	108-112	§3.56	---
<del>§3.246</del>	<del>113</del>	§3.561	---
§3.4	---	§3.562	207-208
§3.41	96-98	§3.563	---
§3.42	99-106		
§3.43	107		

### 5 *Arguing for the Introduction of Division in the Text*

I mentioned at the beginning that we should not expect to find in these pages a finished piece of writing to be read from beginning to end as if the pages formed a continuous text with smooth transitions from one topic to the next throughout. We may, however, have sufficient clues to identify the more significant continuities and discontinuities within the text and so

arrive at a division of the text that facilitates a more profitable reading of it.

First, as already indicated, §3.11 through to §3.2 form a unit: neither the numbering of the sections nor the numbering of the footnotes, apart from the insignificant anomaly in §3.13, indicate any break in continuity. Moreover, from start to finish there is an identifiable pattern in the way the discussion develops. Thus, Lonergan begins by discussing Aristotle's cosmic hierarchy, then he turns to the cosmic hierarchies of Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and St Thomas, and concludes with St Thomas's attempt to systematize the cosmic hierarchy, drawing on both Platonic and Aristotelian sources.

Second, §3.2[*bis*] through to ~~§3.246~~ form a unit of a sort. Admittedly, there are indications of missing sections, and of a break in the consecutive numbering of footnotes that occurs where the missing sections would be located. But every other indication, including Lonergan's own statement regarding what he intends to discuss,<sup>12</sup> supports the position that §3.2[*bis*] through to ~~§3.246~~ form a unit, albeit a unit that is incomplete.

Third, there are similar indications that §3.4 through to §3.434 form a unit. The numbering of the sections indicates no break in continuity, and, with the missing four footnotes between §3.432 and §3.433 adequately accounted for,<sup>13</sup> the numbering of footnotes is consecutive throughout. Moreover, in §3.4 Lonergan announces the topics he intends to discuss, and the subsequent discussion to §3.434 conforms to his announced intention.

Fourth, §3.5 through to §3.563 likewise form a unit. The numbering of the sections follows an orderly pattern with no breaks in continuity. As previously mentioned, there is a puzzling single break in the consecutive numbering of footnotes from §3.54 to §3.55. Whatever the explanation for this break, it is, I suggest, only of marginal significance. For this lapse in the consecutive numbering of footnotes hardly threatens the affirmation that the two sections are in continuity. Moreover, in the crossed-out introduction, Lonergan announces the order of points he will consider. The discussion seems to be aborted before the seventh point, "the absolute

<sup>12</sup>See the last sentence of §3.2[*bis*].

<sup>13</sup>See editorial footnote 33 in draft discussion III in the text below.



value of St Thomas's position," is reached, and this may be the reason §3.5 is crossed out. But the six previous points are treated, and the fifth point to be discussed, "the theorem of universal instrumentality" (§3.55), is said to follow the discussion of the idea of application (§3.54). Clearly, then, §3.5 through to §3.563 form a unit.

We may now note some indications of discontinuity. Perhaps the most obvious is that between §3.2 and §3.2[*bis*]. I argued earlier that despite the order of the pages, as they have come down to us, §3.22 in its present form did not originally follow immediately upon §3.2, and that §3.22 is properly preceded by §3.2[*bis*] and §3.21. Now, clearly, just as there is discontinuity between §3.2 and §3.22, so too it is clear both from the duplication in the numbering of the sections and from the large disruption of continuity in the numbering of footnotes that there is discontinuity between §3.2 and §3.2[*bis*]. To these considerations, we may add the fact that a text from *In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias*, I, lecture 14, §16, quoted toward the end of §3.2, is given again, as if for the first time, in §3.21. Again, the text that concludes §3.2, a quotation from *In VI Metaphysics*, lecture 3, Cathala §§1207-1209, appears again, as if for the first time,<sup>14</sup> near the beginning of §3.22.

Next, there is a break in continuity between §3.245 and ~~§3.246~~, on the one hand, and §3.4, on the other. First, there is the fact of a jump from §3.245 and ~~§3.246~~ to §3.4, with no sign of an intervening §3.3. Second, there is a significant break in the consecutive numbering of footnotes at this point: §3.245 ends with a footnote assigned the numeral "112" and is followed by ~~§3.246~~ and a footnote assigned the numeral "113"; but the next footnote to occur in the text reverts back to the numeral "96." If one supposes continuity between these sections, there is no obvious way to account for this break. Third, the "digression on the *per se* and the *per accidens*" in §3.42 had already come up for discussion in §3.245. Again, Aristotle's comparison in §3.21 of the universe to a well-ordered household in which the heavenly spheres are like the sons of the family who have their conduct mapped out for them, while terrestrial bodies are

<sup>14</sup>Thus, in §3.22 Lonergan remarks immediately before giving the quotation: "Basically, St Thomas's cosmic hierarchy is that of Aristotle's *Physics*. It will be well to cite a passage that makes this hierarchy particularly clear."

like the slaves and the domestic animals that wander about at will, is repeated in almost the same terms in §3.41.

There are also clear indications of a break in continuity between §3.434, on the one hand, and ~~§3.5~~ and §3.51, on the other. First, the footnotes again cease to be numbered consecutively at this point: the last footnote in §3.434 is assigned the numeral "132," and the next footnote to occur, that in §3.51, is assigned the numeral "141." Second, in §3.51 and in the sections that follow there are a series of parallels and repetitions of preceding sections. Thus, to list the more important instances: (1) the quotation at the beginning of §3.51 is given first in §3.245 and, with the exception of the last sentence, in §3.434; (2) parts of the paragraph in §3.51 beginning "But further, in the seventh book ..." have a condensed parallel in footnote 16 of §3.21; (3) as previously mentioned, the comparison of the universe to a household that is given at the beginning of §3.52 is mentioned first in §3.21 and again in §3.41; (4) the paragraph in §3.52, beginning "It cannot but be so ..." parallels the two paragraphs of §3.41; (5) the point about Scotus's position mentioned in §3.52 had already been mentioned in footnote 21 of §3.21; (6) the parallels of the paragraphs of §3.52, from the paragraph beginning "In general the *per se* ..." to the end of the section, with the paragraphs of §3.42, from the paragraph beginning, "Speaking generally the *per se* ..." to the end of the section, and with the discussion in §3.21; (7) the close parallels between the discussions of §3.53 and §3.431; (8) the quotation in §3.54 beginning, "Dicit ergo (Aristoteles) quod ex quo ita est ..." is the same quotation missing from §3.432.<sup>15</sup>

In these pages, then, there are three places of evident discontinuity among the sections: the first between §3.2 and §3.2 [*bis*]; the second between §3.245 and ~~§3.246~~, on the one hand, and §3.4, on the other; the third between §3.434, on the one hand, and ~~§3.5~~ and §3.51, on the other. Combining this result with the earlier identification of the sections that form continuous units yields a fourfold division among the sections of these pages. Thus, §3.11 through to §3.2 form the first distinct continuous unit; §3.2 [*bis*] to ~~§3.246~~ form the second distinct continuous unit; §3.4 to

<sup>15</sup>See, again, editorial footnote 33 in draft discussion III in the text below.

§3.434 form the third distinct continuous unit; and §3.5 to §3.563 form the fourth distinct continuous unit.

I have called each distinct continuous unit a “draft discussion” and assigned to each what I hope is a suitable title. I have also numbered each draft discussion in accordance with the order in which the sections appear in these pages, without, however, wishing to imply that that order necessarily reflects the original chronological order in which the draft discussions were written.

In view of these parallels and repetitions, it seems likely that these four draft discussions are more or less independent of one another. It is as if Lonergan attempted several times to treat a set of topics, using a slightly different approach each time.

#### 6 *Miscellaneous Matters*

Several other points should be mentioned briefly in closing. First, in the text below, the original pagination of the archives copy of these pages is indicated by the insertion of numerals within brackets. For example, “[16]” inserted in the text below indicates where page 16 begins in the archives copy of these pages. The only complication in this regard is the two pages that are assigned the numeral “29.” The place where the second of these pages begins is indicated by inserting “[29 bis].”

Next, Lonergan’s references to Aristotle in these pages are not keyed to Bekker numbers but, typically, refer to Aristotle via St Thomas’s commentaries. Consequently, where appropriate, Bekker numbers have been included in brackets. Now, if Lonergan’s manner of citing Aristotle is any indication, it is likely that he intended his readers to consult St Thomas’s commentary on Aristotle’s text as well as Aristotle’s text. Accordingly, Lonergan’s original references to particular sections of St Thomas’s commentary have been left in the text, even though Lonergan is referring to Aristotle, not to St Thomas.

Third, where possible, Lonergan’s Latin quotations from St Thomas have been corrected to conform to the Leonine edition of his *Opera Omnia*. I have included English translations of Latin terms and quotations, and they appear in brackets—the shorter ones in the text and the longer ones in footnotes—or in parentheses if the Latin expression is nested within

brackets. Otherwise, anything that appears in parentheses is Lonergan's own. If a Latin expression is used more than once within a draft discussion, an English translation is given only for its first occurrence.

Fourth, all editorial footnotes appear within brackets. Among these are frequent references to Lonergan's dissertation, *Gratia operans: A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St Thomas of Aquin*, and to the series of articles based on the dissertation that Lonergan published in *Theological Studies* in 1941 and 1942. I included these references largely to facilitate the work of would-be researchers interested in tracing how the ideas expressed in these draft pages survived, or were modified, or took different shape in Lonergan's later work. Both the dissertation and the series of articles are now included in *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas*, volume 1 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. In that work, Part I comprises the series of articles, and Part II comprises the dissertation. Accordingly, in the publication of the draft pages below, editorial references to the articles take the form, "*Grace and Freedom*, I, ...," and editorial references to the dissertation take the form, "*Grace and Freedom*, II, ...."

Fifth, Lonergan's numbering of the sections has been left intact to preserve relevant information for would-be researchers and as a reminder of the somewhat fragmentary nature of these pages. However, in view of the division introduced into the text and the inclusion of editorial footnotes within brackets, there seemed little point in leaving the original numbering of Lonergan's footnotes intact. Instead, in each of the four draft discussions, the first footnote is assigned the numeral "1" and subsequent footnotes are numbered consecutively until the end of the draft discussion is reached. A reader can easily consult the two tables above to determine how Lonergan's footnotes in each section were originally numbered. So the procedure I have adopted does not result in any loss of relevant information, and it has the advantage of being more serviceable for readers.

These, in fact, have been my two guiding principles in the editing of these pages: to ensure that no relevant information is lost to would-be researchers while, at the same time, seeking to facilitate a profitable reading of the text.

Finally, I would like especially to thank Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., for freely making available to me the results of all his early investigations of these draft pages in their preedited state, and for a keen-eyed reading of their edited version, which issued in a list of corrections and suggestions. I extend my thanks also to Michael G. Shields, S.J., and Robert C. Croken, S.J., for their various, valuable contributions and corrections.

H. Daniel Monsour

BERNARD LONERGAN'S  
DRAFT PAGES FOR CHAPTER 3  
OF HIS DOCTORAL DISSERTATION,  
"GRATIA OPERANS:  
A STUDY OF THE SPECULATIVE  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WRITINGS OF  
ST THOMAS OF AQUIN"

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[DRAFT DISCUSSION I]  
[ST THOMAS'S SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE COSMIC  
HIERARCHIES OF ARISTOTLE AND SOME PLATONISTS]

[COSMIC HIERARCHIES]

3.11 *Aristotle's Hierarchy*

[1] Aristotle's hierarchy is in the field of motion. It consists of three elements: an immovable first mover; the animated celestial spheres; the terrestrial order. The cosmic scheme is put together with incredible skill and, though no one today would think of accepting it, there are extremely few who would be able to write a serious refutation of it. A summary presentation may be made by outlining: the fundamental fact; the problem it constitutes; the solution to the problem.

The fundamental fact is the intermittence of all terrestrial motion.<sup>1</sup> Everything on earth, *quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur* [sometimes it is moved, sometimes it is not moved].

<sup>1</sup>That this is the fundamental fact may be shown as follows. The first seven books of Aristotle's *Physics* are simply an introduction to the eighth. The eighth book is one argument, and its major premiss is the enumeration of the five following cosmic schemes:



[2] The fact of intermittent motion is not established merely by experience. Like the modern physicist, Heraclitus had maintained that everything is always in motion but not all motion is apparent.<sup>2</sup> To meet this Aristotle appeals to his analysis of motion.<sup>3</sup>

- 
- A. Nothing ever moves.
  - B. Everything always moves.
  - C. Some things always move, the others never move.
  - D. All things sometimes move and sometimes are at rest.
  - E. Some things are always at rest, others always in motion, others sometimes are in motion and sometimes at rest. (See *VIII Physics*, lect. 5 [253a 22-254a 2] and 6 [254a 3-b 6].)

Aristotle aims at demonstrating the fifth (E) scheme. But clearly the fourth can be eliminated only on *a priori* grounds: the necessity of a first mover proves something to be always at rest; the necessity of an eternal first motion proves something to be always in motion. It follows that the *a posteriori* element, the basic fact, is intermittent motion, which eliminates the first three schemes. The eighth book of the *Physics* is as follows: Lectures 2-4 [251a 8-253a 21], motion neither begins nor ends absolutely; Lectures 5-6 [253a 22-254b 6], there is intermittent motion; Lectures 7-13 [254b 7-260a 19], there is a *primum se movens* [first self-mover]; Lectures 14-20 [260a 20-266a 9], the first motion is perpetual and uniform circular local motion; Lectures 21-23 [266a 10-267b 26], the first mover is spiritual. [Parts of this footnote survive in *Gratia operans*. See Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 1 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), Part II, 281-82, footnote 65. On a more general note, one can with a fair degree of accuracy say that several of the key features of Aristotle's hierarchy, and the cosmic hierarchies of Al-Farabi and Avicenna, which receive a slightly more extended treatment in this first draft discussion, tend to be relegated to footnotes in *Gratia operans*. (Lonergan seems to indicate in *Gratia operans* that this is his procedure; see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 446, footnote 3.) It may be that after various attempts, Lonergan finally settled in *Gratia operans* on a strategy of pruning more expansive discussions of secondary points and concentrating just on what was essential to achieve his purpose.]

<sup>2</sup>[“... motion is the characteristic fact of nature: moreover, the view is actually held by some that not merely some things but all things in the world are in motion and always in motion, though we cannot apprehend the fact by sense-perception.” Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 3, 253b 9-12.]

<sup>3</sup>Motion defined: *III Physics*, lect. 2 [201a 9-b 5], 3 [201b 6-202a 2]; *XI Metaphysics*, lect. 9 [1065b 5-1066a 34].

Motions are of three and only three kinds:<sup>4</sup> change of place,<sup>5</sup> change

<sup>4</sup>V *Physics*, lect. 2-4 [224b 35-226b 18]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect.12 [1068a 8-b 25]. Generation is not a motion: XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 11 [1067b 1-1068a 7]; I *De generatione et corruptione*, lect. 10 [319b 6-320a 7].

<sup>5</sup>According to Aristotle and St Thomas this is merely a change of extrinsic denomination: III *Physics*, lect. 5 [202a 22-b 29], §15. This invalidates a good deal in Fr. Stufler's argument, *Gott der erste Beweger aller Dinge* (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1936) 1-13. [Apart from what Aristotle and St Thomas may have thought, it can be argued that this remark by Lonergan draws attention to a fact whose significance goes well beyond the present context. If local motion is merely a change of extrinsic denomination, and if it is correct to understand potency and act as *intrinsic* principles of a thing, then it seems to follow that local motion, as such, falls under Aristotle's definition of motion—the act of something existing in potency insofar as it is in potency—in a way different from the way alteration, the coming-to-be or incomplete realization of a sensible quality, and augmentation or diminution, the coming-to-be or incomplete realization of a certain quantity, fall under the definition. Indeed, local motion, the coming-to-be of being-in-a-place, would not, properly speaking, be a transition from potency to act, but a change from one situation to another—unless, of course, one extends the meaning of "potency" and "act" to include potential and actual situations. Now, Lonergan could have appealed to other, perhaps more explicit, statements by Aristotle and St Thomas in support of his claim that for them local motion is merely a change of extrinsic denomination. One example of such a statement in St Thomas is the following: "... dicendum quod motus localis, ut dicit Philosophus in VIII *Physics*, 7 (261a 20) non mutat aliquid de eo quod est intra rem, sed solum est secundum id quod est extra. Unde motus localis non ponit exitum de potentia ad actum aliquem intraneum rei, sed ad actum extrinsecum. Et propter hoc non ponitur per motum localem aliqua imperfectio per hoc quod desit aliquid eorum quae debent inesse; sed ponit imperfectionem secundum quid per hoc quod dum est in loco isto non est in alio." ("... it ought to be said that local motion, as the Philosopher says in VIII *Physics*, 7 [261a 20], does not change something within the thing, but only that which is external. Hence, local motion does not mean emergence from potency to any internal actuality of the thing, but to an extrinsic actuality. For this reason, local motion does not imply some imperfection according to this: that of those things that ought to be present in a thing, something is lacking. But local motion does imply some imperfection according to this: that while something is in this place, it is not in another place.") *Super III Sententiarum*, d. 22, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1m. Lonergan himself accepted the position that local motion is merely a change of extrinsic denomination. But he seems to have regarded that affirmation as having a significance that neither Aristotle nor St Thomas grasped. At least four pieces of direct textual evidence can be provided indicating that Lonergan agreed that local motion is merely a change of extrinsic denomination. And the fourth text gives a succinct indication of the significance he accorded the affirmation. First, in draft discussion IV, §3.54, Lonergan says as much when he remarks: "It is impossible that they [the quintessential heavens] should suffer any change, except the change of extrinsic denomination that is involved in local motion." Second, in *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 395), he writes: "To understand *generans movet gravia et levia* [the generating (agent) moves heavy and light things], merely note that local motion is not an entitative change but simply a change of extrinsic denomination." For the third, see his response to a series of questions on pp. 364-68 of *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT*, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, rev. and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe, with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M.

of sensible quality,<sup>6</sup> and change of size.<sup>7</sup> Except circular motion, all other

Doran, and Thomas V. Daly, vol. 5 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1990). Broader issues that concern not only local motion but alteration and augmentation as well arise in this response. For motion, from Aristotle's perspective, regards the incomplete realization of three of the predicaments or categories, and for Lonergan the predicaments or categories are descriptive, while "metaphysics primarily regards being as explained" and only secondarily does it include being as described—and even then the inclusion of descriptive relations in metaphysics "is implicit, general, mediated, and intellectual." (*Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 3 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* [Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1992] 419.) The fourth piece of evidence has become available in published form more recently. In *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2001), the editor, Philip McShane, quotes in a footnote on p. 13 from a document in the Lonergan archives (batch II, file 48, last page of item A296): "... if local motion as such, that is, change of place without other change, for example, of energy or momentum, is a transition from imperfection to perfection, from potency to act, then there must be imperfect places and perfect places, and the whole Aristotelian theory follows; but if places are indifferent, then change of place as such is not a transition from potency to act but simply being in a peculiar kind of act; local motion becomes a state, and the Newtonian type of theory follows. This much is said to show that St Thomas's position on the influence of the heavenly bodies is far more reasonable than that of the cosmology manuals that hold all places to be indifferent and yet define local motion as a transition from potency to act." Perhaps, then, one can say that if one agrees with Lonergan that just as the supposition of the *primum mobile* [first movable thing], the outermost celestial sphere, having only one local motion, and grounding all other local motions, and with the time of its movement grounding all other times, prevented Aristotle and St Thomas from recognizing that "[o]bjectively...and fundamentally there are many times" (see *Insight*, 182; cf. *Grace and Freedom*, II, 323, footnote 23), so one may agree with what he seems also to suggest, namely, that it was the notion of imperfect and perfect places that prevented Aristotle and St Thomas from grasping clearly the significance of the fact that local motion is merely a change of extrinsic denomination. It remains an even more complicated issue, and one open to subsequent investigation, whether *anything* in the notion of imperfect and perfect places can be retrieved by being brought into contact with Lonergan's discussion of the generic, relatively invariant properties of world process, "in which the design is emergent probability," the succession of world situations is "increasingly systematic" (*Insight*, 149), and the conditioned series of schemes of recurrence "involves spatial concentration," such that "however widespread the realization of elementary schemes, there will be a succession of constrictions of the volumes of space in which later schemes can be found" (*Insight*, 145, cf. 150).]

<sup>6</sup>It consists exclusively in the change of the *sensibilia propria* [sensible things proper (to certain senses)]: hot [to] cold, wet [to] dry, black [to] white, heavy [to] light, bitter [to] sweet, hard [to] soft, etc. See *VII Physics*, lect. 4, 5. [The English translators of St Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* indicate that from around line 243a 3 to around line 248a 9 of Aristotle's text, the Oxford English translation of the *Physics* uses a Greek text that varies considerably from the Greek text that was translated into Latin and was subsequently used by St Thomas as a basis for his commentary in *In VII Physics*, lect. 3 to

local motion is to a definite place. Change of sensible quality is simply to the opposite quality. In both these cases, since the motion is limited in scope, it comes to its term and ends. It may be followed by another motion, but the point is that we then have another motion and not a continuation of the same motion. Finally, change of size is intrinsically intermittent, for it takes place by definite *quanta* and not by infinitesimals.<sup>8</sup>

[3] Thus, terrestrial motion not merely happens to be intermittent: it must be so. Still, this constitutes a problem, and the scientist must find its solution.

It constitutes a problem. Motion in general presupposes the existence of both mover and moved,<sup>9</sup> and for the continuous and perpetual motion that is all that is needed. In intermittent motion one has also to explain why the motion arises now and not previously. To account for its previous non-existence, one must posit a cause of the state of rest. To account for its present existence, one must posit a motion that eliminates the cause of the state of rest.<sup>10</sup> It makes no difference whether the change is produced in the mover or in the moved or in both: but there must be some change, and

6. (See St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, tr. Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath and W. Edmund Thirlkel [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963], 430). They include as an appendix (see pp. 593-96) to their translation of St Thomas's commentary a literal English rendition of the section of the Latin *VII Physics* that Thomas commented on in lectures 3 to 6. Paragraphs 693-96 (roughly, 244b 1-245b 2) of the appendix are the texts Thomas commented on in lecture 4; and paragraphs 697-701 (roughly, 245b 3-246b 20) are the texts he commented on in lecture 5.]

<sup>7</sup>Augmentation is the combination of local motion and alteration, e. g. carry coals to the fire (local motion) where they burn (alteration) thus making the fire bigger. See *I De generatione et corruptione*, lect. 11-17 [320a 8-322a 33].

<sup>8</sup>The argument is principally from *VIII Physics*, lect. 5 [253a 22-254a 2], 6 [254a 3-b 6]; use is also made of the point that only circular local motion can be perpetual, *VIII Physics*, lect. 15 [261a 28-b 26], 16 [261b 27-262b 9].

