

LONERGAN WORKSHOP

**“...and God’s Own Glory, in Part, Is You”:
What Aspect of the Lonergan Legacy
Needs To Be Stressed Right Now?**



volume 21

**edited by
Fred Lawrence**

LONERGAN WORKSHOP

Volume 21

LONERGAN WORKSHOP
Volume 21

edited by
Fred Lawrence

Copyright © 2009
Boston College

ISSN 0148-2009

Printed in the United States of America

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

FOR A VARIETY of reasons, the following papers presented at the 35th Lonergan Workshop regrettably do not appear in this volume. The paper by *John Dadosky* (Regis College, Toronto) asked the intriguing question, "Is There a Fourth Stage of Meaning?" Boston College colleague, *Charles C. Hefling*, presented, "Lonergan's *Cur Deus Homo*: The 'Law of the Cross' Revisited; or, Why Anselm and Abelard Were Both Right," on Lonergan's theology of redemption. Patristics scholar and Boethius expert, *Paul LaChance* (St. Elizabeth's College), reexamined the dogmatic part of *The Triune God* in "Intersubjectivity and the History of Trinitarian Theology." The presentation of *Brian McDonough*, who works for the Archdiocese of Montreal, featured a video of prison encounters between victims of violent crime and prisoners who had committed such crimes on other victims to help us understand Lonergan's notion of conversion and Robert Doran's idea of psychic conversion. His presentation may be accessed online at Boston College's *Frontline*. (Incidentally, later in the summer of 2008, Stephen Pope, my Boston College colleague in Christian ethics used the videotape of this presentation during a course he gave in Nairobi, Kenya, where it had a great impact on persons caught up in tragic ways in civil war.) *Kenneth Melchin* (St. Paul University, Ottawa), brought his international team, which has focused on conflict mediation in association with the Lonergan Centre at St. Paul University, Ottawa. They made brief presentations both in their afternoon workshop and in a plenary session. We do not have the paper by *Cheryl A. Picard* (Carleton University Law School, who played a leading role on Ken Melchin's

team, but the theoretical basis for the team's labors has now been made available in *Transforming Conflict through Insight*, she coauthored with Ken Melchin from the University of Toronto Press in 2008. They explain how the appropriation of the structures of conscious intentionality has provided clues for enacting the liberating process of resolving conflict through the interactions of mediation in multiple venues. Ken's LW 35 discussion of three challenges to Christian ethics sketched both the helpfulness of Lonergan's generalized empirical method as grounded in the interiority of practitioners from any field; and the suggestiveness of Lonergan's notions of differentiated consciousness and functional specialization for creatively integrating the various relevant methods and results of a vast array of human sciences into theological ethics. Lonergan had a lifelong interest in the philosophy/theology of history, yet it was not given to him to think out his ideas in the context of the postmodern concerns that became prominent from the last third of the twentieth century through the first decade of the twenty-first. *William Murnion's* "A Postmodern Philosophy of History" takes up that challenge, and will be made available in a future *Lonergan Workshop* journal. The paper by Seton Hall University's *John Ranieri* used Lonergan's critique of naïve realism to propose a possibly relevant hypothesis about why Leo Strauss did not come sufficiently to terms with the biblical teaching on the Jerusalem side of the tandem with Athens that he argues is crucial to the rich development of Western thought. With a view toward *Method in Theology*, the paper by *Roman A. Siebenrock* was an exploration of how German theologians have used the notion borrowed from legal or forensic rhetoric and applied by Melchior Cano to dogmatic theology – *loci theologici* – not as a format for ahistorical proof-texting but in a vital and heuristic way for mining the treasures of the earlier theological tradition. A special treat for those attending LW 35 was *David Tresan* (a San Francisco area psychoanalyst who was introduced to the Lonergan Workshop by Voegelin scholar and friend Paul Caringella), who spoke on "Psychoanalysis and the Invisible Measure," a paper reflecting his long experience as a therapist and an interest in Jung that complemented his deep concern for his Jewish heritage, as

well as the work of Voegelin, Lonergan, and Robert Doran. *Gerard Walmsley's* "Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism," demonstrated just how far-reaching religious and philosophic pluralism is and showed that the topic of his doctoral thesis is relevant to that pluralism in ways that are integrative and never condescending. Gerry is an English Jesuit whose Boston College dissertation, *Lonergan on Polymorphic Pluralism. The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) is now the president of the first Catholic university in South Africa, St. Augustine's University in Johannesburg, a university he helped to found. *Gerald Whelan*, an Irish Jesuit who was for years a pastor in Kenya and a teacher in Nairobi, now teaches pastoral theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. Gerry's pioneering work in the application of Lonergan's thought to pastoral theology (as in his LW 35 paper, "Lonergan and the Future of Catholic Social Teaching") is available in journals such as *Gregorianum*, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and *Thinking Faith: The Online Journal of the British Jesuits*. We apologize for not being able to make these papers available to our subscribers at this time.

Alison Benders, dean at Ursuline College, wrote her Boston College theology dissertation on Lonergan and Shankara under Francis Clooney, SJ (founder of the discipline now known as comparative theology). Her contribution to LW 35 confronts an issue of great concern to university administrators and concerned people everywhere – the proliferation of the use especially by young people of personalized internet sites like MySpace, Facebook, etc. Alison uses Lonergan's interiority analysis in relation to several recent psychological studies to reflect on possible ways these sites may affect identity in our "postmodern" age.

Canadian Jesuit *Peter Bisson*, SJ, former Lonergan Fellow, has thematized the relatively recent history of Jesuit General Congregations from the perspective of Lonergan's thought. As a delegate to the last General Convention, Peter worked actively both in Canada and at the Jesuit Generalate in Rome in its preparation.

“The Jesuits and a Corporate Use of the Fifth (Religious) Level of Meaning: The Discovery of Love” is a reflection on the actual experience in its entirety.

Emeritus Hesburgh Professor in Philosophy and Theology at Notre Dame, *David Burrell*, CSC, now teaches at his congregation’s university dedicated to the Ugandan Martyrs in Africa. David is a renowned expert in the Shi’ite stream of Muslim theology and philosophy, especially on the thought of Al-Ghazali. His paper brings ideas of Lonergan, MacIntyre, and Taylor to bear on the deconstruction of the myth of autonomous reason as putatively opposed to tradition-directed inquiry; in the course of the paper David unfolds for us the richness of another key Islamic figure, Mulla Sadra, whose meditations on saying and unsaying in relation to theological discourse has had a broad and salutary influence.

Boston College Philosophy Professor and Department Chair *Patrick H. Byrne* shares his further advances in phenomenological exploration via interiority analysis of feelings and values. Pat’s paper is replete with concrete examples, which may evoke in his readers parallel insights into how we arrive at a rank-ordering of values – one of the great unfinished problems of modern philosophy from Hartmann, Scheler, and Hildebrand in Germany, and Nabert, Marcel, and Ricoeur in France.

For many years, *Eileen de Neeve*, Charlotte Tansey’s first successor of as president of the Thomas More Institute for Adult Education (Montreal) and former Lonergan Fellow has studied conventional economics in an effort to understand Lonergan’s economic ideas. She has recently published a primer on Lonergan’s economics. Her paper introduces such key features from Lonergan’s economic manuscripts as functional distinctions in spending, the pure cycle of innovative growth, the good of order, and “the baseball diamond” diagram or image Lonergan used to clarify his original understanding of the rhythms of surplus and basic production.

Robert M. Doran, SJ (Marquette University and still editor-in-chief of the University of Toronto's *Collected Works of Lonergan*) steps into the breach caused by the vast contrasts between *Insight* and *Method in Theology* to argue for a "hermeneutics of continuity" as regards key aspects of Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas's metaphysics. His systematic work, especially on Lonergan's Trinitarian theology, provides the backdrop against which he makes the case for (as the title of his paper puts it) "Preserving Lonergan's Understanding of Thomist Metaphysics: A Proposal and an Example."

Philip Egan, an English priest who taught and was an administrator for many years at the seminary, Oscott College, was just completing his second stint as a Lonergan Fellow at Boston College when he spoke at the Workshop. Phil presented an overview of Lonergan's early short papers and devotional works, which had recently appeared in *Shorter Papers*, volume 20 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007). Like that volume, this paper highlights in a perhaps unparalleled way the pastoral dimension of Lonergan's thought, as well as his deep fidelity to core Catholic Christian beliefs.

Nearing the end of several years as chair of philosophy at Seattle University, *Paul Kidder's* presentation once again featured his skillful use of visual aids to accompany his lecture. As was Fr. Lonergan himself (he dubbed her "Mrs. Insight"), the Lonergan Workshop has always been devoted to the work of the late Jane Jacobs, the extraordinary wife, mother, and writer for an architectural journal who became famous for "urbanism" in her New York City days and continued her combined writing and political activism later on in Toronto. Few have understood her pioneering work on cities as deeply as Paul Kidder, who has shared his insights at several past Workshops. Adopting a novel approach, this year's paper set Jacobs's achievement in relief against the notorious career of her New York nemesis, Robert Moses, whose unbridled virtuosity in embodying his own saying – "You have to break a few eggs for the common good" – so

provoked the genius of Jane Jacobs as to show once again that the adage, God writes straight with crooked lines, still holds.

Robert Luby, MD, together with his wife, Jude Gervais, and their daughter, Blaise, were students of Sebastian Moore and Glenn “Chip” Hughes from the earliest days of the Workshop. Just couple of years ago, Bob did an afternoon workshop on health and health care, which received wonderful reviews from many people. This year, Bob’s lecture presented a new paradigm for medical care, in which he used different aspects of Lonergan’s thought to began drawing the revolutionary implications of shifting from a model focused on intervening in cases of acute illness (“downstream medicine”) to a more long-term, holistic vision of medical care (“upstream medicine”).

Again, following his remarkable paper on T. S. Eliot’s *Four Quartets* the previous year, *Gregory Maillet* (North Atlantic Baptist University) presented a paper on literary themes. His talk this year evokes the theological image of the Holy Spirit as the breath (spiration) of the Living God in “Breathing Back: Lonergan, Literary Creativity, and the Spirit of the Lord.” As we have seen in his past Workshop contributions on such topics as Shakespeare and Tolkein, the paper evinces Maillet’s capacity to bring out the Christian dimension of literary artistry without any hint of extrinsicism or forcing.

Since *William A. Mathews*, SJ (Milltown Institute in Dublin) finished his masterwork, *Lonergan’s Quest*, he has been returning to the venue of science, where he uses Lonergan’s approach to consciousness to study closely the narratives of discovery in the lives of famous scientists, giving special attention to the creative genius, Francis Crick. All he has been learning in this more recent phase of his research enriches his paper on “The Idea of a University, Reductionism, and Lonergan on Emergence.”

Colin Maloney is a former colleague of Fr Lonergan's at Regis College and, with John English, SJ, one of the pioneers in the recovery and renewal of the ministry of Ignatius Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*. It is fitting, then, that he would be drawn to a genetic study of Lonergan on belief and faith. His paper, "Faith and Lonergan," is both a profound and quite personal study, not merely of the development of a theological idea, but of an exemplary spiritual life.

Just after retiring from teaching at Vassar College, *Michael E. McCarthy* became a Lonergan Fellow at Boston College to continue work on a book of essays on Lonergan, along with his monograph on the thought of Hannah Arendt. Michael's paper for LW 35 is an edifying reflection on the meaning of his career as a philosopher, a teacher, and a Catholic Christian working in a secular environment with wonderful colleagues and challenging, talented students.

The paper by *Elizabeth Murray*, now chair of philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, has an intriguing title: "The Second Moment of Intellectual Conversion." Much has been spoken and written in circles devoted to Lonergan's thought on his phrase in *Insight*, "startling strangeness." Richard Liddy has used the phrase for the title of his recent memoir on self-appropriation and what it has meant to him in many years of priestly ministry, teaching, and university leadership. Like Liddy's work, Murray's paper takes seriously Lonergan's point that conversion – whether religious, moral, or intellectual – is a process, and not just a momentary event. As she has done in past Workshops, especially on themes connected with feelings in the moral and religious spheres, Liz uses her delicate phenomenological skills to evoke precise questions and experiences connected with a deepening of one's intellectual conversion that would help people at any stage of Lonergan studies.

Our Workshop has been remiss in not having Loyola of Chicago's *Jon Nilson* as a presenter long before this. When colleague Shawn Copeland invited the society of Black Catholic Theologians to meet at Boston College in the fall of 2007, Jon was

a presenter and accepted our invitation to speak at LW 35. As we learned in his talk, “Beyond Moral Suasion: Reading *Method in Theology* in ‘Racist America,’” Jon has long been concerned and engaged in active theological and practical response to the situation of African Americans in the United States.

Having led Business Ethics Workshops for many years, *David Oyler*, like Mark Morelli, Liz Murray, Tom McPartland, and others was a student of Fr. Tim Fallon at Santa Clara. Dave has made several presentations at the West Coast Methods Institute on the philosophy of biology, long a field of intense interest and study for him. Many people struggling with Lonergan’s discussion of genetic method and development in chapter 15 of *Insight* will be helped by his paper, “Potency and Structure.” Its topic is a part of a book he is writing on philosophical biology.

Cloe Taddei Ferretti (Cybernetics/Philosophy Institute, Naples) is an Italian scientific investigator who was introduced to Lonergan studies by Saturnino Muratore, SJ, and has been his close collaborator over the years. In Muratore’s honor she organized an international Lonergan Colloquium at the venerable Istituto Filosofico in Naples in May 2008. Then in June, as she has done on past occasions at our Workshops, she linked Lonergan’s work to research in a wide range of technical scientific fields in a way unique in Lonergan scholarship. This paper concentrates on sensitive self-transcendence in relation to empirical scientific findings in the field of cognitive science; it was focused on experience of art illustrated by an array of wonderful artistic selections.

Paul St. Amour of St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia chose a specialized topic for his paper. After 18 chapters in which *Insight*’s generalized empirical method has been focused on the intelligibility specifically associated with the intrinsic causes (i.e., formal and material causality or conjugate and central form and potency), Lonergan in chapter 19 demonstrated that what he had been claiming about the intelligibility and reasonableness in regard to proportionate being as intrinsically or extrinsically conditioned by space and time up to that

point also holds good for the transcendent being of God as well. This compelled Lonergan (as notoriously unwilling to brush aside questions arbitrarily) to meet the exigency that arises once we realize that the intelligibility and reasonableness of the universe's being cannot just be "a matter of fact." Here chapter 19 shifts rather abruptly to a discussion of the extrinsic causality by which God is understood to be the efficient cause of the existence and intelligibility of the created universe. Paul told me that the issue of this move's validity has vexed him since his first exposure to it in his undergraduate days. He brings to the task of resolving it the seriousness worthy of a Kierkegaard, and his paper discloses the outcome.

Raymond Topley did his doctorate on Lonergan under the late Valentine Rice of Trinity College in Dublin. A Lonergan Fellow and (with his wife) among the very first to live at the Fellows House at 4 Quincy Road during his Boston College sojourn, Ray teaches teachers of religious education at St. Patrick's College, Dublin. His paper shares his many insights that apply Lonergan's cognitional theory to educating religious educators in a very concrete and down-to-earth fashion, with many helpful concrete examples. Like the many Mexican pioneers in applying Lonergan's education theory, he is quite aware that these insights may be generalized to include educational theory in every area of learning.

German theologian *Nikolaus Wandinger* teaches at Innsbruck University in Austria where he did his doctoral work under the late Raymund Schwager, SJ. He is the author of the magnificent work *Die Sündenlehre als Schlüssel zum Menschen. Impulse K. Rahners und R. Schwagers zu einer Heuristik theologischer Anthropologie* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003). Niki's paper brings out the implications of authentic subjectivity for clarifying the very important topic of performative or implicit theology, since, as Aristotle says regarding the ethical quest for happiness, everyone has to be his/her own philosopher, or (in the light of sin and grace as known by revelation), theologian. He then relates this reflection to an appraisal of Karl Rahner's famous notion of the anonymous Christian.

Another speaker with a background in Africa from years as a pastor in Kenya and a teacher in Nairobi, *Gerald Whelan*, is an Irish Jesuit who did his doctoral work in Toronto on Lonergan's early manuscripts. He is now teaching pastoral theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. In light of his pastoral experiences in Africa, Gerry is doing pioneering work in the application of Lonergan's thought to pastoral theology. Integral to his thinking in the field of pastoral theology is his paper, "Lonergan and the Future of Catholic Social Teaching."

We are grateful to Regina Gilmartin Knox, who is our manuscript editor, and to Kerry Cronin (Business Manager), who helps her with these collections of Lonergan Workshop papers. We also want to say how thankful Sue and I are to the graduate student work crew, along with Greg Lauzon, who have become indispensable to the Workshop's good of order.

Fred Lawrence
Editor, *Lonergan Workshop*

CONTENTS

Editor's Introduction	iii
Beyond <i>MySpace</i> : Grounding Postmodern Identity in Lonergan's Interiority Analysis	1
<i>Alison Benders</i>	
General Congregation 35: The Jesuits and a Corporate Use of the Fifth (Religious) Level of Meaning: The Discovery of Love	17
<i>Peter Bisson</i>	
Autonomous Reason versus Tradition-directed Inquiry: Mulla Sadra, Lonergan, MacIntyre, and Taylor	33
<i>David Burrell</i>	
What Is <i>Our</i> Scale of Value Preference?	43
<i>Patrick H. Byrne</i>	
Lonergan's Economic Ideas Today: Functional Distinctions in Spending, The Pure Cycle of Innovative Growth, the Good of Order, and the Baseball Diamond	65
<i>Eileen de Neeve</i>	
Preserving Lonergan's Understanding of Thomist Metaphysics: A Proposal and an Example	85
<i>Robert M. Doran</i>	
Lonergan's Early Short Papers and Devotional Works	103
<i>Philip Egan</i>	
Robert Moses and the Common Good	125
<i>Paul Kidder</i>	

Upstream Medicine	145
<i>Robert Luby</i>	
Breathing Back: Lonergan, Literary Creativity, and the Spirit of the Lord	179
<i>Gregory Maillet</i>	
Faith and Lonergan	193
<i>Colin Maloney</i>	
The Idea of a University, Reductionism, and Lonergan on Emergence	241
<i>William Mathews</i>	
Conversion	263
<i>Michael McCarthy</i>	
The Second Moment of Intellectual Conversion	277
<i>Elizabeth Murray</i>	
Beyond Moral Suasion: Reading <i>Method in Theology</i> in “Racist America”	295
<i>Jon Nilson</i>	
Potency and Structure	303
<i>David Oyler</i>	
On the Validity of Extrinsic Causality in Proofs for the Existence of God	313
<i>Paul St. Amour</i>	
Leaving Self-Centeredness: Lonergan and Cognitive Science on Art	349
<i>Cloe Taddei Ferretti</i>	
Meeting Lonergan’s Challenge to Educators	369
<i>Raymond Topley</i>	
Implicit Theology, Authentic Subjectivity, and Karl Rahner’s “Anonymous Christian”	383
<i>Nikolaus Wandinger</i>	

BEYOND *MYSpace*: GROUNDING POSTMODERN IDENTITY IN LONERAGAN'S INTERIORITY ANALYSIS

Alison Benders
Ursuline College
Pepper Pike, Ohio

BERNARD LONERAGAN RECOGNIZED that his multifaceted legacy would need to be appropriated in new ways to meet the demands of new cultures and situations. The most important aspect of the Lonergan legacy that needs to be stressed is his interiority analysis to promote authentic identity formation among our youngest generations. The formation of an authentic identity is crucial if people are to transcend a culture of flattered selves. Through authenticity, we enable people to move beyond a *MySpace*¹ mentality to find identity, purpose, and meaning for their lives.

The social networking website *MySpace* epitomizes the *MyCulture*, which represents a radical deformation of the modern “turn to the subject,” resulting not in the normative foundation for authentic humanity that Lonergan envisioned, but in fragmented identities shaped by flattery, superficiality, and impulsivity. I am suggesting a foundation for moving beyond the *MyCulture* by grounding personal identity, purpose, and meaning in self-transcendence. In this paper, I propose first to describe the *MyCulture* and the way people formed in the *MyCulture* lack an authentic personal identity. Next, I will demonstrate how Lonergan’s work on self-appropriation and self-transcendence provides a foundation for personal identity. Finally, I will present the anthropological, moral, and religious outcomes of having an authentic identity founded on self-transcendence. I intend for this approach to personal identity to be applied in a college setting, particularly in introducing the Christian anthropological vision to people who are completely

¹*MySpace* is an interactive, social networking website, accessible on the internet at www.myspace.com.

unchurched or who have been alienated by doctrinal and scriptural approaches to Christian theology.

People who have been formed in the contemporary *MyCulture*, epitomized by the flattered self and infinite choice, lack an authentic personal identity. By *MyCulture*, I am referring to a pervasive phenomenon evident in American culture, although not exclusive to us. That phenomenon is the unrelenting appeal to personal inclination and gratification couched in a subjective, first person grammar. Sociologically, we are witnessing the complete trivialization of autonomy enticed by flattery and infinite optionality. The unrestrained pursuit of profit,² as particularly practiced through the electronic media and communication technologies, has created the “flattered self.”

I borrow the term “flattered self” from anthropologist Thomas DeZengotita and his book *Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It*.³ DeZengotita critically assesses the influence of the media on the development of self-identity and the current confusion over personal identity as symptomatic of a widespread misunderstanding of what it means to be human. His evaluation points to the confluence of two phenomena: (1) postmodern relativism that extends to self-expression and self-definition; and (2) the commercial use of media to induce purchases by appealing to personal preference and gratification. The result is that, in contemporary America, we no longer *are* selves – rather we *choose* selves and we are persuaded by the media that the choice of self is unlimited.

At every turn, the flattered self of the average American is utterly swamped by appeals to a sense of personal privilege – to physical well-being, to pleasure, to success and adulation. We are seduced into believing that we are entitled to solicitous consideration in every dimension of our personal lives and that our individual preferences and whims deserve to be honored. We are flattered by the mass media and other instruments of popular culture into supposing that anything is possible with respect to personal choice and destiny. Choosing *my* self has become a national obsession and the quintessential theme of American life. Burger King’s catchy slogan from the early 1980s, “Have it your way!” was simply the leading edge of the wave of personalizing options that are now

²I am not suggesting that capitalism in and of itself presents an ethical breakdown. Rather, I am indicating here a breakdown in intelligibility in the good of order when economic determinism is unchecked by value. Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 44-48.

³New York: Bloomsbury, 2005.

inundating us. While we may have hoped that the anticipated rise of subjectivity of the modern era would culminate in interiority and self-appropriation, we are experiencing instead a “turn to the self” as *object* and as mediated to us by commercial ventures, whose motive is profit. The consequences of living as flattered selves, rather than claiming an authentic identity, are the temptations of triviality, self-importance, hyper-individualism, an emphasis on materialism, the veneration of choice and optionality, and, ultimately, the loss of transcendence and meaning.

The title of my paper refers to *MySpace*, the social networking website shown below, which is emblematic of the *MyCulture*. The image presents a typical *MySpace* page, created by a thirty-five-year-old woman named Jennifer. Members of *MySpace* post personal messages to publicize their favorite videos, songs, ideas, and even their current emotional mood. Their visitors post comments, which are accessible to anyone who is in the admitted circle of friends. *MySpace* trades on the distanciation and anonymity made possible by internet technologies. *MySpace* flatters our sense of self-importance, enables idealized or even disingenuous personal representations, and insulates exchanges from the normal scrutiny of face-to-face interpersonal communication.

Note in this snapshot, how the invitation to relationship and communication are public, so that any opportunity for intimacy and shared reflection which normally arises in close mutual revelation is eliminated. Ironically, while a person’s most private concerns are displayed for public inspection, the outcome is the truncation of self and the negation of reflective thought in a quest for attention and variety. All personal exploration becomes publically accessible, exacerbating the culture of self-flattery and exhibitionism.

The *MyCulture* pervades our lives and has become so embedded in our worldview that we scarcely recognize its insidiousness. Here a few examples. At *myobama.com*, we can participate personally in the policy-making initiatives of the Democratic candidate for president. *MyWorld* is a computer news service that selects articles and information according to our preestablished political positions, which means that we can isolate ourselves from any opposing viewpoints. iPods personalize music to individual taste. *YouTube* enables people to broadcast their opinions to an audience of millions, on the unchallenged assumption that any personal perspective is entitled to an airing. Note eBay taglines, “You deserve it!”

and “Shop Victoriously,” which are also marks of the flattered self of the *MyCulture*.⁴

Perhaps the most startling example of the lack of an authentic personal identity is the online interactive society called *Second Life*. *Second Life* is a virtual world where people can literally choose the way they look and their talents; they can have a job, get an education, fall in love, and raise a family. The user creates a personal *avatar* for engaging in *Second Life*, by selecting skin color, hair style, and body type. The instructions reassure us: “If it’s not perfect at first, you can change your look at anytime.” Once we become aware of the *MyCulture*, the instances are myriad; whether we attend to the message or not, the culture of flattery is pervasive and unavoidable.

The exaltation of individualism and the glorification of infinite choice have their cost, specifically in the loss of meaning as well as the loss of traditional moral referents. If I am entitled to air my personal perspectives, then all perspectives are equally valid. The mediated message is that I have a right to demand attention for my experiences and opinions, without judgment. However, the implication is quite sobering: if I can be any anything I choose to be, then – because all choices are equally valuable – my choice of personal identity becomes meaningless. Put most bluntly, the message of the *MyCulture* is that it doesn’t really matter who a person is or what a person does.

Intellectually and philosophically, we can appreciate the *MyCulture* phenomenon as the absolutizing of personal autonomy; the veneration of choice and personal liberty is in hindsight the predictable outgrowth of historical consciousness and the modern turn to the self. Charles Taylor traces this

⁴The image in the upper left-hand corner links to a video clip of a young woman called Angel who speaks directly into a locked-down camera trained on her face. This young British speaker offers a desultory, uninflected monotone, beginning as follows:

“Ahh, yeah. A lot’s been happening lately. Me and Rochelle went to Bristol like last month and we got stuck in a box for, well, it was like ages, - *pause* - like so, and that was fun. - *pause* - And Rochelle said they were gonna put it on the TV - *pause* - but I don’t think it ever actually went on the TV, ‘cause no one saw it. None of my family saw it anyway. That’s all right, anyway, ‘cause, ‘cause it was still weird. We met a lot of people. And there were people looking at us, which was really interesting. I don’t know why. - *shrug* - I don’t know why they were looking at us, not I don’t know why it was interesting. But I don’t know why it was interesting.”

This monologue continues for nearly three minutes without any discernable message or purpose.

phenomenon in his careful analyses of the modern identity and the secular age.⁵ Specifically in *Sources of the Self*, he details the rise of individualism in Western thought across several hundred years, during which the theoretical foundation for human identity metamorphosed from the conviction that human beings derive their dignity from God (*imago Dei*), to now the universal right to respect and personal autonomy, a legal privilege that attaches to the person as subject. In the third millennium, we are now witnessing the culmination of the shift toward the primacy of the person in a secular age – the *MyCulture*.

From Taylor's complex and detailed studies, I want to highlight two major themes: (1) the relationship between identity and morality, especially in the way absolute self-determination is linked in contemporary American life with an autonomous morality; and (2) the veneration of ordinary life, which leads to a loss of transcendence. Traditional cultures have defined the identity of all members of society according to social strata, culture, lineage, education or religious affiliation. Identities have been understood as objective, providing fixed roles, responsibilities, and opportunities. Just as identities were immutable and life stations fixed, traditional societies clearly delineated the behaviors and positions that constituted a morally good life. The "Good" and the "True" were objective, enduring, and knowable realities. In contrast, contemporary Americans now choose their own identity and we now ask about the meaning of life, as if the determination of what life's purpose ought to be is completely optional. Therefore, neither our identities are fixed nor are our values certain.

In the opening sections of chapter 1 of *Sources of the Self*, Taylor explains further that contemporary moral conversations are ineffective to create moral certainty precisely because our contemporary intellectual climate rejects any consideration of morality as ontological, relating to the very nature of being human. However, he notes that, even though we no longer speak about the "Good" as an objective notion over and against our lives, in fact we often adhere to a strong notion of good implicitly as we evaluate whether our lives are worth living; in Taylor's opinion, an unexpressed moral framework continues to operate in each of us as the criterion for evaluating our humanity. He also notes that contemporary scientism rejects metaphysics, while pluralism in daily life makes metaphysically and epistemologically based conversations embarrassing. From this Taylor concludes that moral beliefs for the average person are largely

⁵See, for example, Charles Taylor's books: *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); and *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

uncertain and without foundation or structure, shielded behind claims of privacy and subjective rights. He closes by asserting that the search for personal identity is intrinsically related to the search for a dependable moral orientation. Identity necessarily is and must be the core of personal being from which actions flow. This is only to recognize the self-constituting nature of human existence – that what we do shapes who we are; who we are shapes what we do. A personal identity which is seemingly optional and infinitely flexible offers no point of reference, no moral compass for actions, and no purpose for life. Taylor's studies substantiate the problem with the *MyCulture*, which is that the lack of identity engenders a loss of purpose and meaning in contemporary American life.

An equally important aspect of modern culture according to Taylor's comprehensive analysis is the loss of transcendence. In *A Catholic Modernity?* Taylor describes the contemporary struggle between secular humanism, in terms of a commitment to ordinary life, and religion, in terms of a commitment to transcendent meaning and salvation beyond time.⁶ With the rise of the social gospel in the past three hundred years, Western culture has become increasingly secular, emphasizing the human being as the measure of all things. Taylor notes: “[A] powerful constitutive strand of modern Western spirituality is involved in the affirmation of life...to preserve life, to bring prosperity, to reduce suffering world-wide, which I believe is without precedent in history.”⁷ In contrast, a religious worldview holds that “the point of things is not exhausted by [ordinary] life.”⁸ The trajectory of Western thought has been to venerate ordinary life, but the outcome has been secularization and the frequent denial of the transcendent dimension of human life, with its eschatological orientation.⁹ Ordinary life presents itself to the *MyCulture* generation as flattery and infinite options for who or what to be.

Both of these very different observers, DeZengotita and Taylor, are pointing to the same phenomenon in contemporary American life in the *MyCulture*: the

⁶Charles Taylor, *A Catholic Modernity?* Marianist Award Lecture Series (Dayton: Dayton University Press, 1996). More than a decade later, Taylor revisits and expands the theme of the loss of transcendence in ordinary life in his recent book, *A Secular Age*.

⁷*Catholic Modernity*, 18.

⁸*Idem*, at 15.

⁹See Alison Mearns Benders, *A Comparative Study of Self-awareness and Self-transcendence: What Do Lonergan and Sankara Have to Say to Each Other?* Proquest Dissertations and Theses 2006. Section 0016, Part 0322 218 pages; [Ph.D. dissertation]. United States – Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 2006. Publication Number: AAT 3255941, 21-27, regarding the rise of secularism and relativism and the need for new intellectual foundations of meaning.

primacy of self-determination has become a crisis of identity about who we are, a crisis of purpose about what to do, and a crisis of ultimacy about what life means. The intellectual and sociological trends they describe demand that we develop a foundation for personal identity that is verifiable, normative, and open-ended. The foundation of identity must be verifiable as a matter of judgment based upon reality sifted through personal and collective experience. It must be normative as a matter of value, to provide clear purpose and guidance for interactions among people. It must be open enough to engage the future meaningfully as the possibility of creative love. An open-ended identity will be flexible enough to meet new demands without becoming detached from reality or lost to relativism.¹⁰ People need an authentic identity beyond *MySpace*, beyond the *MyCulture*, an identity that is verifiable, normative, and open to the future.

Lonergan's interiority analysis, which leads people through self-appropriation to self-transcendence, addresses the need for an authentic identity. Initially, it would seem that the *MyCulture* is completely incompatible with a verifiable and normative yet open-ended identity. The underlying presupposition of the *MyCulture* (that values and identity are beyond scrutiny as personal choices) undermines completely the position that identity, as an enduring reality, is claimed by discovery and affirmation, and ultimately by actualization. "Open-ended" to the *MyCulture* generation means infinite flexibility, rather than a methodological control that would actually allow creative engagement, heuristically directed toward future goods. Providing a balance between normativity and flexibility, Lonergan's explicitation of the conscious operations offers a foundation for identity based upon self-transcendence as a developmental trajectory, which will continually direct human beings beyond individualism and isolation toward engagement with reality in creative understanding, rational judgment, responsible action, and compassionate love. By claiming an authentic identity, we are led beyond the *MyCulture* toward an identity which finds its purpose and meaning in an ultimate reality.

The chart below portrays Lonergan's teachings schematically, without the embellishments and refinements contributions of subsequent Lonergan scholars. The chart should be read from the bottom level of experience upward to the

¹⁰In the same vein, Charles Taylor opines that identity must have some boundaries: "In light of our understanding of identity, the portrait of an agent free from all frameworks rather spells for us a person in the grip of an appalling identity crisis. Such a person wouldn't know where he stood on issues of fundamental importance, would have no orientation in these issues whatever, wouldn't be able to answer for himself on them (*Sources of the Self*, 31)."

highest or most comprehensive level of transcendence. An authentic identity is established when people appropriate their own successively subsuming levels of consciousness, by understanding data through insight and moving dynamically by way of questions to make judgments of fact and value, and finally by creating meaning through action in history. At the most comprehensive level, love is the dynamism that provides the final meaning to sustain our compassion in the face of inattention, obtuseness, irrationality, and irresponsibility.¹¹

OPERATIONS	LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS	SUBLATION OF LEVELS	TRANSCENDENTAL PRECEPTS
Loving	Transcendent	Being motivated by love in one's actions.	Be in love.
Deciding	Responsible	Acting upon one's judgments.	Be responsible.
Judging	Rational	Affirming the validity of one's understanding.	Be rational.
Understanding	Intelligent	Grasping the intelligibility of experience.	Be intelligent.
Experiencing	Experiential	Attending to data.	Be attentive.

At the *experiential level* of consciousness, a person attends to data gathered through the senses or retrieved by memory from previous experiences. To move from inattention and bias to conscientious focus on the information presented to our senses or from our memories is a matter of psychic conversion. The *intelligent level* of consciousness seeks to understand the information gathered by inquiring into the patterns of meaning within it; intelligent consciousness answers questions such as "what is it?" and "how does it all fit?" At the intelligent level, we use our imagination to organize information into a meaningful pattern. When the pattern is clear, we have an insight, which is that creative "a-ha!" moment when our experience make sense as a whole. The *rational level* of consciousness involves checking the validity of what we think we have understood; rational

¹¹These operations are indicated briefly as: *experiencing* data; *understanding* the intelligibility of the data as experienced; *judging* the validity of what has been understood; *deciding* or acting upon one's judgments; and finally being motivated by love in all one does.

consciousness answers the question “is this true?” with “yes,” “no,” “probably,” or “possibly.” At the rational level, reflective insight grasps the sufficiency of evidence for the correctness of the prior insight, and in doing so affirms that all the evidence is accounted for, so that the possible explanation becomes the most certain explanation.¹² Finally, we are fully human agents when we deliberate about what to do at the *responsible level*, where “consciousness becomes conscience.”¹³ At this level, people decide to do what is good; they become responsible.

At every level, people can become more genuinely human by adhering to the transcendental precepts. The endeavor to follow the precepts constitutes continuous conversion from bias to authenticity at every level. We are continually drawn beyond ourselves by our innate desire to know what is true, to choose what is good, and to love without restriction. In other words, we are constituted as human beings by our desire for and actualization of self-transcendence. Therefore, even though every operation authentically performed is an act of self-transcendence, as human beings we must ultimately claim for our identity the dynamic power of love that moves us beyond ourselves. Most importantly, whenever we act according to our desire for self-transcendence, we move beyond *MySpace* to claim our identity as fully human.

In Lonergan’s work, self-transcendence has two meanings and the nuance is crucial. People can achieve a measure of self-transcendence by adhering to the transcendental precepts: be attentive; be intelligent; be rational; and be reasonable.¹⁴ In every day life, people can experience self-transcendence as the questioning that leads them to desire truth and right action – to know what is true and do what is good. They can recognize in their own engagement with the world that the thrust of human consciousness is naturally toward higher levels of meaning and purpose and that each successive level of consciousness depends upon those prior to it. Therefore, people can cooperate with the innate structure of consciousness, precisely by choosing to be attentive, intelligent, rational, and, most significantly, responsible. To the extent that people appropriate the transcendental precepts as their method for engaging with the world, they “achieve” self-transcendence, in some measure. Said another way, self-

¹²To realize that reality is known in true judgments is a matter of intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion according to Lonergan means advancing from either an empiricist or an idealistic epistemology to critical realism.

¹³Bernard Lonergan, *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), 69.

¹⁴See the chart above, fourth column on the right.

transcendence as achievement signifies the individual effort to claim one's full human identity.

However, Lonergan also speaks of *full self-transcendence* or a *realm of self-transcendence* to identify a state of being-in-love as the ground and goal of our human consciousness.¹⁵ He asks us to recall our own experiences of being-in-love, which enabled us to overcome all obstacles for the sake of the beloved. When we allow ourselves to live in love, we are able consistently and dependably to achieve self-transcendence in our daily interactions; we can experience our innate orientation to self-transcendence as the gift of God's love in our hearts. Lonergan explains: "The realm of transcendence designates *full self-transcendence*, where the 'being in love with God' constitutes 'the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality.'"¹⁶ An experience of transcendence is an experience of God's grace that reveals the human capacity for the infinite. This means that full self-transcendence is not separate from everyday living; it is not a realm of spirit as opposed to matter; and it is not an experience reserved for a chosen few. It also means that full self-transcendence is not achieved by human effort. Rather, even in our secular age, an experience of grace or transcendence may be recognized simply as wonder. Wonder is constituted by feelings of longing and desire for mystery; as an experience which is ineffable, mysterious, terrifying, or fascinating.¹⁷ However, for the purposes of self-appropriation, we can equate the experience of wonder and the notion of full self-transcendence; these are experienced simultaneously as the presence of God as the horizon of human identity.¹⁸ Therefore, being attentive to wonder, being attentive to our pure desire to know what is good and do what is right, and being attentive to our longing for ultimacy are the initial activities that can culminate in the affirmation of our identity as human beings graced by the love of God in our hearts.

¹⁵Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1972; paperback ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, chap. 4, Religion).

¹⁶*Method in Theology*, at 54.

¹⁷Joseph Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 255-56.

¹⁸Lonergan writes:

The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon....The reach, not of his attainment, but of his intending is unrestricted. There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge that he finds his investigation has been inconclusive. The contemporary humanist will refuse to allow the question to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our native orientation to the divine (*Method in Theology*, 103).

As a practical matter, when I teach at Ursuline College, first I ask students to recognize their innate desire for self-transcendence, which impels them beyond themselves from experiencing attentively, to understanding creatively, to evaluating rationally, to acting responsibly and finally to loving compassionately. Next, I ask them to understand this desire as the presence of grace and to verify its effects in their day-to-day lives, in the way they normally engage people in the world. Finally, I invite students to claim for their own identity both the conscious operations (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and loving) and the graced desire which is a dynamic love that leads them beyond themselves. I ask them to recognize and embrace the self-transcendence that draws them toward authentic engagement in reality – physically, emotionally, intellectually, morally, and compassionately. As a practical matter, appropriating full self-transcendence means living within the tension of intentionally developing personal authenticity on the one hand and faithfully developing awareness and openness to the experience of grace on the other. When people accept the graced presence of God in their lives, then love opens up a new and transformed horizon of meaning, which becomes the motive and drive to self-transcendent action in the world.

Loneragan's work enables us to claim the conscious operations and the dynamic of grace that move us to self-transcendence as a personal identity. Self-appropriation yields a verifiable, normative and open-ended identity, providing a framework for meaning and purpose for flattered selves mired in the *MyCulture*. Such an identity is verifiable because we can experience our own levels of consciousness, our own conscious operations as we relate to the world. This identity is normative because, by authentically adhering to the transcendental precepts, we decide what to do based upon publically verifiable judgments of fact and value, not upon privatized meanings, personal whim or uncritical assertions of worth.¹⁹ And this identity is open-ended precisely in the way our subjective operations allow us to engage reality and shape the future according to the ever-changing demands of our social-historical lives. Thus, self-appropriation creates the conditions for self-transcendence which provides authentic identity, purpose, and meaning for human existence.

Turning here to the implications of Lonergan's interiority analysis, there are anthropological, moral, and religious benefits to having an authentic identity

¹⁹Regarding judgments of value and moral norms, see generally: Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); and Michael Lawler. *What Is and What Ought to Be* (New York: Continuum, 2005).

grounded in self-transcendence. Because each of these points dovetails with a Christian theological anthropology, I will also demonstrate how the study of Lonergan's interiority analysis is superior to the study of revelation or authority as an approach to explain basic Christian beliefs. Throughout this next section, it is helpful to recall the chart above presenting Lonergan's interiority analysis, especially the subjective operations and the transcendental precepts.

Anthropological implications: An authentic identity, based on self-appropriation, establishes a heuristic definition of what it means to be human. For those saturated in the *MyCulture* of the flattered self and infinite choice, personal identity claimed through self-appropriation provides a definition of humanity that is flexible enough to encompass the multiplicity of traditions, heritages, and experiences that inundate us in our global culture. A human being can be defined as a living, self-constituting process of creative understanding, rational judgment, responsible action, and compassionate love. I am suggesting that authentic human beings are living, intentionally self-constituting methods, as Lonergan defines this term: "A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."²⁰ First, human beings are self-constituting agents, meaning that they make themselves who they are in and through their engagement in reality, especially their interpersonal relations. Second, human beings repeat the operations in a self-correcting, self-constituting, expanding cycle. Third, authentic human activity, through ever fuller self-appropriation of personal subjectivity, will produce cumulative and progressive results, as human beings individually and collectively know ever more of what is possible to know and choose to enact ever more of all possible good. Finally, human engagement with the world progresses by asking questions, as human beings in and through their questions continually align themselves with ultimate reality, truth, and goodness. The explicit correlation of identity with a self-correcting process of engaging the world establishes a heuristic definition of humanity, which includes a transcendent dimension as that state of being-in-love that grounds us and draws us beyond ourselves.

Most importantly, for the *MyCulture*, an identity based upon self-transcendence retains the holistic, multidimensional realities of human existence. The heuristic definition includes more than the faculties of rationality and cognition: by beginning with experience, it incorporates our physicality – our

²⁰*Method in Theology*, 4. Please see my full discussion of this point in *A Comparative Study*, at 94-97. The explicit correlation of identity with method establishes a normative definition of humanity, including a transcendent dimension.

material and emotional needs; by recognizing judgment it affirms objective reality (not an individually “constructed” world); by leading to action, it integrates past and future in a creative vision of what ought to be; and by culminating in love, it preserves the intersubjective dimension of human existence – in relationship with others and with divine transcendence. Most importantly, in terms of a Christian anthropology, this heuristic definition of human identity correlates to the affirmation of the sacramentality of creation, human beings as embodied spirits, and the vertical finality of human existence in God. For the *MyCulture* generation, who may be completely unfamiliar with the Christian revelation and teachings, the most accessible introduction to the sacramentality of creation is likely to be a short course in self-appropriation, because attention to themselves and their own activities is exceedingly familiar to this group.²¹ When they attend to their own questioning desire to know what is true, to do what is right and to love, they can concretely experience (and then affirm) the transcendent orientation of human life, which is what Christianity has always recognized as spirituality. When they recognize that this questioning desire is always open to more – more knowledge, truer actions, and greater love, then they can begin to create a complex, rich, and personal image of the divine as the horizon of each and every human life. In short, self-appropriation of their own self-transcendence offers students in the *MyCulture* a verifiable human identity, which at the same time accounts for what it means to be human from a Christian perspective.

Moral implications: An authentic identity offers a normative orientation for human interactions and engagement with reality; it furnishes a moral compass for people formed by the *MyCulture*. First, identity grounded in self-transcendence provides objectivity for moral decision-making because adherence to the transcendental precepts enables us to discern and verify values, which are mediated through attentive, intelligent, and critical performance.²² Moreover, because we constitute ourselves by our actions, the appropriation of authentic identity will yield fully human actions, which in turn will yield an ever more authentic and fully human identity. But more than this, specifically in the culture of infinite choice, the norms for action no longer remain whim, personal

²¹For an outline of a “short course” in self-appropriation, see Alison M. Benders. “Renewing the Identity of Catholic Colleges,” *Wabash Journal for Teaching Theology and Religion*, 10, no. 4, 215-22.

²²See Bernard Lonergan. *Insight*, vol. 5 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992; originally published, London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1957, chap. 18, *The Possibility of Ethics*).

gratification, or even uncritical adherence to authority (whether secular or religious). In a world where all values seem optional, adherence to the transcendental precepts will provide methodological control for moral decisions. As difficult as it is to determine how to act responsibly and to love genuinely, the transcendental method for discerning value still provides an important measure of clarity and comfort. By the intentional, habitual effort to appropriate the transcendental precepts, people can grow in moral judgment and personal agency to act and love ever-more authentically. To the extent people are open to the action of God's love, personal striving is continually enhanced and perfected in grace, within the concrete historical situation of daily life. From an identity grounded in self-transcendence, people can discover a verifiable, normative and open-ended purpose for life, which is to promote authenticity in themselves and others.

Second, in terms of Christian soteriology, identity grounded in self-transcendence also suggests an outline for a moral theology that explains sin, decline, and redemption. The language of interiority and self-appropriation transposes traditional theological assertions into terms that may be more accessible to the *MyCulture*. For example, people who have vastly inadequate images for God, or those with strong tendencies toward atheism, will not comprehend the notion of sin as an affront to God or as an action contrary to God's will. However, they may well grasp the significance of sin as a failure of authenticity or as a rejection of the invitation to self-transcendence, especially when they have experienced their innate desire to know truly, act responsibly, and love compassionately. Similarly, the doctrine of original sin, even for the most devoted Christian, has become an obscure explanation about why no one is perfect. However, the insidious and self-perpetuating presence of sin can be apprehended in our personal experience of the way that all distortions of intelligibility, judgment, and responsibility tend to diminish or destroy the future possibilities of intelligent understanding, rational judgment, and responsible action. Likewise, sin understood as a failure of authenticity explains how personal sin breeds social sin; when individuals violate the transcendental precepts not only do they constitute themselves as irrational, obtuse, irresponsible, and indifferent, they also create a culture where selfishness, rather than self-transcendence, flourishes. The repeated failures of understanding, responsibility, and compassion can even now be recognized in the forces of cultural, social, political, and family life as prominent and visible cycles of turmoil in human history. The self-perpetuating nature of sin, at the individual or communal level,

substantiates the Christian conviction that human beings cannot save themselves and that the solution to sin and suffering in the human condition requires divine redemption. Redemption is God's grace experienced as self-transcendence; it is the "being-in-love" that reverses decline and overcomes evil, both personal and social.²³ Christianity witnesses to the unique event of the Incarnation as God's love that redeems creation.²⁴ Self-transcendence as being-in-love can then be concretized as loving compassion that redeems all human relationships, whether between spouses and partners, in families, or in nations as patriotism. Self-transcendence, appropriated through the transcendental precepts, therefore, explains it means to act as a human being from a Christian perspective, and explains the Christian notion of sin and redemption in terms accessible to the *MyCulture*.

Religious implications: An authentic identity reveals the religious dimension and orientation of human life. As discussed above, human identity, verified in and through our innate desire to know what is true, to do what is right, and to love compassionately, reveals the normative human orientation toward infinite truth, goodness, and love.²⁵ Self-transcendence reveals that human beings are manifestly suited to participate actually and intentionally in the redemption of creation through genuine responsibility and creative love. Thus, self-transcendence provides a comprehensive, compelling, and certain meaning for our lives: we must strive to be fully human and to promote the full humanity of others who share the world with us.

More than this, in a secular, material age, an authentic identity preserves both spirituality and religion as dimensions of human meaning. Religious conversion can be understood through interiority analysis as the adherence to and the intentional decision to recognize our orientation toward ultimate truth, goodness, and love. For the *MyCulture*, however, identity grounded in self-transcendence

²³Benders, *A Comparative Study*, at 74-77.

²⁴According to Lonergan: "What distinguishes the Christian, then, is not God's grace, which he shares with others, but the mediation of God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord." *Doctrinal Pluralism* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971), 156.

²⁵This orientation is evidenced by two isomorphisms. First, there is the correspondence between human subjectivity and reality itself. Human beings engage reality intelligently, rationally, responsibly, and lovingly because reality is intelligently ordered toward value. Second, there is the correspondence between human subjectivity and God, because God is the fulfillment of the human capacity for infinite intelligence and infinite love. In fact, I suggest that the essence of the revelation in Genesis – that human beings are created in the image of God (*imago Dei*) – testifies precisely to the isomorphism between human subjectivity and God (Benders, *A Comparative Study*, at 184-200).

also explains the nature of faith by demonstrating the continuity between knowing, acting, loving, and experiencing grace. It addresses the seeming divide between faith and reason, between secular and religious, and between faith and action, by highlighting in personal experience the continuity of consciousness driven by our innate desire toward self-transcendence. Individuals can verify that their personal efforts toward self-transcendence operate within the horizontal finality of responsible action in history even while they are oriented toward absolute transcendence, which is commonly referred to as God.

In summary, we can find identity, purpose, and meaning in contemporary life by appropriating our conscious operations and living authentically according to the transcendental precepts that express the innate orientation of our very selves toward the divine. The *MyCulture* flatters us with infinite yet meaningless choices about who to be and what to do. Without a verifiable identity, we lack guidance for our actions and direction for our lives. Lonergan's work offers an authentic identity grounded in self-transcendence that provides purpose and meaning. In the moment when we claim our identity as oriented toward self-transcendence, in that event there is the realization of the divine context of who we are, what we should do, and what our lives mean.

GENERAL CONGREGATION 35:
THE JESUITS AND A CORPORATE USE
OF THE FIFTH (RELIGIOUS) LEVEL
OF MEANING:
THE DISCOVERY OF LOVE

Peter Bisson, S.J.
University of Regina
Saskatchewan, Canada

THE 35TH GENERAL Congregation of the Society of Jesus (GC 35), which met from January 7th until March 7th of this year, 2008, consolidated many things achieved by earlier General Congregations, but has also set some new emphases. Most remarkably, and for the first time, a Jesuit General Congregation has written a decree that is entirely about the Society's religious experience. It is called *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires: Rediscovering Our Charism*. It is the second of six decrees promulgated by GC 35, so it can also be referred to as "Decree 2." Furthermore, the decree is not written to be read discursively; rather, it is meant to be prayed. What is the meaning of this novel content and literary form?

I believe that the existence of this decree, and its relationship to Jesuit mission, achieves three things. Firstly it highlights and uses what Lonergan occasionally called the religious or fifth level of value, the highest, distinguishing it from other levels without separating it from them. Thus Decree 2 might clarify the uses of other levels of value in Jesuit mission, especially the role of justice in the service of faith. It might also move the Society to address more explicitly than before what Lonergan called the "long cycle of decline." Secondly, after decades of promoting and using the fundamental link between faith and the justice of the Kingdom, with much emphasis on promoting that justice in the service of faith, the Society turns its attention to its own faith by getting Jesuits to focus on their religious experience. Thirdly, Decree 2 promotes interiority and self-appropriation as a way of thinking and living mission. My presentation will have

three parts: first, a summary of the decree; second, an account of the problem or preoccupation to which the decree is a response, which will include an account of the text's evolution during the Congregation; and thirdly, how Lonergan's levels of meaning help us to understand the decree's significance for the Society's participation in the mission of Christ in the world.

1. A FIRE THAT KINDLES OTHER FIRES: WHAT DOES IT SAY? HOW DOES IT SAY IT?

The decree's fundamental goal is to inspire and motivate Jesuits by getting them to attend to their experience of Christ, to recognize and understand what is Ignatian and Jesuit about it, and to use their religious experience intentionally in their decision-making. How does it do this?¹

1.a Decree 2's Content

The introductory section "Many Sparks, One Fire: Many Stories, One History," uses the metaphors of fire and story to evoke the Jesuit charism as a gift from God, as a source of meaning, and as a source of unity in diversity, all of which are especially important today when meaning and direction tend to be confused and fragmented. Christ and his mission is the source of this unity, because he is the image of God and is sent on mission by God. This experience of Christ in turn produces community and companionship, and a participation in Christ's ongoing mission, under the guidance of Christ's vicar on earth, the pope.

The second and third sections, "Seeing and Loving the World as Jesus Did," and "Our 'Way of Proceeding'," show how this kind of religious experience leads to a positive and indeed loving attitude toward the world, while at the same time being realistic about the bad and the good found there and in our own hearts. Growth into this attitude follows a pattern that appears in every Jesuit's religious experience, beginning with how the founder, Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556),

¹The decree has twenty-seven paragraphs, organized into six sections: Many Sparks, One Fire: Many Stories, One History; Seeing and Loving the World as Jesus Did; Our 'Way of Proceeding'; A Life Shaped by the Vision of La Storta (which in turn is subdivided into: "Following Christ...", "In the Church and for the World...", "As an Apostolic Religious Community..."); A New Context – To New Frontiers; Its Inflammate Omnia (Go, Set All on Fire).

was transformed by his own experiences with Christ. This pattern is a process of growth in freedom from false desires, and growth in freedom for discovering the presence and activity of God in the concreteness of the world, including in the falseness and pain that are found there. The world is good and to be loved because God is found there, present and at work, in the heart of the world. Indeed, because of this, and together with Christ carrying his Cross, one can go also into the apparently meaningless and painful parts of the world, places of anguish and death, because there too God is active and to be found, even if the divine presence and activity might not always be sensed. Thus this pattern produces polarities, tensions between love of God and love of world, between contemplation and action, between mysticism and service. Such tensions are characteristic of this kind of religious experience and spirituality, and are therefore good, but both sides must be lived together, for the polarities' creativity would be lost if the balance were tipped on one side or the other. Moreover the tensions must be lived in such a way so that others see in the living of them God at work.

The fourth section, "A Life Shaped by the Vision of La Storta," is the longest part of the decree, and it sketches the pedagogy for practicing this contemplative way of acting and seeing, and for inviting others into it. It is rooted in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, where he used his own experiences to help others discover and engage generously in the loving divine activity in the world. While many groups and persons practice Ignatian spirituality, based in the Exercises, this pedagogy is institutionalized into an ongoing community in the Society of Jesus, by patterns that distinguish Jesuit spirituality within the families of Ignatian spiritualities. The decree draws these patterns from a vision that Ignatius had in a small church in La Storta, on the outskirts of Rome, where he stopped with his companions on their way to offer their services to the pope. In this vision Ignatius saw God the Father ask Christ, who was carrying his cross, to accept Ignatius and his companions as companions of his in his mission. Christ then turned to Ignatius and said "I wish you to serve us." Ignatius also felt that the Father said to him and his friends, "I will be propitious to you in Rome."

In three subsections, this part of the decree discusses three aspects of the La Storta vision that characterize and define the Society's contemplative practice of engagement in the world. Jesuits are "Following Christ...", "In the Church and for the World...", and do so "As an Apostolic Religious Community." "Following Christ" means following his pattern of self-forgetting love as manifested in his incarnation and paschal mystery. This is done not individually or for one's own good, but "In the Church and for the world," seeking the more universal good

especially by making ourselves available for the pope's ministry, as vicar of Christ on earth, to promote the universal aspects of the Church's mission. Finally, in order to stay together while pursuing mission in these ways, Jesuits do so "As an Apostolic Community" constituted by the traditional vows of consecrated life, in such a way that has a variety of roles and ministries, and where Jesuit community is also a basic part of Jesuit mission.

The penultimate section, "A New Context – To New Frontiers" turns from the ongoing or permanent characteristics of Ignatian and Jesuit religious experience to the important contributions such experience can make in today's world. This section presents globalization as a new context for mission, which means thinking and acting in new, more global ways, overcoming traditional boundaries and discovering God's life on new frontiers, such as the importance of diversity and of dialogue with cultures and religions, and of responsibility for the protecting the integrity of creation.

The decree concludes with a call to confidence and action, called, in Latin, "Ite Inflamate Omnia" which means, "Go, set all things on fire." Legend has it that Ignatius sent his friend and companion Francis Xavier to India with these words.² The conclusion is a call to Jesuits to be on fire with this charism, and to be so in such a way that inspires others to similar passion and commitment.³

1.b Decree 2's Form

"A Fire that Kindles Other Fires" does not say anything that Jesuits have not heard before. It does not explain the Jesuit charism, analyzing how each component relates to each other component. Nor does it describe the Jesuit charism, showing how its various elements relate to the individual Jesuit. Instead the decree invokes and appeals to things that Jesuits already know. In doing so, it seeks to motivate, to inspire, to move the heart and will, to move the reader to prayer, to move the reader to Christ by stimulating the reader's desires to be and act with Christ in loving the world into fullness of life. The subtitle "Rediscovering Our Charism" names the purpose of the decree's literary form.

²There is a stature of this in the Jesuit curia in Rome, and it bears the inscription "Ite inflamate omni." Behind it sits a fire extinguisher.

³The decree's title "A Fire that Kindles Other Fires," is apparently a phrase that was used to describe the character of Alberto Hurtado, S.J., a Chilean Jesuit recently canonized, who was renowned for his work with youth.

The decree functions like the Kingdom meditation in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola. There in order to prepare to get to know Jesus and his desires for the Kingdom of God more personally, the exercitant is first invited to become aware of his or her own generosity, his or her own dreams and desires to make a difference for people, even to the point of self-sacrifice. Decree 2 functions as a similar gateway and invitation into the life and mission of Jesus, and into how this shapes the way of life of the Society of Jesus. To this end, the text constantly refers the Jesuit to his religious experience, not as just any religious experience or any Christian religious experience, but more specifically to what is Ignatian and Jesuit about it. The text does so by invoking the religious experiences of Ignatius, who founded both the forms of active spirituality called Ignatian and the Society of Jesus.

The text does not explain the theological meaning of Ignatius's foundational experiences, nor does it explain which ones founded Ignatian spirituality and which ones founded the Society of Jesus. Instead the text simply recalls these experiences for the reader so the reader can use them to identify similar characteristics in one's own experience of Christ. The text does not direct the reader to have a certain kind of experience but allows the readers to let their own religious experience be invoked and evoked, perhaps even provoked, however God sees fit.

The decree's language is warm and affective, sometimes even lyrical. It is not the language of prayer, for it does not address God, Christ, or the Spirit, but it is about prayer. I believe it is a language of what Lonergan calls interiority, for it directs readers to their inner experience, to the data of their consciousness, and to recurrent patterns there that are Ignatian and Jesuit.

Does the text actually work as it was intended? During the Congregation itself, when various drafts of this decree were being discussed, many delegates talked about how the text sent them to prayer, and how it affected them spiritually. Indeed, that the text provoked consoling spiritual experiences in delegates was crucial data for the decision to let it go forward through the processes of the Congregation., and the kinds of spiritual experiences it provoked in prayer were important data for how the text was shaped in the editing processes.⁴

⁴Like the other texts that became decrees of the General Congregation, this one was written by a small drafting commission. They used materials prepared for the topic by large numbers of interested delegates working in groups. The commission's drafts were responded to by all the

2. IF DECREE 2 WAS THE RESPONSE, THEN WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?

The General Congregation's chief preoccupation and concern was a strong sense that the Society above all needed not more or better explanation about its mission and charism, but rather inspiration and motivation; not something for the head, but something to move the heart. Why this concern with inspiration and motivation?

2.a Questions and Concerns in GC 35

The reasons typically expressed for this concern had to do with Jesuit identity. It was felt that many Jesuits around the world were confused and uncertain about the role and need for the Jesuit charism in the Church and world today, despite the fact that Jesuits tend to be known for a strong and distinctive identity, and despite the fact that many Jesuits were and continue to be quite excited by the Society's contemporary commitment to the promotion of justice in the service of faith.

The major challenge came probably from globalization. It has been pushing cultural, religious, and other identities into contact with each other that previously lived more or less by themselves. This change causes people to become aware that they have identities, that they can be affected and change, and then that they are human constructs. Identities have become more fluid than before, and now require intentionality to manage them whereas in the past they simply had to be lived. Globalization challenges all identities.

Some changes in the Church have also put Jesuit identity into question. Some of these difficulties are chronic or typical. First of all, there is the perpetual tension between the prophetic role of religious life and the conservative role of the hierarchy. Secondly, there is also the typical misunderstanding of apostolic or active religious life. When church people think "religious life" they tend to think of contemplation and the convent or monastery. When they think "apostolic or active life" they think of the laity or the secular priesthood. Thus to some, "apostolic religious life" can seem almost like a contradiction in terms. This problem goes up and down in the Church; in the moment it seems to be in a "down" phase, for some tend to see the activity or apostolicity of apostolic religious life as infidelity to religious authority. The Society of Jesus is the largest

of the apostolic religious orders in the Church, and the most well known, so it has become a lightning rod for all the criticisms and complaints that might come from such a misunderstanding of the role of religious life in the church, and especially of apostolic religious life.

Two changes in the Church since Vatican II (1962–1965) have also unsettled Jesuit identity. Before the Council, and for the previous millennium, religious life was very predominant in the Church. Since the Council, emphasis has shifted to the diocese, the diocesan bishops, and the laity. In this changed context, religious life has become marginal in the Church, and this has unsettled many religious, including Jesuits. Furthermore, over the past few decades, the Society of Jesus has come to share responsibility for many of its ministries with lay people. Some Jesuits have wondered, “If lay people can do what I do, then why am I here? What am I contributing?”

2.b Decree 2’s Journey – The Values at Stake

To understand better what was at stake for the General Congregation in this decree, it helps to know something of the text’s evolution. Its remote beginnings lie in the preparatory meetings held in 2005 and in 2007. A 2005 meeting of Jesuit provincials⁵ from around the world in Loyola, Spain, asked that the next General Congregation study the relationship of Jesuit identity to the Society’s mission in the Church and world today.⁶ Then, in 2007, the *Coetus Praevius*, the preparatory commission charged with the Congregation’s immediate preparations, also highlighted the question of identity and the need for motivation. In their November 2007⁷ analysis of the formal proposals sent to the General Congregation from the provinces, and of other preparatory studies, the *Coetus Praevius* recommended that the Congregation write two decrees on mission, one

⁵GC 34, in 1995, in its Decree 23, mandated periodic meetings of all provincials and equivalent major superiors approximately every six years after a General Congregation.