<sup>9</sup>The principle, *quidquid movetur ab alio movetur* [whatever is moved is moved by something else], is established by an induction in *VIII Physics*, lect. 7 [254b 7-255a 18], 8 [255a 19-256a 2]; it is proved *a priori* in *VII Physics*, lect. 1 [241b 24-242a 15], from the principle that whatever moves is necessarily an extended body.

<sup>10</sup>*VIII Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3], §6. Compare St Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8: '... non est motus secundum actionem nisi *metaphorice et improprie*; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus...' ["...there is no movement in respect of action except *metaphorically and improperly speaking*, as we say that one who passes from inaction into action is changed..." Lonergan's emphasis.]

that change is a motion.<sup>11</sup> Now, this previous motion in turn presupposes not only mover and moved but, in addition, another previous motion or premotion. And that premotion another premotion. And so forth, back through the whole of unending time. Thus, terrestrial motions form an infinite series.

[4] Such is the problem. Now a solution must be found for it: one cannot, like Democritus, simply say that things happen to be so or always were so. The three angles of a triangle were always equal to two right angles; nonetheless, the geometer must reduce this eternal fact to its first principle. Similarly, eternal motion has to be explained.<sup>12</sup>

We now come to consider the arguments by which Aristotle establishes his explanation of the infinite series of terrestrial motions.

First, motion is not self-caused: the *gravia* [heavy things] and *levia* [light things] are moved by the *generans* [generating thing];<sup>13</sup> every case of alteration presupposes a local motion, else the alteration would have taken place previously;<sup>14</sup> change of size presupposes both local motion and alteration;<sup>15</sup> corruption and generation presupposes all three.<sup>16</sup> The animals are self-moved only locally<sup>17</sup> inasmuch as one part moves

<sup>11</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3], §8. The motion envisaged is a local motion. To melt an iceberg it makes no difference whether the sun moves up to the Pole or the iceberg moves to the Equator. [In the archives copy Lonergan adds: "The fact that the premotion is fundamentally a local motion explains St Thomas's referring to it in the *De potentia* as a metaphorical transition from potency to act." Subsequently, this sentence is crossed out by pencil and marked, "No," presumably by Lonergan himself. In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 278) Lonergan provides the needed corrective. Speaking of the "metaphorical" transition from potency to act in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8, he remarks: "...if the mover changes from potency to act simply in virtue of a change in the moved, then the change in the mover is *metaphorice et improprie*." See also *Grace and Freedom*, II, 259].

<sup>12</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 3 [252a 4-b 6].

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. lect. 8 [255a 19-256a 2]; III *De caelo et mundo*, lect. 7 [301a 22-b 31].

<sup>14</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 14 [260a 20-261a 27], §3.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid. and I *De generatione et corruptione*, lect. 11-12 [320a 8-b 15].

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. lect. 10 [319b 6-320a 7]; V *Physics*, lect. 2 [224b 35-225b 4], §§8, 9, 10.

<sup>17</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 4 [252b 7-253a 21], §6.

another,<sup>18</sup> but this motion presupposes a premotion from some outside source, food or the atmosphere.<sup>19</sup>

[5] Second, an infinite series of things moving and moved does not account for motion. It will be convenient to distinguish between two types of series, the vertical and the horizontal. The vertical series is concentrated at the instant: the will moves the hand, the hand moves the cue, the cue moves the ball. The horizontal series is spread out in time: heat evaporates the water of the sea; lightness lifts the vapour to the air; condensation forms clouds; the wind carries them over the land; precipitation causes rain which fills the rivers flowing to the sea.<sup>20</sup>

A vertical infinite series is no explanation, for a *movens motum* [a moving agent that is (itself) moved] is an instrument, and an infinity of instruments with no one to use them results in nothing being done.<sup>21</sup>

A horizontal infinite series is not self-explanatory. The necessary continuity of the process as a whole is not accounted for: it cannot be caused by any single mover within the process; it cannot be caused by all [the movers] together, for all [the movers] are not together.<sup>22</sup>

It follows that one must posit an immovable mover outside the whole process.<sup>23</sup> Since this mover is immovable, he can cause only one unchanging motion; for if he caused now this and now that, he himself would have to change; that is impossible, for he must be immovable.<sup>24</sup> On

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. lect. 7 [254b 7-255a 18], 10 [257a 35-258a 5].

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §4.

<sup>20</sup>See *II Meteorologica*, cap. 2 [354b 1-356b 3], §§8, 13, 17; cap. 3 [356b 4-359b 26], §32. For the distinction between the two types of series: *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5m 2a ser. In Aristotle the distinction seems implicit. [On this showing, the horizontal series, at least sometimes, is what Lonergan will later call a scheme of recurrence.]

<sup>21</sup>*VIII Physics*, lect. 9 [256a 3-257a 34].

<sup>22</sup>Ibid. lect. 12 [258b 10-259a 21]. The presupposition is that a single effect (a perpetual process) must have a cause that is one.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid. lect. 12 [258b 10-259a 21], 13 [259a 22-260a 19].

<sup>24</sup>Ibid. lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §§8, 9. [In *Gratia operans*, Lonergan remarks: "Aristotle's fundamental idea is that the first mover cannot be the terrestrial *quandoque moventia* (things sometimes moving [others]) because then he would have to act differently at different times and so himself need physical premotion; on the other hand, the *primum mobile* (first movable thing) or *corpus caeleste* (heavenly body) is constantly changing and so can cause the *quandoque moventia* (things sometimes moving [others])... Hence the *corpus caeleste* is the *primum alterans* (the first thing altering [another]) or the

the other hand, the *primum mobile* [first movable thing; the outermost celestial sphere], moving perpetually and uniformly, and so continually changing, accounts for the intermittent character of terrestrial motion.<sup>25</sup>

[6] Such is the Aristotelian theory of motion. Certain points are to be observed.

It attends to corporeal movements: change of place, of sensible quality, of size. These alone are *actus existentis in potentia* [act of something existing in potency]; those of the soul are *actus existentis in actu* [act of something existing in act].<sup>26</sup> St Thomas strictly observes this distinction, and when he uses the broad sense of motion, he warns the reader.<sup>27</sup>

Premotion consists in a change of either the mover or the *mobile* [movable thing], and the change envisaged is basically a local motion.<sup>28</sup> This type of premotion is required just as much by the *agens per intellectum* [(agent) acting through intellect] as by the *agens naturale* [natural agent].<sup>29</sup>

The need of the first mover regards quite impartially the premotion and the motion: for each motion is the premotion of its successor. The function of the first mover is to account for the whole series.<sup>30</sup>

Since the function of the celestial spheres<sup>31</sup> is established indirectly, there is no close definition of just what they do to be the causes of all terrestrial motions. All that is known is that they must be the causes of everything below the circle of the moon; what precisely they do is

*alterans non alteratum* (a thing altering [another] but not [itself] altered): because it is moved locally it can cause alteration." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 282, footnote 65.]

<sup>25</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §§8, 9. Compare XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 6 [1071b 22-1072a 26], Cathala §§2510 ff.; II *De generatione et corruptione*, text 56 [336a 24-336b 11].

<sup>26</sup>Compare III *De anima*, lect. 2 [425b 11-426b 8].

<sup>27</sup>For example, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 109, a. 1.

<sup>28</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3], §8.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.* lect. 12 [258b 10-259a 21].

<sup>31</sup>The eternal circular motion is the first motion. The implication of 'first' is that it accounts for all other motion. But this is proved not by showing what the celestial spheres do, but by an *a priori* argument which involves the supposition that God cannot be a free agent.

indeterminate and determined only by fancy.<sup>32</sup> This involves a serious break in the chain of causality between the first mover and terrestrial corruption and generation.

### 3.12 Al-Farabi

[7] That he was the author of the *Liber de causis* has recently been established.<sup>33</sup> In his later period St Thomas wrote a commentary on this

<sup>32</sup>Such fanciful determinations account for our epithets: saturnine, jovial, martial, mercurial, lunatic. Compare *XII Metaphysics*, lect. 9 [1073a 14-b 17], Cathala §2561. ["... when one gets down to details, one has to distinguish between the instances in which the fiction of celestial influence can be carried through plausibly and the instances in which it cannot and is not. Thus, the celestial spheres cause a secondary conservation of terrestrial beings, a task that is as important as it is vague when one recalls that the mixture of humors that are health to a lion would be death to a man. Similarly, the spheres effect the variation of the seasons and so have a large role in generation and corruption; moreover, the lower spheres each have their special influences, which has given rise to the epithets of saturnine, jovial, martial, mercurial, and the like. Finally, they have a very clearly defined role to play in the speculative embryology of the age, and this gives rise to the otherwise perplexing statement that "homo generat hominem et sol" ("man and the sun generate man") *Grace and Freedom*, I, 77.]

<sup>33</sup>[The archives copy indicates that Lonergan intended to provide a reference for this claim, but none is given. However, a glance at the unpublished bibliography for *Gratia operans* reveals H. Bédoret's article, "L'auteur et le traducteur du *Liber de causis*" (*Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie* 41 [1938] 519-33), and it may be that Lonergan concluded that Al-Farabi was the author of *Liber de causis* from his reading of that article. Frederick Crowe notes that on the back of this page in the archives copy, under "3.12" and the title "Al Farabi," there is the following sentence that ends without punctuation: "Presumably the author of the *Liber de Causis* (32), this tenth century citizen of Bag[h]dad was thought to be Aristotle ..." Interestingly, Lonergan's remark on this issue in his dissertation is more circumspect, saying only that the *Liber de causis* "may be by Alfarabi" (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 167). In one of the articles that reworked the material from his dissertation (see *Grace and Freedom*, I, 87), he speaks simply of "[t]he Arabic author of that very Platonist work." Thus, if one assumes, as seems natural, that the sentence just quoted on the back of the page of the archives copy was written earlier than the sentence that appears in the text, it seems that Lonergan went from thinking that there are good scholarly reasons for holding that Al-Farabi was the author of *Liber de causis*, to thinking that the scholarly case had been established, and finally, in *Gratia operans* and in *Grace and Freedom*, to thinking that the scholarly case is inconclusive. The article on Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (c. 870-950), by Ian Richard Netton in volume 3, pp. 554-58, of the recently published *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) gives no indication that Al-Farabi is the author of *Liber de causis*. On the other hand, in his article on the *Liber de causis* in volume 5, pp. 595-98, of the same work, Hannes Jarkasellers says on p. 596 that "Very likely, the author of the *Liber de causis* was a Muslim or Christian thinker writing in the Near East, probably at the intellectual centre of Bag[h]dad, in the ninth century (in any case, no later than the last quarter of the tenth century.)" Such a description does not positively exclude Al-Farabi from being the author



work, showing it to be by some Arab. Earlier in his life he refers to it as though it were written by Aristotle.<sup>34</sup> This fact, combining with the influence of the pseudo-Dionysius and with the special attention of Aristotle to the material world, has probably not a little to do with the Thomist synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonist thought.<sup>35</sup>

Al-Farabi's system is to collect the Platonic ideas into an absolute being and divide the rest of the world into higher and lower intelligences, higher and lower souls, higher and lower bodies.<sup>36</sup>

He influenced St Thomas, as far as we are concerned here, first by his theory of degrees of causality and second by his theory of divine activity

of the work. In any event, in various places in the present text, Lonergan assumes that Al-Farabi is the author of the work.]

<sup>34</sup>Compare St Albert [the Great]: *Summa de creaturis* 2, q. 80, a. 1, sed contra. For St Thomas, see [*In Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, 3. 2a. Lonergan does not give this reference. He has simply, "For St Thomas see ..." This reference, however, does provide an example of a place in St Thomas's early writings in which the *Liber de causis* is attributed to "the Philosopher." So it could well have been the reference Lonergan had in mind. Be that as it may, the reference supports Lonergan's claim. In volume 2 of his *History of Philosophy* (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1985, 207) Frederick Copleston remarks that it was William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus's *Elementatio theologica* that "brought to St Thomas the realization that the *Liber de causis* was not the work of Aristotle, as it was previously supposed to be, but was based on the work of Proclus."]

<sup>35</sup>See [André] Bremond, ["La Synthèse Thomiste de l'Acte et de l'Idée," *Gregorianum* 12 (1931): 267-83. The archives copy just has "See Bremond." However, as the article just mentioned is listed in Lonergan's bibliography for his dissertation, as it is the only item listed under that name, and as the topic of the article is on the precise point Lonergan is making in the text, it is highly likely that this is the reference he had in mind.]

<sup>36</sup>See *Liber de causis*, prop. 3a ["Omnis anima nobilis habet tres operationes; nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio divina"; "Every noble soul has three activities, for its activities consist of animate activity, intellectual activity, and divine activity." The work is written in an aphoristic style, with appropriate comments and corollaries following the enunciation of each leading proposition. For St Thomas's commentary on this work, one may now consult Henri-Dominique Saffrey's critical edition, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino super Librum de Causis Expositio* (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1954). An English translation of St Thomas's commentary, based largely on Saffrey's critical edition, but also taking current research into account, has recently become available. See St Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Causes*, translated and annotated by Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles R. Hess, and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of American Press, 1996). This text has been used here to provide a translation of the propositions of *Liber de causis* that Lonergan refers to. Lonergan's original reference here also directs the reader to "Mandonnet 1, 207 ff.," thereby indicating that the reader should consult lect. 3 of St Thomas's commentary.]

in the universe.<sup>37</sup> It will be more convenient to present thought on these points when the occasion arises.<sup>38</sup>

### 3.13 Avicenna's [Ibn-Sina's] Hierarchy

[8] Avicenna combines a Plotinian emanationism with Aristotelian cosmic theory and Ptolemaic astronomy.

His basic principle is that from the One proceeds only the One. In other words, he evidently fails to elaborate the concept of God as an intellectual and free agent. His system may be outlined briefly, for it was through the Arabs that St Thomas first knew Aristotle, and their position had a notable influence upon the development of St Thomas's conception of God moving the will.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup>[*Liber de causis*] prop. 1a, 20a, 31a. [Prop 1a: "Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam secunda universalis"; "Every primary cause influences its effect more than does a universal second cause." Prop. 20a: "Causa prima regit omnes res creatas praeter quod commisceatur cum eis"; "The first cause rules all created things without being mixed with them." Prop 31a: "Inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momento aeternitatis et inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momento temporis existens est medium, et est illud cuius substantia est ex momento aeternitatis et operatio ex momento temporis"; "Between a thing whose substance and action are in a moment of eternity and a thing whose substance and action are in a moment of time there exists an intermediary, and it is that whose substance belongs to a moment of eternity, while (its) activity (belongs to) the moment of time."]

<sup>38</sup>[In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 297-303), under the heading, "The Degrees of Causality," Lonergan mentions three theorems on the degrees of causality in St Thomas that "represent speculative elaborations [of the Aristotelian cosmic scheme] from a different viewpoint, namely, the relative importance of the different hierarchic movers" (297). The first theorem, ascribed to Aristotle, is: Everything that is moved is moved more by the higher mover than by the lower, and consequently much more by the first mover. The second theorem is drawn from the first proposition of the *Liber de causis*. The Platonists held that that which is being itself is the cause of being for all things, that which is life itself is the cause of living for all things, and that which is intelligence itself is the cause of understanding for all things. In St Thomas, according to Lonergan, these Platonist positions are expressed in the second theorem on the degrees of causality: The activity of the higher cause is a presupposition of the activity of the lower. The third theorem on the degrees of causality in St Thomas is said by Lonergan to be "a use of the *Liber De causis*" (299). It states: God's power is most immediate to all things. And two corollaries are: (1) God does not act by a *res media* but by his essence; (2) The divine essence is present where it acts.]

<sup>39</sup>["...at all times St Thomas affirmed divine intervention in the will; and Avicenna had provided the speculative framework through which God entered." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 99.]

Avicenna begins by positing the necessary being. This, being one, causes only one, viz., the first intelligence. The first intelligence knows both the necessary being and himself, and so is twofold; he accordingly causes the second intelligence and the first soul. The first soul, presumably from the potency of matter, receives the first body, which is the utmost and invisible celestial sphere discovered by Ptolemy.<sup>40</sup> The second intelligence causes the third intelligence and the second soul, and this process continues till the number of celestial spheres is complete. The lowest of the intelligences is the *intellectus agens* [agent intellect] which causes and dominates the terrestrial region.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup>[Lonergan is probably referring to a ninth sphere, beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, which was not part of Aristotle's cosmic scheme. Henry Corbin, in *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960, 97) mentions briefly some of the historical details connected with the postulation of a ninth sphere: "Aristotle and Ptolemy himself, in the *Almagest*, had accepted the number of *eight* spheres—that is, seven for the planets and an eighth for the fixed stars. However, Aristotle did not know the motion of the precession of the equinoxes; the 'fixed stars' being considered really motionless, the Eighth Sphere was made responsible for the apparent diurnal motion of the celestial vault from east to west, a motion that the Eighth Sphere imparted to all the others. But Ptolemy, accepting the motion of precession by which the fixed stars have a slow and continuous increase in longitude, was obliged, at least implicitly, to attribute to the Sphere of the Fixed Stars two motions in opposite directions: one the diurnal motion from east to west, the other from west to east. The contradiction could not but be felt. Hence in the *Hypotheses* Ptolemy already proposed the existence of a *ninth* sphere; and immediately after him the Alexandrians accepted it, without further reference to the spheres that lay below these two and to which it had previously been sought to attribute the diurnal motions of the respective 'wandering stars.'" Avicenna, it seems, allowed for the possibility of a ninth sphere but left the matter to astronomers to decide.]

<sup>41</sup>Avicenna (Ibn-Sina), 988-1035, born near Bokhara, knew no Greek and used Syriac versions of Aristotle, influenced by [the] Platonist Al-Farabi of Bagdad (ob. 949, 950). Because of [the] Platonic element in his thought, he was favoured in the West more than Averroes [Ibn-Rushd]. Though a syncretist, he is exceptionally brilliant at pure metaphysics. For the argument in which he evolves his hierarchic conception, see [Avicenna], *Metaphysices Compendium*, Bk. I, Part IV, Tract II, Cap. I and III. Latin translation by Nematallah Caramé (Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1926). [Cap. I is found on pp. 186-196 of the Latin translation; Cap. III on pp. 199-201. See footnote 57 below for Lonergan's brief description in *Gratia operans* of Avicenna's procedure in "deducing the Aristotelian hierarchy" and the rigidity in the cosmic structure that resulted from it.]

### 3.14 Hierarchy in St Thomas

[9] First, St Thomas has no need of the idea of hierarchy.

God is an *agens per intellectum* free to execute whatever he conceives. Again, God's activity is creative, productive of being and all its differences, and so can have no presuppositions of any kind.<sup>42</sup>

Second, though St Thomas does admit hierarchy, yet he makes notable reservations.

First, hierarchy does not regard *esse* [being] but only *fieri* [becoming]. The point is illustrated by the principle, *sublata causa tollitur effectus* [when the cause is taken away, the effect is taken away]. Take away the master builder, and the process of construction ceases. Suppose God not to be acting, and what is in process of construction is annihilated.<sup>43</sup>

Second, the human soul is not a product of the world process but in each instance created by God. Accordingly, God alone acts directly on the human will.<sup>44</sup>

Third, hierarchy in St Thomas does not imply, as it does in Aristotle,<sup>45</sup> any limitation of the universality of divine providence. God exerts an absolute and universal sway that descends to the least detail. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the design of providence is not executed through the mediation of creatures. The execution of providence is a motion,<sup>46</sup> motion is hierarchic;<sup>47</sup> and so what divine [10] providence

<sup>42</sup>See VIII *Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3]; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, cc. 31-38. ["It was because Aristotle could not conceive the immovable mover as the immediate cause of the *quandoque moventia et mota* (things sometimes moving actively and being moved) of this earth that he invented the mediatory role of the heavens and postulated a cosmic hierarchy." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 73.]

<sup>43</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 104, a. 1; and passim.

<sup>44</sup>*Super II Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3; and passim.

<sup>45</sup>XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 12 [1075a 11-1076a 4. "... the idea of divine design and controlling providence is simply absent from Aristotle's cosmic scheme ... Nor could Aristotle have conceived things differently, once he had made the radical mistake of thinking that the first mover could not cause anything but one perpetual and unvarying motion." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 286.]

<sup>46</sup>"... gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante ..." ["... government is a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed ..."], *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 103, a. 5, ad 2m.

conceives, is executed not by direct divine intervention but through the hierarchy of angels, celestial spheres, and human wills. Accordingly, did God not control the freedom of rational creatures, there would be no execution of divine providence in either the spiritual or the material world.<sup>48</sup>

St Thomas's admission of the influence of the heavenly bodies, that is, their causation of *all* material change in the terrestrial order,<sup>49</sup> seems fundamentally to be a matter of yielding to authority.<sup>50</sup> Nonetheless, he advances the ordinary reasons. Aristotle's basic argument in *VIII Physics*, lecture 12 [258b 10-259a 21], is accurately reproduced by *oportet reducere omnem multitudinem in unitatem* [every multitude has to be reduced to unity].<sup>51</sup> The function of the heavens as the first cause of alteration<sup>52</sup> and as *causa speciei* [cause of species]<sup>53</sup> is defended on rather Platonic principles.<sup>54</sup> Since this Platonism leads to a notable rigidity in St Thomas's

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<sup>47</sup>*Super II Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2; *De veritate*, q. 5, aa. 8, 9; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 77-79, 82, 91, 92; *Summa theologiae*: 1, q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6; q. 110, a. 1; q. 115, a. 3; and *passim*.

<sup>48</sup>This is not only a deduction but also an explicit statement to be found in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 90. It is not retracted in later works. [Echoes of the last three sentences survive in *Gratia operans*: "... there are a number of Avicenna's Platonist tendencies in St Thomas, and there is the denial that the intermediate beings create. But though God is sole cause of *esse*, creatures are the cause of *fieri*. Hence the execution of providence is mediated: to be observed is the fact that the execution of providence is a motion and that there are no motions except those intended by providence; hence did God not control the wills of angels and of men, there could be no execution whatever of providence in either the spiritual or material world." (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 282).]

<sup>49</sup>Despite frequent assertions to this effect, nonetheless the angels act directly on terrestrial bodies in many ways: *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 110, a. 1, ad 2m.

<sup>50</sup>*Super II Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2: To reject all celestial influence is 'omnino contra sensum et contra sanctorum auctoritates' ["completely against reason and the authoritative statements of the saints"].

<sup>51</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 91; compare *ibid.* c. 82; *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 8. [This last reference to *De veritate* is added by hand in the archives copy and is followed by a question mark.]

<sup>52</sup>See footnotes 24, 25, 32 above.

<sup>53</sup>The famous 'homo generet hominem et sol.' [See *De substantiis separatis*, c. 10.]

<sup>54</sup>Compare *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 82; *Summa theologiae* 1, q. 115, a. 3, ad 2m; *De substantiis separatis* c. 10. [Lonergan's original reference had "De Subst. Separ., 8, Mandonnet, 1, 107," which corresponds to the last part of c. 10 in the Leonine edition, the paragraph beginning: "Item, alicuius naturae ..."]

hierarchy—a rigidity that cannot be accounted for on purely Aristotelian grounds—something must be said about it. To this we turn in the next section.

### 3.2 Systematization of Hierarchy [in St Thomas]

[11] St Thomas does some borrowing from the Platonists to systematize the Aristotelian hierarchy.<sup>55</sup> It is of no little importance to grasp that this does not involve the introduction of more motions—in Platonist thought motion is caused by "soul"<sup>56</sup>—though it does imply a greater rigidity of thought and a more emphatic manner of assertion.<sup>57</sup>

For the Platonist, causation is a participation of the absolute idea. It follows that everything belonging to a given species *must* be caused by the idea: *si esset forma ignis separata ut Platonici posuerunt esset aliquo modo causa*

<sup>55</sup>[“St Thomas systematizes the Aristotelian hierarchy on somewhat Platonist lines. God is the *primum movens* (first moving agent), and the *corpus caeleste* as *primum alterans*, are affirmed to be universal causes. Just as the Platonic Idea cannot but be the cause of every participation of the Idea, so there cannot be an *ens* (being) that is not produced by *ipsum esse* (being itself) nor a *res naturalis* (natural thing) that is not produced by the *causa speciei*.” *Grace and Freedom*, II, 290-91.]

<sup>56</sup>[“... in the *Liber De causis* motions are caused not by the first cause but by soul.” Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, II, 372, footnote 130. Lonergan would seem to be referring to the corollaries under Proposition 3 in the *Liber de causis* and, in particular, to the following text: “Since the soul receives the impression of an intelligence, it came to have an activity inferior to (that of) an intelligence in its impression upon what is under it. This is because (soul) impresses things only through motion, since what is under it receives its activity only if soul moves it. For this reason, then, it happens that soul moves bodies.” (See pp. 19-20 of the translation provided by Guagliardo, Hess, and Taylor and mentioned in footnote 36 above.)]

<sup>57</sup>[In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 309), Lonergan remarks that “The Platonist systematization of the Aristotelian hierarchy results in a notable rigidity.” Earlier, on p. 282, he had remarked that while there is a general acceptance of the Aristotelian cosmic scheme in St Thomas, he adds that “there are a number of Avicenna’s Platonist tendencies in St Thomas.” To this remark, footnote 66 on the same page provides the following clarification: “Avicenna deduces the Aristotelian hierarchy beginning from the first principle and proceeding along the lines of Plotinian emanations: this gives the cosmic structure a great measure of rigidity not to be found in Aristotle.” Avicenna supposed that the Aristotelian hierarchy could be “deduced” in virtue of there being necessary emanations from the One. In speaking of rigidity, it seems Lonergan is referring, at least in part, to these necessary emanations. Note that in *Gratia operans* even though Lonergan grants that St Thomas “does some borrowing from the Platonists to systematize the Aristotelian hierarchy,” he no longer says expressly that the rigidity is “in St Thomas’s hierarchy.”]

*omnis ignitionis* [if there were a separate form of fire, as the Platonists maintained, it would be in some way the cause of all burning].<sup>58</sup> The mere fact that a statue is a statue does not prove it to be the work of Michelangelo and not of Bernini; but it would prove it to be the work of the *sculptor separatus* [the separate (Form of the) Sculptor], if there were one. Thus, this type of causation is of its nature universal, and *necessarily* occurs whenever an effect is of a given kind.

Now in the *De substantiis separatis*, after distinguishing between the causation of individuals in a species and of the species as such, St Thomas writes:

Relinquitur igitur quod oportet super omnes participantes naturam equinam esse aliquam *universalem* causam totius speciei. Quam quidem causam Platonici posuerunt speciem separatam a materia, ad modum quo omnium artificialium principium est forma artis non in materia existens; secundum Aristotilis autem sententiam hanc universalem causam oportet ponere in aliquo caelestium corporum ...<sup>59</sup>

Here then the celestial bodies are universal causes on the analogy of the Platonic ideas. The superiority of Aristotle's position and its implication appears in the *Pars prima*:

[12] ... Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles: et sic sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum.

Unde secundum Philosophum, in *2 de Gener.*, text. 56, necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et *ideo* quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad

<sup>58</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 1, corp. post med.

<sup>59</sup>["It remains, therefore, that above all those (individuals) participating in equity, there must be some *universal* cause of the whole species. This cause the Platonists posited as a Form separate from matter in the manner in which the principle of all artifacts is the artistic form that does not exist in matter. According to Aristotle's opinion, however, this universal cause must be located in some one of the heavenly bodies ..." (Lonergan's emphasis).] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 10.

speciem, sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in *II Phys.*, text. 28, quod homo generat hominem, et sol.<sup>60</sup>

The student of *De potentia* will recall,

... nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis ...<sup>61</sup>

But in the same passage we have asserted the principle,

Quanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior; et quanto est efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum ...<sup>62</sup>

This is Al-Farabi's first proposition<sup>63</sup> and simply derives from Porphyry's tree applied to a Platonic hierarchy. St Thomas makes Proclus the author of the basic principle,

... quanto virtus alicuius causae est perfectior, tanto ad plura se extendit,<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup>["... the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being; and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.

"Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (*II De generatione et corruptione* [336a 24-336b 11]), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently, whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (*II Physics*, 2 [194b 14-15]) that man and the sun generate man." Lonergan's emphasis.] *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 3, ad 2m; compare *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 9. [This last reference to *De veritate* is added by hand.]

<sup>61</sup>["... nothing acts towards (production of) a species in these lower bodies except through the power of a heavenly body ..."] *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

<sup>62</sup>["The higher the cause the more common and efficacious it is; and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effects ..."] *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>["Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam secunda universalis"; "Every primary cause influences its effect more than does a universal second cause." See *Super Librum De causis*, lect. 1. (Lonerger's original reference had simply "Madonnet, 1, 193-200.")]

<sup>64</sup>["... in the degree that the power of some cause is more perfect, in that degree does the power extend itself to more things." ] *Ibid.* post med. [In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 291, footnote 106), Lonergan refers to this as the "basic principle" of St



and so we find in [St Thomas's commentary on] the *Physics* the following clear and full statement:

[13] Manifestum est enim quod quaelibet virtus extenditur ad aliqua secundum quod communicant in una ratione obiecti;<sup>65</sup> et quanto ad plura extenditur, tanto oportet illam rationem esse communiorem; et cum virtus proportionetur obiecto secundum eius rationem, sequitur quod causa superior agat secundum formam magis universalem et minus contractam. Et sic est considerare in ordine rerum:<sup>66</sup> quia quanto aliqua sunt superiora in entibus, tanto habent formas minus contractas, et magis dominantes supra materiam, quae coarctat virtutem formae. Unde et id quod est prius in causando, invenitur esse prius quodammodo secundum rationem universalioris praedicationis; ut puta, si ignis est primum calefaciens,<sup>67</sup> caelum non tantum est primum calefaciens, sed primum alterans.<sup>68</sup>

It is to be noted that this theorem reverses the logic of the cosmic hierarchy. Aristotle proceeded from the generation and corruption of the terrestrial cycle to the *primum se movens* [first self-mover]. St Thomas, presupposing the universal causality of the heavens, explains it by assigning the celestial agents a generic category of activity, alteration.

The significance of the generic category is not to be overlooked. Fire is the *primum calefaciens* [the primary heating thing]; but nothing can be

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Thomas's systematization of the Aristotelian hierarchy. He adds that in his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, St Thomas attributes the principle to Proclus.]

<sup>65</sup>I. e., the category of effects. [In the archives copy, this footnote and the next four footnotes, all of which occur on a single page, have had their numbers altered by hand so as to maintain consecutive numbering of footnotes. The alterations suggest that this single page was inserted here from some other sheaf.]

<sup>66</sup>Application to cosmic hierarchy.

<sup>67</sup>Compare *ignis calidissimus* [Fire hot in the highest degree].

<sup>68</sup>["For it is clear that any power extends to certain things insofar as they share in one nature, and the farther that that power extends, the more common that nature must be. And since a power is proportioned to its object according to its nature, it follows that a higher cause acts according to a form which is more universal and less contracted. And this can be seen in the order of things. For to the extent that among beings some things are superior, to that extent they have forms which are less contracted and more dominant over matter, which contracts the power of form. And so that which is prior in causing is found to be prior in some way under the aspect of a more universal predication. For example, if fire is the first in heating, then the heavens are not only the first in heating but also the first in producing alteration."] *In II Physics*, lect. 6, §3.

heated without being altered; therefore the activity of fire presupposes the activity of the heavenly bodies. There follow such brusque statements as,

... quantumcumque ignis habeat perfectum calorem, non alteraret nisi per motionem caelestis corporis.<sup>69</sup>

[14] It is not to be inferred that this introduction of Platonist universal causes has added any precision to the conception of the action of the heavenly bodies on terrestrial causes. The idea of the first cause of alteration is present in the [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles*,<sup>70</sup> but in the *De potentia*, when it is asked whether the elements could act, were the heavenly spheres to stop, the answers to difficulties are as vague as one would expect. Fire is always hot and always determined to act; it is in contact with other elements; but all the same, unless you presuppose the motion of the *corpus caeleste*, it cannot act.<sup>71</sup> Such a conclusion could not be had from the argument in Aristotle's *Physics*.

The systematization of hierarchy, however inept when applied to the celestial spheres,<sup>72</sup> results in very brilliant syncretic thought when applied to the summit of the hierarchy, God. In truth, God is a *substantia separata* [separate substance] and his substance is *ipsum esse separatum* [separate being itself] and, as well, *ipsum intelligere separatum* [separate understanding itself].<sup>73</sup> That God is the cause of all being is established by the familiar argument,

<sup>69</sup>["No matter how perfect the degree in which fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of a heavenly body." Lonergan's emphasis.] *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 109, a. 1; compare *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 8; *Il De caelo et mundo*, lect. 4, §13 [286a 3-b 9]. [In the archives copy, the reference to *De potentia* and to *De caelo et mundo* have been added by hand.]

<sup>70</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 82.

<sup>71</sup>*De potentia*, q. 5, a. 8 and ad 1m, 5m, 6m. This article is very interesting from the view-point of the 'intentio.' For Al-Farabi on motion caused by soul, see *Liber de causis*, prop. 3a. [See footnote 36 above. For St. Thomas's commentary see *Super librum De causis*, lect. 3.]

<sup>72</sup>[Loneragan has already touched on this ineptness. See the last paragraph of §3.11 and footnotes 31 and 32 above.]

<sup>73</sup>"... Dei substantia est ipsum eius esse; non est autem in eo aliud esse atque aliud intelligere, sic enim non esset perfecte simplex, unde nec simpliciter primum: oportet igitur quod sicut eius substantia est suum esse, ita etiam eius substantia sit suum intelligere sive intelligentia, ut etiam Philosophus concludit in *XII Metaphysicae*"; "... the substance of God is God's very act of being. Furthermore, God's being and God's

Oportet autem effectus proportionaliter causis respondere, ut scilicet effectus particularis causae particulari respondeat, effectus autem universalis universali causae ...<sup>74</sup>

and a few lines later,

... quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto est universalior et virtus eius ad plura se extendit. Sed id quod primum invenitur in unoquoque ente maxime commune est omnibus ...<sup>75</sup>

which recalls

... secundum ordinem causarum, esse ordinem effectuum, quod necesse est propter similitudinem effectus et causae... Et propter hoc [15] nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei.<sup>76</sup>

A particularly brilliant statement of the idea that God is universal in knowledge, will and activity, I cannot refrain from copying,

... ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate:

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understanding are one and the same; otherwise, God would not be a perfectly simple being, not the absolutely prime being. Therefore, just as God's substance is God's act of being, so is God's substance God's understanding or God's intelligence, as the Philosopher also concludes in *XII Metaphysics*."] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 14.

<sup>74</sup>["But there must be a proportion between effect and cause, so that a particular effect corresponds to a particular cause and a universal effect corresponds to a universal cause."] *Ibid.*, c. 10.

<sup>75</sup>["...the higher the cause, the higher and more universal is it and the more things its power extend to. But that which is found to be prime in each and every being is especially common to all beings ..."] *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup>["... the order of the effects follows the order of causes, and this must needs be so on account of the likeness of the effect to the cause ... And because of this no action in these lower bodies attains to the production of a species except through the power of the heavenly body, nor does anything produce being except by the power of God."] *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7. The fact that St Thomas also uses this argument to prove that God alone creates does not mean that this argument can prove nothing but creation and conservation. Fr Stufler seems to slip into this error. (See *Gott der erste Beweger aller Dinge*, 67-83.) However, he perhaps would not deny that God as head of the hierarchy of motion is the cause of all production of being under the title, *universale principium essendi* [universal principle of being], and that this is distinct from conservation.

sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens.<sup>77</sup>

The meaning of the passage is accurately defined by its parallel in the *De substantiis separatis*, where the universality of divine knowledge is proved from the premiss that God is *ipsum intelligere separatum*.<sup>78</sup>

To conclude this section on systematic hierarchy, St Thomas himself is most competent:

Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum gradus. Est enim primo causa incorruptibilis et immutabilis, scilicet divina; sub hac secundo est causa incorruptibilis,<sup>79</sup> sed mutabilis: scilicet [16] corpus caeleste; sub hac tertio sunt causae corruptibiles et mutabiles. Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu existentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.

Causa autem secundi gradus est quodammodo universalis, et quadammodo particularis. Particularis quidem, quia se extendit ad aliquod genus entium determinatum, scilicet ad ea quae per motum in esse producuntur; est enim causa movens et mota. Universalis autem quia non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium<sup>80</sup> se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia, quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum, oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.

Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis: eius enim effectus proprius est esse: unde quicquid est, et quocumque modo est, sub causalitate et ordinatione illius causae proprie continetur.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>77</sup>["... from the very fact that something is knowable, it falls under his (God's) knowledge; and from the very fact that it is good it falls under his will; just as from the very fact that it is a being, a thing falls under his active power, which he comprehends perfectly since he is (an agent) acting through intellect."] *In Aristotilis libros Peri hermeneias*, I, lect. 14, §16. [This text is quoted again at the beginning of §3.21.]

<sup>78</sup>*De substantiis separatis*, c. 14.

<sup>79</sup>The heavenly spheres are quintessential, and the only change they undergo is local motion which does not involve anything but change of extrinsic denomination. *III Physics*, lect 5 [202a 22-b 29], §15. [On local motion as involving only change of extrinsic denomination, see footnote 5 above.]

<sup>80</sup>Hence the sun is a *causa aequivoca* [equivocal cause]: horses generate horses and men [generate] men, but the sun does both and does so more than either.

<sup>81</sup>["Now we find three grades of causes in the world. First, there is the cause that is incorruptible and immutable, namely, the divine cause; second, beneath this there are causes which are incorruptible but mutable, namely, the heavenly bodies; and third,

beneath this there are the causes which are corruptible and mutable. Therefore, causes in this third grade are particular causes and are determined to proper effects of the same kind; for example, fire generates fire, humans generate humans, and plants generate plants.

“Now a cause belonging to the second grade is in one sense universal and in another sense particular. It is particular because it extends to some special class of beings, namely, to those which are generated by motion; for it is both a cause of motion and something that is moved. And it is universal because its causality extends not only to one class of changeable things but to everything that is altered, generated and corrupted; for that which is first moved must be the cause of everything that is subsequently moved.

“But the cause belonging to the first grade is universal without qualification, because its proper effect is existence. Hence whatever exists, and in whatever way it exists, comes properly under the causality and ordination of that cause.” *In VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3, Cathala §§1207-1209. [This text is quoted again near the beginning of §3.22.]

[DRAFT DISCUSSION II]

[ST THOMAS'S TWOFOLD DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
ARISTOTELIAN COSMIC SCHEME]

3.2[bis] St Thomas's Theory of Motion

[29 bis] It [St Thomas's theory of motion] consists of three elements: Aristotle's theory; developments of Aristotle's theory; modifications of Aristotle's theory.

As Aristotle's theory has no possible relation to a theory of grace, it follows that developments of Aristotle's theory have no possible relevance.<sup>1</sup> However, in this section we study simply the developments. The reason for this is obvious: unless one knows what is irrelevant, one will not know what is relevant. To put the question in the concrete, to what

<sup>1</sup>[At first glance, this may seem a somewhat surprising sentence, especially if one recalls Lonergan's remark at the beginning of chapter 3 of *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 252) that speculative theology "constructs its theorems with respect to the supernatural order by appealing to the analogy of nature," or the earlier remark in chapter 1 (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 167), that "*Philosophia ancilla theologiae*: it supplies the necessary breadth of view; it is the accurate analysis of the natural element in theological problems ..." Surprise, however, quickly dissipates if one recalls that Lonergan has just distinguished not two but three factors in St Thomas's theory of motion. Neither Aristotle's theory of motion, as such, nor some homogeneous expansion of Aristotle's theory, as such, has any possible relation and relevance to a theory of grace. For they are hampered from having such a relation and relevance by their radically deficient understanding of the first mover. For Lonergan, it is Aristotle's theory and the development of Aristotle's theory, as incorporated and developed by way of *modification* by St Thomas—the higher viewpoint centring on a corrected understanding of God as first mover, and more specifically, as an agent acting through intellect, who operates in every operation of the creature—that has the relation and relevance to a theory of grace. (On this, see the summary statement at the bottom of *Grace and Freedom*, II, 314.) St Thomas's modification of Aristotle's theory, then, is hardly a matter of minor mending. Indeed, Lonergan will say in a moment that between Aristotle's few vague remarks on the first mover and St Thomas's understanding of God there is an "immeasurable abyss."]

what extent does *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, bear on St Thomas's theory of grace?<sup>2</sup> Is it a development of Aristotle or a modification of Aristotle?

Four points are treated: development in the idea of the first mover; development in the cosmic hierarchy; theorems regarding hierarchy; the operation of God in the operation of nature.

### 3.21 *Development in the Idea of the First Mover*

St Thomas knows the first mover as the Christian [knows] his God. Between Aristotle's few vague remarks on the first mover and St Thomas's idea of God there is an immeasurable abyss. We treat only the points that bear on the present issue.

First, God is the Absolute, *ipsum esse* [being itself], *ipsum intelligere* [understanding itself],<sup>3</sup> and we might add *ipsum amare* [love itself].

Second, God is the unconditioned condition of everything.

... ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadet sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate: sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ispe perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens.<sup>4</sup>

[30] Third, not only is God the fount of all reality, truth and goodness, but these proceed from him not by blind spontaneity but as from an intelligent agent.

Thus, there are two fundamental developments of Aristotle's thought.

<sup>2</sup>[The title of the article, as Lonergan points out in *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 307), is: "Utrum Deus operetur in operatione naturae," "Whether God operates in the operation of nature." Lonergan calls the affirmation that God operates in every operation of the creature the "central theorem" of the theory of cooperation (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 304, 306).]

<sup>3</sup>*De substantiis separatis*, c. 14.

<sup>4</sup>"... from the very fact that something is knowable, it falls under his (God's) knowledge; and from the very fact that it is good, it falls under his will; just as from the very fact that it is a being, a thing falls under his active power, which he comprehends perfectly, since he is (an agent) acting through intellect." In *Aristotlis libros I Perihermeneias*, 1, lect. 14, §16. [This text was quoted in draft discussion I; see towards the end of §3.2, and footnote 77.]

Aristotle's first mover moves because he is the good, sought by all things.<sup>5</sup> His causation is that of a final cause, the object loved by the *caelum animatum* [animated heaven].<sup>6</sup> But St Thomas's first mover is not only the final cause of all activity, but also the efficient cause not merely of all activity but of all reality.

Again, Aristotle's first mover is no more than a *causa per accidens* [cause per accidens] of particular events. He moves the heavenly bodies and the altering [*sic*] heavens continuously keep terrestrial activity from the death of entropy. There is a *causa per se* [cause per se] only of the world process as a process; there is no conceiving, intending, executing this world process complete in its every detail. Aristotle compares his universe to a well-ordered household, in which the conduct of the sons of the family is mapped out for them, but the slaves and the domestic animals wander about pretty much as they please.<sup>7</sup>

But St Thomas affirms divine providence and, indeed, as a matter of faith.<sup>8</sup> God knows all, intends the good and permits the evil.<sup>9</sup> Without providence the beneficence of nature would be mere chance:<sup>10</sup> since then nature succeeds either always or for the most part, natural law is as much

<sup>5</sup>Compare *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 1; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 105, a. 5.

<sup>6</sup>XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 7 [1072a 26-b 14].

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.* lect. 12 [1075a 11-1076a 4]. [For a parallel to this paragraph, see the first paragraph of §3.41 in draft discussion III and the beginning of §3.52 in draft discussion IV. There are other parallels in *Grace and Freedom* that we may note: "The activity of Aristotle's first mover is to contemplate himself ... and be the object beloved by the animated heavens ...; his causality is efficient only in the sense of 'appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum' ('the desirable thing when apprehended moves desire') ...; hence Aristotle compares his universe to a Greek household in which the heavenly spheres, like sons of the family, have their course mapped out for them, while terrestrial bodies, like slaves and domestic animals, wander about at random." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 80, footnote 67; "... the idea of divine design and controlling providence is simply absent from Aristotle's cosmic scheme; he compares the world to a household: the heavenly bodies, like the sons of the family, have their conduct mapped out for them; the terrestrial agents, like slaves and domestic animals, move a good deal at random. Nor could Aristotle have conceived things differently, once he had made the radical mistake of thinking that the first mover could not cause anything but one perpetual and unvarying motion." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 286.]

<sup>8</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 2.



the effect of an intention as the movement of an arrow to its mark.<sup>11</sup> Still, providence has different modes. [31] Rational creatures are provided for on their own account; natural agents for the sake of the species.<sup>12</sup> But all are directed to the final end, goodness itself, which is God.<sup>13</sup>

Providence is the prudence of the artist: as the prudent man foresees, arranges, provides; as the artist conceives, intends, executes; so God is the prudent architect of the universe and [of] everything in it.<sup>14</sup> Not only is God an artist inasmuch as he plans coincidences and combinations that lead to an end,<sup>15</sup> but, in a profounder way, nature itself is his art. *Sicut artifex se habet ad artificata, ita Deus se habet ad naturalia* [As an artisan is to artifacts, so God is to natural things].<sup>16</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Ibid; compare *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 103, a. 8.

<sup>12</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, aa. 3, 5, 6; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 112,113, etc.

<sup>13</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, cc.16-24; etc.

<sup>14</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1; *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 94.

<sup>15</sup>*Omnia divinae providentiae subduntur* [All things are subject to divine providence]. *Passim*.