⁶GC 35, *Historical Introduction*, 2.

⁷A *Coetus Praevius*, or preparatory commission, is appointed by the Superior General from Jesuits chosen to go to the next General Congregation. Their task is to prepare the work of the Congregation especially by studying, classifying, summarizing, and evaluating the “postulates” or formal proposals sent to the General Congregation from Jesuit provinces and individuals. The *Coetus Praevius* for GC 35 wrote two reports: its main one in April 2007, then in light of responses from delegates, a revision in November 2007. While the *Coetus* had some discussion about whether to separate the matters of mission and identity or to keep them together, in its first report the *Coetus* recommended a decree on mission and another on identity. In its revised report, it recommended two decrees on mission, one that was inspirational and motivational, and another written in the more typical explanatory mode.

that was inspirational and motivational, and another in the more typical explanatory form.

Now let us move to GC 35 itself. Once the new superior-general, Fr. Adolfo Nicolàs, was elected, by the end of the second week, then the Congregation could turn to the other matters of importance, including that of setting or clarifying major orientations of the Society by means of decrees. The Congregation decided that it would deal with identity and mission as one topic. About ten small groups, based on interest, were set up to discuss and discern the matter and to write reports. Then a small writing commission of about five people was set up to turn these reports and other materials into a draft that the Congregation could respond to. These reports asked for something that would express the distinctiveness, need and urgency of the Jesuit mission and charism today in a way that was spiritual, moving, motivational, hopefully even poetic. This they did. Their first draft received a strong reaction. The text was felt to be very spiritual; it focused on our experience of Jesus, and moved readers to turn to their experience of Christ. Many delegates had strong, positive experiences of prayer with the draft. However there was also a strong feeling, even frustration, that the text's mission orientation was too weak, that it focused too much on the consolation of religious experience, with insufficient attention to pain and suffering in the world and to apostolic outreach to that pain, and that the text was about a generically Christian religious experience, with little that made it distinctively Ignatian and Jesuit. The desire for a strong Ignatian and Jesuit mission orientation that evoked contemporary needs and opportunities also came up in other contexts, especially with regard to the Congregation's work on globalization and ecology. The fear that the Ignatian and Jesuit mission orientation might not be expressed in a decree became somewhat acute in early to mid-February, and was something of a crisis. In order to respond satisfactorily to these desires, and to allow the "identity" writing group more easily to focus on the novel inspirational and spiritual nature of their work, another small writing group was set up to prepare a more typical explanatory text on Jesuit mission today, with special reference to the challenges and opportunities of globalization and ecology. Since this group was set up in mid-February, they had to work very quickly. Thus work of these two drafting commissions became the Decrees 2 and 3 of GC 35: *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires: Rediscovering Our Charism*, and *Challenges to Our Mission Today: Sent to the Frontiers*.

In the strong feelings evoked by GC 35's discussions about Jesuit identity and mission we can infer the values that were at stake, for feeling is a response to

value. We can see from this story that the Congregation's desire for something about mission and identity that was motivational and inspirational, that spoke to the heart and evoked inner experience, was very strong and continued throughout the Congregation despite some challenges. Moreover, the desire for something about mission and identity that was explanatory, that spoke to the mind and that evoked values, and that acknowledged the pain and suffering of people today, as well as their joys, was also strong and indeed would not be silenced.

3. THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DECREE 2

Now that we have explored the novelty of Decree 2's content and form, and how it responded to a concern, let us turn to what this novelty might mean for the Society's search to participate more effectively and fully in the divine activity in the world. I will interpret Decree 2 firstly in the context of GC 35's other decrees, secondly in context of the mission decrees of recent General Congregations, and finally in light of Lonergan's scale of values.

3.a *In the Context of GC 35*

With regard to GC 35 itself, two things about Decree 2 are to be noted: the desire to acknowledge and use inner experience, and the decree's place among the five other decrees. The desire for something that speaks to and from the heart, that acknowledges inner experience and subjectivity, is not only present in *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires*, although that is where it is developed most strongly. It is also present in Decrees 1 and 3, the two other decrees that can be characterized as defining Jesuit mission today. Decree 1 is GC 35's letter to Pope Benedict XVI, called "*With Renewed Vigor and Zeal*": *The Society of Jesus Responds to the Invitation of the Holy Father*. This text, and the remarkable events that shaped it, are worthy of their own story, but I will not tell it here. Suffice it to say that the Congregation felt that the Pope spoke to us from his heart, so the Congregation wanted to reply in a similar fashion. Therefore the text is full of affective language. The Pope expressed the Church's need for the Society to be on the complex frontiers of human experience, as contemplatives in action with its mission of promoting justice in the service of faith in a way that dialogues with cultures and religions, in a learned manner. The Society accepts and receives this with "vigor and zeal," as the title says, and in language intended to stimulate vigor and zeal in an ordered way.

Decree 3, *Challenges for Our Mission Today: Sent to the Frontiers*, confirms the faith-justice orientation given to Jesuit mission by recent General Congregations, with the added dimensions of dialogue with cultures and religions. It opens with the familiar abstract language of faith and justice, mission, aim of mission, and integrating principle, which has been typical of the mission texts of general congregations since Vatican II. However, in its longest section, where it discusses today's challenges, it uses new language to express the Society's mission, that is, simpler, less abstract and more experiential language of relationship and covenant with God, among human beings and with creation. With this threefold relationship comes a threefold mission of reconciliation, with God, among human beings, and with creation. These expressions are closer to the language of Scripture and of Catholic social teaching than official Jesuit mission language has recently been. It is worth noting that Decree 3 makes ecology a basic dimension of Jesuit mission, not by means of theoretical and explanatory arguments and language, but as an aspect of our relationship with God. This new expression of Jesuit mission, with a fundamental ecological dimension, was uncontested. Why was it uncontested? The urgency of the matter is one reason, but I also believe another reason is that the point was not made in formal language referring to abstract and explanatory relationships, but in relational language that evoked spiritual relationships, and hence inner experience.

Finally, in presentation order of GC 35's six decrees, *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires* comes before *Challenges for Our Mission Today*. This suggests that the latter should be read in light of the former, the explanatory in light of the experiential. This order may be reinforced by the status that Decree 3 gives its discussion within Jesuit mission. Decree 3 uses the logic of the link between the service of faith and the promotion of the justice of the Kingdom of God as the logic for its entire discussion. The 34th General Congregation called this link the "integrating principle" of Jesuit mission, that is, this link should integrate the many Jesuit ministries and activities into one coherent whole.⁸ With GC 34, Decree 3 asserts that the aim of Jesuit mission is higher than the integrating principle, and the aim of Jesuit mission is the service of faith.⁹ In other words, because it is called the aim of Jesuit mission, the service of faith is higher¹⁰ than

⁸GC 34, D. 2, n. 14.

⁹GC 35, D. 3, n. 2.

¹⁰This clarification was first suggested by Fr. Pedro Arrupe, superior-general from 1964 until 1981, in a response to questions about new ideas of having worldwide priorities ("Our Apostolate in Africa and Madagascar Today," *Studies in the International Apostolate of Jesuits*, vol. 1, n. 2,

and integrates or completes the link between faith and justice, even if aim and integrating principle cannot be separated, and the aim makes no sense without the underlying integrating principle of Jesuit mission. While neither Decree 3 nor Decree 2 says that *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires* is about the service of faith as the aim of Jesuit mission, I believe it is.

3.b In the Context of Recent General Congregations

A Fire that Kindles Other Fires is not the first time that a recent General Congregation has invoked religious experience. In 1983, GC 33's Decree 1, *Companions of Jesus Sent into Today's World*, devoted a section to "Our Experience,"¹¹ about the Society's experience of the service of faith and promotion of justice, articulated eight years before by GC 32. More substantially, in 1995 GC 34's four mission decrees each began with an account of the Society's encounter with Christ active in the world, as shaped by and occasioned by different aspects of Jesuit mission. The discussions that followed in each of these decrees was based upon the way the Society had been affected and even transformed by these religious experiences. Thus, GC 35's Decree 2 builds on and greatly amplifies the recent trend not only to invoke the Society's religious experience, but also to use it as a ground for discussion and decision. By consecrating an entire decree to the Society's religious experience, GC 35 pays even stronger attention to the subjectivity of the Society than earlier Congregations did.

In 1975, the 32nd General Congregation reexpressed Jesuit mission as "the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement."¹² This was a huge transformation, one that gave the Society great motivation – and great confusion. This is a very interesting story indeed, and has been told in many places.¹³ The new formulation understood justice as the justice of the Kingdom of God, and while it made the promotion of justice essential to and constitutive of Jesuit mission, nevertheless in its various expressions it gave priority to the service of faith. In 1995, GC 34 distinguished more clearly and explicitly between

September 1972, 66.). He said the service of faith is beyond priorities for it is the aim of Jesuit mission and is therefore not negotiable.

¹¹GC 33, D. 1, n. 31-33.

¹²GC 32, D. 4, *Our Mission Today: The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice*, n. 2.

¹³A version of this story, with a Lonerganian analysis, was told here in this Workshop in 2006 and may be found in the essay, "The Post-Conciliar Jesuit General Congregations: Social Commitment Constructing a New World of Religious Meaning," by P. Bisson, S.J., published in the Lonergan Workshop, 2006.

the aim of Jesuit mission and its integrating principle.¹⁴ The aim is the service of faith. The integrating principle is the inseparable link between faith and the justice of the Kingdom. By calling the service of faith the aim of Jesuit mission, then presumably the Congregations intended to assert its priority over the integrating principle, even if the two are linked and must inform each other.

One may understand *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires* as about the service of faith, including Jesuit faith, for it implicitly presents the origin and source of Jesuit ministries as the Ignatian and Jesuit forms of experience of Christ, and the aim of Jesuit ministries as helping others have their own encounters with Christ, in their own ways, that is, to “kindle other fires.” If Decree 2 may be understood in this way, then this is the first time since the Society began speaking in terms of faith and justice that we have so clearly distinguished the aim of our mission from its integrating principle. The text does so not by explaining the relation between the two principles, but instead by demonstrating the distinction in a practical way by devoting an entire decree to the Jesuit experience of Christ, and another to the integrating principle of Jesuit mission, the link between faith and justice. I hasten to add again that neither Decree 2 nor Decree 3 explicitly link the matter of Decree 2 to the service of faith as the aim of Jesuit mission; this is my interpretation.

Of course, the faith that is being served as the aim of Jesuit mission is informed and transformed by promoting the justice of the Kingdom of God. The binomial formulation “faith and justice” should not be read as assuming a dichotomy between faith and justice, even if in practice this is sometimes the case. Nor should equating the aim of Jesuit mission with the service of faith be read as implying the priority of a faith that is not engaged. Nevertheless the priority of the aim of mission over mission’s integrating principle has proven in practice a difficult point to grasp. Jesuits and others readily grasp that faith is informed by justice and vice-versa, but the more subtle permutations of faith and justice produced by the distinction of aim from integrating principle is more challenging, terminologically because the term faith is in both principles, and conceptually because the distinction between aim and integration is often perceived to threaten the fundamental link between faith and justice. This is where Lonergan’s scale of values helps.

¹⁴GC 34, D. 2 (*Servants of Christ’s Mission*), n. 14.

3.c GC 35 and the Scale of Values¹⁵

The scale of values, especially the relationships upward and downward between each level on the scale, helps to clarify the relationships between the terms that constitute Jesuit mission. Mission is a defining category of the Jesuit world of religious meaning, so a clarification of these constitutive inner relations will help Jesuits better control and manage their own religious meaning. If the aim of mission is above the integrating principle of mission in the scale of values, and especially if it is the next level up (see the discussion in the next paragraph), then in the upward relation of integrating principle to aim of Jesuit mission is essential to the operation of the aim. Without the lower values the higher values cannot exist. In the downward relation, the aim then completes and integrates the lower level of values. In other words, the questions and difficulties raised by the operation of the integrating principle of Jesuit mission are resolved in the higher viewpoint of the aim of Jesuit mission. Those same difficulties also help the higher level to emerge. There were certainly pressures within the Society that led to the emergence in GC 35 of a sustained focus on Jesuit religious experience. Moreover, if the aim of Jesuit mission is the higher level, then it becomes the base for the proper operation of the integrating principle.

Now I would like to conclude my interpretation by doing two things: by suggesting a correspondence between the scale of values and the principles and values that constitute and order Jesuit mission; secondly, in light of this hypothetical correspondence, I would like to suggest another difficulty that underlay the problems that led to Decree 2, but that remained unarticulated.

I suggest that the aim of Jesuit mission, the service of faith, corresponds to the fifth and top level of the scale of values, the religious level. I also suggest that the integrating principle, the inseparable link between faith and justice, corresponds to the fourth level, the level of personal or moral values, insofar as the aim of mission is one of the tools used to construct the Jesuit world of religious meaning. The second suggestion is more controversial than the first since it treats the connection between faith and justice as a moral reality as distinct from – but not separate from – a religious reality. If the fifth level is about the operation of grace, of God's love being poured out into our hearts, then *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires* is all about becoming aware of that, and then about using that awareness, in

¹⁵For Lonergan's discussion of values, see his *Method in Theology*, chap. 2; and for discussions on using the scale of values, see Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 10, 93-107. In ascending order, the values are: vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious.

gratitude, to inform all other activities, and to “kindle” similar “fires” in others. Placing the link between faith and justice on the fourth level certainly fits with how many Jesuits, and indeed many Christians, have talked about and lived this connection, that is, primarily in moral terms and in terms of responsibility. This in turn explains the predominance of theoretical language and theoretical consciousness in talk about faith and justice.

Further clarification is needed to explain the proper operation of the aim of Jesuit mission in the scale of values. When justice is understood in the more typical political senses as distributive justice and social justice, then it operates at the social level on the scale of values. Thus, when the Society and other groups seek to intervene in the operation of social structures and systems, this action should be understood at the social level of values, the second level. Action thus understood corresponds to what the Society means by the social apostolate. However, the integrating principle of Jesuit mission is not only the promotion of justice but the inseparable link between faith and justice. This link affects the meaning of both faith and justice, ensuring that the former is social – broadly understood – and the latter is religious, also understood in a broad sense. This change means that the aim of Jesuit mission, when used in an apostolic way to act in the world, is being used at the cultural level, the third level on the scale of values, to affect the meanings that inform social values and structures. Furthermore, it is being used at both the infrastructural¹⁶ cultural level of the operations of daily life, and the more reflexive superstructural level of culture reflecting on itself in a critical way. I believe is what the Society means when it refers not specifically to the social apostolate but to the social dimension of all Jesuit ministries and of the whole of Jesuit mission. However, the aim of Jesuit mission is not only used to shape Jesuit engagement in the world. It is also used to constitute Jesuit identity, to shape the world of religious meaning that motivates and guides Jesuit action and self-understanding. In this particular function of corporate self-constitution and of originating value in the context of culture, I believe the aim of Jesuit mission operates at the personal, or fourth level of value. It is at this level, and in this function of constituting Jesuit corporate self-identity, that the aim of Jesuit mission is immediately completed and shaped by the aim of Jesuit mission, that is, by the fifth level of value.

What does this ranking along the scale of values do to the promotion of justice in the service of faith? Asserting the priority of the service of faith as religious

¹⁶For the distinction between the infrastructural and superstructural aspects in the cultural level of the scale of values, see Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 97-99.

experience, as both having and facilitating an experience of grace, avoids reducing justice to problem-solving, or to instrumental practicality.¹⁷ In light of this scale, justice ministry and any other ministry becomes more clearly a seeking for God, an encounter with God, and an act of worship. Justice becomes more clearly a religious reality, the justice of the Kingdom. One promotes justice because one has met Christ, seeks Christ, and wants to help others have their own encounters with Christ. While the objective of solving problems is still present, and the possible motivation of anger or scandal at injustice might be as well, the chief objective is liturgical, an encounter with God, and the chief motivations are gratitude for having first been loved by God, and so joy not anger is the main energy for action. Such objectives and motivations are at a higher level than a moral level of right and wrong, good and bad, hence the appropriateness of a fifth level of value. By not reducing justice ministry or any other ministry to the practicalities of problem-solving, a stance in the fifth level of values can overcome the general bias of seeking only the short-term good, and help the Society and the Church more readily address the long-term cycle of decline. Such a stance also makes it easier for religion to participate in the public space, building the common good, as religion, and not simply privatized behind moral values. If the scale of values is about progressively higher levels of self-transcendence,¹⁸ then a stance in the fifth level, as Decree 2 seems to do, makes it clear that the highest term of self-transcendence in Jesuit mission values is love,¹⁹ not justice. This does not mean that justice is not of crucial importance, but rather that justice's proper place in the scale of values, beneath being loved and loving, ensures the proper promotion of justice, preventing it from becoming violence of one form or another, or implementing only short-term changes. From the other direction, the promotion of justice prevents the service of faith, from being ineffective and even naïve or irresponsible.

Finally let us turn to the problems and questions raised by the operations of the faith-justice link, which could not be resolved at that level, and which pushed toward a higher viewpoint. If Decree 2 was the answer, then what really was the problem? The tensions that led to Decree 2 were not tensions between faith and justice. Unlike in the past three General Congregations, this hardly came up as a preoccupation. Indeed, the previous General Congregation, in 1995, talked about

¹⁷See Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 106.

¹⁸Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 94.

¹⁹Cf. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 31.

faith and justice in terms of attention to religious experience. This turn to interiority may have effectively resolved the tensions between faith and justice. In any case, this was not an explicit concern in GC 35. What then led to Decree 2?

I think that operating from the link between the service of faith and the promotion of justice was not enough to feed the soul in the long run. When this link was the highest principle, it may be that the Society was conflating the fourth and fifth levels of value. In addition to the causes discussed earlier, I think this too contributed to confusion about Jesuit identity. As attention to religious experience as a way of defining mission has grown in the Society from GC 33 to GC 35, there has been a growing turn to what Lonergan calls interiority, and to use it as a foundation. I believe that one of the main tensions that may have been resolved by moving to a higher level in Decree 2 was one between theoretical consciousness and an emerging interiority. The Society had overused theory and theoretical consciousness to construct its religious meaning, the central category of mission, and this led to spiritual hunger expressed as confusion about Jesuit religious identity.

CONCLUSION

The great gift of GC 35's Decree 2, its content and its form, is that it enables Jesuits to discover that they are in love – even if this embarrasses them! I believe that a shift toward a stance in the fifth level of value, and toward interiority, is happening in the Society of Jesus and in many other groups. Such a shift might even mean a new axial change in religions. The surprising fact of GC 35's Decree 2, *A Fire that Kindles Other Fires*, is evidence of such a shift. I hope that the emergence of a fifth level of value in the scale of values that constitute the contemporary world of Jesuit religious meaning will help the Society control or manage that meaning more intentionally, and therefore help us better constitute ourselves as subjects and agents in the world.²⁰ This in turn should help us participate in the divine activity in the world, in the direction in the movement of life,²¹ in ways that are more attentive, more intelligent, more reasonable, more responsible, more loving, and finally more joyful.

²⁰Cf. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 43.

²¹Cf. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 422.

**AUTONOMOUS REASON VERSUS
TRADITION-DIRECTED INQUIRY:
MULLA SADRA, LONERAGAN,
MACINTYRE, AND TAYLOR**

David Burrell
Uganda Martyrs University
Nkozi, Uganda

THESE REFLECTIONS WERE inspired by a student in Shiraz (Iran), objecting to my assertion that “‘there was no such thing as pure reason’. Did that mean we were just ‘fated to follow the traditions in which we were imbedded’?” The context had been an extended reflection on ethics, and the role which I envisage the Persian philosophical theologian, Mulla Sadra, playing in restoring a creation-centered and eschatologically oriented ethics to contemporary Muslims. So let us recall what I take to have been the sense given to “pure (or autonomous) reason.” The student was certainly correct in taking it to mean reason free from any extraneous influence; or as popular idiom (and TV panels) presume: that “reason alone decides,” after the fashion of “making up my own mind about” the topic in question. (One can hear Wittgenstein’s query: “I can indeed make my own bed, but my mind?”)

So laying to rest the shibboleth about “making up my own mind,” we could be minded, more constructively, of Gadamer’s query: what if my reasoning always requires a starting point which reason itself cannot establish? That is the query which introduces “postmodernity,” once Descartes’s stringent requirement of “self-evidence” has been found to have no real purchase. For absent so perspicuous a starting point, any alternative would be contingent and so rationally unsubstantiated. Yet pace Descartes’s dream, what has in fact provided reason a starting point over the history of philosophical reflection? Aristotle proposed some sort of consensus. Yet that consensus would have to be critically examined, sorted, shifted; itself an open-ended process, so in fact reason has never enjoyed an indubitable starting point from which to proceed. So C. S. Peirce’s trust in a

“community of inquirers” has ever been the best we have: reasoning dependent upon trust. That is the sense in which I had insisted that there can be no such things as “pure reason,” for reasoning has always required more than reason itself. So inquiry will always require a community, yet what can transform a group into a community but trust? So in fact, the political venture “we the people,” which some have celebrated as rationalist presupposed “in God we trust.”

And the skeptical query: how can we trust in God? can only elicit: what else can we trust in? For Socrates, it was self-critical communal inquiry. For the process of reasoning, yes, but what of its grounding? But we can ask: why do we need a grounding? Is not trust in the process enough? But the “process,” in fact, involves other trustworthy human beings, and what makes people trustworthy? Again, in Socrates’s terms, how to assure authentic argument rather than eristic? That, it seems, demands an undergirding quest for truth strong enough to override demands for advantage, power, and prestige. But such a quest itself requires that we believe there is something to discover, an order providing meaning. Here is where Plotinus’s account of origins enters, or the Abrahamic alternative of a wise free creator, for without that source the ordered universe which Aristotle presupposed to inquiry inevitably fragments into centers of power vying with each other, the Nietzschean alternative.

For Lonergan, it is our inbuilt quest for meaning which leads us to affirm a course of meaning, but how might we proceed from that affirmation to tap the source itself? Mulla Sadra responds in a manner reminiscent of Lonergan: successive efforts to understand this order lead us progressively to trust in it. Mulla Sadra identifies these progressive “acts of understanding” with the role designated for human beings in the universe: to return everything to the One from whom we have received everything, precisely by exercising our God-given intellectual powers to understand the world around us, thereby confirming its inherent order. So each attempt we make to understand the “truth of things,” rather than impose our perspectives (and interests) upon them, is an exercise of our role as vice-gerents of creation. That is our way of returning it to the One from whom it originates, thereby becoming attuned ourselves with that emanated order, for understanding of this sort is always given, rather than self-generated – as in “making up one’s own mind.” In this way, the naked affirmation of an ordering creator takes flesh in our unrestricted desire to understand, which in its turn confirms that original affirmation by liberating us from the dominance of our own interests, only to return what we have received to the One from whom we have received it.

So the upshot of this cosmic intellectual scheme can help us realize how chimerical “pure reason” can be, sending us rather in search of ways to purify the exercise of our reason. Indeed, “pure reason” turns out to be as chimerical as one of its infamous constructs: “economic rationality.” For employing that construct in the world about us requires so many conditions that its very “purity” can never be realized! And all this should explain to foot-draggers why “modernism” had to morph into “postmodernism.” Yet a “postmodernism” akin to that of Newman, Lonergan, MacIntyre, and Taylor, animated by a trans-empirical affirmation of a transcendent source to which authentic inquirers are impelled by the demands of inquiry itself. In this way, an inbuilt quest for understanding, confirmed by progressive acts of understanding, becomes our way beyond selfishness, helping to liberate us from interests to becoming attuned to what we gradually and more confidently take to be some premonition of the very order of the universe. I have always suspected that the personal dynamic animating all this, for Lonergan, was the “spiritual exercises” of Ignatius. For others of us, like Pierre Hadot, it may be some other “spiritual exercise;” perhaps a transforming friendship or love drawing us out of ourselves. As an American imbued with optimism, my school has been participating in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which honed that groundless optimism into an abiding hope, from the witness of Palestinians enduring suffering with dignity, and Israelis bought to a trenchantly critical assessment of Zionism, as the dream turned into a nightmare. But it is always people who turn our minds and hearts around. And for anyone or any culture intent on dominating other people, it will be shame at that abuse of power, reinforced by denial of the abuse itself, as in the rhetoric of the previous regime in the United States. For when our endemic penchant for denial so obscures our innate desire to know what is the case, our pervasive attitude must be defensive, yet further alienating us from that inborn orientation to what is true and good.

All this can be corroborated in Charles Taylor’s recent *A Secular Age*,¹ and find reinforcement closer to home in Brian J. Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence*². By way of illustration, let us explore how this affects our understanding of human freedom, by sketching a book to be published by the University of Scranton Press: *Learning to Trust in Freedom: Signs from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Traditions*. If we begin with freedom as response to “the

¹Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

²Brian Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

good” rather than assertive initiative, we find it to be rooted in trust. For without a native trust, we could never initiate anything. Yet trust in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions is vested in the point where these traditions fruitfully intersect: the assertion that the universe is freely created by the One. But as Wittgenstein would ask: how can this faith-assertion gain any traction? What is it about the universe that could possibly testify to its being created? Recall that Augustine had to negotiate a harrowing inner journey before being able to hear things in the tenth book of his *Testimony [Confessions]*: “we did not create ourselves.” Yet the shape of that journey already offers us a clue: a journey through desires, it was prompted throughout by desire. So desire will serve as an opener, as the dialectic between desires and desire will begin to provide the traction we need at least to wonder, for ourselves, whence things come and wither they are going. Moreover, desire will lead us into an exploration of agency, which offers a short answer to the query: what is it about the universe that could possibly testify to its being created? Yet like many such answers, it is fraught with questions, since even the most univocally minded will recognize that there is no more analogous term than “act” (or “agency”), so different persons are bound to interpret the short answer in diverse ways. So I have chosen to follow the sinuous pathways of desire to offer a phenomenology of agency which seems at once more faithful to our experience and may even allow a glimpse of the expressly ineffable relation between the universe and its creator; that is, offer some way for us to be able to perceive things as created.

To offer what Islamic thought is wont to provide – a silsala, or roster of those to whom one is intellectually indebted – let me mention Bernard Lonergan, my guide into philosophical theology in Rome, and René Girard, whose work I first encountered in Jerusalem some twenty-five years ago, under the mock-modest title: *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* [Things Hidden from the Foundation of the World]! I recall these mentors simply to note how each proposes a fresh (and sometimes revolutionary) reading of the intellectual tradition in which he worked – for Lonergan, Aquinas; for Girard, Freud. For I intend to do the same, in an effort to revise conventional notions of “agency” by way of a classical typology of desire. Here the archetypal figure will be Plato, especially in his “erotic dialogues,” the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*.³ Yet throughout, we find the inherent correlation between good and desire structuring

³Avital Wohlman, *Eros and Logos. The Conflict between Isocrates and Plato on the Subject of Athenian Culture as seen through the Symposium* (Jerusalem: Kesset Publication, 1990); René Girard, *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (Paris: Grasset, 1981).

his work, as testified in Aristotle's axiom at the outset of his *Nicomachean Ethics*: "the good is what all things desire;" together with the lapidary opening to his *Metaphysics*: "all human beings desire to know." So the lineage between agency and desire reflects Plato, for whom "the Good" represents the source of all. Did he fasten on this language because it is inherently indeterminate, yet can also trigger a connection with action, as we know it, through desire?

Let us explore the fruitfulness of this classical matrix by contrasting it with current conventional notions of action, which, if I am not mistaken, all presume acting to be initiating. That is, the grammar of "acting" is consonant with "originating." Yet classically, following Plato, acting originates in receiving; action is rooted in passion.⁴ As another of Aristotle's lapidary summaries of Plato puts it: "whatever is moved is moved by another," that is, self-motion is oxymoronic; we cannot move ourselves unless something else moves us to it. (Indeed, this statement may even have been intended as a gentle correction of his mentor, for Plato had asserted that "the soul moves itself," doubtless to accentuate its unique status in the universe.) Yet nothing could be more contrary to current conventions than to insist that self-motion is oxymoronic. Is not much of current "action-theory" designed precisely to articulate "self-motion" over against "physicalist" accounts, as libertarian accounts of human freedom strive to distinguish free action from the specter of "causal determination" by insisting that it is self-originating? To the extent that this is the case, I shall be offering an expressly contrary account from both Aristotle and Plato, dubbing it "classical," with overtly anti-Hegelian overtones designed to counter a standard typology identifying classical thought as "pre-modern," implying, of course, pre-critical, and so easily assimilated to Kant's pejorative caricature of medieval philosophical theology as "dogmatic." Yet I would rather contend that each intellectual epoch has engaged in critical thinking, albeit locating critical criteria differently.

On that provocative note, let us consider desire more closely, by calling to mind desires, much as Socrates will attempt to explicate "the good" by canvassing what we consider to be goods, only to query whether they are really good – a familiar ploy. We shall hear echoes of neo-Platonic voices, notably Plotinus, and indeed an entire panoply of such voices in Augustine. Yet these echoes will serve us well. One hardly needs be a philosopher to realize, of course, that desires are multiple and often contrary to one another. So the classical response, highlighted

⁴Frederick E. Crowe, "Complacency and Concern in the thought of St. Thomas," in *Three Thomist Studies*, ed. Fred Lawrence [Lonergan Workshop supplementary volume 16]. (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Institute, 2000).

by neo-Platonists, was to find a set of “spiritual exercises” to allow the homing instinct of desire itself for the good to overcome its distracting multiplicity so that an overriding (or underlying) desire for the good can prevail over multiple desires for contrary goods (Hadot).⁵ Notice that these philosophers never put this in terms of “control,” though we will spontaneously label the exercises recommended as “ascetical practices.” They are, of course, yet while “ascetical” invariably connotes “controlling” for us, as in “self-control,” “spiritual exercises” for the ancients were more like the strategies of astute parents (or *au-père’s*), who have learned to wean children from risky attractions by offering something yet more attractive to them. So “attraction,” rather than “control,” is the watchword. And herein lies a lesson: when it comes to sorting among desires, is it not rather a matter of discerning than of deciding? Yet here again, we must consider how our conventional picture of deciding has been skewed as well, by a complex of presumptions which lead us to speak spontaneously of “control” or of “will-power,” and, of course, consider these to be actions we must initiate for them to be our actions.

Yet if our strategy is correct, we would not do anything unless we wanted to; that is unless we could construe it to be a good, so human activity is found primordially in responding more than in initiating. A few ordinary reflections should convince us that Plato and Aristotle are correct, even though a bevy of modern presumptions may keep us from recognizing these simple truths. We regularly use alarm clocks to awaken us in the morning, but unless we are able to conjure an attractive task awaiting us (or remuneration attractive enough to wed us to a tedious task), the snooze-button is ready to hand. For though designed to do so, the sound of the alarm cannot “push us” out of bed; we need to be attracted to an alternative to sleep, even at so importune a moment. Similarly, once we find Jesus’ recommendation to “become as little children” insulting to our acquired adulthood, and so renounce using the strategies of parents’ and *au-père’s* on ourselves, we are led to have recourse to our own “will power.” Yet ironically, to the extent that we are successful in systematically exercising “will power,” we become even more prone to succumbing to the very desires we sought to control (by repressing them); or short of that, we become decidedly unattractive “uptight” individuals, where the watchword is indeed “individual.” So the persistent failure of “will power” to achieve “control” should already have alerted us to the

⁵Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, translated and presented by Arnold Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), and *What Is Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

prevailing misconception of will at work. That is, we tend to think of will as a motive power in the sense of “efficient cause,” something which can push us to act. But what if willing were itself directed by a “final cause,” the good, so that we could (with Eleonore Stump) speak of will as “a hunger for the good?”⁶ . If that were the case, whatever “power” the will might be able to exercise would come, not from itself but from the good it was pursuing. In intentional beings, final cause often trumps efficient causes; actions to which we are drawn have a better chance of being our own than those to which we are pushed, even when we are pushing ourselves!

So we may now be ready to consider cognate misconceptions of the intentional activity we associate most intimately with free action, deciding. Here the therapy required to discard our conventional notions may be even more illuminating, yet for that very reason we could find ourselves more steadfastly resisting it. Having already contrasted discerning with deciding, I shall now propose that an act of discerning rather than an assertive choosing lies at the very heart of any decision worthy of the name. It is in fact common enough to distinguish decisions from choices, reserving “decision” for actions more portentous than selecting among breakfast cereals on a market shelf. Yet for all that, a pervasive supermarket culture may rather tempt us to assimilate deciding to choosing, as though one actually picked one’s spouse from a field of contenders. The differences which separate what I shall call “mere choosing” (as though it were a matter of simple willing, whatever that might be), from deciding are multiple and subtle, yet the strategies I am proposing (beginning with desire) may help develop strategies to discriminate among them. Aristotle insists – again, contrary to current presumptions, and certainly counter to Jean-Paul Sartre – that we exercise choice with respect to means only; and not with respect to ends. But if we cannot be said to “choose our ends,” how do we – we want to ask – “pick them?” The answer is that we don’t; they rather impose themselves on us, or even better, insinuate themselves into us. For what characterizes ends is precisely that they are normative, so that coming to recognize that we have been pursuing the “wrong ends” will inevitably trigger a kind of conversion, for in pursuing them we have allowed them to direct (or “norm”) our actions. We can always resist recognizing how wayward we have been, of course, yet we call that “denial.” Nor

⁶Eleonore Stump, “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” in John Martin Fischer, ed., *Perspectives on Moral Responsibility* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), amplified in her recent *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2002), chap. 9: “Freedom: Action, Intellect and Will.”

are these assertions gratuitous; they articulate what Wittgenstein would call “grammatical features” of intentional human discourse. In other words, they are stern reminders how normative our discourse already is; reminders which Lewis Carroll recalled with verve and humor in his *Through the Looking Glass*.

So “discerning” seems an appropriate term to use for the way we have discriminated among the various ends which took over our lives at different times, and while we may be accustomed (for the reasons given) to think ourselves simply to be “choosing” one set of ends over another when we set out to “change our ways,” what is at stake is more like a conversion. Moreover, using the term “conversion,” along with “discern,” to characterize the way we relate to ends, not only confirms Aristotle but also reminds us how Jean-Paul Sartre, having insisted that we can (and indeed, must) “choose our ends,” was quite unable to confront the piercing query: “but how can they be normative if we simply choose them?” For whether they be right- or wrong-headed, ends are normative by their nature, to make “a grammatical point.” Yet having said all this, the conventional identification of freedom with choice is so pervasive that we may still wonder how we can say we are free unless we can do as Sartre recommended? Yet we have seen that he was doing nothing less than proposing a normative definition of freedom itself, though in doing so violated key grammatical features of freedom as we know it. So however confused we may be about human freedom, counter-witnesses like Sartre can remind us that we already know something about it, touching on its very grammar. So then, to return to our current query: if deciding is more than simply choosing, what makes it to be more? Can we describe that feature more clearly?

I believe we have assembled the materials to do so. For just as language usage can help us discriminate among diverse feelings, attitudes, or orientations, so our attempts to describe such things will come up against inbuilt grammatical structures, so the practice acquired by discriminating among ends can bring us to recognize that one course of action is preferable to another by a certain inevitability. Consider this linguistic clue regarding the discernment at play in deciding: no language I know, other than American English, speaks of “making a decision.” British English follows the pattern of romance languages in “taking a decision,” while Germans may even use the expression “meeting a decision.” Now “taking a decision” is closer to “receiving” it, and so leads us into the logical neighborhood of “discerning,” rather than “merely choosing.” Indeed, this must be what Aristotle was gesturing towards in insisting that we choose means, but not ends. And if our phenomenology has been persuasive enough to begin to

deconstruct standing presumptions about free action, we will not only have vindicated the use of classical strategies to expose weaknesses endemic to current discourse about these matters, but have also prepared ourselves to examine the assertions of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian traditions to see how faith in a free creator might help us reach a more positive characterization of freedom, one rooted in trust rather than self-assertion. And as we do so, we may even discover ourselves how such a conception of freedom is more congruent with our experience than prevailing “libertarian” accounts.

WHAT IS *OUR* SCALE OF VALUE PREFERENCE?

Patrick H. Byrne
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

WHAT IS *THE* scale of value preference? In this question I emphasize the word “the” because I regard this as the most difficult dimension of this question. Clearly there is overwhelming evidence of many different scales of value hierarchy held by many different people and different cultures. These facts are frequently taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion that there is not and cannot be one, single – “the” – scale of values that is normative for all. But such a conclusion does not follow by logical necessity from this evidence. Nor, in the end, is the conclusion really consistent with human experience in matters of value. That is to say, most people do not *really* act as though their own scales of value are merely arbitrary. Their abiding commitments to their own scales of value manifests a deep human aspiration for normativity in value priority.

Certainly Bernard Lonergan concluded that there is a normative scale of value preference after a very long, and I suspect, a very difficult period of reflecting on the matter. For Lonergan *the* scale of value preference is “vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in ascending order.”¹

Lonergan read works by or about Dietrich von Hildebrand and Max Scheler on this topic, and these works profoundly influenced his thinking about the scale of value preference. It is noteworthy that the formulations of scales of value preference espoused by these two earlier thinkers differed from each other. Just as significantly, in the end, Lonergan, did not agree completely with either of them and so posited yet a third version of the scale. It would not be difficult to find still other philosopher’s formulations of scales of value preference (Nietzsche’s for example, although he is sly). Still more numerous are the many other different scales that remain tacit in the lives and decisions of billions of ordinary people.

¹Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 31.

Even speaking of *the* single scale of value preferences (as Lonergan, von Hildebrand and Scheler all do) contains an implicit reference to a number of differing value preferences, from which *the* scale is singled out. So the question, “What is *the* scale of value preference?” is really a compression of four questions: What is *a* scale of value preference? Is there one, single, “*the*” normative scale? If so, *which* one is the normative scale? And, out of all the other possible candidates, *why* is this one the special one? I am inclined to think that Lonergan has the right answer to the second and third of these questions – namely, both that there is a single, normative scale of value preferences, and that his formulation of that scale is the correct one, at least in its basics. But he did not offer us much help in answering *why* this is the correct normative scale. Nor, for that matter, does he offer much guidance in for answering the first question – what after all is *a* scale of value preference? What sorts of roles do scales of value preference play in *our* conscious activities?

In order to answer the important question of why Lonergan has the correct formulation of the normative scale of value preference, I think we need to begin with the prior question of what is *a* scale of value preference. That is to say, What are *our* scales of value preference? What are we doing when we are becoming aware of value priorities? In this paper I hope to open up some of the complex dimensions of these questions. Among other things, I hope to show how a single normative scale of value preferences underlies and underpins the many individual, diverging variations and distortions of value preferences. Such is the approach I will take in this paper.²

A. *What Is Deliberating?*

Regarding scales of value preference, Lonergan writes:

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in ascending order.³

Note that Lonergan speaks first of “some” scale of value preference, implying that there are several. He even explicitly acknowledges that people’s individual scales of preference can change over time.⁴

²I attempt to answer, at least partially, the fourth question of *why* Lonergan’s scale is correct in a forthcoming, companion article, “Which Scale of Value Preference? Lonergan, Scheler, von Hildebrand and Doran.”

³*Method in Theology*, 31.

Lonergan's remarks about value preference appear in the broad context of his discussions of the human good, deliberating, the notion of value, feelings that intend values, judgments of fact and value, acts of deciding (or choosing), and acting. Therefore, in order to answer the question "What is a scale of value preference?", we must refer to this broader context.

The transcendental notion of value is the most basic dimension of the context in which Lonergan discusses scales of value preference. Regarding that notion of value, Lonergan says

Value is a transcendental notion. It is what is intended in questions for deliberation, just as the intelligible is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and just as truth and being are what are intended in questions for reflection.⁵

As he does with being, Lonergan's definition of value is heuristic, indirect, second-order. Value is defined as that which will be realized through answers to an unrestricted multiplicity of questions for deliberation. Questions for deliberation are questions that reach their final resolution only when we make responsible choices. Along similar lines Lonergan elsewhere says that the human good is "realized through human apprehension and choice."⁶ Scales of value preference make their presence felt within contexts of deliberating. They play an important role in the conscious activities that ask and answer questions for deliberation. In order to understand what a scale of value preference is, therefore, we will need to attend carefully to what we are doing when we are deliberating.

We also need to attend to the domain of intentional feelings that apprehend values, since Lonergan also situates scales of value preference within that domain.⁷ Concerning the role that such feelings play in the processes of deliberating, Lonergan is maddeningly terse. He says, cryptically,

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings.⁸

But Lonergan never clarified just what he meant by this. Elsewhere I have proposed a way of situating feelings within the structure of deliberating that both

⁴*Method in Theology*, 32.

⁵*Method in Theology*, 34.

⁶Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 32.

⁷*Method in Theology*, 32.

⁸*Method in Theology*, 37.

fits Lonergan's scattered writings and that also seems to me to correspond to the data of consciousness. Briefly, I suggest that deliberating is a matter of asking and answering ever further pertinent questions about possible courses of action, heading toward a grasp of a course of action as a virtually unconditioned value. These further questions include questions for intelligence that arise during our deliberating, as we realize that we need to better understand certain things before we can move ahead in our deliberating. The further pertinent questions will also include questions for reflection concerning matters of fact. For, as we deliberate, the seriousness of being certain about the facts looms ever more important. And of course there are also the further questions regarding value as such as we head toward responsible value judgments. Moreover, throughout our deliberating, our attention to data is heightened as we pursue answers to these various further pertinent questions.

My proposal regarding the place of intentional feelings in all this, then, is as follows: In deliberating, it is intentional feelings that determine what further questions will be considered as pertinent. This is the crucial role played by intentional feelings. Our intentional feelings settle in advance what sort of value we are deliberating toward. They do this though their "felt apprehension" of the value. We *feel* values before we *know* values in value judgments. Still, our feelings of values apprehend what questions are and are not pertinent to ultimately making judgments and decisions regarding the value that first comes to consciousness only as felt.

Third, while there are several forms and stages of value consciousness prior to judgments of value, values are only *known* in the proper sense in judgments of value. Genuine judgments of value, in turn, rest upon prior acts of value reflective understanding. Just as reasonable judgments of fact rest upon a grasp of the virtually unconditioned in an act of reflective understanding on the third level of consciousness, so also judgments of value rest upon a grasp of the virtually unconditioned in a different kind of act of reflective understanding on the fourth level of consciousness. These acts of value reflective understanding grasp the virtually unconditioned as the proper basis for those value judgments.⁹ Prior to these value judgments, the notion of value and its questions for evaluating and deliberating *intend* value. That is to say, questions for evaluation and deliberation consciously anticipate and seek to know and realize value – but do not yet know

⁹Brian Cronin has also arrived at this position, although he uses the term "deliberative insight" following the suggestion of Michael Vertin. See Brian Cronin, *Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective* (Nairobi: Consolata Institute of Philosophy, 2006), 187-90.

value. Likewise, Lonergan says that feelings *apprehend* values.¹⁰ He employs the neutral, undefined term “apprehend” in order to distinguish the mode of value consciousness proper to intentional feelings from both value questions that *intend* values and value judgments that *know* values. Feelings apprehend values, but they do not yet know values. It is only in value judgments that judgments are fully *known* in the proper sense. And it is only in choices and actions based upon such value judgments that values in the proper sense are realized and made actual.

Still, there could be no knowledge of values if it were not for the prior notion of value manifested in questions for evaluation and deliberation. Nor could there be proper knowledge or realization of value without prior intentional feelings that apprehend values. Max Scheler goes so far as to insist that “Values are given first of all in *feeling*.”¹¹ Even more emphatically he asserts that:

The actual seat of the entire value *a priori*...is the *value cognition* or *value-intuition* that comes to the fore in feeling...These [feeling] functions and acts supply the only possible *access* to the world of values.¹²

I am inclined to agree with Scheler on these points. Feelings always play a constitutive role in our knowledge of values, whether we acknowledge this or not. Reason alone cannot give us knowledge of values, moral and ethical values included.

In anticipation of predictable objections to my last statement, let me quickly add two points. First, intentional feelings that apprehend values include feelings of moral obligation and responsibility. There is a powerful tendency to associate “feelings” solely with lower feelings of pleasures or pains, comforts or discomforts and satisfactions or dissatisfactions of various kinds (what Kant termed “inclinations” [*Niegungen*]). Feelings have therefore long been thought of as standing in opposition to the ethical and moral dictates of reason. But even Kant, with whom Scheler wrestles so vigorously, acknowledged that respect [*Achtung*], so fundamental to his project of founding morality, is a feeling.¹³ Hence I join Scheler is claiming that the horizon of intentional feelings that apprehend values is very broad, and extends beyond the narrow confines of

¹⁰*Method in Theology*, 37-38.

¹¹Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Max S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 35.

¹²*Formalism/Values*.

¹³Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), 14, n. 14.

pleasures and pains to include moral feelings themselves. All such feelings are elements in the horizon of intentional feelings that are constitutive of the knowledge of values.

Second, in no way am I claiming that reason plays no role whatsoever in knowledge of values, ethics or morality. Nor am I contending that morality rests upon feelings alone. Rather, I am insisting along with Scheler that some dimension of feeling is in fact intrinsic to all moral knowledge and all knowledge of values. It has been a long and difficult challenge to work out the nuances of a proper relationship between reasoning and feeling in this realm of the knowledge of values.

Scheler set himself the task of working out a proper cognitional theory to go along with his theory of values. This was to be one of his four great life projects,¹⁴ but did not live long enough to complete that project. In my judgment, Lonergan accomplished in his own lifetime what Scheler was aiming at. "Reason" in Lonergan's sense is "the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity" reaching judgments that are grounded in reflective grasps of the virtually unconditioned.¹⁵ We reach the virtually unconditioned by drawing upon the resources of experiencing, inquiring, and understanding which will fulfill the conditions linked to a conditioned, prospective judgment. In matters of virtually unconditioned value, we reach virtually unconditioned knowledge of value by asking and answering all the further pertinent questions as dictated by the apprehension of value given in our feelings. Our felt apprehensions "model" the value that we are attempting to know fully. The values as felt guide our evaluating and deliberating, and determine which values we come to know when we grasp the virtually unconditioned.

In light of all this, I believe that it would be more helpful to speak of feelings as *surrounding* this structure of deliberating, rather than to speak of those feelings as standing *intermediate* between judgments of fact and value. Again, most significantly, it is our felt apprehensions of value that fix the meaning of what will count as further pertinent questions in concrete situations – whether these be further questions for intelligence, reasonableness, or of value. Lonergan himself says, for example, "there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape

¹⁴See "Translator's Introduction," in Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David R. Lachterman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), xv.

¹⁵*Method in Theology*, 115.

one's horizon, direct one's life."¹⁶ Feelings, therefore, channel and direct attention to both data and to further questions and thereby determine what is and is not pertinent to the value that the feeling brings to consciousness.

In order to make all this more concrete, consider the example of someone deliberating about how to properly respond to an act of kindness by another. The value of that act of kindness comes to consciousness in an intentional feeling. Absent any such feeling, the recipient would have no notion whatsoever of the value of that kindness. But in the penumbra of that felt apprehension of the kindness, the recipient's conscious activities begin to flow. Additional feelings of gratitude and of the wish to "do something nice" are added to the original feeling of the value of the kindness. These feelings form a complex of felt valuation that begins to structure the processes of deliberation. Under guidance of these feelings, practical inquiry will seek insights about possible courses of action. These insights will be supplemented as the feelings direct attention to memories and elicit new imaginative scenarios about possible courses of action. Still further questions and insights – about what kind of person the giver is, what gift would fit her personality, where to obtain it, imagining the look on her face when she receives it – all follow in rapid succession. Questions for reflection and reflective insights reign in flights of fancy, as the feelings direct the deliberator toward realistic ways of showing the value of gratitude. The truly pertinent questions will be those felt as relevant to the goal of effectively realizing the value of gratitude. The eventual course of action chosen out of such deliberation will have value, and it will be the value of gratitude that originated from the initial felt valuation, and which in turn initiated and guided the flow of these acts of deliberating.

However, this example is abstract. It is abstract because it treats the felt value of gratitude as though it were felt in relative isolation. This is never the case in concrete living or deliberating. Intentional feelings, including the feeling of gratitude, are always felt in association with other feelings. Obviously in this case, the feeling of gratitude is already accompanied by the feeling of the value of the prior act of kindness itself. But in concrete living, there is of course much more. Many other feelings will further modulate and tint the ways that we concretely feel the value of gratitude. For example, the act of kindness may have been startlingly unexpected – bestowed by someone with whom there has been a long history of hostility. The feelings of negative values – feelings of wrongs suffered in the past and earlier feelings of anger and hostility – will affect how the

¹⁶*Method in Theology*, 32.

gratitude is felt as well as and how the deliberating proceeds. In so doing, these additional feelings qualify the importance of the value of the kindness as felt. They might make the recipient feel gratitude with a heightened intensity, or with begrudging *ressentiment*, or with tentative hesitancy, depending upon the prior history of felt values. Hence, our feelings form complex horizons, in which many different feelings mix and blend with each other and guide our evaluating and deliberating

B. Scales and Comparative Judgments of Value

The role played by feelings that apprehend values come to light as we attend to the conscious, concrete processes involved in evaluating and deliberating. In order to appropriate the notion of a scale of value preference, it is helpful to become still more concrete. Concretely, just about all of our deliberations are about choices between goods. Hegel allegedly said, “the tragedy of existence is not the conflict between right and wrong, but between right and right.” Even more ironically, President John F. Kennedy has been quoted as saying that the most important choices are between bad and worse. When we speak so frequently of moral dilemmas, we are speaking about choices among values.

Therefore we turn to the more concrete and more complicated processes of deliberating about comparative values. As Lonergan observes,

Judgments of value are simple or comparative. They affirm or deny that some *x* is truly or only apparently good. Or they compare distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better or more important, or more urgent than the other.¹⁷

This means that we must broaden our focus, and no longer think of deliberating as though it were concerned exclusively with choosing values singly – choosing *this* as a true *versus* an apparent value. Most often we deliberate in order to judge and choose, not about simple, but about comparative values. Most frequently we deliberate about the better or more important or more urgent value over the lesser. When we do so, our own scale of value preference is operating, even if we are not attending to its operation. Discerning our own scale of value preference, therefore, requires that we learn to attend carefully to these very common, concrete situations of deliberating about which values are to be preferred above others in concrete situations.

¹⁷*Method in Theology*, 36.

So I invite you the reader to reflect upon some of your own concrete deliberative processes, where issues of choosing among values were in play. Doing so will lead to helpful clarification of this notion of a feeling-scale of value preferences. I also suggest that you will be better served if you *do not initially* turn your attention to earth-shattering, life-changing choices (e.g., conversions) that have affected the entire course of your life. Such decisions of course do indeed follow upon deliberations about comparative values, but they are very complicated instances, and therefore not well suited to initial reflections. These monumental decisions not only depend upon but also radically transform our scales of value preference. Fully appropriating the notion of a scale of value preference will eventually require turning attention to the phenomena of conversion, but I suggest this is not the best place to start.

So instead I suggest it would be best to begin by reflecting upon some more mundane, everyday moments of deliberating. In reflecting, endeavor to slow down in your memory these processes of deliberating, which often occur in less than a few seconds of time.

I offer in assistance of your own reflective self-appropriation illustrations of some instances of such deliberating from my own recent past:

- Whether to order entrée *A* or *B* from a restaurant menu.
- Whether to vacuum the living room or to read a philosophy book.
- Whether to set a regular exercise time daily at 8:00 am, or to allow other work and community related activities to impinge upon that time.
- Whether to attend a lecture co-sponsored by my department in my official role as chairperson of the Philosophy Department or to attend my son's high school soccer game.
- Whether to keep my previous commitment to serve as an interviewer of semi-finalists for a fellowship, or to attend my wife's uncle's funeral service.
- Whether to attend my own uncle's funeral service, or to give a presentation at a national conference.
- Whether to babysit for my grandson, or to attend Parish Council meeting of which I am a member.

I also offer the following reflections upon these deliberations of mine.

(1) The first thing to notice is that space and especially time are almost always key commodities in deliberating. In all of the cases mentioned above, I

could have affirmed in the abstract my commitment to both values at stake. Certainly we often juggle our schedules, parceling out our time so as to endorse one value now and another later. But frequently the concrete circumstances (of space and time) dictate that only one of the comparative values can actually be chosen. Concretely, it was only possible for me to use my time in realizing just one out of each of these pairs values that I listed. In order to concretely choose either value in these pairs, I had to be spatially present in my embodied, incarnate being at one place or the other, but not both at the same time. By placing myself at one location or the other, I was expressing and signaling my commitment to – my choice of – that value. In part this is what Lonergan was getting at when he commented that comparative judgments of value involve affirming or denying that one value is more urgent than another.

Lonergan speaks of the “data” of experience. Data comes from the Latin word for “given.” Data are what we are given. As Lonergan makes clear, prime potency is the most basic of all givens. While time and space may not be exactly equivalent to prime potency, they are pretty close.¹⁸ Among the most elemental and basic and precious of all the gifts (potencies) that we are given, time and space are especially so. So almost always when you or I choose between values, we choose what we are to make of – how we will give form to – the most elemental and precious of our gifts, especially time. We use the metaphor of “spending” our time, and in doing so we point to this most basic phenomenological fact. Our time is given to us, for the sake of committing ourselves to values in the realm of the good proportionate to human apprehension and choice. We can only realize these choices by giving form and value to the pure potency of our gifts of time. When we do so – when we spend our time to be with friends or families or in prayer with God, or to serve a community or an organization – we contribute to the developing human good in *this* particular way rather than in any of the many other possible ways that we could have “spent” our time.

(2) As I deliberated about these and similar everyday choices, numerous acts of consciousness entered into the mix. For example, I had previously made the decision to co-sponsor the lecture in my capacity as department chairperson. In doing so, I expressed to the primary sponsor – the director of another program

¹⁸Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 468-69 and see also 195.

here at the university – that not only I but my department endorsed the speaker and the topic of the lecture. If I as the chairperson of the department I did not show up for the lecture, this would unequivocally diminish the value of the endorsement in the eyes of the primary sponsor. And indeed, that is exactly how she took it when I did not attend – a reaction that I fully anticipated. On the other side, my son played many soccer games, and missing just one would not have been such a big deal to him – as he repeatedly told me. But of course, I have to be attentive, intelligent and critical about what others do *not* say as well as to what they do say. But other important factors in this concrete decision included the fact that all the rest of my son’s home games conflicted with my class times. I would have had to cancel a class in order to attend any of his other home games – and in my own scale of feeling preference, holding class ranks very high. This is especially so because, while I rank fulfilling job responsibilities very highly, I value education even more highly. Also important in my decision were the memories of my own father making sacrifices, often taking time from work, to attend the school athletic contests of myself and my brothers, which meant a great deal to us. (We “felt the value” of his being there for us. I can assure you that he did not come to see the athletic prowess of his sons!)

All of these factors entered into the flow of questions, recollections, insights, judgments, etc. as I deliberated about this question of comparative value. In the end I went to my son’s game. In the end *it was my scale of preference that determined* what were, and what were not, the questions and answers pertinent to choosing that value over the value of endorsing the lecture with my presence.

Likewise, in the other examples of deliberating about comparative values and choices, very specific flows of acts of consciousness took place. These flows of acts served to make concrete these deliberations, judgments of value, and choices. For example, my decision to decrease my physical exercise time was definitely influenced by the fact that I would usually be exercising all alone early in the morning, and the fun was beginning to wane for me. In my feelings, I was preferring certain other values over the vital value of exercising – a value preference that, in this case, probably involved distortion. In another case, my deliberations about whether to attend the national conference or my uncle’s funeral included memories and feelings of a once warm relationship that had grown distant, along with present feelings of close personal relationships with members of the national organization. Also entering into consideration was the fact that this organization would have to forfeit the cost of my airline ticket. In yet another case, I chose to babysit for my grandson, because his parents had an

important commitment to keep. In my felt sense of preference, the importance that this commitment had for them, and the importance that they have to me, outweighed the importance of attending the parish council meeting. Was I choosing a personal or some other value over religious values? In one sense, No; but in another sense, Yes.

I do not mention any of these examples because I regard them as paradigms of normative ethical orientation. I present them as objectively as I can, as aides to you as you endeavor to appropriate what *a* feeling scale of value preference is, and how it operates in your own comparative value judging and deciding.

(3) In the list of my mundane comparative choices, I attempted to include issues that at least seem to touch the whole range of values in Lonergan's scale – vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values – and even the agreeable/pleasant (e.g., the restaurant menu).¹⁹ Yet as we attend carefully to our judgments and decisions regarding comparative values, we discover that in many instances these are not necessarily, or at least not obviously, choices between values located at different levels in Lonergan's scale. For example, in deciding among items on a menu, considerations of which foods on a menu are more healthy may play a role. Yet when all selections are equally healthy, we still choose one vital value over another. Usually we do so on the basis of what appeals to us on the level of what would seem to be more satisfying, more pleasurable or more agreeable.

Likewise, each of us is committed to several different social roles – for me, teacher, parent, chairperson, parish council member, and citizen, among others. Yet frequently we choose to devote particular times to one social role at the expense of another—for example, a parental role *as opposed to* a professional role, or *vice versa*. This means that we are choosing one social value over another. Just as when choosing one vital value (one kind of food) over another, here again we are giving preference to one social value over another. What is the basis of this preference among social values?

Sometimes we are in fact relying upon a *scale within the scale*; we are tacitly feeling distinctions and levels of preference within the category of social values themselves. Yet in other cases we choose to play certain social roles (and thereby commit to certain social values) on the basis of some higher values – cultural, personal, or religious. So, for example, we might choose to act as parent

¹⁹This is a level that does not appear explicitly in Lonergan's scale of values (see *Method in Theology*, 31) – or even in von Hildebrand's scale. It does however appear in Scheler's scale. See "Which Scale?"

and neglect our professional role, because in doing so we would be realizing a cultural value – emulating a cultural heroic figure, for example. That is to say, our prior felt preferences for which cultural exemplars to emulate, precede and form the background for our choosing social roles to play in order to actualize those cultural values. Or the exact reverse might be in play – neglecting parenting for the sake of pursuing the cultural ideal “the successful business person,” or the artist. Such cultural values are felt as higher than all mere social values – whether parenthood, professional role, or whatever. In the particular circumstances acting as a parent is regarded as the concrete way of manifesting that cultural value. Or again, choosing to act as parent and eschew a professional role may be motivated by something from the still the higher level of personal values – for example, by the felt sense of a higher moral responsibility (i.e., the moral value of our own authentic human existence).

Our comparative valuations and choices therefore are very specific and concrete. It is not possible to generalize *a priori* how values will be preferred by specific individuals. The basis for that preference may be a hierarchy of the levels of values, or it may be a hierarchical scale within a level itself. It is necessary to attend to the specifics of our own deliberations in order to discern the details of the scale that is motivating our deliberations. These efforts of close attention will reveal how we employ scales of preference *within* levels (i.e., preferences within vital, social, cultural levels of values) in combination with more generic value preferences among the levels themselves.

Hence, the felt value preferings that we employ in our valuating and deliberating are very detailed, minutely graduated, and finely tuned.

(4) Perhaps a bit more subtly, attention to our ordinary acts of evaluating and deliberating about comparative values reveals that the phenomenon of feeling preference is primordial. Whether we focus on the felt preference of cultural values over social values, or the felt preference within a level of values, feeling preference is the horizon for *all* intentional feelings that apprehend values. Earlier I agreed with Scheler’s strong claim that the intentionality of feelings is indispensable to knowledge of values. Yet the phenomenon of feeling preference of values is even more fundamental. *Whenever* we apprehend a value through an act of intentional feeling, we always feel that value as positioned, as ranked in a hierarchical scale of values. We do not just intend one value in one feeling, and then another value in a second feeling, and then compare them with one another, and finally somehow logically deduce where these values stand in comparison to one another. Lonergan makes this point when he observes: “Not only do feelings

respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference.”²⁰ Scheler is much more emphatic:

One must not assume that the height of a value is “*felt*” in the same manner as the value itself, and that the higher value is *subsequently* “preferred” or “placed after.” Rather, the height of a value is “given,” by virtue of its essence, only *in* the act of preferring.²¹

the “feeling” of values has its foundation, by essential necessity, in “preferring” and “placing after.” The feeling of values is by no means a “foundation” for the manner of preferring, as though preferring were “added” to the values comprehended in a primary intention of the feeling as only a secondary act... Only those values which are originally given [in preferring] can *secondarily* be “felt.” Hence, the *structure of preferring and placing after* circumscribes the value qualities that we feel.²²

Therefore the order of the ranks of values can *never be deduced or derived*. Which value is “higher” can be comprehended only through the acts of preferring and placing after. There exists here an *intuitive “evidence of preference”* that cannot be replaced by logical deduction.²³

This is to say that all feelings of values already and always occur within a felt scale of value preferring. In general each of our feelings of values always carries within it a felt sense of its place within a ranking or scale of values. This felt sense of value ranking is prior to our reasoning about such matters.

By insisting on the priority of feelings and a felt scale of value preference, Scheler is criticizing of the limitations of a “reason alone” approach (and especially that of Kant) in matters of valuing and morality. One cannot use reason alone to either to establish values or to establish the proper priority of one value over another. However, I repeat my earlier qualification: Scheler’s claim about the priority of feelings in consciousness of values – and now its extension to the priority of a felt scale in consciousness of value hierarchy – does not imply that reason has no role whatsoever in evaluating or in morality. Precisely because our scale of value preference as felt is *only* felt, most often we do not *know* just where this or that value is ranked in the scale of value preferences. We have to gradually

²⁰*Method in Theology*, 31.

²¹*Formalism/Values*, 87.