<sup>16</sup>Apparently based on the comparison of nature and art in the study of the Platonic idea: *VII Metaphysics*, lect. 5-8 [1031a 15-1034b 19]. On the principle that nature is God's art are explained: objective truth (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 16, a. 1), objective falsity (Ibid. q. 17, a. 1), the justice of God (Ibid. q. 21, a. 2), the eternal law (Ibid. 1-2, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3m), the natural law (Ibid. q. 91, a. 2), the law of irrational creatures (Ibid. q. 93, aa. 4, 5), the causality of divine knowledge (Ibid. 1, q. 14, a. 8), the identification of *ratio gubernationis divinae* [design of divine government] with *lex aeterna* [eternal law] (Ibid. 1-2, q. 91, a. 1; Ia, q. 22, a. 1), which is also providence (Ibid. q. 22, a. 3) extending as far as divine activity (Ibid. q. 22, a. 2) and divine finality (Ibid. q. 103, a. 5), that is, with absolute universality (Ibid. 1, q. 19, a. 6; q. 103, a. 7). In the passages cited the pivot of the explanation is in each case: *Sicut artifex se habet ad artificata, ita Deus ad naturalia*. [In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 289, footnote 104) Lonergan mentions this analogy in the context of his discussion of St Thomas's theory of instrumentality. There, as in the present footnote, and with similar references to St Thomas, the analogy, *Sicut artifex se habet ad artificata, ita Deus ad naturalia*, enables one to bring together objective truth, objective falsity, the principle *scientia Dei causa rerum* [God's knowledge (is) the cause of things], truth and justice, providence and the *lex aeterna*. Finally, note the parallel discussion of the analogy in draft discussion IV, §3.51, in the paragraph beginning, "But further in the seventh book ..."]

[32] But though St Thomas pushes the idea of divine providence to the ultimate extreme, he nonetheless maintains the Aristotelian theory of contingency. The point is one of considerable importance.<sup>17</sup>

The modern thinker derives his idea of determinism from the assumption of an initial situation<sup>18</sup> from which all else could, theoretically, be deduced. Aristotle supposed the world to be eternal and so had no premise for such a deduction. The first mover moves the heavens; the heavens prevent the entropy of terrestrial activity. It follows that motion is necessary, but not that this or that terrestrial motion is necessary. Natural laws hold not absolutely but *ut in maiori parte* [as in a majority of cases]; they are frustrated *in minori parte* [in a minority of cases]; and this frustration is due to chance.<sup>19</sup>

Now while St Thomas admits that there can be no natural cause for the chance combination of causes or the fortuitous coincidence of effects,<sup>20</sup> he maintains that God knows, intends and brings about these products of chance and fortune. Further, though God's foreknowledge is infallible, his will irresistible, his activity necessarily efficacious, nonetheless the effects of chance and fortune remain contingent.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup>It settles outstanding questions regarding *omnia applicat* [applies all things] and *scientia media* [middle knowledge].

<sup>18</sup>*V Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1013a 24-b 16], 3 [1013b 16-1014a 25], 5 [1014b 15-1015a 20], 9 [1017a 7-b 9]; *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1026a 33-1027a 28], 3 [1027a 29 b 16]; *XI Metaphysics*, lect. 8 [1064b 15-1065b 4].

<sup>19</sup>[At this point in the archives copy there occurs what appears to be an inadvertent repetition in the numbering of footnotes: two consecutive footnotes, this one and the previous one, are both assigned the numeral "63." As Lonergan is still discussing Aristotle's position in this paragraph, and only turns to St Thomas's position in the following paragraph, it seems likely that the references he intended to give in this footnote, if not exactly the same as those given in the preceding footnote, are at least close to those given the preceding footnote.]

<sup>20</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 86, 94; *Summa theologiae* 1, q. 115, a. 6; *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3 [1027a 29-b 16]; *In Aristotlis libros I Peri hermeneias*, 14. [Proper consecutive numbering of footnotes resumes here in the archives copy.]

<sup>21</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 72, 86, 94; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 116, a. 3; *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3; *In Aristotlis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 14. Scotus ridicules this position, *Opus Oxon., Super II Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 3, n. 15. [In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 446, footnote 3), Lonergan remarks that "[t]he subtlety of Aristotle's idea of contingency was too much for even the subtle Scotus, who dismissed it as arrant nonsense." In *Grace and Freedom*, I, 80, Lonergan remarks that "Scotus looked upon Aristotle as a benighted pagan for his theory of terrestrial contingency."] There is no

### 3.22 Development in the Idea of Hierarchy

[17] St Thomas is always careful to point out that while providence takes into immediate consideration every detail, nonetheless the execution of providence is through the mediation of creatures.<sup>22</sup> The angels are universal mediators,<sup>23</sup> the heavenly bodies mediate between the angels and lower bodies.<sup>24</sup> The exception, on earth, to the rule of the celestial spheres is the human will, which is under the triple influence of God, who alone acts immediately, of the angels and of the heavenly bodies.<sup>25</sup>

Basically, St Thomas's cosmic hierarchy<sup>26</sup> is that of Aristotle's *Physics*. It will be well to cite a passage that makes this hierarchy particularly clear.

Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum gradus. Est enim primo causa incorruptibilis et immutabilis, scilicet divina; sub hac secundo est causa incorruptibilis, sed mutabilis; scilicet corpus caeleste; sub hac tertio sunt causae corruptibiles et mutabiles. Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu existentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.

[18] Causa autem secundi gradus est quodammodo universalis, et quodammodo particularis. Particularis quidem, quia se extendit ad aliquod genus entium determinatum, scilicet ad ea quae per motum in esse producuntur; est enim causa movens et mota. Universalis autem quia non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia, quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum, oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.

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possibility of doubt that St Thomas means exactly what he says. [*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 86 clearly distinguishes between "contingent being" and "contingent event" even though [*Summa contra Gentiles* 3, c. 72, does not. *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3, sets its problem in terms of the Aristotelian *per accidens* and then faces the problem of providence. In *Aristotilis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 14, first sets the problem of the *per accidens*, joins to it the problem of free choice, and then argues that foreknowledge or divine will cannot necessitate.

<sup>22</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, aa. 8, 9; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc.77-79, 82, 91, 92; *Summa theologiae* 1, q. 22, a. 3, q. 103, a. 6, q. 110, a. 1, q. 115, a. 3.

<sup>23</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 8; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 78; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 110, a. 1.

<sup>24</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 9; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 79; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 3.

<sup>25</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 91; Compare *De malo*, q. 3, a. 3: *disponens* [disposing], *consilians* [advising, commanding], *perficiens* [perfecting].

<sup>26</sup>In *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3, Cathala §§1207-1209.

Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis: eius enim effectus proprius est esse: unde quicquid est, et quocum que modo est, sub causalitate et ordinatione illius causae proprie continetur.<sup>27</sup>

Very little of this is not exactly Aristotle. The three levels of causes are plainly his: the immovable mover is the *causa divina incorruptibilis et immutabilis* [divine, incorruptible and immutable cause]; the *corpus caeleste* [heavenly body] is again his. The argument that because the heavenly sphere is the *primo motum* [that which is first moved] therefore it is the cause of all other motions would seem to be a fair deduction from the eighth book of the *Physics*. The motion envisaged—alteration, corruption, generation—is exactly what he defined and scientifically elaborated. The only notable exception is to be found in the words *causalitate et ordinatione* [causality and ordination]. Aristotle's first cause is, at least explicitly, only a final cause; and it does not pre-ordain the course of all events.

<sup>27</sup>["Now we find three grades of causes in the world. First, there is the cause that is incorruptible and immutable, namely, the divine cause; second, beneath this there are causes which are incorruptible but mutable, namely, the heavenly bodies; and third, beneath this there are the causes which are corruptible and mutable. Therefore, causes in this third grade are particular causes and are determined to proper effects of the same kind; for example, fire generates fire, humans generate humans, and plants generate plants.

"Now a cause belonging to the second grade is in one sense universal and in another sense particular. It is particular because it extends to some special class of beings, namely, to those which are generated by motion; for it is both a cause of motion and something that is moved. And it is universal because its causality extends not only to one class of changeable things but to everything that is altered, generated and corrupted; for that which is first moved must be the cause of everything that is subsequently moved.

"But the cause belonging to the first grade is universal without qualification, because its proper effect is existence. Hence whatever exists, and in whatever way it exists, comes properly under the causality and ordination of that cause."] *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3, Cathala §§1207-1209. [This is the quotation that concludes §3.2 in draft discussion I. There, having first alluded to some of the influences on St Thomas's thought, it functioned as the summary statement in the account of St Thomas's systematization of Aristotle's hierarchy by borrowing from the Platonists. Here, the passage is presented first, and the various influences that operated on St Thomas's thought, as he delineated his own distinctive position regarding cosmic hierarchies, are then alluded to briefly. Finally, there occurs again here what appears to be an inadvertent repetition in the numbering of footnotes. In the archives copy, this footnote and the previous footnote are both assigned the numeral "70." It is evident from the text, however, that the intended reference is the same.]

However, St Thomas does intercalate the angels between the Absolute First and the heavenly spheres, as has already been noticed.<sup>28</sup> His angelic hierarchy is based upon the pseudo-Dionysius; and its relation to the material world derives quite obviously from Avicenna's combination of Plotinian emanations with Aristotelian cosmic theory and Ptolemaic astronomy.<sup>29</sup>

[19] Again, though the heavenly bodies are the *causa essendi* [cause of being]<sup>30</sup> and the *causa speciei* [cause of species]<sup>31</sup> of all earthly bodies, even in the elements,<sup>32</sup> still they are only instruments of the *substantiae separatae* [separate substances] for the production of animal souls.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the angels exercise a great deal of direct influence over terrestrial agents.<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, were the *corpus caeleste* to stop moving, all motion and activity on earth would cease.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup>See [in this draft discussion] note 23 above.

<sup>29</sup>See the convenient: [Avicenna] *Metaphysices Compendium*, [For bibliographic information for this text, see footnote 41 in draft discussion I.]

<sup>30</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 104, aa. 1, 2. ["... aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente: sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia: et ideo est causa non solum fieri, sed essendi." "... sometimes ... the effect has not the aptitude to receive the impression of its cause in the same way as it exists in the agent; as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves. Thus, the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of the form as such, and not merely as being joined to this matter; and consequently it is not merely the cause of *becoming* but also the cause of *being*." *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 104, a. 1 c.]

<sup>31</sup>*De substantiis separatis*, c. 10; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

<sup>32</sup>*Meteorologica*, lect. 4 [340a 15-b 30], §5.

<sup>33</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 70, a. 3.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.* q. 110, a. 1, ad 2m; compare *De occultis operationibus naturae*.

<sup>35</sup>*De potentia*, q. 5, a. 8; *De caelo et mundo*, lib. 2, lect. 4 [286a 1-b 10], §13.

### 3.23 Limitation of the Idea of Hierarchy [from St Thomas's Perspective]

Though St Thomas by his affirmation of the mediated execution of providential designs and of a modified Aristotelian cosmic scheme<sup>36</sup> most certainly affirms a hierarchical universe, there is nonetheless a vast difference between his hierarchy and that of Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Proclus, Plotinus or Aristotle. Appealing to Avicenna he defines this difference in his earliest work:

... duplex est agens; scilicet, agens divinum, quod est dans esse; et agens naturale, quod est transmutans. Dico ergo, quod primus modus actionis soli Deo convenit; sed secundus modus etiam aliis convenire potest: et per modum istum dicendum est, corpora caelestia causare generationem et corruptionem in inferioribus, in quantum motus eorum est causa omnium inferiorum mutationum.<sup>37</sup>

Now, this activity of God, *dare esse* [to confer being or existence], is not an operation that is performed once and for all:

... esse cuiuslibet rei et cuiuslibet partis eius est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem [20] creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse...illud, quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. 1, *Sufficientiae*, cap. XI, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, secundum ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus, sed non esse rei; et ideo remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cuius causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet; sed fieri domus, cuius causa erat (aedificator). Et similiter remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius...quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius, qua dat esse, non sit intercisa; sed

<sup>36</sup>See above pp.... [In the archives copy, no page numbers are cited. Perhaps Lonergan is referring to the paragraph in the previous section that begins: "However, St Thomas does intercalate ..."]

<sup>37</sup>["... there is a twofold agent: the divine agent which is conferring being; and the natural agent, which is changing being. I say, then, that the first mode of action is proper only to God. But the second mode can be proper to other agents; and through this mode, heavenly bodies cause generation and corruption in lower things, inasmuch as their motion is the cause of all lower changes."] *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2.

continua; unde dicitur Ioan, 5, 17, *Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor*.<sup>38</sup>

From this it immediately follows that God is intimately present in every creature:

... Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare posset, nisi per operationem Dei ...<sup>39</sup>

### 3.24 Development by Theorems

[21] Aristotle's cosmic scheme could be developed in two ways. First, by the introduction of new elements into the scheme. Second, by the elaboration of theorems for a profounder understanding of the scheme.

<sup>38</sup>["...the existence of anything whatever, and of any part of it, is immediately from God; because of this we do not consider as true, according to our faith, that anyone creates, only God. But to create is to confer existence ... that, because God is the cause of existence, God cannot cease from the operation by which existence is conferred without the thing itself also ceasing to exist. As Avicenna says in *Sufficiantiae*, Book I, chapter 11, this is the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent, that a natural agent is only the cause of motion, and the divine agent is the cause of existence. Therefore, according to him, with the removal of any efficient cause, its effect is removed, but not the existence of the thing; and on that account with the removal of the builder, the existence of the house is not destroyed, whose cause is the heaviness of stones, which makes it persist, but the becoming of the house, whose cause the builder was. And similarly, with the cause of existence removed, existence is destroyed. Hence, Gregory says ... that all things would descend into nothingness if the hand of the Almighty were not maintaining them. Therefore, it is necessary that the operation by which existence is conferred not be interrupted but be continuous; whence it is said in John 5:17: *My Father is working always, and I am working in the same way.*"] *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1. Compare *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3 c. 65; *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 1; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 104, a. 1. For the difference between this divine conservation and the conservation exercised by the heavenly spheres inasmuch as they continue moving, see *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7m.

<sup>39</sup>["... God is innermost to every single thing, as existence is the characteristic of the thing innermost to the thing itself, which can neither begin to be nor continue in existence except through the action of God ..."] *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, corp. ad fin. It is best not to confuse this creative activity with divine providence. Providence is not universally immediate; this creative activity is universally immediate. Were there no providence over angelic and human wills, there would not be any providence at all, for the will is the first in the chain of mediators (*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 90). But did not creative activity immediately sustain every being in every part, then that being would cease to exist.

Between these two there is all the difference between discovering another planet or another continent, and discovering a natural law or a principle. When Columbus discovered America, he discovered something concrete, distinct, palpable. When he discovered that one can make an egg stand on its end by breaking the shell, he did not discover either eggs or egg-shells or anything else concrete, distinct, palpable. He simply understood, got an idea.

So far we have been studying the simpler development of the Aristotelian cosmic scheme that St Thomas maintained. Aristotle's first mover is a final cause; St Thomas's is also an efficient cause. Aristotle's universe contains a great deal of chance; St Thomas's eliminates all chance. Aristotle does not concern himself with the creative activity of God; St Thomas does and so cuts away from hierarchic causation a fundamental element. This sort of thing is easy to understand.

Now we have to consider an utterly different sort of development. In this case no new change is introduced, though a new idea is introduced. When [Galileo] Galilei discovered the law of falling bodies, he did not discover that bodies fall. When Archimedes grasped the principle of work, he did not give the lever an efficiency or a power of work which it did not previously possess. Similarly, the theorems with which St Thomas elaborates the Aristotelian cosmic scheme are simply theorems, intellectual elaborations, fuller expressions of what is latent or implicit. But they are not additions, nor changes.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup>["An argument may prove either an existence or a theorem: for instance, one may prove the existence of another continent, or another planet, or another element; but one may also prove simply a theorem, the law of falling bodies, the principle of work, the circulation of the blood. In the former case one knows a new thing; in the latter one understands better a thing already known." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 308, footnote 156. Later (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 337), Lonergan mentions again the distinction between the discovery of a new fact and the discovery of a theorem. St Thomas's discovery of the theorem, *Deus operatur in omni operante* (God operates in everything that operates) "is like the discovery of the principle of work and not like the discovery of a new continent or planet ..." A theorem, to recall Lonergan's definition, "is the scientific elaboration of a common notion" (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 164); it is a "reflective addition" to the common notion (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 191). The example he provides is the common notion of *going faster* and the theorem concerning *acceleration*: "Everyone is familiar with the common notion of *going faster*. Few understand what you mean when you explain that an acceleration is the second derivative of a continuous function of distance and time ... Both *going faster* and *acceleration* apprehend the same fact, but the former merely apprehends, while the latter adds to apprehension acts of analysis and generalization, of



## 3.245 Theorem of Causation by Intellect

[33] The present theorem is distinctively the property of St Thomas. A man of extreme intelligence, he very naturally would evolve a theorem of causation by intellect. Moreover, while Aristotle does not introduce the idea of providence, St Thomas does. He does so on the ground that God is not an *agens naturale* [natural agent] but an *agens per intellectum* [(agent) acting through intellect]. It will be well to cite a notable explicit passage:

Non est autem alicuius causa Deus nisi sicut intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere ... Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae: Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines. Hoc autem est providere: omnia igitur divinae providentiae subsunt.<sup>41</sup>

How then does God move all things to their appointed [proper] ends by his intellect?

Let us recall the basis of the Aristotelian problem of motion. For motion there is needed besides mover and moved the precise situation in which motion takes place. To produce this situation a motion is needed. To produce that motion a prior situation. And so forth, backwards through the eternity of the past.<sup>42</sup>

Next recall the Aristotelian solution to this problem. It is not providence that provides the continuous emergence of apt situations. It is the continuous round of the celestial spheres. They insure the perpetuity of terrestrial motion; they do not cause this or that motion. What is more

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deduction and systematic correlation" (*Grace and Freedom*, I, 15). It would seem to follow, then, that development by theorem typically involves the process of analyzing, generalizing, deducing, and systematically correlating.]

<sup>41</sup>["God is the cause of something only as understanding, since God's substance is God's understanding... Each thing, however, acts according to the mode of its substance. Therefore, God moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect, and this is providence. Therefore all things are subject to divine providence."] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 15.

<sup>42</sup>See above p ... [Lonergan refers the reader back to an earlier discussion at this point, but no page is mentioned. This footnote is numbered "109" in the archives copy, so at some point a considerable amount of material must have preceded it. Although the available evidence is not sufficient to go beyond conjecture, it is at least possible that there was an arrangement of this material that enabled Lonergan to refer the reader back to the content of the discussion of pre-motion in what is now §3.11 in the archives copy.]

they could not. For an apt situation requires the coincidence of different lines of causation: it needs the mover in the right place and the moved in the right place. In simpler terminology, the mover has to be applied to the moved, or the moved has to be applied to the mover. But the *corpus caeleste* cannot cause precisely this or that coincidence; [34] it can merely keep things going on the chance that there will be some coincidence:

Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aëris generetur et deorsum cadet, habet cuasam aliquam virtutem caelestem: et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens.<sup>43</sup>

How then is it that either always or *in maiori parte* natural processes take place and succeed?<sup>44</sup> How is it that the tempering of humours which is life to the lion but death to a man<sup>45</sup> is regularly found in lions and rarely in men? Divine providence. God acts by his intellect. His mind and providential plan is the *causa per se* of the coincidences, the combinations, the situations, that make the difference between the mere existence of mover and moved [on the one hand,] and, on the other hand, actual motion.

Note that this is the real solution to Aristotle's problem of motion. Aristotle could not leave the world to chance; he needed a *causa per se*. On the other hand, his immovable mover could cause only one uniform eternal motion. He found in the heavenly bodies a *causa per se* of the world

<sup>43</sup>["For instance, some terrestrial body catching fire in the higher regions of the air and falling to the earth is caused by some heavenly power; again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental." *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 6; compare *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 92; *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3 [1027a 29-b 16]; *In Aristotilis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 14. [See also draft discussion IV, footnote 38.]

<sup>44</sup>*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3 c. 64 ('Item. Probatum est ...'); *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 2, a. 3.

<sup>45</sup>Example from *VII Physics*, lect 5, §6. [In the text, the numeral for this footnote is added by hand. The corresponding footnote, however, is typed. Note also that this example of the mixtures of humors in lions and men is also mentioned towards the end of §3.53. See also footnote 32 in draft discussion I for reference to a quotation from *Grace and Freedom* that mentions this same example.]

process as such. But the idea of providence had to be elaborated before a *causa per se* of each single event could be conceived.

To conclude, Aristotle's first mover is the *causa per se* of the world process as such, but only a *causa per accidens* of this particular world process. St Thomas's first mover is the *causa per se* of the world process as such inasmuch as he moves; he is the *causa per se* of this particular world process in all its details because he is an *agens per intellectum*. *Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines* [agent (acting) through intellect. God, therefore, moves all things to their proper end].

[35] An objection may be considered. It will be said, perhaps, that the effects of chance and fortune arise only in *minori parte*. Therefore, in *maiori parte* Aristotle has a *causa per se* of precisely what happens.

First, then, what actually does occur in *minore parte* could occur in *maiore parte*. Because of the exceptions the whole rule becomes contingent. The division is *contingens ut in maiore parte* [contingent as in a majority of cases] and *contingens ut in minore parte* [contingent as in a minority of cases].

Next, why does the proper effect emerge in *maiore parte*? It will be said that this is the natural finality of the heavenly spheres and the terrestrial agents. True, but they are many. Being many, they interfere with one another in *minori parte*. Why do they not interfere in *maiore parte* and succeed only in *minore parte*?

To answer that question it is necessary to posit a still higher universal cause that is to nature itself as an artisan is to the product of his art. The natures of individual things cannot account for the order of the universe.

### 3.246 Theorem of *Immediato Virtutis* [Immediacy of Power]

The theorem has two aspects, one logical, the other ontological. It will be well to begin from the latter aspect.

St Albert followed Avicenna in distinguishing two kinds of *virtus motiva* [a motive power effecting something]: the first *imperans* [commanding], such as the will, the *pars irascibilis* [the irascible faculty], or the *pars concupiscibilis* [the concupiscent faculty]; the second *efficiens* [effecting] which is explained as '...*infusa in nervis et musculis, contrahens chorda et ligamenta coniuncta membris, aut relaxans et*

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~~extendens'; ["infused in the nerves and muscles, contracting the cords and ligaments joined to the members, or relaxing and extending (them)."]<sup>46</sup>~~

<sup>46</sup>[Loneragan indicates a footnote here, but none is given. The reference, however, is to Albert the Great, *Summa de creaturis*, 2, q. 68, a. 2. For a passage in *Gratia operans* that closely parallels this crossed-out text, see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 299.]



## [DRAFT DISCUSSION III]

### [PROVIDENCE, PREMOTION AND CONTINGENCE]

#### 3.4 THE PURE COSMIC THEOREM

[22] This theorem is one of the profoundest elements in St Thomas's thought. In the opinion of the present writer, it provides the basis for a solution of the metaphysical problems of the XVI<sup>th</sup> century. But of that later. The first step is to grasp the fundamental points. These are three: first, Aristotle's position; second, the formulation of Aristotle's position; third, St Thomas's position.