²²*Formalism/Values*, 89; emphasis is Scheler’s own.

²³*Formalism/Values*, 89-90; emphasis is Scheler’s own.

figure this out, and we rely upon our reasoning to do accomplish this task. In this case, reasoning means our asking and answering of questions about what is better, more important, more urgent. But the inquiries that lead to acts of understanding and judging always presuppose some experiences. The relevant experiences here are the intentional feelings that merely apprehend values and value preferences. Before we understand or critically judge our felt preferences, we experience them. Most often our felt ranking just remains implicit. Seldom is that scale fully known through the self-correcting cycle of learning that Lonergan refers to as reason. When we reason to judgments and decisions concerning comparative values, our reasoning is guided by the prior experiences of felt value preference. But this does not necessarily mean that our reasoning to judgments and decisions about comparative values is also guided by full knowledge of that scale of value preference. Often the guidance remains at the implicit level of feelings alone. The need for full knowledge of our scale arises when distortions in that scale undermine the objectivity of value judgments and choices.

Although our felt preference often remains tacit, it is difficult if not impossible to be authentic in our concrete deliberations and living if we constantly avoid the need to understand and know exactly how we are ranking values in our felt preferences. When we deliberate responsibly, when we arrive at virtually unconditioned judgments of value, when we make actual decisions – we have figure out just what values we concretely value as higher and lower. The unavoidability of making decisions, and the existential import of our exigence for responsibility (i.e., the exigence of our fourth level of consciousness) impels us to employ our self-correcting processes of knowing. To the extent that we are faithful to the transcendental notion of value, we gradually make explicit for ourselves and to come to terms with our own actual, existential, feeling scale of value preference.²⁴

Certainly there is much more to be learned through careful reflections on our ordinary, daily deliberations about matters of comparative value judgments and choices. No doubt greater depth would be gained from the more difficult

²⁴There is also an important, second role that reason plays in evaluating and in authentic moral living. This is the role played by experiencing, inquiring, understanding, reflecting and judging in comparing our actual scale of preference to *the* normative scale of preference. Reason will not “make” us choose the authentic scale of values over our own degenerate scale. That is, reason alone cannot produce moral conversion or any of the other conversions. But reason is needed in order to clarify and to present and to effectively communicate *the* scale and *why* it is the scale. What one chooses to do in response to such presentations and communications is the most radical exercise of freedom, and radical freedom cannot ultimately be caused even by reason.

reflections required when the choices are expanded to include deliberations about major life changes and even moments of intellectual, moral and religious conversion. But these foregoing reflections will have to suffice for the present. Let us now turn to the question of what role Lonergan's attempt to formulate a scale of value might play in our own efforts to appropriate our own scale of preference, and more importantly, in our own efforts to judge, choose and live authentically.

C. What Is the Role of Lonergan's Formulation of THE Scale?

The preceding reflections revealed, among other things, that our own existential scales of value preference expand to include complex gradations within as well as across the levels of values that Lonergan enumerates. Hence scales of value preference are far more complex than Lonergan's simple formulation of the scale would seem to indicate. For that matter, they are even more complex than the scales proposed and discussed at much greater length by either Scheler or von Hildebrand.²⁵ In fact, their complexity seems to defy adequate formulation in words. If this is the case, then what is the point to these formulations of scales of value preference, which are so streamlined and schematic?

The answer to this question must be indirect. For what defies formulation in words – philosophical words at least – does not necessarily defy expression by symbolic and artistic means. There are non-philosophical resources for formulating the extraordinary diversity and complexity of human feelings and felt value preferences. Primary among these alternative resources are those of literature, drama, painting, music, sculpture, dance, architecture, and related forms of artistic and symbolic expression. Where philosophical language pales in comparison to the finely tuned details of our unarticulated feelings and felt preferences, art and symbol strive to explore and give rich and concrete expressions to this realm. Still, while symbolic and artistic expressions can meet the need for expressing, slowing down, and exploring the richness and detail of feelings as concretely felt, they are not designed to meet other needs. Symbolic and artistic expressions draw their audiences into wondrous realms, and in doing so they evoke not only new feelings but also new questions. One of the most recurrent questions in encounters with art and symbols is – What does this all mean? Symbolic and artistic exploration and expression of feelings of value

²⁵See "Which Scale?"

preference, therefore, give rise to questions that they themselves are not designed to answer.

Hence symbols and art often need to be supplemented by philosophical and other kinds of interpretive expressions. Each type of expression provides a contribution to the exploration of feelings and felt horizons of value preference that the other modes do not and cannot provide. I suggest that Lonergan's formulation of the scale of value preference is meant to play some such role. Its role is not the impossible task of formulating the unfathomable richness of felt value preferences. Rather its role is that of a standard for interpreting and reflecting on these feelings and the various attempts to give expression to them.

As we attempt to appropriate and make explicit how our felt scale of value preference really functions in our deliberating, we will realize surprisingly – or perhaps not so surprisingly – that our *actual*, implicit scale of values may be different from what we *think* that scale is. Indeed, our own existential scale of value preferring may differ from what we think it *ought* to be. We may very well say, for example, that we subscribe wholeheartedly to Lonergan's scale of values. We may even truly believe that we do. But concretely and on a regular basis we may very well choose certain values over other values, in ways that violate Lonergan's normative order. Our own, personal, existential scale of value preferences is revealed in the ways it actually directs our concrete patterns of comparative choices (and, though less easy to discern, in the comparative judgments of value that stand behind those choices).

This brings me to what I regard as the central point of my paper, namely: *Objectivity in judgments and decisions regarding comparative values rests upon the normativity of the feeling-scale of value preference.* Or, to use Lonergan's language, *the objectivity of our judgments and decisions regarding comparative values rests upon the self-transcendence of our feelings,²⁶ and our feelings are self-transcending to the extent that our actual, existential scale of preference is THE normative scale of value preference* as Lonergan has formulated it. That is to say, we can only be as authentic and objective in making comparative judgments of value and choices as our own existential felt scale of value preference enables us to be. When we deliberate, the “marshalling and weighing” of the further pertinent questions and other factors will be governed ultimately by our feelings, feelings which unavoidably prefer some values to others. If our actual, existential scale is biased or otherwise distorted, so also will be our judgments and choices.

²⁶On feelings as self-transcending see *Method in Theology*, 37-41.

Hence, the questions of what is *the* normative scale of value preference, and how to best bring oneself into harmony with it, are of the utmost importance.

The importance of Lonergan's formulation of the scale of value preference, therefore, is that it is offered as a standard of comparison. As such it functions in a way similar to what Lonergan says about ideal types: even though they are too generic for the complexity of concrete situations, they still direct attention to what might be otherwise overlooked.²⁷ Such, I believe, is also the case with Lonergan's formulation of the scale of values. It is really a heuristic formulation of what might be called value *genera*.²⁸ Lonergan's formulation lacks the specific details of value hierarchies within each of the value genera of vital, social, cultural, personal and religious values. To expect something more detailed is to miss the point of this way of formulating a scale. Lonergan's formulation is not some mathematical algorithm – plug in the situation and it will print out for you a decision to which value to choose over the others. His formulation of the scale cannot substitute for the ongoing and difficult processes of growth and progress in discerning, in valuing and in ethical authenticity. His formulation is no substitute for the even more difficult processes of withdrawing from inauthenticity.²⁹ What his formulation does offer is a standard for comparison. Our own existential scales of values are subject to the gross distortions of *ressentiment* as well as less severe deviations from normativity. We catch some of these distortions from our cultural influences; others are of our own making. In either case our own value preferences reverse and invert the proper order of value hierarchy. Such distortions can be brought to light by reflecting on something like Lonergan's formulation of the scale of values. When we begin to prefer vital values over social values (neglecting our job responsibilities in order to “buff up” for example), Lonergan's scale can bring this to our attention. Or again, if we prefer to bury ourselves in the social value of mere work in order to evade the need to the need to develop more refined of cultural values, Lonergan's scale can point to this inversion and distortion.

Of course this task of bringing value distortion to light is performed much more effectively and flexibly by the long traditions of commonsense value formation. Traditions of parenting are far more effective in cultivating scales of value formation and in combating value distortion than a dozen books in philosophy or theology. Again, the refined ascetic traditions of spiritual direction,

²⁷ *Method in Theology*, 285.

²⁸ See “Which Scale?”

²⁹ *Method in Theology*, 110.

meditation, and prayer are especially effective in value formation and in undoing value distortion. These traditions of spiritual practices are found throughout the history of world cultures and world religions. They often provide effective and practical guidance for heightening the very highest of religious values. That is to say, spiritual practices can be very effective in heightening our awareness of the indwelling gift of “being in love in an unrestricted fashion.”³⁰ They can provide further guidance for contemplating other values in felt-comparison to the highest value. In doing so, traditions effectively model and shape normative scales of value preferring in people’s feeling lives.

Unfortunately, these traditions themselves can (and have) also become infected with distortions of value feelings. To choose an easy target, in at least some cases New Age spiritualities do seem to smack of self-indulgence and even seem to eliminate truly religious values. But such problems are not unique to New Age spirituality. While Nietzsche could only see the nihilism in Christian and Buddhist spiritualities, he nevertheless did indeed discern darkness that in too many cases indeed is there to be discerned.

So among other things, I think Lonergan offered his account of the scale of value preference in order that it might play a role in the critical mediation and correction of commonsense cultural traditions, as well as traditions of spirituality. Such traditions themselves are manifestations of the functional specialty of Communications. Their authenticity and effectiveness will be enhanced to the extent that these traditions of are enriched by the fruits of Lonergan’s other seven functional specialties. Still, virtually every functional specialty will rely upon and use some scale of value preference, at least implicitly. These implicit scales are made at least somewhat explicit in the functional specialty of Dialectics, as it engages in its tasks of evaluative interpretation and evaluative history.³¹ Hence it becomes increasingly important to ever better formulate the normative scale of felt value preferring, so that in the end the commonsense, ascetic, and spiritual traditions are better able to help people discover and reorient their feelings of value preferring.

It is among the ongoing tasks of the functional specialty of Foundations to formulate the normative scale of value preference. Foundations endeavors to take converted subjects as its starting point, and to articulate what is implicit in the thinking, feeling and living of converted subjects. Ultimately, then, the only

³⁰*Method in Theology*, 105.

³¹*Method in Theology*, 250.

criterion of what is *the* normative scale of value preference is the felt value preferring of completely converted human subjects.³² There is no other standard accessible in human thinking, feeling, choosing and living.

This strong claim implies that in order to know what is *the* scale of value preference, we must find wholly converted subjects and find out how they feel values preferentially. This of course raises the difficult question of how to know who is and who is not a converted subject. While modesty will prevent some (though not all) from claiming the title of complete conversion, it will not prevent modest unconverted people from making erroneous judgments about who else is, and is not, converted. Unconverted people will emulate false models of conversion, and therefore develop misleading and distorted scales of value preference.

It was of course to this problem that Lonergan addressed the eight functional specialties of his theological method. As he put it, the aim of that method is to aid the converted in finding one another. This means finding one another not only in their own local communities, but across the centuries and across geographical and other boundaries. But the method is also for the unconverted, perhaps more so. While Lonergan's method in theology cannot produce conversions, it can make conversions more likely. It facilitates encounters with oneself as reflected in the writings and deeds of the people belonging to a tradition. As the functional specialties gradually make the meanings, values, and preferential scales of values of different people increasingly evident, sooner or later practitioners of the method will discover things about themselves through the mediation of others. These discoveries will pose invitations to affective development and refinement, now made evident through the methodical encounter with the refined values of others. The discoveries will also pose exhortations to withdraw from distortions that have crept into one's own feelings of value preference. Underlying Lonergan's theological method, therefore, there is a very profound act of supernatural hope – hope that in the long run, conversion will become the most effective dynamic in human history.³³ But the long run can be very long indeed.

To my mind, Lonergan's articulation of the normative scale of value preference was meant as a partial contribution to that goal. When Lonergan articulated his own account of the scale of value preference, I believe that he was

³²See also Robert M. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 88.

³³See *Method in Theology*, 254.

he was effectively engaging in Foundations, and asserting that intellectually, morally, and religiously converted subjects spontaneously prefer values according to the ascending order vital-social-cultural-personal-religious.

If it is the work of Foundations to offer ever better formulations of the normative scale of values, then its work ought to depend to some extent upon input from the first four functional specialties – Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectics.³⁴ This points to a massive, collaborative research project about how scales of felt value preference have been expressed and formulated in various cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions, and especially by the great thinkers who have written thematically on this phenomenon in those traditions. The ultimate point to these exercises in the functional specialties, of course, is to move from appropriating our own existential scales of value preference, toward encountering and attempting a foundational formulation of *the* normative scale of value preference.

Lonergan's way of articulating the scale of value preference is heuristic, but no more than heuristic. It makes strong claims about the proper axiological priority among value-genera, but leaves the ordering of the value-species to be worked out.³⁵ This heuristic scale of value preference leaves almost all of the details of value preference to be filled out by converted people as they live their lives. It offers no more than a heuristic for the global orientation of the life of human feelings. In effect Lonergan seems to be saying, "Is the *whole* of your feeling scale of preference attuned to this scale of values, or is it in rebellion against this scale?" He appears to be assuming that when this generic heuristic scale is intact, the other dimensions of people's feelings of preference will gradually develop normatively. Their judgments and decisions concerning comparative values will grow in authenticity and objectivity, because the scale of value preferences upon which they rest is properly oriented. This need not mean of course that people for whom the scale of value preference is properly oriented will be completely free of biases or value distortions. But in effect, Lonergan seems to be inferring that such distortions can be overcome.³⁶ The greatest

³⁴Lonergan himself of course did not do this explicitly. For the most part, he was drawing on his life-long encounters with converted and unconverted people (including himself), in person and through writing, and endeavoring to give his best account of the scale. For his dialectical encounter with Scheler and von Hildebrand's writings, see "Which Value?"

³⁵See "Which Scale?"

³⁶A scale is intact of course when religious conversion as well as moral conversion is operative; religious conversion is the existential foundation for the level of religious values being properly preferred in one's own individual scale of value preference.

distortions arise when *ressentiment* sinks in its vicious roots and perverts the generic order as such. The greatest of evils ensue when there are such major distortions of the generic scale of values.

In formulating this heuristic account of the scale of values, therefore, Lonergan intended to offer an important heuristic tool. Methodical use of this scale of values can enhance the capacity of individual persons, of cultural traditions, and of traditions of spiritual practices to notice and rectify distortions in value preference. It will provide them with anticipations of growth and development in valuing. Such, I believe is the role that Lonergan's scale is meant to play.

LONERGAN'S ECONOMIC
IDEAS TODAY:
FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
IN SPENDING, THE PURE CYCLE OF
INNOVATIVE GROWTH,
THE GOOD OF ORDER,
AND THE BASEBALL DIAMOND

Eileen de Neeve
Thomas More Institute
Montreal, Canada

INTRODUCTION

AFTER BRIEFLY CONSIDERING why Loneragan was attracted to the study of economics early and late in his adult life, this paper presents two central ideas of Loneragan's economic thought: *the functional distinction in production and spending between investment and consumption*; and *the pure cycle of innovative growth*, or Loneragan's equilibrium theory of macroeconomic dynamics. Because the economy is also embedded in society, the second part of the paper discusses two of Loneragan's central ideas on social and cultural order and change: *the good of order*; and his normative notion of social and cultural dynamics, or *Cosmopolis*. Finally, in the appendix, the paper interprets the *Baseball Diamond*, Loneragan's circuits of economic payments that illustrate his functional distinctions and his dynamic equilibrium criterion.

WHY ECONOMICS?

Why did Loneragan research and write on the economy? Wasn't his principal desire and concern directed to the study of philosophy and theology?

At the age of 25, Loneragan returned to Canada after undergraduate studies in England. The world was sinking into the long and deep economic depression that

followed the boom years of the 1920s and the stock market crash of 1929. Everywhere, he saw businesses closed and unemployed people without income. Banks were calling in loans or failing; people were losing their savings, and businesses could not borrow credit for their operations. In those days, governments believed that the economy, as a free market, would work best without government action. Although relief for the poor was sometimes organized locally or nationally, it was overwhelmed by the number of unemployed needing help. Government leaders, moreover, did not understand the links between the money supply and the gold standard, or the national economy and the world economy. They raised tariffs on imported goods in the hope of encouraging domestic production. But their markets in other countries then failed because foreign producers could not sell their products abroad because of tariffs and, in turn, could no longer import goods from abroad. Depressions spread from one country to another. North American economies continued to decline until 1934, when governments such as the Roosevelt administration in the United States began to provide public works and other remedies.

Loneragan had studied mathematics and philosophy in England. Economics – a human science that studies a system of interrelated events that change historically and are influenced by human behavior – combines both mathematics and philosophy. Economics seeks to understand how people behave competitively and cooperatively as they produce, distribute, and exchange scarce goods and services. But explaining the relations among the many variables in economic analysis can often require the use of mathematics. Both the times and Lonergan's intellectual abilities explain Lonergan's interest in economics. Perhaps his long interest in social and economic issues even prepared him for the writing of *Insight*, especially chapters 6 and 7.

Loneragan had worked on understanding economic processes in his spare time from 1930 to 1944, while teaching full time or working on his Ph.D. in theology at Gregorian University. We know from the Lonergan Archives that he read Schumpeter and Hayek, among other economists.¹ And he, himself, also mentions Keynes, Wicksell, Kalecki, and Kaldor. In June 1940, Lonergan returned to Canada from his studies in Rome. By 1944, from his base in Montreal, he had taught theology at the Jesuit seminary of the French-Canadian province,

¹Loneragan Research Institute, Toronto, Canada; www.loneragan-lri.ca. See also Eileen de Neeve, *Bernard Lonergan's "Circulation Analysis" and Macrodynamics* (Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1990), 46.

l'Immaculée; defended his thesis; written the two essays on economics, and had three papers based on his thesis published in the *Theological Studies* journal.²

Lonergan wrote the economics essays to explain how key variables interact and change over time. The variables he studied were investment and consumption in production and spending, income distribution, relative and money prices, money flows and circuits, governments in the economy, and international trade and currencies. These variables are related via schemes of recurrence.

How the schemes operate depends on how people function in their economic activities. Lonergan argued that the failure to understand the changes in the economic system's schemes of recurrence³ during innovative growth, or to adapt to their requirements, explains the occurrence of booms and slumps in the economy. His economics proposes an ideal, or norm, of equilibrium economic development and growth that offers the possibility of avoiding business cycle crises.

Let us now turn to a discussion of two of Lonergan's central economic ideas.

WHAT IS LONERGAN'S FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND CONSUMPTION IN PRODUCTION AND SPENDING?

Lonergan emphasized the centrality of production in an economy. In particular, he distinguished two kinds of production and spending that occur in all developed economies: investment spending and consumption spending. *Investment spending* produces tools, equipment, offices, roads, shops, banks, education, healthcare, weapons and training for defense or war, and entertainment. *Consumption spending* creates the demand for the production of goods and services that contributes to our standard of living: food, shelter, concerts, transport, and recreation or leisure. For example, creating a new bank is investment spending, while using a bank's financial services is consumption spending. Investments perform a necessary but indirect function in the production

²Richard M. Liddy, *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1993); William A. Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); Cathleen Going, Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, interviewers and editors, *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Thomas More Institute Papers, 3405 Atwater Ave. Montreal, Canada H3H 1Y2, 1982)

³Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press [1957] 1992), 141-43. Lonergan developed his notion of schemes of recurrence later as he was writing *Insight*.

of our standard of living. Without the banks, we would not have financial services.

Our standard of living in the developed world depends on the income we earn when we produce both the necessary infrastructure of institutions, equipment, and know-how as well as the consumer goods, services, and leisure we choose. Most people spend their income on both consumption and investment. In the developed world, it is often possible to supplement people's low incomes through the tax system, or to provide for unemployment and incapacity through social policies. The burden on poor countries is to find the necessary saving locally or internationally to build their infrastructure and human capital while still providing a minimum standard of living to their populations.

Loneragan also emphasized that economies are "changing systems," ones that expand when people innovate; that is, they find new ways to produce more, or in a better fashion, with the same resources. Economies also grow when the number of people producing and consuming within them grows. However, Lonergan's analysis abstracted from population change and fundamental technology change to focus on innovations and the investment related to them. He emphasized the functional distinction between investment and consumption to draw attention to the crucial changes in spending that must be understood to successfully complete economic growth.

Loneragan told us that when the production of goods that we call investment, capital, or surplus goods is dominant in important industries, the economy needs more savings and investment from income earners. Businesses find money to invest from their profits, from financial institutions such as banks and the stock market, from government subsidies, as well as from foreign investment. But to make this possible, the distribution of income needs to be less egalitarian. We know, for example, that people with higher incomes have more disposable income and do save more. Or perhaps a climate of savings and investment could be encouraged in a society; for example, by government policies that respond to climate change issues. Or, as Lonergan explained, in Canada, during World War II, inflation was reduced when governments issued bonds to encourage saving. With production concentrating on weapons and military training in wartime, fewer consumer goods were available to buyers, and wartime incomes might have bid prices up.⁴

⁴Bernard Lonergan, *Shorter Papers*, vol. 20 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2007), 68.

As an economy industrializes and diverse equipment, buildings, education, and healthcare systems are put into place and staffed by qualified people – and, moreover, the country is not at war – the proportion of income that can be consumed becomes larger and the standard of living of more people rises. In fact, consumption income rose in England during the 1870s, and in the United States and Canada after the Second World War. As Lonergan explained, the distribution of income should reflect the development requirements of the production system.

To me, Lonergan's functional distinction between capital and consumer goods production does not necessarily imply that there are well-defined production stages in the macro economy as a whole. He clearly said that investment and consumer goods expansions can take place within a single firm and can even be simultaneous.⁵ However, the stages of economic development are clear in industrial revolutions, such as during China's recent economic development. To ensure sufficient saving, incomes in the investment stage of an industrial revolution will be inegalitarian, as they have been in the past in England, Germany, and Japan. After all, the success of an investment stage depends on innovative investment (or imitative investment in the case of economies that develop later), and takes time to complete.

During ongoing innovative growth in developed economies, the stages of development are less distinct. We can think of examples: people who do their investing in their spare time after producing what they need to live; people who study in their spare time; corporations that do ongoing research and development on production processes, marketing, or organization. Nowadays, investment can also be affected by government action or by factors external to a national economy. Nevertheless, aggregate statistics for the total economy in Canada and the United States show periods of above-average investment; for example, during most of the 1960s, for shorter periods during the 1970s and 1980s, and during the dot.com boom of the 1990s. These were also periods of strong overall economic growth. For the United States, the data show that personal incomes and private domestic investment seem to move together. Because personal income is an aggregate, though, that does not tell us anything about income distribution.

What remains clear, however, is that we can distinguish the indirect function of investment in production and the saving or new credit it demands. We can also distinguish the direct function of the products we produce and the leisure we

⁵Bernard Lonergan, *For a New Political Economy*, vol. 21 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 25, 54.

consume as part of our standard of living, as well as the shift in our disposable income, big or small, from saving to consumption.

Loneragan assured us that the distinction between investment and consumption in production is not proprietary; it does not matter who owns the product. Nor does the distinction depend on the product itself; for example, trucks could be capital or consumer goods. Instead, the distinction depends on whether the product makes possible a certain standard of living or is part of that standard of living. Take the writing of a new book: that would be investment; just as selling the book may well create consumption that raises people's standard of living. Or take people who work independently from home: they figure out what part of their house or apartment is an office and include it in their cost of production, rather than in their consumption.

The next section of the paper discusses a second central idea of Lonergan's economic thought: his pure cycle of equilibrium innovative growth.

IS THE PURE CYCLE OF INNOVATIVE GROWTH AN IDEAL OR A NORM OF MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS? AND DOES ITS PROBABILITY OF ACTUALLY OCCURRING DEPEND ON CHANGE AND HUMAN ERROR?

In both periods of his life when he worked on economics, Lonergan referred to the distinction between the actuality of economic and political events and the normative or ideal – or what I think are the classical laws in the social sciences, such as economics. He drew parallels with the classical laws in the natural sciences; for example, the law of falling bodies can only be proven in a vacuum. Otherwise, falling bodies do not fall at 32 feet /second/second because they will be affected by other forces such as friction, and so forth.⁶ Similarly, equilibrium in innovative growth only occurs when human behavior adapts to the exigencies of the process.

In his 1942 essay, Lonergan defined four possible phases or states of the economy: the stationary state, the capitalist phase or an economic state of investment expansion, a materialist phase or an economic state of a rising standard of living, and a cultural phase or an economic state of “developing cultural pursuits.” I would argue, as I did above, that these states of the economy

⁶*For a New Political Economy*, 25-26.

could occur more or less together except in the case of an industrial revolution.⁷ Lonergeran, himself, noted that the stationary economy exists only in theory.

In his 1944 essay, Lonergeran distinguished a proportionate expansion in which both capital and consumer goods grow together, as well as a surplus or capitalist expansion and a basic or consumption expansion. In his 1944 essay, I think, that cultural expansion may have been included in both the capital and consumption expansions, given that the functional distinctions are similar when building cultural institutions and consuming their products.

In Lonergeran's pure cycle, or what I have called "equilibrium innovative growth," there is only a forward movement; there is no downturn. Lonergeran argues that the normative process is not what, in general, occurs. There is disequilibrium as the expansion matures because of misguided money creation, or reduction,⁸ and a misunderstanding of the function of profit variation. In his later discussion of *mistaken expectations*, Lonergeran explained that the basic mistake is the failure to understand the variations from normal profits. The extraordinary profit in an expansion is a "social dividend" intended for reinvestment, one that ensures that the investment expansion benefits society as a whole.⁹ Like Keynes, Lonergeran called for a social level of investment.¹⁰

In his late period of work on economics, Lonergeran began his introduction by stating that in the sciences there are classical laws that apply "provided other things are equal" and statistical laws "that tell us how often that proviso is met."¹¹ In economics we think of the laws of supply and demand, of the time priority of investment over consumption in particular innovations, and of the phenomenon "that bad money drives out good."¹² The probabilities with which economic laws hold in an economy can be determined in statistical studies of the past, but those probabilities may change in the future.

While human communities help to devise the changing schemes of recurrence in an economy, those economic schemes depend on the ecologies of nature on the

⁷For a New Political Economy, 241-42; Bernard Lonergeran, *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, vol. 15 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergeran*, ed. Frederick G. Lawrence, Patrick H. Byrne, and Charles C. Hefling, Jr. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 80-82.

⁸For a New Political Economy, 59.

⁹*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 80-82.

¹⁰J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (London: MacMillan & Co. [1936] 1961), 325.

¹¹*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 3.

¹²Gresham's Law.

one hand, and underpin social and cultural structures on the other. Lonergan drew attention to the fact that “the concrete and dynamic component” in changing social schemes of recurrence “is supplied by human individuals.”¹³ Social outcomes, including economic ones, will depend on whether individuals act with knowledge and are willing to ensure that the outcome will also benefit others.

In these first two sections, I have discussed two key elements of Lonergan’s economic thought: his functional distinction between investment and consumption in production and spending, and his understanding of innovative economic growth and crises. Lonergan offers a more developed theory of equilibrium economic growth, one that distinguishes sharply the dynamics of investment and consumption over time, as well as the way in which people’s incomes, spending, and production must adapt in order to benefit society as a whole.

HOW DO LONERGAN’S ECONOMIC IDEAS CONNECT WITH TODAY’S SCHOOLS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT?

Lonergan’s economic analysis remains important. Economists are still concerned, as Lonergan was, about the sufficiency of saving and investment for innovative growth, the variations in income distribution needed over time to encourage investment or sufficient consumption demand as the productive process requires, and the matching of money supply growth to growth in the real economy.

Still, economic theory continues to be plagued by controversy. I think, however, that the controversies are based on the different weightings given to economic variables in analysis, and on the different notions of the government’s role in the economy. One controversial question concerns the possibility of reducing unemployment. Do government benefits discourage work? Should governments and corporations increase spending to help workers adapt to innovations in production? Does unemployment depend on the degree of monopoly in production and on technical change? Is executive compensation in world corporations excessive when employees’ compensation has increased so very little?

Meanwhile, in much of the economy, competition is intense. Corporate producers work to maintain profits and share prices, so that shareholders will not sell their shares and gifted employees will be happy with the bonuses offered.

¹³*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 5.

Nonprofit organizations struggle to maintain their funding and balance their budgets. Moreover, today's global economy is a scene of intense international competition. China, for one, is huge and competes, along with other emerging economies, with national economies that industrialized earlier. The growing world demand for resources is currently raising costs, and higher prices are cutting into living standards. The world economy is an evolving playing field with new teams.

I think Lonergan would agree with economists who emphasize the role of real innovation, research, human capital, and investment in production and economic growth. Currently, that would include such economists as Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, as well as Paul Romer. These economists assumed that money is neutral in their economic growth theories and called for a stable monetary policy without money surprises.¹⁴ (Money was also considered to be neutral, or well behaved, in Lonergan's normative pure cycle of growth and development.) Like Lonergan, they also included a lag between investment and the new output related to it.

But Lonergan's pure theory called attention to more than market equilibrium. He explained that in macro dynamics there are more fundamental equilibriums that matter; for example, the changing balance of income flows between the financing of investment and consumer goods in production and spending. The changing balance in financing production can be defined as diminishing returns to further investment and a shift in financing to the production of related consumer goods. Such changes can work if they are balanced by changes in income distribution – from profit income that is saved and invested, to consumption income.

For Lonergan, a properly functioning economy implied that producers' receipts and production incomes must be acceptable to society as a whole.¹⁵ As Lonergan stated elsewhere, "One has to place first human society, which is served by the economic process, and second the economic process, which is to be served by money . . . and not vice-versa."¹⁶

However, I think that Lonergan also emphasized that money growth often does not adapt smoothly to the changes in investment and consumption needed for economic growth. Lonergan recognized that there are sources of disequilibria,

¹⁴Their theories of economic growth are discussed in my book, *Decoding the Economy: Understanding Change with Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 2008).

¹⁵*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 92.

¹⁶*For a New Political Economy*, 101.

such as innovations in money and monetary products (mortgage-backed securities, junk bonds), as well as government policies that run counter to the changes in production. Such changes may result in booms and slumps that rebound on production and incomes. Here, I think he would have tended to agree with the Keynesian economists, who acknowledged the effects of financial crises on real production, employment, and income and called for monetary and fiscal policies to restart the economy.

Nevertheless, Lonergan did not turn to governments as a panacea to remedy the failures of the market economy. He emphasized that the role of government is constrained by the need to balance spending with taxes, at least over the medium term. Lonergan argued, instead, for a better understanding on the part of citizens and business of the changing flows of money between investment and consumption during economic innovation and growth; in that way, actions might increase the likelihood of an equilibrium process.

The next section of the paper moves beyond economics to consider two of Lonergan's ideas about the patterns of human activities by which a society can progress or decline.

WHY IS THE NOTION OF THE GOOD OF ORDER IMPORTANT?

Let us think about the *good of order* in terms of baseball. Lonergan's metaphor for the economy was a baseball game – one that depends on the skills of the players, the managers, and the coach; how they work together; what new plays, equipment, or bats have been developed; and how the other team has changed since their last game. In short, how will the behavior of players and managers have to change?

Lonergan's approach to economics was developmental, as was his approach to historical development in *Insight* and *Method* and elsewhere. The past, he explained, is history on which we can build, or history which we can now repair – for a better future. Regarding development, Lonergan commented, “our starting point is already determinate: we have to face things as they are, we may never lose sight of them or attempt to reckon without them. But not only is there ever the broad and unalterable datum of things as they are; there are also the limitations which this datum imposes on things as we are going to make them.”¹⁷

Lonergan's good of order, to me, emphasizes the order that actually exists; it is “good” in the sense that the economy's schemes of recurrence are at least

¹⁷For a New Political Economy, 74.

operating. I understand the economic and political systems or schemes of recurrence that we have right now as examples of Lonergan's good of order. As the quotation above states, Lonergan emphasized that changes depend not on theories or ideologies but on what is possible economically and politically in a dynamic system that is able to change for the better or worse. That is, we can hope and work for changes for the better. Development will come with the insights of individuals and their intersubjective groups – insights that are developed, chosen, and become broadly accepted in a society. The good of order recalls for people the importance and limitations of their actions as consumers, investors, and citizens in the world economy and national states.

The trouble, as we know, is that the ideas of individuals and groups can be too narrowly defined, or biased, by a limited concern for their own interests. Such biases can and do move society toward decline. Moreover, it is difficult to read the meaning of current events when we are not familiar with the background stories. Although the danger signs may be hard to read, it is important to discern as clearly as possible the trends going forward in the economy and state. Economic and political breakdowns may come abruptly through wars, financial crises, or natural disasters.

To return to Lonergan's distinction between the normative and the actual, it seems to me that Lonergan's notion of a normative process of social change is a *Cosmopolis* – one that transposes the issue, as he explained, from the social systems concretized in the police and courts, and the laws of diplomacy and war, to the "level of culture and morality."¹⁸ But the normative process depends on the development of self-knowledge in individuals and their collaborative groups. And self-knowledge is historically dependent on cultural development, which, in turn, is built, for Lonergan, on the "security and leisure generated by technological, economic, and political advance."¹⁹

I think that a *Cosmopolis*, as a process, calls on people and groups to "ridicule, explode, (and) destroy" myths and illusions created by dominant economic and political elites. That is the role that Ronald Biener, a Canadian political theorist, sees for people like himself.²⁰ I think it also applies to economic theorists. In effect, then, their role is to criticize the behavior of politicians,

¹⁸*Insight*, 262-63, 619-20.

¹⁹*Insight*, 558-59.

²⁰Ronald Biener, *What Is the Matter with Liberalism?* and *Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays in the Problem of Political Community* cited in my book, *Decoding the Economy: Understanding Change with Bernard Lonergan*, 137, 171.

business people, and citizens in general when, by their actions or omissions, they show tendencies to misread economic or political processes, breaking down the good of order that exists rather than developing it. The role of a theorist differs from that of politicians and citizens. In short, people's choices are more or less limited by the mechanics or processes of economic and political systems. Economics, like politics, is the art of the possible. In the end, how societies work depends not just on corporations, governments, lobbies, and so forth but also on all of us individually – as consumers, investors, and citizens.

As Lonergan demonstrated in *Insight* and elsewhere, human beings are characterized by an unrestricted desire to know and love. In their economic lives, people express this desire in innovations that can raise people's standard of living. However, Lonergan also noted in "Healing and Creating in History" that there is a tendency for our intellectual development to outrun our moral development, while, on the other hand, our wish to help others may fail because of insufficient knowledge of a situation.²¹ As Lonergan commented, "the economic process can be wrecked by the stupidity of capital or by the stupidity of labor, by the demand of high profits or high wages out of due season."²²

It seems to me that the notion of a Cosmopolis as a normative process synthesizes liberal thought of the nineteenth century with Marx's social philosophy. The nineteenth-century liberals believed that some automatic economic mechanism would ensure progress. Marx responded to the social costs of industrialization by anticipating social disintegration in a revolution that he believed would bring about a utopia beyond politics. Lonergan assured us that, because of our practical intelligences, there will always be technologies, economies, and politics and that we must work with the data as we find them. However, Lonergan rejected out of hand the alternative of excessive bureaucratic leadership in the economy or state; he felt that bureaucracies depend on planning that tends to restrict the introduction of innovations that do not fit the plan, or that, in the state, bureaucracies tend to restrict the freedom of citizens to create social development. Lonergan would rather rely on individuals and their groups in democracies to be informed and vigilant, and thereby correct bureaucratic

²¹*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 97-106.

²²*For a New Political Economy*, 70.

tendencies that can divert or limit social progress in both the economy and the state.²³

SUMMARY

To summarize, this paper has presented two of Lonergan's ideas that are central to his economic thought. The first is the functional distinction between investment and consumption and the different roles in production they imply. The production of producers and consumer goods are related to each other, inasmuch as producer goods are used in the production of consumer goods. Moreover, the importance of one or other in the economy can vary over time. As both economic agents and citizens, people must be aware of the requirements of the economic system and understand what policies will benefit society as a whole.

Loneragan's second economic idea discussed here is his pure cycle of innovative growth. The pure cycle is a development of the equilibrium theory of economic growth presented by supply-side economists, such as Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, as well as Paul Romer. Lonergan's notion of innovative growth also focused on the variations in prices and income distribution that result from the lag in production between investment and the output of consumer products. Although both the lag and the changes in prices and income distribution are more evident in an industrial revolution, they can be discerned in all innovations that lead to economic growth. By drawing attention to the variation in prices and income distribution, Lonergan shared the concerns of Keynesian economists who deplored the levels of unemployment that too often accompany innovative economic growth. He argued that the extraordinary returns to innovation are a social dividend normally intended for reinvestment – a dividend that can extend production, employment, and the standard of living to the whole society.

This paper has also addressed two of Lonergan's ideas on social and historical dynamics. First discussed was the good of order, which is Lonergan's notion of the actual functioning of the schemes of recurrence; that is the activities of people as economic agents in their production, consumption, investment, and money payments. There are related schemes of recurrence pertaining to the activities of

²³Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1993), 60-61; *For a New Political Economy*, 34-35.

citizens with regard to paying taxes, receiving the benefits of public production, and supporting economic policies as well as the nonprofit production that they think will benefit others. Lonergan's notion of schemes of recurrence is both dynamic and indeterminate. The outcomes depend on events and people. The schemes' functionings can clearly move toward social progress or social decline.


The second of Lonergan's ideas on society and history addressed by the paper is his notion of a Cosmopolis; that is his social and historical ideal process, related to the dynamisms of social and cultural systems. According to Lonergan, the direction of development of these systems depends on people's practical, intellectual, and moral-religious understanding and judgment, as well as their willingness to act in ways that benefit people both now and in the future.

APPENDIX

WHY DID LONERGAN PRODUCE A BASEBALL DIAMOND DIAGRAM?

Lonergan used the Baseball Diamond diagram to explain his theory graphically, possibly because he himself found economic diagrams helpful. It also tells us metaphorically about macroeconomic dynamics: the circulation of money payments for goods and services, as well as for production costs (wages, salaries, interest, and dividends). Lonergan's diagram shows us that the economy is a game in which teams compete and members of each team cooperate. Like a baseball game, the economy is a dynamic system in which money, instead of a ball, is pitched by producers, investors, or consumers. For example, the Boston Red Sox baseball team won the World Series in 2007 because they had outstanding players, managers, and coaches, enjoyed the support of the community, and played well as a team. In the economy, some of us are outstanding players, like Bill Gates or Warren Buffett. Others play on less important teams. But most of us are players in the economic game. Of course, the game has rules that are sometimes hard to interpret. Moreover, some players will win while others will lose. The diagram illustrates that the players' economic activities are the significant payment flows between producers, investors, and consumers of functionally distinct but related products. Such flows need to balance, or move toward equilibrium in a growing economy.

Figure 1 shows the bases of the baseball diamond. Sp = production and supply of producer or capital goods and services. Production and supply require outlays (O) that become incomes to those who make production possible. Dp =



investment income (I) and demand for capital goods and services. Sc = production and supply of consumer goods and services that require outlays (O) to the incomes of those who make production possible. Dc = consumption income (I) and demand for consumer goods and services. The diagram puts home plate where consumption income or the standard of living is located.²⁴ The choice makes sense inasmuch as the main purpose of production is not profit – although profit is an important measure of efficiency – but provision of people with their standard of living.

The sources of money for investment are banks and other providers of financial services, such as insurance companies, stock markets, and private capital funds (household and business saving), governments (saving from tax revenues, or government borrowing), and international or foreign corporations or

²⁴For a New Political Economy, 118.

governments (foreign saving). These sources of money are shown at BGF.²⁵ All three circulate money through the system and are sources of new money for expansions.

Development or innovative growth in the real economy of goods and services depends on matching changes in money and credit so that businesses can invest and operate. Part of the problem in the Great Depression, and in the recent financial crisis that resulted from non-payments by U.S. sub-prime mortgage holders when interest rates increased, was that the banks failed and money and credit became scarce. In such cases, some businesses find their credit restricted, or worse, face bankruptcy, and new businesses are unable to start up. As well, jobs disappear and debts pile up for consumers.

Figure 2 aims to illustrate the distinction between the two kinds of production. As discussed above, S_p and S_c are functionally distinct in the sense that producer goods are defined by the fact that they are not consumed but are used in the production of consumer goods. Because they are used to produce consumer goods, they may be prior in time, especially when the producer good is buildings and equipment, or human capital development in education and training.

The crossovers in the diagram are from outlays (O) of both kinds of production to the incomes (I) of their employees, managers, creditors, and shareholders, insofar as these receivers of income demand the other kind of product. For example, people working to produce airplanes or buildings or other producer goods still spend most of their income on consumer goods. That is why they are called “crossovers.” These crossovers go one way from producers to the opposite kind of income and demand. For equilibrium or normal growth, crossovers must balance. That last is Lonergan’s dynamic equilibrium criterion.

As the diagram helps to make clear, the equilibrium or balance of this dynamic process depends on more than balancing market supply and demand. It also depends on the balance of flows of outlays (O) and incomes (I) that determine investment or demand for producer goods (D_p), and consumer spending or demand for consumer goods (D_c). For example, we can ask whether

²⁵The position of the functionally distinct production of consumer goods at the top of the diagram follows Lonergan’s 1944 essay in *For a New Political Economy*, page 258, and *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, page 181. The final diagram on page 199 of the latter volume inverts the positions of the kinds of production and consumption in the diagram. I do not think that difference is significant, but consistency could help our understanding.

the trend toward zero saving by households in the United States maintains the balance between investment and consumption. Are the other sources of saving such as business, governments, and international finance providing sufficient investment in the economy? Alternately, is the high rate of household saving in China balanced between consumption and investment? What roles do other sources of saving from government or foreign investment play there? In any event, we cannot legislate the rate of saving in a free society except through policies that might encourage saving, or might persuade citizens that saving will benefit them in the medium term.

Figure 2




Figure 3 focuses on demand (D_p and D_c) and supply (S_p and S_c), not in the aggregate but as divided between consumption and investment. Currently, in North America, about 80 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is consumed and 20 percent is invested. The investment share rises to 24 percent in a boom and falls to about 18 percent in a recession.

In a theoretical stationary economy in equilibrium, in which 80 is used as an index of consumer goods production and 20 as an index of producer goods production, the crossover flows would be equal and measure 16. This measure would keep the rate of consumption and investment unchanged in the economy. In other words, producers of producer goods would consume 16 and invest 4 (a ratio of 4 to 1), using up their production income of 20. And producers of consumer goods would consume 64 and invest 16 (a ratio of 4 to 1), using up their production income of 80.

In most developed economies, governments produce some health care, public housing, and education in various different ways. Moreover, governments have been given the role of providing income to, as well as perhaps retraining, people who lose their jobs in an economic recession. Governments implement their income redistribution policies through the tax system. The public provision of goods and services and income redistribution depends on the taxes received from incomes and sales in the whole economy. The public sector's payments and receipts are included in Lonergan's diagram. Inflows to government in BGF are taxes and fees from producers and consumers, while outflows are government expenditures.

Nonprofit production is another growing sector in developed economies.

Government grants, private sector philanthropy, volunteer services, and fees fund nonprofit enterprise production. Nonprofit production is included in Lonergan's diagram as flows from BGF to either or both kinds of production. Other payments to and from nonprofit enterprises would move as payments in the rest of the economy. Nonprofit enterprises rarely account their profits, and must demonstrate their efficiency in other ways to obtain funding. When they have no profit to reinvest, their grants, donations, and fees need to allow for reinvestment and development.

Figure 3





Figure 4 demonstrates the use of arrows. Note that in Figure 4, producer goods are referred to as “P goods.” The two arrows pointing from both production outlays (O at Sc and Sp) to income (I at Dc) represent the flows from all incomes that are to be spent on the consumer goods that are produced. The inner arrow from Dc to Sc shows the purchases made by that income. Similarly, the two arrows pointing from both production outlays (O at Sp and Sc) to income (I at Dp) represent the flows from all income being spent on investment in the production of producer goods. The inner arrow from Dp to Sp shows the purchases made by that income. Recall that investment and consumption income will be augmented or reduced by money flows from and to banks, governments, and international sources (BGF) made by individuals, corporate or human, who are doing the consuming or investing.

Figure 4



SUMMARY

Lonergan's Baseball Diamond diagram distinguishes between the functions of investment and consumption that are generally regarded as important in economic growth. Because it is a diagram of payment flows, the importance of changing money flows to and from each kind of production is underlined more clearly than would be the case when only aggregate changes in the supply of money and credit are followed. The appendix has not discussed the real or monetary changes that occur in innovative growth, which can tend toward an equilibrium process or toward booms and slumps. Nor has the appendix discussed the diagram in terms of actual economic events.

PRESERVING LONERGAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF THOMIST METAPHYSICS: A PROPOSAL AND AN EXAMPLE

Robert M. Doran, S.J.
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

1. A PROPOSAL

IN MY PRESENTATION here last summer, I summarized the contents of four draft chapters of a book in progress entitled *The Trinity in History*.¹ (More accurately, it is a book that *was* in progress a year ago, but that has stalled in the past year.) The aim of the book is to set forth what for several years I have been calling the “unified field structure” of a contemporary systematic theology. That unified field structure would consist of an integration of (1) the heuristic of history presented in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, which itself builds on Lonergan’s philosophy and theology of history, with (2) the hypothesis found in chapter 6 of *The Triune God: Systematics* regarding the four divine relations and four created participations in and imitations of these relations – the so-called “four-point hypothesis.” The four draft chapters that I summarized last summer were entitled “The Starting Point,” “Initial Issues,” “Mimesis,” and “Sacralization and Desacralization.” The latter two chapter titles indicate clearly that an engagement with René Girard’s mimetic theory will figure rather centrally in the book, and I will return to this point later in the current presentation.

Subsequently I have moved these four chapters back just a bit in the book, from being chapters 1 through 4 to being chapters 2 through 5, and have begun the book with a slightly revised form of a lecture that I delivered at Marquette

¹See Robert M. Doran, “Envisioning a Systematic Theology,” *Loneragan Workshop 20*, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Institute, 2008), 105-26.

University last October, “Constructing a New Catholic Systematics: A Vision and an Invitation.” That lecture expanded on the introductory comments that were included in my presentation here last summer, and so I won’t repeat here the principal points of the chapter.

In the course of the past year I have added two further draft chapters. Chapter 6 is entitled “Autonomous Spiritual Processions: Lonergan’s Early Analogy,” and chapter 7 is called “Generation and Spiration.” But – and here is the problem – these two chapters are, in their present form, little more than an extended commentary on, respectively, the first two assertions in *The Triune God: Systematics*. There is very little original in these two chapters in their present form, and while I doubt that this present form is what I will eventually publish, the significance of the impasse that I have encountered is worth some reflection and comment, and in fact has given rise to much of what I want to say in the present paper.

We are asked at this year’s Workshop to concentrate our attention on elements of Lonergan’s work that we believe must be preserved. I wish to propose that the early Lonergan in general, and his appropriation of both Aristotle and Aquinas in particular, rank high among the features of his work that cannot be left behind. In fact, I am proposing that we will succeed in moving Lonergan’s project forward, in developing and implementing his work, in direct proportion to the extent to which we make our own his reaching up to the mind of Aquinas and his appropriation of the rest of his intellectual and spiritual heritage. Surely one of the elements in his work that must be preserved as we move forward is his retrieval of the Thomist psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions. In fact, I think it may be claimed that Lonergan gives us more than a retrieval; in my view he provides a definitive clarification of what Aquinas was about in questions 27 to 43 of the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, and he was able to do that because he had already provided in *Verbum* the detailed presentation of Thomist cognitional theory that Aquinas himself never did formulate in a single work.

So I have found myself immersed for a time in the so-called early Lonergan, precisely in the interest of moving on, of developing and implementing. In my paper in Naples last month, I emphasized the abiding significance of chapter 18 of *Insight*, despite the development in Lonergan’s notion of the human good that had

taken place by the time of *Method in Theology*.² One of my arguments for the permanent value of chapter 18 was the close relationship between the unfolding of rational self-consciousness in that chapter and the dynamics of the psychological analogy as these are presented in *The Triune God: Systematics*, that is to say, in *Divinarum personarum* and more fully in *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*.³ But I am finding as I attempt to explore what I might be able to do in further work in systematics that more is at stake regarding the so-called “early Lonergan” than incidental or hit-and-miss retrievals of immensely valuable materials composed prior to the “hermeneutic turn” in his thinking in the early 1960s: the turn to a philosophy of meaning, to an understanding of divine revelation in terms of meaning, to progress, decline, and redemption understood in terms of meaning, etc., etc. A doctoral student of mine in Toronto, Darren Dias, who just defended successfully a very fine dissertation, called this hermeneutic turn the shift from causality to meaning in the principal emphases of Lonergan’s thinking. But as Dias correctly insisted, the shift does not mean an abandonment of “causality,” that is, of metaphysics, nor does it mean relegating to the dustbins of history the complex and sophisticated analyses of Aristotelian and Thomist texts that appear both in Lonergan’s published writings and in the notes that abide in his archives. Again, it does not mean that these analyses are valuable only for scholarship on Lonergan’s development, that is, for work in the first phase of theology involving interpretation and history, and that they have little or nothing to do with what remains permanently valid doctrinally or systematically in his thought.

With the present paper, then, I’d like to suggest we launch a mild campaign against any communal appropriation of Lonergan that would for all practical purposes simply replace theory with interiority rather than sublimate theory by interiority. The tendency to that kind of appropriation presents a real danger, perhaps the single greatest danger, to the effective history, the *Wirkungsgeschichte*, of Lonergan’s work. In *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, I spoke several times of the possibility of an emerging post-interiority mentality at the level of common sense, a mentality analogous in our time to the

²Robert M. Doran, “The Abiding Significance of the Ethics of *Insight*,” to be published in the proceedings of the 2008 Lonergan conference in Naples, Italy.

³Now available as Bernard Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, vol. 12 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

post-systematic or post-theoretic mentality that Lonergan finds responsible for the achievements of the great Greek councils of the Church. I do not wish to make light of such a possible development, for I think it would hold immense potential for the renewal of culture and civilization in a world that quickly is losing both of these even in many of its institutions of so-called higher learning – institutions that are turning into little more than expensive trade schools, whether the trade in question be civil and secular or ecclesiastical and ministerial. But the emergence of a post-interiority mentality in common sense would be a by-product of a far more profound development at the superstructural level of theory and specialization. That more profound development entails the sublation of theory by interiority. For one thing, the sublation of theory by interiority throws light back upon the meaning of what had previously been presented only theoretically. Think, for instance, of what an appropriation of the emergence of insight from image under the force of the desire to know and an appropriation also of the difference between that emergence and the emanation of an inner word from insight itself could do for the metaphysical appreciation of the meaning of potency and act. For the former – insight from image in a questioning mind – is the emergence of act from potency, while the latter – inner word from insight – is the emergence of act from act. Could there be a clearer instance of the meaning of these Scholastic terms than the one that emerges from interiorly differentiated consciousness? Might this become our primary source of data as we explore and teach at the level of our own time the meaning of Aristotelian and Thomist metaphysics? But I also call to mind that it is by reading chapter 3 of *Verbum* and the later development in the Trinitarian systematics of the metaphysics of knowledge contained in *Verbum*, even more than by reading *Insight*, that one will be able to appropriate the difference between these two processions. *Insight* gives one the emergence of the act of understanding from appropriate constellations of images under the force of the desire to know; but it is not as explicit on the emergence of the inner word from insight as is *Verbum*, and it does not present either of these processions in terms of potency and act with the same precision that the distinction of *processio operationis* and *processio operati* has provided, first in *Verbum* and then in *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*.⁴ It is this precision that I am arguing needs to be preserved, and I'm afraid of the possible loss of

⁴See Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 2 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), chap. 3 *passim*, and Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, 124-69.

what it has to offer if we settle for a purely commonsense, descriptive interiority that, while it certainly helps everyday living, cannot suffice to address the major human-scientific, philosophical, and theological issues of our time.

If the appropriate model for thinking of Lonergan's significance has something to do with what he called the *third* stage of meaning, it would violate that intention to resort to a sophisticated commonsense, descriptive presentation of interiority rather than to appropriate and develop (as Lonergan clearly wanted done) the post-theoretical presentation that is his real legacy, where by "post-theoretical" is meant not the abandonment of theory by interiority but the sublation of theory by interiority. Lonergan is heading toward and making possible a new language, a language that he admits is only inchoate even in his own work; but that new language has to involve a transposition of the heritage that entered into his efforts, and not an abandonment of portions of his integral development as if these were only relics of another era that he had to spend some of his time abiding in even against his own will because of the conditions under which he was forced to teach in pre-Vatican II pontifical faculties of Catholic theology. Lonergan was entirely at home in the best of the Scholastic heritage, more so than any other thinker I have encountered. His effort to move beyond it would be incorrectly interpreted as a repudiation. And we will continue to move to the creation of a new language, I am proposing, in direct proportion to our assimilation and appropriation of the entire cultural, religious, philosophical, and theological heritage that made Lonergan the great figure that he was.

On the other hand, I'm not arguing simply for a return to the Scholastic framework or the Scholastic language. *Insight* and the psychological analogy as presented in *The Triune God: Systematics* both provide us with sufficient materials to retain in the philosophy and theology of the future, in the third stage of meaning, such terms as "potency," "form," and "act," which "come alive," as it were, in chapter 15 of *Insight*, but a good deal of the other Scholastic language is going to have to be transposed into a new key. Some of this Lonergan has done: "agent intellect" becomes the pure, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, for example; one instance of "passive potency" and "active potency" becomes, respectively, sublated and sublating operations in intentional consciousness;⁵

⁵More precisely, "... the active potencies are the transcendental notions revealed in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation. The passive potencies are the lower levels as presupposed and complemented by the higher." Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (latest printing, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 120.

“sanctifying grace” becomes the dynamic state of being in love without restrictions or conditions or qualifications or reservations. Even so, in one of his most honest and forthright admissions of the stark incompleteness of what he had only begun to accomplish, Lonergan states quite forthrightly that we do not yet have the appropriate language for articulating “the emerging religious consciousness of our time.” “There cannot be expected any synthesis,” he wrote, “for the contributions are as yet not available. At most there is possible a set of suggestions that might facilitate reflections,” a set of suggestions that can do no better than rely on the best of the language that *is* available to us from our own tradition as “a temporary or momentary convention.”⁶ So I am suggesting the need for a balance between a retrieval of the best of the theoretical heritage of Catholic philosophy and theology and the anticipation of the radical transpositions and developments that will be demanded as we move into the future. The two were intimately related in Lonergan’s own development. *Vetera novis augere et perficere* was anything but a slogan for Lonergan. It can legitimately be claimed, I believe, that he accepted this papal injunction as defining his own vocation, and that in his own mind the work of developing and completing the positional work in his own heritage was intimately connected to the work of identifying and understanding what that work was in its own right, in its own context, and in its own language.

The mention of “slogans” brings me to a related point. In a casual conversation that I had with Joseph Komonchak when Joe came to Marquette this year to present the Père Marquette Lecture, he spoke about the frequent impression one gets of “boilerplating” in Lonergan’s own writing of *Method in Theology*. That expression summarized better for me than anything else the impression that I have had for some time that *Method* is the work of a tired man who simply wanted to finish the book that was his life’s work. But nobody could legitimately describe *Insight* as “boilerplating.” And I think that we have to avoid similar traps, similar easy ways out, that in our case can’t be justified in terms of fatigue but would be better described as symptoms of laziness. Even the constant repetition of the transcendental precepts, while it no doubt has its value, if it functions as a substitute for careful explanatory disengagement of sublated and

⁶Bernard Lonergan, “Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 55, 70.

sublating operations, is taking an easy way out that in the long run will not be very helpful to anyone. The rigorous phenomenology of judgment, for example, that is, of being reasonable, has barely been begun. A more or less universally agreed-upon phenomenology of fourth-level operations and states has not yet been reached in the Lonergan community. And the lacuna is particularly clear with respect to the first transcendental precept, "Be attentive." Thirty years ago, Lonergan told me that I had to read a book by Manfred Clynes entitled *Sentics*.⁷ He described it to me as brilliant and told me he thought the author was a genius. The book begins an attempt to disengage what in fact are conjugate intelligibilities at the level of the flow of sensitive consciousness, what I would like to call "sentic forms." Despite the fact that my own work on psychic conversion was moving in this area, I failed to take up Lonergan's suggestion until this past year, when I was put on to Clynes's work again by Greg Lauzon, who is attempting to move on from his wonderful lecture here last year on emergent probability and the operators of musical evolution⁸ and who is using Clynes to help him do so. We can be content at one level to articulate in summary fashion the transcendental precepts. There is a value to doing so. But if we do little or nothing more than that, we are not moving into a new stage of meaning but reverting to a purely commonsense appropriation of interiority.

Again, a somewhat different instance of what analogously would be the same point can be drawn from a reflection on Lonergan's Ignatian heritage. I have argued that a mutual self-mediation between Lonergan and Ignatius is possible if one interprets Lonergan's two accounts of decision – chapter 18 of *Insight* and chapter 2 of *Method in Theology* – in terms of Ignatius's "times of election" and, conversely, if one understands what Ignatius is talking about with the help of Lonergan's more detailed and explanatory exploration of conscious intentionality.⁹ But that mutual self-mediation would also be or bring about an advance on the appropriation of the Ignatian heritage. While this claim might meet with disfavor from those people whom my friend, iconographer William Hart McNichols, calls the "Ignatius police," still I want to put it forward. None

⁷Dr. Manfred Clynes, *Sentics: The Touch of the Emotions* (New York: Doubleday, 1977; a revised edition appeared in 1989 from New York: Avery Publishing Group).

⁸Greg Lauzon, "Emerging Probabilities and the Operators of Musical Evolution," *Lonergan Workshop* 20, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Institute, 2008), 185-96.

⁹See Robert M. Doran, "Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Revisiting a Topic that Deserves Further Reflection," *Lonergan Workshop* 19, ed. Fred Lawrence (Chestnut Hill, MA: Lonergan Institute, 2007), 83-106.

other than Roland Barthes concludes an extraordinary essay on the *Spiritual Exercises* with the observation – and the observation is correct concerning some experiences of the *Exercises* and some directors of the *Exercises* – that Ignatius’s work both “establishes a psychotherapy designed to awaken, to make resonate, through the production of a fantasmatic language, the dullness of this body which has nothing to say,” and also “provokes a neurosis whose very obsession protects the submission of the retreatant (or Christian) with regard to [a particular understanding of] the Divinity.” Again, writes Barthes, “Ignatius (and the Church with him) sets up a psychotherapy for the exercitant, but constantly refuses to resolve the transference relationship that it implies.”¹⁰ This is true of some experiences of the *Exercises*, and it is may be only by moving beyond the explicit text of Ignatius that we will be able to avoid the danger of an obsessional neurosis. The best directors of the *Exercises* have sublated the text into a spirituality that has advanced beyond the sixteenth century. And that moving beyond the text may in fact take the form of a mutual self-mediation of Ignatius with Lonergan. Barthes contrasts the situation of the unfree version of the *Exercises* with “another type of asceticism, Zen for example, whose entire effort is on the contrary to “de-obsessionalize” meditation by subverting, in order better to supersede them, classes, lists, enumerations – in short, articulation, or even: language itself.”¹¹ Was Lonergan drawn to the work of fellow Jesuit William Johnston, I have to ask, because that work was moving in a direction that would allow Zen to heal Ignatius even while Ignatius provided a context for appropriating Zen? It is entirely possible. But my present point is that a new language is required to answer these questions, a language found neither in Ignatius nor in Zen and only inchoately in Lonergan, but also that this new language emerges not from nothing but from the ongoing transposition – which is likely to take centuries – of the language and the terms of meaning that influenced Lonergan to advance to a new stage of meaning that sublates what went before.

In summary, then, I’m proposing

(1) that the immense potential in Lonergan’s work for the integration and reorientation of the sciences and of common sense will not be realized until we

¹⁰Roland Barthes, *Sade, Fourier, Loyola*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 71.

¹¹Barthes, *Sade, Fourier, Loyola*.

acknowledge that the task of integration and reorientation is the task of metaphysics as Lonergan conceives the latter, the task of the explicit conception, affirmation, and implementation of proportionate being,

(2) that making that metaphysics our own, that is, conceiving and affirming the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, entails following Lonergan through his detailed reading of Aristotle and Aquinas as well as through the transpositions in their thought that he made in the context of his awareness of modern science, and

(3) that implementing the integral heuristic structure in all the areas envisioned by Lonergan and in the work of developing a new language even for interreligious understanding will succeed in direct proportion to our success in conceiving and affirming the heritage that was his and that is also our own.

2. AN EXAMPLE

I have time to present only one example of what I am talking about, and it is an example that formed the third part of my paper in Naples on the importance of chapter 18 of *Insight*. Unless I'm profoundly mistaken, it would be an example of *implementing* something of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.

The example has to do with the possible appropriation of Girardian mimetic theory by Lonergan's intentionality analysis or, better, by the interiorly differentiated consciousness that emerges in part from that analysis.

In the Naples paper I offered three arguments for the abiding significance of the approach to the good, to decision, to ethics reflected in chapter 18 of *Insight*. The first had to do with a point that is familiar to a number of you from a previous paper that I gave at the Workshop on Ignatian elements in Lonergan's thinking, namely, the proposal that chapter 18 of *Insight* provides in philosophic terms something like the pure form of Ignatius's so-called third time of election.¹² The second proposed that the psychological analogy contained in *De Deo trino* relies on the same appropriation of rational self-consciousness as that facilitated by chapter 18, with the single addition that once (and only once) in *De Deo trino* the judgment entailed in the process is called a judgment of value, something that to my initial great surprise was not the case in *Insight*. The third is that what in

¹²See the paper referred to in note 9 above.

Insight is called rational self-consciousness in *De Deo trino* is called existential autonomy, and that the notion of existential autonomy as understood by Lonergan provides perhaps the principal key to the integration of Girardian thought with Lonergan's interiority analysis. It is this third point that I would now like to use to exemplify and, I hope, bolster the principal point that I'm trying to make in this paper, namely, that implementing the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being in direct conversation with contemporary trends is directly proportionate to conceiving and affirming that structure in indirect conversation with the best in the philosophical and theological heritage that formed Lonergan's own mentality.¹³

I begin with a statement of psychiatrist Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in the dialogical encounter with René Girard published as *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*: "... the real human *subject* can only come out of the rule of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and the "interindividual." Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure."¹⁴

While the statement is excessive, it does contain a position, and my effort is to advance the position. The phrase "the mimetic structure" refers to what is disclosed in the account of acquisitive desire that Girard has been presenting for several decades, in various works of literary criticism, anthropology, psychology, and theological reflection. Very briefly, many of our desires are neither as spontaneous nor as autonomous as we like to believe, but originate rather in the desire of another whom we take as a model or mediator of our own desire. When the desire is acquisitive, that is, when I want what you have or want because you have or want it, where "because" signifies a sensitive mechanism, not a rational decision, the other becomes the rival, and attention is gradually removed from the object of the respective desires to focus more or less exclusively on the rivalry between the model and the imitator. Acquisitive mimesis has become conflictual mimesis, and conflictual mimesis is contagious within a community, leading eventually, if it is allowed to fester and grow, to the selection of a more or less

¹³This section repeats as well some elements from the paper I presented this April at the West Coast Methods Institute at Loyola Marymount University, entitled "Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Cultural Critique: A Meeting Point for Lonergan and Girard."

¹⁴Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 199, emphasis in the text. Girard's response (*ibid.*): "That is quite right."

arbitrary victim or scapegoat, whose immolation, exclusion, or marginalization from the community restores peace at least temporarily and avoids the danger of escalating violence in the community. In other words, the phrase “the mimetic structure” summarizes basic elements in Girard’s mimetic theory. I am interested in Girard first because I think there is something profoundly on target for our authenticity in much of what he says. But I am interested in him also as a systematic theologian, because there are theological issues to which he can make a great contribution, especially in the areas of revelation, original sin, and redemption. But his work needs to be integrated with that of Lonergan, and this task has occupied a good deal of my attention over the past couple of years.

Now, one possible initial heuristic structure for integrating the respective studies of human desire composed by Lonergan and Girard may be derived by expanding upon something that Lonergan writes in *The Triune God: Systematics*:

...we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act.¹⁵

The first way of being conscious is sensitive or psychic; the second is intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Both ways of being conscious are also ways of desiring. The first entails a preponderance of “undergoing,” while the second, though it surely involves passivity – “intelligere est quoddam pati,” Lonergan repeats from Aquinas¹⁶ – stresses as well, and indeed highlights, the self-governed and self-possessed unfolding of operations that is indicated by Lonergan’s repetition of the phrase “in order to ...” The first way appears more spontaneous, though if the “undergoing” is interindividual this may be an illusion. The second shows greater autonomy, but only if it manifests what Oughourlian calls “the real human subject,” the subject that has transcended the influence of

¹⁵*The Triune God: Systematics*, 139.

¹⁶*Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 142, quoting Thomas Aquinas, *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol., who himself is quoting Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 4, 4292 13-15.

the negative mimetic, however precariously. For the two ways of being conscious interact, and the relative autonomy of the second way may be compromised by the gradual infiltration of mimetic desire into the performance of spiritual operations. A clear instance of how this may happen may be illustrated by expanding on a comment in Max Scheler's essay on *ressentiment*, an essay which may justly be interpreted, I believe, as foreshadowing Girard's work, in that Girard adds the crucial piece regarding mimesis. Scheler writes,

Beyond all conscious lying and falsifying, there is a deeper "organic mendacity." Here the falsification is not formed in consciousness but at the same stage of the mental process as the impressions and value feelings themselves: *on the road* of experience into consciousness. There is "organic mendacity" whenever a man's mind admits only those impressions and feelings which serve his 'interest' or his instinctive attitude. Already in the process of mental reproduction and recollection, the contents of his experience are modified in this direction. He who is "mendacious" has no need to lie! In his case, the automatic process of forming recollections, impressions, and feelings is involuntarily slanted, so that conscious falsification becomes unnecessary.¹⁷

The expansion on this comment that I have in mind would stress that the very processions of act from act at the levels of intelligence, reason, and decision – the emergence of a word from insight, the emanation of a judgment from reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned, the procession of a decision from the preceding acts – have already been derailed by an earlier distortion that reaches into the organic interdividuality of the less than "real human subject" and occasions a deviation in the emergence of act from the potentiality of underlying manifolds all along the line, including the emergence of images from the neural manifold. The distortion of the emergence of act from potency gives rise to a distortion also in the emergence of act from act.¹⁸

The first way of being conscious and of desiring is more (though not exclusively) characterized by the emergence of act from potency, and the second

¹⁷Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 77-78.

¹⁸Questions raised by Fred Lawrence following my presentation in Naples prompted this articulation, which needs further development.

more (though not exclusively) by the emergence of act from act, by *emanatio intelligibilis*, intelligible emanation or what I prefer to call autonomous spiritual procession. Girard specializes in clarifying the first of these ways of being conscious, emphasizing its intersubjective or “interdividual” character, while Lonergan has explored the second perhaps more acutely and more thoroughly (to say nothing of more accurately) than any other thinker.

Precisely because of the interplay between these two dimensions of interiority and desire, Girard regards as illusory most of our attempts to describe our acts, including our intentional operations, as either spontaneous or autonomous. In the first book-length presentation of his theory of mimetic desire, *Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque*, translated into English as *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*, he speaks of the illusion that our desires are spontaneous inclinations toward attractive objects.¹⁹ But the same illusion is spoken of there as the “illusion of autonomy.”²⁰ As an illusion of spontaneity, the desire is imagined to be “deeply rooted in the object and in this object alone.”²¹ As an illusion of autonomy, it is thought to be “rooted in the subject.” In fact the two delineations of the illusion cover over the same fact, namely, that the desire has been mediated by another and is contaminated by mimetic contagion.

In the paper that I delivered at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles this April, I proposed some considerations to enable us to make our way through these complex relations. I will repeat these suggestions here in summary fashion.

Lonergan speaks of the need for a fourfold differentiation of consciousness if we are to replace classicism with an acceptable *Weltanschauung* for our time, a differentiation in which “the workings of common sense, science, scholarship, intentionality analysis, and the life of prayer have been integrated.”²² But as I have attempted to argue from the beginning of my own work, “intentionality analysis” is one dimension of “interiority analysis,” but not the only one. There is also the sensitive-psychological dimension, the conjugate intelligibilities that, if Girard is correct, reside largely or at least partly in the intersubjective roots of

¹⁹René Girard, *Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976), 12.

²⁰Girard, *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*, 16.

²¹Girard, *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*, 12.

²²Bernard Lonergan, “Doctrinal Pluralism,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, vol. 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 85-86.

Lonergan's first "way of being conscious." But in this context the word "autonomy" can take on an added significance, beyond the salutary hermeneutic of suspicion that Girard exercises with regard to our illusions. There is a discussion of existential autonomy that appears in Lonergan's presentation of his analogy for the Trinitarian processions, and it is rooted in the rational exigence for self-consistency between knowing and doing that constitutes the notion of value in the ethics of *Insight*.

Lonergan reaches a clear specification of the proper Trinitarian analogy through a series of disjunctions. The disjunctions, he says, will provide a set of criteria by which we may discern whether any given analogy is appropriate or not. The first six of these disjunctions may be treated very briefly.

In the first disjunction Lonergan establishes that we must move from the appropriation of some concrete mode of procession in human consciousness, rather than from an abstract definition of procession; in the second that any knowledge of divine procession must be analogical; in the third that the analogy must be systematic, that is, capable of resolving every other theoretical question in Trinitarian theology; in the fourth that the analogy must be from what is naturally known; the fifth establishes that it must be from a specific nature, not from metaphysical common notions as in natural theology; and the sixth that that nature must be spiritual.

While these first six disjunctions themselves contain elements of Lonergan's appropriation of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, and so while, in the light of what I am trying to convey here, they should not be taken lightly, it is particularly the next three disjunctions that help me to emphasize my point. The seventh disjunction brings us closer to the notion of autonomy. The seventh disjunction is between those spiritual processions in which act proceeds from potency and those in which act proceeds from act. Since in God there is only act, only the latter processions in human consciousness will provide an appropriate analogy. "The analogy... must be selected from the conscious originating of a real, natural, and conscious act, from a real, natural, and conscious act, within intellectual consciousness itself and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself."²³ Such are the procession of conceptual syntheses from direct understanding, the procession of judgments of fact and of value from the grasp of

²³*The Triune God: Systematics*, 175.

sufficient grounds, and the procession of decisions from reflective grasp and the inner word of judgment that follows upon it.

The eighth disjunction is between an *appropriation* of the dynamics of intellectual consciousness and a more distant metaphysical statement of cognitional fact. Only appropriation can enable us to distinguish the autonomous intellectual procession of act from act under the power of transcendental laws from the spontaneous intellectual procession of act from potency and from the spontaneous sensitive processions of act from both potency and act in accord with the laws specific to continuations of prehuman processes such as those manifested in primordial human intersubjectivity. Note, though, that the appropriation itself relies on the more distant metaphysical statement. Note, too, that Lonergan has here introduced his own meaning for the words “spontaneous” and “autonomous.” By “autonomous intellectual procession of act from act” he is referring to a consciousness that is under rule or law only inasmuch as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire, to which there are attached what he came to call the transcendental precepts. But by fidelity to these precepts such a consciousness “rules itself inasmuch as under God’s agency it determines itself to its own acts in accordance with the exigencies” of intelligence, rationality, and existential responsibility.²⁴

This, I propose, is the autonomy of what Oughourlian called the “real human subject.” It does proceed from an intellectual spontaneity, namely, the conscious transcendental notion of being that is the native desire to know and the conscious transcendental notion of value that extends that native desire by force of a further question, a question in the existential order. But that spontaneity becomes preceptive, and this is what converts the spontaneity into a genuine autonomy: not only *do* we raise questions, we must raise them; not only *do* we doubt, we must doubt; not only *do* we deliberate, we must deliberate. We must raise questions lest we pass judgment on what we do not understand; we must raise doubts lest we adhere to a false appearance of truth; we must deliberate lest we rush headlong to our own destruction.²⁵ And it is in fidelity to the *must*, to the exigency into which the spontaneity has been transformed, that there emerges the only genuine autonomy of which the human subject is capable. That autonomy governs only some of the processions that occur in intelligent, rational,

²⁴*The Triune God: Systematics*, 175.

²⁵*The Triune God: Systematics*, 177.

responsible consciousness, those processions in which act proceeds not from potency but from act. Such is the case with the autonomy of freedom whenever we choose *because* we ourselves judge and *because* our choice is in accordance with our judgment; such is the case with the autonomy of rationality whenever we judge *because* we grasp the evidence and *because* our judgment is in accord with the grasped evidence; such is the case with the autonomy of clarity whenever we define *because* we grasp the intelligible in the sensible and *because* our definition is in accord with grasped intelligibility.²⁶ And it is only in the procession of act from act, and not in the procession of act from potency as in the emergence of insight from questions, that the proper analogy is found for understanding, however remotely, the Trinitarian processions: “as is the case when a word arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of understanding, and a choice arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of judgment (that is, by a compound word).”²⁷

The ninth disjunction, the most important, is tripartite, for such autonomy can be manifested in the realm of practical intelligence and rationality, in the realm of speculative intelligence and rationality, and in the realm of existential self-determination through rational judgment and responsible choice. Lonergan writes:

When one asks about the triune God, one is not considering God as creator or as agent, and so one is prescinding from practical autonomy. Nor is one considering God insofar as God understands and judges and loves all things, and so one is prescinding from speculative matters. But one is considering God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune, and so one takes one’s analogy from the processions that are in accordance with the exercise of existential autonomy,’ the autonomy in which one decides to operate in accord with the norms inherent in the unfolding of attentiveness, intelligence, rationality, and moral responsibility.²⁸

That alone is the genuine autonomy of the “real human subject,” and while it is an autonomy that has transcended the mimetic structure of the interindividual and thus emerged into genuine subjectivity, it has not transcended every form of

²⁶See *The Triune God: Systematics*, 177, emphasis added.

²⁷*The Triune God: Systematics*, 177.

²⁸*The Triune God: Systematics*, 179.

subordination or of imitation. Rather, "the autonomy of human consciousness is indeed subordinate, not to every object whatsoever [and, we must add in a Girardian context, not to every mimetic structure whatsoever], but to the infinite subject in whose image it has been made and whom it is bound to imitate."²⁹ Even more precisely, of course, we must emphasize that the autonomy of human consciousness has been made in the image and likeness not of one but of three infinite subjects of the one divine consciousness, and its genuine autonomy consists precisely in its fidelity to that image, issuing a word *because* it has understood something and moving to loving decision *because* that decision is in accord with the true value judgment that is its *verbum spirans amorem*. In such fidelity there *is* imitation, mimesis, but it is the imitation built into the image of the triune God, the imitation of the divine relations themselves. The so-called four-point hypothesis would emphasize such an imitation in the supernatural order, but Lonergan's original psychological analogy insists that such an imitation is constitutive of human nature.

I concluded my Naples paper with the claim that in the final analysis, the abiding significance of the ethics of *Insight* is found in the fact that it is a clear articulation of precisely what constitutes the imitation of the Trinitarian relations that constitute us even in our human nature as images of God. In dialogue with Girard, it may be stated that by fidelity to the transcendental precepts, we move from mimetic contagion to an imitation of God that converts the deviated transcendence of mimetic rivalry and its false religion into the genuine transcendence of being in love with God. But in the context of the present paper, I wish to add that Lonergan's appropriation of the difference between *processio operationis* and *processio operati*, between the emergence in intentional consciousness of act from potency and the emergence of act from act, and so his sophisticated retrieval of the permanent achievements of Thomist metaphysics, alone made possible the contribution that his analysis now is capable of making to implementing the same integral heuristic structure that, before implementing it, he conceived and affirmed with a fullness that is perhaps unparalleled on the contemporary scene. With that intimate joining of appropriating the *vetera* and addressing the *nova*, he has left us a permanent example that we must follow if we wish to develop and implement his achievements.

²⁹*The Triune God: Systematics*, 215.

LONERGAN'S EARLY SHORT PAPERS AND DEVOTIONAL WORKS

Philip A. Egan
St. Mary's College, Oscott
Birmingham, England

A SMALL BUT fascinating part of the Lonergan legacy is that collection of early short essays and devotional works of Lonergan which incorporated into Part Two of volume 20 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, *Shorter Papers*.¹ Here we find fourteen papers, each three to seven pages long, arranged chronologically from the period 1931 to 1953. Lonergan wrote them for college and religious magazines and weeklies or, in one case, delivered as a spiritual conference for Jesuit seminarians. At first glance, readers might be tempted to overlook these early writings as of little lasting value either for understanding Lonergan's later thought, or for Christians today, living after the seismic shifts of the Second Vatican Council. However, a closer examination suggests otherwise. Indeed, there are some gems here well worth exploring.

It might be helpful to begin with a list of the papers, together with the order of their appearance in volume 17, their delivery and original publication details (see table). They fall roughly, in the view of this author, into two chronological blocks, the eight earlier papers (1931-43) and the six later (1947-53). Here we examine, first, the earlier papers, then the later, and at the end, offer some concluding remarks.

¹*Shorter Papers*, vol. 20 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

THE EARLY GROUP OF PAPERS

The topics of the earlier group of papers are somewhat random. The two earliest (“Gilbert Keith Chesterton” and “The College Chapel”) were articles for the annual *Loyola College Review* of which Lonergan was the faculty moderator (1931-33).² Lonergan, by then in his late-twenties, had just returned to Canada from England and had been appointed to the teaching staff of Loyola College, Montreal. He was there until November 1933. He then left for Rome and the *Bellarmino*, and after his Tertianship at Amiens in 1937, returned to Rome to begin the doctorate. He completed his dissertation in just seventeen months. By that time, 1940, the War had broken out and he was sent back to Loyola. His teaching load was not heavy and this afforded him opportunities to pursue his own intellectual interests.³ This was the period when he penned the other six papers in this earlier group: the three short articles for *The Montreal Beacon*, a Catholic weekly (“Secondary Patrons of Canada,” “Savings Certificates and Catholic Action,” and “The Queens Canadian Fund”), “The Mystical Body and the Sacraments,” written for the quarterly magazine of the Catholic Women’s League of Canada, “Quartercentenary,” celebrating the four hundred anniversary of the founding of the Society of Jesus, and another article on Chesterton (“Chesterton the Theologian”), which was published in the Catholic weekly, *The Canadian Register*.

Let us now examine these papers, more or less in order.

Lonergan’s second contribution to the *Loyola College Review* “The College Chapel” – we will return to the first Chesterton paper in a moment – is a brief, three-page description and comment on the new College chapel. As Fred Crowe remarks, Lonergan shows a surprising mastery of the architecture, whilst, true to character, his account passes effortlessly from the building itself to remarks about

²Speaking of his time at Loyola in Montreal, Lonergan once said: “I was busy, you know. My first year at Loyola, I taught Latin, Greek, French and English and had the College debating society, the newsletter and the annual review.” See Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going (eds.), *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 32. For more on this period, see William A. Mathews *Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 49f.

³See Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 109f.

human history.⁴ It needs to be recalled that at this time Lonergan had been reading Christopher Dawson's *The Age of the Gods*, and unsurprisingly the article touches on the themes of culture and cultural shift. Thus, Lonergan admires how the chapel manages to blend harmoniously the new with the old. It is, he notes, "a child of the time," yet its gables suggest Ghent, its windows a Gothic cathedral, its nave Romanesque, its altar, Byzantium and Rome ("The College Chapel" 61). It manages to baptize something of "the Athenian's keen perception of measure, of the Roman's love of order, of the mediaeval passion for logic, of Renaissance enthusiasm for man, of the scientist's control of nature" ("The College Chapel" 62). The reader might be forgiven for detecting here a whiff of that great program *vetera novis augere et perficere* ("to enhance and perfect the old with the new"), which years later would fascinate Lonergan and be so central to his purpose.⁵

The two papers on Chesterton are interesting. At Heythrop, Lonergan found himself attracted to English authors, particularly to G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936), and Chesterton continued to appear from time to time in his writings.⁶ In the first paper, Lonergan lauds Chesterton as a masterful essayist. He highlights Chesterton's superb use of paradox and grotesque, of humorous and imaginative illustrations unexpectedly applied to serious topics, of a constant topsy-turvydom, that is, "standing on one's head to see things properly" ("Gilbert Keith Chesterton" 54). "He exults in playing with words, but his play is seldom child's play; more often does it recall the resourceful hero of Western fiction playing with a revolver" ("Gilbert Keith Chesterton" 58). In the later paper ("Chesterton

⁴Frederick Crowe, *Lonergan* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 18-19.

⁵Lonergan saw his work in *Insight* as not a new line of thought but as a development or enhancement of Thomism according to Pope Leo's dictum: "... I believe this work [i.e., *Insight*] to contribute to the program, *vetera augere et perficere*, initiated by the encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, of His Holiness, Pope Leo XIII." *Insight*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 768.

⁶For example, Lonergan illustrates an aspect of Piaget's understanding of habits by referring to the child in Chesterton's *Orthodoxy* demanding "Do it again! Do it again!" See *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 197-98 and n. 23. There are two other references to Chesterton in the Lonergan corpus. One is an adaptation of Chesterton's famous saying that Christianity had not been tried and found wanting, but had been found difficult and left untried: see *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, vol. 15 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick G. Lawrence, Patrick H. Byrne, and Charles C. Hefling (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 95 and n. 120. The other is a reference to reality as "hard little knobs," a Chestertonian image: see *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 259.

the Theologian”), Lonergan sees a Chestertonian paradox that however much respect Chesterton had for the technicalities of modern philosophy and theology, he was not in the modern, technical sense a theologian (“Chesterton the Theologian” 90). However, Lonergan argues, if Chesterton had lived at the time of St. Anselm, things might have been different. “Then being a theologian was simply a matter of a cast of mind that seizes the fitness and coherence of the faith, that penetrates to its inner order and harmony and unity” (“Chesterton the Theologian” 90). In the eleventh century, in other words, Chesterton’s vitality and inquisitiveness would have made him a peerless theologian. His “questions go to the root of things” Lonergan notes; his answers “are right on the nail”; he has the ability to discern “what really was relevant” whilst rejecting the irrelevant (“Chesterton the Theologian” 91).

Lonergan was enamored of Chesterton’s style, and perhaps it is not too far-fetched to find echoes of it in Lonergan’s own style, particularly in his use of the occasional *bon mot*, or of short, pithy statements and paradox? One thinks of those eloquent, captivating passages in *Insight* and *Method* especially on progress and decline.⁷ Moreover, Lonergan’s admiration for Chesterton as a rhetorician, journalist, and litterateur presages that later differentiation of his between the realms of meaning: commonsense (meanings expressed in ordinary, everyday language), scholarship (“a commonsense grasp of the commonsense thought, speech, action of distant places and/or times”), and theory.⁸

In 1941 Lonergan wrote three articles for *The Montreal Beacon*. “Secondary Patrons of Canada” is a doctrinally rich and spiritually uplifting essay, celebrating the naming by Pius XII in 1940 of the North American Martyrs as Canada’s secondary patron saints.⁹ The background was war, and Lonergan in typical

⁷For example: “Decline has a still deeper level. Not only does it compromise and distort progress. Not only do inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility produce objectively absurd situations. Not only do ideologies corrupt minds. But compromise and distortion discredit progress. Objectively absurd situations do not yield to treatment. Corrupt minds have a flair for picking the mistaken solution and insisting that it alone is intelligent, reasonable, good. Imperceptibly the corruption spreads from the harsh sphere of material advantage and power to the mass media, the stylish journals, the literary movements, the educational process, the reigning philosophies. A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless consistency.” Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972, 55).

⁸See, for instance, *Method in Theology*, 257f and 233 respectively.

⁹The eight North American or Canadian Martyrs were all Jesuit missionaries put to death in the wars between the Huron and Iroquois in upstate New York and Canada in the mid-seventeenth century: Isaac Jogues, Antoine Daniel, Jean de Brébeuf, Gabriel Lalemant, Charles Garnier, Noël

fashion paints with broad brushstrokes. He portrays the patron saint as the answer to a "profound exigence of human nature," an answer to the "infinite longing in the heart of man which St. Augustine diagnosed...when he wrote: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee" ("Secondary Patrons" 66 and 67). Lonergan's argument is that the effort of the modern world to deny God and to create a world without reference to God has resulted in the present "new pattern of egoisms" and "in the hideous nightmare of the fierce religions of hatred" typified by National Socialism and communism. What is needed, he argues, is not a revolution of violence and bloodshed but an "inner revolution in the heart of man," an ongoing "illumination of his understanding and the purification of his will." The Canadian martyrs are wonderful examples of this. Their self-renunciation, modeled on the sacrifice of Christ (cf. Luke 9:23), continues now in heaven where, interceding for us, they seek "to obtain for us the enlightenment that brings the necessity of self-denial, and the good will that makes intentions sincere and performance effective" ("Secondary Patrons" 67).

What makes "Secondary Patrons" interesting for readers today is its anticipations of the basic positions of Lonergan's later thought about the redemptive role of religion in culture. As he would say years later in *Method in Theology*, a "religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress" (*Method in Theology* 55). This theme of the redemptive role of religion in culture runs through many of the essays in both the earlier and the later groups.

In "The Queen's Canadian Fund," Lonergan recalls preaching a retreat to religious sisters in Worthing, on the south coast of England. While he was there, the British government, as a precaution against the possibility of a *Blitzkrieg*, enacted Operation Pied Piper, a huge evacuation of civilians, mainly children, from London and other major cities deemed potential targets for the *Luftwaffe*. Lonergan was impressed by the generosity of the people of Worthing toward the evacuees. He relates it to the Last Judgment scene from Matthew 25 ("I was hungry and you gave me to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me to drink; I was a stranger and you took me in...") and then invites the reader to be equally generous

to the Queens Canadian Fund for Air Raid Victims as a means of offering practical assistance.

In the other *Montreal Beacon* essay, "Savings Certificates and Catholic Action," Lonergan's argument is simple. Canadian war activities, he notes, were causing a 50 percent increase in the national turnover. This surplus, however, was problematic in that it could easily result in inflation and the soaring cost of living, unless another way could be found to balance the books and manage it wisely. The most reasonable solution, Lonergan enthuses, is for all Canadians to save. This requires "the responsible use of freedom," that is, to ask Canadians "to be reasonable in their expenditure, not to increase unreasonably their demand for goods and services, but to save, to save in a big way" ("Savings Certificates" 70). Lonergan identifies such responsibility with Catholic social thought, since, according to Aquinas, "reasonableness is the basic principle in human morality" ("Savings Certificates" 71). This therefore should be the contribution of the Catholic community: being economically reasonable, in order to maintain the health of the Canadian economy. Engagement with the War Savings Certificates scheme, compliance with the government's budgets and taxes, and making voluntary contributions, these were all ideal opportunities for Catholics to put into practice the church's social teaching.

For the reader today, "Savings Certificates" is something of a classic, since it gives a rare and highly accessible glimpse into Lonergan's early economic thinking. The essay was republished in 1992 by Fred Crowe in the *Lonergan Studies Newsletter* together with a brief introduction and some notes, all of which have now usefully been incorporated into the *Collected Works*. It contains a number of links to the piece Lonergan would eventually publish in 1944 under the title *An Essay in Circulation Analysis*.¹⁰ Moreover, its novelty is its interpretation of Catholic social teaching: that in economic matters one is called to act reasonably and responsibly for the sake of the common good. It is not uncommon for Christians to call for a "just wage" or "to use resources wisely," yet Lonergan was seeking to demonstrate in economic arguments exactly what that would mean; as he once put it: "How can you get economic moral precepts that are

¹⁰For a summary of Crowe's remarks, see "Savings Certificates," 68, n. 1. Lonergan elsewhere remarked how "from 1930 to about 1944 I spent a great deal of my free time on economic theory," in E. Cahn and C. Going (eds.), *The Question as Commitment: A Symposium* (Montreal: 1977) 110, cited in Crowe, *Lonergan*, 37 n. 63.

based on the economy itself? That was my question.”¹¹ Here, he explains that what the Church teaches makes good economic sense. This is an approach significant for contemporary apologetics which arguably needs to go beyond grand moral statements in order to flesh out exactly what those statements might mean in terms of the social sciences they seek to critique, leaven and re-orientate.

Lonergan's third contribution to *The Loyola Review* was “Quartercentenary,” an article celebrating the four hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the Society of Jesus. He discusses Ignatius's conversion experience, his ongoing reflection, and, what Lonergan calls, the “method of exploitation” he developed for discerning God's grace, the spiritual exercises. Lonergan then mentions the formation of the Society of Jesus and its spread throughout the world. He sees the Jesuits as characterized by soldierly obedience, by their work in education and by their inward asceticism in the midst of outward activity, which initiated a new form of religious life, markedly different from the enclosed and monastic orders of previously.

“Quartercentenary” could be deemed significant in two respects. First, the paper demonstrates how thoroughly Ignatian Lonergan's intellectual trajectory was. Lonergan lauds Ignatius for his introspective skills, skills that surely characterize Lonergan's own achievement?

Few, if any, have had [Ignatius's] capacity for reflection, for introspective analysis. God led him on, but he kept his eyes wide open. Ever alert, he studied his strange experience. He would ask why he felt now overjoyed and again dismayed, now ready for anything and later overpowered....These states of serenity and anguish he observed, tabulated, compared. By dint of experiment – the terrific experiment of saying “yes” to every good impulse – he came to know practically the answers which theoretical theology and psychology together could hardly formulate. (“Quartercentenary” 84)

Readers of *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, with their appeal to self-appropriation and to the structure and operations of one's own consciousness, would surely concur that Lonergan himself excelled in these qualities and abilities. In this sense, Lonergan was a profoundly Ignatian thinker and “Quartercentenary” reveals this. His intellectual life, interests and achievements

¹¹Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring about Meaning*, 31. See also his remark: “The issue is making economics moral” (*Caring about Meaning*, 163).

were true to type, coinciding exactly with his spiritual commitment as a member of the Society of Jesus.¹²

Secondly, “Quartercentenary” is interesting for what it reveals of Lonergan’s theology of grace and conversion. In 1941, not long back from Rome, he had begun converting into article form, for publication in *Theological Studies*, his doctoral dissertation on operative grace in Aquinas.¹³ The issue Lonergan had studied was Aquinas’s understanding of how God, entirely respectful of free will, operates on the hardness of the human heart, removes it, and works with native good will to enable a person to develop good performance. Significantly, Lonergan finds a concrete example of this in Ignatius and what, in his later writings, particularly in *Method in Theology*, he would summarily refer to as the gradual, long-haul, life-long nature of conversion. “Usually,” Lonergan notes,

God gives his grace not by buckets but by drops. It comes into our souls, not a fully grown tree of sanctity but just a seed. It makes us thoughtful; seriously we utter a prayer; honestly we make a good resolution. But always there are the birds of the air, the rocks, the trodden wayside, the thorns... (“Quartercentenary” 84)

A few years later, when Lonergan was teaching in Toronto, Fred Crowe remembers Lonergan’s passionate conviction about his theology of grace and in particular its unwavering emphasis on God’s initiative and gift, and on its powerful efficacy.¹⁴

The final paper in this early group, “The Mystical Body and the Sacraments,” reprises what is, arguably, the key theme running through these papers: the redemptive role of religion within history. In winter 1940, Lonergan had been reading Toynbee’s *A Study of History*, which explores the progress and decline of civilizations and how creativity results from a creative minority willing to

¹²Elizabeth Murray states that Lonergan’s thought correlates perfectly with the Ignatian tradition in six respects: (1) his emphasis on method (cf. the directives of the *Ratio*); (2) self-appropriation (cf. the spiritual exercises); (3) self-consciousness (cf. meditation); (4) dialectic (cf. discernment); (5) the polymorphism of human consciousness (cf. emphasis on the education of the whole person); (6) work in economics (cf. concern for social justice). See E. Murray “Bernard Lonergan: An Ignatian Thinker,” paper given at the American Catholic Philosophical Association, http://www.sju.edu/~jgodfrey/Murray_Jesuit_ACPA_2007_Lonergan.pdf [May 2008] ACPA, Milwaukee, November 2007.

¹³See Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 92-104 and 110.

¹⁴See Crowe, *Lonergan*, 42-48.

withdraw from day-to-day living to think through the longer term issues, a “withdrawal for the sake of a return.”¹⁵ These concerns are evident in the paper.

Many bonds of solidarity, he says, unite people with each other and there is much that is good. Yet there is also evil in the world, thanks to the crippling effects of original sin.

Men are truly men; they acknowledge a rule and a law above that of beasts; they distinguish right and wrong; they praise many an heroic deed; they abominate much evil. Yet in their very manhood they are cripples: at the best, the good they would they do not, and the evil that they would not, that they do... (“The Mystical Body” 78)

There is only one solution, one true hope, refuge, and remedy for the human heart and for human history: the death of Christ on the Cross of Calvary. We receive the fruit of Christ’s salvific death through the sacraments. Lonergan then develops this theme in relation to each sacrament. Baptism destroys the reign of sin in the individual and “lays the foundations of a new humanity” (“The Mystical Body” 80). Confirmation gives us strength to face the challenges of hatred and error. The Eucharist sustains us in the very life of Christ as branches of the Vine. Penance restores us when we fail or become diseased. Matrimony and Orders structure and extend the saving mission of the Church, and Extreme Unction prepares the dying person to meet the Lord.

“The Mystical Body and the Sacraments” is both a fine piece of catechesis as well as one that tackles head-on the problem of evil. He offers a richly scriptural and theological catechesis in direct relation to the individual’s salvation and to the redemption of human history. Lonergan envisages the Church and its sacraments as a Toynbeeian creative minority, a redemptive community within the world that is the theological, Christological, and ecclesiological solution to the problem of evil. This, of course, is the position he would later map out heuristically in chapter 20 of *Insight*. The theological “solution” not named there is the Christian community presented here.

If one looks at this early group of papers as a whole, we could certainly conclude that their material is of historical interest for Lonergan studies. There is little by way of surprise in them, yet many of the central themes that Lonergan’s later writings will develop and systematically explore can be found in them in embryo: history, progress, decline and redemption, culture and cultural shift, the

¹⁵See Mathews, *Loneragan's Quest*, 110-11. Mathews also refers to four untitled and undated pages of notes from around this time that Lonergan made on the ideas of progress and decline.

redemptive role of religion, conversion, and the operations of grace. There is also a growing focus on the discernment of the inner structures of human consciousness. The one general exception to these remarks is the important essay "Savings Certificates and Catholic Action," with its accessible glimpse into, and application of, Lonergan's developing thoughts on economics.

THE LATER GROUP OF PAPERS

The topics of the six papers in the later group are more homogeneous and richer than the earlier. They were all, with one exception, offerings for the devotional magazine, *The Canadian Messenger of the Sacred Heart*, and explored the General Intention of prayer for the month as mandated by the pope. This period of Lonergan's life from 1947 to 1953 was exceptionally busy. Six years studying the cognitional structure of Aquinas and came to its term in 1948 with the completion of the last essay of *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*.¹⁶ Already in the mid-1940s, he had completed his early cycle of writings on economics (*For a New Political Economy* [1944] and the initial draft of *An Essay in Circulation Analysis* [1945]).¹⁷ In 1945, he had begun teaching for the first time a course on Trinitarian theology. That was also the year that The Thomas More Institute for adult education was established at Loyola and Lonergan began offering an evening class, "Thought and Reality," which explored many of the themes on cognition with which he was now absorbed.¹⁸ However, in 1947, Lonergan had been moved from Loyola to Regis College, Toronto, a change he initially found uncongenial, but once settled in, he taught courses on grace, the Blessed Trinity, Christology, and the virtues. It was there, in 1949, that he began work in earnest on *Insight*, a masterpiece which would have to be rounded off early in time for his departure to Rome in late summer 1953.¹⁹

The first paper, "The Mass and Man," is an outstanding offering. It was written in response to the papal prayer intention for June 1947, that "from the

¹⁶See Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan SJ*, ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrell (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974) 266-67; cf. Crowe, *Lonergan*, 48f and Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 133f and 160-76.

¹⁷See Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 112-23.

¹⁸See Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 146-59.

¹⁹Cf. Crowe, *Lonergan*, 66-67. For the "creative illness" Lonergan suffered after his move to Toronto and the subsequent commencement of *Insight*, see Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 185-90 and 211-20, respectively.

Holy Sacrifice of the Mass be drawn the power of saving human society," a theme Lonergan must have found congenial. The paper begins with a moving meditation on the sufferings on Christ and their meaning, which can be grasped not by arguments but by faith. To human judgment "the passion and death of Our Lord is the symbol of human suffering caused by human wrong; it is the drama of human vice and the consummation of human virtue. But to faith, it is the chief act of religious worship..." ("The Mass and Man" 95). It is an act of sacrifice, adoration, propitiation, thanksgiving, and intercession. Through it, we are called to put on the same mind of Christ and to enter this Way, the Way of the Cross (cf. "The Mass and Man" 95-96). This Way, Lonergan notes, is for us a grace and, repeating what he had said elsewhere about the gradualness of grace, notably in "Quartercentenary," he tells the reader that

[g]reat and sudden changes wrought by grace would set grace in conflict with the slow and gradual processes of nature. But pray first to pray constantly; pray constantly to know as Jesus knows, to love as He loves, to do as He did. That is the prayer that draws out of us the old Adam, to mould us, mostly unaware, day by day, ever more in the loveliness of Christ our Lord. ("The Mass and Man" 95-96)

Above all, however, Lonergan says, we must participate in Christ's self-offering on Calvary made present in the Mass. His words about the Mass are sublime and inspiring.

The Body that was given for us on Calvary, the Blood that was shed for us there, are present on our daily altars. The same High Priest that offered His Body and Blood on Calvary still offers them, a clean oblation, at the continuous break of sunrise, as spinning earth ever greets new day. ... One may come as the faithful and beloved St. John with Our Lady by his side. One may come as the reluctant thief in honest acknowledgement of one's sins. One may come as the repentant Magdalene who knelt weeping at the foot of the Cross. But what matters is not how one comes, but whether one puts on, prays to put on, the sacrificial spirit of Our Lord, to offer with Him His Sacrifice for the redemption of mankind and the mystery of the glory of God. ("The Mass and Man" 97)

The last two paragraphs, about the power of the Mass to save human society, are among the most sublime in the whole Lonergan *corpus*, as well as a succinct and lucid expression of his position on the redemption of history. The problems of human society, he says, will not be solved by an

astonishing series of miracles. If problems are to be solved, they will be solved by men who have taken the time and the trouble to discover their nature, who possess the talent to think out solutions, who are gifted with the judgment necessary to proceed from abstract theory to concrete policy. ...But it remains that man without the grace of God cannot begin to do for himself what he ought to do. ("The Mass and Man" 97)

This is the role of God's grace. Lonergan's words are arguably even more applicable today:

Our glorious Western civilization is on the verge of intellectual and moral bankruptcy. Once more we must learn to love, one the other. Once more we must learn that life on earth is endurable only if first we seek the kingdom of God. Once more we must learn to believe God as little children, to be able to think as objective and honest men. ("The Mass and Man" 98-99)

The Mass is the source of human salvation, he concludes, because its participants are intensified in faith, hope, and charity "to the point where they become effective in human affairs" and as such effectiveness becomes "operative on a sufficiently broad scale" so human society can be saved.

"A New Dogma," about the recently defined doctrine of Mary's Assumption, to some extent repeats in a more popular form some of the arguments, examples and conclusions Lonergan reached in the paper "The Assumption and Theology" given in summer 1948 at a theological congress in Montreal and subsequently incorporated into first *Collection*.²⁰ In "A New Dogma," Lonergan makes a clear distinction between doctrines and systematics, "It is one thing to believe, as God requires us to believe, and it is another to know the reasons and explanations that are to be given for our belief" ("A New Dogma" 100). Still, he argues, while the dogma of Mary's Assumption must be believed because it is a dogma, it is nevertheless a good thing to know the reasons. A dogma of faith must be in scripture or in an apostolic tradition, Lonergan argues, either implicitly or explicitly. Whilst many things are explicit in scripture (e.g., the foundation of the Church on Peter in Matthew 16:18-19), other matters are only implicit (e.g., that Peter would have successors). An example of this is the manner in which the Divine Stranger in Luke 24 led the disciples to grasp the meaning of the passages in the Old Testament referring to the redemptive death of the Messiah. Moreover,

²⁰See Bernard Lonergan "The Assumption and Theology," in *Collection*, vol. 4 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 66-80.

the Church had used this distinction between the implicit and the explicit throughout its history in order to propose dogmas not explicitly contained in scripture. Such, for instance, was Nicea's definition of the Son's consubstantiality with the Father, or Ephesus's definition of Mary as the Mother of God, or Chalcedon's definition of the two natures in one Person.

Revelation is not merely a matter of words, but also of meaning; not merely of superficial meaning, but also of profound meaning. God expects us to accept his whole message, and he has given us an infallible church to teach us as our Lord taught his apostles and disciples. ("A New Dogma" 103)

Loneragan discusses the grounds for the dogmatic definition, arguing that it is contained implicitly in scripture, a fact that can be grasped in exactly the same way Christ demonstrated the doctrine of his redemptive death to be contained in the Old Testament. Mary, by her immaculate conception, was kept free from original sin, the ground of death and corruption, and she lived a sinless life in the grace of God, the ground of the resurrection. How could she have been subject to the curse of Eve? The conviction about her Assumption grew over the centuries in the mind of the Church as can be seen in the liturgies of East and West, the sermons of the saints, and the writings of the great theologians. Latterly, Lonergan notes, for almost four centuries the ordinary magisterium has been asserting the Assumption to be a matter of faith and "this, of course, is far more significant than the thought of theologians, for the church cannot err in such matters" ("A New Dogma" 105). Pius XII consulted widely and then decided to make a solemn definition. "May the Immaculate Heart of Mary," Lonergan concludes "alive in her living body in heaven, take compassion on all her children in this world, and obtain for them the grace of inward peace with God and of outward peace with their neighbor."

"A New Dogma" is avowedly interesting to readers for the light it sheds on "The Assumption and Theology." But perhaps more importantly, it illuminates Lonergan's enduring view of the role of systematic theology: that of methodically seeking to understand the doctrines of faith.²¹ This position remained fixed throughout his career and was eventually transposed into the higher viewpoint of his proposed method for theology.

²¹Loneragan articulated this clearly in an article he wrote in 1954 for *Gregorianum* : see Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," in *Collection*, 114-32, especially 127f.

In the short “Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Immaculate Heart of Mary,” written for the June 1951 *Messenger*, Lonergan’s piety is evident. He speaks of sin as deception, as a great lie, and how latterly such lies have spread throughout Western culture. The fundamental problem of the times is the permanent human problem of truth and of remaining steadfast in it, through the prayer that enables it. Yet this was exactly the purpose of Christ’s mission, to give testimony to the truth (cf. John 18:37), to enable people to find the truth and to live according to the truth. This grace God continues to give in abundance today as ever before, if only we would ask for it. This, Lonergan says, is the significance of devotion to the Heart of Christ and the Heart of Mary. The Church

directs our imagination to the symbol of Christ’s love, to the Sacred Heart that represents love greater than which no man hath, ... [and to the] Immaculate Heart [of Mary] that in faith and trust, in charity and perseverance, in sacrifice and in penance we pray for the blessings of truth and the glory of God in this world and hereafter. (“Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus” 115)

The General Intention of Prayer for January 1952 was the “Humble Acknowledgement of the Church’s Teaching Authority,” and this was the title of the next of Lonergan’s articles. In this paper, Lonergan makes extensive appeal to scripture, although, like his argument, the texts cited are somewhat eclectic. He begins with the life of Christ, which, he states, was but a prelude to his abiding presence among us in his mystical Body, the Church. At the Ascension, Christ mandated his apostles to go out to make disciples of all the nations, to baptize and to teach in his name (Matthew 28:18-20). He completely shared with his apostles his authority. As a consequence, Lonergan argues, appealing to the Last Judgment scene of Matthew 25, just as Christ is to be recognized

in the hungry and the thirsty, in strangers and prisoners, in the sick and destitute ... so too there is an acknowledgment of Him in the teaching authority of his Church. If one acknowledges that authority to be the authority of Christ, the Son of God, there is no difficulty in being humble about it. (“Humble Acknowledgement” 119)

Lonergan then concludes in apologetic mode. There is, he says, “only one Church that unmistakably is his mystical body, that is spread over the face of the earth, that speaks with his authority, that demands allegiance in his intransigent way” (“Humble Acknowledgement” 120).

The challenge is that to acknowledge Christ present in that Church requires grace, and God gives his grace in response to our prayer. That is why we should pray for humble acknowledgement of the Church's teaching authority.

We shall pray that the light of faith and the strength of good will may be given to those outside the Church, that they may believe and be saved. We shall pray that those in whom the light of faith has grown dim may break away from the seduction of human opinions to acknowledge humbly the voice of Christ in the voice of his Church. ("Humble Acknowledgement" 120)

The reader today might be struck by two aspects of this paper. One is the unusual, meandering line of argument Lonergan pursues. He could have made use of such more usual texts as Matthew 16:18f ("You are Peter") or the call of the apostles in Luke 6:13f. He makes no mention of Pentecost or the role of the Holy Spirit in the call and guidance of the Church's pastors and their teaching, and his appeal to the Last Judgment scene in Matthew 25 – that just as Christ is to be seen in the hungry and the thirsty, the naked and the sick, in strangers and prisoners, so too he is to be seen in the Church's magisterium – seems at best forced, even odd! "Humble Acknowledgement" is in some respects the least successful and most uneven of these *Messenger* articles.

On the other hand, the paper does afford a glimpse into Lonergan's own uncomplicated faith in Christ and his Church. There is a refreshing immediacy about his submission to the truth-claims of Catholic ecclesiology. Indeed, Lonergan's simple piety, visible in many of the papers from this period, suggests he took to heart from early on Newman's adage that ten thousand difficulties do not make a doubt.²² It had served him in good stead both vocationally and intellectually during his time at Heythrop and during the early 1930s, enabling him "to look difficulties squarely in the eye, whilst not letting them interfere" with his vocation or his faith.²³ Indeed, in his 1968 paper "Belief: Today's Issue," Lonergan applies Newman's adage directly to the distinction between personal faith and religion, on the one hand, and the complexities of theology, on the other:

...religion is one thing, and theology is another. Most saints were not theologians, and most theologians were not saints. Theology stands to

²²For Newman's saying, see John Henry Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua. Being a History of His Religious Opinions* (2nd ed., 1864), reprinted and edited by P. Hughes (New York: Doubleday: 1959), 239

²³See "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection*, 263. Cf. Lambert, *Caring about Meaning*, 14.

religion, as economics does to business, as biology to health, as chemistry to du Pont industries....Because of this difference, Cardinal Newman was quite right in saying that ten thousand difficulties do not make a doubt: the ten thousand difficulties are in the superstructure, but doubt is in one's personal life. ²⁴

All his friends and acquaintances testify to his strong faith throughout his life, even in later years when facing infirmity and suffering.

The last paper for the *Messenger* was "Respect for Human Dignity," the General Intention of prayer for July 1953. It is important to recall the background in Lonergan's own life at this time as he prepared to move to Rome, whilst, *Insight* largely complete, he was anxiously seeking a publisher. Of all the early papers, this is the one that readers will immediately recognize as characteristically Lonerganian as he differentiates critical realism from naive realism: knowing as taking a look from knowing as that which is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.

Lonergan begins with 1 Samuel 8:1-7 (the people rejecting prophetic rule and asking God for a king) but then, rather abruptly, he applies the text to today's situation, in which people want science to be their king rather than God. However, there are two different orientations within modern science, he notes. The older scientists "took it for granted that the real is what is out there, and that knowing it objectively is a matter of taking a good look," whereas the newer are committed to a different view of reality, knowledge and objectivity: that "all one can do is observe, understand and verify" and that "what is true is not what one can see and imagine, but only what one can conceive intelligently and affirm reasonably" ("Respect for Human Dignity" 122). He then explains why this is important. On the older view, naive realism, because the soul, free will, and God cannot be literally seen, they cannot possibly be real, whereas the new approach, critical realism, simply asserts that what is real is what is true. This allows as much for four-dimensional space-time and other such unimaginable processes, as well as for affirming or denying the truths of religion. There is though, Lonergan adds, a lag. Because the new approach has not yet made much headway in economics, sociology, politics, psychology, education, and the other human sciences, these disciplines are still currently under the sway of the older view. This is regrettable because the new view promises to revolutionize them, making them truly "human" sciences by replacing their reductionist view of humanity and

²⁴Bernard Lonergan "Belief: Today's Issue," in *A Second Collection*, 97.

replacing it with a view of the human person as intelligent and reasonable, free and responsible.

In dealing with material things the intelligent procedure is to count and to measure, to chart tendencies and frequencies, to formulate correlations and functions, to design machines and methods, to coordinate and to check and to keep books. But it does not follow that that is the way to deal with persons... ("Respect for Human Dignity" 124)

Unfortunately, the erroneous view, combined with modern technology, raises the spectre of totalitarian, machine-like societies in which man is controlled and not left to be intelligent and reasonable, free and responsible. This would gravely damage the dignity of humans and human aspirations.

One is assured that in due time the world will be a paradise of prosperity, security, and peace. But, while men wait for the utopia promised by universal organization, there are wars, transplanted populations, refugees, displaced persons, unemployment, outrageous inequalities in living standards, the legalized robbery of devaluated currencies, and the vast but somewhat hidden numbers of the destitute. ("Respect for Human Dignity" 125)

This was the nub of Pius XII's "Christmas Eve Address" (1952). Lonergan argues that at the root of the problem lie not only theological but philosophical errors. Just as the old science involved a flight from God, so the new way of knowing would pave the way for a return to God, although this would require God's grace and so our prayer. Hence, Lonergan concludes with a prayer to the Sacred Heart that he will send forth the Holy Spirit to free humanity from inadequate and reductionist epistemologies:

The Sacred Heart of Jesus is the symbol of the personal love of God for man. To that Person and that Love let us turn... Let us turn genuinely, honestly, sincerely, as we are, with all our sins and sufferings, our sorrows and regrets, our weaknesses and fears. Let us thereby come to know ourselves better as persons. Let us pray that the Light and the Love of his Holy Spirit may come abundantly to us and to all men, that the face of the earth may be recreated; that organized society may cease to be a source of almost inevitable sinning; that men may know men as the free and responsible persons that they really are; that man's aspirations for doing

good widely and effectively may no longer be corrupted by an antiquated notion of objectivity. (“Respect for Human Dignity” 127)²⁵

In the view of this author, this paper stands alongside “The Mass and Man” as one of the best of these articles for the *Canadian Messenger*. It is also one of the most important, especially as it articulates in popular form Lonergan’s life-long doctrine about reality, human knowing, and objectivity. Moreover, “Respect for Human Dignity” also describes the need for an intellectual conversion leading to a subsequent change in the way humans operate (moral conversion). The way to both conversions, Lonergan avers, is through prayer to God for the gift of his grace. In other words, here in embryo is the core of Lonergan’s philosophy, recapitulating the points about progress and decline made in the earlier papers whilst pointing the way toward his maturing thought in the essays of the late 1960s. It might make a fine introductory paper to use with students beginning their studies of Lonergan.

This brings us to the last of the six items in this later group of papers, the domestic exhortation on “The Mystical Body of Christ,” given in November 1951 to Jesuit seminarians. It must have been an unforgettable occasion. The paper given is magisterial and full of depth yet also very inspiring, one that succeeds in being personal enough – heart speaking to heart – to act as a spiritual conference. It is both highly theological and deeply spiritual, using carefully chosen scriptural passages, and yet not remote, in that Lonergan’s own faith and piety as a believer shine through time and again, as he summons up the very best of his thought as a professor of theology, an expert on Christology and the Trinity.

He takes five aspects of love as his integrating theme. First, there is the eternal love of the Father for his eternal Son, which is the Person of the Holy Spirit. Then, there is the love of the Father for his Son as man, which is also equally the Holy Spirit, the “stupendous corollary of the incarnation”: that the Father loves created humanity with the same love (“The Mystical Body” 107). Thirdly, there is the love of Christ as a man for his fellow humans, the love of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, his human will and mind, feelings and emotions, the Good Shepherd laying down his life for us. Then there is the love of the Father who loves us his adopted children in the same way he loves his only Son, in fulfilment of Jesus’ prayer at the Last Supper: “Thou hast loved them as Thou hast loved me” (John 17:23). By becoming his adopted sons and daughters, we have been reborn, with our sins forgiven. The life of God’s Son has been implanted within us so that we might

²⁵“Respect for Human Dignity,” *Shorter Papers*, 127.

now imitate the self-sacrificing love of the Son. But this new and higher way of life, Lonergan adds,

is not lived in isolation. For it is the life of the member of Christ, and it flourishes in us in the measure that we are united with Christ. He is the vine and we are the branches. As branches wither and die when separated from the vine, so are we without the life of grace, when separated from Christ. As branches flower and fructify when united fully with the vine, so too do we when united fully with Christ. ("The Mystical Body" 109)

Lonerган adduces several sayings of St. Paul that demonstrate how this new life of grace in Christ is a gift. It means dying to self to live for Christ. It cannot be lived alone, but only through the Holy Spirit dwelling within. Its goal and final end "is the beatific vision, a vision that was Christ's by right from the first moment of his conception, a vision that will be ours inasmuch as suffering with Christ we shall be glorified with him" ("The Mystical Body" 110). We might note in passing here how Lonergan's Christology challenges those theologians who deny or obscure the view that in his earthly life Christ enjoyed the beatific vision.

The fifth aspect of love Lonergan identifies is the "charity of God diffused in our hearts by the Holy Ghost given to us (Romans 5:5)."²⁶ It is this love of God which had enabled the seminarians to enter the Society of Jesus and currently to persevere in it. But unlike the other virtues which can become excessive, charity, the love of God and the love of neighbour, can never be excessive. Lonergan ends the conference with the prayer of Jesus at the Last Supper. Let us ask him that his grace and love within us might grow ever greater. Let us make this prayer, Lonergan concludes,

not only for ourselves but for all his mystical Body, that all its members be alive with the life of grace, that in our age, so blotted with anxiety and suffering, the number of saints totally given to God be multiplied, that the mystical Body grow enormously to include all men in accord with the universal salvific will of the Divine Father. ("The Mystical Body" 111)

The content of this conference, its undoubted delivery in his characteristically magisterial and sing-song manner, the depth of its meaning and its dramatic

²⁶Here again we find Lonergan referring to what was always one of his favorite scripture passages: Romans 5. Interestingly, as Fred Crowe notes, that spring, Lonergan had repeated his Thomas More Institute lectures, but under a new title, "Intelligence and Reality." He provided a handout of almost thirty pages of notes, at the end of which he spoke of the insufficiency of philosophy and a reference to the new love "poured forth in your hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given you." See Crowe, *Lonerган*, 68-69 and 77, n. 29.

conclusion would surely have made a lasting impression on its listeners. But overall for readers today, what is significant is that once again we see Lonergan the man of faith, a Jesuit and a priest, drawing on his profound intellectual resources yet communicating with his listeners in a genuinely personal and spiritual manner. "The Mystical Body of Christ" is another contribution whose brilliance stands out in this second batch of the early short papers and devotional works.

SOME EVALUATIVE COMMENTS

In offering an initial, brief evaluation of the overall significance of these fourteen early papers and devotional works, we must first acknowledge that they form a mixed bag, with the later papers generally richer and more impressive than the earlier. Even so, there are times, even in the articles written for the *Canadian Messenger*, when one has the impression that Lonergan is not entirely comfortable with his topic or writing in this medium, as if he were travelling away from home. Nonetheless, an uncomplicated piety and commitment shines through his prose, which manages to incorporate poetic and inspiring phrases. Outside the Latin theology, it is fascinating to hear Lonergan as a theologian and spiritual writer as well as to gain an insight into his own heart.

Not everything here is, by any means, of lasting significance for understanding the *iter* of Lonergan's development. In the earlier group, "Savings Certificates and Catholic Action" stands out as an exceptional entrée into his economics, and "Quartercentenary" is notable for its theology of grace and for manifesting Lonergan's own Jesuit provenance. In the later group, the two papers "The Mass and Man" and "The Mystical Body of Christ" give a glimpse into Lonergan's theology. "A New Dogma" and "Respect for Human Dignity" reflect his lifelong interest in cognitional structure and theological method. As a collection, the papers range across all the key areas of Christian faith and morals, but they have typically Lonerganian concerns: the structure of history, grace, human solidarity, and the redemptive role of religion. In this respect, "Secondary Patrons of Canada," "The Mystical Body and the Sacraments," and "The Mass and Man" stand out. Indeed, if anything, the whole collection, with occasional references to the Last Judgment scene of Matthew 25 or calls to readers actively to exercise their responsibility, evinces Lonergan's abiding social concern, his Jesuit commitment to justice and his own desire for the resolution of pressing human problems. This is the context to his discussion of the role of grace and the

operations of human consciousness, especially human reasonableness and responsibility, and how a redeemed solidarity can be redemptive of present woes.

There are at least three features or aspects of these writings of Lonergan that would seem to be of import for contemporary Christian witness and theology.

First, three of these papers would make excellent spiritual reading because of their doctrinal content and motivation to personal responsibility: "The Mystical Body and the Sacraments," "The Mass and Man," and the domestic exhortation, "The Mystical Body of Christ." These are papers which stand on their own and could be read profitably by Christians today. In them, Lonergan's realistic theology of the sacraments is refreshing. He sees the sacraments as instituted by Christ to be the ordinary means of grace for bringing about that human solidarity needed to redeem human history. This is a theme not always explored in systematic theology: a kind of liberation theology of the sacraments. In the Western cultural context, this is important when discussing and establishing appropriate pastoral priorities and strategies. For many Christians have drifted away from the active practice of their faith, or they deem regular participation in the Church's sacramental life a matter of personal choice.

Secondly, in "The Mass and Man," Lonergan, in a manner characteristic of the pre-Vatican II era, lays stress on the sacrificial nature of the Eucharist, the Mass "as a memorial of the passion and death of Our Lord" ("The Mass and Man" 93). This, of course, entirely in accord with the doctrine articulated in paragraph 47 of *Sacrosantum Concilium*, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council. But Vatican II also sought to bring out a fuller theological understanding of the Eucharist: the real Presence of Christ in the scriptures proclaimed, the Mass as a sacred meal, the adaptation of the liturgy to cultural contexts, the Mass as a celebration of the royal priesthood of all the faithful, the Eucharist as not only the summit of the Church's life but the source of its mission in the world. All of this was enfolded in the liturgical changes that ensued: the use of the vernacular, the reordering of the altar, the enhancement of the presider's chair, the emphasis on lay ministries, and communal participation. Yet perhaps in all of this, for many Christians today, the sacrificial nature of the celebration has now been overlaid or even forgotten, which is why recent liturgical thinking, notably in the writings of Pope Benedict XVI, has been seeking to address this. In this respect, Lonergan's Eucharistic theology, far from being an anachronism, could arguably contribute toward an authentic and holistic liturgical renewal.

And thirdly, Lonergan's differentiation between systematic and doctrinal theology is critical for any authentic Christian theology. In "A New Dogma," he expressed this as a distinction between the fact and reality of dogmatic truth, a reality to be believed in faith, and the theology which explains and investigates it. This distinction, developed in Lonergan's later writings, especially in *Method in Theology*, is grounded in the difference between understanding and judging. Certainly within Roman Catholic theology, the doctrinal and systematic differentiations have a venerable tradition yet often in practice seem to get overlooked with the result that much of the pluralism and development taking place in theology ends up being conflictual, dialectical, and counterpositional rather than complimentary and genetic. The distinction between doctrines and systematics is also important on a pastoral level, especially when encountering believers who express difficulties with Church teaching. Newman's dictum – that ten thousand difficulties do not make a doubt – a saying that put Lonergan in good stead – can be helpful when dealing with disagreements, real or apparent.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Some concluding remarks. In Lonergan studies, it is usual to play up his philosophy and theological method whilst playing down his Roman Catholic provenance. There may be good reasons for this. His actual contribution to philosophy and theology is massive, crossing all the usual boundaries, and so to play down the fact that he was a Christian, a priest, and a member of the Society of Jesus might help to propagate his thought in some circles. But on the other hand, the engine cannot be removed from car and then the car be expected to work. True, most readers of Lonergan rightly focus on his major works such as *Insight*, *Method*, *Topics*, and the *Collections* rather than these early essays. Yet these papers are a reminder of the Tradition to which Lonergan all his life faithfully belonged, a Tradition which he massively helped to transform, and a Tradition which deserves to know him far better than it does. These early papers, then, act – to change the image - like an anchor to a ship. In any case, they have an interest of their own. They disclose something of the inner man, the *humanum*, the personality that grounded his intellectual quest and achievement. Indeed, more than that, they disclose the Source of his phenomenal creativity: namely, God's gift of his love in Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. Without that Source, from which he drew every day in the sacramental life of the Church, a

complete understanding of Lonergan's thought is not possible. In an era when many neglect this Source themselves, or, for one reason or another, overlook it, these early essays act as an abiding corrective.

ROBERT MOSES AND THE COMMON GOOD

Paul Kidder
Seattle University
Seattle, Washington

THERE IS A provocation in my title that will require some history to explain. It recalls the title of Patrick Byrne's essay, "Jane Jacobs and the Common Good," delivered at a 1987 conference at Boston College celebrating the work of Jane Jacobs and serving as a venue for her presentation of her theory of ethics in making a living – a theory ultimately published as the book, *Systems of Survival*.¹ The 1987 conference had come about through the splendid efforts of Richard Keeley in cultivating a relationship with Jacobs and featured contributions by Boston College Lonergan scholars, who had long been attracted to Jacobs as result of Lonergan's praise of her great classics, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, *The Economy of Cities*, and *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* – a series that has been called her "urban trilogy."² While Lonergan had always recommended Jacobs's work as an illustration of what insight is all about ("there are five of them on every page," he would say), Byrne realized that the affinity between Jacobs and Lonergan runs deeper than that, for Jacobs had given us a vision of the good of cities as concrete and culturally embedded, such that one must look for it by dwelling within the patterns of urban interaction and by analyzing clues, the way a detective does, rather than by manipulating the

¹Patrick Byrne, "Jane Jacobs and the Common Good," in *Ethics in Making a Living: The Jane Jacobs Conference*, a supplementary issue of *Lonergan Workshop* 7 (1989): 169-89. Jane Jacobs, *Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992).

²Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Modern Library, 1993); *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969); *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Random House, 1984).

abstractions (such as “housing,” “jobs,” “central business district,” “slum,” and “open space”) that tend to drive the planners’, developers’, and government officials’ grand schemes for urban growth and renewal. Byrne argues that, although Jacobs does not explicitly use the language of ethics or Catholic social teaching in her urban works, nevertheless her thinking is exceptional in carrying forward the intentions of that tradition and even correcting some of its weaknesses. Central to the tradition is the idea that the good is realized not simply in the practical ends achieved through social cooperation, but is just as importantly embodied in the quality of the human relations that are born of those patterns of cooperation. This is what is meant, says Byrne, when one says that a company is “good to work for” – not primarily that it is profitable, or efficient in its production, but that the character of the community shaped by the commercial enterprise is a source of meaning, value, and pride to everyone connected with it.³

Jacobs’s urban writings form a defense of the dignifying “moral patterns” of community that flourish in neighborhoods that are invested in the life of their streets and the strength of the informal ties that develop when neighbors encounter one another regularly in the course of pursuing their individual interests or concerns.⁴ Out of these vital streets can emerge the vital community that can organize politically in ways that focus the power of the city on the concrete insights of citizens living the life of the neighborhoods first hand.