##### 3.41 *Aristotle's Position*

Aristotle's first mover can produce only one unchanging motion;<sup>1</sup> he cannot but produce it, for he is simply the final cause, the object of the affections of the *caelum animatum* [animated heaven].<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, Aristotle compares the universe to a household, in which the sons of the family (the celestial spheres) have their conduct mapped out for them, but the slaves and the domestic animals (all terrestrial beings) wander about pretty much as they please.<sup>3</sup>

Plainly, this confronts St Thomas with the famous problem, How precisely does divine providence exercise absolute sway over the world and the destinies of men?

<sup>1</sup>*VIII Physics*, lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §§8, 9. Compare *XII Metaphysics*, lect. 5-7 [1071b 3-1072 b 14].

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.* lect. 7 [1072a 26-b 14]. Compare *VIII Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3].

<sup>3</sup>*XII Metaphysics*, lect. 12 [1075a 11-1076a 4]. [For parallels, see draft discussion II, §3.21, the paragraph beginning, "Again, Aristotle's first mover ...," and footnote 7, and draft discussion IV, at the beginning of §3.52.]

### 3.42 The Formulation of Aristotle's Position

Unless Aristotle's position is formulated exactly in the categories of Aristotelian thought, there is no clue to St Thomas's method and manner of correcting and transcending Aristotle. This necessitates a digression on the *per se* and the *per accidens*.

Speaking generally, the *per se* is what is so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the intelligible, the explanatory, the [23] necessary. The *per accidens* is what is so without being so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the empirical, the to-be-explained, the merely contingent. A philosopher or a scientist is interested in the *per se*. A positivist is concerned with the *per accidens*, what merely happens to be.

Aristotle is constantly treating this distinction: he has to free science from the futility of the sophists.<sup>4</sup> For him the *per accidens* is a metaphysical pariah. The *ens per accidens* [being *per accidens*] is excluded from the company of the *decem genera entis* [ten genera or categories of being].<sup>5</sup> It is not the object of any science whatever.<sup>6</sup> It has no cause or explanation.<sup>7</sup>

The stock example is the *musicus albus* [the musical person who is also white], that is, the coincidence of unrelated predicates in the same subject.

Now the *per accidens* is the root of contingency. There has to be a cause of Socrates's being white. There has to be a cause of his musical ability. But there can be no cause (except a cause *per accidens*) of his being both white and a musician. The accidental coincidence of the effects is due to the accidental combination of causes. That accident to a previous accident, and so on indefinitely. No matter how far back the inquiry is carried, it is impossible to assign a *causa per se* [cause *per se*] for the combinations or the coincidences. Any *causa per se* is an *unum per se* [one *per se*]; its *effectus per se* [effects *per se*] must also be a *unum per se*.<sup>8</sup> Since then the *per accidens* can have no *causa per se*, it cannot be necessitated: the

<sup>4</sup>See any Aristotelian index.

<sup>5</sup>V *Metaphysics*, lect. 9 [1017a 7-b 9].

<sup>6</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1026a 33-1027a 28]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 9 [1065b 5-1066a 34].

<sup>7</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 3 [1027a 29-b 16].

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. Compare *In Aristotilis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, 14.

necessity referred to is, of course, not the necessity [24] of violence but the necessity of the logico-mathematical parallel that conceives objective necessity on the analogy of the syllogism.<sup>9</sup>

So much for the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* and the relation of the latter to contingency.

Aristotle's position, then, is this. The first mover is necessitated, but the terrestrial order is contingent.<sup>10</sup> Terrestrial laws are either *contingens ut in minore parte* [contingent, as in a minority of cases] or *contingens ut in maiori parte* [contingent, as in a majority of cases]. The former are the results of chance combination of causes. The latter are the results of *causae per se* [causes *per se*], but not necessary effects, for chance interference by other causes might prevent them.<sup>11</sup>

Again, there is a *causa per se* for the perpetuity and continuity of the world process. But it regards this perpetuity and continuity as such. It does not regard the precise course of human and world history. That is an *effectus per accidens* [effect *per accidens*].<sup>12</sup>

### 3.43 St Thomas's Position

No amount of guessing or *a priori* thinking would ever discover St Thomas's position.

<sup>9</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1026a 33-1027a 28]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 8 [1064b 15-1065b 4]. [This footnote is added by hand.]

<sup>10</sup>["We think of any creature as a contingent being; but Aristotle thought of the heavens as necessary beings ..." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 110.]

<sup>11</sup>In *Aristotlis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, §9 ad fin; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 6, [and] q. 116, a. 1. [In the archives copy, the references to q. 115, a. 6 and q. 116, a. 1 of the *Summa theologiae* are added by hand.]

<sup>12</sup>See VIII *Physics*, lect. 12 [258b 10-259a 21]; XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 5 [1071b 3-b 22], 6 [1071b 22-1072a 26]. ["Aristotle had refuted determinism by appealing to the *per accidens*, that is, to the fortuitous combinations and interferences of causes and the fortuitous coincidences of unrelated predicates in the same subject. He argued that the *per accidens* upset both premises of the determinist position: it showed both that, granted the cause, the effect did not necessarily follow and, as well, that not every effect had a *causa per se*." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 79-80. The paragraphs of §3.42, from the paragraph beginning "Speaking generally ..." to the end of the section closely parallel the paragraphs of §3.52, from the paragraph beginning "In general the *per se* ..." to the end of the section. See also draft discussion II, §3.21.]



St Thomas holds that God is an *agens per intellectum* [(agent) acting through intellect]; that an intellectual agent can apprehend and so intend an accidental coincidence or combination of causes, effects, or predicates; that, therefore, God is the *causa per se* of every event, every coincidence, every combination; finally, that though God knows infallibly, wills irresistibly, effects omnipotently every instance of the *per accidens*, nonetheless they are all contingent.<sup>13</sup>

### 3.431 [Causal Certitude of Divine Providence in St Thomas]<sup>14</sup>

[25] St Thomas does not arrive at this position immediately. In the *Sentences* he is engaged in defining more fundamental ideas.<sup>15</sup> Providence pertains to the practical intellect; it is the thought of the artist designing the work he is to execute.<sup>16</sup> According to the Christian's faith *omnia providentiae subiacent* [all things are subject to providence].<sup>17</sup> Predestination is predicated not of the predestined but of God predestining;<sup>18</sup> it involves a good more than providence;<sup>19</sup> it is certain that each person predestined will be saved.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup>In *Aristotilis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, 14; In *VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 105, a. 6, together with q. 116, aa. 1-3; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 72-74, 86, 94. The distinction between contingent being and contingent event, though overlooked in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 72, is clearly made against Albumazar [in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 86].

<sup>14</sup>[Numerals serving to subdivide §3.43 are found in the archives copy. The subheadings are an editorial addition.]

<sup>15</sup>See below, pp .... [In the archives copy, no page numbers are given.]

<sup>16</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.* a. 2.

<sup>18</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 40, q. 1, a.1.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.* a. 2. Predestination adds to providence chiefly *propositum, preaeparatio, et praesentia exitus* [purpose ... preparation ... foreknowledge of the outcome].

<sup>20</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 40, q. 3. The emphasis is on foreknowledge apparently. [Two passages in *Grace and Freedom*, the first from I, pages 80-81, and the second from I, page 85, closely parallel this paragraph: "In the commentary on the *Sentences*, in which Avicenna was the great philosophic influence, one finds clear and unequivocal affirmations of Christian providence; still, the speculative work gets little further than basic definitions, and theoretical shortcomings are evident. Thus, both predestination and reprobation are in terms of divine foreknowledge with no apparent mention of divine causality. Again, divine permission seems to be indifferent to opposite courses of creaturely actions; and one can even read the words, '... multa fiunt quae Deus non

The certitude of predestination is more fully considered in the *De veritate*.<sup>21</sup> There, it is explicitly stated that predestination is certain not merely because of the certitude of God's foreknowledge but also because of the certitude of the aggregate of means God uses to obtain his end. A comparison between providence and predestination makes this clear. Prescinding, then, from the certitude of divine foreknowledge, we find that providence is certain in two different ways but uncertain in a third. First, it is certain with regard to the effects of necessary causes, for instance, the activity of the heavens. Second, it is certain with regard to the general rule of the effects of contingent causes: the process of terrestrial corruption and generation inevitably continues. Third, it is not certain with regard to particular cases within this process: nature fails now and then, but such failure is natural to contingent nature, and God ordains it to the general good. On the other hand, predestination is a *certitudo ordinis* [causal certitude]<sup>22</sup> and *in particulari* [in particular] even though its finite causes are contingent. To reconcile the opposition between contingent causes and certain effect [26] St Thomas urges that God gives so many aids to good action that either the predestined does not sin at all or, if he does, then he rises from his sin. Thus, though there is no certitude from the proximate cause, free will, there is certitude from the first cause, predestination.<sup>23</sup>

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operatur' ('... many things are done which are not done by God')."; "The commentary on the *Sentences* points out that God is an intellectual agent and that his knowledge is causal, not because it is knowledge but only inasmuch as it resembles the plan or design or art in the mind of the artisan. Moreover, this divine plan has a twofold existence: primarily it exists in the mind of God, and there it is termed providence; secondly it exists in the created universe and there it is termed fate."]

<sup>21</sup>*De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3.

<sup>22</sup>["I use 'causal certitude' to translate 'certitudo ordinis' where the 'ordo' is 'ordo causae ad effectum' ('order of cause to effect') (*De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3 c.)." *Grace and Freedom*, I, 81, footnote 73.]

<sup>23</sup>*De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3. [In the parallel passage to this paragraph in *Grace and Freedom*, I, (see page 81) we read: "In the *De veritate* the question of the causal certitude of providence is raised. In the case of necessary causes such as the celestial spheres, it is affirmed both with respect to general results and with respect to each particular effect. In the case of contingent causes such as terrestrial agents, it is affirmed with regard to general results but denied with regard to each particular case. However, there is an apparent exception to the latter rule, for dogmatic data require the affirmation of causal certitude with regard to the predestination of the elect. Still, this exception is only

In the philosophic [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles* the hitherto untreated question of the causal certitude of providence is raised.<sup>24</sup> The main objection, exposed at length and accurately, is Aristotle's theory of contingency. The objection concludes with a trilemma: either every effect is not subject to providence; or, if there is providence, then its effects are contingent and so not certain; or, if providence is certain, then its effects are not contingent but necessitated.<sup>25</sup> St Thomas answers that the effects of providence are contingent and certain. His explanation is that what is first is the divine plan; therefore, since God is universal cause, there is no possibility of a coincidence, combination or interference except such as is ordained by the plan. Therefore divine providence cannot but be certain.<sup>26</sup> The argument clearly establishes the certitude of providence; but how this

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apparent. Not each act of the elect but only the general result of salvation is causally certain; just as God makes certain of the perpetuity of the species by the vast number of its members, so also he makes certain of the salvation of the elect by imparting so many graces that either the predestined does not sin at all or, if he does, then he repents and rises again." In the next sentence, Lonergan calls this a "transitional position," for it no longer appears in the *Summa contra Gentiles*.]

<sup>24</sup>[Lonergan would seem to correct this statement in *Grace and Freedom*, I, 81: "In the *De veritate* the question of causal certitude of providence is raised." Indeed, on Lonergan's own account above, it would seem that the question "is raised" in *De veritate* and that there Aquinas denies the causal certitude of providence with regard to particular cases within the process of terrestrial corruption and generation. One might, of course, say that in the "philosophic" *Summa contra Gentiles* the question of the causal certitude of providence with regard to particulars is first "raised," in the sense that it is for the first time considered philosophically and with a view to affirming it in the face of an objection drawn from Aristotle's theory of contingency. Thus, Lonergan remarks in *Grace and Freedom*, I, 82, that "[o]nly when St Thomas settled down to the vast task of thinking out the Christian universe in the *Contra Gentiles* did he arrive at the truth that divine providence is an intrinsically certain cause of every combination or interference of terrestrial causes." Lonergan's sentence in the text above, then, could be considered as a shorthand mode of expression, and one could grant that there is an appearance of conflict between it and the sentence from *Grace and Freedom*. But one could add that once the sentence is recognized as a shorthand mode of expression, and expressed more fully, it can be seen not to be in real conflict with the sentence from *Grace and Freedom*.]

<sup>25</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 94: 'Ostendit ...'

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid*, 'Primo namque...' Note that this position gives certitude not merely of foreknowledge but also of causality, not only with regard to necessary causes but also with regard to particular contingent effects.

leaves intact the contingency of a frost under Arcturus we may consider later.<sup>27</sup>

In the *Pars prima* the same position is again presented:

... praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediēte,<sup>28</sup> quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem ... Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter [27] totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis: sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam causam.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup>See below pp .... [Again, no page numbers are given in the archives copy. Arcturus is the brightest star in the constellation Bootes and the fourth-brightest star in the heavens. It lights the northern spring skies and so has come to be especially associated with the coming of spring and warmer weather, as in Hesiod's poem, *Works and Days* (ll. 564-70): "When Zeus has finished sixty days after the solstice, then the star Arcturus leaves the holy stream of Ocean and first rises brilliant at dusk. After him the shrilly wailing daughter of Pandion, the swallow, appears to men when Spring is just beginning. Before she comes, prune the vines, for it is best so." There is a poem by the American nature poet, Madison Cawein (1865-1914), titled, "Under Arcturus." It is not outside the realm of possibility that Lonergan may have known of the poem. Finally, in draft discussion IV, footnote 36, Lonergan will speak rather more prosaically of "a frost in the dog days," that is, the days reckoned from the heliacal rising of Sirius, the Dog Star, the period in the northern hemisphere between early July and early September.]

<sup>28</sup>[The phrase] *causa impediens* [impeding cause] points to Aristotle's theory of contingency.

<sup>29</sup>["It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason for this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause ... Therefore, as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause."] *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 103, a. 7. Compare q. 19, a. 6, ad 3m.

So much, then, for the causal certitude of divine providence and the assertion, though not yet the explanation, of its compatibility with contingency.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.432 [Promotion]

If now attention is turned to the details of God's control over all events, what immediately comes to mind is the distinction between the possibility of created activity and its actuality. The existence of mover and moved gives merely the possibility of motion. For actual motion, as we have seen, there is required a previous motion or physical promotion. To avoid all confusion or obscurity on the exact nature of this promotion, let us cite St Thomas himself:

Quies enim est privatio motus: privatio autem non inest susceptivo habitus vel formae nisi per aliquam causam. Erat ergo aliqua causa vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis<sup>31</sup> quare quies erat: ergo ea durante, semper quies remanebit. Si ergo aliquando movens incipiat

<sup>30</sup>[Lonergan's passage in *Grace and Freedom*, (see I, pages 81-82), paralleling these paragraphs, offers this more condensed statement: "In the *Contra Gentiles*, this transitional position [that is the position in *De veritate*] no longer appears. The theorem of divine transcendence was worked out ... [S]imultaneously St Thomas had achieved the higher synthesis of Aristotelian contingency and Christian providence. In Aristotle, terrestrial contingency had its ultimate basis in his negation of providence: events happened contingently because there was no cause to which they could be reduced except prime matter, and prime matter was not a determinate cause. Antithetical to this position was the Christian affirmation of providence, for divine providence foresaw and planned and brought about every event. The Thomist higher synthesis was to place God above and beyond the created orders of necessity and contingency: because God is universal cause, his providence must be certain; but because he is a transcendental cause, there can be no incompatibility between terrestrial contingency and the causal certitude of providence." This statement is more condensed in that it includes an indication of why the affirmation of the causal certitude of divine providence is compatible with the affirmation of contingency. As Lonergan remarks toward the end of *Gratia operans* (See *Grace and Freedom*, II, 446, footnote 3), "... Aristotle held that celestial beings and events are necessary, terrestrial ones contingent; St Thomas [held] that God produces both, making the necessary necessary and the contingent contingent. Aristotle denied providence in the terrestrial sphere; St Thomas affirmed God to be an *agens per intellectum* eternally planning and efficaciously producing a temporal and contingent world order."]

<sup>31</sup>'Motivum' is to 'movens' as 'mobile' to 'motum.' Note the 'vel ... vel ...'

movere, oportet quod illa cuasa quietis removeatur. Sed non potest removeri nisi per aliquem motum vel mutationem.<sup>32</sup>

That states the principle with admirable clarity: if the mover now begins to move the *mobile* [the movable thing], there must be some previous motion or change produced in either the mover or the *mobile*.

Next, this is an universal law: it applies not merely to natural agents but also to rational agents. Motion requires besides mover and moved the right degree of proximity, the right disposition, the right situation, the right mutual relation.<sup>33</sup>

Dicit ergo (Aristoteles) quod ex quo ita est, quod simili modo se habet in iis quae agunt secundum naturam et secundum intellectum, possumus universaliter de omnibus<sup>34</sup> loquentes dicere, quod

<sup>32</sup>[“A state of rest is the privation of movement; but a privation is not had in what is susceptible of a habit or form except by reason of some cause; there was, therefore, some cause, either on the side of the motive force or on that of the movable, which is the reason for the state of rest; therefore, while that lasted, the state of rest always remained. If therefore at some time the moving force begins to move, it is necessary that the cause of rest be removed. But it cannot be removed except through some movement or change.”] *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2, Cathala §6 ad fin.

<sup>33</sup>[Internal evidence from the archives copy suggests that there is a page missing here. First, the hand numbering of the pages indicates that after page 27 the next page in the archives copy was originally numbered “29” and was altered to “28.” Second, in the archives copy the text on page 27 ends with a colon (“mutual relation:”), suggesting a quote is to follow. But no quotation is given, and there is no other obvious reason for the colon. Third, the last footnote on page 27 is numbered “122” and the next footnote on what is now the next page in the text is numbered “127,” suggesting that there are four footnotes to be accounted for. Now it so happens that in the original ordering of the sections in the archives copy, a later page, numbered “49,” fulfils all the requirements of the suspected missing page. The text on this page consists just of a long quotation from St Thomas’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*. The quotation fits neatly into the discussion and makes precisely the points demanded by the context and by Lonergan’s remarks. Further, there are four footnotes on the page, and they were originally numbered “123” to “126.” The number and numbering of the footnotes on this page, then, are exactly what one would expect to find on the suspected missing page. Moreover, the quotation plus footnotes in the archives copy take up just one page, so inserting the page after what is page 27 in the archives copy restores what seems to have been the original numbering of these pages. All the evidence, then, suggest that what is now page 49 in the archives copy is the suspected missing page. Accordingly, the page is restored in the text, but with a frame to indicate its absence in the archives copy.]

<sup>34</sup>Though Aristotle makes no exception for the first mover, St Thomas very neatly does. Since God is not in time, one cannot ask why he did not act previously: ‘before time’ is meaningless. Compare *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, cc. 31-38; *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2, §§18-20; *In XII Metaphysics*, lect. 5, Cathala §2498, 99.

quaecumque sunt possibilia facere aut pati aut movere vel moveri, non penitus possibilia sunt: id est, non possunt movere aut moveri in quacumque dispositione se habeant; sed prout se habent in aliqua determinata habitudine et propinquitate ad invicem.

Et hoc concludit ex praemissis, quia iam dictum est, quod tam in agentibus secundum naturam quam in agentibus secundum voluntatem non est aliquid causa diversorum nisi in aliqua alia habitudine se habens. Et sic oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum moveat et aliud moveatur, necesse sit hoc movere et illud moveri.<sup>35</sup>

Si ergo non semper erat motus, manifestum est quod non se habebant in ista habitudine ut tunc unum moveret et aliud moveretur; sed se habebant sicut non possibilia tunc movere et moveri. Postmodum autem se habent in ista habitudine ut unum moveat et aliud moveatur. Ergo necesse est quod alterum eorum mutetur.<sup>36</sup>

Hoc enim videmus accidere in omnibus quae dicuntur ad aliquid, quod numquam venit nova habitudo, nisi per mutationem utriusque vel alterius: sicut si aliquid, cum prius non esset duplum, nunc factum est duplum, etsi non mutetur utrumque extremorum, saltem oportet quod alterum mutetur. Et sic si de novo adveniat habitudo per quam aliquid moveat et aliud moveatur, oportet vel utrumque vel alterum moveri prius.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup>Compare *In IX Metaphysics*, lect. 4, Cathala §§1818 ss.

<sup>36</sup>'mutatum sit' ?

<sup>37</sup>["He (Aristotle) therefore says that from the fact that the situation is similar in those (agents) which act according to nature and (those which act) according to understanding, we can say, speaking universally about everything, that all things which it is possible to make or suffer, or to move (actively) or be moved, are not simply possible (patients); that is, they cannot move or be moved in any disposition whatever in which they exist, but (only) insofar as they exist in some determinate relationship and propinquity to one another.

"And this he concludes from what had been said earlier; because it was already stated that, as much in agents acting according to nature as in those which act according to will, there is nothing which is the cause of diversity unless it is something existing in some other relationship. And thus it is necessary that, when the mover and the moved approach each other in suitable propinquity, and likewise when they are in any disposition at all which is required for this that one move actively and the other be moved, it is then necessary that one be moved and the other move.

"If therefore there is not always movement, it is clear that they did not exist in such a relationship that one should move and the other be moved; but they were like those things that cannot, (as they) then (exist), move and be moved. But afterwards they are in

[28] From this it clear that (A) motion presupposes premotion universally, (B) the premotion affects either the *movens* [the moving thing] or the *mobile* [the movable thing], and (C) the premotion consists in a change of mutual relation (*habitudō*) which may be either a change in distance (*proximitas*) or a change of disposition (*dispositio*).

### 3.433 [Promotion as Application]

Now it may be asked whether St Thomas had any special term to denote the change effected by the premotion. The following passage is illuminating:

... in potentiis irrationalibus necesse est, quando passivum appropinquat activo, in illa dispositione que passivum potest pati et activum potest agere, necesse est quod unum patiatu er alterum agat; ut patet quando combustibile applicatur igni.<sup>38</sup>

This is exactly what was said above. But an example is added and the term *applicatio* is used. It seems an excellent choice, for, like *usus*, *applicatio* simply means the intentional conjunction of two things.<sup>39</sup> Further, just as the premotion affects indifferently either the mover or the moved, so St

such a relationship that one (of them) moves and the other is moved. Therefore it is necessary that one of the two be changed.

"But we see this to be the case in everything that is characterized as (related) to another, (namely) that a new relationship never occurs except by a change of both or of one (of them); as when something which before was not double is now made double, although it may not be the case that each of the extremes is changed, it is necessary that at least one (of them) be changed. And thus if there occurs again a relationship by means of which one (of them) moves and the other is moved, it is necessary that either both or one (of them) be moved first." In *VIII Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3], §8. [Note that this text is also quoted in §3.54.]

<sup>38</sup>"... in the case of non-rational potencies when the thing capable of being acted upon comes close to the thing which is capable of acting, then in accordance with that disposition whereby that able to be acted upon can be acted upon and that capable of acting can act, it is necessary that the one be acted upon and that the other act. This is clear, for instance, when something combustible is *applied* to a fire." Lonergan's emphasis]. In *IX Metaphysics*, lect. 4, §1818. The will is treated in the same place, and on the same principles. But it is more convenient to consider it separately. See below pp .... [No pages are given; Lonergan may be referring to what eventually became chapter 4 of his dissertation.] Compare the previous citation, second paragraph. [In the archives copy, this last sentence is added by hand.]