It is remarkable to observe, from the perspective of our own day, the degree to which she envisioned this vitality of streets and districts as a function of diversity. A diversity of neighborhood uses that bring decent people out at all times of the day helps to keep neighborhoods safe; a diversity of building types permits start-up businesses and low-income residents to be incorporated into the community; a diversity of ethnic backgrounds allows new types of immigrants to benefit from the experience of those who have come before. The great threat to this vision of the common good would be the zoner’s and planner’s vision of the homogenized city of single-use districts, massive super-blocks, and monolithic housing projects, all tied together by limited-access automobile routes. Such a vision is the urban version of static conceptualism. Jacobs’s anti-conceptualist approach locates the good in cycles of cumulative progress and in concrete human relations rather than in abstract visions of efficient order and abstractive aesthetics.

³Byrne, 173.

⁴Byrne, 171-73.

In her response to Byrne's presentation at the 1987 conference, Jacobs had a mixed reaction to his interpretation of her work. She appreciated the intent of his use of the phrase, "the common good," and found refreshing the confidence with which he brought moral language into urban affairs; however, she expressed a fear that the term, "common good," is itself too abstract; for it was, in fact, the very kind of abstraction that was used against activists like herself in the 1960s, activists who were fighting the slum clearance projects that were turning huge parcels of New York City into monocultures of high-rise housing laced with expressways. These citizens who put up a fight to preserve their traditional, walkable, multi-use neighborhoods were called "selfish" and were marginalized in the name of "the common good."⁵

Behind these massive slum clearance and highway projects was the man who, in the course of five decades, established himself as the greatest builder of public works in American history and one of its most ingenious masters of governmental process: Robert Moses. Jacobs came up against Moses most directly in the battle over Washington Square Park in the late 1950s. Moses had developed a plan to route a four-lane arterial right through the middle of the park. With a characteristic stubbornness, he refused to consider an alternative route around the park. But under the leadership of activist Shirley Hayes, and with the support of academics such as Charles Abrams and William H. Whyte, a highly effective organization of park advocates managed to put up a formidable resistance – what Abrams called, "the revolt of the urbs."⁶ On the one occasion that this fight brought Jacobs into the presence of Moses himself, he was angrily defending the Washington Square project before New York's Board of Estimate, declaring, with exasperation, before storming out of the room, "There is nobody against this! Nobody! Nobody! Nobody! ...but a bunch of...a bunch of...mothers!"⁷ But in this case, the "mothers" won. This victory, moreover, was followed by others – opposition to street-widening and removal of the "slum" designation for the West Village among them – with the result that Jacobs and her fellow activists earned

⁵Byrne, 186-87: "Jane Jacobs's Response to Patrick Byrne's Presentation."

⁶Robert Fishman, "Revolt of the Urbs: Robert Moses and His Critics," in Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson, eds., *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York* (New York: Queens Museum of Art, 2007), 122-29.

⁷Alice Sparberg Alexiou, *Jane Jacobs: Urban Visionary* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 56.

the reputation of doing what no politician had been able to do: to marshal effective opposition to the plans of Moses.⁸

As we have come to know, there was much more at stake in these battles than the fate of single projects, for Jacobs was also introducing a new strategy and a new vision. Moses was expert at marginalizing public opposition. When he couldn't do it with rhetoric he could find the political weaknesses of the decision makers and exploit them. Jacobs and her colleagues realized that to reverse what Moses was doing to New York's neighborhoods required something more than organization and something more than politics. One had to attack his strength, which was, above all, his vision for New York: the modernist Radiant City, with its organization of life into gleaming skyscrapers amid parks and ribbons of highways. One would need to penetrate to the philosophical assumptions at the root of that vision and to amass the evidence that would demonstrate what people in New York neighborhoods knew from their own experience: that all of the condemnation of property, all of the displacement of persons, and the billions of dollars spent on construction created projects that were destructive of the kind of communities that were New York's greatest asset, that made it a good place for ordinary people to live – or even a great one.

The Death and Life of Great American Cities has been called a classic of American letters not merely because it is a great piece of activist writing, but because it beautifully evokes a dimension of the American dream that modernism had almost completely obscured: the longing for a built environment that is conducive to the creation of strong community. This is why, looking back to Jacobs's urban works, Patrick Byrne finds a profoundly moral argument at its core: the case for locating the good in the concrete patterns of human engagement that promote human development, creativity, conversion, and transcendence.

It is, of course, a great exaggeration to say that this larger battle was a contest between Jacobs and Moses, for there were hundreds of activists and writers reflecting Jacobs's point of view, and hundreds of thousands of planners, officials, functionaries, urbanologists, economists, businessmen, contractors, and workers behind the forty-year march of New York's modernist agenda. Yet, in the way that complex matters often become crystallized through the incarnate meaning of single individuals, the battle of which I speak has come to be characterized as "Moses versus Jacobs." In part this is due to the great surge of eulogy that followed upon Jacobs's death two years ago, the high-profile

⁸Alexiou, *Jane Jacobs*, 96-111.

establishment of the Jane Jacobs Medal by the Rockefeller Foundation, the championing of Jacobs by the founders of the Congress for the New Urbanism, and the prominence of Jacobs in Ric Burns's 1999 *New York: A Documentary Film* and *New York: An Illustrated History*.⁹ The Jacobs-Moses controversy has been given new urgency in the face of global warming, for the foot-oriented model of urban design that Jacobs advocates is sustainable in a way that the modernist vision is decidedly not. The narrative of Jacobs's New York activism in these appreciations of her work fits neatly into a David-and-Goliath template, with Moses playing as scenery-chewing Goliath. In an initiative that functions as something of a corrective to this narrative, a large retrospective of the entire career of Moses was mounted last year by the Museum of the City of New York and two other institutions, the associated essays and photographs for which have now been published as *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York*, edited by Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson.¹⁰

But there is another monumental authority who plays into this reconsideration of the legacy of Moses: it is Robert Caro and his 1974 biography, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*.¹¹ Here again, we are dealing with a classic of American letters, a book that won the Pulitzer Prize the year it was published and which has more recently been listed, by The Modern Library, as one of the one hundred best nonfiction books of the twentieth century, among only a handful of biographies on that list.¹² In a lecture given recently in connection with the Museum of the City of New York exhibit on Moses, Caro described a dramatic insight and a dramatic inverse insight that lead him to write this 1,246-page book. The insight came very slowly, over a long period of time. Caro was an aspiring investigative political reporter working in New York City and living on Long Island. He began to notice that when he and his wife played tennis at Hempstead Lake State Park or visited Jones Beach they were using facilities built under the authority of Robert Moses. He began to notice that they drove to these places on parkways that Moses had envisioned, for which Moses had secured the funding and fought the battles for the right of way. If they were

⁹Ric Burns, Lisa Ades, and James Sanders, *New York: A Documentary Film* (New York: Steeplechase Films, 1999), and *New York: An Illustrated History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

¹⁰Op. cit.

¹¹Robert Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).

¹²*The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, which is now published in a Modern Library edition, did not make the list.

heading into the city they might take three expressways built by Moses and then cross Moses's Triborough Bridge. If they went to Lincoln Center (built by Moses) they would take the Throgs Neck bridge (by Moses), the Cross Bronx Expressway (by Moses), and then the West Side Highway (again, by Moses). What Caro gradually came to realize, as he says, is that "one man had shaped the whole city and the whole region in which I lived. He had had enough power to do that."¹³ As this insight slowly dawned on Caro, he began to read the plaques that marked the opening of the parks. The various plaques named a whole series of governors, but next to each was the name, "Robert Moses," and on Long Island, at Heckscher State Park, the plaque dated from the 1920s, while now in the 1960s, as Caro was looking at this plaque, Moses was still in power. Moses had possessed that power for over forty years.

If Caro's insight had to do with the breadth and depth of Moses's influence, his inverse insight had to do with the nature of political power. As a young writer dedicating his professional life to the task of explaining political power within a democracy, Caro now suddenly came to believe that everything he had attempted to say as a reporter was, in his words, "a kind of baloney." For the implicit assumption in all of it was that political power, in a democracy, derives from the citizenry through the medium of elective office. But Moses, who had never been elected to anything, had exercised more power to shape New York than any of the six governors or five mayors under whom he had worked. Yet neither Caro, nor apparently anyone else, could say what the sources of that power were. To discover those sources would require years of investigative work.¹⁴

In the course of pursuing this work, Caro added further dimensions to the project. He wanted, in the first place, to get deeply into the particular kind of creative genius that Moses possessed, and so he painstakingly followed the process by which the vision for Long Island's parks and beaches came to be formed in Moses's imagination, showing how all of this came to Moses with such grandeur and urgency as to drive him to oversee his great parks projects of the 1930s with a meticulous command that carried his creative imprint right down to the details in the brickwork on the bath houses. Caro wanted, secondly, to discover, in a very concrete way, how the traits of a particular character (Moses's complex combination of creative ambition, managerial skill, loyalty to mentors,

¹³Robert Caro, lecture at the Museum of the City of New York, February 11, 2007. Available online:<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=6647840002253263069&q=Robert+Moses&ei=RKMbSOmiN5vWrgOIqOjFAQ&hl=en>.

¹⁴Caro, lecture at the Museum of the City of New York.

dedication to public service, competitiveness, political wiliness, stubbornness, and arrogance), came to be changed by power, and then lured, by power, into his own unique, tailor-made form of political excess tinged with cruelty. Caro had the conviction, thirdly, that a book about power must be, in part, about the effects of that power on the powerless, and so he spends many pages on the stories of those who were defeated or displaced by Moses, whose neighborhoods were plunged into decline, or whose careers were ruined in the name of progress and the common good. *The Power Broker*, fourthly, aims to be as much a history as a biography, for Moses was not the author of the urban ideal that he sought to realize. He was the man who could get things done; what was to be done had already been envisioned by the artists, planners, and visionaries that Jacobs refers to collectively as the proponents of the “Radiant Garden City Beautiful” paradigm which had, already by the late 1920s, begun materializing in the form of consumer demand for urban open space, office towers, and automobile thoroughfares. Caro was very much aware that Moses’s power lay, in large measure, in his ability to channel these great historical forces.¹⁵

Throughout the book, Caro frequently draws attention to the public perception of Moses as a democratic hero. In the 1920s he gained a reputation as the man who wrestled some of the most magnificent properties on Long Island from the hands of elitist landowners and developed them for public recreation. Throughout the thirties and forties he was the builder of hundreds of parks, playgrounds, and pools throughout the New York metropolitan area. All through this period, and into the fifties and sixties, he was knitting up the five boroughs of New York City with the stunning bridges and beautiful parkways that linked the city with the treasures of Long Island. Throughout most of this long period, Moses served without drawing a salary; amassing no personal wealth, benefitting personally in no monetary way from his policies and projects. He was “money honest,” and for that reason, in the eyes of the press, was always “on the side of the angels.”¹⁶

This is the “good Moses” that is often contrasted with the “bad Moses” who was put in charge of urban renewal for New York City, who oversaw, in particular, several enormous Title I slum clearance programs and who undertook to ram several expressway projects right through densely settled urban areas. These are the projects that destroyed neighborhoods deemed “slums” by Moses and his ilk simply because they could not, or would not, see that the

¹⁵Caro, lecture at the Museum of the City of New York; and Robert Caro, “The Man Who Built New York,” available online: <http://www.robertacar.com/cityshaper.html>.

¹⁶Caro, *The Power Broker*, 16-17, 348-49, 406, 433, 566-71, 632-36.

neighborhoods in question were healthy and vibrant communities. His programs displaced tens of thousands of citizens without giving them any kind of reasonable means of coping with their displacement. It was the triumph of automobile-centered culture over those who had no cars and no need of them. It was the triumph of a concept of living – the uniform high-rise dwelling – over the tangible good of the life of urban streets. Caro's subtitle, "Robert Moses and the Fall of New York," articulates the author's thesis that the decades-long shift of priorities to building programs had, by the late 1960s, so weakened other aspects of New York's infrastructure, and the highway system had gone so far in abetting urban flight, that Moses's ideal of progress had turned out to be a surprisingly effective recipe for urban decline.

The reassessment of Moses that appears in the writings of Ballon, Jackson, and others associated with the recent Moses exhibits takes issue with this image of decline. While these authors admit that Caro was writing at a low point in the city's history, they emphasize that the resurgence that New York has recently been experiencing depends heavily on the Moses infrastructure. They point to the hundreds of public amenities that continue to be of service to the cities neighborhoods in an age when such public works are out of fashion. The reassessment occurs, it could be said, in light of a kind of fatigue that many are feeling with the forms of public process that are common today, where the budgets are endlessly scrutinized by the tightfisted taxpayers, where projects must undergo layers of environmental impact screening and design review, where any crank with sufficient persistence can, it sometimes seems, exercise veto power over any given project. Former governor Eliot Spitzer frequently said that another biography of Moses could be written, entitled, "At Least He Got It Built."¹⁷ Even Paul Goldberger, architecture critic for the *New York Times* and columnist for the *New Yorker*, has wondered aloud whether we shouldn't be willing to sacrifice some of our present-day urban democracy for some of Moses's brand of executive efficacy.¹⁸

But such claims do not get to the depth of either Caro's criticisms of Moses nor of his praise of the man. No one that I know of has painted a richer picture of

¹⁷Eliot Spitzer, "Downtown Transportation Issues Speech," Regional Plan Association 16th Annual Regional Assembly, May 5, 2006. Available online: <http://www.rpa.org/pdf/SpitzerRPATransportation.pdf>.

¹⁸Paul Goldberger, "Eminent Dominion: Rethinking the Legacy of Robert Moses," *The New Yorker*, February 5, 2007. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/skyline/2007/02/05/070205crsk_skyline_goldberger.

the inspiration and genius of Moses; no one has stood in more awe of the scope of his achievements. But Caro insists upon an exact accounting of the costs that come when we allow this kind of person to wield the kind of power that Moses did. When we overlook questionable steps in the conduct of public process for the sake of a worthwhile outcome, we tend to ignore the way in which the lapse in this case becomes a precedent for the next one, setting the stage for cumulative procedural decline. In evidence of this phenomenon we may draw on examples from Caro's book. As early as the construction of Jones Beach in the mid 1920s, Moses was making a standard practice of what he called "driving stakes." The extraordinary design that Moses had conceived for Jones Beach was conceived on a scale that no one had ever seen before. Two enormous bathhouses done in Barbizon brick, with a water tower designed as a kind of art-deco version of St. Mark's Campanile in Venice, and with projected costs upwards of a million dollars. Incredulous at the extravagance, legislators offered a mere \$150,000 in funding, expecting a new design that would be within reason. Moses promptly used this entire budget to lay the foundation for one bathhouse, and then invited the legislators to see what their money had purchased. They sought and failed to fire him, and so they were stuck either settling for the embarrassment of wasted money, or providing more funding.¹⁹ Over and over again Moses used this technique. He would get a budget for a highway approved, and once construction was underway, would go back to see if the legislature was interested in adding on- and off-ramps, which, apparently, did not come as standard equipment. He managed to have his projects exempted from city procedures in such a way that he could apply for approval of a project and begin construction on it the same day.²⁰ If there was a question of historical preservation affecting one of his projects, he would send his workers in to destroy the structure before the approvals had entirely made their way through the bureaucracy. On one occasion, Mayor LaGuardia, having been tipped off that Moses was jumping the gun, sent in police to physically force workers to halt the demolition.²¹

These are the kinds of means that were justified, in Moses's mind, by the ends. But how many, among the public at the time, would be so convinced of the value of those ends that they would tolerate such means if they had known of them? Moses could not have been optimistic that the public would approve,

¹⁹Caro, *The Power Broker*, 224-25.

²⁰Caro, *The Power Broker*, 468.

²¹Caro, *The Power Broker*, 448-49.

because he worked very hard to keep such matters out of the public eye. To do so he had to have the cooperation of members of the press, who, in fact, became ever more malleable with the unveiling of each new public work.

Another trick of Moses that began very early and made longstanding contributions to his power was his talent for writing deceptive legislation. Serving under Governor Al Smith in the 1930s he drafted bills that buried potentially unpopular provisions deep in the most tedious parts of the prose, sometimes with elements of the provision separated in the document in such a way that no one could notice the combined effect of those elements.²² And like J. Edgar Hoover, he kept files with damaging information on any potential opponent, scraped up by the men he called his “bloodhounds,” and did not hesitate to use it.²³ He marginalized opponents with misleading or false accusations; he ruthlessly destroyed careers without scruple or remorse; and eventually his power was so great that he would simply go ahead with projects in exactly the way he wanted to, no matter whose opinions were on the opposite side.

In bringing these activities to light, Caro offers a corrective, first, to the mythology of Moses as the man “on the side of the angels,” for that moniker hid the fact that Moses’s devilish deeds were simply not motivated by the things that we normally associate with corruption. They were not aimed at financial gain, or perks, or sinecure, but at creative control. Secondly, Caro lays to rest the equally inadequate mythology of the “good Moses” and the “bad Moses.” For the *modus operandi* did not fundamentally change throughout the whole of Moses’s career, only its rapacity and the number of people negatively affected by it. And so Caro’s account forces us to think deeply about the complex relationship of means and ends in the pursuit of urban affairs. We cannot be satisfied to identify the good with some set of particular urban goods, but we must equally identify the good with a process that is pursued not only by the letter of democracy but by principles of ethics, and by the ethical formation of character, that are the only bases upon which democracy can thrive.

Just as ethics, then, lies at the heart of Caro’s biography, and just as it was central to Byrne’s reading of Jacobs, so too, as I mentioned in my opening, was ethics the subject of Jane Jacobs’s own contribution to the 1987 conference at Boston College. It was a working paper for the theory that was eventually published as *Systems of Survival*. In many ways, this book is unlike her previous

²²Caro, *The Power Broker*, 174-75, 185 ff.

²³Caro, *The Power Broker*, 469-74.

writings. It is not a work specifically on cities – in fact it says very little about urban issues *per se*. It is rather a much more general work of applied philosophy, attempting to identify and relate various moral values and virtues that occur in all kinds of human productive activity, or what she calls “making a living.”

The central claim of the theory is that there are two systems of ethics and values that dominate the moral life of human beings. There is not one universal system, as many philosophers have held, nor an indefinite number of systems existing relative to an indefinite number of circumstances, as some philosophers have held. There are two. They correspond to, and arise out of, the two kinds of activity necessary to every society: trading and ruling. Each form of activity establishes sets of means and ends; each requires the cultivation of specific virtues and values; each develops, over the course of generations, the complexes of custom and ritual that determine the character of a culture.

Virtues and values associated with the “commercial,” or “trading,” syndrome include qualities that one can immediately recognize as necessary to the viability of every sort of private production and trade: “shun force, come to voluntary agreements, be honest, compete, respect contracts, use initiative and enterprise, be efficient, dissent for the sake of the task, be thrifty.”²⁴ This list identifies a “syndrome” in the sense that its imperatives complement one another and form a circle of mutual dependency. For example, honesty, the making of voluntary agreements, and respect for contracts combine to mutually reinforce one another in providing alternatives to the use of force in getting what one wants. Competition, initiative, and efficiency combine to form ways of enhancing the productivity of the overall commercial system, yet they do so only when tempered by virtues of honesty and respect for contracts.

The task of governing yields virtues that not only differ from, but in some cases prove the opposite of, the virtues of the commercial syndrome. Among the ones that Jacobs associates with the “guardian” syndrome are these prescriptions: “shun trading, exert prowess, be obedient and disciplined, respect hierarchy, be loyal, deceive for the sake of the task, make rich use of leisure, dispense largesse, be exclusive.”²⁵ Where trade requires people who can enter easily into financial relationships while remaining open to changing market opportunities, governance requires people who will not be swayed from their obligations and loyalties by the

²⁴Jacobs, *Systems of Survival*, 215.

²⁵Jacobs, *Systems of Survival*, 215. In the working paper for the Boston College conference, this was called the “raiding” syndrome.

enticements of financial gain. Where trade must make the most of limited time and resources, governance is strengthened by manifesting its importance through grand ceremonies, lavish expressions of largesse, and great shows of force. Where trade expands its range of potential partners by rewarding consistent honesty and openness to the good will of strangers (even encouraging dissent for the sake of making the venture more competitive), governing closes its ranks around those who excel, not only in performance, but in forms of obedience and loyalty that entail a willingness to deceive when deception will serve the objectives of the ruling authority.

Jacobs supports her description of the syndromes with a great variety of examples. In the history of cultures the guardian syndrome can easily be recognized in the virtues of warriors, hunters, and raiders. But she means to recognize also the ways in which such virtues must be adapted to the problem of just governance under conditions of complex specializations of work, and this recognition is signaled in her decision to name the syndrome after the governing class of the imaginary state in Plato's *Republic*. One of the most interesting explanations of a historical pattern that Jacobs's theory provides is her account of the traditional disdain for trade by ruling classes. The reason why Plato's guardians do not engage in trade, or why codes of chivalry forbade it, or why the exchange of political services for money by elected officials is considered a form of corruption is not that these things violate some particular rule or single value, but that they disrupt an entire system of delicately interrelated guardian values.

Such violations lead to breakdowns in the systems. The obvious sort of breakdown is where one or more of the precepts within a syndrome fails to be observed. But Jacobs is chiefly concerned with the compounded breakdown that occurs when virtues from one syndrome are imported into the other, an occurrence which can produce particularly virulent forms of corruption by instantly turning the other virtues of the syndrome into vices, resulting in what she calls "monstrous hybrids." The most obvious and potentially atrocious version of this sort of hybrid is the case in which a governing body enlists the commercial entities of its polity in an unscrupulous expansion of its power. By such a move, not only does commerce lose the freedom and competitiveness that allowed it best to serve the populace, but all of its remaining virtues of efficiency, thrift, initiative, and enterprise contribute to a more effective promotion of the wrong goal.²⁶ Such a scenario is at the root of the power of organized crime.

²⁶Jacobs, *Systems of Survival*, chap. 9.

Extortion, for example, brings force and the threat of force into the world of trade with the result that the trading virtues are subverted into serving the racketeers that are acting as the self-appointed rulers over it. On a larger scale, planned economies can negate so many of the rewards for initiative, competition, efficiency, and thrift that they undercut the self-motivating and self-rewarding character of production and exchange. The black market that emerges in such situations is an equally, though differently, demoralized hybrid wherein neither the guardian nor the commercial virtues function as they should.

These examples illustrate the incursion of ruling into commerce. The incursion of commerce into ruling is no less problematic. Bribery of public officials is the most apparent sort of case, but bribery is just one example of how the introduction of payments in the wrong circumstance creates conflicts of interest, many of which are more subtle than bribery. Indeed, so easily can conflicts of interest arise that the ethical codes, ethics boards, and regulators of many professions and public-service organizations are dedicated principally to defining and preventing such conflicts. Yet often there are such large forces at work that codes and boards are not enough to ensure ethical practice. Legal scholar Mary Ann Glendon has made insightful use of Jacobs's model in interpreting the complex sets of ethical standards that characterize the legal profession. Having to serve clients from many varied sectors of society, and acting as both guardians of the law and sellers of services, law practitioners have, at their best, found ways to move through both of Jacobs's systems of values while recognizing and maintaining the tension between them.²⁷ But when, in the early twentieth century, a powerful legal elite arose that disdained the "morals of the marketplace," there came with it a danger that guardian values would become the overriding paradigm in a profession where, in fact, most lawyers do not appear in courtrooms and offer their services for fees in a manner nearly indistinguishable from other service professions.²⁸

Although *Systems of Survival* turned out to be the only one of Jacobs's books to ever make a best-seller list, it has always been difficult to know exactly what to do with its moral theory. By giving it a completely general scope Jacobs separates herself from urban studies, taking on the philosophers, as it were, rather than the planners and city managers. But she does not take on the tradition of philosophical ethics in her writing in the way that she had taken on the tradition

²⁷Mary Ann Glendon, *A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 63-69.

²⁸Glendon, *A Nation Under Lawyers*, 69-71.

of planners and urban economists in her earlier books, so that philosophers seem to have felt little need to look into her theory or respond to it. In the celebrations of Jacobs's life and work that have followed her death in 2006, it is the urban trilogy, along with her urban activism, that has been consistently proclaimed as her legacy, while relatively little has been said about her contributions to ethics.

But now I wish to make an assertion about Jacobs's ethics that ties it more closely to her urban thinking and activism and may therefore help to give it a more central place in her legacy. Jacobs herself may have been wishing to move beyond the urban context, but we are more likely to appreciate the ethical theory the more we can relate it to her urbanism, for it is in that context that we value Jacobs the most. My assertion, then, is that whatever else Jacobs's moral theory may be good for, it is certainly good for making sense of the battles that Jacobs fought in New York City. Support for this assertion can be found in Jacobs's response to Byrne at the 1987 conference and in response to a question from the audience. The connections contained in these brief allusions to the New York battles can be filled out by everything we have learned about Moses from Robert Caro and others.

I imagine Jacobs, at some point in her reflections leading up to entry into the field of moral theory, puzzling over those contesting visions of "the good" in New York City. How was it possible, she might have wondered, for points of view as diametrically opposed as her side and Moses's side to be speaking the same moral language of character, community, and the good? How could they use these same terms and yet find themselves so consistently speaking right past one another? Does this mean that ethics is simply not very relevant in such practical struggles? That only politics matters? Or only the bottom line? One can imagine Jacobs feeling that the phenomenon in question lies so deep within our moral sensibilities that any explanation of it would have to go well beyond the field of urban affairs to something that is present in all economic and political activity. If she were to achieve this explanation with the kind of generality that it demanded, it would make sense to downplay, in the exposition of it all, her own special expertise in matters of North American urban life.

But in her reaction to Byrne's paper the urban connections come flooding back. Her chief frustration with the language of the common good is that Robert Moses spoke it in support of his goals. Other statements she made at the conference reinforce this connection. Asked explicitly about how the ethical theory flows from her previous works, she said that she had always been puzzled by the way English upper classes have so often been hostile to cities. Jacobs's

began to connect this attitude with the friction that the guardian syndrome has with the world of trade that is the engine behind the growth in any major city: "Cities are the locus of these bourgeois, these trader virtues."²⁹ In a subsequent comment she confessed her own personal preference of the trading virtues, but added that when it comes to a neighborhood fight, one has to be willing to adopt the other syndrome.³⁰ So the distinction of syndromes clearly applies, in her thinking, to cities, to neighborhood fights, and, with particular force, to Moses and his minions.

The theory, moreover, explains much about these things. How could there be such a disconnect between Moses and the neighborhoods? Because the values that the neighborhoods were seeking to promote were trader values, and until the residents of those neighborhoods started organizing and fighting, their methods dealing with the city were trader methods that could not succeed in the world of governing. How could Moses see so little value in the networks of small local commercial enterprises that knit up the fabric of New York districts, enlivening their streets and keeping work, for many, close to home? It was not merely an oversight on his part, but a deep moral scotosis born of his monocular vision of New York as a product of guardian values. Why did the two sides in the battles for the city manage to speak the same language with such different purposes in mind? Because the words acquire their concrete meanings through two completely different ways of relating values to one another. The terms are fixed by relations and the relations pertain to two different syndromes.

If these explanations cast Moses as a guardian's guardian, still, we need to go further. For Moses is not simply a paradigmatic case of the guardian syndrome, but a case of the guardian syndrome run amok. If even a slim majority of Caro's extensively researched claims are accurate, we have, in Moses, a guardian who was excessive in his deception for the sake of the task, who dishonestly manipulated the legislative process and pushed the envelope of legality, who wrongly created a massive enclave of autocracy within a democratic system, who did not buy influence but lavishly distributed it to obtain power over officials and companies, and who deepened, over time, in his stubbornness, arrogance, unreasonableness, and indifference to elected officials and the public.

But having said all of this, we must go further still, for Moses was also, we should say, the perpetrator of a particularly monstrous hybrid. One could make a

²⁹Lawrence, ed., *Ethics in Making a Living*, 239.

³⁰Lawrence, ed., *Ethics in Making a Living*, 274.

good case that the hybridization is to be found in the way that Moses replaced market-driven building with government-mandated building, pursuing projects on such a scale that huge segments of the construction industry were turned over to public works and Moses commanded extraordinary power over investment and labor markets. But the hybrid that I have in mind is something even more pervasive and insidious. It is the abstractive “planning mentality” that I referred to in my opening paragraph. The planning mentality, which is Jacobs’s principal adversary on nearly every page of *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, subverts spontaneous enterprise in cities, thwarts the social ingenuity of residents, and masks important kinds of feedback to its initiatives by conceiving its solutions on the drawing table and then imposing them through the devices of government. In so doing it always believes that it is promoting (among other things) business, but it cannot grasp that what urban commerce needs most is a set of relations that planning cannot provide because they are, in many respects, the opposite of planning. Planning hybridizes commerce in a way that subverts the very thing it wants to promote: the commercial and residential vitality of urban neighborhoods. Jacobs’s ethical reflections dig into the deep roots of this hybrid in commonsense morality and character formation, adding a layer of complexity to all that she had said in her great trilogy of urban writings.

Now, before concluding, let me confess that I have one more reason for emphasizing the ties between Jacobs’s ethics and her urban works. It is that I am reluctant to grant the generality to her moral theory that she would like it to have. To the extent that Jacobs’s syndromes are used as a stand-alone interpretive framework, I would like to see them used to say something fairly particular about certain kinds of human economic, social, and political activity. To the extent that we are seeking to express the most general framework for thinking about moral matters, I would prefer – not surprisingly – to see Jacobs’s ethical ideas nested within Lonergan’s theory of the human good. In this light, Jacobs would be seen as differentiating characteristic ways in which terminal values are made to inform the good of order, showing how these values play out in both individual and social contributions to that order.³¹ Such an approach adds a greater degree of normativity to her observations. As Byrne observed regarding the urban writings, Jacobs is always focused on a balance that must exist between the good of ends and the good of means, for there are always ends, as it were (i.e., intrinsic values), operative in the means that are adopted. By this same interpretation, Jacobs’s

³¹Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), chap. 2.

ethics becomes an ingenious tool for exploring the way particular complex arrangements of means and ends form coherent wholes, and why they must be treated as such. But by putting Jacobs within Lonergan's theory one can emphasize this role of intrinsic values in every moment in the moral life: in particular actions and particular values within syndromes, in the value of the syndromes themselves, and in the cultivation of the kind of mentality that can dwell within both syndromes, thus coordinating their ends and means without conflating them. Many of the questions from Lonergan scholars at the 1987 conference were nudging Jacobs in this direction, and a letter from Patrick Byrne drew attention to Lonergan's formulations specifically.³²

But there are, no doubt, limits to the number of these theoretical qualities we could have successfully brought to the discussion with Jacobs herself, for we believed that she possessed them fully, but possessed them less in what she was saying than in who she was and how she was motivated. It is one thing to describe an arrangement of interrelated values; it is another to pursue them with exceptional inspiration, with extraordinary belief in people, with a rare infusion of intrinsic and transcendent worth. We saw Jacobs as possessed of a great genius for the transformation of common sense. This she achieved not only through the power of "five insights per page," but through a genuineness that formed an irreducible and irreplaceable exemplar of incarnate meaning.

Under the weight of endless process that has recently plagued New York City development – five years spent debating the rebuilding of ground zero, ten years trying to push through a plan for an improved Penn Station³³ – some have wondered whether the city might not have saddled itself with a bit too much of Jacobs, whether it might not be time for "another Robert Moses." But if the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction from Moses, let us not see the solution in a nostalgic swing back to the old extreme. The true message in Caro, in Jacobs, and in Lonergan, is a call for discernment of the balance of means and ends in our pursuit of the common good. The impasses present in much of public process, I believe, are less a problem of the proliferation of public involvement than a problem of widespread participation by people who lack an appreciation of the public realm and have less than a whole-hearted commitment to it. The solution to such a dilemma is not to leave the matter to the likes of a Jacobs or a Moses but to learn from their story how to dedicate ourselves more

³²Patrick Byrne, "Some Further Reflections and Comments: A Letter," in *Ethics in Making a Living*, 203-10.

³³Goldberger, "Eminent Dominion."

intelligently and confidently to our cities and to the moral community of humankind.

UPSTREAM MEDICINE

Robert Luby
Lawrence Family Medicine Residency
Lawrence, Massachusetts

A “HIGHER VIEWPOINT” is said to occur when there is a movement “from an understanding within one context to an understanding within a new and more comprehensive context that includes the prior understanding in a much richer and broader context.”^{1,2} Modern medical science has achieved unparalleled success in treating acute diseases and crisis health situations. But when this same paradigm has been applied to chronic disease, the outcomes have been far more modest. The thesis herein argues that modern medicine needs to undergo a paradigm shift in order to arrive at a higher viewpoint capable of more successfully treating and preventing illnesses of all kinds, acute and chronic

In contemporary clinical practice, medical practitioners rely heavily on descriptive knowledge of disease (symptoms and diagnoses). Because most acute diseases have limited variability in their clinical presentation, the paradigm has enjoyed success in the treatment of acute disease. However, this necessarily results in a “downstream” approach. Symptoms and manifestations of illness far from the physiologic origins of disease are targeted, leaving root causes unaffected.

Chronic diseases, in contrast, usually have multiple obscure causes, protean manifestations, and a much higher degree of variability in their phenotypic expression. Therefore, descriptive knowledge alone will often prove inadequate for successful treatment. Explanatory knowledge will be necessary for impacting the root causes and having a chance at cure. The utilization of explanatory knowledge will require that physicians move away from the current paradigm’s focus on symptoms and diagnosis. A “more comprehensive context” must be embraced, namely, the whole of the *physiologic functions* of the body.

¹Joseph Flanagan, *Quest for Self Knowledge* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 23.

²Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 37-42.

The “*physiologic function-based*” approach is an “upstream” methodology seeking to modulate *physiologic dysfunction* close to the root cause(s) of disease. If this approach is realized, modern medicine will have arrived at a higher viewpoint. Medical practitioners will find themselves in a much richer and broader context more amenable not only to the successful treatment of chronic diseases, but to the maintenance of optimal health.

In order to better understand the “richer and broader context” of which we speak, the paper is organized as follows. The first section will introduce three foundational influences operative at the time of the rise of modern medicine which were instrumental in its successful treatment of acute diseases. The second section describes three critical misinterpretations which emerged as a result of the events of the time. The third section traces the demographic shift from acute to chronic diseases, and discerns important differences between acute and chronic diseases. The fourth and fifth sections analyze how and why the foundational influences and the misinterpretations introduced in the first two sections proved to be Achilles’s heels in the context of chronic disease. In the sixth section an “upstream” paradigm is proposed with the intent of an improved diagnostic and therapeutic approach to chronic disease. In the seventh and final section an analogy is presented between the new medical paradigm and linguistic grammar. Therein it is demonstrated how the “higher viewpoints” which have been a hallmark in the development of other fields of knowledge may be applied to the medical enterprise.

I. THREE FOUNDATIONAL INFLUENCES OF MODERN MEDICINE

Historical Background

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the epidemiology of disease and the demography of death were very different than today. Life spans were short. Death usually occurred rapidly from infection or other acute disease at an age which would be considered young by today’s measure. Chronic disease which lingered for years in an individual patient was relatively rare. This was the time when the discovery of the pathogenic microbe, or “germ,” heralded the onset of modern medicine.

The Germ Theory of Disease and the Doctrine of Specific Etiology

With the discovery of the microbe, the germ theory of disease soon followed. This theory stated that the presence of one type of germ was the cause of one specific disease. It was often expressed in its mathematical form: “one germ = one disease”. Tuberculosis was one of the early demonstrations of the verity of this new formula when it was discovered that the tubercle bacillus could be found in the sputum of patients with “consumption”.

The search for the causative agent, or “specific etiology”, of all diseases soon followed. The discovery of pathogenic microbes stirred the medical imagination like gold in the hills of California. The rush to find the disease-causing nuggets was on, and continues to this day. The wild optimism of the time led to the prediction that medical science would ultimately be able to proceed under the rubric of “one agent = one disease”. It would only be a matter of time before all the agents of disease would be isolated and catalogued. Thenceforth, it would remain only for researchers to develop therapeutic weapons to treat each disease-causing agent.

Superficially, the “one agent = one disease” theory appeared sound when applied to many acute diseases and emergency situations. Strep throat did appear to be caused by the streptococcus bacterium. Hepatitis did appear to be caused by a virus attacking the liver. Myocardial infarction did appear to be caused by the blockage of a coronary artery by a cholesterol plaque, and so on. In order to understand how such a simplistic theory was able to take hold of the medical world, it must be remembered that the identification of microbes occurred long before the accrual of detailed biochemical knowledge of the body’s physiologic functions. It is also instructive to consider two other influences operative at the time.

Cartesian and Newtonian Influences

One of these influences may be traced to Rene Descartes and Isaac Newton. Cartesian analysis proposed that the properties and behaviors of a system (or a machine) were able to be understood through the properties of the component parts. Newtonian mechanics combined with Cartesian analysis led to the belief that the human body (considered to be merely a complex machine) would be

entirely understood via the application of the laws of chemistry and physics to its component parts.³

The medical practitioners of that time reduced the body into its component parts (organs and tissues) when studying issues of medical cause and effect. The observation that infections and other acute disease tended to affect one body part only served to reinforce this practice. The “one agent = one disease” formula could be restated as “one agent :: one disease :: one organ”. When the Cartesian and Newtonian influences were added to this expanded formula, the specialization of medical practitioners was the logical outcome.

Although quantum physics, systems biology, and other scientific developments emerged in the twentieth century which should have dampened the enthusiasm for these early Cartesian and Newtonian influences, they have held a firm grip on the medical field to this day. Medical specialization, for its part, has proven to be an effective arrangement for treating many acute diseases, but problematic for chronic medical conditions affecting multiple organs and systems.

Fundamental Scientific Knowledge and Medical Heuristics

An additional influence which served to promote the formulaic “one agent = one disease” theory is the tendency of all sciences to seek fundamentals, or fundamental knowledge. Fundamental knowledge is that from which data may be deduced. It is the theoretical “Holy Grail” of every branch of science.

The classical Newtonian laws are the prototype of such fundamental knowledge. Other sciences have yearned for fundamentals on par with these. The microbe was a heady discovery for the practitioners of the fledgling science of medicine eager to establish fundamental knowledge in their own field. Could these be the fundamentals so sought after? Indeed, the lure was irresistible. From the presence of the microbe in the body, one may deduce the disease. From the disease, one may deduce the presenting symptoms. If you have the tubercle bacillus, you will have tuberculosis. If you have tuberculosis, you will have cough, wasting, and fatigue.

This type of fundamental knowledge could be put to use heuristically in the educational efforts of the medical enterprise, which is essentially a deduction / induction educational model. The classroom years of a medical student’s life are focused on laboriously learning the clinical presentations which correspond to

³For an expanded version of these historical events, see: Fritjof Capra, *The Web of Life* (Doubleday Press), 17-35.

every disease. If one knew the disease, one could deduce the symptoms. The subsequent clinical task of the developing physician on the hospital wards was to induce the identity of the disease from the patient's symptomatology. The compactness of this model is appealing. Thus, from the discovery of the microbe and the theory of specific etiology emerged the belief in the "disease" as fundamental knowledge.

II. THREE CRITICAL MISINTERPRETATIONS

The germ theory of disease, the Cartesian/Newtonian mechanistic view of the body, and the "disease as fundamental knowledge" dogma of medical heuristics provided the basis for the most successful paradigm the world has ever known for treating acute disease and crisis health conditions. But these cornerstones of modern medicine also provided the foundation for three critical misinterpretations which would hinder similar success with chronic disease. These three misinterpretations are concerned with the perception of the nature of health, order in the body, and the body's inherent vulnerability. We will now examine the germination of each of these.

The Nature of Health

In traditional medical paradigms, health has always been perceived as the presence of flow and balance. Disease was the absence or disruption of these positive entities. Modern medicine reversed this perception. Recall too that "the disease" had begun to be equated with fundamental scientific knowledge. In this environment it is no wonder that disease began to be perceived as a thing, an entity in and of itself. This negative entity was usually an external invader, as in the case of microbes, or an internal defect, as in the case of a failing organ. The resulting misinterpretation which took hold was that health began to be perceived not as a positive presence, but merely as the absence of these negative entities. Health, in modern medicine, had devolved into the absence of disease.

Thermodynamics and Order in the Body

With the paradigm shift toward disease as a presence, the stage was set for the shift in the perceived locus of order in medicine. For the practitioner of traditional medicine, order lay in the flow and balance present in the body. The Chinese

doctor finds order in the flow of qi and the balance of yin/yang. But for the modern physician, who had equated health with the absence of disease, there was no place for order and intelligibility to be found in health.

In its search for order, modern medicine had nowhere to turn but to the disease itself. And turn it did. Entire textbooks and medical school classes are devoted to pathology, the study of the expected progress of individual diseases. Support for this shift was believed to be found in one of the most fundamental of scientific laws, the second law of thermodynamics. This law stated that there is a trend in physical phenomena from order to disorder. More specifically, any closed physical system will proceed spontaneously in the direction of ever increasing disorder.

The application of this law to the physical system at hand, namely the human body, made it all too clear that the natural inclination of the body was to become less orderly over time as a person ages. The notion, therefore, of health or physiologic processes as loci of order was easy to discount as hopelessly naïve. The second law of thermodynamics demanded that the human body and its physiologic processes would break down, weaken, and become more disorderly over time.

The Vulnerability of the Body

The combined influences of the second law of thermodynamics and the discovery of hostile microbial agents led to the notion that, not only did the body spontaneously tend toward disorder, but that it also was highly vulnerable to external agents of disease capable of accelerating the natural tendency toward disorder.

The subsequent discovery and production of antibiotics, with their fantastic ability to render impotent these deadly attackers, strengthened the notion that the body was dependent on outside reinforcements in order to survive. The body's natural defenses lacked potency compared with the synthetic enhancements which modern pharmacology and surgery could supply to protect its vulnerability.

The Patient as Analogous to Empirical Residue

Thus far we have spoken much of disease and very little of the patient. In historical medical paradigms, prior to the knowledge of agents of acute disease, there was much intelligibility to be anticipated by the healer in the perceived differences between individual patients. But working in the shadow of the three misinterpretations just adumbrated, the modern physician would anticipate

variations in clinical presentations to be accounted for by the characteristics of the disease rather than by characteristics of the patient. Attributes of the patient could be largely ignored in favor of discerning the attributes of the disease. Thus, in the modern medical office visit, the patient is often perceived as “empirical residue.”

According to Lonergan, empirical residue may be identified during any of the various abstracting processes common to all human knowers. Recall that the modern medical practitioner proceeds by abstracting from an individual patient’s symptoms in the attempt to identify the causative disease. Lonergan’s criteria for empirical residue are that it 1) consists in positive empirical data, 2) it is denied any imminent intelligibility of its own, and 3) is connected with some compensating intelligibility of notable importance.^{4,5}

For all healers ancient and modern, there is no distinction to be made with the first criterion. The patient has always represented positive empirical data. The split occurs with the second and third criteria. Lacking both a biochemical understanding of the body’s physiologic functions and knowledge of the agents of disease, the ancient healer had no “compensating intelligibility of notable importance” which would allow for the denial of the imminent intelligibility inherent in the individual patient. The ancient healer always had to ask, “Why is this *patient*, *this patient*?”

Although the physician in the early days of modern medicine lacked a biochemical understanding of the body’s physiologic functions, the identification of agents of disease and the resultant taxonomy of diseases provided a “compensating intelligibility of notable importance” which allowed the modern medical practitioner to deny the individual patient “any imminent intelligibility of his/her own.” The result is that too often the physician no longer asks, “Why is this *patient*, *this patient*?” Neglecting to ask this question does not always adversely affect the treatment of acute disease, but the question must be asked by the physician treating chronic disease. The following section provides the background for understanding the critical nature of this question.

⁴Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge*, 29 – 31.

⁵*Insight*, 50 – 55.

III. ACUTE AND CHRONIC DISEASE

The Transition from Acute to Chronic Disease

The modern medical paradigm has had and continues to have astounding success in treating acute disease and crisis situations in the health care setting. Many once-dreaded infections have been eliminated. Previously fatal conditions are now treatable. The paradigm has worked so well, in fact, that it is customary to place it at the top of the list of factors contributing to the changing demographics of death and morbidity in this country. It is conventional wisdom that modern medicine's successes have caused life expectancy to soar as deaths due to infections and other acute causes have plummeted.

While there is no doubt that the advances of modern medicine were important, they are probably less significant than generally believed. Poor sanitation and nutritional deficiencies created a favorable environment for many of the formerly lethal acute diseases and epidemics. Indeed, even before the rise of modern medicine, advances in sanitation, agriculture, and nutrition had drastically reduced the toll taken by these calamities.⁶ However, these low-profile public health efforts with their incremental results were largely forgotten and overshadowed by the more dramatic, sensational, and immediate improvements wrought by the tools of modern medicine.

Other factors magnified this trend toward chronic disease. The nation transformed from an agrarian economy involving physically active labor to a sedentary workforce employed in a service-oriented economy. Micronutrient deficiency gave way to macronutrient excess as cheap processed food became overly available. Toxins from these processed foods, as well as from industrial, agricultural, cosmetic, and dental sources began to poison vital physiological functions. Even side effects from the diagnostic tests, the powerful medicines, and the elegant operations which epitomize modern medicine's success with acute disease have contributed to the rising burden of chronic disease.

⁶Rene Dubos, *Mirage of Health* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1959), 129-40.

Distinguishing Acute from Chronic Disease

The attempt to define acute and chronic disease is problematic for a variety of reasons. For the sake of this discussion we will proceed as follows. An acute disease or an acute health crisis is one in which mortality or prolonged morbidity will result if it is not treated in a timely manner. By “a timely manner” we take to mean hours or days.

Often the most dramatic of this type of acute disease results from trauma such as bone fractures, lacerations, puncture wounds, and foreign objects entering the body. Modern surgical techniques have no rival in terms of success with treating these conditions.

The second example of acute disease is the infection. An infection is believed to be caused by an external agent not normally present in the body. These are usually microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, and the like. The development of antimicrobial drugs and vaccines has curtailed much of the terror these fatal and morbid diseases once instilled in the population.

The sudden decline in or failure of the function of an organ is yet a third type of acute disease. This would include heart attacks, kidney failure, liver failure, asthma attacks, etc. Modern medicine has had quite a good deal of success at creating therapies for postponing death and prolonging life when these conditions manifest. Medicines, dialysis, organ transplants and other surgeries and devices have all contributed.

The sudden blockage of a bodily process is the fourth type of acute disease and is often closely related to or has some degree of overlap with the previous category. This would include kidney stones and gallstones, choking, intestinal obstruction, etc. No other medical paradigm can claim the same level of success as modern medicine in rapidly reversing these conditions.

Chronic disease is perhaps even more difficult to define and categorize than acute disease. For the present purposes chronic disease will be defined as any health condition causing morbidity and/or suffering over a time frame of months to years. In this category one would find well-defined entities such as hypertension, hypothyroidism, and diabetes, but also the more poorly defined syndromes such as irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue and fibromyalgia.

The Modern Medical Paradigm and Chronic Disease

With acute disease and chronic disease thus defined, it is pertinent to inquire whether the assumptions of the modern medical paradigm were appropriate for addressing the chronic diseases which emerged in the wake of its success treating acute disease. It appears that physicians did not ask this further relevant question, and continued to apply the principles for the diagnosis and treatment of acute diseases to chronic disease.

Ironically, it is the patients themselves who have asked this question. It is they who have discerned important distinctions among the various medical paradigms. In ever increasing numbers they have chosen specific types of providers to consult for different types of conditions. This has almost always resulted in a decision to choose conventional physicians for acute diseases and crisis health situations, and to select a practitioner of a different paradigm for disease prevention and the treatment of chronic conditions.

IV. CHALLENGING THE FOUNDATIONAL INFLUENCES

What are the patients attending to and understanding which the medical field as a whole is not? Much of the explanation may be revealed by revisiting the three influences which were instrumental in the early successes of the modern medical paradigm, namely 1) the doctrine of specific etiology of disease, 2) the Cartesian/Newtonian influences, and 3) the belief in disease as fundamental scientific knowledge. It is important to note that, when applied to acute disease, these influences often appeared capable of explanation. But when applied to chronic disease, and especially in light of subsequent physiologic knowledge, they are revealed as merely descriptive.

The Doctrine of Specific Etiology Challenged

Ockham's Razor

The germ theory and the doctrine of specific etiology which it spawned were attractive not only for their early success in treating acute disease, but also for their parsimony. The medical profession has a long history of adhering to what is known as "Ockham's Razor". William of Ockham originally stated that "entities

should not be multiplied unnecessarily,” and that “the simplest of competing theories should be preferred”. During teaching rounds on the hospital wards this has come to mean that a patient’s condition is more likely to have one etiology than several. The astute clinician is advised to propose only one diagnosis which will explain all the presenting symptoms and findings. Thus, the theory of specific etiology coupled with Ockham’s Razor caused medicine to be practiced as “one patient presentation = one diagnosis.”

Acute Disease, Ockham’s Razor, and Specific Etiology

This approach has been very fruitful in crisis health situations. The stigmata of these emergencies are easily recognizable with a basic history, physical exam, and diagnostic tests. Furthermore, it is unlikely that two catastrophic health events will occur simultaneously. Therefore, Ockham’s Razor holds true in most medical emergencies.

This doctrine also appeared to work well for infections. Or did it? At the time it was believed that if your body harbored the germ, you would *have* the disease. The tubercle bacillus was isolated from the sputum of those suffering from “consumption”, which then came to be called “tuberculosis”. Thus, the theory of specific etiology appeared to be satisfied. Too late for the purposes of revising medical doctrine came the discovery that fewer than ten percent of people who harbor the tubercle bacillus would ever *have* the stigmata of tuberculosis.

This pattern has repeated itself throughout the history of medicine. The presence of the strep bacteria in your throat is not equivalent to *having* strep throat. Many people who harbor the hepatitis C virus will never *have* hepatitis C, the disease. In a room full of people who are all exposed to a common cold virus, only a minority will succumb and *have* a cold. Clearly, the presence of the agent is not sufficient to cause the disease. This is the first chink in the armor of the doctrine of specific etiology.

In the case of the sudden failure of organ function or blockage of a bodily process the technological advances of laboratory medicine and medical imaging have led to remarkable precision in the ability to diagnose and subsequently treat these acute conditions. For example, when a heart attack or a kidney stone is rapidly detected and diagnosed, on the surface it would appear that the theory of specific etiology and Ockham’s Razor had been satisfied in these events.

Chronic Disease Masquerading as Acute Disease

But there is a further relevant question which is less vigorously pursued in modern medicine; what caused the heart attack or the kidney stone? There are likely to be multiple contributing etiologies, yet they all lead to a final common expression. This is known as the “final common pathway phenomenon”. If a physician proceeds in his/her thinking no further than the final diagnosis, the multiplicity of contributing underlying etiologies will be missed. The theory of specific etiology and Ockham’s Razor will appear to be satisfied only because the several etiologies which contributed to the final outcome have not been considered.

Moreover, the very fact that so many “acute” diseases have multiple underlying contributing factors penetrates their facade and reveals them for what truly are; the final easily recognizable clinical event of a previously silent chronic disease. The doctrine of specific etiology appears to apply well to these acute diseases only if the physician fails to recognize their true chronic nature. Or, to state it in the terminology of the scholastic tradition, only if the physician insufficiently carries out the process of “*resolutio in causas*,” or analysis, which starts out from the “thing” (the disease), and works toward the discovery of the causes.

Parenthetically, the momentum generated by the theory of specific etiology continues to operate as new scientific knowledge emerges. The latest expression of this momentum has been observed in the field of genetics, where huge resources have been dedicated to finding single genes which “cause” single diseases. With all but a few rare exceptions, the “one gene = one disease” theory has also been a dismal failure.

Chronic Disease and Specific Etiology

For chronic diseases, the problems confronting the doctrine of specific etiology are magnified. To begin with, there is often the problem of identifying the agent. For many of the most chronic common diseases we simply have not identified causative agents. An agent which ‘causes’ hypertension or chronic asthma is still at large. True, risk factors and triggers are known. But many people have the same risk factors and are exposed to the same triggers without *having* these diseases. Risk factors and triggers are not causative agents.

Proponents of the doctrine of specific etiology could claim that the effective therapies which have been developed are justification of its continued application.

The counter to this argument is that these chronic disease therapies do not affect the root cause of the disease, only the downstream manifestations of the disease. In the words of Rene Dubos:

From the field of infection the doctrine of specific etiology spread rapidly to other areas of medicine.

Yet few are the cases in which it has provided a complete account of the causation of disease.

Effective therapies do not constitute evidence for the doctrine of specific etiology.

The story of insulin and diabetes well illustrates that the discovery of a therapeutic agent does not necessarily solve the problem of disease causation.⁷

It could be argued further, that with regards to chronic disease, Ockham's Razor should be abandoned. When a patient presents with years of symptoms and suffering, it is relevant to inquire if diagnostic parsimony is a legitimate expectation. With such a large time frame available for development of chronic diseases, multiple causality is more likely to be the rule rather than the exception. Again, in the prescient words of Dubos:

The search for *the* cause may be a hopeless pursuit because most disease states are the indirect outcome of a constellation of circumstances rather than the direct result of single determinant factors.⁸

Thus, with regards to chronic disease, diagnostic parsimony is not a legitimate expectation. The doctrine of specific etiology and Ockham's Razor encourage a practice of medicine based on descriptive knowledge. A successful paradigm for chronic disease must recognize that there exist multiple "upstream" causes for chronic diseases. This would result in a practice of medicine based on explanatory knowledge. This emerging paradigm, as we shall see, involves rethinking the very concepts of diagnosis and disease.

Cartesian/Newtonian Influences Challenged

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when acute diseases were common and knowledge of the agents of disease was more advanced than the biochemical knowledge of physiologic processes, physicians could be forgiven for perceiving the body as mechanistic. But with the subsequent depth of

⁷Dubois, *Mirage of Health*, 91-94.

⁸Dubois, *Mirage of Health*, 92.

understanding of the physiologic functions of the body and the emergence of chronic diseases, this view is no longer tenable.

An understanding of the workings of the parts is not sufficient for understanding the whole. Properties emerge at higher levels of organization in the body which are not predictable from an understanding of the lower levels. These is one of the important tenets of “systems biology” which emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century.⁹

With its emphasis on understanding the relationships among various functions of the body, rather than merely the functions themselves, systems biology is better suited to explain chronic disease than is its Cartesian predecessor. Through the lens of systems biology, the body is understood much more adequately as a web of relationships among organs and physiologic functions. The emergence of systems biology should have marked the end of understanding the body as a machine, and the beginning of understanding the body as an ecosystem.

Working against the emergence of this type of understanding is the entrenchment of specialization in the medical profession which the mechanistic approach encouraged. Chronic diseases affect multiple organs, tissues, and processes. What is needed is not more specialization, but “physiologic functionalists.” Until the medical sciences become aligned with this type of thinking, patients will continue to seek care for chronic disease from providers outside the mainstream of modern medicine.

Disease as Fundamental Knowledge Challenged

It was previously described how the medical field de facto adopted diagnoses as fundamental knowledge from which symptoms could be deduced. This is the modus operandi of medical education. The daily task of the medical practitioner is to induce and abstract from the patient’s symptoms to identify the diagnosis. From a patient’s symptoms, it is a much more straightforward task to induce the identity of an acute disease than a chronic disease. This is because acute diseases, by their very nature, exhibit a full phenotypic expression of symptoms at or very near their onset. The emergence of chronic diseases challenged the validity of this heuristic method.

On the one hand, symptom presentations of specific chronic diseases are far more variable than acute diseases. This is in part due to the multiplicity of bodily systems involved. It is in part due to the gradual and inconsistent progress of

⁹Capra, *Web of Life*, 36-50.

symptoms. It is also in part due to the physiologic differences among individual patients. This last factor seems obvious now, but remains too often overlooked by an overly enthusiastic adherence to belief in the “diagnosis-as-fundamental.” Thus, the very nature of chronic diseases would make them less amenable to the heuristic method involving induction from symptoms. At best, this methodology will fail to diagnose chronic disease until the very late and less treatable stages.

On the other hand, some chronic diseases appear to have relatively similar symptom presentations even though the root causes are vastly different. For example, depression as a side effect of medication is symptomatically similar to depression caused by loss of a loved one. Many other chronic diseases exhibit this “final common pathway” phenomenon. Dubos cogently summed up the predicament of the medical field nearly 50 years ago:

There are only a limited number of ways in which the organism can respond to stimuli and the response is not always beneficial.

As the manifestations of this faulty response are limited in number and character, disease, which is made up of their summation and of their consequences, can take only those forms of which the organism is capable, and cannot possibly reflect the peculiarities of each of the stimuli from which it originated.

In the light of these facts it is easier to understand why direct cause – effect relationships often fail to account for the natural phenomena of disease.

Each type of insult can have many different effects depending upon the state of the recipient individual.

On the other hand, any given pathological effect can be the outcome of many varied kinds of insults.¹⁰

Numerous are the examples where the symptom presentations of the same chronic disease in different patients was so variable that heated controversies have been generated regarding whether or not the entity in question should actually be considered a “disease.”

Fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome are but two of the most recent examples of this phenomenon. With the symptoms of chronic disease having become so unreliable, the status of the disease, or diagnosis, as fundamental knowledge was threatened.

What then, of the scientist’s eternal yearning for fundamental knowledge? With chronic disease, the end result has been that when physicians can not rely on

¹⁰Dubois, *Mirage of Health*, 106.

diagnoses as fundamental knowledge, they have begun to consider abnormal lab values and imaging studies as surrogate fundamentals. When there are no abnormal diagnostic tests, physicians may blame the patient, believe it is “all in their head”, or at best, treat downstream symptoms without addressing underlying upstream etiologies.

With regards to chronic disease, the science of medicine would do better to abandon the notion that diseases, diagnoses or diagnostic test results represent fundamental knowledge. They must be acknowledged for what they are, merely descriptive heuristic devices in a field devoid of fundamental knowledge. As descriptive devices they are not reliably effective in addressing the root causes of chronic diseases. The current paradigm may remain in place for treating acute health crises, but a different heuristics is needed for an effective chronic disease paradigm.

V. REVISITING THE CRITICAL MISINTERPRETATIONS

Three of the basic tenets upon which modern medicine has successfully addressed acute disease have now been challenged with regards to chronic disease. The misinterpretations which emerged on the heels of modern medicine’s early successes with acute disease must also be revisited. To this we now proceed.

The Misinterpretation of the Nature of Health

In a previous section it was described how health, which had always been perceived as a presence (flow, balance) had, with the ascension of modern medicine, come to be perceived as an absence (of the agent of disease, or of a disease or diagnosis).

It should be evident by now that for chronic disease this perception will not hold. The presence of the agent alone is not causative or explanatory. There are other “upstream” physiologic factors soon to be discussed which better satisfy the need for causality and explanation.

With the demotion of the “disease” and the “diagnosis” from the status of fundamental knowledge to descriptive heuristic devices, there is no validity in the persisting belief that health is the absence of disease. Health cannot be defined as the absence of a descriptive device. With regards to chronic disease, it will be more fruitful to come full circle, align with our medical ancestors, and once again consider health to be the presence of a positive entity. This implies that chronic

disease will be more accurately understood as an absence. In short order we will describe just what this absence “is.”

The Misinterpretation of Vulnerability and Order

The second law of thermodynamics (with its emphasis on the inevitable decrease in order of physical systems), the discovery of microbial agents of disease, and the production of antibiotics and other powerful medicines combined to create a bias in the minds of medical practitioners that the human body is highly vulnerable.

Claude Bernard was perhaps the earliest scientist to take issue with this view in the latter half of the nineteenth century when he questioned the role of microbial agents in disease. Bernard postulated that it was the internal environment, or “milieu,” of the body which determined whether or not a disease would manifest, not the mere presence of the microbe. The internal milieu of different patients (or of the same patient at different times) would determine whether or not the microbe could proliferate and “cause” disease. Far from depicting a vulnerable body, Bernard presented this view:

Survival and fitness are conditioned by the ability of the organism to resist the impact of the outside world and maintain constant within narrow limits the physicochemical characteristics of its internal environment.¹¹

Walter B. Cannon, in the first half of the twentieth century, coined the phrase “homeostasis” to describe the internal bodily processes of which Bernard spoke:

All the vital mechanisms, however varied they may be, have only one object, that of preserving constant the conditions of life in the internal environment.¹²

There remained the problem of the second law of thermodynamics. Even if the body possessed vigorous homeostatic mechanisms to maintain constant the internal milieu and thereby ward off agents of disease, it was nevertheless doomed. It was doomed by virtue of its status as a physical system which inevitably must tend toward decreased order and increasing entropy.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy was the first scientist to point out how the second law of thermodynamics had been misinterpreted and misapplied. Recall that the law

¹¹DuBois, *Mirage of Health*, 104.

¹²Walter B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (W.W. Norton, 1932), 106.

applies to *closed* systems. Bertalanffy was the first to recognize that biological systems are open, not closed systems:

The organism is not a static system closed to the outside and always containing the identical components; it is an open system in a quasi-steady state...in which material continually enters from, and leaves into, the outside environment.¹³

This recognition allows for the human body to indefinitely maintain the stability of Bernard's "internal milieu" and Cannon's "homeostasis". In scientific terminology, an open physical system characterized by the continual flow of matter and energy can maintain a steady state far from thermodynamic equilibrium. It was not until the 1970s that the mathematics which described this thermodynamics of open systems was developed.¹⁴

The human body is such an open system and therefore not subject to the second law of thermodynamics and the inevitable trend toward entropy and disorder. If and when these concepts are applied to the field of medicine, the bias of the human body's vulnerability no longer has a foundation.

Shifting the Locus of Order

The tendency to consider disease as the locus of order in the field of medicine is also undercut by these arguments. It is now evident that the processes which maintain homeostasis, the processes which promote an optimal internal milieu, the physiologic processes of the human body which allow it to "maintain self-organization far from thermodynamic equilibrium" are the loci of order. In keeping with a systems biology perspective, it is not merely the processes themselves, but their relationships with each other which constitute true order in the field of medicine.

With the locus of order thus shifted from disease to physiologic processes, it becomes clear that the many chronic diseases are best explained as the absence of the body's ability to maintain orderly and well-functioning physiologic processes. Disease is no longer a thing, an entity. Disease is an absence. It is health which is a presence; the presence of well-functioning physiologic processes and their relationships to one another.

¹³Capra, *Web of Life*, 48.

¹⁴Capra, *Web of Life*, 112-56.

The Patient as Empirical Residue Challenged

When compared with chronic disease, there is relative homogeneity in the clinical presentation of the same acute disease in different patients. In acute disease then, perceiving the patient as “empirical residue” will not significantly decrease the probability of successful treatment. The variability of the clinical presentation of the same chronic disease in different patients mandates an end to this practice. With health now defined as the presence of well-functioning physiologic processes, the primacy of the individuality of the patient’s physiology emerges. But the degree of functioning of physiologic processes differs in different patients. Therefore, the physician faced with the patient with chronic disease must always ask, “Why is this *patient, this patient?*” Expressed in another way: “Who ignores individuality fails the patient.”¹⁵

The end result of the demise of the disease/diagnosis and the ascension of patient’s physiologic individuality is that the physician must change the nature of the most basic clinical question s/he has asked for years. The question that must be asked is no longer “What does this patient have?” The more relevant question when confronted with a patient with chronic disease is “What does this patient lack?”

VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW PARADIGM FOR CHRONIC DISEASE

It is one matter to deconstruct the paradigm. What remains is to construct a revised paradigm. The foundations of such a paradigm will now be proposed for chronic disease, revisiting the previously discussed influences and misinterpretations as they respectively apply to 1) the diagnostics and, 2) the therapeutics of chronic disease.

The Diagnostic Foundations of an Upstream Paradigm: Specific Etiology and Diagnostic Testing

Diagnostic tests are of two basic types. The first is an analysis of a substance withdrawn or eliminated from the body (blood, urine, stool, etc.). The

¹⁵Sidney Baker, “Who Ignores Individuality Fails the Patient,” *Alternative Therapies In Health and Medicine* 13, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2007): 88-95.

conventional physician seeks positive evidence of markers of disease (microbes, abnormal levels of chemicals, etc.) in these substances. The second is an imaging study (x-ray, CT scan, MRI scan, etc.). The physician seeks positive evidence of disease by visualizing defective organs or tissues. But the demise of the doctrine of specific etiology must be accompanied by changes in the nature of diagnostic testing for chronic disease.

Specific agents are rarely found in chronic disease, and laboratory “markers” are often not present in recognizably abnormal levels early in the course of chronic disease. Thus, modalities which search for these will not often yield diagnostic fruit. The remedy involves a return to the definition of health as the presence of optimal physiologic functions. Laboratory tests of bodily substances will do better to focus on detecting optimal levels of these basic functions. There are two specific advantages of this strategy. This “function-based” type of laboratory analysis will detect abnormalities earlier in the course of chronic disease than do the “damage-based” laboratory tests currently employed. Secondly, function-based diagnostic testing pinpoints the source of the disease much more accurately than the tests currently employed, which often detect damage far “downstream” from the physiologic source of the problem.

Imaging studies may be divided into two basic types; static or functional. The static tests (x-ray, CT, MRI, etc.) are only capable of revealing structure. The functional imaging tests (such as the echocardiogram which detects the motion of the heart as it moves blood) are not often abnormal in the early stages of chronic disease. Therefore, while imaging studies will continue to yield important diagnostic information in acute disease, they will not be particularly helpful until the end stages of chronic disease, when it masquerades as an acute disease.

Mechanism, the Millieu, and Diagnostic Testing

The physiology of the human body is not akin to a machine. It is a web of interrelating biochemical and energetic processes. This is but one way in which the human body is most accurately viewed as an ecosystem. The optimal functioning of these processes is dependent upon conditions of the internal environment, or milieu, of the body. Important examples include the levels of inflammation and oxidation, two prime contributors to chronic disease. Our dependence on the beneficial bacteria in the intestines for digestion, immune system function, and toxin elimination (to name only a few) is another manifestation of the human body’s true nature as an ecosystem. The implications

of this systems biology-based viewpoint for diagnostic testing schema are profound.

What is needed are laboratory markers of an optimal internal milieu. Deviations from these optimal levels will be present early in the course of chronic disease and will allow for more prompt and successful treatments. Also beneficial in this regard would be laboratory tests to detect substances which are known to damage the internal milieu (especially synthetic toxins). These diagnostic tests have been and are continuing to be developed. But unfortunately, they remain outside the mainstream of conventional modern medicine and health insurance reimbursement schemes.

From Fundamentals to Antecedents, Mediators, and Triggers

For reasons previously discussed, symptoms are much more reliable for diagnosing acute diseases than chronic diseases. Yet even for acute diseases which appear to have a specific agent (such as an infection), it is important to note that the symptoms are not usually caused by the agent of disease. Paradoxically, symptoms are most often caused by the body's response to the agent. Consider the common cold as an example. Not one of the symptoms (fever, sore throat, runny nose, etc.) is caused by the common cold virus itself, but by the body's attempts to increase the function of the immune system, to destroy the virus, and to eliminate both it and the debris resulting from the carnage.

Another paradox with respect to symptoms is that they are only considered as heralding a deterioration of the patient's condition. However, when viewed thermodynamically, changes in a system may be observable when that system undergoes either a decrease *or an increase* in order. The same is true of symptoms. Symptoms do not exclusively herald the worsening of a patient's condition. Symptoms may also represent evidence of changes rendered by the organism to increase order. Physicians would do well to attempt to discern the meaning of symptoms rather than continue the current practice of suppressing each and every one.

What, then, is to become of the symptom? Is the act of taking a medical history obsolete? Not at all. The first step is to recognize that symptoms are more reliable in the setting of acute disease than chronic disease. The second step is to modify the history-taking process. The method of taking a medical history with the intent of obtaining insights into a chronic disease will focus less on identifying a specific diagnosis, and more on detecting the physiologic processes

which are likely to be dysfunctional. It will focus less on symptoms, and more on antecedents, mediators, and triggers.

Antecedents of Disease

Antecedents are those factors which predispose a patient toward the development of chronic disease. These include, but are not limited to, such things as family history and genetics, nutritional factors, bodily trauma, emotional trauma, stress, sedentary lifestyle, and recreational drug use.

Many antecedents are only elicited by way of a thorough history with a patient willing to disclose. Hence, the attitude and communication skills of the medical practitioner are of paramount importance. Many antecedents will be disclosed only to the extent that trust exists in the doctor-patient relationship.

Genetics and Genomics

With regards to antecedents, a special word is necessary regarding genetics, nutritional factors and diagnostic testing. The much-hoped-for discovery of single genes which cause specific diseases will not be realized except in a few rare cases. However, what is diagnostically helpful is determining patients who have altered physiologic function based on genetic "polymorphisms" which would predispose them to chronic disease. These polymorphisms are small alterations in the chemical sequence of genes which result in the production of altered proteins. These altered proteins may increase or decrease the normal rate of physiologic processes, thus predisposing a patient to disease.

An example of this would be a polymorphism in a gene which controls the elimination of a toxin from the body. A patient with this polymorphism would not be able to eliminate a given toxin to the same extent as someone without the polymorphism. This patient would be "selectively vulnerable" to the exposure to a small amount of that toxin, whereas the patient without the polymorphism would be unaffected by an even higher exposure. It is important to note that it is not the gene alone which causes the disease, but the influence of the environment on the gene which determines whether or not the disease will manifest. A patient with this polymorphism will never develop disease if never exposed to the toxin.

Another principle, not widely recognized by physicians, is that the environment influences the expression of genes. Nutrients and toxins may increase or decrease the expression of genes, and thus physiologic functions. This

has come to be known as “genomics”.¹⁶ In direct contrast to current practice, genomics mandates that some patients will require higher levels of specific nutrients than others. The levels required for some individuals would be many times higher than the levels currently recommended by government agencies. A medical history focused on antecedents highlights the need for physicians to consider individual differences among patients as critical to the understanding of chronic diseases.

Mediators of Disease

Mediators are those physiologic and biochemical factors which participate in the expression of the disease. A familiar example is the blood sugar level in diabetes. Lowering the blood sugar level with insulin is helpful to the patient and may normalize the test result. But this does nothing to alter the underlying problems which drive the diabetes. The new paradigm will not do away with therapeutically targeting mediators of disease, but it will not confuse mediators with root causes. It will strive to develop and utilize diagnostic tests capable of detecting mediators ever closer to the “upstream” sources of physiologic dysfunction.

Triggers of Disease

Triggers may be chemicals, environmental conditions, emotional conditions, nutritional factors, or behaviors which incite physiologic dysfunction and/or the expression of chronic disease. Some of these are detectable by diagnostic testing, but many are only elicited by way of a thorough medical history. Given the practical constraints of the office visit, it can be difficult for a medical practitioner to uncover these. Similar to antecedents, it often requires a trusting doctor-patient relationship. Triggers may lie close to or far from the physiologic source of disease. While it is a helpful strategy to eliminate and avoid the triggers of disease, it does not excuse the physician from searching for further “upstream causes.”

To conclude, the methodology of an upstream diagnostic paradigm will place less emphasis on identifying a specific diagnosis, and more emphasis on detecting the physiologic processes which are dysfunctional. Uncovering the antecedents,

¹⁶*Textbook of Functional Medicine* (Institute for Functional Medicine, 2005).

mediators, and triggers specific to each patient will be a pivotal step in this process. One such model has already been used clinically with success.¹⁷

The Therapeutic Foundations of an Upstream Paradigm

With the basic physiologic dysfunctions, antecedents, mediators, and triggers thus revealed by novel diagnostic tests and modified history taking, a more successful therapeutic approach can be applied. It is to the therapeutic approach we now turn. In order to do this, it will be necessary to revisit the misinterpretations which accompanied the rise of modern medicine and its successful treatment of acute diseases.

The Definition of Health and Therapeutic Strategies

In the world of modern medicine, where disease was considered to be an entity and health was considered to be the absence of disease, it is no wonder that therapies emerged which targeted what were believed to be agents of disease. Antibiotics which targeted infectious agents of acute disease were the prototype. In the realm of chronic disease, where easily identifiable agents of disease are lacking, modern medicine has often turned its therapeutic intentions toward other targets.

This has resulted in the proliferation of what have come to be known as “anti-drugs”: antihistamines for allergies, antihypertensives for high blood pressure, antacids for gastritis, etc. While these may suppress the most downstream mediators of disease, they do nothing to alter the upstream causes of the disease or the indefinite dependence of the patient on the “antidrug.” A related therapeutic strategy has been to attempt to normalize lab tests which fall outside of an acceptable range. This also leaves the root causes of the disease unaffected. Finally, when an agent was undetectable, or a diagnosis was not easily forthcoming, the physician often had no therapeutic target other than the symptoms themselves. While no one would take issue with relieving symptoms which cause suffering, there is an objection to the medical paradigm which merely suppresses symptoms without developing further therapeutic strategies focusing on the root causes of disease.

If health is to be defined as the presence of optimally functioning physiologic processes, therapeutic strategies must impact these very processes and the internal milieu upon which the optimal functioning of these processes depend. These

¹⁷*Textbook of Functional Medicine.*

strategies will rarely involve pharmaceutical tools or surgery, the great majority of which do not optimize physiologic function or the milieu. In order to discover what these therapeutic strategies would entail, it will be instructive to revisit the misinterpretations regarding vulnerability and order.

Vulnerability, Order, and Therapeutic Strategies

Recall that systems biology has determined that an open physical system characterized by the continual flow of matter and energy can maintain a steady state far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Upon this foundation we refuted the notion that the human body is inherently vulnerable. Upon this foundation it was also proposed that the human body does not spontaneously tend toward disorder, or entropy. But it is not just *any* matter or *any* energy which is able to maintain the human body in an invulnerable steady state. With regards to medical therapeutics, it is critical to examine the type, the quality, and the quantity of the “matter and energy” entering and exiting the system.

Influx of Matter

Matter entering the open physical system of the human body may either enhance or detract from the foundational physiologic processes and the optimal milieu necessary for maintaining order and minimizing vulnerability. This matter may be considered to “enter” the body from either an external or an internal location. While this may appear to be paradoxical, consider that water may “enter” an ecosystem either from the clouds above or the springs below the earth.

External Matter

Matter entering the human body from external sources most obviously includes that which enters the intestines when eating or drinking. To a lesser extent, matter enters through the lungs and the skin. The consideration of these portals of entry makes it clear that the therapeutics of the new paradigm must emphasize nutrition, toxin avoidance, detoxification, and lifestyle/behavioral changes.

The basic therapeutic question which has been asked by physicians and patients for years must be fundamentally altered. For the physician, “What does the patient need?” must become “What is the patient getting too much of or too little of?” For the patient, “What can I take?” must become “What must I eliminate or add to my lifestyle?”

Ay, there's the rub. Until now, the burden of ushering in a new medical paradigm had depended entirely upon the physician changing his/her ways. The therapeutics of the emerging paradigm will be a therapeutics of elimination as much as addition – a therapeutics of omission as much as commission. The responsibility of deciding what to eliminate and what to add will involve the physician, but responsibility for the acts of omission and commission rests squarely on the patient.

Internal Matter

Matter entering the body from an internal source is not strictly new matter, but the newly manifested matter which is the result of the activity of the body's metabolic activity. This activity is dependent both on the genetics and the environment of the individual. There is tremendous variability among individual patients with regards to this. For example, these genetic (and genomic) differences make some patients "selectively vulnerable" to chronic disease even in the presence of what are considered to be normal levels of nutrients and safe levels of toxins. The therapeutics of the new medical paradigm must take genomics into account. It will do this first by discerning which patients are selectively vulnerable and how (with appropriate genomic diagnostic tests). Second, it will be necessary to alter the "environment" to which genes are exposed, both by the appropriate additions of cofactors which optimize genomic expression, and by the elimination and/or avoidance of genomic detractors.

Influx of Energy

It is not only the flow of matter, but the flow of energy which is needed to maintain an open physical system in a steady state far from thermodynamic equilibrium. While we are on thinner scientific ice here, it is nevertheless useful to consider energy to encompass a wide range of phenomena. Most obviously, there is the energy generated by assimilation of dietary nutrients. Less well studied are the forms of radioactive, geopathic, and electromagnetic energy which are purported to affect human physiologic function. It could be further argued that emotional, psychological, and spiritual states are forms of "energy" which may enhance or detract from an individual's ability to maintain physiologic order and minimize the vulnerability to chronic disease.

It has been well studied how stress, anger, fear, loneliness, grief, depression, etc. are associated with the expression of high levels of biochemical mediators of oxidation and inflammation. Oxidation and inflammation are instrumental in the

development of many chronic diseases. It has also been studied how laughter, prayer, and being in love are associated with lower levels of these harmful mediators, and higher levels of other mediators which appear to enhance physiologic function. Consistent with the principles of genomics, it can be predicted that some patients will be selectively vulnerable to or protected from the effects of emotionally derived biochemical mediators of chronic disease.

As this regards the therapeutics of chronic disease, the first task of the physician and patient alike is to identify physiologically detrimental forms of “energy” (emotional, electromagnetic, spiritual, or otherwise) present in the patient’s life. Another task is to employ appropriate functional diagnostic testing to determine “selective vulnerability” to these “energies” as the availability of this type of testing emerges. A third task will be to assist the patient to avoid, minimize, or eliminate any form of “energy” which is detrimental. The final, and perhaps most difficult task of all, will be for the patient to make lifestyle changes which will favor more positive forms of “energy” continually “flowing through the open physical system” which is their body.

Influx and Efflux

Finally, the maintenance of a steady state far from thermodynamic equilibrium requires not only the optimal influx of matter and energy, but also the optimal *efflux*. Chronic diseases demonstrate the verity not only of “You are what you eat”, but equally “You are what you do not eliminate”. With regards to “energy,” it could also be argued that if toxic emotions are not properly “eliminated,” detrimental physiologic effects will follow. Therapeutic strategies to optimize physiologic efflux of both matter and “energy” (maintenance of normal bowel function for the elimination of wastes, liver detoxification capability, sauna, stress reduction practices, etc.) are destined to be cornerstones of the upstream chronic disease paradigm.

VII. THE GRAMMAR OF PHYSIOLOGY

Ever since becoming enamored with the processes and the mysteries of human physiology, a certain biblical phrase has held special reverence for me: “The Word became flesh.” It is not for me to aspire to theologically explain how the Word is in and of the flesh. Still one cannot but wonder if words, in their archetypal relationship with humans, are somehow imbued in the flesh. Inasmuch

as they are, there must exist a “grammar of physiology.” It is to this grammar of physiology we will now turn to coalesce the ideas previously discussed. A helpful concept in this regard will be Lonergan’s “higher viewpoints.”¹⁸⁻¹⁹

Higher Viewpoints in Mathematics

In the field of mathematics, the basic element is the number. Early mathematicians focused on the different types of numbers. These represent the “lowest viewpoint” in mathematics. But numbers can also be thought of as being generated by, and acted upon by operations such as addition, subtraction, and so on. These operations are considered “higher viewpoints.” Still higher viewpoints in mathematics became possible with the discovery of the variable and algebra, with analytic geometry and calculus...

“...where successive systems were built upon prior systems by extending the range of objects that could be generated and combined with one another.”²⁰

Operations and Higher Viewpoints in Grammar

In grammar, the noun is the basic element and lowest viewpoint analogous to the mathematical number. The next highest viewpoint is the verb, which can be thought of as an operation which acts upon nouns in the way addition acts upon numbers. Higher viewpoints still are the adjectives and adverbs, which are operations which act upon nouns and verbs, respectively. Marks of punctuation, which are operations acting on groups of the previous four elements, can be considered the next highest viewpoint. Finally, in spoken language there is intonation, the highest viewpoint of grammar. Intonation operates upon all the previous elements to make more precise the meaning of the message. (It could be argued that body language is still the next highest viewpoint. Indeed, there is a striking way in which body language is “the word made flesh.” But for the purposes of this physiological analogy, body language will be omitted.)

The Operations and Higher Viewpoints of Human Physiology

In creating a grammar of human physiology, it is helpful to distinguish the microscopic from the macroscopic. Thus, the lowest viewpoint of interest in the

¹⁸*Insight*, 37-42.

¹⁹Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge*, 23-26.

²⁰Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge*, 26.

microscopic realm is the molecule, which corresponds to the grammatical noun. The molecule may be a vitamin, a hormone, a neurotransmitter, and so on. The next highest viewpoint is the collection of all the microscopic biochemical reactions which take place in the body. These are operations which act upon molecules in the way a verb acts upon a noun. These are the “micro-nouns” and “micro-verbs” of physiology.

In the macroscopic realm, the organs and the bodily tissues represent the “macro-nouns” of physiologic grammar. The next highest viewpoint is to consider the operations requiring the use of these tissues and organs. Thus, contraction and relaxation are operations of the heart which move blood. Inhalation and exhalation are operations of the lungs which move air, and so on.

The physiologic conditions comprising the internal milieu and ecosystem of the body are the next highest viewpoint. They modify, or “operate on,” the organs and biochemical reactions in the way that adjectives and adverbs modify grammatical nouns and verbs. Temperature affects the immune system, pH affects breathing, and oxygenation affects heart rate, to name a few. Especially pertinent for our topic, oxidation and inflammation represent adjectives and adverbs of the milieu which damage many of the “micro-noun” molecules (oxidation damages cholesterol) and hinder the efficacy of many of the “micro-verb” biochemical reactions which function suboptimally in chronic disease. The aspect of the milieu which best exemplifies the concept of the body as ecosystem is the “microbiota.” This is the community of beneficial bacteria in the intestine which assists the digestion and absorption of nutrients, the elimination of wastes and toxins, the regulation of the immune system, and many other processes. It is arguably the most important site of therapeutic intervention for the majority of chronic diseases.

The structurally supporting tissue of the body is the physiologic analogy of the punctuation marks of grammar. This would include the microscopic cytoskeleton of individual cells, all the various “connective” tissues of the body, and the bones themselves. Manual therapies (such as chiropractic and osteopathic manipulation) which affect the structurally supporting tissue of the body represent operations which are able to modulate the functions and the processes of the lower physiologic “viewpoints.”

The energies to which we have previously referred are analogous to the intonation of spoken grammar. Thus, radiation, geopathic, electromagnetic, emotional, psychological, and spiritual “energy” may modify the function and expression of all the other elements of physiologic “grammar.” With regards to

chronic disease, the degree to which a person's emotions affect their biochemistry cannot be overemphasized. Table 1 in the appendix displays all of these components of physiologic "grammar," as well as selected examples at each level.

Regrettably, very few of these operations are actually utilized in the clinical practice of conventional modern medicine. Table 2 in the appendix demonstrates how modern medicine focuses almost exclusively on the lowest operations of physiologic "grammar."

Technological advances in diagnostic testing are indeed impressive, and pharmaceutical drugs and surgeries are excellent tools for acute diseases and crisis health conditions. But the blank spaces in this table demonstrate that the diagnostic and therapeutic missed opportunities for impacting chronic disease are plentiful.

The body is trying to tell us a story, but we are diagnostically "listening" only to the nouns and verbs, and an abridged list of nouns and verbs at that. We are therapeutically "speaking" with a limited vocabulary and a truncated grammar. If this be the word made flesh, it is emaciated flesh indeed.

Table 3 in the appendix (necessarily abridged) provides selected examples of the diagnostic and therapeutic modalities which could be utilized to enable physicians to listen for and speak with a more complete and precise 'grammar of physiology'.

CONCLUSION

What most needs to be emphasized now in modern medicine is a higher viewpoint for addressing chronic disease. The prevailing paradigm, with its focus on disease, emphasizes descriptive knowledge. The higher viewpoint needed, which focuses on physiologic functions, will go further toward providing explanatory knowledge. The prevailing paradigm, with its reductionist view of the body and its tendency to perceive organs, tissues, and physiologic functions as isolated entities, must give way to an expansionist paradigm which emphasizes the systems-based nature of all physiologic relationships.

Succinctly put, the prevailing paradigm emphasizes:

Tissues with issues

The new paradigm will emphasize:

Issues with tissues

The success of the paradigm in dealing with chronic disease will depend upon its ability to place less emphasis on measures which only affect the downstream manifestations of disease, and to employ modalities which positively modulate the upstream factors at the physiologic root of dysfunction. Transformation will be required of both patients and physicians.

Patients must acknowledge that most chronic diseases involve lifestyle insufficiencies and excesses. They must be willing to ask fundamentally different questions. “What can I take?” must become “What can I give up?” and “What can I begin?” Patients must be willing to partake in that most archetypal of human activities: sacrifice. Patients must be willing to make sacrifices to increase what is insufficient, and to curb what is in excess – to live a life of flow and balance.

Physicians must also be willing to ask fundamentally different questions. Diagnostically, “What does this patient have?” must become “What does this patient lack?” Therapeutically “What does this patient need?” must become “What does this patient need to omit, and commit to?”

Diagnostically, physicians must ask not only, “What is attacking the patient?” but also, “What is not functioning optimally and why?” Therapeutically, physicians must not ask only, “What synthetic external substances will suppress the problem?” but also, “What intrinsic substrates, processes, and functions might I help the patient to optimize and how?”

Physicians must be willing to broaden the diagnostic and therapeutic ‘language’ with which they listen to and speak the ‘grammar of physiology’. In essence, there must be a conversion from a focus on disease to a focus on physiologic function, a conversion from what is negative in the body to what is optimal.

In the words of Bernard Lonergan:

“The healer is essentially a reformer. First and foremost he counts on what is best in man.”

“But the materialist is condemned by his own principles to be no more than a manipulator.”

The upstream medicine paradigm will achieve an understanding in a new and more comprehensive context – a higher viewpoint. In its most distilled form, it could be expressed thus:

You are chemistry, care for your molecules

You are ecosystem, care for your milieu

You are energy, care for your mind

You are of spirit, care for your soul

Grammar of physiology

PART OF SPEECH	PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATE	EXAMPLE
Micro-noun	Molecule	Cholesterol
Macro-noun	Organ	Heart
Micro-verb	Biochemical reaction	Methylation
Macro-verb	Contraction	Pump blood
Adjective	Milieu	Inflammation
Adverb	Ecosystem	Microbiota
Punctuation	Structural tissue	Bone
Intonation	“Energy”	Fear, Love

Commonly utilized diagnostic and therapeutic methods in modern medicine

PART OF SPEECH	DIAGNOSTIC METHOD	THERAPEUTIC METHOD
Micro-noun	Blood level	Pharmaceutical
Macro-noun	Radiographic imaging	Surgery
Micro-verb		
Macro-verb	Echocardiogram	Pharmaceutical medicines Surgery
Adjective		
Adverb		
Punctuation		
Intonation		

Underutilized diagnostic and therapeutic methods in modern medicine

PART OF SPEECH	DIAGNOSTIC METHOD	THERAPEUTIC METHOD
Micro-noun		
Macro-noun		
Micro-verb	Specialty laboratory functional assessments	Nutrition Supplementation
Macro-verb		
Adjective	Specialty laboratory assessments of inflammatory markers, toxins	Nutritional, supplements, lifestyle & behavioral change, detoxification
Adverb	Genomics testing Intestinal milieu testing	Lifestyle modification Nutrition, supplements
Punctuation	Osteopathic exam Chiropractic exam	Manual therapies, exercise, stretching, manipulation
Intonation	Medical history, acupuncture, EMF meters, dousing, radon testing	Stress reduction, acupuncture, reiki, Env. remediation, counseling, etc.

BREATHING BACK: LONERAGAN, LITERARY CREATIVITY, AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LORD

Gregory Maillet
Atlantic Baptist University
Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada

I. INTRODUCTION

THE QUESTION OF Lonergan's contemporary relevance has always been a matter that I have evaded, regarding his philosophy not as for "now" but for "ever," since Lonergan's general concern for "understanding and being" (to borrow the title of his lectures on *Insight*) transcends particular culture and ultimately intends life in the Kingdom of God. As usual, however, a deeper reading of the "workshop quotation" selected by Fred and Sue Laurence prompted further thought.¹ As a literary scholar often concerned with the relationship between Christian conversion and the development of human culture, a central question for me has always been: what form might be taken by literature, and literary criticism, that is "thought out in Christ Jesus"; further, given that so much great literature is written far in the past, in what way does such art remain relevant "for the world that is now"? Certainly the numerous challenges of our time require, as Lonergan puts it, a "profound and far-reaching creativity," but how does literary art become not merely culturally constructed, but rather "catholic with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord"?²

¹Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento." 1965. *Collection*, vol. 4 of *Collected works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 222-31.

²"Existenz and Aggiornamento," 231.

The relationship of these questions to this year's workshop was further clarified for me by Patrick Byrne's passionate essay on Lonergan's legacy, which argues that foundational to transcendental method is how "God breathes God's own loving self into us."³ "This strikes me as a metaphorically apt way to describe Lonergan's conception of the relationship between humanity and God. Byrne's conception also recalls Christ breathing on the apostles to give them the Holy Spirit (John 20:22), and further convicts me of Lonergan's emphasis on "God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit" (Romans 5:5) as being the very essence of religious conversion.⁴ For Lonergan, "from a causal viewpoint" this gift of God's love is the foundation of the moral and intellectual conversion that occurs as the human subject seeks to know and value the true good of any subject at all.⁵ In the medieval conception of the transcendentals, as moderns such as Lonergan⁶ and Von Balthasar⁷ confirm, transcendental method also leads the subject to an aesthetic conversion in which the beauty of the one, true, good God is at least partially glimpsed. Such conversion is necessarily creative, for it involves struggle, change, and the emergence of the new human person who becomes foundational to Christian culture.

Within any creative process that involves the profound reality of the divine-human relationship, scripture makes clear that the Holy Spirit plays a crucial role, yet the nature and variety of this work is not always well understood. Although our sense of the third distinct Person within the Triune God can never be exhaustive, it can be enhanced by literary works in which the creative power of the Holy Spirit is not only invoked, but also given concrete illustration through plot, character, theme, or symbol. In a sense, the writers about to be discussed are "breathing back" the Being given by God, their writing offering tangible evidence to demonstrate that, in Lonergan's words, "God's own glory, in part," is the creative human being responding with joy to the Creator's good gifts.

³Patrick H. Byrne, "The Passionateness of Being: The Legacy of Bernard Lonergan, S.J." in *Finding God in All Things: Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner*, ed. Mark Bosco and David Stagman (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 35-69.

⁴Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Minneapolis: Seabury, 1979), 105.

⁵*Method in Theology*, 243.

⁶Bernard Lonergan, "Art," *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 208-32.

⁷Hans Urs Von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*. 7 vols. 1961. (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983); Also, Gesa Elsabeth Thiessen, *Theological Aesthetics: A Reader* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).

II. CREATIVITY AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LORD

In the words of the Nicene Creed, the Holy Spirit is “The Lord and Giver of Life,” a summation based, first, on the second verse of the Book of Genesis, when an earth “without form, and void,” where “darkness was upon the face of the deep,” is transformed as “the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters” until God exclaims, “Let there be light” (1:2-3). Gerard Manley Hopkins’s “God’s Grandeur” memorably affirms that this transformation was not a single historical event, but an ongoing process, a daily event, in which the light of morning follows the setting of the sun in the West – “Because the Holy Ghost over the bent / World broods with warm breast and with ah! Bright wings” (11-14).⁸ Here Hopkins invokes the “bird” or “dove” image of the Holy Spirit that later scripture makes explicit, but experience of one Person of the Trinity leads to communion with all three. In Milton’s *Paradise Lost*,⁹ for example, the Holy Spirit is Milton’s central muse, because he desires not merely human knowledge, but poetry illumined by the divine light of Genesis. This point precedes and is assumed by Milton’s famous claim to “justify the ways of God to men,” and so the physically and morally blind poet admits his own inadequacy by requesting:

And chiefly thou O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples the upright heart and pure,
Instruct me, for thou know’st; thou from the first
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread
Dove-like sat’st brooding on the vast abyss
And mad’st it pregnant: what in me is dark
Illumine, what is low raise and support;
That to the height of this great argument
I may assert eternal providence,
And justify the ways of God to men. (I: 17-25)

⁸Gerard Manley Hopkins, “God’s Grandeur.” 1877. *Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Oxford Authors*, ed. Catherine Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 128.

⁹John Milton, “Paradise Lost.” 1674. *John Milton: The Major Works*, ed. Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Explicit invocations of the Holy Spirit's creative inspiration are common in English poetry, but a more subtle statement of this process comes in Dante's *Divine Comedy*.¹⁰ As Dante is climbing Mount Purgatory, he meets Bonagiunta, another poet, who recognizes Dante as the author of *La Vita Nuova*,¹¹ "The New Life." Bonagiunta recalls this text's opening lines on "Women who have intelligence of love" (*Purgatorio* XXIV 51), but its importance lies in how it shifted the emphasis of Italian Renaissance poetry away from romantic love and towards the love of God, the new life found by Beatrice, St. Lucy, Mary, and the other faithful women who have initiated Dante's journey upwards towards heaven. Thus Dante's reply to Bonagiunta credits his own poetry not to any human skill, but rather the love breathed within him by God through the Holy Spirit:

I am one who, when love
Breathes on me, notices, and in the manner
That he dictates within, I utter words.
(*Purgatorio* XXIV 52-54)

"O brother now I see," Bonagiunta responds, "the knot / which held back" himself and other Italian poets "from the sweet new style of writing" practiced by Dante, whose "pens follow closely what is dictated to you; / Something which certainly did not happen to ours" (*Purgatorio* XXIV 55-60). The "knot" Bonagiunta speaks of is the human desire to achieve satisfaction through fashionable popularity rather than faithful listening to the will of God, a problem common to any human culture. This knot is of the same form as that which the prophet Ezekial seeks to break, for he saw that it leads to a valley of dry bones that can only be brought to new life when the Lord God says, "See! I will bring spirit into you, that you may come to life" (Ezekial 37:5). In Dante and prophetic scripture, it is essential to notice that the Holy Spirit is inspiring not just words, or aesthetic objects, but rather is creating new life in new communion with the Creator.

In their own way, in their own times, Hopkins, Milton, and Dante all express an unfashionable reliance upon the aesthetic inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but one subsequently canonized by the history of literary criticism. A similar but not

¹⁰Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*. 1321. Translated by C. H. Sisson and ed. David H. Higgins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹¹Dante Alighieri, *La Vita Nuova*. 1295. Translated by Barbara Reynolds. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).

yet so popular text is *A Cry of Stone*,¹² a recent work of fiction by Canadian painter and novelist Michael D. O'Brien. Drawing in part on his own experience in the residential schools that the Canadian government created to "civilize" aboriginals, O'Brien tells the story of Rose Wabos, an orphaned native girl whom the Holy Spirit leads to become a painter. As her Grandmother reads the Bible, Rose learns that Jesus "sent a white bird that spoke words difficult to hear, and the words took the shape of tongues of fire," but "that kind of fire did not hurt you," for it comes from "Winijishid-Manito, Holy Ghost God in the white people's tongue" (15). In church, especially, "Rose could hear the words which Jesus sent by the messenger bird," and "as she listened to its words, she felt the opening petals of fire that does not hurt" (16). This interior experience eventually creates, for Rose, a capacity for aesthetic expression that she calls "*falling-into-seeing*" (17). Even before learning to express this capacity as a painter, Rose falls into a dream vision in which she asks "Winijishid-Manito" for new life, the life of a brother. The "fire-song," however, responds by saying, "I ask a sacrifice of you," a "mending" that can involve "hurt" (29). As a new orphan boy named Binemin arrives in the school, Rose recognizes, through the Holy Spirit, that despite the boy's ragged outward appearance, his inner soul is a beautiful gift from God; in church, Rose

glanced down at the dirty, wild, mad boy lying in the shadow under the bench. She loved him, and, as she loved him, the sweet fire song swelled in her heart, and she knew that the hurt would be a small thing compared to the love she would have for him, and the life that would come back into him. She fell-into-seeing inside herself and found the quiet place in her heart where Jesus was.

"Yes, I will," she said in words without words. (30)

Both Rose and Binemon become painters whom the adult problems of our world physically divide and sunder, but not sever; while technically important, their later artistic training is of small importance in comparison to their creative communion, with each other and with God, that is established through the "*falling-into-seeing*" made possible by the Holy Spirit. For them, the Spirit's work is not primarily the production of aesthetic objects, but as with Peter's response to the great question, "who do you say that I am?" (Matthew 16:15), the Holy Spirit's revelation that Jesus is the Christ allows God to remain speaking, teaching and loving within "the quiet place" of human hearts.

¹²Michael D. O'Brien, *A Cry of Stone* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003).

III. CREATIVITY, REPENTANCE, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

The Holy Spirit's descent at John's baptism of Jesus also reveals both the divine Christ and the united Trinity as the Father praises His "beloved Son" (Matthew 3:17). Yet the sinless Christ's need for baptism is more mysterious, and probably points to the Holy Spirit's continuing work for general human repentance, against sin, to create life transforming conversion. The Church itself is "born again" of "water and the Spirit" (John 3:5) at Pentecost, when the "fire that does not hurt" comes to rest on the disciples and "all were filled with the Holy Spirit"; this miracle allows listeners to hear the disciples' message as though they were "speaking in [the foreigner's] own language" (Acts 2:4, 6), an early example of Christ's promise to send "the Spirit of Truth" who "will guide [us] to all truth" (John 16:14-15). This is the same Spirit whom the apostle John calls "paraclete," a complex Greek word, derived from legal terminology, which suggests that the Spirit defends us from the world and thus comforts us, leading to the common English translation of "paraclete" as "Comforter" (John 14:16)¹³. Yet as with popular misconceptions of the "love of God," the "comfort" of the Holy Spirit can be conceived in an unrealistically optimistic manner. For just before promising "the Spirit of Truth," Jesus states that this same Spirit will also "convict the world of guilt in regard to sin and righteousness and judgment: in regard to sin, because men do not believe in me; in regard to righteousness, because I am going to the Father, where you can see me no longer; and in regard to judgment, because the prince of this world now stands condemned" (John 16:8-11). There is, in other words, a dramatic *agon* in which the Holy Spirit challenges us to believe in Christ, reveals the ultimate justice of His resurrection, and becomes an advocate for us by opposing the condemnatory power of Satan. While the truth about our personal failings usually does hurt, thankfully the gift of God's mercy also allows a healing that is profoundly creative. These teachings prepare the disciples to receive the Holy Spirit, for Christ breathing on the Apostles is immediately followed by Him instituting the holy sacrament of reconciliation as he solemnly tells them: "if you forgive people's sins, they are forgiven," but "if you retain people's sins, they are retained" (John 20:23).

¹³As noted by the "Confraternity of Christian Doctrine," or members of the Catholic Biblical Association of America, in their *New American Bible*. (New York: Benziger, 1970), 154.

The Holy Spirit's role in penance and forgiveness finds profound expression in T. S. Eliot's "Little Gidding," particularly the symbolically dense image of how "the dove descending breaks the air / with flames of incandescent terror."¹⁴ In the poem's British World War II context, the dove may be the Holy Spirit or the dangerous German bombers, but either way "the tongues declare" that "the one discharge from sin and error," "the only hope or else despair," is "in the choice of pyre or pyre-- / to be redeemed from fire by fire."¹⁵ In other words, either we will be destroyed by sin, or purified by the Holy Spirit, for "our God is a consuming fire" (Hebrews 12:29). Eliot perhaps illustrates why "blasphemy against the Holy Spirit... will not be forgiven" (Matthew 12:31), because mercy cannot be accepted if "Mercy itself" (*Tempest* 5.1: 336),¹⁶ as Shakespeare's Prospero terms God, is ultimately rejected. Thankfully, Eliot concludes, "the drawing of this Love" can lead the penitent, eternally, to where "the fire and the rose are one,"¹⁷ Dante's vision in *Paradiso* (XXX-XXXIII) of the eternal communion between human souls and the Spirit of our Lord.¹⁸

While Eliot stresses the existential choice offered by the Holy Spirit, a different but also faithful approach is taken by one of the original members of the historical "Little Gidding." George Herbert's "Ephesians 4:30: Grieve not the Holy Spirit"¹⁹ sensibly begins by asking why the Holy Spirit would be concerned at all with an insignificant human creature, asking:

And art thou grieved, sweet and sacred Dove,
When I am sour,
And cross thy love?
Grieved for me? The God of strength and power
Grieved for a worm, which when I tread,
I pass away and leave it dead? (1-6)

¹⁴T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding." *Four Quartets* (London: Faber and Faber, 1942), 42.

¹⁵Eliot, "Little Gidding," 42.

¹⁶William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*. 1610. Edited by Stephen Orgel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

¹⁷Eliot, "Little Gidding," 43-44.

¹⁸Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, 481-99.

¹⁹George Herbert, "Eph. 4: 30: Grieve not the Holy Spirit." *George Herbert and Henry Vaughan: The Oxford Authors*, ed. Louis L. Martz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 121-22.

Herbert's *The Temple* is an entire volume devoted to describing the indwelling of the Holy Spirit within the temple of the human soul, and ultimately it does not equate the human person to a dead worm; however, the analogy is hyperbolic only because of Christ's redemption and atonement for us on the cross. For Herbert, the human inability to fully repent and hence grieve the Holy Spirit is redeemed only by the prayer with which he concludes "Grieve Not...": "Lord, pardon, for thy Son makes good / My want of tears with store of blood" (35-36).²⁰

The Holy Spirit's ability to remind us of the "drawing" power of God's love through the cross of Christ is also figured powerfully by Victorian poet Christina Rossetti, especially her "Goblin Market."²¹ An allegory possibly about drug use or, more likely, prostitution, as Rossetti did spend much of her devoutly Anglican adult life attempting to aid "fallen women," "Goblin Market" tells the story of two sisters. Laura is seduced by "goblin men" (42) and eats their addictive fruit, then withers into a spiritual state near death; her sister Lizzie, though rejecting sin herself, is by compassion moved to try and "buy back" her sister by purchasing more fruit from the "goblin men," who respond by physically abusing and assaulting her so that, Christ-like, she experiences sin but does not accept or participate in it. The allegory of this atonement story becomes murky, however, upon Lizzie's climactic return, when Laura rushes out to greet her and begins to kiss her passionately, seeking the physical satisfaction that her earlier experience of the fruit still causes her to crave. Rossetti then makes clear the contrast between the spiritual fruit, the fruit of the tree of Life, found in Lizzie's self-sacrificial act of love, and the physical death caused by direct experience of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of evil. Foreshadowing Eliot's imagery, and following scripture, Rossetti vividly portrays the conflict between the spirit of the fire of lust and the eternal flame of the Holy Spirit; as Laura kisses Lizzie,

Swift fire spread through her veins, knock'd at her heart,
Met the fire smouldering there
And overbore its lesser flame;
She gorged on bitterness without a name:
Ah! fool, to choose such part
Of soul-consuming care!

²⁰Herbert, "Eph. 4: 30: Grieve not the Holy Spirit," 122.

²¹Christina Rossetti, "Goblin Market." *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Major Authors*, 8th ed., gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2006), 2143-55.

Sense fail'd in the mortal strife...
She fell at last;
Pleasure past and anguish past,
Is it death or is it life?
Life out of death. (507-23)

Rossetti concludes the poem by confirming that Lizzie had “stood / in deadly peril to do [Laura] good, / and win the fiery antidote” (557-59) which readers can name. The Holy Spirit’s life giving power ultimately allows both sisters to form their own families and have children, but also to realize that “there is no friend like a sister... to cheer... to fetch ... to lift... to strengthen whilst one stands” (562-67). Though clearly a Victorian cultural context, this praise of family also has scriptural roots in the human acceptance of being children of God. For nowhere in the Bible is there a clearer statement of the power of the Spirit of the Lord than when St. Paul teaches that, despite our need for repentance, we

have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but we have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God: And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together. (Romans 8: 15-17)

IV. THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE GLORY OF THE HUMAN PERSON

St. Paul’s vision of the Spirit of the Lord confirms Loneragan’s promise that the glory of the Lord is, in part, us; despite sin, God’s plan for the human person is ultimately glorious, and there are some wondrous literary portrayals of this plan. Among my favorite such stories is the creation of Narnia as told in C. S. Lewis’s *The Magician’s Nephew*,²² the prelude to *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*. Aslan the Lion, Lewis’s Christ figure, creates Narnia as Jesus creates the Church in the disciples, by breathing the creative fire of the Holy Spirit to form nature, beauty, and creative creatures that can become who the Father (or, in Aslan’s case, “the Emperor-beyond-the-sea”²³) intends them to be. Gazing on the formless void that precedes Narnia:

²²C. S. Lewis, *The Magician’s Nephew*. 1955. (London: Fontana, 1980).

²³Mr. Beaver’s term, in C. S. Lewis, *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*. 1950. (London: Fontana, 1980), 75.

The Lion opened his mouth, but no sound came from it; he was breathing out, a long, warm breath; it seemed to sway all the beasts as the wind sways a line of trees. Far overhead from beyond the veil of blue sky which hid them the stars sang again: a pure, cold, difficult music. Then there came a swift flash like fire (but it burnt nobody) either from the sky or from the Lion itself, and every drop of blood tingled in the children's bodies, and the deepest wildest voice they had ever heard was saying:

“Narnia, Narnia, Narnia, awake. Love. Think. Speak. Be walking trees. Be talking beasts. Be divine waters.” (108)

The voice, of course, is Aslan's but the words are not commands so much as gifts allowing beauty, creativity, and wisdom. When Aslan finally speaks to the created creatures, He says simply, “Creatures, I give you yourselves” (109). Within the world of Narnia, Lewis is depicting the living God's motivation for creating creatures and desiring relationship with them; in poetic, figurative symbol, Aslan is showing the beauty of exactly what Lewis' devilish Screwtape, in *The Screwtape Letters*,²⁴ so laments as he advises the junior devil Wormwood on how to ensnare souls:

One must face the fact that all the talk about His love for men, and His service being perfect freedom, is not (as one would gladly believe) mere propaganda, but an appalling truth. He really does want to fill the universe with a lot of loathsome little replicas of Himself – creatures whose life, on its miniature scale, will be qualitatively like His own, not because He has absorbed them but because their wills freely conform to His... Our war aim is a world in which Our Father Below has drawn all other beings into himself: the Enemy wants a world full of beings united to Him but still distinct (45-46).

Lonergan's and Lewis's account of the glory of the human person is paralleled, in many ways, by a “pair poem,” or set of linked poems on succeeding pages, by contemporary Canadian poet Margaret Avison, who just passed on last summer after an incredibly creative career in which she was publishing award winning poetry well into her 80s. First appearing in *The Dumbfounding*, the 1966 collection that announced Avison's Christian conversion, “Person” and “... Person, or Hymn on and to the Holy Ghost”²⁵ use a simple elipses to signal the

²⁴C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters*. 1942. (London: Fontana, 1955).

²⁵Margaret Avison, “Person” and “...Person, or Hymn on and to the Holy Ghost.” *The Dumbfounding*. 1966. *Always Now: The Collected Poems of Margaret Avison*. (Erin, Ontario: Porcupine's Quill, 2003), 191-92.

intimate connection Avison sees between the formation of the human person and the work of the Holy Spirit. "Person" begins with three natural images, "Sheepfold and hill / lie under an open sky" (1-2), but these may also evoke biblical metaphors for the people of God, for the Lord is our shepherd and His Sermon on the Mount reminds us that "a city set on a hill cannot be hidden" (Matthew 5:14). Avison then suggests, however, the universal human alienation from this vision, caused not by external factors but rather original sin: "This door that is 'I am' / seemed to seal my tomb" (3-4). On the other hand, of course, "I am" is also a name of God revealed to Moses (Exodus 3:14) and later used by Christ – "Before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58) – to express His divine nature. Avison then moves to questions that, while unanswered, seem to evoke the hope and freedom of Christ's resurrection: "A skied Stonehenge / unroofed the prison? And lo its walls uprising, / very stone drawing breath?" (8-11). Again, however, this vision is short lived, and its images "closed again" (12). The poet is trapped, imprisoned "Beneath / steel tiers, all walled," and "lay / barred, every way" (12-14).

Unexpectedly, inexplicably, suddenly "I am" (15) reappears in the poem, but not as a merely philosophical notion of Being. Rather, "the door was flesh; was there" (15-16). Possibly alluding to Christ's promise to "Knock, and [the door] shall be opened to you" (Luke 11:9), Avison actually rules out action on her part; "No hinges swing, no latch lifts. Nothing moves" (17-18) in this conversion process, yet in Avison's experience of Christ "such is love" that "the captive may in blindness find the way" (17-19). Perhaps admitting her own captivity to sin, and her own blindness, Avison more accurately recalls Christ's promise in the Book of Revelation, where the risen Lord promises, "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock : if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me" (3:20). This is the profound movement that Avison then describes in a single line: "In all his heaviness, he passes *through*" (2). Heavy, serious, life-changing though the process of becoming a newly created person certainly is, Avison concludes the poem with a lyrical hymn to the freedom of being in Christ:

So drenched with Being and created new
the flock is folded close, and free
to feed – His cropping clay, His earth –
and to the wooly, willing bunt head, forth
shining, unseen, draws near
the Morning Star. (21-26)

While elements of our personality retain the stupidity of sheep, the willfulness of wooly buntheads, nothing can separate us from the love and light of Christ.

The Holy Spirit's role in allowing us to become new persons in Christ is demonstrated in the second poem, which begins with Avison admitting the common difficulty in speaking of the Divine Person least accessible to our senses. "How should I find speech to you," she writes, "the self-effacing / whose other self was seen / alone by the only one" (1-4), or Christ. For though "known to him, / seeing him only, loving / with him," the Holy Spirit remains "yourself unseen" (5-8). Avison's answer to this aesthetic problem is a prayer that echoes Christ's farewell discourse, where our Lord prays "that all may be one, as you Father, are in me, and I in you... that they may be one in us" (John 17:22); thus Avison asks God to "Let the one you show me / ask you, for me,"... "to lead *my* self, effaced / In the known Light, / To be in him released / From facelessness" (9-16). As the person in the previous poem was imprisoned within the walls of the alienated self but redeemed by the spiritual movement of the physical Christ, the process is in a sense now reversed; here Avison asks Christ to send the spiritual person, the Holy Spirit, to finally give her the communion with God in which love, according to St. Paul, allows us to forever forsake "facelessness," or evasion of our created personhood, and finally see God "face to face" (1 Corinthians 13:12). Since Christ would then be dwelling within us, as He also makes clear is possible to be seen even now in the least of His brothers (Matthew 25:39-44), Avison concludes her hymn to the Holy Ghost by asking to follow wherever the Spirit leads, so that through her person, and highly personal poetry, Christ himself may also be seen; paralleling, in fact, the major theme of Lewis's great novel *Till We Have Faces*,²⁶ Avison ultimately seeks to be "released / from facelessness" not for personal individuality or popular praise, but rather

so that where you
(unseen, unguessed, liable
to grievous hurt) would go
I may show him visible. (17-20)

V. CONCLUSION: CREATIVITY AND THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST

²⁶C. S. Lewis, *Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold*. 1956. (London: Fount, 1978).

Avison's poetry thus rests within the communion to which the Holy Spirit would ultimately lead us: as the historical Jesus sent by the Father promised, the Risen Christ sends His Spirit, and the Spirit in turn leads us back to the one God. In a sense, the movement of the Trinity works to reveal, again and again, the one moment in time when the Holy Spirit conceived within the Virgin Mary our Incarnate Lord, miraculously altering forever how a human being can and should be united to God. While the wide variety of writers discussed here confirm that the literary creativity inspired by the Spirit of the Lord does not demand any surface or formal conformity, at the same time each example seems linked to "the way, the truth, and the life" of "the light of men" (John 14:6; 1:4). It is within this communion, perhaps, that we might locate at least one important meaning of Lonergan's reminder that "God's own glory, in part, is [us]"; to return to Christ's prayer for unity, He says to the Father, "I have given them the glory you gave me that they may be one, as we are one" (John 17: 2). This unity, in turn, is vitally linked to the Holy Spirit, for earlier in the same discourse Christ promised that his Spirit "remains with" His disciples, and "will be within us," allowing us "to know," Christ proclaims, that "I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you." (John 14:20).

While the very substance of the Living Word is given historically within scripture and the sacraments of God's church, John Paul II was also surely correct, in his "Letter to Artists,"²⁷ that "art remains a kind of bridge to religious experience," that with the "help of artists the knowledge of God can be better revealed," and to note, with Father Chenu, that "works of art" are, in their own way, not only aesthetic representations, but genuine 'sources' of theology"; this is especially true, in the words of Desert Father Macarius the Great, when art reflects a "soul which has been fully illumined by the unspeakable beauty of the glory shining on the countenance of Christ" and so "overflows with the Holy Spirit." In relation, finally, to the theology of Lonergan, creative poetry inspired by the Spirit of our Lord can be taken as a preparation for authentic religious conversion, a prelude to the living "faith" that Lonergan defines as the "knowledge born of religious love,"²⁸ because in the knowledge of such poetry there occurs not merely an "apprehension of vital, social, cultural, and personal values," but also the "transcendent value" that occurs in "our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe."²⁹

²⁷John Paul II, "Letter to Artists" (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1999).

²⁸*Method in Theology*, 115.

²⁹*Method in Theology*, 116.

Such terms have specific, sacred meaning for trained theologians, but the more concrete, particular images favored by writers can also remain oriented towards the reality of God. As Tolkien puts it in "Mythopoeia,"³⁰ his great poetic defense of mythological writing, if the writer "draws some wisdom from the only Wise" (53-54), he or she can become a "sub-creator," a "refracted light / through whom is splintered" the "single White" light of God, thus allowing for "many hues... endlessly combined in living shapes that move from mind to mind" (61-64). To conclude with a poet who sought such wisdom within similar Jesuit spiritual disciplines as Lonergan himself, G. M. Hopkins's "As Kingfishers Catch Fire"³¹ intends much more than to illustrate Duns Scotus' concept of "inscape," the process by which any created thing reveals how its nature is reflective of divine purpose, how "myself it speaks and spells / Crying What I do is me: for that I came" (7-8). Rather, this demonstration is a prelude to engaging readers with the central moral and spiritual truth about themselves; in words "catholic with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord," Hopkins calls us to delight in the beauty of the communion allowed by "Being in Christ Jesus" :

I say more: the just man justices;
 Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces;
 Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is –
 Christ. For Christ plays in ten thousand places,
 Lovely in Limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
 To the Father through the features of men's faces. (9-14)

³⁰J. R. R. Tolkien, "Mythopoeia." *Tree and Leaf*. 1965. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).

³¹Gerard Manley Hopkins, "As Kingfishers Catch Fire." 1877. *Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Oxford Authors*, 129.

FAITH AND LONERGAN

Colin Maloney
Toronto, Canada

IN THIS PAPER I intend to do four things: first, a short biographical overview of Lonergan's personal growth in faith, secondly, the principal purpose of the paper, the historical development of his thought on faith, thirdly a consideration of Avery Dulles's concerns, with Lonergan's teaching on faith in *Method* as outlined in Dulles's book, *The Assurance of Things Hoped For*, and finally, to highlight the key role faith has in Lonergan's social vision that is the horizon for all his writings.

LONERGAN'S PERSONAL FAITH

Bernard Lonergan was born December 17th, 1904, in Buckingham, a small town in Canada's French-speaking province of Quebec. The large majority of Quebec's population was Catholic. The Catholic faith and traditions were a significant part of public, and to a great extent, private life. The Catholic Church was seen as a bulwark to defend the identity, language, and culture of Quebec over against the rest of Canada that was mainly English and Protestant. His faith was rooted in and absorbed from his Mother who incarnated for him what it was to be Catholic and loved by God.

His mother Josephine was a devout Catholic. "In Buckingham she had a reputation for holiness, saying the rosary three times a day and going to Mass every day....He was her first born. She made him feel special, loved by God....The Lonergan children were obliged by their mother to visit the local

parish daily.”¹ Lonergan became an altar boy. “His mother joined the third order of Saint Dominic and said the beads three times a day for the rest of her life.”² In an interview later in his life Lonergan says, “Well, I was brought up under the principle that I was lucky to be alive!”³

When teaching on faith in 1940-41 he could be describing himself, “In older children, reasonableness will be present in keeping with their age: generally speaking, parents, sisters, parish priests, and the Church herself teach them prayers and the catechism; they do not talk about credibility, except to say that it is very wrong not to believe, like Protestants, communists, or Jews.”⁴ This echoes the culture of Catholic Quebec at the time of his youth with the culture’s bias against Protestants, Communists, and Jews. While faith is a gift through the family, school, and culture there remain the challenge of a personal, free appropriation of one’s faith so that one believes from personal choice and not just because one grew up that way. “For those that have lived their lives in the religion in which they were born and brought up, the emergence of religious consciousness is a relatively straightforward process of coming to assimilate the available religious meanings, make their own the available religious ideals, participate with their fellows in the customary rituals.”⁵

His early education was with the Brothers of Christian Instruction. The Baltimore catechism was the text used to teach the Catholic faith, his first encounter with church doctrines. “When the question of his religious vocation surfaced he thought, for a time, of joining the Brothers.”⁶ His father vetoed it.⁷ In 1918, thirteen years old, as there was no high school in Buckingham, he was sent to boarding school with the Jesuits in Montreal. In a way the boarders lived the religious routines of the Jesuit community. “He would rise at 6:20; prayers and Mass were at 6:45 followed by breakfast at 7:30.”⁸

¹William Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 18-19.

²Interviews with Lonergan published in *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers/82), 104.

³Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 221.

⁴Unpublished notes written by Lonergan in 1940-41 for class preparation, 39.

⁵Bernard Lonergan, *A Third Collection* (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1985), 59.

⁶Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 20.

⁷Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 131.

⁸Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 25.

On the 29th of July 1922, Bernard nearly eighteen, entered the Jesuit noviciate. When speaking about life's limiting situations he says, "If I had not been born at a certain time, in a certain family with a certain home, a certain elementary schooling, and so on, would I have become a Jesuit? It is very improbable."⁹ But then he would not have been Bernard Lonergan. There followed the traditional fifteen years of Jesuit formation. In the first year of his two-year noviciate he made the thirty-day retreat based on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. He would repeat the Spiritual Exercises after theology in his tertianship, the fall of 1937. His comment on the Spiritual Exercises as he had experienced them was, "It was a stone that was offered when he was looking for bread."¹⁰

In his notes from his thirty-day retreat in tertianship he writes: "Faith is the difference between a saint and ordinary Christians. Saints see the things of God. The Cure D'Arms said our prayer was to talk to God as one would to any man, be saturated in God, speak of God naturally, spontaneously, whole heartedly, men expect it of you – and it makes a terrifically good impression."¹¹

In the fall of 1945 Lonergan gave a course at the Thomas More Institute on "Thought and Reality." "Eric Kierans, a former student of Lonergan from Montreal, attended the lectures and, in conversation, asked him what he considered to be the most important thing in life. Lonergan's response was, to get clear about one's relationship with Christ; after that, other things fell into their place....Lonergan commented that for him it was foundational that there was a Jesus Christ and that he did in historical fact say, "Thou art Peter and on this rock I will found my Church." Kierans believed that Lonergan had a very deep faith but could not talk about it: he came to his own beliefs and that was that."¹²

In 1958 he described what was important for a Catholic. "For a Catholic what is decisive is that a Catholic says, 'I believe' and there follows a list of propositions, they are truths, and they determine his religious life. If you want to be a modernist, you will say that what counts is religious experience."¹³ Lonergan isn't saying that religious experience is not important but rather what is decisive is truth. This did not mean that he had no difficulties in his faith to struggle with. As for difficulties Lonergan would say, "Newman's remark that ten thousand

⁹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 18 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 239.

¹⁰Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 30; Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring about Meaning*, 145.

¹¹William Mathews, "Lonergan's Apprenticeship 1904-46." *Lonergan Workshop Journal* 9 (1993): 74

¹²Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 158

¹³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 279.

difficulties do not make a doubt has served me in good stead. It encouraged me to look difficulties squarely in the eye, while not letting them interfere with my vocation or my faith.”¹⁴

“Bernard would say late in life an injustice, as he thought it to be, taught him to pray but not yet with joy.”¹⁵ The injustice was the punishment of having to teach high school for an extra year. “I had regarded myself as one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain.”¹⁶

This prayer without joy would change many years later. Lonergan remarked in a letter to Louis Roy, OP, in 1977: “After twenty four years of aridity in religious life, I moved into that happier state and enjoyed it now for over thirty-one years....What Lonergan is saying in this communication is that after his creative illness a radical change took place in his religious interiority. The problems that were disturbing him faded and were replaced by an inner peace and joy.”¹⁷

Thirty-one years of this happier state would mean it began around 1946. This state of consolation could well have been important for the integrating of affectivity and emotions in his thought and in his life. In an interview in 1970 he says, “Then von Hildebrand (*Christian Ethics*, published in English in 1953) and Frings’s book on *Scheler* (pub. 1965) were a big help. I was also meeting questions of my own. One also has feeling oneself too, you know.”¹⁸ In 1966, the experience of great suffering in his struggle with lung cancer, nearly dying and being lovingly cared for by Sister Florian who saved his life and in whom he had great trust, confirmed in his life what occurred in his writings, namely, a integration of affectivity in his religious life.

Perhaps this is why he spoke so strongly about being conscious and alive in one’s religious life not as substance but as subject in a talk he gave September 14, 1964, to the Jesuit community at Regis College. For a person to move from substance to subject is to take personal responsibility for one’s beliefs. One who is substance is just going along with things, but the subject deliberately and consciously chooses.

¹⁴Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 263.

¹⁵Fred Crowe, *Lonergan* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 17.

¹⁶Crowe, *Lonergan*, 7.

¹⁷Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 189.

¹⁸*A Second Collection*, 222.

“But this being in Christ Jesus may be the being of substance or of subject... Inasmuch as it is just the being of substance, it is known only through faith,...it is being in love with God without awareness of being in love. Without any experience of just how and why, one is in the state of grace or one recovers it, one leaves all things to follow Christ, one binds oneself by vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, one gets through one’s daily heavy dose of prayer, one longs for the priesthood and later lives by it. Quietly, imperceptibly there goes forward the transformation operated by the *kurios*, (Lord) but the delicacy, the gentleness, the deftness of his continual operation in us hides the operation from us.

But inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden...the substance in Christ Jesus becomes the subject in Christ Jesus.¹⁹ For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting an experience as human love.”²⁰

I presume for Lonergan his shift to consolation in prayer indicates a shift to being more deeply a subject in Christ Jesus. This shift to consolation will be tested and deepened by his life and death struggle with his lung cancer in 1966. At this time in his life and in his writings the integration of knowledge and feelings and his turn to the subject allows him to think of sanctifying grace as a state of being in love that grounds faith as the “eyes of love.” He would still affirm that Catholic faith has to do with truths and doctrines, but now he was clear the interior mediation of believing the truths of faith was God’s love poured into our hearts.

“In a letter to Matt Lamb on September 18, 1967 concerning faith and the intellectual life Lonergan wrote: ‘I was almost forty when my first article was published and over fifty when my book came out. What carried me on over all the years was my trust that what God wants will be done; it also carried me through my pneumectomy and thoracoplasty last year; my *Method in Theology* is advancing very slowly but I feel confident that it will be done.’”²¹

As he got older his hearing and memory began to diminish. He was asked, “Can you see, in your own development, the purgative, illuminative and unitive stages? L. ‘Yes; they are not that separate, you know. The purgative stage is

¹⁹Max Scheler uses this distinction (Manfred S. Frings, *Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the World of a Great Thinker* [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1965]), 133.

²⁰Bernard Lonergan, *Collection* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 250.