<sup>39</sup>Compare *De veritate*, q.17, a. 1; then *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 109, a. 1.



Thomas speaks of the woodsman applying his axe to the tree<sup>40</sup> or the cook applying the food to the fire.<sup>41</sup>

### 3.434 [Promotion and Providence]

The next question is whether or not St Thomas saw the connection between his theory of providence and his theory of motion. According to his theory of providence all activity is according to the divine plan; and nothing can interfere with that plan, for God is universal cause, and any interferences that do occur only occur because they have been planned. According to the theory of motion the existence of mover and moved is alone insufficient; the two have to be brought together; they have to be given the right disposition; and this application requires [29] a promotion. The two theories are obviously complementary. Nothing can interfere with the divine plan, because to interfere it would need a promotion which can come, ultimately, only from the universal cause. On the other hand, God inasmuch as he is the first mover, is merely a *causa per accidens* of terrestrial events;<sup>42</sup> only inasmuch as he is a first mover that plans, does he differ from Aristotle's *substantia separata* and become the *causa per se* of each and every event.

Thus, providence is certain because of the need of promotion.

On the other hand, God is the *causa per se* of motion not because he moves but because he is a mover who plans.

The first point is fairly evident in the proof of the certitude of providence from the universality of divine causation: interference arises from a cause whose action has ultimately to be reduced to the first cause.<sup>43</sup>

The second point is expressed in a general way as follows:

Non est autem alicuius causa Deus nisi sicut intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere ... Unumquodque autem agit per

<sup>40</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 67.

<sup>41</sup>*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

<sup>42</sup>[That is, God understood just as Aristotle's first mover.]

<sup>43</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 103, a. 7.

modum suae substantiae: Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines.<sup>44</sup>

But there are also more concrete expressions. Thus, in the [*Summa contra Gentiles*,

Quidquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus [est Deus].<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup>["God is the cause of something only as understanding, since God's substance is God's understanding ... Each thing, however, acts according to the mode of its substance. Therefore God moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect."] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 15.

<sup>45</sup>["Anything that applies an active power to (its) action is said to be the cause of that action: for an artisan, applying the power of a natural thing to some action, is said to be the cause of that action; as a cook in regard to cooking which is (done) by fire. But all application of a power to its operation is principally and foremost by God. For operative powers are applied to their proper operations by some movement of body or soul. But the first principle of both these motions [is God]]." *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 67. There are a number of indications in the archives copy that the discussion breaks off prematurely at this point. First, the reference for this quotation from St Thomas is not given in the text. Indeed, the section ends somewhat abruptly with the words "utriusque motus" and the last two words from the quotation, "est Deus," are not given. Second, the numbering of the footnotes again ceases to be consecutive, reverting back to "48." In addition, in the archives copy, the next section is numbered "3.2," even though an earlier section was numbered "3.2." And there is something of an overlap in the topics just treated and the topics treated in §3.51 and following. Thus, this quotation is again given in §3.54. It is as if Lonergan became dissatisfied at this point with his discussion in §3.4 and decided to make another attempt—but this, of course, is hardly the only possible explanation.]



[DRAFT DISCUSSION IV]

[GOD AS AGENT ACTING THROUGH INTELLECT AND  
OPERATING IN THE OPERATIONS OF NATURE]

**3.5 Per Intellectum Agens**

[36] ~~In this section the characteristic product of St Thomas's genius is considered. It is a masterpiece in synthesis, and the foregoing sections of this chapter have been written merely to clear away the lumber that obscures a magnificent structure.~~

~~Seven points are considered: first, the essential difference between St Thomas and Aristotle; second, Aristotle's position; third, St Thomas's position in relation to Aristotle's; fourth, the idea of application; fifth, the theorem of universal instrumentality; sixth, the nature of *the virtus instrumentalis* [instrumental power]; seventh, the absolute value of St Thomas's position.~~

3.51 *St Thomas's First Mover*

In the *De substantiis separatis* one reads,

Non est autem alicuius causa Deus nisi sicut intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere ... Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae: Deus igitur PER SUUM INTELLECTUM omnia MOVET ad proprios fines. Hoc autem est providere: omnia igitur divinae providentiae subsunt.<sup>1</sup>

In the opinion of the present writer, one misses one of the finest things

<sup>1</sup>["God is the cause of something only as understanding, since God's substance is God's understanding ... Each thing, however, acts according to the mode of its substance. Therefore, God MOVES all things to their proper ends THROUGH HIS INTELLECT, and this is providence. Therefore all things are subject to divine providence." Lonergan's emphasis.] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 15. Compare c. 14. [This text is quoted in draft discussion II, §3.245, and all but the last sentence are quoted in draft discussion III, §3.434.]

In the opinion of the present writer, one misses one of the finest things in St Thomas—and missing it, one misinterprets most of the rest of his writings—unless his affirmation that God moves all things by his intellect is seen to be of peculiar significance.

The point that God is *per intellectum agens* [(an agent) acting through intellect] by itself constitutes the refutation and the practical elimination of the whole creaking mechanism of hierarchy. As has already been pointed out, this cosmic mechanism in Aristotle, in Plotinus, in Avicenna, is little more than a blunder. They posit hierarchy, not because reality is hierarchic, but because they fail to conceive the liberty of an Absolute Being.<sup>2</sup>

[37] Now one has only to glance through St Thomas's [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles* to grasp the fundamental significance of the affirmation, *Deus est per intellectum agens*. In the first book chapters 63 to 96 on God's knowledge and will, in the second book chapters 1 to 45 on the emergence of creatures, in the third book chapters 1 to 63 on finality, chapters 64 to 97 on providence, and chapters 111 to 146 on law, are but expansions of this basic truth in its essential opposition to pagan hierarchy. They form a vast but closely-knit synthesis in which the central idea is the Christian idea of God transforming the philosophy of the Gentiles. If you would find St Thomas in his keenest and most brilliant mood, read in Book II, chapters 31 to 38, the discussion of Aristotle's position that the world must be eternal.

But further, in the seventh book of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle draws the parallel between nature and art: both act in the same way; briefly, both are the domination of matter by the intelligible.<sup>3</sup> But turn now to the

<sup>2</sup>[Lonergan would seem to be referring here to at least part of the contents of what I have called draft discussion I, and perhaps especially to §3.14, where he states that "St Thomas has no need of the idea of hierarchy." If this is indeed the case, one may conjecture that at some point Lonergan had discussed Plotinus's hierarchy in a separate section; but if so, no such section has come down to us. Again, if Lonergan is indeed referring to at least parts of the contents of what I have called draft discussion I, those same contents may be at least part of what he has in mind when he speaks in the crossed-out §3.5 of "the foregoing sections of this chapter" that have been written "merely to clear away the lumber that obscures a magnificent structure." And perhaps the other part may have been some form of the discussion of terminology in what is now §1 of chapter 3 of *Gratia operans* (*Grace and Freedom*, II, 252-77).]

<sup>3</sup>VII *Metaphysics*, lect. 5-8 [1031a 15-1034b 19].

*Summa theologiae* and you find, cropping up all over, the profounder parallel: *Sicut artifex est ad artificiatam, ita Deus ad naturalia* [As an artisan is to artifacts, so God is to natural things]. The analogy of the artisan or artist or master-builder is the explanatory synthesis of the relations, for our thought, of the Absolute Truth, the Absolute Goodness, the Absolute Reality, whence all things come and whither they go. It explains objective truth<sup>4</sup> and objective falsity,<sup>5</sup> the justice of God,<sup>6</sup> the eternal law,<sup>7</sup> the natural law<sup>8</sup> and the law of irrational creatures,<sup>9</sup> the causality of divine knowledge,<sup>10</sup> the identification of providence with the eternal law,<sup>11</sup> a providence that extends as far as divine activity and divine finality.<sup>12</sup>

[38] But not only did St Thomas affirm God to be an intellectual agent and make this affirmation the basis of a Christian theory of providence, nature and cosmic order. The idea extends into the theory of motion itself, though to show how it does so necessitates a further exposition of Aristotelian thought.

### 3.52 Aristotle and Divine Providence

According to Aristotle the universe resembles a household. Like the sons of the family, the heavenly bodies have their conduct mapped out for them. Like the slaves and domestic animals, terrestrial beings wander about pretty much as they please.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>4</sup>*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 16, a. 1.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.* q. 17, a. 1.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.* q. 21, a. 2.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.* 1-2, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.* 1-2, q. 91, a. 2.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.* 1-2, q. 93, aa. 4, 5.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.* 1, q. 14, a. 8.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.* 1-2, q. 91, a. 1; 1, q. 22, a. 1.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.* 1, q. 19, a. 6; q. 22 aa. 2, 3; q. 103, aa. 5, 7. [For the condensed parallel for this entire paragraph, with similar references to St Thomas, see draft discussion II, footnote 16.]

<sup>13</sup>*XII Metaphysics*, lect. 12 [1075a 11-1076a 4]. [For parallels of this paragraph, see §3. 21, the paragraph beginning, "Again, Aristotle's first mover ...," and §3. 41.]

It cannot but be so. The first mover can produce only one unchanging motion.<sup>14</sup> He cannot but produce it, for he acts only as a final cause, as the object of the affections of the *caelum animatum* [animated heaven].<sup>15</sup> Through the mediation of the wheeling heavens, he is the *causa per se* [cause *per se*] of the continuity and perpetuity of the terrestrial process,<sup>16</sup> but it is one thing to guarantee the process as a process and quite another to determine what precise effects by what precise causes at what precise times emerge from the process.<sup>17</sup> Aristotle's first mover attends to the former, to the process as such; he cannot attend to [the] course of human or earthly history.<sup>18</sup>

This general description of Aristotle's position must be given its technical formulation, else it will be impossible to see just how St Thomas meets and transcends it.

[39] Scotus, then, thought it ridiculous that Aristotle considered the first mover and the heavens necessitated and yet maintained earthly events to be contingent.<sup>19</sup> Whether the reader chooses to agree with Scotus on this point or not is of no importance to the argument. But it is necessary to grasp Aristotle's reason for affirming contingency. This lies in his theory of the *per se* and the *per accidens*.

In general, the *per se* is what is so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the intelligible, the explanatory, the necessary. On the other hand, the *per accidens*, to *sumbebêkos* [a happening by coincidence], is what merely happens to be so: it is cognate to the empirical, the fact, the datum, the contingent. The essence of philosophy or of science is that it is concerned with the *per se*. The essence of positivism is that it is concerned

<sup>14</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §§8, 9; compare XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 5-7 [1071b 3-1072b 14].

<sup>15</sup>XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 7 [1072a 26-b 14]; compare VIII *Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3].

<sup>16</sup>XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 5 [1071b 3-b 22]; VIII *Physics*, lect. 12 [258b 10-259a 21]. ["... while Aristotle's wheeling heavens do necessitate continuous change on earth, it remains that they do not account for anything more than the continuity of that change." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 285 ]

<sup>17</sup>For the contrast, compare *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 115, a. 6; q. 116, a. 1.

<sup>18</sup>See footnotes 13 and 14 above. [This paragraph closely parallel the two paragraphs of §3.41.]

<sup>19</sup>E. g., *Opus Oxon.*, *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 3, n. 15. [See draft discussion II, footnote 21, where the same point is made regarding Scotus's position.]

with the *per accidens*: more accurately, positivism *per se* is concerned with the *per accidens* and *per accidens* it is concerned with the *per se*.

Constantly Aristotle returns to this distinction, for he has to free science from the futility of the sophists.<sup>20</sup>

Metaphysically, the *ens per accidens* [being *per accidens*]<sup>21</sup> is a pariah. It is excluded from the company of the *decem genera entis* [ten genera or categories of being].<sup>22</sup> It has no cause and no explanation.<sup>23</sup> It is not the object of any science, not even of metaphysics, which treats everything.<sup>24</sup>

[40] Since the *ens per accidens* has no cause it cannot be necessitated.

Take the stock example, the *musicus albus* [the musical person who is also white], or any other coincidence of unrelated predicates in the same subject.

There has to be a cause of Socrates's whiteness. There has to be a cause of his musical ability. There can be no cause of the coincidence of both predicates in the same subject.

For the accidental coincidence of these effects is due to an accidental combination of causes. That accident to a previous accident. And this regression continues indefinitely, for the world is eternal. The, until recently, modern determinist might offer to explain the relation of the number of bald heads in Siam to the number of Aztec monuments in Peru by the simple process of deducing both from some initial world situation. Aristotle would deny that the relation was explanatory. That and not the negation of an initial situation is his real point. Because the two

<sup>20</sup>Aristotle's scientific errors are not due, as many a *vulgarisateur* has proclaimed, to neglect of fact: he collected more facts than most scientists have. They are not due to his views of finality: the modern concept of evolution is simply a surreptitious and inarticulate return to the idea of finality. The great error of the *Physics*, the idea of alteration, is in violation of Aristotle's own principle that the *primum quoad se* [first in itself] is not the *primum quoad nos* [first as regards us]. By definition alteration is change of the *sensibilia propria* [sensible things proper (to certain senses)], so that a *primum quoad nos* is made of fundamental importance. [Compare footnote 5 of draft discussion I. Lonergan's important remarks here regarding the "great error of Aristotle's *Physics*" anticipate his position in *Insight* (see especially p. 419) and in *Understanding and Being* (see pp. 364-68).]

<sup>21</sup>See any Aristotelian index.

<sup>22</sup>V *Metaphysics*, lect. 9 [1017a 7-b 9].

<sup>23</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 3 [1027a 29-b 16].

<sup>24</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1026a 33-1027a 28]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 8 [1064b 15-1065b 4].



conclusions are disparate, the initial situation would have to contain disparate elements; and the disparate elements of the initial situation cannot constitute an intelligible first, a basis of explanation. The whole effort would merely reduce one instance of the *per accidens* to another instance which merely happens to be first in time.<sup>25</sup>

But though it is granted that the *per accidens* cannot be an object of scientific thought, what has that to do with contingency? The answer appears to be that Aristotle thinks of necessity in terms of the parallel of the real and logical orders. The necessity which he denies is not the necessity of violence but the necessity that is to be found in the syllogism. In other words, the *per accidens* is contingent [41] because it does not admit syllogistic treatment.<sup>26</sup>

To carry the argument a stage further, terrestrial causes may fail to produce their effects because of the interference of other causes. The modern scientist speaks of the necessity of natural law; but his natural law is an abstraction; in the concrete he settles down to approximations and the theory of probability. Aristotle speaks simply of the concrete and so makes his division of *contingens ut in maiori parte* [contingent as in a majority of cases] and *contingens ut in minori parte* [contingent as in a minority of cases]. The former corresponds to natural law: heavy bodies fall, light ones rise. The latter covers the exception: heavy bodies are prevented from falling, light ones from rising. But whether or not the general rule is obeyed, the effect remains contingent: in any given case, what does take place might not have taken place.<sup>27</sup>

This brings us back to the Aristotelian negation of providence. The heavenly spheres act under necessity. The world process as a process is necessary, for it has a *causa per se*. But terrestrial events are contingent. Nature works for the best, and, usually, succeeds; in any particular instance, she might fail; and so in all instances the results are contingent.

It follows that while Aristotle's first mover is a *causa per se* of the perpetuity and continuity of the world process, he is a *causa per accidens* of

<sup>25</sup>See VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 3 [1027a 29-b 16]; In *Aristotlis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, 14.

<sup>26</sup>VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 2 [1026a 33-1027a 28]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 8 [1064b 15-1065b 4].

<sup>27</sup>Compare In *Aristotlis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, §9, ad fin.

the actual course of world events. On Aristotelian principles, a *causa per accidens* is not a cause at all.

When, then, St Thomas affirms God to be *per intellectum agens* and providence universal, he not merely affirms a divine attribute and divine governance of the world. He affirms a whole field of divine causality that Aristotle overlooked. *Deus igitur per suum intellectum movet omnia ad proprios fines.*<sup>28</sup>

### 3.53 St Thomas on Providence

[42] St Thomas's theory of providence undergoes a brilliant development when confronted with the Aristotelian theory of the *per accidens*.

In the *Sentences* he [St Thomas] is content to define fundamental ideas. Providence pertains to the practical intellect,<sup>29</sup> like the thought of the artist designing the work he is to execute. According to the Christian faith, *omnia providentiae subiacent.*<sup>30</sup> Predestination is predicated formally not of the predestined but of God;<sup>31</sup> it includes three elements, namely, *propositum*, *praeparatio* and *praescientia exitus.*<sup>32</sup> It is certain that each person predestined will be saved.<sup>33</sup>

In the *De veritate* an important distinction is made between two kinds of certitude regarding the outcome of providential activity. There is the certitude that arises from foreknowledge. There is another that arises from causality. With regard to the former St Thomas had already reached his definitive solution in the *Sentences*. With regard to the latter his thought is not yet fully developed.

<sup>28</sup>["God, therefore, moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect."] *De substantiis separatis*, c. 15. [The paragraphs of §3.52, from the paragraph beginning "In general the *per se*..." to the end of the section, closely parallel the paragraphs of draft discussion III, §3.42, from the paragraph beginning "Speaking generally ..." to the end of the section. See also draft discussion II, §3.21.]

<sup>29</sup>*Super I Sententiarum*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>30</sup>["...all things are subject to providence."] *Ibid.* a. 2.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.* d. 40, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>32</sup>[proposal, preparation and foreknowledge of the outcome.] *Ibid.* a. 2.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.* q. 3.

Confining his attention to certitude based on causality, he distinguishes three kinds of certitude in the field of providence. There is certitude with regard to the effects of necessary causes, the heavenly bodies. There is certitude with regard to the general rule of contingent causes: God sees to it that the order of the universe is maintained, that nature attains its end *in maiori parte*.<sup>34</sup> There is not certitude *in particulari* [in particular], for terrestrial causes are contingent.

Here St Thomas does not yet see his way to reconciling the causal certitude of providence with the contingency of secondary causes. This is manifest from his theory on predestination. For he explains the causal certitude of the salvation of the elect on the ground that God gives so many graces, helps, occasions of doing right.

[43] In the [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles* all this is transcended. Not merely predestination but providence as well is causally certain with regard to every particular event. The responsibility of Aristotle for this development seems patent.

The main objection is derived from Aristotle's theory of contingency. This is exposed at some length and with considerable accuracy, though without the detail of later treatments.<sup>35</sup> The conclusion from this theory is a trilemma against the causal certitude of providence:

Either every agent is not a product of providence; or, if there is providence, its products are contingent and so not certain; or, if there is providence and it is certain, then its products are not contingent but necessitated.

The answer is that providence is certain while events remain contingent.

The reasoning is clear and cogent, provided the reader understands the Aristotelian position.

Contingence arises from the chance combinations and interferences of causes. But there are no causes except those produced by God and there are no combinations or interferences except those planned by God.

<sup>34</sup>We are discussing *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3. Here see *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 2.

<sup>35</sup>Compare *In VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 6 [and] q. 116, a. 1; *In Aristotelis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, 14.

Because God is the universal cause of being and because he is *per intellectum agens*, divine providence cannot but be causally certain.<sup>36</sup>

[44] The metaphysical necessity of the causal certitude of providence is repeated throughout the *Pars prima*.

... praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa *impediente*; quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem... Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; *impossibile* est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis: sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam causam.<sup>37</sup>

The reference to the *causa impediens* [impeding cause] clearly makes this assertion the rejection of the Aristotelian negation of providence. If a nature fails to attain its end in any given case, that is only because of the interference of some other nature. But the action of the other nature has to be accounted for, and this action cannot be accounted for without referring ultimately to the universal cause of all reality. It follows

<sup>36</sup>Contrast Scotus's view: God would not know the *futura contingentia* [future contingent things (or events)] unless one posits what he calls *concursum* [concurrence].

Compare the argument of later theologians that unless you add a divine influence over and above what is metaphysically certain, God would not have absolute control of his universe. They do not put their argument in this precise form. But that is what it amounts to. However, note above all that they are thinking of the contingency of an act of free will, while St Thomas is thinking primarily of the contingency of a frost in the dog days. [This last sentence appears as handwritten in the archives copy. See also draft discussion III, footnote 27.]

<sup>37</sup>["It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason for this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other *impeding* cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause ... Therefore, as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is *impossible* for anything to occur outside the order of divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause." Lonergan's emphasis.] *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 103, a. 7; compare q. 19, a. 6, ad 3m; q. 22, a. 2, ad 1m.

rigorously that the causal certitude of divine providence is a metaphysical necessity.

It remains to be seen just what it is, exactly, that the universal cause does effect. This appears from the contrast between the specific universal cause, the heavenly spheres, and the absolute universal cause, God. On the former, one reads:

... omne quod est per se, habet causam: quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. *Album* enim causam habet, similiter et *musicum*; sed *album musicum* non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae, ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrat ei interdum per accidens: [45] unde talis concursus non habet causam, in quantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aëris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem: et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat, et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, though the heavenly spheres are the universal causes of all terrestrial change, their causality regards the terrestrial process as such. The *virtutes caelestes* [heavenly powers] account for this, and they account

<sup>38</sup>["... everything that is a being *per se*, has a cause; but what is accidental, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For that a thing is *white* has a cause, likewise that a person is *musical* has a cause, but that a being is *white-musical* has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently, what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body catching fire in the higher regions of the air and falling to the earth is caused by some heavenly power; again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental."] *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 6. Compare *In VI Metaphysics*, lect. 3; *In Aristotelis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 13, 14. [See also draft discussion II, footnote 43.]

for that, but not for the coincidence of this and that, nor for the consequents of the coincidence.

But while the heavenly spheres do not explain coincidence, combination, interference, it remains that God is the *causa per se* even of the *per accidens*. For God is *per intellectum agens*:

... id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis. Nulla ergo natura pe se hoc facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis principii: unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna.

Et ideo dicendum est quod ea, quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus, sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam cuasam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu: alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, *Fodiens [46] sepulchrum invenit thesaurum*. Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere: sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum. Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat; et praecipue intellectum divinum ...<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup>[ "... what is accidental is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Hence it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. Therefore, no natural cause can have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: hence its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.

"We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preexisting cause, which is divine providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form the proposition, *The digger of a grave found a treasure*. And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance someone who knows of a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by

The foregoing meets Aristotle on his own ground. Natural science cannot make a combination of disparate elements a first principle; theology can make an intellectual apprehension of the disparate a first principle. It is to be noted, however, that providence is not confined to the effects of change and fortune. Its principal object is what occurs *ut in pluribus* [as a general rule], the constant order of the universe. Plainly, if in any instance nature can be defeated by interference, then all the success of nature is contingent. The tempering of humours that is life to the lion is death to a man; that such a temperament should regularly be found in lions, rarely in men, cannot be explained by natural causes.<sup>40</sup> There has to be a reason why what sometimes interferes does not always interfere. Nothing less than the absolute cause can explain nature's normal success.