²¹William Mathews, “A Biographical Perspective on Conversion and the Functional Specialties,” *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 16 (1998):123-60.

getting rid of your bad habits; the illuminative is the discovery of the positive things to be done. With the unitive way, it's much more plain sailing. You are more secure, even in the Dark Night."²²

In 1980 during his interview, Lonergan continued to use the term "holy Ghost" even if his interviewer or the Scripture translation used the more modern term "Spirit." Is this an echo of his early faith that was the deep foundation for his life? When asked, "Did your perception of God change with time? He answered, "Oh no!"²³

After a life time of listening to Lonergan, Fr. Crowe points out "There is a piety in Lonergan that surfaces in a way unusual in theological writings – in such simple manifestations as speaking of 'our Lady,' or of God's efforts through Calvary to 'touch our hard hearts,' or concluding a lecture by asking all to pray for the institute sponsoring the lecture, or – most remarkable – reminding readers at the end of *Insight* that success in their search for truth 'is principally the work of God.'"²⁴ "Lonergan never lost what Thomas above all theologians could teach, that theology can be done, must be done, that when it is done, we are confronted with mystery and bow our heads in adoration."²⁵ Here are a few reflections from those who studied or worked with him.

Fr. Matthew Lamb writes, "From my earliest correspondence with Fr. Lonergan at the Trappist monastery in Georgia, and my first conversation with him in Rome in September 1964, what impressed me most was how profoundly he united in his own horizon, intelligence, faith, and prayer. His life was a testament to the profound truth that in faith and worship and prayer we human beings attain the highest wisdom and goodness capable of fulfilling our intelligent and rational natures."²⁶

I always find reading St. Thomas that he is personal and devotional. I think the words Lonergan applied to St. Thomas are also true of Lonergan's writings. "As Aquinas conceived his world as coming from God and returning to him, so too can we. As Aquinas conceived man as the end of the material universe, so much more clearly and distinctly can we. Finally as Aquinas, so we too can place the meaning and significance of the visible universe as bringing to birth the elect – the recipients to whom God gives himself in love, in the threefold giving that is

²²Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 208.

²³Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 172

²⁴Crowe, *Lonergan*, 30, # 14.

²⁵Crowe, *Lonergan*, 48.

²⁶Matthew Lamb, "Historicity & Eternity," *Lonergan Workshop Journal* 10 (1994):179-80.

the gift of the Holy Spirit to those that love²⁷ the gift of the divine Word made flesh and dwelling amongst us,²⁸ the final gift of union with the Father who is originating love.”^{29, 30}

Ivo Coelho writes: “Lonergan’s work is in fact suffused with a hope born of faith, with the confidence that it is God who works through history. This, I think, is a salutary attitude, especially for those who work on the frontiers; and besides as we will perhaps realize through ongoing dialogue, such an attitude is not completely unrelated to the *anatta* (selflessness) of the Buddhists and the *niskama karme* (desireless action) of the Gita.”³¹

Charles Hefling writes of the Lonergan Workshops at Boston College, “The aim of the dialogue sessions has been the aim of the workshops as a whole – patiently and persistently to pursue possibly relevant questions. For Lonergan, that pursuit was nothing less than a way of adoring God.”³²

Harvey Egan S.J. writes: “After nine years of relatively close living with Father Lonergan I would say...Lonergan was a holy thinker, who worshipped both with his mind and his heart, who joined together discreet love and loving understanding. His theology is a love that thinks and a thinking that loves.”³³

I will end these reflections on his personal journey of faith by applying to Lonergan his own words in 1981 on the struggle for enlightenment. “It is brought about through regular and sustained meditation on what it really means to be a Christian, a real meaning to be grasped not through definitions and systems but through the living word and deeds of our Lord, our Lady, and the saints, a meaning to be brought home to me in the measure that I come to realize how much of such meaning I have overlooked, how much I have greeted with selective inattention, how much I have been unwilling to recognize as a genuine element in Christian living. So gradually we replace shallowness and superficiality, weakness and self-indulgence, with the imagination and the feelings with the solid knowledge and heartfelt willingness of a true follower of Christ.”³⁴

²⁷Romans 5:5

²⁸John 1:14

²⁹1 John 4:8, 16

³⁰*Third Collection*, 53.

³¹Ivo Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method: The “Universal Viewpoint” in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 215.

³²Charles C. Hefling, *Compass*, March (1985): 12.

³³Harvey Egan, *Compass*, March (1985): 19.

³⁴*Third Collection*, 236.

DEVELOPMENT OF LONERGAN'S THOUGHT ON FAITH, 1936-1940

We have seen how Lonergan grew in his own personal faith. We now turn to the development of Lonergan's thought on the virtue of faith. During his years in Heythrop, England, studying philosophy, his reading of Newman was a significant development. Newman was one of the great theologians of his time and, as Aubert remarks, of great influence on the European theologians.³⁵ Lonergan admits he read certain chapters in Newman's *A Grammar of Assent* several times.³⁶

Newman was important in his struggle to free himself from nominalism and conceptualism. Newman often affirms the importance of the concrete, of the concrete subject. "Abstract argument is always dangerous. I prefer to go by the facts."³⁷ The illative sense is the seed for Lonergan's reflective judgment that is the pivotal step in the faith process unifying all the other steps.³⁸ Newman makes a distinction between belief in doctrine and what the mind does when it believes.³⁹ He also affirms the absoluteness of assent that will become Lonergan's virtually unconditional. Newman's shows how beliefs are a major part of our knowledge, in science and in religion.⁴⁰ "Belief is the cloth and furniture of the mind."⁴¹ As Lonergan, Newman often uses the example of Great Britain being an island as an example of belief as knowledge. Newman was very aware how often subjective bias shapes our understanding and judgment. Since men using the same facts can arrive at various conclusions, Newman insists "that method is needed as a common measure between minds."⁴²

Here is a good example of the echo of Newman in Lonergan, "As intellect is common to all men as well as imagination, every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian and no theology can start or thrive without the initiative and abiding presence of religion."⁴³ This quote gives an indication how important

³⁵Roger Aubert, *Le Problem de l'acte de foi et donnees traditionelles et resultants des controversies recentes*, 343-56. Future references as Aubert.

³⁶*Second Collection*, 263.

³⁷*Grammar*, 120.

³⁸*Grammar*, 260; *Second Collection*, 264.

³⁹*Grammar*, 77.

⁴⁰*Grammar*, 41-43.

⁴¹*Grammar*, 126.

⁴²*Grammar*, 197.

⁴³*Grammar*, 75.

Newman was but also the creative genius of Lonergan as he expands these ideas into *Insight* and *Method*.

In his article on Newman, Dulles writes, "Thus Newman can say, 'We believe because we love,' and several pages later, 'Love, not reason, is the eye of faith.'" I do not know if Lonergan ever read these texts but surely Newman is a major influence on his thinking on faith and knowledge.⁴⁴

In the summer of 1933 before his theological studies in Rome he read St. Augustine's *Cassiciacum Dialogues* where Augustine struggles with how to reconcile God's justice with good and evil, how do we know the truth, and how reason, the eye of the mind, must be purified by faith if it is to see clearly. Lonergan remarks that, "Augustine was so concerned with understanding, so unmindful of universal concepts, that I began a long period of trying to write an intelligible account of my convictions."⁴⁵

This reading stimulated Lonergan to write a 25,000 words essay in English of his convictions especially on the act of faith. He gave it with a challenge to his friend, Fr. Smeaton, who was in tertianship and was quite positive in his response. "Gerald McGugian, a Montreal Jesuit, told me that Lonergan also gave it to his teacher, William Bryan, to read. Bryan told him to put it in his drawer until after he was ordained."⁴⁶

From the lost text there seems to remain thirteen pages in the Lonergan archives that "are almost certainly remnants of this essay."⁴⁷ These pages are much more focused on the critical problem from Hume and Kant and how we know substance, arrive at certitude, the difference between assent and consent ending with the truth for man, namely, the light of the world, Christ. This leads to the assent called faith, a subordination to the will of God.

After the summer of 1933 Lonergan begins his theological formation in Rome from 1933-37. Lonergan describes the theology that he was taught as based on the methodology of Melchior Cano's, "*De Locis Theologicis*" written in the seventeenth century. "Such a theology was classicist in assumptions. Truth is eternal. Principles are immutable, change is accidental."⁴⁸ It became known as

⁴⁴Avery Dulles, "From Images to Truth: Newman on Revelation and Faith," *Theological Studies*, 51(1990):251-267. See G. Worgul, "The Ghost of Newman in the Lonergan Corpus," *The Modern Schoolman* 54 (1977): 317-32.

⁴⁵*Second Collection*, 265.

⁴⁶Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest*, 61.

⁴⁷Michael Shields, "Introduction to Lonergan's Analysis of Faith," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 20(2002):123.

⁴⁸*Second Collection*, 109.

dogmatic theology. "It demoted the quest of faith for understanding to a desirable, but secondary, and indeed, optional goal. It gave basic and central significance to the certitudes of faith, their presuppositions, and their consequences."⁴⁹

Cano's book "...has the theologian proving doctrines by arguing from Scripture, the Fathers, the councils, the theologians, the *sensus fidelium*, and so on."⁵⁰ It was this scheme that governed much of the theological literature of the last two centuries with little if any historical context, or with any critical hermeneutics. There was an emphasis on memory because the proof for one's thesis was primarily authority. Nevertheless, Lonergan would say, "I think that the manual tradition in theology was a solid foundation. People aren't getting that today."⁵¹

With war breaking out in Europe, Lonergan finished his theological studies with his thesis, "Grace and Freedom in St. Thomas Aquinas." In 1940 he returned to Montreal to begin his teaching career. Lonergan taught the course on faith in 1940-41 in Montreal and again in Toronto 1951-52. For the course in Montreal he wrote "notes," some sixty-two pages seemingly for himself as class preparation.

NOTES FOR HIS COURSE ON FAITH, 1940-1941

The sources for Lonergan's thought for his 1941 course on faith are in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto. The unpublished notes he prepared for his course on faith in Montreal 1940-41 consisted of a set of sixty-two typewritten pages, all but two pages in Latin on various topics concerning faith. He derived much of his course material from Lennerz's textbook, *De Virtutibus (On the Virtues)* that he had studied in Rome. Following tradition, Lennerz presents the teachings of the councils and the church fathers so that the students acquire some understanding of the church's teaching on faith. What is interesting is where Lonergan's teaching in his course on faith differed from Lennerz's.

The key to Lonergan's teaching on faith in 1940-41 is his theory of knowledge and his work on grace, especially operative grace. Echoing Newman, Lonergan affirmed that belief is another manner of achieving knowledge not through one's own knowing but through borrowing the knowledge of others. He

⁴⁹Second Collection, 57.

⁵⁰Second Collection, 197.

⁵¹Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 271.

also gave priority to illuminated judgment's reflective grasp of the evidence that grounds conclusions. Judgment will become central in his later "Verbum" articles and in *Insight*. Through judgment based on understanding Lonergan breaks free of conceptualism. "...conceptualism consists precisely in the affirmation that concepts proceed not from intellectual knowledge and intelligibly but, on the contrary, with the same natural spontaneity as images from imagination."⁵²

Lonergan, in his own "notes,"⁵³ explains further that the assent of faith is grounded in the light of faith that is a participation of the uncreated divine light. Through the light of faith one grasps the grounds for the judgments, why one can and ought to believe. Analogously as the intellect's reflective light grounds judgment, so the supernatural illumination of the intellect is a participation in the divine light that grounds the value judgment that this truth should be believed.

This teaching on the light of faith echoes St. Thomas. "The light of faith makes one see the things to believe in."⁵⁴ This "seeing things to believe in" will be echoed later in the metaphor of the eye of love. "Beyond the wisdom we may attain by the natural light of our intellects, there is a further wisdom attained through the supernatural light of faith, when the humble surrender of our own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light makes the latter the loved law of all our assents....But faith, besides involving a contact with reason, also involves a contact with God."⁵⁵

Lonergan in his notes for this course makes several references to Roger Aubert's book, *On the Difficulty of the Act of Faith*, published in 1945.⁵⁶ This book with its 800 pages finds little echo in Lonergan's analysis of faith except for the two references. The only other time he refers to Aubert is as editor of the 4th volume of *Concilium*.⁵⁷ Perhaps the book's insights are more like seeds in Lonergan's development of his thought. The book seems prescient of Lonergan's intellectual development over the next twenty years.

Aubert begins with an Augustinian perspective of love. "It is love that demands, it is love that makes one adhere to revelation and it is love also that maintains the adhesion once it has been given."⁵⁸ He insists on the psychology of

⁵²Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, 224.

⁵³"Notes on Faith," 7 (Lonergan archives A 155).

⁵⁴Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIa IIae 45; *Second Collection*.

⁵⁵Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 101 (1947).

⁵⁶See "Notes," 38-42. Here Lonergan references Aubert, 112-22 and 267.

⁵⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 260.

⁵⁸Aubert, 24-25 (my translation).

the subject as the foundation of St. Thomas's work on faith just as Lonergan would claim for St. Thomas's thought on grace and understanding.⁵⁹

Aubert is clear that in St. Thomas there are two ways of knowing, by reason and by connaturality.⁶⁰ He points out how little importance St. Thomas gave to the external signs so important in the new-scholastic tradition. Perhaps the reason for this is that in St. Thomas's world, faith was mostly one of infants coming to faith through baptism. Aubert gives a clear analysis of what were the developments on the analysis of faith in France and Germany. He speaks about Newman and his extensive influence.⁶¹ He writes about the contemporary existentialism, especially Marcel and Moureau.⁶² He simply states that modern psychology doesn't relate to faculty psychology.⁶³

What is of most interest is Aubert's insistence on the need to take into account the phenomenology of Husserl and Scheler. He calls Max Scheler a philosopher of genius.⁶⁴ He writes about Scheler's distinction that besides what we may know by our intellect, there are values such as the good, the beautiful, and so forth that are not apprehended by intelligence but by an emotional intuition that he names feeling.⁶⁵ All of these points raised by Aubert will be integrated in Lonergan's development that leads to his teaching on faith in *Method*.

“ANALYSIS OF FAITH” COURSE NOTES 1951-1952

For his course on faith in 1951-52 at Regis College in Toronto, he wrote notes called “Analysis of Faith”⁶⁶ for the Jesuits seminarians who were taking the course. Lonergan in his “Analysis of Faith” calls the grace the intellect needs in order to proceed to the act of faith, a supernatural illumination but he no longer calls it the light of faith. This illuminated judgment is the beginning of faith. “Nor can the assent of faith be made because of any knowledge of ours that is had

⁵⁹Aubert, 45.

⁶⁰Aubert, 61.

⁶¹Aubert, 343-56.

⁶²Aubert, 657.

⁶³Aubert, 551.

⁶⁴Aubert, 518.

⁶⁵Aubert, 51.

⁶⁶Published in *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 20 (2002): 121-54 (trans. Michael Shields, SJ)

through faith itself, this would involve circularity in reasoning, leading nowhere.”⁶⁷

What is new in his “Analysis of Faith” is that Lonergan begins to give more priority to the psychological process of supernatural faith, “to respect the dynamics of the advance toward truth.”⁶⁸⁻⁶⁹ He begins with the subject who is an unbeliever in the fact of revelation but wants salvation.⁷⁰ Crucial to his thought on faith is that the grace to desire salvation is the grace of conversion. This is operative grace so that the will adheres to God as God wills. This is replacing the heart of stone with the heart of flesh. This is a central to his understanding of conversion. This quest for salvation also requires the absolutely supernatural grace of enlightenment for an inquiry and understanding that is salutary.

The unbeliever wants salvation on condition that the truth is clearly seen. For this conditional desire he has received the grace that is a “devout inclination to believe” by which he wants to believe the mysteries of faith on account of the authority of God, provided that God has in fact revealed them.”⁷¹ This act in the will, namely, the “devout inclination to believe,” presupposes both the cause of its exercise and the cause of its specification. The cause of its exercise is another more general act in the will, namely, the will to adhere to God as God wills.⁷² This general act wills the end and the devout inclination wills the means, namely, the will to assent, to will the act of faith once the means is known. The means are specified by the reflective judgment that grounds the value judgments of credibility and credendity. I can and I ought to believe what God has revealed because God has revealed it.

Like any judgment, the “...reflective act understanding proceeds with rational necessity from one’s own grasp of the virtually unconditioned and it posits precisely what is grasped as virtually unconditioned, namely the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition. It differs from other judgments of fact or theoretical judgments for it settles a question of value, simply and solely as the good for intellect with a particular belief.”⁷³ “That which is to be believed by us

⁶⁷“Analysis of Faith,” 133.

⁶⁸*Second Collection*, 72.

⁶⁹See Ulf Johsson, *Foundations for Knowing God: Bernard Lonergan’s Foundations for Knowledge of God and the Challenge from Antifoundationalism* (Frankfort: Peter Lang, 1999), 127.

⁷⁰“Analysis of Faith,” 142-43,

⁷¹“Analysis of Faith,” 143, #40.

⁷²Notes, 2; *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 1, 379.

⁷³Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (Toronto: Longman, Green, and Co, 1958 student edition), 708.

is a good of the human intellect that is to say, it is a good not only absolutely speaking, in the sense that every being is good, but also a good in relation to the human intellect, just as, for example, food is good for an animal.”⁷⁴ “One anticipates, therefore, new obligations to be assented to through faith, a new life to be begun, new relationships of love towards one’s neighbor, a new submission of the mind to the magisterium of the church, and above all a new relationship with God to be entered into through the theological virtue of faith.”⁷⁵

We have seen how Lonergan goes beyond Lennerz, his teacher, especially with the role of understanding, the role of the illumination of the intellect and judgment to ground the judgments of values. His exposition of faith as a pilgrim’s journey begins a shift to the psychological subject away from the metaphysical. He shifts away from the deductive approach of the syllogism and emphasizes the role of grace of conversion and the dynamic orientation to do what is good. There is still the traditional concern to elucidate the reasonableness of faith and how it is above all an assent to revealed truths, not just subjective experience. While conversion is the essential beginning but to arrive at assent there is needed the judgment that this assent is a value for the intellect.

LONERGAN’S TEACHINGS ON FAITH IN *INSIGHT*, 1951

At the same time as his course on faith with his class notes, “Analysis of Faith,” Lonergan is writing *Insight*. In *Insight* the audience is no longer Jesuit seminarians but a much broader professional community and people of different or no faith. In *Insight* Lonergan’s purpose is not a presentation of the Catholic Church’s teaching on faith as in his “Analysis” but to articulate a heuristic to discover what is the solution to the problem of evil. His aim was “to seek a common ground on which men of intelligence might meet.”⁷⁶ “... our first eighteen chapters were written solely in the light of human intelligence...were followed by a nineteenth and twentieth that revealed the inevitability with which the affirmation of God and the search of intellect for faith arise out of a sincere acceptance of scientific presuppositions and precepts.”⁷⁷ Here is a question of understanding seeking faith.

⁷⁴“Analysis of Faith,” 25, # 2.

⁷⁵“Analysis,” 129-30.

⁷⁶*Insight*, xiii.

⁷⁷*Insight*, 744.

The problem is “that man’s intelligence, reasonableness, and willingness stand in opposition and tension with sensitive and intersubjective attachment, interest, and exclusiveness, and suffer from that tension a cumulative bias that increasingly distorts immanent development, its outward product and the outer conditions under which the immanent development occurs. Essentially the problem lies in a incapacity for sustained development and the schism in the soul that follow.”⁷⁸

To solve the problem of evil a new and higher collaboration is needed that “... is principally the work of God who illuminates our intellects to understand what we had not understood and to grasp as unconditioned what we had reputed error, who breaks the bonds of our habitual unwillingness to be utterly genuine in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection and by infusing the charity, the love that bestows on intelligence the fullness of life.”⁷⁹ We are freed from the rationalizations and biases that so deform our understanding and judgments and thus we are able to contribute to mankind’s progress. Faith in *Insight* along with love is the needed solution to the problem of evil if the solution actually exists.

“The act of faith will be an assent of intellect to truths transmitted through collaboration and it will be motivated by man’s reliance on the truthfulness of God. For, as a belief, the act of faith will be an assent of intellect to an object and because of a motive.... Because it is belief within a collaboration of man with God as initiator and principal agent, the motive of faith will be the omniscience, goodness, and omnipotence of God originating and preserving the collaboration.”⁸⁰

This act of faith, as a belief, will follow the typical process of any true belief. “In the process of true belief five stages are to be distinguished, namely:

- (1) preliminary judgments on the value of belief in general, on the reliability of the source for this belief, and on the accuracy of the communication from the source,
- (2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary judgments grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition,
- (3) the consequent judgment of value,
- (4) the consequent decision of the will,

⁷⁸*Insight*, 630, 632.

⁷⁹*Insight*, 730.

⁸⁰*Insight*, 720.

(5) the assent that is the act of believing.”⁸¹

Insight affirms the parameters needed for supernatural faith and love to overcome evil and leaves the readers to enquire and discover for themselves where this faith collaboration is concretely realized. What is central in *Insight* is the role of faith that includes beliefs in realizing the solution to evil. There is an illumination of the intellect, a higher development that overcomes the problem of development, allows us to assent to revealed truths, and makes us habitually willing to be utterly genuine in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection.⁸² It is the second step that is pivotal.

THE YEARS BETWEEN *INSIGHT* AND *METHOD*, 1951-1972

After *Insight*, Lonergan is assigned to teach in Rome and his writing is mostly dedicated to writing texts for his students. In this international center Lonergan has to engage with students who are more in touch with the different context of modern culture with its sense of the historical, and modern science. This leads to major transpositions and developments in his thought. Lonergan’s response to this changing context led him to create the needed method in theology.

There is a major shift in context from *Insight* to *Method in Theology* with the breakdown and disappearance of neo-Scholasticism. The shift begins in *Insight*. The context of theology and faith in *Insight* and the “Analysis of Faith” is the classical notion of theology and specifically fundamental theology. “Generically, fundamental theology was a logically ordered set of propositions....The logical operations were in a cumulative series.”⁸³ Classical fundamental theology was a highly technical conception. It was concerned with presenting the reasonableness of faith, “With meanings fixed by definitions, with presuppositions and implications fixed by the laws of logic, there resulted what used to be called eternal verities but today are known as static abstractions.”⁸⁴ Theology is seen as faith seeking understanding. Faith is an assent to revealed truths.

Lonergan’s reflections on the changes necessary for Thomism describe the new context. “Thomism for tomorrow has to move from logic to method; from

⁸¹*Insight*, 708.

⁸²*Insight*, 730

⁸³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 255 (1973).

⁸⁴*Second Collection*, 47 (1968).

science as conceived in the *Posterior Analytics* to science as it is conceived today; from the metaphysics of the soul to the self-appropriation of the subject; from an apprehension of man in terms of human nature to an apprehension of man through human history; and from first principles to transcendental method.”⁸⁵

Lonergan, in 1970 speaking to Jesuits, articulates what his agenda was from *Insight to Method in Theology*, “First, I wished to get out of the abstract and static context dictated by logical clarity, coherence and rigor and into the concrete, open and ongoing context dictated by attention, inquiry, reflection and deliberation. Secondly, I wished to get out of the context of a faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism, none of which has any serious, viable meaning, and into the context of intentionality analysis that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations and reveals that together they head man towards self-transcendence. Thirdly, I wished to have a base, a starting-point, a springboard, in people as they are and as they can discover themselves to be; ...”⁸⁶

The difference between Vatican I and the pastoral council Vatican II clearly symbolizes the change of context. These changes moved Lonergan not only to write *Insight* as an appropriate cognitional basis for theology but also to articulate in *Method in Theology* a theological methodology that redefines and expands fundamental theology and distinguishes faith from belief.

After we have reviewed these new developments in his teachings that the new context inspired, we will examine Lonergan’s presentation of faith in *Method in Theology*. The developments to be considered are:

1. shift from faculty psychology to the existential subject
2. transposition of sanctifying grace to being-in-love
3. different meanings of “faith” and the two vectors of faith
4. expansion of the fourth level of consciousness based on a new notion of value and the integration of feelings and knowing
5. the metaphor “the eye of love”

1. The Shift from Faculty Psychology to the Existential Subject

With the influence of existentialism, Lonergan shifts away from faculties to the existential subject who makes himself by his own acts what he is to be and he

⁸⁵*Second Collection*, 50 (1968).

⁸⁶*Second Collection*, 170 (1970).

does so freely and responsibly. "Such is the existential subject. It is a notion that is overlooked on the schematism of older categories that distinguished faculties, such as intellect and will, or different uses of the same faculty, such as speculative and practical intellect, or different types of human activity, such as theoretical inquiry and practical execution. None of these distinctions adverts to the subject as such..."⁸⁷

"Secondly, I wished to get out of the context of a faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism, none of which has any serious, viable meaning, and into the context of intentionality analysis that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations and reveals that together they head man towards self-transcendence."⁸⁸

"In *Insight*,...while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis."⁸⁹ "His reason is that intellect and will are not given directly to consciousness but rather are reached through metaphysics."⁹⁰ With intentionality analysis, "General theological terms will find their roots in cognitional theory. Specific theological terms will find their roots in religious experience."⁹¹ This centrality of subject's religious experience for theological terms leads to the transposition of the notion of sanctifying grace.

2. Transposition of Sanctifying Grace to Being-In-Love

Consonant with intentional analysis, Lonergan transposes not the traditional doctrine but grounds the meaning of sanctifying grace in religious experience. The reason for this transposition is that "Where we distinguish four realms of meaning, namely, common sense, theory, interiority and transcendence, an older theology distinguished only two, common sense and theory,...Hence, the older theology, when it spoke of inner experience or of God either did so within the realm of common sense – and then its speech was shot through with figure and symbol – or else it did so in the realm of theory – and then its speech was basically metaphysical. ...The older theology conceived sanctifying grace as an entitative habit, absolutely supernatural, infused into the essence of the soul. On

⁸⁷*Second Collection*, 79 (1968).

⁸⁸*Second Collection*, 170 (1970).

⁸⁹*Second Collection*, 277 (1972).

⁹⁰Fred Crowe, "Introduction," *Third Collection*, x.

⁹¹*Second Collection*, 237 (1972).

the other hand, because we acknowledge interiority as a distinct realm of meaning, we can begin with a description of religious experience, acknowledge a dynamic state of being in love without restrictions, and later identify this state with the state of sanctifying grace.”⁹²

In his doctoral thesis on “Grace and Freedom” completed May of 1940 Lonergan was clear that conversion as “The first act does not presuppose any object apprehended by the intellect; God acts directly on the radical orientation of the will...Further, conversion is the cause of the other acts; it is their *primum principium*, ...”⁹³ The new heart of flesh is God’s love poured into us, so that we are in a state of being-in-love. As the grace of conversion, being-in-love has the same significance as sanctifying grace as the dynamic principle shaping all other acts and is not dependent on our knowledge. Similarly, being-in-love is an entitative perfection, a higher perfection of being that grounds and elevates our nature and its subsequent operations.⁹⁴

The priority of the operative grace of conversion is present in the “Analysis of Faith.” Lonergan affirms that any process towards what is salutary is only possible with the grace of conversion. Since he has not shifted to the realm of interiority and the existential subject, he does not elaborate on this grace of conversion. Is it because the act of faith is specified by the intellect’s value judgment? In *Insight* he continually affirms that the solution to evil is principally the work of God.⁹⁵ He also affirms that “the development in each of us is principally the work of God who illuminates our intellect...and by infusing the charity, the love, bestows on intelligence the fullness of life.”⁹⁶ This is still faculty theology but love enriches intellect.

The shift to interiority allows Lonergan to affirm that religious conversion is God’s love poured into our hearts. This allows the clear articulation of sanctifying grace as the state of being-in-love as a dynamic first principle. “From it flow one’s desires and fears, one’s joys and sorrows, one’s discernment of values, one’s decisions and deeds.”⁹⁷ With this shift, conversion becomes central to and the beginning of any religious development. This being-in-love becomes the

⁹²*Method in Theology*, 120, 1971.

⁹³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1, 128.

⁹⁴On the twofold effect of habitual grace, the first is being, the second is operationCollected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1), 43, 48.

⁹⁵*Insight*, 723, 720.

⁹⁶*Insight*, 730.

⁹⁷*Method in Theology*, 105; *Second Collection*, 129 (1968).

foundation for theology as specific theological terms are grounded in conversion. Love is primary and the dynamic first principle of all religious development. Salutary faith can only flow from the change of heart, the state of being in love. This shift in love's priority not as a habit or act of love but as a state of "being-in-love" opens the way for the integration of feeling and knowing.

3. *The New Notion of Value and the Integration of Feeling and Knowing*

Many commentators on Lonergan affirm a divide in his work as before 1965 and after, especially with the publication of *Method in Theology* in 1972.⁹⁸ The first part of his writings was more focused on the intellect and knowing while the latter was more focused on "being-in-love," spiritual conversion, the prominence of value, the fourth level of consciousness, and method, and so forth. In an interview Lonergan was asked about the movement after *Insight* to an increasing interest in affectivity and feeling. Fr. Lonergan commented: "I was dealing in *Insight* fundamentally with the intellectual side...Then von Hildebrand and Frings' book on Scheler were a big help. I was also meeting questions of my own. One also has feelings oneself too, you know."⁹⁹ In order to grasp what is this affective integration with knowledge, I will consider what prepared Lonergan to make this integration of intentional feelings and emotions with the cognitive side.

In his thesis in 1940 on Grace he articulates that when God replaces a sinner's heart of stone, someone is inclined to sin and not to God. This is pure gift, operative grace that is not dependent on one's knowledge, willingness, or goodness.¹⁰⁰ This radical giftedness of conversion will later allow Lonergan to affirm that the adage, something has to be known by the intellect before it can be desired, may have an exception, namely, the love of God poured into our hearts. It is pure gift not dependent on our knowing God.¹⁰¹

Already in 1943 in his brilliant article on "Finality, Love, Marriage" the foundation of his thought on religious love is, "...he sent his Spirit of Love into our hearts; and in this redemption we are justified, rectified, renewed, ..." ¹⁰² This infusion of the Spirit becomes a *leit-motiv* for him and the interior basis for religious conversion and religious life. This is a "divine solidarity in grace which

⁹⁸"Introduction," *Second Collection*, vii.

⁹⁹*Second Collection* (1971), 221-23.

¹⁰⁰Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1, 440.

¹⁰¹*Method in Theology* (1972) 283.

¹⁰²*Collection*, 26.

is the mystical body of Christ...which takes over, transforms and elevates every aspect of human life.”¹⁰³

His next work on St. Thomas was his *Verbum* articles that he began in 1943 and finished in 1949. There is not much that relates to the integration of knowledge and affectivity. In these articles he did consider the dynamic presence of love. “By final causality there results from the beloved the *amari* (the to be loved) and this *amari* of the beloved is not in the beloved but in the lover... the *amari* of the beloved in the lover is one and the same act as the *amare* of the lover for the beloved.”¹⁰⁴ This is affirmed by quotes from St. Thomas. “The person loved is in the one loving insofar as the beloved is actually loved” and again, “that which is loved is in the one loving it insofar as it is actually loved.”¹⁰⁵ This is repeated in his writings on the Trinity.¹⁰⁶

This emotion of “to be loved” is a conscious impact on the subject from the object that results in the dynamic presence of the beloved in the lover in as much as the subject responds by loving the beloved. This sounds like a preview of Scheler and von Hildebrand who will influence him so much on how the intentional feeling-response reveals value through its impact on the subject, and is a different kind of “knowledge” than what is realized on the third level. This is key for the integration of affectivity and knowledge.

Crucial to his understanding of God’s love in our hearts is that the reality of sanctifying grace is first of all an enrichment of man’s nature, a supernatural elevation of his being. Similar to grace, love was the dynamic state of being from which flowed not potencies, habit, and acts as these terms were dropped but acts, desires, discernment of values and judgments of value.¹⁰⁷

St. Thomas had already raised the question whether knowledge and love of God and the self are constantly in act. “The knowledge in question is not a *discernere* (to discern) which distinguishes one object from another, nor a *cogitare* (to think) which relates the parts of one object to the whole nor any *intelligere* (to understand) that fixes attention in a determinate fashion; what is affirmed is some simple and continuous intuition in virtue of presence by which the soul knows and loves both itself and God in some indeterminate manner.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³Collection, 26 (1943).

¹⁰⁴Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, 210,

¹⁰⁵Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, 210, n. 85, 86.

¹⁰⁶Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 12, 218-29, 623.

¹⁰⁷The works of Hefling and Doran are basic to Lonergan’s thought on the supernatural.

¹⁰⁸Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, 102.

Loneragan later describes love's continuity beyond habit or act as a conscious state of being-in-love. Interesting that Thomas describes this knowledge as a "continuous intuition."

Insight was basically finished before Lonergan went to Rome in 1952 but was only published in 1957.¹⁰⁹ Lonergan also says that love is present in *Insight*. In an interview Lonergan was asked, "You didn't foresee what happened in *Method* with the whole shift into love from knowledge?" Lonergan answered, "No. It is there. Read the twentieth chapter and the Epilogue to *Insight*. You have a lot as hypotheses, eh? The solution to the human problem is faith, hope and charity."¹¹⁰ Charity is there but the notion of a state of being-in-love is not yet developed.

The main focus of *Insight* is the three related operations that together constitute knowledge: experience, understanding, and judgment. This in turn grounds three levels of consciousness. In *Insight* the third level of reflection that grounds judgment of truth is extended to include judgment of value, decision, and the carrying out of the decision. The distinction of the theoretical as opposed to the practical is maintained. The judgment of fact, that something is or is not true, is not on a separate level from the judgment of value. Judgments of values are practical judgments leading to decision. "Value is the good as the possible object of rational choice."¹¹¹

Loneragan does refer to a fourth level. "The advent of the absolutely supernatural solutions to man's problem of evil adds to man's biological, psychic, and intellectual levels of development a fourth level that includes the higher conjugate forms of faith, hope and charity."¹¹² "Finally, there can be the entry of a volitional component and its relevance is a fourth variable."¹¹³ "So it is that the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject."¹¹⁴ This is the going beyond knowledge more as an extension to include decisions that raise the questions of choosing values as the bases of morality. A new synthesis on a fourth level is for a later development.

¹⁰⁹Insight Revisited, *A Second Collection*, 268

¹¹⁰Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 95.

¹¹¹*Insight*, 601.

¹¹²*Insight*, 741

¹¹³*Insight*, 571.

¹¹⁴*Insight*, 599.

The role of affectivity is not very integrated with his theory of knowledge or faith. The significance of *Insight* for the integration of affectivity is the initial break from faculty psychology and the “turn to the subject.”¹¹⁵

After finishing *Insight* Lonergan was off to Rome where he taught from 1953 to 1965. His work in Rome was primarily teaching and writing for courses on the Trinity and Christology. In these courses there is also some shift to intentionality analysis. For example, he first describes sanctifying grace as an entitative habit in the essence of the soul, a grace which is a quality and an accident received in the soul of the just person.¹¹⁶ Then from an interpersonal relations perspective he describes sanctifying grace as a dynamic state between the Trinity and oneself. He speaks of sanctifying grace as a dynamic state constituted by the relations and not some accident inhering in one’s essence.¹¹⁷

In his Christology he deepens and expands his understanding of love and redemption. The law of the cross is how love transforms evil and death into eternal life. All mankind is called to incarnate in their lives Christ’s pattern of love transforming evil through their mutual love. The law of the cross is central for his social vision because it articulates the fundamental dialectic of the historical process in which evil is overcome by love, and biases are purified by faith, not to achieve an utopia or everlasting life here on earth but so that bias, decline, and death are not the final word.¹¹⁸

Of significance for the development of Lonergan’s thought on faith is his framework to understand the supernatural order of faith, hope, and love that he articulated in his Christology. Lonergan struggled with this question in his course on Christology that he gave at Regis in 1948-49. He realized that nothing finite could mediate participation in the intimate divine life. To know God immediately is only possible if one is somehow God because the level of knowledge is correlative to the level of being. The purpose of the incarnation is not only to reveal the Father’s love but also to share with us God’s life, so that we may love mediated by their love and know mediated by their knowing. The possibility of this is our becoming Christ, being one in the body of Christ. Christ’s created human existence, our light of faith, and charity are only created terms signifying the truth of our participation in the divine through Christ’s hypostatic union. These created terms cannot of themselves bridge the gap between the infinite and

¹¹⁵*Second Collection*, x.

¹¹⁶Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 12, 475.

¹¹⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 12, 513-21.

¹¹⁸*De Verbo*, 552-58.

the finite only the son as God and man in the hypostatic union bridges the gap for us.¹¹⁹⁻¹²⁰

From 1955 on, during the summers in order to escape from Rome and its heat and to pay for his expenses he gave workshops in North America. "In the summer of 1959 I gave an institute at Xavier in Cincinnati, on the philosophy of education. In preparing that I read a lot of Piaget, also Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form*, things like that, and that was the beginning of entry into these things."¹²¹

A further development in regards to feelings was the integrating of Scheler's teaching via von Hildebrand, Frings, and Pascal that in the intentional feeling-response to an object, especially with love, there is given a conscious grasp of value and a scale of values. In 1968, after his illness and the confrontation with death, Lonergan further develops his notion of value beyond *Insight*. "In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value.... It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions."¹²²

Until now in all his teaching, for the will to choose the assent of faith, the will depended on the intellect's judgment that the assent of faith is a value, both the general value of belief and this particular act of belief. For this the will is always depended upon the intellect's grasp of the values because the will was not considered capable of knowing since that is the domain of the intellect. The will can freely rationally desire what the intellect presents but otherwise it is blind and does not know and cannot rationally choose. Thus the adage nothing is loved unless it is first known.

Once Lonergan integrates the will's apprehension of value not by the intellect but in feelings and especially in love, this frees the will of its dependence on the intellect on the third level. This opens the way to formulate a fourth level of value sublating the other levels, not dependent upon them but just the opposite, the first three levels are ordered by love.

The notion of value grounds a fourth level of consciousness that is constituted by four interrelated intentional operations grounded in the dynamic notion of value expressed by the question, "Is it worthwhile?"

¹¹⁹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7, 145-47.

¹²⁰See my "Ignatian Discernment from Lonergan's Perspective," 150-62.

¹²¹*Second Collection*, 222.

¹²²*Second Collection*, 277 (1973).

This development of his notion of value, the question is it worthwhile, now, for me, drives the dynamism of the fourth level so the subject becomes a doer not just a knower, and a principle of benevolence and beneficence. The grasp of value and judgment of value on the fourth level, the level of rational self-consciousness are central to the process of the integration of affectivity and knowledge. First let us be clear what is meant by apprehension of value and the judgment of value.¹²³

What is a comprehension of value? A particular object evokes in me a spontaneous feeling-response. This feeling-response intends this object in and for itself and for the sake of which I go out of myself. Thus the feeling-response is intentional and self-transcending. Since there is a correlation between my feeling-response and the intended object, the depth, intensity, and type of feeling reveal the object as value to me and to what degree it is valued by me in the present response. My awareness of my feeling-response is how I grasp value. Personal value is only grasped through feeling-response. This is, in an analogous sense, “knowledge” as a conscious awareness of an object not as an object understood and conceptualized but as valued object for me, now, and to what degree of value or disvalue. Because there is “knowledge” from love, this needs to be integrated with the knowledge that is achieved through experiencing, understanding, and judging.

Consequently to the grasp of value there arises the “judgment of value” not grounded primarily in intellectual reflection but as a response to the question: “Is this value, now as revealed through my feeling-response, good or bad, authentic or unauthentic, true or false for me?” How can I discover the answer? Rational self-consciousness becomes conscience. I become aware that my conscience is peaceful, consoled or is disturbed and desolate.¹²⁴ This harmony or disharmony reveals to me that this object is or is not for me, authentic or unauthentic, true or false. “The criteria for a value judgment, is that it occurs in a virtuous person who pronounces a judgment with a good conscience. Such judgments are felt to be true or false in so far as they generate a peaceful or uneasy conscience.”^{125,126} “The good and the uneasy conscience are indications whether your judgment of value is sound or not. But that alone is not sufficient. You also must have developed

¹²³See Michael Rende, *Lonergan on Conversion: The Development of a Nation* (Lanham, MD: University Press of American, 1991), 27-34.

¹²⁴*Third Collection*, 175,

¹²⁵*Method in Theology*, 40.

¹²⁶Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 197 (1972); *Second Collection*, 221 (1971).

morally, developed your moral feelings, and so on, and that development will be stunted in an inadequate social and cultural milieu.”^{127,128}

The judgment of value does not dispense with knowledge. “One cannot do good without knowing the facts, without knowing what really is possible without knowing the probable consequence of one’s course of action. Just as inquiry directs sense towards knowledge of a universe, just as reflection turns sense and understanding and judgment towards the realization of the good, of values.”¹²⁹

Clearly with this development of the fourth level of rational self-consciousness Lonergan achieved a pivotal synthesis of knowledge and affectivity. “Now you get the synthesis of this feeling side and cognitional side of the level of the question, ‘Is this worthwhile?’ the judgment of value, the decision, the action.”¹³⁰ Where mind is experience, understanding, and judgment, the heart is what’s beyond this on the level of feeling and judging, “is this worthwhile?” that leads to judgment of value, and decision. “Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.”¹³¹ “Without feelings this experience, understanding, judgment is paper-thin. The whole mass and momentum of living is in feelings.”¹³² “These operations (of experiencing, and inquiring, understanding and formulation, checking and judging) occur under the rule and guidance of the fourth level, the level of deliberation, evaluating, deciding.”¹³³

There may be one exception to the necessity to know an object before we have a feeling-response and that is the love of God poured into our hearts and to whom we respond to as valued but not as known. Love as response is the love of God that is given to us. The initial response, as in all love, is a spontaneous self-surrender that we in all freedom affirm and say “yes” in total surrender without limits or conditions. There is a grasp of transcendental value through the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality that grounds our “yes,” our judgment of value without limits or conditions. This is not an experience of God but of our fulfillment by God.

¹²⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 25.

¹²⁸1968.

¹²⁹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 37 (1969).

¹³⁰*Second Collection*, 223 (1971).

¹³¹*Second Collection*, 277 (1973).

¹³²*Second Collection*, 221(1971).

¹³³*Second Collection*, 237 (1972).

This being-in-love, this total surrender, becomes the first dynamic principle of our grasp of values and judgment of values. There is the availability of knowledge to love, but love regulates knowledge and not vice versa. Love bestows the fullness of life on the intellect."¹³⁴ With love there is a wisdom, a supernatural perfection, the light of faith, a new horizon in which values are transvalued to what is in harmony with this divine love poured into us. The priority of being in love and the grounding of all terms in the religious experience occasions Lonergan's clarification of the terms, faith and belief.

4. Faith as Distinct from Belief and the Different Meanings of "Faith"

Lonergan can speak of faith as grounded in the existential subject as "It remains the power of total loving to reveal and uphold all that is good; it remains the bond that unites religious community in mutual recognition. That directs their common judgments of value, that purifies their beliefs."¹³⁵ Here he affirms the meaning of faith as a faith that grounds belief. He is acknowledging what would have been termed *lumen gratiae* or *lumen fidei* or infused wisdom.¹³⁶ Doctrinal faith becomes the harkening to the word of Emmanuel, of God-with-us. "The history of its origins and developments becomes doctrine as well as narrative; faith is also belief."¹³⁷ This faith is concerned with doctrine, the truths of faith. "I have been describing faith as the eye of otherworldly love, and doctrinal faith as the recognition of God's own love."¹³⁸ Faith as such is the power of love, the eye of love and distinct from belief.

In theology there is the distinction of *fides ex auditu*, faith from hearing and *fides ex infusione*, faith from infusion.¹³⁹ "The former mounts up the successive levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, deliberating and always grounded in the operative grace of conversion. The latter descends from the gift of God's love through religious conversion..."¹⁴⁰ Fred Crowe may be correct in saying the two ways of development were not operational in *Method's* chapter on love and faith. Perhaps this is true as ways of development but certainly the tradition of the two ways of faith were a part of Lonergan's thinking. The search for faith in

¹³⁴*Insight*, 730.

¹³⁵Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 21 (1968).

¹³⁶*Method in Theology*, 123.

¹³⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 21 (1968).

¹³⁸Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 21 (1968).

¹³⁹*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 6, a.1 as quoted in *Third Collection*, 34 n. 10.

¹⁴⁰*Third Collection*, 32 (1976).

Insight, and in his “Analysis of Faith.” is *fides ex auditu*. In *Method*, faith is mostly *fides ex infusion* because he “wished to have a base, a starting-point, a springboard, in people as they are and as they can discover themselves to be; ...”¹⁴¹ Before we consider faith in *Method* we need to reflect on the metaphor “eye of love.”

EYE OF LOVE

St. Paul prays “that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ may give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of him, having the eyes of your hearts enlightened, that you may know what is the hope to which he has called you, ...”¹⁴² This metaphor is echoed in St. Matthew’s beatitude, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.”¹⁴³ This metaphor is continued in St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Augustine specifies that “faith sees with the eyes of love.”¹⁴⁴ Two quotes from St. Thomas indicates how traditional is this metaphor of the eye of faith. “...that it is the light of faith that shows that which we must believe.” and “faith works through love.”¹⁴⁵ In 1910 P. Rousselot revived this scriptural metaphor in his famous article, “Les Yeux de la Foi.”¹⁴⁶ Lonergan doesn’t refer to the article even though he mentioned Rousselot’s other “famous” work, *L’intellectualisme de saint Thomas*.¹⁴⁷ In the Society of Jesus the article was still under a cloud but surely Lonergan would have read it. The textbook, *De Virtutibus* that he studied in Rome, mentions Rousselot’s article on “the eyes of faith.”¹⁴⁸ “Rousselot was pleased to find in Newman, the idea that the will, under the attraction of grace, prompts the intellect to believe.”¹⁴⁹

Following scriptures, the Augustinian and Thomist traditions, Lonergan uses the metaphor “eye of love” to express love’s priority and relation to faith. The focus on the priority of love is not new as we saw with operative grace but as

¹⁴¹*Second Collection*, 170 (1970).

¹⁴²Ephesians 1:17-18.

¹⁴³Matthew 5:8.

¹⁴⁴Dulles, “Newman on Revelation and Faith,” 236.

¹⁴⁵Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1, 6 n. 13.

¹⁴⁶See “The Eyes of Faith” translated by Joseph Donceel, and “Answer to Two Attacks,” translated and introduced by Dulles.

¹⁴⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2, 224.

¹⁴⁸See Lennerz, *De Virtutibus Theologicis*, 4th ed. (Rome: Gregorianum Press, 1938), 146.

¹⁴⁹Dulles, “Newman on Revelation and Faith,” 266.

grounding faith it is major shift. The metaphor of eyes of love as the means to see or grasp in a new creative way, seems appropriate. "Love recognizes,"¹⁵⁰ "our perceiving is through our own loving."¹⁵¹ I think it is also symbolic of the integration of knowledge and affectivity. Lonergan hasn't disowned any of his teaching on the process of belief or of Christian faith *ex auditu* but the transpositions and the integration of affectivity allow him to articulate that faith as our capacity to believe flows from love. *Fides ex infusione*. This emphasizes love's priority, relates to his idea of horizon, and gives a transcultural basis for "faith" in his method in theology.

"Nor is this somewhat metaphorical identification of faith with an eye of love something peculiar to religious knowledge. All human knowing occurs within a context, a horizon, a total view, an all-encompassing framework, a *Weltanschauung*, and apart from that context it loses sense, significance, meaning. Further, the sweep of one's horizon is proportionate to one's self-transcendence: it narrows as one fails to transcend oneself; it advances in breadth and height and depth, as one succeeds in transcending oneself. Being in love with God is the existential stance opening on the horizon in which Christian doctrines are intelligible, powerful, meaningful..."¹⁵²

Being-in-love "dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing."¹⁵³ "Because it is a dynamic state of being in love, it opens one's eyes to values and disvalues that otherwise would not be recognized,...So religious people live in a world transfused by religious experience, informed by the investigations to which the experience gives rise, and motivated by the evaluations which it grounds."¹⁵⁴ The "investigations" and the "evaluations" lead to religious community, to acceptance of its value judgments, its practices and teachings and theology.

Doran and Ormerod suggest that this world transfused by religious experience allows for a theological aesthetics.¹⁵⁵ This would be in harmony with the

¹⁵⁰*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁵¹*Method in Theology*, 290.

¹⁵²*Second Collection*, 162 (1969).

¹⁵³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 39 (1969).

¹⁵⁴Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 46 (1969).

¹⁵⁵Robert Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989), 164-65; Neil Ormerod, *Method, Meaning and Revelation* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), 149. Behind this metaphor is the shift to theology as an empirical science. "For example, right up to 1964 he has theology begin not with data as in empirical

metaphor of faith being the eye of love even though this is in tension with Lonergan's strong rejection of the analogy of sight in his theory of knowledge. I suggest that the immediacy of love that reveals value, supports the metaphor of eyes of love. "That prior word (love) pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of mystery of love and awe."¹⁵⁶

Lonergan similarly describes conversion. "It is as if one's eyes were opened and one's former world faded and fell away."¹⁵⁷ In his article on Mary's assumption in 1948 he writes, "... finally, one has to piece together these many passages into a single intelligible pattern. By this selection and piecing together there is effected a development of understanding, an opening of the eye of faith, upon what had been long revealed but that had not, from lack of understanding, been apprehended."¹⁵⁸

Another instance of the metaphor "eyes" was when asked in an interview about the fundamental expectation of religious consciousness, Lonergan refers to an Ignatian aphorism of "seeing God in all things."¹⁵⁹ Interestingly the wording is usually, "finding God in all things" or "to love and serve God in everything."

All the transpositions and theological developments arise out of the dynamics of the change in context and Lonergan's creative response to the changes. His response to the new context redefines theology and theological method and consequently the notion of faith in *Method*. This raises the questions, what is the difference in his description of faith in *Method*?

FAITH IN *METHOD IN THEOLOGY*, 1972

Method, nearly twenty years after *Insight*, was written for Roman Catholic theologians but with the hope that members of other communions may find it

sciences, but with the truths of faith: "*non a datis sed a veris incipit.*" Within three years he seems to have abandoned this and to be holding the exact opposite. Thus in his 1967 paper, "Theology in its New Context" he says "theology was a deductive, and it has become largely an empirical science." Frederick Crowe, "Lonergan's Universalist View of Religion," in *Developing the Lonergan Legacy*, ed. Michael Vertin, 87.

¹⁵⁶*Method in Theology*, 112.

¹⁵⁷*Method in Theology*, 130.

¹⁵⁸*Collection*, 72 (1948)

¹⁵⁹Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 156.

useful.¹⁶⁰ In *Method* the primary description of faith is that “Faith is the knowledge born of religious love.”¹⁶¹ This knowledge born of religious love “is not the factual knowledge that is reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.”¹⁶² “Faith, accordingly, is such further knowledge when the love is God’s love flooding our hearts.”¹⁶³

But how can loving be independent of knowledge and generate its own knowledge?¹⁶⁴ What is love’s knowledge? How does love relate to this knowledge? Faith is love’s knowledge but not the factual knowledge that is reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying. There is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.¹⁶⁵ The subject in love apprehends the experienced, basic fulfillment of his unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence in his actuated orientation towards and surrender to the mystery of love and awe.¹⁶⁶ The impact of God’s love reveals the supreme value through the experience of self-fulfillment.

As with all love, there is a spontaneous response of self-surrender that raises the value question, do I freely say “yes,” surrender myself or refuse to accept such self-fulfillment as true for me? This is a judgment of value that leads to decision and action. This surrender is without conditions or reserves. It is adoration and awe. This grasp of transcendent love and the subsequent judgment of value is “knowledge” by conscience and connaturality given through the subject’s conscious union with the supreme value that is transcendental love.¹⁶⁷ This knowledge of love is faith or infused wisdom or love’s capacity to know or to value all values in light of the supreme value, God’s love. Being-in-love determines the subject’s horizon to one of total self-transcendence by grounding the self and its self-transcendence in the divine lover whose love makes those he

¹⁶⁰*Method in Theology*, xii.

¹⁶¹*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁶²*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁶³*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁶⁴Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17 (1969).

¹⁶⁵*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁶⁶*Method in Theology*, 113.

¹⁶⁷On connaturality see Andrew Tallon, *Head and Heart*, 221-49.

loves in love with him, and so with one another.¹⁶⁸ “In the Christian, accordingly, God’s gift of his love is a love that is in Christ Jesus.”¹⁶⁹

Being in love opens the subject’s eyes to values and disvalues that otherwise could not be recognized, and it gives the power to do the good. There results a transvaluation of values and consequently a transformation of the dynamic of one’s world. So religious people live in a world transfused by religious experience, informed by the investigations to which the experience give rise, and motivated by the evaluations that it grounds.¹⁷⁰ Being-in-love underpins one’s judgments of value.¹⁷¹ Or we can say judgments of value come from faith.¹⁷² Faith discerns values and especially the value of believing.¹⁷³ Or we may say since love is the immanent, effective first principle from it flows one’s discernment of values.¹⁷⁴ Faith, the eye of love can discern God’s self-disclosures.¹⁷⁵ Or we can say it is being in love that discerns God’s hand in nature and his message in revelation.¹⁷⁶⁻¹⁷⁷

Love’s capacity to recognize all values and their relation to itself is the “eye of love” or love’s wisdom or the light of faith. This is the major shift from faith in the “Analysis” or *Insight*. We have to shift from the metaphysical terms, such as intellect and will, and turn to the existential subject who is in love with God through the gift of God’s love immanently deeper than his most intimate self. The existential subject is in a state of being-in-love that grounds faith.¹⁷⁸ Faith is distinguished from belief even though traditionally ‘faith and religious belief are identified.’¹⁷⁹

Traditionally “faith” was also understood in a secondary way, as light of faith or light of grace or infused wisdom flowing from sanctifying grace that is an entitative habit radicated in the essence of the soul.¹⁸⁰ This secondary and traditional meaning is transposed and made primary in *Method*. “Among the vales

¹⁶⁸Volume 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (1968), 22-23.

¹⁶⁹*Second Collection*, 156 (1969).

¹⁷⁰Volume 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, 46 (1969).

¹⁷¹Volume 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, 20 (1968).

¹⁷²*Method in Theology*, 119.

¹⁷³*Method in Theology*, 118.

¹⁷⁴*Third Collection*, 123 (1976).

¹⁷⁵*Method in Theology*, 115.

¹⁷⁶*Second Collection*, 162 (1969).

¹⁷⁷See *Method in Theology*, 116; *Third Collection*, 250, # 9 (1982).

¹⁷⁸*Second Collection*, 154.

¹⁷⁹*Method in Theology*, 123.

¹⁸⁰*Method in Theology*, 289.

that faith discerns is the value of believing the word of religion, of accepting the judgments of fact and the judgments of value that religion proposes. Such belief and acceptance have the same structure as other belief already described in chapter 2. But now the structure rests on a different basis and that basis is faith.”¹⁸¹

Why does Lonergan in *Method* focus on faith as infused and as distinguished from belief and not faith from hearing? Both vectors are clearly affirmed and interrelated as in the traditional Catholic doctrine on faith. I think priority is given to faith as infused, abstracting from any faith as historically and culturally realized because it is of foundational importance for his teachings on method. Lonergan was writing for as broad an audience as possible and not just for Catholic theologians and seminarians or writing an analysis of the Catholic faith. The identification of faith and beliefs would seem to imply that other religious traditions do not have true faith if they have different beliefs. Methodologically Lonergan sought for what is given in human interiority in the search for God transculturally, independent of the religious tradition, beliefs and culture. Conversion, the love of God, and faith as the eye of such love poured into our hearts becomes a transcultural foundation for transcendental theological method.

In 1969 in his talk on “Faith and Beliefs,” he writes, “It was my hope to sketch a construct, a model, an ideal type containing a systematic distinction between a faith born of otherworldly love and possibly common to all genuine religions, and, on the other hand, the many diverse and often opposed beliefs to which religious people subscribe.”¹⁸² Transcendental method is, in a sense, transcultural.¹⁸³ Similarly, God’s gift of his love¹⁸⁴ has a transcultural aspect. This gift is offered to all men, though apprehended and manifested in many ways. “Thirdly, both with regard to transcendental method and with regard to God’s gift of his love we have distinguished between an inner core, which is transcultural, and an outer manifestation, that is subject to variation.”¹⁸⁵

The inner core of the grace of conversion is also present in his notes “Analysis of Faith” and in *Insight* as faith from hearing even if not identified as such. He clearly affirms the necessity of the grace of conversion, the grace of adhering to God as ultimate good, the grace of willingness, and also the grace of illumination

¹⁸¹*Method in Theology*, 118.

¹⁸²Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 46.

¹⁸³*Method in Theology*, 282.

¹⁸⁴Romans 5:5.

¹⁸⁵*Method in Theology*, 284.

for the intellect to be able to integrate all the steps of ascending from hearing, understanding and judging and their consistency with subsequent implications. In *Insight* the traditional focus is on the reasonableness of faith, as God's response to evil and that the realization of faith is principally the work of God. God's love "bestows the fullness of life on the intellect."¹⁸⁶

The major difference in *Method* that implies not only a different context and purpose but a major change in his thought was the further development of the fourth level of consciousness. The pivotal step is no longer the reflective judgment but the grasp of value through emotions and the judgment of value. The notion of value is known through our feeling-response and not through the reflective act of judging. In the immediate experience of the feeling response, value is revealed, is grasped, "seen" by the one who loves. Religious love discerns, reveals to us through faith "the value of believing the word of religion, of accepting the judgments of fact and the judgments of value that the religion proposes."¹⁸⁷

While the various graces and illuminations are mentioned in *Insight* and the "Analysis of Faith," they are like presuppositions and not the primary focus, nor grounded clearly in the state of being in love as the dynamic principle of all subsequent acts as in *Method*. In *Insight* love cannot be the dynamic principle of the act of faith because the judgment of value, that specifies the will's consent, is grounded in the reflective judgment from the intellect on the third level and not from love.

On the fourth level of rational self-consciousness, a subject does not grasp value by the intellect but through intentional feelings, especially, love. Love "knows" independently of understanding and judgment on the third level. This frees love in its choice of value to sublimate knowledge and not to be subject to its rule but like a role reversal love grounds faith. In *Method*, conversion, grounded in God's love, is a transcultural foundation for theology and the horizon for doctrines, systematics and communications. "Beliefs do differ, but behind this difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgments of value, and the judgments of value relevant for religious belief come from faith, the eye of religious love an eye that can discern God's self-disclosures."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶*Insight*, 730.

¹⁸⁷*Method in Theology*, 118.

¹⁸⁸*Method in Theology*, 119.

AVERY DULLES'S CONCERNS

Now I will consider the concerns Avery Dulles has with Lonergan's teaching on faith in *Method* that he presents in his book, *The Assurance of Things Hoped For*. For Dulles faith includes belief as a fundamental and essential ingredient.¹⁸⁹ Dulles notes that Lonergan on the other hand, makes a "radical"¹⁹⁰ distinction between faith and belief. In the place of faith from a Catholic perspective, Dulles sees Lonergan as proposing a "universalist faith,"¹⁹¹ a faith common to many religious traditions, such as, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Moslems, and so forth and even secular humanists¹⁹². Beliefs vary but "faith" doesn't.

This universalist faith,¹⁹³ distinct from all belief, is grounded in the subjective, spiritual emotion of God's love poured into our souls rather than objective truths.¹⁹⁴ In 1969 Lonergan writes, "By a universalist faith, then, I would understand the transvaluation of values that results from God's gift of his love. Just as the gift of that love, so too the consequent transvaluation of values is, in some sense, a constant....The values that are transvalued may vary, but the process of transvaluation has its constant ground in God's gift of his love."¹⁹⁵ This seems very different from his teaching on faith in 1958. In his 1958 workshop on *Insight* in Halifax, Lonergan taught that, "For a Catholic what is decisive is that when a Catholic says, 'I believe' and there follows a list of propositions, they are truths, and they determine his religious life. If you want to be a modernist, you will say what counts is religious experience."¹⁹⁶ Lonergan has not changed his mind on Catholic faith but in *Method* he distinguishes "universal faith" and Catholic faith. Universal faith, which is given with God's love in our hearts, is incomplete if it is to be considered Catholic faith. He affirms that, "It is also true that a Christian theologian should be an authentic human being and an authentic Christian and so will be second to none in his acceptance of revelation, scripture, and his church doctrine."¹⁹⁷ If the sixth functional

¹⁸⁹*Method in Theology*; Dulles, *Assurance of Things Hoped For*, 173.

¹⁹⁰Dulles, *Assurance of Things Hoped For*, 268.

¹⁹¹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 42 (1969).

¹⁹²Dulles, *Assurance of Things Hoped For*, 154.

¹⁹³See Crowe, "Lonergan's View of Religion."

¹⁹⁴Dulles, *Assurance of Things Hoped For* p. 159

¹⁹⁵Volume 17 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 43.

¹⁹⁶Volume 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5, 279 (1958).

¹⁹⁷*Method in Theology*, 331.

specialty is concerned with Catholic doctrine then the theologian needs catholic faith, a faith that accepts revelation and the teaching of the Catholic Church.¹⁹⁸

Dulles is also concerned that the emphasis on love implies there are two revelations or words: one interior, subjective, of the Spirit and an exterior word, that of Christ and his church. The interior word is universal, prior, and common to all religious traditions overshadowing the importance of the external revelation of Christ in his teachings, life, suffering, death and resurrection and church doctrines. "Since he relates faith and conversion almost exclusively to the 'inner word' of God's love poured into the heart, Lonergan can easily be understood or misunderstood) as denying the salvific importance of God's outer word."¹⁹⁹

In response to Dulles's first concern I would recall that the gift of love and faith, necessary for salvation, is offered to all men and women. What is offered is the intimate sharing of God's personal life necessary for salvation. This self-communication is absolute, one and the same always and everywhere even if in varying degrees. On the part of the human person there is great diversity in how God's self-communication is apprehended and manifested. This depends upon God's grace, one's historical situation and religious values, traditions, language, personal development, education, and so forth. Thus how we believe can be distinguished from what we believe. This gives us an inner core, a transcultural basis, a model, to relate to all authentic religious experiences and traditions. It also provides a common religious foundation for all theological reflection. Dulles would probably still advise us to be attentive not to be understood to be presenting a communal religious faith that is in the existential subject as radically separate from his or her beliefs. Distinct doesn't necessarily mean radically separate in the concrete.