So much for the metaphysical necessity of the causal certitude of Providence. It is posited in answer to the Aristotelian theory of contingency. How contingency really and truly remains, is a matter for further study.<sup>41</sup> But [what] concerns us for the present is this: God, because he acts by intellect, is the *causa per se* of each particular event; in this respect, he differs from the Aristotelian first mover which is a *causa*

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the intellect, especially the divine intellect."'] *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 116, a. 1; compare *In Aristotilis libros I Peri hermeneias*, lect. 14, §§15, 16. [We may fruitfully compare the way the point of the argument is made here with the way it is made in *Insight*, 672-74, where Lonergan argues that "... from the viewpoint of unrestricted understanding, the nonsystematic vanishes," "... to yield place to a fully determinate and absolutely efficacious plan and intention" (688).]

<sup>40</sup>[This example of the mixtures of humors in lions and men is also mentioned in draft discussion II, §3.245. See also footnote 32 in draft discussion I for reference to a quotation from *Grace and Freedom* that mentions this same example.]

<sup>41</sup>See below, pp. .... [In the archives copy, no page numbers are given. Lonergan would seem to be referring to the set of considerations on necessity and contingency in Aquinas that he (Lonergan) crystallizes as the Theorem of Divine Transcendence: "Whatever God knows, wills, and does necessarily exists—not, however, with absolute necessity but with hypothetical necessity; and since what is hypothetically necessary can be absolutely either necessary or contingent, it follows that nothing is either contingent or necessary simply because it proceeds from God, is willed by God, and is known by God." See "Bernard Lonergan's Notes for the Defence of His Doctoral Dissertation, 'St Thomas's Doctrine on Gratia Operans.'" Document A51 (Batch I-A, Folder 16), Lonergan Research Institute Archives, Toronto, page 7. For Lonergan's discussion of these issues, see *Grace and Freedom*, I, 104-11; II, 334-36. See also draft discussion III, footnote 30.]

*per se* of the world process as such but not of world history. In the next section, further details of St Thomas's thought are examined.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.54 *The Idea of Application*

[47] There is no difficulty in determining what precisely St Thomas means by the term *applicatio*.

In the *De veritate*<sup>43</sup> the nature of conscience is discussed. Is it a potency or a habit or an act? The answer is that it is an act, the application of knowledge to something. Apply knowledge to what is or was, and there is *conscientia* in the sense of consciousness. Apply knowledge to what ought to have been, and conscience is said to be remorse. Apply knowledge to what ought to be, and conscience is said to warn. It appears quite clearly that *applicatio* consists in the conjunction of two things and that it is an aspect of *usus* [use].

Turning to the field of the theory of motion, one finds *applicatio* used four times, *usus* once.

In the [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles* the cook *applies* the meat to the fire; in other words, he makes use of the fire to cook the meat. In the *De potentia* and the *Pars prima* the artisan applies his axe to cutting; which does not notably differ from using the axe to cut. In the *Prima secundae* it is asserted that any *usus* involves some motion and so is impossible without the first mover.<sup>44</sup> Finally, in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* there is a passage exactly parallel to the proof of physical premotion in the *Physics*,<sup>45</sup> namely,

<sup>42</sup>[Note how closely §3.53 parallels §3.431. There are parallel discussions of the gradual development of St Thomas's theory of providence from the *Sentences*, through *De veritate* to the *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa theologiae*. In both discussions, Lonergan quotes *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 103, a. 7, and in both cases he alludes to *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3m. (In §3. 53 he adds another reference, namely, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1m.)]

<sup>43</sup>*De veritate*, q. 17, a. 1.

<sup>44</sup>*Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 67; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 105, a. 5; 1-2, q. 109, a. 1. [In the archives copy, the last reference is inserted by hand.]

<sup>45</sup>[Lonergan actually wrote: "Finally, in a passage in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* there is a passage ..."]



... in potentiis irrationalibus<sup>46</sup> necesse est; quando passivum appropinquat activo, in illa dispositione qua passivum potest pati et activum potest agere, necesse est quod unum patiatur et alterum agat; ut patet quando combustibile *applicatur* igni.<sup>47</sup>

The use of *applicatio* here is exactly the same as in the foregoing instances. It follows that the term is used by St Thomas to denote physical premotion. There remains only two questions: first, what is physical premotion; second, is physical premotion what is meant in the well-known passages of the [*Summa*] *contra Gentiles*, *De potentia*, Pars [48] *prima* and *Prima secundae*? As the answer to the second question will be clearly affirmative, there need be no inquiry into other possible meanings of the term *applicatio*.

First, then, what is physical premotion?

In proving the eternity of motion Aristotle points out that the existence of mover and moved accounts solely for the possibility of motion but not for its actuality. The matter is not of any great difficulty. The jungle is hot enough to melt an iceberg. There are endless icebergs in the Arctic seas. But the existence of the jungle and of the icebergs will not necessarily result in the corruption of the latter. This simple truth is universalized as follows. Any given motion either is eternal or it is not. If eternal, then motion is eternal in that instance. If not eternal, then it began to be. If it began to be, then there must be a reason why it did not exist previously yet does exist now. That reason can be only first the absence and then the presence of some other motion. With regard to that other motion, the question returns. There follows an infinite regression. Thus, whether or not particular motions are eternal, motion itself must be eternal. The essential point is presented as follows by St Thomas:

<sup>46</sup>On rational activity see fourth chapter. [Lonergan would seem to be referring to what eventually became chapter 4 of *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 316-83).]

<sup>47</sup>[“... in the case of nonrational potencies when the thing capable of being acted upon comes close to the thing which is capable of acting, then in accordance with that disposition whereby that able to be acted upon can be acted upon and that capable of acting can act, it is necessary that the one be acted upon and that the other act. This is clear, for instance, when something combustible is *applied* to a fire.” Lonergan’s emphasis.] In *IX Metaphysics*, lect. 4, Cathala §1818.

Quies enim est privatio motus: privatio autem non inest susceptivo habitus et formae nisi propter aliquam causam: erat ergo aliqua causa vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis,<sup>48</sup> quare quies erat: ergo ea durante, semper quies remanebat. Si ergo aliquando movens incipiat movere, oportet quod illa causa quietis removeatur. Sed non potest removeri nisi per aliquem motum vel mutationem ...<sup>49</sup>

Let us term this previous motion or change that makes the difference between possible and actual motion, a physical premotion. As appears from the following passage, which is somewhat more detailed, physical premotion is necessary not merely for the emergence of natural motions but also for the motions of intellectual agents:

[49] Dicit ergo (Aristoteles) quod ex quo ita est, quod simili modo se habet in iis quae agunt secundum naturam et secundum intellectum, possumus universaliter de omnibus<sup>50</sup> loquentes dicere, quod quaecumque sunt possibilis facere aut pati aut movere vel moveri, non penitus possibilis sunt: id est, non possunt movere aut moveri in quacumque dispositione se habeant; sed prout se habent in aliqua determinata habitudine et propinquitate ad invicem.

Et hoc concludit ex praemissis, quia iam dictum est, quod tam in agentibus secundum naturam quam in agentibus secundum voluntatem non est aliquid causa diversorum nisi in aliqua alia habitudine se habens. Et sic oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum moveat et aliud moveatur, necesse sit hoc movere et illud moveri.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup>Because it makes no difference whether the premotion affects the mover or the moved, sometimes the transition from *otium* [inactivity] to *actus* [act] is a change in the mover, sometimes it is not. See above, pp.... [In the archives copy, no page numbers are given.]

<sup>49</sup>["A state of rest is the privation of movement; but a privation is not had in what is susceptible of a habit or form except by reason of some cause; there was, therefore, some cause, either on the side of the motive force or on that of the movable, which is the reason for the state of rest; therefore, while that lasted, the state of rest always remained. If therefore at some time the moving force begins to move, it is necessary that the cause of rest be removed. But it cannot be removed except through some movement or change."] *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2, §6, ad fin.

<sup>50</sup>Though Aristotle makes no exception for the first mover, St Thomas very neatly does. Since God is not in time, one cannot ask why he did not act previously: 'before time' is meaningless. Compare *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, cc. 31-38; *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2, §§18-20; *In XII Metaphysics*, lect. 5, Cathala §2498, 99.

<sup>51</sup>Compare *In IX Metaphysics*, lect. 4, Cathala §§1818 ss.

Si ergo non semper erat motus, manifestum est quod non se habebant in ista habitudine ut tunc unum moveret et aliud moveretur; sed se habebant sicut non possibile tunc movere et moveri. Postmodum autem se habent in ista habitudine ut unum moveat et aliud moveatur. Ergo necesse est quod alterum eorum mutetur.<sup>52</sup>

Hoc enim videmus accidere in omnibus quae dicuntur ad aliquid, quod numquam venit nova habitudo, nisi per mutationem utriusque vel alterius: sicut si aliquid, cum prius non esset duplum, nunc factum est duplum, etsi non mutetur utrumque extremorum, saltem oportet quod alterum mutetur. Et sic si de novo adveniat habitudo per quam aliquid moveat et aliud moveatur, oportet vel utrumque vel alterum moveri prius.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup>'mutatum sit' ?

<sup>53</sup>["He (Aristotle) therefore says that from the fact that the situation is similar in those (agents) which act according to nature and (those which act) according to understanding, we can say, speaking universally about everything, that all things which it is possible to make or suffer, or to move (actively) or be moved, are not simply possible (patients); that is, they cannot move or be moved in any disposition whatever in which they exist, but (only) insofar as they exist in some determinate relationship and propinquity to one another.

"And this he concludes from what had been said earlier; because it was already stated that, as much in agents acting according to nature as in those which act according to will, there is nothing which is the cause of diversity unless it is something existing in some other relationship. And thus it is necessary that, when the mover and the moved approach each other in suitable propinquity, and likewise when they are in any disposition at all which is required for this that one move actively and the other be moved, it is then necessary that one be moved and the other move.

"If therefore there is not always movement, it is clear that they did not exist in such a relationship that one should move and the other be moved; but they were like those things that cannot, (as they) then (exist), move and be moved. But afterwards they are in such a relationship that one (of them) moves and the other is moved. Therefore it is necessary that one of the two be changed.

"But we see this to be the case in everything that is characterized as (related) to another, (namely) that a new relationship never occurs except by a change of both or of one (of them); as when something which before was not double is now made double, although it may not be the case that each of the extremes is changed, it is necessary that at least one (of them) be changed. And thus if there occurs again a relationship by means of which one (of them) moves and the other is moved, it is necessary that either both or one (of them) be moved first." *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2 [251a 8-252a 3], §8. [Note that this quotation is the same as that which would have appeared on the missing page from §3.432. (See draft discussion III, footnote 33.) In the archives copy, this quotation in §3.54 takes up an entire page, and it includes four footnotes, the numbering of which has been altered so as to maintain consecutive numbering. Going by the crossed-out numbering of the footnotes on this page, it seems evident that Lonergan has lifted the page from its

[50] It will be well to review the foregoing paragraph by paragraph.

In the first paragraph there is the distinction between the possibility of motion and its actuality. What makes the difference is the precise *dispositio*, *propinquititas*, *habitus* [disposition, propinquity or proximity, relationship] of the mover and the moved.

In the second paragraph the doctrine is asserted to be true of both natural and rational agents. When the requisite *dispositio* or *propinquititas* is had, motion must follow. It is this paragraph that is exactly parallel to the already cited paragraph in the *Metaphysics* on *applicatio*.

In the third paragraph the doctrine is applied to any case of intermittent motion. The necessity of a physical premotion to account for the intermittence is deduced. However, it makes no difference whether the premotion affects the mover or the moved. What counts is the relation between the two. This is obvious: to melt an iceberg one must either move it down to the equator or tilt the earth's axis so that the Equator passes through the Poles.

In the fourth paragraph St Thomas insists on the fact that premotion is given either to the mover or [to] the moved. In any case of relation, the relation is changed by changing either of its terms. The one thing necessary is some previous change, but that is absolutely necessary.

This, I think, should settle the very disputed question of physical premotion. Though for some centuries people have argued at length on St Thomas's meaning, still even the most combative should be willing to yield to St Thomas himself on the matter.

It remains to be seen whether or not St Thomas refers to physical premotion when he uses the term *applicatio*. The passage in his earliest expression of this theorem is as follows:

Quidquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis; artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad [51] operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus est

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earlier position in §3.432 and then changed the numbering of the footnotes so as to maintain consecutive numbering of footnotes from §3. 5 onward.]

Deus. Est enim primum movens omnino immobile, ut supra (1, 13) ostensum est.<sup>54</sup>

Here it is argued that anyone applying an active principle to its action or operation is said to be the cause of that action or operation. The cook cooks the dinner, not because he heats the meat, for the fire does that, but because he puts the meat on the fire. Obviously, if he left the meat on the board, it would not be cooked; not even if he had a roaring fire in his stove. It would seem that *application* here means physical premotion. Further, God is said to apply all things because he is the immovable mover, the source of all motion. If, then, God is the first agent, the one who *primo et principaliter omnia applicat* [(the one who) first of all and principally applies all things], because he is the first mover, it follows that application has to be a motion. Finally, the motion God causes is the physical premotion the cook gives the food that it be cooked. Nothing more follows from the assertion that God is the first mover, as that is proved in chapter 13 of Book 1 [of *Summa contra Gentiles*]. Nor is anything more here asserted: God is not said to give the cook or the fire any other application than that of physical premotion, for what he does is attributed to him not exclusively but *primo et principaliter*. There is no need to seek any further interpretation of the passage, unless, of course, one has committed oneself to some blunder and is out to defend the blunder at all costs.

Turn to the *De potentia*.

Sed quia nulla res per se ipsam movet vel agit nisi sit movens non motum; tertio modo dicitur una res esse causa actionis alterius in quantum movet eam ad agendum; in quo non intelligitur collatio aut conservatio virtutis activae, sed applicatio virtutis ad actionem;

<sup>54</sup>["Anything that applies an active power to (its) action is said to be the cause of that action: for an artisan, applying the power of a natural thing to some action, is said to be the cause of that action; as a cook in regard to cooking, which is (done) by fire. But all application of a power to its operation is principally and foremost by God. For operative powers are applied to their proper operations by some movement of body or soul. But the first principle of both these motions is God. For he is the first and altogether immovable mover, as was shown above (book 1, chapter 13)."] *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, c. 67. [This quotation was also given in draft discussion III, §3.434, where the discussion abruptly breaks off.]

sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli ex hoc ipsum quod applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum movendo ipsum.

[52] Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota, eo quod huiusmodi corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata; caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum, et hoc non cessat quosque perveniatur ad Deum; sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.<sup>55</sup>

In this passage the first paragraph explains the nature of *applicatio* while the second demonstrates (*sequitur de necessitate* [necessarily follows]) that God is the cause of all activity inasmuch as he moves and applies all active principles.

There is nothing in the first paragraph to exclude from *applicatio* the meaning of physical premotion. The *applicatio* is not the creation or the conservation of the *virtus activa* [active power]. Neither is physical premotion. The *applicatio* is the result of motion; but the need of physical premotion is not for its own sake but for the sake of its results, namely, the right proximity, disposition, relation of mover and moved. Finally, to use a knife to cut is an instance of *applicatio*. But inasmuch as the knife is moved to what is to be cut (or *vice versa*), there is physical premotion. In fact, the parallel between the two is so striking that one wonders why theologians have been drawing on their imaginations for centuries instead of reading St Thomas's account of physical premotion in *In VIII Physics*, lect. 2. The work has not lain in the manuscripts all these years. It has been, I believe, published.

<sup>55</sup>[“But since nothing moves or acts of itself unless it is an unmoved mover; in a third way one thing is said to be the cause of the action of another, insofar as it moves it to activity; and this is not to be understood as creation or conservation of an active power, but the application of the power to action, as a person is the cause of the knife's cutting by this fact alone that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting by moving it.

“And because a lower agent does not act unless moved (to do so), because of the fact that lower bodies of this kind are altered in (the act of) effecting alteration, and (because) heaven is not altered (in the act of) effecting alteration, and nevertheless it is not a moving (force) unless it is moved, and this (series) does not cease till one arrives at God, therefore it necessarily follows that God is the cause of the action of any natural thing whatever, as (the one) moving and applying the power to action.”] *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

But not only does the first paragraph leave physical premotion as a possible meaning of *applicatio*. The second paragraph excludes all other meanings.

Observe, the second paragraph is an argument, a demonstration. Because terrestrial bodies are *alterantia alterata* [things that alter (another and are themselves) altered] and celestial bodies, if *alterantia non alterata* [things altering (another) but not (themselves) altered], nonetheless are *moventia mota* [moved movers], [53] and this transmission of motion does not cease till one comes to the first mover, God, for this reason it is necessary that God moves and applies every active principle.

To offer an interpretation of this passage and overlook the fact that it is a demonstration, that St Thomas explicitly states *sequitur ex necessitate*, is sheer nonsense. Either St Thomas means what he says, or there is no possibility of determining what he means. What, then, is the demonstrative force of the argument?

First, Aristotelian physics recognizes three types of motion and demonstrates that there are only these three: change of place, change of sensible quality and change of size.<sup>56</sup> The second of these types of motion, change of sensible quality, alteration, is very much in evidence in the passage. First we are told that *corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata*. Then we are told that *caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum*.

What does the first of these expressions mean: *corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata*?

There are *alterantia* inasmuch as they produce change of sensible quality, change heavy to light, hot to cold, wet to dry, black to white, bitter to sweet, hard to soft, rough to smooth. That is the defined meaning of alteration. It is the only meaning.<sup>57</sup>

They are *alterata* because the heavens act upon them. In the spring when the sun is near the earth, all things flourish. In the autumn when it recedes, all wither away.<sup>58</sup> This is the essential point in the Aristotelian

<sup>56</sup>V *Physics*, lect. 2-4 [224b 35-226b 18]; XI *Metaphysics*, lect. 12 [1068a 8-b 25].

<sup>57</sup>VII *Physics*, lect. 4, 5. [See draft discussion I, footnote 6.]

<sup>58</sup>XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 6 [1071b 22-1072a 26], Cathala §2511. [Neither Aristotle nor St Thomas knew the correct reason for the seasons, namely, the 23.5 degree axial tilt of the

hierarchy: because the heavens are in different places at different times they can cause intermittent motion, the *quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur* [sometimes it is moved, sometimes it is not moved] of the terrestrial process.<sup>59</sup>

[54] What does the second expression mean: *caelum autem est alterans non alteratum et tamen non est movens nisi motum?*

It is *movens* because it is *alterans*. It is *alterans* because it is the *primum mobile*, the cause of all other motion and change. As is demonstrated in the *Physics*, the first motion is necessarily a circular local motion.<sup>60</sup> Here 'first' means 'presupposed by all other motion.' As St Thomas describes it,

... non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia, quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum, oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.<sup>61</sup>

Though *alterans*, it is *non alteratum*. For the heavens are quintessential. They have a different *materia prima* [prime matter] which is in potency not to contraries but *ad unum tantum* [to one thing only]. It is impossible that they should suffer any change, except the change of extrinsic denomination that is involved in local motion. For alteration is from one contrary to another, but the heavens are neither hot nor cold, wet nor dry, heavy nor light, sweet nor bitter, but *aliquid eminentius* [something more eminent].<sup>62</sup>

But if the heavens are *non alteratum*, nonetheless they are *motum*. Any cause of alteration must be moved locally. This is demonstrated in the *Physics* as follows:

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Earth. But this does not affect the point of the argument. For one could easily adjust the statement of the argument so as to incorporate the correct reason for the seasons.]

<sup>59</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 13 [259a 22-260a 19], §§8, 9; XII *Metaphysics*, lect. 6 [1073a 14-b 17]; II *De generatione et corruptione*, text 56.

<sup>60</sup>VIII *Physics*, lect. 14-20 [260a 20-266a 9].

<sup>61</sup>[ "... its causality extends not only to one class of changeable things but to everything that is altered, generated and corrupted; for that which is first moved must be the cause of everything that is subsequently moved." ] In VI *Metaphysics*, lect. 3, Cathala §1208.

<sup>62</sup>*De caelo et mundo*, passim.



... ante omnem alterationem praecedat motus localis: quia si aliquid alteratur, necesse est quod sit aliquid alterans, quod potentia calidum faciat esse actu calidum. Si autem hoc alterans semper esset eodem modo propinquum in eadem distantia ad alteratum, non magis faceret calidum nunc quam prius: manifestum est ergo quod movens in alteratione non similiter distat ab eo quod alteratur, sed aliquando est propinquius, aliquando remotius; quod non potest contingere sine loci mutatione.<sup>63</sup>

[55] Alteration, then, presupposes change of place. The heavens are causes of alteration. Therefore they must be moved locally. *Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur...et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum* [whatever is moved is moved by something else ... and this does not cease till one arrives at God].

The premiss of the argument is simply a statement of the Aristotelian cosmic hierarchy. It is not a point to be debated; the matter cannot but be an absolute certainty.

What then is the connection between the premiss and the conclusion? How can St Thomas say:

... sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.<sup>64</sup>

One has only to ask another question, What is the connection between the Aristotelian cosmic theory and the world of experience? What is the fact Aristotle is trying to explain? We have already shown it to be the fact of intermittent motion, the *quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur*. The whole structure is raised to explain that fact.<sup>65</sup> But what is the immediate

<sup>63</sup>["... local motion precedes every alteration. For if a thing is altered, there must be an alterer which makes that which is potentially hot to be actually hot. If, however, this alterer were always near *in the same way and at the same distance* from that which is altered, it would not make it hot now rather than before. It is clear, therefore, that in alteration the mover does not remain at the same distance from that which is altered, but at one time it is nearer, and at another it is further away. This cannot occur without local motion." ] *In VIII Physics*, lect. 14, §3. [Lonergan's emphasis.]

<sup>64</sup>["... it necessarily follows that God is the cause of the action of any natural thing whatever, as (the one) moving and applying the power to action." ]

<sup>65</sup>[For Lonergan's argument in support of this claim, see draft discussion I, footnote 1. Lonergan's remark here seems to be a reference to §3.11 and so indicates, perhaps, that at some stage what I have called draft discussion I was joined in some way with what I have called draft discussion IV. ]

mechanism of the *quandoque movetur*? What makes the difference between the possibility of motion and the actuality of motion? It has been shown to be physical premotion in Aristotle's and St Thomas's and not Bañez's sense of the term.<sup>66</sup> It has also been shown that *applicatio* is a technical term used by St Thomas to denote physical premotion. I submit the conclusion to be obvious.

If Aristotle's first mover does not apply all things to their activities, St Thomas's does: he [St Thomas's first mover] is *per intellectum agens*.

In the sense assigned, that God moves and applies all things because he is the intelligent and free first mover of the Aristotelian hierarchy, and in no other sense, is it true to say,

... sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.

Q. E. D.

### 3.55 Universal Instrumentality

[56] The idea of instrumentality in St Thomas cannot be understood without a preliminary consideration of the idea of causality.

There are basically two conditions of causality: act and proportion.

The cause must be *actu: omne agens agit quatenus est actu* [in act: every being acts insofar as it is in act].

But this alone is not enough; otherwise anything could produce anything else. There must also be proportion between the cause and the effect;<sup>67</sup> four modes in which such proportion or similarity may be attained are enumerated.

... alio modo per sui similitudinem, secundum quod causa producit effectum sibi similem; et hoc contingit quatuor modis.

<sup>66</sup>Perhaps Lonergan is referring to earlier parts of the discussion in §3.54. In any event, a concise statement contrasting, point by point, the Aristotelian and Thomist understanding of premotion with the Bannezian understanding can be found in *Grace and Freedom*, I, 74-75.

<sup>67</sup>["There are two aspects to the cause as a cause. First, it must be something in act: *omne ens agit quatenus est actu* (every being acts insofar as it is in act). Second, the something that it is must be proportionate to the effect intended: *omne agens agit sibi simile* (every agent produces something similar to itself)." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 288.]

Uno modo, quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale et secundum eandem rationem, sicut est in effectibus univocis; per quem modum potest dici quod calor aëris est in igne calefaciente.

Secundo, quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale, sed non secundum eandem rationem, sicut patet in effectibus aequivocis, per quem modum calor aëris est in sole.<sup>68</sup>

Tertio modo, quando similitudo effectus est in causa non secundum esse naturale, sed spirituale, tamen quietum, sicut similitudines artificiatorum sunt in mente artificis; forma enim domus in aedificatore non est natura quaedam, sicut virtus calefactiva in sole vel calor in igne, sed est quaedam intentio intelligibilis in anima quiescens.

Quarto modo, quando similitudo effectus non secundum eandem rationem neque ut natura quaedam neque ut quiescens, sed per modum cuiusdam defluxus est in causa, sicut similitudines effectuum sunt in instrumentis, quibus mediantibus defluunt formae a causis principalibus in effectus ...<sup>69</sup>

[57] To become an apostle of the obvious and repeat what has just been said, a cause may be proportionate to its effect in four ways. The first two

<sup>68</sup>The point is that the sun is not hot. The heavenly bodies are quintessential, neither hot nor cold, heavy nor light, wet nor dry, but *aliquid eminentius*. Hence they are the causes of all natural species and not merely of this or that one; they are *causae aequivocae*. On the other hand, terrestrial agents are *causae univocae*. ["The *causa univoca* (univocal cause) directly follows the rule *omne agit sibi simile* (every agent produces something similar to itself); the *causa aequivoca* (equivocal cause) is proportionate *eminentiori modo* (in a preeminent way)."] *Grace and Freedom*, II, 288, footnote 101.]

<sup>69</sup>["In another way it (the effect) is in the cause by means of its own likeness, inasmuch as the cause produces an effect like itself. This happens in four ways.

"First, when the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence and in the same manner, as it is in univocal effects. In this way it can be said that the heat of the air is in the fire which heats it.

"Second, when the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence but not in the same manner, as is the case with equivocal effects. In this way the heat of the air is in the sun.

"Third, when the likeness of the effect is in the cause not as regards its natural existence but as regards a spiritual existence, and yet statically, as the likeness of works of art are in the mind of the artist; for the form of a house in the builder is not a real being, like the heating power of the sun or heat in a fire, but it is an intellectual intention at repose in the soul.

"Fourth, when the likeness of the effect is in the cause not in the same manner nor as a real being nor statically, but as a dynamic influence, as the likeness of effects are in instruments, through the mediation of which forms flow from the principal causes into their effects ..."] *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 7, c.

regard natural agents. The third regards intellectual agents. The fourth regards instruments in the strict sense of that term.

Natural agents are proportionate to their effects in virtue of their forms. Thus heat causes heat, cold cold, wetness wetness, plants plants, horses horses. Similarly, the sun causes heat, cold, wetness, plants and horses, and it does so in virtue of its form; but still it is neither hot, cold, wet, a plant or a horse, but something more eminent than all these.

Intellectual agents are proportionate to their effects in virtue of their ideas. The house-builder is proportionate to his effect, houses. But he is not a house, either naturally or eminently. He merely has in his head the idea of a house.

Finally, instruments in the strict sense are proportionate to their effects, for instance, this typewriter is proportionate to this study of St Thomas. But the proportion of the instrument is not that of a natural form: a typewriter is not a book. It is not that of a more eminent form: a typewriter does not enjoy the marvelous properties of the celestial spheres. It is not that of an intellectual agent: a typewriter does not think. Still there is some similarity, some proportion between the flow of instrumental movements and the effect produced; in the case of the typewriter the pattern in which the letters appear on the pages is identical with the pattern in which the keys of the typewriter are moved. To write out 'qwertyuiop,' one must strike in succession [the keys for the letters] 'q,' 'w,' 'e,' 'r,' 't,' 'y,' 'u,' 'i,' 'o,' 'p.' The similarity of the typewriter to 'qwertyuiop' arises solely from given instrumental movements taking place in a given order.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup>["... there are four ways in which a cause may possess proportion to an effect. First, in virtue of a natural form: thus, fire has the form or *virtus* of heat, and it causes heat in other things. Second, in virtue of a more eminent form: thus, the *corpus caeleste* (heavenly body) is neither hot nor cold, wet nor dry, yet as *primum alterans* (the first thing altering another) it is the principle cause of all emergence of heat, cold, humidity, and dryness; it does all this in virtue of a more eminent form. Third, in virtue of an idea in the mind: thus, a master builder is not a cathedral, nor something more eminent than a cathedral, and yet he is proportionate to the production of cathedrals because he has an idea of a cathedral in his head. Fourth, in virtue of an idea that is on its way from the mind to the effect: thus, the idea of the master builder guides the masons and carpenters, and these guide the motions of their bodies and of their tools; because the idea is somehow immanent in the motions, it is eventually realized in the effect. Such is the presentation in *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 7." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 288. Lonergan adds that in his commentary on the *Sentences* (*Super IV Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 1m), St Thomas expresses

After this elaboration of the obvious, it is possible to proceed to the distinction between instruments in the broad sense and instruments in the strict sense.

[58] In the broad sense any *movens motum* [moving (agent) that is moved] whatever is an instrument. Thus, the moon in reflecting the light of the sun is the instrument of the sun in illuminating the earth.

In the strict sense not every *movens motum* is an instrument, but only such as is proportionate to its effect in virtue of a similarity *per modum cuiusdam defluxus* [in the way of a certain downflow]. Thus, the moon reflecting the light of the sun to illuminate the earth is *not* an instrument. The reason is that the moon is actually bright; it has in it the natural form of light, the *esse naturale* of light. But the carpenter's saw used in making a desk is strictly an instrument: for at no time nor in any way is the saw a desk, except *per modum cuiusdam defluxus*.<sup>71</sup>

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the idea of proportion in another manner: "In defining motion Aristotle explained that it is not 'something' but a process 'towards something' It is not included in any of the ten *genera entis* (genera of being), but is the process toward three of them; it is 'towards being in a place,' 'towards being of a certain kind,' 'towards being of a certain size.' The intermediate between not being and being, the process towards being something, a motion, is termed an *esse incompletum* (incomplete being).

"... one can say that the fire is proportionate to its effect *per modum naturae completae* (in the way of a complete nature), that the sun is proportionate to its multiple effects, for it is a *causa aequivoca* (equivocal cause), *per modum naturae completae et eminentioris* (in the way of complete and preeminent nature); that the master builder is proportionate to his effect, not indeed *per modum naturae* for he is not a cathedral, but *per formam apprehensam* (through an apprehended form) for he is an intellectual agent; finally, that the instrument is proportionate to its effect not *per modum naturae completae*, nor *per formam apprehensam*, but *per modum naturae incompletae*, *per quoddam esse incompletum* (in the way of incomplete nature, through a certain incomplete being). The theory is that just as a motion is the *esse incompletum* of its term—for instance, 'becoming white' is an incomplete 'being white'—so also the proportion of the instrument is an incomplete realization of the proportion of the principle cause." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 288-89. Lonergan's account of the proportion of an instrument to its effect in *Gratia operans*, then, varies slightly from his account in this draft discussion. See also the quotation included in footnote 71 below.]

<sup>71</sup>*De veritate*, q. 27, a. 4 elaborates this point. [Compare Lonergan's account of Aquinas's position in *Gratia operans*: "... an instrument in the broad sense is any *movens motum*; an instrument in the strict sense is a cause that is proportionate to its effect *per modum naturae incompletae*. Thus, the moon illuminates the earth in virtue of the light it receives from the sun: it is a *movens motum* but it is not an instrument in the strict sense, for the moon is bright *per modum formae completae*. On the other hand, in the generation of animals the seed is an instrument in the strict sense, for it is not an animal nor something more eminent than an animal and yet it is the cause of an animal." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 289.]

According to St Thomas all creatures are instruments.

First, they are instruments in the broad sense. They are all *moventia mota* [moved movers]. This follows automatically from Aristotle's cosmic hierarchy.<sup>72</sup>

Second, they are instruments in the strict sense. This follows automatically from the Platonist systematization of Aristotle's cosmic hierarchy. God alone is naturally proportionate to the production of being, for he alone is by nature. The heavenly bodies alone are naturally proportionate to the production of species *qua* species, for if the terrestrial agent were the cause of its own species, it would be the cause of itself.<sup>73</sup> Since, then, other agents are not naturally proportionate to the production of being or of species, it remains that they are merely instrumentally proportionate, and therefore they are instruments in the strict sense.

### 3.56 Virtus Instrumentalis [*Instrumental Power*]

[59] There will be no need to investigate the whole of St Thomas's theory of instrumentality: for those who wish to do so, some indication of the sources for such a study is given (§3.561). Our aim is merely to determine the precise nature of the *intentio* of *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m., and the argument will be extremely simple.<sup>74</sup> First (§3.562), it will be shown that St Thomas frequently conceives the *virtus instrumentalis* as something from the mind of the artist and in the instruments. Second (§3.563), it will be shown precisely what St Thomas conceives to proceed from the mind of the divine artist and to exist in the universe of his instruments. Thus, there will be three brief sections: sources, principles, parallels.

<sup>72</sup>Read VIII *Physics*, lect. 9 [256a 3-257a 34], §5. The remark, *non quilibet consideraret secundum movens esse instrumentum primi* [not everyone would consider the second mover to be an instrument of the first], is very apposite.

<sup>73</sup>Compare *De substantiis separatis*, c. 10. [In the original reference Lonergan refers to "cap. 8, Mand[onnet] 1, [page] 107."] ]

<sup>74</sup>[For the corresponding discussion of the same issue, see *Grace and Freedom*, I, 84-86, II, 291-96.]

## 3.561 Sources [for St Thomas's Theory of Instrumentality]

There are five lines of investigation: the theory of the generation of animals; the theory of light and colour; the theory of the sacraments; miscellaneous items; and the theory of the limitation of instrumental causality.

The theory of the generation of animals is the fundamental source. Practically all the elements in St Thomas's thought are to be found in Aristotle's *De generatione animalium* I, 21-II, 5 [729b 1-741b 25].<sup>75</sup> After reading this, see St Albert on the same subject in *Summa de creaturis*, 2, q. 17, a. 3, Borgnet [vol.] 35: 154-155. In St Thomas the main passages are *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, c. 86;<sup>76</sup> *De potentia*, q. 3, aa. 11, 12; *In VII Metaphysics*, lect. 6-8; and *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 118, a. 1. Observe that in the earlier passages St Thomas differs notably from Aristotle while in the *Pars prima* [he] reproduces a number of elements right out of Aristotle. With regard to Aristotle's automatic puppets, see [A.S.L.] Farquharson's note, *De Motu Animalium* 701b 4, in the series of Oxford translations.

[60] On the theory of light and colour, see St Albert, *Summa de creaturis*, 2, q. 21, a. 5, Borgnet [vol.] 35, 205-10. Then, in St Thomas, *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3; d. 19, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1m.; *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 8 [ad fin.]; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 67, a. 4; *In II De anima*, lect. 14. Observe that the *intentio* can never produce any effect except a perception;<sup>77</sup> the same is true of the *esse spirituale* [spiritual being] that supplants the *intentio* [intention] in all later works. On the nature of immateriality, intentionality, spirituality, see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 14, a. 1 and parallel

<sup>75</sup>[In *Gratia operans* (see *Grace and Freedom*, II, 289, footnote 104), a less extensive reference is given: *De generatione animalium*, II, 1, 734b 31-735a 26. In this footnote, Lonergan repeats the claim that "[t]he generation of animals appears to be the source for the theory of instrumental causality." The same, less extensive, reference is given in *Grace and Freedom*, I, 83, footnote 82.]

<sup>76</sup>[Lonergan does not mention this reference to the *Summa contra Gentiles* in *Grace in Freedom*, II, 289, footnote 104, or in *Grace and Freedom*, I, footnote 82.]

<sup>77</sup>["Note that the *intentio* by itself cannot cause anything but a sensation, a perception; to produce a physical effect it must be immanent in a motion; compare the gramophone record which has the *intentio*, the *virtus artis* [power of art], permanently, but renders the work of art only inasmuch as it is moved." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 290, footnote 104.]

passages. Relative to the *vis spiritualis in voce* [spiritual force in language] of *Summa theologiae*, 3, q. 62, a. 4, see just what the teacher does in *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 117, a. 1 and parallel passages. Finally, observe the negation of the existence of any *intentio* in the instrument in *Summa theologiae*, 3, q. 64, a. 8, ad 1m.

On the theory of the sacraments there are *Super IV Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2 and qc. 4; *De veritate*, q. 27, aa. 4 and 7; *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 43, a. 6, ad 4m.; 3, q. 62, aa. 1, 3 and 4; q. 63, a. 4. On the problem of reconciling this theory with the flat assertions of limited instrumentality, study Cajetan's interpretation of St Thomas in his commentaries on *Summa theologiae*, 3, q. 62, a. 4 [Leonine Text, vol. 12: 25-26] and q. 78, a. 4 [Leonine Text, vol. 12: 211-12]. For a clear and cogent exposition of Cajetan, see [Ludovicus] de San, [*Tractatus*] *de Deo Uno* [Louvain: C. Peeters, 1894], vol.1: 719, 720 in note.

The principal miscellaneous items are the opusculum, *De occultis operationibus naturae*; the account of prophecy [in] *Summa theologiae*, 2-2, q. 171, a. 2; the instrumentality of the heavenly spheres in *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 and *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 70, a. 3 with ad 3m, 4m, 5m, and the numerous parallel passages; all the passages that make the accidental form the instrument of the substantial form, for example, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 115, a. 1, ad 5m, or the lower faculties the instrument of the higher faculties; the always interesting *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 8. On *intentio* in general, see H. D. Simonin, ['La notion d'*Intentio* dans l'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin,'] *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 19 (1930) 445-63.

Finally, instrumental causality is not unlimited. In proving that a creature cannot create even as an instrument, St Thomas argues that an instrument merely serves to dispose the recipient of the effect of the principal effect: see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 45, a. 5.<sup>78</sup> Again, to show that

<sup>78</sup>[Loneragan's expression here is not especially clear. In fact, in the archives copy, he first typed, "... to dispose the matter for the reception of the principal effect," but then corrected it to read, "... to dispose the recipient of the effect of the principal effect." In any event, Thomas's point is clear: "... causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris nisi in quantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." In English: "... the secondary instrumental cause does not share in the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively in relation to the effect of the principal agent."]



the [61] human soul has to be created, he maintains that there cannot be a *virtus activa* [active power] for the production of a spiritual effect in a material subject: see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 118, a. 2.

### 3.562 Principles

Anyone who is interested enough in St Thomas's thought to read through the foregoing will be certain of this: there is no simple and straightforward theory that covers absolutely all the data. It follows that there is no possibility of deducing what St Thomas *must* mean in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. So much, then, in answer to the secular assertions of what that passage clearly, obviously and certainly does mean.

In the second place, the data can be divided into three classes. First, there are occasional passages that favour the opinion which assimilates St Thomas's *virtus instrumentalis* to Avicenna's *virtus motiva efficiens* [efficient motive power] and St Albert's *virtus divina creata* [divine created power]: such, for example, is what one spontaneously imagines St Thomas to have imagined to be the *virtus* in the *imagines necromanticae* [necromantic images]. Second, there is an imposing mass of evidence in favour of the opinion that St Thomas held a purely rational theory such as Aristotle's, namely, the *virtus instrumentalis* is the pattern of the instrumental movements determined by the idea in the mind of the artisan. Third, there are passages that can be interpreted either way, thus, in the sacramental theory one may either agree with Cajetan or one may choose to agree with those that support the theory of 'physical' causality.

The question arises, Is *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m, to be interpreted in accordance with the first view or in accordance with the second? The best answer is that of St Thomas himself. There happens to be a whole series of passages in which he discusses the subject of fate; taken together these passages form a clear parallel to the passage in question, for fate is a *virtus artis in instrumento artificis* [the power of an art in the instrument of the artisan]. [62] But before considering the treatment of 'fate'<sup>79</sup> it will be well to give a few data that reveal the parallel.

<sup>79</sup>[See the beginning of §3.563.]

From the *De veritate* it is clear that the idea of the artisan is of first importance: the instrument has a special effect *inquantum est mota ab artifice* [insofar as it is moved by the artisan];<sup>80</sup> it is proportionate to its effect not in virtue of a natural form, nor in virtue of an idea that is static in the mind, but in virtue of the idea in motion from the mind to the effect.<sup>81</sup> From both these passages and those cited from the *Pars tertia* there is the analogy: the proportion of the instrumental cause is to the proportion of the principal cause, as the motion of the former is to the idea or the form in the latter.

It should seem that the *intentio* is this instrumental proportion as such; it is the proportionateness of the motion in distinction from the motion which is proportionate. For it clearly emerges from all the passages on light and colour that the *intentio*, by itself, produces no effect except a perception. This repeated assertion (*Sentences, De potentia, Pars prima, De anima*) may be reconciled with instrumental causality by saying: the *intentio* as such is merely perceptible; the *intentio* as immanent in a motion is causal inasmuch as the motion it informs is causal.

Finally, it is to be borne in mind that instrumental causality does not require the immediate action of the principle cause: whether one agent uses one instrument or one million instruments, all the instruments are instruments. This is clear from the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies and from the explicit statement in *Summa theologiae*, 3, q. 62, a. 4, ad 4m.

### 3.563 Parallels

There remains only the presentation of the series of passages on 'fate.' There is no mention of instrumentality as such; there is frequent mention of the idea of the artisan, the first cause, and of the mode of its presence in his instruments, secondary causes.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>80</sup>*De veritate*, q. 27, a. 4.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.* a. 7.

<sup>82</sup>[There follows in the archives copy two lengthy sets of quotations going from p. 63 to p. 71. The first quotation consists of the entire commentary of Thomas de Vio Caietanus (Cajetan) on *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 (Leonine Text, vol. 7: 319), presented without any comment by Lonergan. The second consists of a series of quotations from Dominicus Bañez, *Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Madrid: Editorial F.E.D.A., 1934). The following

information is provided to enable the reader to identify each of these quotations and the order in which Lonergan presents them. In most instances, Lonergan includes an upper-case letter at the beginning of the quotation, possibly for grouping or reference purposes, and this is also included. (1) 1, q. 2, a. 3, *commentarium* (page 113): C *obiectio Scoti de potentia formali et actu virtuali* ("non tamen ... respectu intellectionis"); (2) *Ibid.* (page 115): D "respondetur, ... potentiae mediae...et alibi saepe"; (3) 1, q. 14, a. 13, *commentarium* (page 351): F "Tertia conclusio ... in suis causis, etc"; (4) *Ibid.*: B "... Deus cognoscit omnes ... omnibus causis ..."; (5) *Ibid.* (page 352): C (Quarta conclusio) "... Infallibilitas et certitudo ... comprehendit, liberum"; (6) *Ibid.* (page 353): D "... voluntas creata infallibiliter ... ad bene operandum"; (7) *Ibid.*: E "... quartam conclusionem D. Thomae ... determinationi primae causae"; (8) *Ibid.* (page 352) B "... Si ad infallibilitatem ... et cognitione intuitiva"; (9) 1, q. 19, a. 8, *commentarium* (page 429): B "... contingens naturaliter ... possibiliter aliquid esse..."; (10) *Ibid.* (page 430): B "Tertio conclusio: Nullus effectus ... eiusdem causae"; (11) *Ibid.* (page 431): E "Sexta conclusio ... Nullus effectus ... effectum contingentem"; (12) *Ibid.*: A "Septima conclusio ... contradictoria asseruisse"; (13) *Ibid.*: C "Ultimo conclusio: Si Deus *ad extra* operaretur ex necessitate naturae, nullum esset liberum arbitrium in rebus." (Lonergan adds the following comment at this point: "If 'quandoque movetur' explained as in *Summa theologiae* 1-2, q. 9. a. 3, ad 2m, true; if explained as 1-2, q. 10, a. 1, ad 2m, then false. Argument from 'primum liberum' per se is valid, but not to the point for we consider a hypothesis that is impossible.") (14) 1, q. 19, a. 10, *commentarium* (page 438): E "... causa totali prorsus ... non possit produci ..."; (15) Comment by Lonergan: "B-D Admits God exactly the same even if he had not created; but openly admits the point is hard to understand"; (16) *Ibid.* (page 443): (no upper-case letter) "... libertas actus ... ex radice actus intellectus ..."; (17) *Ibid.* (page 444): B "Quotiescumque actus voluntatis ... ad Dei similitudinem transferant..."; (18) *Ibid.*: E "Tandem colligamus...assimilata est"; (19) Comment by Lonergan: "F Takes Caietan to task because on *Summa theologiae* 1, q. 22. a. 4 'quiescit intellectus non evidentia veritatis inspectae sed altitudine inaccessibilis veritatis occultae'"; (20) 1, q. 2, a. 3, *commentarium* (page 115): C "Ad secundum respondetur ... est motio finis."

In *Gratia operans*, Lonergan provides this summary statement of the difference between the position of St Thomas and the interpretation of St Thomas's position by Bañez: "I think it may be said that Bannezian thought, point for point, corresponds to the thought of St Thomas, yet between the two there is a notable difference which arises from the arrangement of the points. St Thomas's synthesis of premotion, application, instrumental participation; his affirmation of universal instrumentality, of divine transcendence and efficacy, of operative grace as a special case of instrumental control—all these points are to be found in the Bannezian interpretation. But the difference lies in the analysis of the instrument: St Thomas posits three *actiones* but only two products; Durandus maintained that if there are only two products, there are only two *actiones*; both Molina and Bañez were out to discover a third product that they might have a third *actio*, and the former posited a *concursum simultaneum* (simultaneous concurrence), the latter a *concursum praeivum* (preceding concurrence).

"We have argued that on every point the Bannezian idea does not square with what St Thomas says ... The root of the whole trouble is that they take it for granted that a third *actio* postulates a third product." *Grace and Freedom*, II, 448-49.]

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