Lonergan's intention in *Method* is seen already in his lecture at the University of Toronto, In January of 1968, "It was my hope to sketch a construct, a model, an ideal type containing a systematic distinction between a faith born of otherworldly love and possibly common to all genuine religious, and on the other hand, the many diverse and often opposed beliefs to which religious people subscribe, But in concluding I must point out that my model is just a skeleton. To apply it to any particular religion further parts may need to be added. Moreover, because religions can differ in fundamental ways, one must have different sets of parts to add, and even one may have to add them in quite different ways.

¹⁹⁸*Method in Theology*, 332.

¹⁹⁹Dulles, *Assurance of Things Hoped For*, 155

Let me illustrate this with an example. My account of religious beliefs does not imply that they are more than objectifications of religious experience. It is a view quite acceptable to the nineteenth-century liberal Protestant or to the twentieth-century Catholic modernist. But it is unacceptable to most traditional forms of Christianity, in which religious beliefs are believed to have their origin in charism, prophecy, inspiration, revelation, the word of God, the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Obviously to be applicable to this traditional type of religious belief, the skeleton model needs to be fleshed out, and fleshing it out calls for creativity.”²⁰⁰ “It is to be stressed that this use of the special categories occurs in interaction with data. They receive further specifications from the data...so too a theology can be neither purely *a priori* nor purely *a posteriori* but only the fruit of an ongoing process that has one foot in a transcultural base and the other on increasingly organized data.”²⁰¹

Dulles’s other major concern is the lack of balance between faith from hearing and faith from infusion and the consequent risk of diminishing the importance of the exterior revelation of Jesus and the teachings of his church. Redemption is accomplished through the missions of the Son who becomes man, teaches, suffers, dies and is resurrected and of the Spirit of love who makes us capable of hearing and believing in Jesus and his church. “...he will guide you into all the truth;...He will glorify me for he will take what is mine and declare it to you.”²⁰²

The mission of the Son is bound in time and place as is the witness of his disciples throughout history. The Spirit of love is not bound by time or space but can be poured into the hearts of men and women by the Father through his Son. Through the Spirit, all humanity is united in the humanity of Christ. These missions complete one another, responding to us as individuals, as historical beings and as a human community.²⁰³

“Further, religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state of mind and heart. Essential to it is an intersubjective, interpersonal component. Besides the gift of the Spirit within, there is the outward encounter with Christian witness. That witness testifies that of old in many ways God has spoken to us through the prophets but in this latest age through his Son.”^{204,205}

²⁰⁰Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 46-47 (1969),

²⁰¹*Method in Theology* (1972), 293.

²⁰²John 16:13-14.

²⁰³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 269 (1973).

²⁰⁴Hebrews 1:1-2.

²⁰⁵*Method in Theology*, 327.

Lonergan is very clear that the two divine missions are complementary. Love urges us, as a question of life and death, to discover who is this Divine Lover. He expresses this well in his article on "Mission and Spirit." "Without the invisible mission of the Word, the gift of the Spirit is a being-in-love without a proper object; it remains simply an orientation to mystery that awaits its interpretation, Without the invisible mission the Spirit, the Word enters into his own, but his own receive him not."²⁰⁶

The two missions reflect that we are individual and at the same time a member of the human race. "I" comes to be through the "we" of my parents and develop through a family, a social, cultural, religious context. In 1977 Lonergan reiterates his teaching in *Method*: "The Christian religion as lived enters human living both on the side of the object and on the side of the subject. On the side of the object it enters human history and penetrates human cultures as the word of God in and about and through Jesus Christ his life and his work....within the individual it is God's love flooding his heart and thereby transforming his existential subjectivity; with the ongoing human community it is the objective revelation of God's love in Christ Jesus, the mediation of that revelation through the Christian and the mission to preach the gospel to all nations until the consummation of all in all."²⁰⁷

Dulles perhaps would remind us that most of these quotations are a few years after *Method* and he believes the integration of the two missions is not emphasized in *Method* and this invites misunderstanding. In *Method* Lonergan is writing a book on theological method for anyone who is authentically interested in reflecting on religious experience and their tradition. The model of faith as the eye of love gives a foundation that is transcultural and further reflection on a particular faith will lead to additions and so forth, but it is not a presentation of a Christian's faith. Faith is always in individuals. Through faith, the eye of love, the existential subject is able to discern and assent to the religious values expressed in that person's language, culture, beliefs, and traditions.

Lonergan was always clear that we begin with a falling in love that it is the beginning of a new life. In 1971 Lonergan writes, "For it (the Christian religion) knows God not only through the grace in its heart but also through the revelation of God's love in Christ Jesus and the witness to that revelation down the ages through the church. Christian love of God is not just a state of mind and heart;

²⁰⁶*Third Collection*, 32 (1976).

²⁰⁷Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 358-59 (1977).

essential to it is the intersubjective, interpersonal component in which God reveals his love and asks ours in return.”²⁰⁸

With the completion of *Method in Theology* Lonergan had accomplished what he felt called to do and now he could return to his first love, economics. All his writings have as their horizon, a framework, a call to action, a social vision. Now let us consider this social vision and faith’s crucial role.

FAITH IN LONERGAN’S SOCIAL VISION

The events of the thirties such as the approach of the Second World War, the worldwide fascination with communism, Nazi Germany and Italy, the civil war in Spain all compounded by the dislocation and suffering of the great depression made a deep impression on Lonergan. Men could not support their families for there was widespread unemployment during this major economic decline. “There can be a depression, and it is not for lack of raw materials, nor for lack of factories and railways, nor for lack of capital – money is going begging. Nor is it for lack of people willing to work or for lack of people willing to invest. It is just that the whole setup has simply gone awry; it just will not work. That is a case of the evil in the depression. You can see the absence of the good of order.”²⁰⁹

“There arise vast illusions, A greater part of my life, and of many of your lives, was passed in a milieu in which the idea of automatic progress dominated social thinking. Everything was inevitably getting better. That idea has been eliminated by two world wars, the Depression, and the Cold War, so that no one talks about automatic progress any more, But it was a vast illusion that possessed men’s minds and influenced all sorts of decisions. The classless society promised by Marx is another such illusion, the illusion of a utopia. Nietzsche’s Superman is another illusion, an illusion of the individual.”²¹⁰

Lonergan felt strongly the need to articulate a Christian social vision that would “put the competing social visions in the shade.”²¹¹ In 1934-35, his second year of theology in Rome, Lonergan for the first time articulates his social vision in his notes on St. Paul’s “Panton Anakephaliosis,” the restoration of all things in

²⁰⁸Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 83 (1971).

²⁰⁹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 34 (1959).

²¹⁰Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 47 (1959).

²¹¹Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 73.

Christ.²¹²⁻²¹³ ‘This was nearly his motto, the refrain of his writings.’²¹⁴ He realizes this paper on a social vision “can only be suggestive ideas for it presupposes very definite views on all things, theological, philosophic, historical, social, political even economic.” His life work is needed to fully articulate this social vision “on all things,…”²¹⁵

These notes of 1934-35, very scholastic, metaphysical, with its Platonic and Hegelian overtones already affirm the importance of grounding everything in a clear theory of knowledge. Also the “Crisis in the West” reveals unmistakably the necessity of a fundamental sociology and a philosophy of history if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement. He sees in Christianity the sole possibility of a practical human unity. Writing a treatise on the philosophy of history in his free time is not what is usually expected in tertianship, the final third year of spiritual formation for Jesuits. In the fall of 1937 to the spring of 1938 Lonergan did his tertianship at Amiens in France. During his free time he continues his work on his social vision for a world he sees captivated by the mysticism of rationalism and freemasonry, or of naturalism and progress, or National Socialism with its mysticism of race, or Communism with its mysticism of revolution. The goal of Lonergan’s speaking and writings will be to fill in the pieces of the puzzle for a social vision that appeals more than National Socialism, Communism and a Capitalism based on greed.

The role of Christ’s mystical body and especially the role of faith are foundational for his social vision. Only in the body of Christ is there a unity that overcomes all differences, time, evil, and death.²¹⁶ This will be repeated and refined in his later articles, “The Mystical Body and the Sacraments” in 1941²¹⁷ and again on “The Finality of Marriage” in 1943,²¹⁸ and in 1951 his exhortation to the Regis community is on “The Mystical Body of Christ.”²¹⁹ This framework

²¹²“The Restoration of All Things (Panton Anakephalaiosis),” *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9 (1991): 139-72.

²¹³Ephesians 1:10.

²¹⁴See Crowe, introduction to volume 2 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vii.

²¹⁵“Restoration of All Things,” 140.

²¹⁶ “Thus, the material unity of man in Adam is replaced by the intelligible unity of man in Christ, the blind course of nature by the voluntary course of faith, ... Man is indeed made to the image and likeness of God when the actuation of his being is from the Father, the actuation of his adoptive sonship is from the son, the light of the world, and the actuation of his effective humanity is from the Holy Ghost.”(Restoration, 1)

²¹⁷*Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 10, 77-82.

²¹⁸*Collection*, 16-53.

²¹⁹*Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 20, 106-11.

will be echoed in chapter 7 of *Insight* as cosmopolis and in the epilogue.²²⁰ “But the solution to man’s problem of evil is not in a human initiative, but in an acceptance of the solution that God has provided; ...”²²¹

To solve this problem of evil, did God have to revise his plans and bring in a new solution, a substitute player, Christ Jesus, the second Adam? No, God doesn’t revise his plans to deal with the unexpected as there is no unexpected for God. There may be millions of possible universes that God could have freely chosen to create, for example, a universe with freedom but without suffering, injustice or sin. God chooses in his eternity to create the universe we know, a universe of emergent probability, evolving according to classical and statistical laws. A world where man is free to sin, to cause great evil, suffering and injustice, caught up in personal, group and general bias and the social surd.

But the vertical finality of this universe is to become divine, to participate in the divine life through God’s son who in the fullness of time became incarnate as the son of Mary and Joseph. This supernatural finality is not an afterthought, a solution to fix the problem of evil but God chose this universe out of the abundance of His love. “St. Augustine made perhaps one of the most profound remarks in all his writings, and for that matter in the whole of theology, when he said that God could have created a world without any evil whatever, but thought it better to permit evil and draw good out of the evil.”²²²

Lonergan’s social vision is grounded in this abundance of God’s love poured into our hearts from the Father in the Son. I think Lonergan’s most quoted text from scriptures is Romans 5:5. His social vision is “principally God’s achievement” but everyone is invited to participate, to cooperate with Christ in the task of confronting evil with the power of divine love, and to make up what is missing in the sufferings of Christ. This supernatural finality means to be merely human is to fall short of what is authentically human.²²³ To be authentic is an apostolate. “Religious effort towards authenticity through prayer and penance and religious love of all men shown in good deeds become an apostolate, ...”²²⁴

Authentic life is a call to action through one’s authentic decisions and deeds. One becomes a principle of benevolence and beneficence and capable of loving. A love that “promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of

²²⁰*Insight*, 742.

²²¹*Insight*, 745.

²²²Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 29 (1959).

²²³*Insight*, 729.

²²⁴*Method in Theolog*, 119 (1971).

self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress.”²²⁵ “The redemptive work of Christ is carried on by all members of Christ’s mystical body. It follows that this work is to be performed by all, at times as individuals, at times as member of this or that larger or smaller group, at times as members or as officials of the whole body.”²²⁶ “Being in love is being in Christ Jesus that is not tied down to place or time, culture or epoch. It is catholic with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord. Neither is it an abstraction that dwells apart from every place and time, every culture and epoch, It is identical with personal living, and personal living is always here and now, . . .”²²⁷

This is not another utopia like Marxism since the world of sin and death are not destroyed or overcome but rather divine love in us sublates evil and death not to absorb it, or abolish it but to integrate sin into a higher meaning. Our death becomes our sacrificial embrace of the Father’s will, repeating Jesus’ words “Into your hands I commend my spirit.” Death is sublated to participation in Christ’s death and resurrection.

This is a shift in constitutive meaning. The sin of the world becomes as in the Easter liturgy, the *felix culpa*, O! happy fault. This is the “cry of wonder accompanied by surging emotion” of Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises # 60. This allowing of evil and sin is the occasion of God’s greater and more intimate love revealed in Jesus’ sufferings, death, and resurrection.

All human love is sublated by Jesus’ love. Human love remains human but now it is transformed by being grounded and mediated by the Love of Christ. Outside of his love there is no authentic human love. “There is domestic love, the love that makes a home, in which parents and children, each in his or her own ever-nuanced and adaptive way, sustains and is sustained by each of the others. There is the love that is loyalty to one fellows: it reaches out through kinsmen, friends, acquaintances, through all the bonds – cultural, social, civil, economic, technological – of human cooperation, to unite ever more member of the human race in the acceptance of a common lot, in sharing a burden to be borne by all, in building a common future for themselves and future generations. But above all, at once most secret and most comprehensive, there is the love of God.”²²⁸

²²⁵*Method in Theology*, 55 (1971).

²²⁶Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 231 (1973).

²²⁷*Collection*, 250 (1964).

²²⁸Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 248-40 (1973); *Second Collection*, 145.

This gift of God's Spirit of love in our hearts dismantles our horizon and the new horizon that is the eye of love transvalues all our values and orders all values to the supreme value of transcendent love. For example, the transvaluation of poverty means: "First and foremost God speaks to the poor, to the poor in the underdeveloped nations, to the poor in the slums of industrialized nations. And if the work of God is not preached to the poor, then the church has failed."²²⁹ We are grasped by ultimate concern.²³⁰ Lonergan would add "that the basic steps in aiding the poor in a notable manner is a matter of spending one's nights and days in a deep and prolonged study of economic analysis."²³¹ The transvalued values are those of the beatitudes and of St. Ignatius' Standard of Christ. I think much of Lonergan's social vision is echoed in St. Ignatius's "Contemplation to Attain Love" of the Spiritual Exercises #230. As St. Augustine said, "love and do what you desire."²³²

Lonergan made three major contributions to the implementation of this social vision. First, he strove to bring a renewal of Christian theology in relation to all the human sciences so that it may "take its place in contemporary culture." Fundamental to this renewal was the articulation of a phenomenology of knowledge that could give a firm foundation for theology to take its proper place. He wanted "a philosophy and theology that works out of modern science and scholarship as the basis of a contemporary cognitional theory and undertakes to overcome the relativism and agnosticism that are the prima facie implications of modern science and scholarship."²³³ "And if modern theologians were to transpose medieval theory into the categories derived from contemporary interiority and its real correlatives, they would be doing for our age what the greater Scholastics did for theirs."²³⁴ This transposition enlarges the traditional idea of theology as faith seeking understanding. "While theology used to be defined as the science about God, today I believe it is to be defined as reflection on the significance and value of religion in a culture."²³⁵

Secondly, Lonergan created a basic methodology grounded in the consciousness of the authentic subject. "Mathematics, science, philosophy, ethics,

²²⁹*Third Collection*, 228 (1981).

²³⁰*Method in Theology*, 240 (1971).

²³¹Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 280 (1973).

²³²St. Augustine, *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers* vol. 7, homily vii, 8, ed. Philip Schaff (*In Ep. 1st Joannis ad Parthos* tr. vii, 8).

²³³Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 278 (1973).

²³⁴*Method in Theology* (1971), 327-28.

²³⁵*Second Collection*, 190.

theology differ in many manners; but they have the common feature that their objectivity is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.”²³⁶ “In brief, underpinning special methods there is what I have named generalized empirical method.”²³⁷ This is a method that gives a basic methodology through which every specialization, in its own way, can contribute to mankind’s progress and help offset decline in partnership with theology.

Matthew Lamb writing on the social and political dimensions of Lonergan’s theology states, “What is more, by articulating the related and recurrent operations of human conscious intentionality, Lonergan has provided a non-dominative basis for communal, regional, national, and international collaboration toward peace and justice. He does not offer a theory to be imposed from without. Rather, he presents an invitation to a self-appropriation which cognitively, morally, and religiously respects and seeks to promote the effective freedom of all human communities. The truth of the higher viewpoint offered by religion and faith is not a truth to be imposed, for such imposition and dominative use of religion has always been a sign, not of profound faith, but of precisely those biased flights from understanding which genuine faith and religion heal.”²³⁸

Lonergan’s lifelong ambition was to interrelate theology and economics as an example of collaboration of theology and a key human science. Such integration was essential for his social vision as a collaborative process. “From 1930 to about 1944 I spent a great deal of my free time on economic theory”²³⁹. He had to put economics aside during his work in St. Thomas and his teaching of theology but he picked economics up again in 1977 as his main interest for the rest of his life.²⁴⁰

He gave priority to his work on economics so important to world order as an example how the human sciences can partner with theology to offset decline and sustain progress. In 1975 he writes: “From economic theorists we have to demand, along with as many other types of analysis as they please, a new and specific type that reveals how moral precepts have both a basis in economic process and so an effective application to it. From moral theorists we have to

²³⁶*Method in Theology*, 265 (1971).

²³⁷*Third Collection*, 150.

²³⁸Matthew Lamb, “The Social and Political Dimensions of Lonergan’s Theology,” in *Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Vernon Grignn, 278.

²³⁹Crowe, *Lonergan*. 37, # 63.

²⁴⁰Lambert, Tansey, and Going, *Caring About Meaning*, 225.

demand, along with their other various forms of wisdom and prudence, specifically economic precepts that arise out of economic process itself and promote its proper functioning.”²⁴¹

Thirdly, Lonergan could sum up much of his effort as integrating history with theology. Mankind’s aspiration for the human good, the good of order is brought about through history’s dynamic dialectic, the redemptive structure of progress and decline. “Impotent in his situation and impotent in his soul, man needs and may seek redemption, deliverance, salvation. But when it comes, it comes as the charity that dissolves the hostility and the divisions of past injustice and present hatred; it comes as the hope that withstands psychological, economic political, social, cultural determinisms; it comes with the faith that can liberate reason from the rationalizations that blind it.”²⁴² History is mostly meaning and he places the ultimate meaning of human history in the Father’s redemptive love through the divine missions of His Word and their Spirit.²⁴³ For it is only through the Father’s gift through Christ, with their Spirit in faith, hope, and love that there is a human capacity to overcome the surd of evil in the history of mankind.

Key to this social vision, geared not just to theory but also to action, is faith as the eye of love, the liberator of reason. In *Method* Lonergan emphasized the role of faith in his social vision. “Without faith, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist. But faith recognizes that God grants men their freedom that he wills them to be persons and not just his automata, that he calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good. So faith is linked with human progress and it has to meet the challenge of human decline. For faith and progress have a common root in man’s cognitional and moral self-transcendence. To promote either is to promote the other indirectly. Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence....Most of all, faith has the power of undoing decline.”²⁴⁴ Until He comes in glory to bring their kingdom, the end of death and history when God is all in all.

CONCLUSION

²⁴¹*Third Collection*, 108 (1975).

²⁴²*Third Collection*, 31-32.

²⁴³*Third Collection*, 234 (1976).

²⁴⁴*Method in Theology*, 117 (1971).

We have considered Lonergan's personal growth in faith and reviewed Lonergan's development in his teachings on faith. First, in his courses to theologians with his "Analysis of Faith." The context of his "Analysis of Faith" is Catholic faith seeking understanding. This is a traditional analysis of faith *ex auditu* with more emphasis than traditionally given at that time to the psychological and to the reflective judgment that grounds and specifies the judgments of value and the role of operative grace. In *Insight* he raises the question what is the supernatural solution to the problem of evil. He presents a heuristic to help the reader discover for her or himself the supernatural solution of faith, hope and charity to the problem of evil. In *Insight*, inspired by Newman, he develops a foundational analysis of belief, its importance in all our knowing. Faith and belief begin to be considered separately even if it is true that concrete, authentic religious belief is always integrated with the light of faith.

In *Method* the theological context is a "theology that mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."²⁴⁵ Faith is seen from the perspective of faith from infusion. He had realized that since love has its own "knowledge of value" it could be freed from intellect's control and become the dynamic principle that grasps value and the judgment of value that is faith, the eye of love. Faith is now the power of love that transforms the power of intellect. The light of faith is transposed to the horizon of love. Faith is seen as faith *ex infusione* and this gave Lonergan a transcultural infrastructure, a model to ground his method in theology that would be open to the collaboration of all religious traditions and all authentic theologians.

Oversimplifying, I would say in the writings before *Method* the model is faith from hearing so that belief and faith are one. In *Method* faith as the eye of love, is from infusion and faith is distinguished from beliefs but faith leads to the acceptance and purification of beliefs. In reality there are always both vectors and they complement each other.

The context for all his writing is his social vision of redemption in Christ. The dialectic of progress and decline, of life and death that is with us individually and collectively is overcome through Christ. Redemption is an individual pilgrimage and at the same time, a collective collaboration in faith, hope and charity. Faith is the fundamental answer to sin's distortion of the intellect. Faith liberates human reasonableness from its ideological prisons and hope enables men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. There is no utopia. Sin and evil are not eliminated

²⁴⁵ *Method in Theology*, xi (1971).

but sublated into the good by the love of God shared by all authentic persons who continue the mission of Christ through the law of the cross to overcome evil, sin and death with love, to the glory of the Father in his Son through their Spirit of love.

THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY, REDUCTIONISM, AND LONERGAN ON EMERGENCE

William Mathews
Milltown Institute
Dublin, Ireland

BEHIND THE HIGH tech postmodern buildings of our multicultural internet savvy contemporary universities such as we find at Boston College and Loyola Marymount University is a long and complex series of genetic and dialectical transformations in history. In some respects it stretches right back to Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum, through the Arabic centers of learning in Fez, Toledo, and the later European Universities of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford. What follows should be interpreted as some point concerning a form of thought experiment. Pivoting around the idea of a university its goal will be to explore the implications of the different stances of reductionism and Lonergan's emergence based philosophy if they were enacted in a social institution such as a university. Different philosophies have different social implications and thinking through those implications in and through a thought experiment can both illuminate their possible potential as well as put them to the test.

I

As there can be posed such questions as: what is the nature of movement, of light, life, consciousness, a human person, so also can there be posed the question, what is the nature, or even the meaning and value, of a university? The simple articulation of the question in words should not mask the complexity of the reality it refers to. It is far more complex than the realities studied in mathematics or the classical and statistical heuristic structures of physics or chemistry or the biological and neurosciences or the humanities with their languages, for it is a question in some senses about all of those. As experience teaches that the answers

to simpler questions do not come easily, so it should warn us in the present instance. What can we say about the X, the “to be known” which the question signs? In what manner might Lonergan’s two major works, *Insight* and *Method in Theology* enable us to begin to fill out heuristically some of the details of the X? What gaps might be left?

Acknowledging the relevance of the moving viewpoint, I will begin with an opening definition of a university which is to be considered as subject to ongoing development. A university is an organ of the contemporary culture whose mandate is to assemble a teaching and research staff that are educated in a wide range of the core questions and methodologies of a broad range of disciplines up to the contemporary level of the cultural advancement of knowledge and the related life and practical skills which accompany it. Underlining the mediating function of the teacher as articulated in chapter 17 of *Insight*, their task is to transmit that cultural achievement to an up and coming generation of students in order to enable them to become productive agents of society and to advance it through the speculative process of advanced research. As the knowledge explosion of the recent centuries has made clear, post classical universities are confronted with the challenge of constantly changing and growing as the overall cultural horizon expands.

That explosion of knowledge brings with it an acute sense of fragmentation. Still, that does not mean that we can dispense with the challenges of Newman in his *Idea of a University*. A key notion for Newman is that there is a whole, a unity so to speak, in knowledge, “All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact.” Clearly that totality of knowledge cannot exist in and be contemplated by any single mind; it is a socially distributed attribute and reality.¹ It follows that if there is to emerge an engagement with the challenge to make some sense of the unity of knowledge it will only come about by a social collaboration of experts in different disciplines engaging with each other in a common pursuit which includes an effort to understand how their different realms are a part of a wider whole. The alternative is a group of solitary isolated and nonrelating disciplines and their practitioners masquerading as a unity under the label of the proper name of their institution.

¹This point is treated in detail in my “Method and the Social Appropriation of Reality,” in *Method and Creativity: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Matthew Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981) and “Explanation in the Social Sciences,” in *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan S.J.*, ed. Timothy Fallon and Philip Boo Riley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987).

As well as the challenge to relate and unify realms of knowledge within the whole there is also the challenge to define the whole in the most inclusive manner. That effort can be more or less successful. If not successful some parts will be excluded, the consequences of which for Newman are made clear in the following remarks.

and that if any part of it is discarded or downgraded, then the sense of the whole is damagingly distorted, even corrupted....All knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one. For the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together that we cannot separate off portion from portion and operation from operation....I say, then, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that in proportion to its importance.²

Consider from this perspective the broad outlines of a modern university. It is comprised of such disciplines as the hard sciences from physics through chemistry, biology, and psychology to archaeology and a related anthropology. In their application these disciplines relate to different forms of engineering and the whole complex field of medicine. In addition, there are the human sciences of sociology, economics, law, and politics. To these we must add the core of the humanities with their study of ancient civilizations and modern languages and related literary movements. Around the periphery we find philosophy, religious studies, and theology.

Each discipline, speciality, so to speak, adds its own contribution to the whole and its absence creates a *scotosis* in the total fabric. Some particular absences might result, not just in a blind spot or gap here and there but in a distortion of the truth and realities involved in all remaining specialties. What is being suggested is a real interdependence of the different realms and departments of knowledge. Thus mathematics is different from physics or chemistry or engineering yet in a real sense the latter depend on the former and the former is constantly fertilized by its interaction with the latter. If the university lacked a mathematics department then all of those dependent disciplines would suffer. Similarly within the humanities historical research is dependent on archives. If there were no archives and archivists and their particular field of knowledge there would be no history. Running through all of this is the challenge to understand the relation

²The Newman quotes are from pages 45, 51-53, of John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University, Defined and Illustrated* (London: Longmans and Green & Co, 1902).

between the “nature” and the “culture sciences,” the latter having their focus on meaning and value.

Ahead of his time Newman suggested that a philosophy in the true sense of the word would be a science of the sciences. But what if within the social collaboration there is no group dedicated to addressing the question: what is the nature of human understanding and knowing as it functions in this social collaboration? What are the consequences for the collaboration if there is a flight from resolving Kant’s perfect question about the mind-world relation as it applies across all the disciplines from physics to history? It is in response to this challenge of unification that the world views of reductionism and emergence have arisen.

II

Related to the dialectic of the unity and parts of the whole that is “the to be known” there is also a related dialectic of academic freedom in the pursuit of the totality of the parts of the whole. Louis Menand opens his discussion of academic freedom in *The Metaphysical Club* with some pointed remarks:

Coercion is natural; freedom is artificial. Freedoms are socially engineered spaces where parties engaged in specified pursuits enjoy protection from parties who would otherwise naturally seek to interfere in those pursuits. One person’s freedom is therefore always another person’s restriction: we would not have the concept of freedom if the reality of coercion were not already present.

Academic freedom for a professor is therefore, actually or potentially, a restriction on everyone who is not a professor. But what is the social good? Why should society prefer that Edward Ross, an employee of a private institution, be permitted to say whatever he chooses, but that Jane Stanford, who pays his salary, be prevented from trying to shape the intellectual content of her own university? She (with her husband) had created Stanford; she was free to close it down whenever she liked. But she could not fire Edward Ross.³

³*The Metaphysical Club* (London: Harper Collins, 2001), 409, 415. In many cases coercion could be a polite word for the bullying that occurs in all master slave relations.

For Menand it seems that the professor of the department has the power and authority to define the freedoms of the members but who has the power and authority to define the freedom of the professor. What happens if the professor in a science faculty is an out and out reductionist? It is a constant experience in the academic life that the creative spirits of new movements are again and again opposed by the very individuals in the community who, themselves, ought to be their most devoted advocates.

The analysis of ethical freedom in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* by Simone de Beauvoir has a bearing in this.⁴ According to her, as well as the category, subject-world of classical male philosophies of mind, there is also the category of the self-other. As the former, she considers this latter to be an ontological relation. It follows for her that if the self is to achieve proper ethical freedom it is not sufficient just to will one's own freedom. One must also will the co-freedom of the Other, exceptions clearly being made for criminal and antisocial behaviour and the like. Achieving such freedom entails mastering a certain dualism in one's self-consciousness in relation to the other. That dualism arises because the modes of intentional consciousness opened up by Husserl and others always exist inseparably with the dimension and developmental stage of the master-slave relation of Hegel in relation to the other. In this she is very close to Lonergan's assertion that there are two realisms in tension in human consciousness, an intellectual and an animal realism. The measure of the tension finds its expression in the degree of dysfunction in the institution. In short de Beauvoir illustrates very well what Lonergan would call moral conversion as it is necessitated in a social and institutional environment.

III

There are many forms and contexts of reductionism. There is the intimately interpersonal when one person through belittling and bullying the other reduces their meaning and value to something immeasurably less than it is. There is the group/ group form which expresses itself in racism or in social and cultural attitudes which imprint an inevitable sense of inferiority and grievance on the victim group. This group/ group form exists in all social communities, even in

⁴Jo-Ann Pilardi, *Simone de Beauvoir Writing the Self: Philosophy Becomes Autobiography* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 28-29; Kristana Arp, *The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics* (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), chap. 4.

Universities, where individuals coexist. As we shall see, reductionism is a world view that has had considerable consequences for the social and interpersonal relations that constitute the university world. There is also the cosmic form of reductionism expounded by E. O. Wilson in his book, *Consilience*. This maintains that all the apparently distinct explanations sought by sociology, anthropology, and psychology all reduce to one form of explanation which is rooted in physics. The former necessitate a moral conversion, the latter an intellectual conversion in order to overcome them.

I would like now to locate and contextualize the above remarks within the twentieth-century framework of reductionism. I will draw on Darwin's *Descent of Man*, Wilson's *Consilience* and *Naturalist*, the conflicts between molecular and evolutionary biology, and neurobiology and linguistics.

Reductionism in Darwin's Descent of Man

Darwin's *Descent of Man* is I believe one of the fundamental reductionist texts. Despite the evolutionism of his uncle Erasmus and Lamarck, with whom he was well acquainted, Darwin was brought up to believe in the permanence of species. Even on the voyage of the Beagle he was not yet an evolutionist. According to David Quammen his change of mind from such a belief did not occur until later:

Still, it's possible to approximate the timing of this intellectual conversion: March of 1837, soon after his talks with Gould and Owen. Species changed, one into another. He knew it. He just didn't know how.⁵

His new question with its recognition that species changed was a genuine intellectual conversion which revolutionised the subsequent life sciences. Only after many years of pondering over the question did he hit on his solution of the species relation in terms of gradual variations with the more favourable having a greater chance of survival. It's a solution that fits neatly into a reductionist but not an emergentist world view. Both acknowledge the fact of evolution through which higher and higher forms of life emerge but the latter adds that some emergences are not slight and gradual but irreducible. Both will clearly have quite different views on genera, species and their relations. Among philosophers Edith Stein recognised that Darwin presented a challenge to the classical treatment of

⁵*The Reluctant Mr Darwin* (New York: Norton, 2007), 27. What was involved in this conversion was a change in his questioning but not yet his understanding.

genera and species in Aristotle and Aquinas. Chapter 5 of her book, *Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (The Structure of the Human Person)* was entitled: “The Problem of the Origin of the Species – Genus, Species, Individual.” In her perceptive essay on this topic Sarah Sharkey quotes from Stein to the effect that philosophy “cannot take the physics of St Thomas for physics or the psychology of Aristotle for psychology.”⁶

After Darwin published his *Origin of the Species* which explained the transmutation of species through its core doctrine of natural selection he turned his attention to the question of human origins. His subsequent *The Descent of Man* (1871) presents as its aim:

The sole object of this work is to consider, firstly, whether man, like every other species descended from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner of his development and thirdly, the value of the differences between the so-called races of man.⁷

Chapter 1 opens with the remark:

He who wishes to decide for himself whether man is the modified descendent of some pre-existing form, would probably first enquire whether man varies, however slightly, in bodily structure and in mental faculties; and if so, whether the variations are transmitted to his offspring in accordance with the laws which prevail in the lower animals.

He goes on to open up the question of varieties and sub-races with slight differences and others whose differences were so great that their membership of the species is in question. Further questions arise for him about the geographical distribution of such races and the patterns of their interbreeding. Does man tend to increase at so rapid a rate so as to lead to occasional severe struggles for existence? Are beneficial variations, whether in body or mind preserved, and injurious ones eliminated? There follows a long section on bodily structure with reference to the similarities of the embryos of a dog, fish, bird, frog and human leading to his conclusion:

Thus we can come to understand how it has come to pass that man and all other vertebrate animals have been constructed on the same general

⁶“Edith Stein’s Response to the Darwinian Challenge,” text of lecture delivered at the 34th Annual Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 19, 2007, 2.

⁷Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (London: John Murray, 1871, 1901), 3. All page references given in the text are to this version.

model, why they pass through the same early stages of development, and why they retain certain rudiments in common.⁸

The treatment, being pre DNA-genetics, is surprisingly modern and would sit well as an introduction to the work of de Robertis and others on *Hox* genes and the early embryo.⁹

Chapter II addresses the question of the manner of the development of the human being from some lower form, Chapter III is concerned with a comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower animals. Three Fugeans were passengers on the voyage of the Beagle. About them Darwin comments:

The Fugeians rank amongst the lowest barbarians; but I was constantly struck with surprise how closely the three natives aboard HMS Beagle, who lived for some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most of our mental faculties. If no organic being excepting man had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been gradually developed. But it can be shown that there is no fundamental difference of this kind. We must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between one of the lowest of the fishes, as a lampres or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up by number less gradations.¹⁰

There follows a further paragraph concerned with differences in the human family.

Nor is the difference slight in moral disposition between a barbarian, such as the man described by the old navigator Byron, who dashed his child on the rocks for dropping a basket of sea-urchins, and a Howard or Clarkson; and in the intellect, between a savage who uses hardly any abstract terms,

⁸Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 14-15.

⁹Eddy M. De Robertis and others, "Homeobox Genes and the Vertebrate Body Plan," *Scientific American* (July 1990).

¹⁰Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 98-99. To this add the account in Janet Browne of the first encounter of the Beagle with native Fugeans in its visit to Tierra del Fuego where she quotes from Darwin's diary: "I shall never forget how wild and savage one group was. - Four or five men suddenly appeared on a cliff near us, - they were absolutely naked & with long streaming hair; springing from the ground & waving their arms around their heads, they sent forth most hideous yells. Their appearance was so strange, that it was scarcely like that of earthly inhabitants." *Charles Darwin, Voyaging*, 240. See also *Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle* (London: Penguin Books, 1989), chap. XI.

and a Newton or Shakespeare. Differences of this kind between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest savages, are connected by fine gradations. There it is possible that they might pass and be developed into each other.

After setting the stage in these opening paragraphs he states his object in the chapter “is to shew that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties.”¹¹ (99)

Addressing the moral sense, chapter IV finds him agreeing with those who consider conscience, the word ought or the moral sense as central to the problem of differences between animals and humans. Despite this he concludes:

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable – namely that any animal whatever endowed with well-marked social instincts*, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.¹²

Under the heading sociability Darwin goes on to illustrate the sympathy, which he distinguishes from love, which very many animals are observed to feel for their fellow beings who are suffering. Further considerations are offered of man as a social animal and on the social virtues.¹³

At the end of chapter IV he acknowledges that there is an enormous difference between the mind of the lowest human being and the highest animal. An ape could form a skilful plan to plunder a garden or use stones for breaking nuts open but could not fashion a stone tool, solve a mathematical problem, follow metaphysical reasoning, admire a landscape, or reflect on God. Still he concludes:

Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree, not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, &., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well developed condition, in the lower animals. They are also capable of some inherited improvement, as we see in the domestic dog compared with the wolf of the jackal.... If it could be proved that certain high mental powers, such as the formation of general concepts, self-consciousness, &., were absolutely peculiar to man, which seems extremely doubtful, it is not improbable that

¹¹Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 99.

¹²Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 149-50.

¹³Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 153f., 178.

these qualities are merely the incidental results of other highly advanced intellectual faculties; and these again mainly the result of the continued use of a perfect language. At what age does the new-born infant possess the power of abstraction, or become self-conscious, and reflect on its own existence?¹⁴

The text brilliantly poses the question: Is what sets off the human from the animal a matter of degree or of irreducible ontological properties and related powers?

The previous excerpts attempt to communicate some of the key foundational points of what might be termed the mindset of reductionism that is emerging in Darwin. The basic horizon is that the human being has evolved from some unidentified primitive organism by means of a succession of small and gradual developmental changes. In this process those adaptations to the environment which are found to be advantageous are retained and transmitted from generation to generation, those which are not so advantageous are discarded. As the changes involved are a matter of degree rather than of kind it follows that there can be no real ontological distinctions between any two species.

Reductionism in E. O. Wilson's Consilience

As Michael Ruse has pointed out in his review, Wilson's *Consilience* started its life as a hugely controversial book.¹⁵ Ruse is both critical of and sympathetic to Wilson. He acknowledges that it is a visionary work which made an attempt to identify a coherent unity in the otherwise exploding fragmentation of contemporary knowledge that gave it its great public appeal. Ruse admits, humbly, "I lack the grand vision and imagination which illuminates Wilson's work and which makes what he writes so meaningful and so important to many." Wilson in *Consilience* is in agreement with Newman that there is a whole, a unity in knowledge. There I would suggest the agreement might end although it has to be said there is in some of the reductionists quite a high environmental morality.

In *Consilience* Wilson remarks that while it is the custom of scholars of behaviour and culture "to speak variously of anthropological explanations, psychological explanations, and other explanations appropriate to the perspectives

¹⁴Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 193-94.

¹⁵For a "review of the reviews" of *Consilience* see Michael Ruse, "Review of E. O. Wilson's 'Consilience' in The Global Spiral: A Publication of the Metanexus, available online: <http://www.metanexus.net/Magazine/BookReviews/tabid/73/Default.aspx>. Assimilating the content of this book and of Darwin's *Descent* is a sort of Preface to the challenge of articulating an emergentist world view. That world view cannot be any less visionary.

of individual disciplines” for him there is only one class of explanation. The unity of knowledge is to be found in the fact that all accessible phenomena of the sciences, from the birth of the stars and galaxies to the birth of social and cultural institutions “are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics.”¹⁶ Acknowledging that those who work in the social sciences consider reductionism to be the vampire in the sacristy it is his belief that in time reductionism will unite the natural sciences and social sciences.

In chapter 5, entitled *Ariadne’s Thread*, he is concerned with exploring the chain of downward casualty from the highest to the lowest domains of science. There he comes up against a significant snag:

The greatest obstacle to consilience by synthesis, the approach often loosely called holism, is the exponential increase in complexity encountered during all upward progress through levels of organization. I have already described how an entire cell cannot yet be predicted from a knowledge of its scrambled molecules and organelles alone. Let me now indicate how bad this problem is. It is not even possible to predict the three-dimensional structure of a protein from a complete knowledge of its constituent atoms.¹⁷

In Lonergan’s upward view of the scientific disciplines outlined in chapter 8 of *Insight* the key notion is that every higher level and its higher conjugates forms or relations establishes a completely new dimension of freedom from the constraints of the lower levels.

Wilson’s reductionist net also extends to literature, visual arts, drama, music, and dance as well as ethics and religion. He acknowledges that these fields present him with the greatest challenges. Having said that the three references to be found in the index to “hermeneutics” and the related passages in the text make clear how shallow is his knowledge of the sciences of meaning. He is still sustained by his conviction that there is a biological origin to the arts and hence a path for reductionists.

Naturalist and the Molecular Wars

For some understanding of the how the consequences of the reductionist world view might work out on the interpersonal level in a university we must turn

¹⁶*Consilience*, 297-98.

¹⁷*Consilience*, 91.

to Wilson's other well known work, *Naturalist*, in particular chapter 12, *The Molecular Wars*. Quoting Mill to the effect that "both teachers and learners fall asleep at their posts when there is no enemy in the field" Wilson singles out James Watson as his adverse hero. Appointed an assistant professor in Harvard in 1956 he injected into the department a conviction that

biology must be transformed into a science directed at molecules and cells and rewritten in the language of physics and chemistry. What had gone before, "traditional" biology – my biology – was infested by stamp collectors who lacked the wit to transform their subject into a modern science. He treated most of the other twenty-four members of the Department of Biology with a revolutionary's fervent disrespect.¹⁸

Wilson attempted to increase the number of evolutionary biologists from one, that is to say himself, to two in order to establish a balance in the treatment of the discipline. Watson's response at the board meeting was: "Anyone who would hire an ecologist is out of his mind," the preferred candidate being an ecologist. The room fell silent until the meeting was brought to a close by the chair. Wilson goes on to outline the subsequent *Molecular Wars* in the faculty, adding:

For those not studying biology at the time in the early 1950s, it is hard to imagine the impact of the discovery of the structure of DNA had on our perception of how the world works. Reaching beyond the transformation of genetics, it injected into all of biology a new faith in reductionism.¹⁹

It was such that, for some considerable time, the term ecology ceased being used in the department. Strangely, Watson's reductionism was to impact on Wilson to such an extent that it influenced his thought on *sociobiology* and eventually in *Consilience*, on his total world view.²⁰ This despite the fact that that very reductionism was undermining the proper autonomy of the irreducible questions and experiments of his own field of work, evolutionary biology.

This cultural separation of molecular and evolutionary biology on reductionist grounds was not at all unique to Harvard. In a recent interview of Douglas Futuyma (author of the core textbook, *Evolutionary Biology*) by David Quammen, a discussion about the evidence for evolution led into the question of

¹⁸*Naturalist* (Washington DC: Island Press, 1994), 219.

¹⁹*Naturalist*, 223.

²⁰*Naturalist*, 225.

the relation between evolutionary and molecular biology. Futuyma reminded Quammen

that molecular biologists generally haven't concerned themselves with the same questions, let alone the same answers, that engage evolutionary biologists. For fifty years, since Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA, the molecular people have been interested in genes, proteins, and the ways they function within living cells, but not much in species and the ways they evolve. At the University of Michigan and many other universities, the two disciplines – molecular biology and evolutionary biology – don't even reside within one department.²¹

Futuyma then went on to discuss some developments in the present century that indicate that after decades of tension and conflict it is now being acknowledged that all biology is evolutionary biology.

Neurobiology and Linguistics

After the breakthroughs of molecular biology and their impact on the biological sciences there was set in train by Francis Crick the quest for the neural correlates of consciousness. That quest, like the molecular, has positives and negatives. Positively it has greatly opened up the field of consciousness studies to a much broader clientele than the departments of philosophy or psychology. Experimental scientists like Christof Koch have moved in and stirred up much of the complacency in the humanities. Negatively it has spawned the tendency, as with Watson and others, to reduce and downplay those more traditional approaches to the purely neurobiological and phonetic. As tensions arose between molecular and evolutionary biologists in the field of biology so tensions are now in train in the field of the neuroscientists and classical linguists which could result in similar distortions of the academic landscape.

The developmental dimension of language learning has recently been taken up by Maryanne Wolf in her *Proust and the Squid: The Story of Science and the Reading Brain*.²² For her we were never born to read, there being something almost unnatural, even awesome about such a taken for granted performance as reading. To understand truly what we do when we read would amount to an unravelling of the tangled story of “the most remarkable specific performance that

²¹David Quammen, *The Reluctant Mr. Darwin* (New York: Norton, 2006), 232.

²²(New York: Harper and Collins, 2007)

civilization has learned in all its history.”²³ The average five year old has a vocabulary of some 10,000 words, by the end of the school years 87,000 words. Being talked to, read to and listened to matter. The quality of the reading skills of an adult are related to the frequency with which the child had stories read to it in the first five years. Wolf has problems with the Google world of her children, wondering if it will distort the depth of the experience of previous generations with its deeper examination of words, thought, reality and virtue.

To a great influence on her of Proust’s *On Reading* she adds her professional expertise in the neurosciences focusing on the neural differences involved in learning languages that have alphabets, and thus a phonetic dimension, and those that don’t such as Chinese. Our efforts to understand the curious creative potential that can lie hidden in dyslexia “in which the brain struggles to learn to read, contains insights that are transforming our understanding of reading.”²⁴

The real focus of this stimulating book is, as she acknowledges, on the biological and cognitive aspects of reading rather than on the cultural transformation that the reading of the text causes in the reader. In a review John Carey sums up the focus:

Before a brain can read it must physically rearrange itself. It must create new neuronal circuits to connect the part it uses for seeing with the part it uses for listening to someone talk. Not until it has done this will the brain’s owner realise that the marks on paper present sounds. ... Brain scans show that when someone reads an alphabetical language, such as English, specialized parts of the brain’s left hemisphere are activated. But when a Chinese speaker reads Chinese, quite different parts of the brain are used. They are in both hemispheres, and include frontal areas not used for reading by English speakers. Since this proves that the Chinese reader’s brain is connected up differently, it prompts the question whether Chinese thought is different from western thought. Linguists used to argue that there is always a relationship between the language a person speaks and how that person understands the world. This idea fell out of favour under the influence of Chomskyan linguistics and theories of universal grammar. But the advent of the brain scan seems to be reopening the question. What Wolf’s own views are it is impossible to say.²⁵

²³(New York: Harper and Collins, 2007), ix-x.

²⁴(New York: Harper and Collins, 2007), x. The word insight also occurs on 5, 17, notable on 25-26, 94; intuition on 23-24.

²⁵From a review by John Carey of Maryanne Wolf, *Proust and the Squid: The Story of Science and the Reading Brain* (Icon: 2008), *London Times*, Culture Section, March 9, 2008. See Wolf, 17, for her comment on her biological and neural rather than cultural focus.

Reading, for Carey, generates thought and gives a sense of inner selfhood but he does not elaborate on what that means. But does not the world of the emergent self of the reader also expand through connection with the wider cultural world of the text. The personal transformation of the reading self is inseparable from that relation with the wider world. Einstein's reading of works on Maxwell and Newton brought him into their worlds and transformed his whole scientific outlook. A whole generation of molecular biologists in the making were influenced by Schrödinger's *What Is Life?* Such transformative reading has, it seems much greater depths than Wolf, or as we shall see Jackendoff, acknowledge. Despite her neurobiological emphasis, Wolf seems to me quite open to this further profound dimension.

Ray Jackendoff in his *Language, Consciousness and Culture, Essays on Mental Structure*, takes the reduction of language and reading a step further.²⁶ On page 80 he asks: "What aspects of linguistic structure correspond most closely to the character of awareness – as it were when one is experiencing speech? His answer is largely the phonetics, the sounds of the words one hears. On page 83 he puts forward as Hypothesis 3: 'The *form* of thought itself is always unconscious.' In this he is challenging what he considers a very deep prejudice which he finds in Bernard Baars that thought and consciousness are both taken to be the highest level of cognition. Rejecting this identification of consciousness with thought as a big mistake leads him to his answer to the above question in hypothesis 4: 'Our Linguistic images provide most of our evidence that we are thinking.' I have no doubt that they provide much of the evidence but what is the residue that remains when we subtract them? Surely by eliminating the desire of the mind to master the unknown, its insights and related thoughts from language Jackendoff has effectively eliminated with it the whole world of culture with its meanings and values, the properly human world in which we come to live, not through our senses but through our understanding of and insights into the text when we read.

By way of contrast in the process of speaking, reading, and writing, Ayn Rand distinguishes between the conscious, the subconscious, and the unconscious. "When we speak, it feels as if the words come automatically – as if the words and the thoughts come simultaneously. Of course, they do not. If you observe children learning to speak, or yourself learning a foreign language, you discover that language is not innate and automatic, but an acquired skill. It is so well integrated at the adult level, however, that the transition from the thought you want to

²⁶(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007).

express to the words you use is automatic.”²⁷ Her emphasis on the distinction between the thought and the words that are used to express it is spot on. But so also is her observation that it is in the learning process that we have a heightened conscious awareness of our mental operations. As Ayn Rand remarks, it is in the learning process that the quality of mental awareness is most intense and recognizable; when one has mastered a field of discourse the intensity of the awareness of the mental control is at its least intense. Jackendoff is cashing in on a small part of the evidence to make a greatly mistaken claim about the conscious awareness that accompanies mastered mental activity. No doubt Jackendoff’s conclusion is also given credence to some by the uncomfortable fact that the awareness that accompanies mental activity and processes is unimaginable. But to say it is an unimaginable awareness is quite different from saying that it is unconscious.

It is my own view that the thought-word-world relation cannot be reduced to the neural or the qualia/phonetic levels of language learning and use. The most important thing we learn about words, what they mean and refer to in our world should never be confused with or reduced to their sounds or their symbolic shape. Perhaps our minds and their and their relations with our worlds are such that they can express the very same meaning with enormously different symbol systems. This tension between the neural basis, the phonetics and hermeneutics of the language involved in reading a classic text of a tradition, be it scientific, artistic or literary, will no doubt have its counterparts in reductionist and non-reductionist stances in the university.

IV. LONERGAN ON REDUCTIONISM, EMERGENCE, AND THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY

Related to all of the previous forms is a form of first person reductionism, which results in what Lonergan calls the existential gap that exists between what one really is and what one thinks one is.²⁸ There can be discerned two dimensions to

²⁷*The Art of Nonfiction, A Guide for Writers and Readers* (New York: Penguin, 2001), 58. See also index under subconscious.

²⁸John McDowell in his *Mind, Values and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), essay 17, “Reductionism and the First Person”; Essay 359-82 addresses this topic; see also B. Alan Wallace, *The Taboo of Subjectivity: Towards a New Science of Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

first person reductionism, operational and identity. By and large Lonergan has been concerned with enlarging our understanding of the emergent operational qualities of the first person subject of consciousness. It is the antidote to what Wallace terms scientific materialism, an extreme form of first person reductionism that is rampant in the scientific community. Its mode of operation involves a taboo of subjectivity that resides in the methodological creed that scientific knowledge is independent of the "observer." It follows that the scientific observer, (as contrasted with the inquirer) not being a factor in science is to be eliminated from consideration. What Lonergan has not addressed in detail is a further form of reductionism that restricts the identity of the other to labels and classifications based on selected character traits or uncritical cover stories. A non-reductionist approach to personal identity has to give full scope to the manner in which the operations of the subject function in the writing of an entire personal life narrative. MacIntyre is right when he claims that the key to the problem of personal identity is in a personal narrative.²⁹

In the present context it is important to clarify some basic related points about the structure of Lonergan's world view. He should be considered as fundamentally a philosopher of an emergentist world view which embraces from this perspective both the human subject and the entire proportionate universe. The word emergence occurs in his work in a host of contexts: emergent standard of living in economics, emergent probability as a component in his world view, cognitively there is the emergent wonder in every human being and insight is the prototype of emergence. Ontologically there is the emergence of form from potency which is at the heart of the dynamism of the finality of proportionate being. His fundamental anti-reductionist statement occurs in chapter 8 of *Insight*. His emergentist position takes shape in chapters 4 and 15. My present study tentatively entitled *Emerging Realities*, will in one of its aspects be a development of the content of those chapters.

In chapter 8 of *Insight* Lonergan treads a path on genera and species from Aristotle's substance, through Kant's unknowable things in themselves to a post-Darwinian perspective. He explores the implications of insights into phantasms, into the imaginative presentations of the problems posed in the different sciences for an understanding of their relations. The laws of the higher genus and its species relates to the lower as the insight to the image. Because the insight can

²⁹Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth 1985), 216-18. See also Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 39 (1971): 291-311.

never be reduced to the imaginative presentations, the higher conjugate forms and laws of the higher sciences are not reducible to those of the lower. But what those higher laws might be is not worked out in *Insight*. There remains the task of discovering what concretely those of the biological and neurosciences are.

In chapter 15 Lonergan takes the matter a step further in his discussion of finality in the universe of proportionate being. The basis of the dynamism of finality is potency. No less than the dynamics of the pure desire of the mind to know, potency is dynamically orientated towards forms and acts. As a result we find the most extraordinary remark: "And the dynamic orientation of such experience no less than the experience itself (of the pure desire to know) has its counterpart in proportionate being." This leads to the further remark: "Sixthly, this directed dynamism is realistic. It results from the classical laws that rest on forms, from the statistical laws that rest on acts, from the emergent process that rests on potency."³⁰ As there is the potency of the pure desire to know to grow our intellectual selfhood there is the potency of proportionate being to grow the entire universe.

In an unpublished draft of a section of chapter 15 of *Insight* Lonergan wrote that the realizations of finality "may be transitive or immanent; they are transitive when they occur in later individuals, later species, later genera; they are immanent when they occur in the same individual."³¹ He instances as an immanent development "the growth of an organism, the acquisition of skills by sensitive consciousness, the mastery of mathematics, science, or philosophy by an intelligence." Such developments are emergent processes in which the classical laws change:

Not all that occurs regularly in the embryo occurs regularly in the adult; *not all that occurs regularly in the adult occurs regularly in the embryo. Similarly, there are different regularities before and after the acquisition of a skill or the mastery of a science; at one time one cannot speak a foreign language and at a later time one can; at one time one cannot solve problems in physics and at a later time one can. The emergent process, however frequent its occurrence and however fixed its route, does not follow a set of classical laws but consists in a change from one set to another.*

³⁰Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 473, (448).

³¹Lapierre Residue, Toronto Archives, section 6, *Elements of Metaphysics*, page 34. This I believe has a bearing on Edith Stein's criticism of the Thomistic species form, see Sharkey op. cit., 9.

When an organism grows, when a psychoneurotic is cured by psychiatry, when a physicist drops a previous general view and accepts a new one, there is not simply the addition of a new set of regularities but also the suppressions of an old set. To understand immanent development one has to think, not of the addition of a higher system to an otherwise coincidental manifold, but of a succession of higher systems in a sequence of changing manifolds.³²

It is, I believe, through this principle of finality at work in the universe that there emerges not from a mythical big bang but from the pure potential of the beginning the distinct intelligible central and conjugate forms and subsequent operators and integrators of developments that are studied by particle physicists, chemists, biologists, zoologists, anthropologists, and cognitional and cultural theorists.

When *Insight* was published in 1957 these remarks, being ahead of their time, did not relate easily to the context of the largely reductionist philosophy of science at that time or since. The situation in the world of the sciences is however, undergoing an immense transition just at the present time. The older reductionist world view which largely dominated the practice of science in the twentieth century is now under fire. Philip Clayton, Nancy Murphy with Warren Brown and William Stoeger, and Steven Horst among others, are working on an emergentist philosophy of science and related world view.³³ In their writings Lonergan's work now has an emerging context in which its contribution to the current debate about the emergentist scientific world view is now possible. A particular point of contact has to do with the notion of upward and downward causality, in terms of which such authors seek to understand the relations between different emergent levels of reality.³⁴ Lonergan's account of the explanatory relations between the sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, sensitive and cognitive psychology in chapter 8 of *Insight* in terms of higher conjugates systematizing lower

³²Lapierre Residue., 34-5, 36.

³³Philip Clayton, *Mind and Emergence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Nancy Murphy and Warren Brown, *Did My Neurons Make Me Do It: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Nancy Murphy and William Stoeger, SJ, *Evolution and Emergence, Systems, Organisms, Persons*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Steven Horst, *Beyond Reduction, Philosophy of Mind and Post Reductionist Philosophy of Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

³⁴Clayton, *op cit.* index under downward causation; Murphy and Brown, *op cit.* index under causation, bottom up, downward causation; Murphy and Stoeger, *op cit.*, vii on Arthur Peacock and upward and downward causation.

coincidental manifolds is an instance of downward causation. His example of the emergence of higher viewpoints in mathematics is an instance of upward causation.

A further reason why I believe *Insight* did not take in the wider culture after 1957 has to do with the problems associated with the very word, insight. Francis Crick remarked that when at first he began to engage in consciousness studies it was a marginal interest and many in the scientific community were hostile towards or suspicious of it. It took some twenty years for that situation to change and now it is a very hot topic. I believe something of the same applies to the word, insight. At the time *Insight* was published the use of the word insight was almost non-existent in philosophy and scientific literature.

In 1996 a large book, edited by Sternberg and Davidson, was published with the title: *The Nature of Insight* by the MIT Press. It was their conviction that the time was ripe for such a study. Be that as it may it was my conviction and that of others who read it that it was a flop. It did not seem to know what to do or where to go with the topic. It took a very careful reading of it to discover the one reference to Lonergan's *Insight*, and that one rather dismissive. Even by 1996 the culture was still struggling with the word insight.

At the present time interest in the word insight is still marginal in philosophy but the situation in science and current science writing has changed drastically. Almost all of the significant number of science related books that I have read in the past year are spontaneously using the word abundantly. A good example would be Eric Kandel's *In Search of Memory, The Emergence of a New Science of Mind*.³⁵ Kandel is a hard core reductionist. Memory is to be explained in terms of neural processes and the production of certain proteins in brain cells. Yet no other author I know of uses the word, insight (and related, idea) with greater frequency. On a casual indexing of the book it turned up, sometimes more than once on a page, on the following pages: xiii, 9, 67, 75, 83-85, 93, 182, 194, 218-20, 228, 236-37, 241, 246, 268, 273, 275, 279, 281-82, 300-301, 306, 319, 324, 333, 339, 357. So you have in Kandel a "schizophrenic" narrative which on the one hand is all about neurons and proteins and on the other insights and ideas. The most significant thing is that the word, insight, is not indexed; he is almost unaware that he is using it. Yet the frequency of its use points to the fact that it must meet an important felt need arising out of his experience of which he has a quite low level of awareness. If the question was put to him: what does this word

³⁵(New York: Norton, 2006).

mean and why are you using it he might find that it calls for a revision of his emerging new science of mind.

In my recent reading of narratives of scientific discovery I have also come across some extraordinary accounts of eureka or insight moments in Kary Mullis's Nobel Lecture, Francis Cricks's *What Mad Pursuit* 139-40, Francois Jacob's *An Autobiography, The Statue Within*, 290-312, and Craig J. Venter *A Life Decoded: My Genome My Life*, 121-22. That of Francis Crick, so spontaneous yet perhaps one of the best accounts of an eureka moment in the literature is worth repeating here. With Sydney Brenner he was working on the problem of protein synthesis in the cell but they found themselves utterly and totally stuck. In the middle of a seminar one afternoon in Cambridge François Jacob gave an account of an experiment in which he had recently been involved and apparently, without knowing it, provided the missing clue. Crick has described his experience of the event as follows:

It is difficult to convey two things. One is the sudden flash of enlightenment when the idea was first glimpsed. It was so memorable that I can recall just where Sydney, François, and I were sitting in the room when it happened. The other is the way it cleared away so many of our difficulties. Just a single wrong assumption (that the ribosomal RNA was the messenger RNA) had completely messed up our thinking, so that it appeared as if we were wandering in a dense fog. I woke up that morning with only a set of confused ideas about the overall control of protein synthesis. When I went to bed all our difficulties had resolved and the shining answers stood clearly before us. Of course, it would take months and years of work to establish these new ideas, but we no longer felt lost in the jungle. We could survey the one plain and clearly see the mountains in the distance.³⁶ ...

The new ideas opened the way for some of the key experiments used to crack the genetic code. The eureka moments of Archimedes, Crick, and others explain how to do something or why something is the way it is. They discover an intelligibility in the sensible data of the problem as presented that cannot be accessed by our senses or imagination. What these narrated experiences make clear is that insight problem solving is not peripheral but radically foundational in the empirical sciences.³⁷ The accounts of the explanatory content of the insights

³⁶Francis Crick, *What Mad Pursuit* (Basic Books, 1988), 120.

³⁷The same point is made about mathematics in Robert Kanigel's *The Man who Knew Infinity, A Life of the Genius Ramanujan* (London: Abacus, 1999), 225-26.

of the biologists are also drawing attention to kinds of explanation that are different from the classical and statistical laws of physics and chemistry. Being more like computer algorithms which make regular the occurrences of vast aggregates of events on the lower level it is my belief that they will help us to unpack the currently speculative meaning of higher conjugates in Chapter 8 of *Insight*.

When one reads Darwin's *Descent of Man*, Wilson's *Consilience* and *Naturalist* in conjunction with Jackendoff on linguistics one gets a glimpse of the reductionist University. It could be argued that it contains the potential to extend the conflict between molecular and evolutionary biologists right across the entire spectrum of the sciences and into the humanities. The fragile seeds of the world view of Lonergan, which are sown in *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, explore the possibility of achieving genuine openness within frameworks for collaborative creativity both within and between the academic disciplines of the sciences and humanities. That openness will necessitate a respect for the character of the entire range of the irreducible questions necessary to encompass the proper range of explanations in the sciences and interpretations in the humanities. The emergentist University is much more demanding but true to the precious and restless spirit of inquiry whose presence at the heart of our existence defines irreducibly what we humans are.

CONVERSION

Michael McCarthy
Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, New York

OUR THEME HAS been the modern cultural crisis and the need for a critical center of scholars and thinkers at home in the old and the new. Following Lonergan, we have argued that this indispensable center will be equal to the crisis only if its members undergo a profound transformation. We have identified two requirements of that transformative process: 1) sustained intellectual development in mastering the thought of our predecessors and contemporaries and 2) the self-appropriation of the polymorphic intentional subject. We shall now turn to a third requirement, distinct from though clearly related to these prior demands.

Conversion is an important theme in religious and philosophical thought. *Metanoia*, a fundamental change in the mind and heart of a person is central to both the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth and the maieutic method of Socrates and Plato. The need for conversion appears in muted form in Aristotle's distinction between what is first for us as sentient animals and what is first in reality. It reappears emphatically in existential thinkers like Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard, and in Heidegger's critique of the forgetfulness of being.

Jesus commands his disciples to repent so that they might enter the kingdom of heaven. Socrates requires a moral conversion of his sophistic interlocutors before they can understand what he is saying. "For if you are serious and what you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals must be turned upside down, and apparently we are everywhere doing the opposite of what we should."¹ The sophists and their pupils implicitly assume that the good is pleasure, the satisfaction of somatic or social desire. Socrates, by contrast, appears to believe that justice, the ordered harmony of the soul, is the true good of the human being, and that we must discipline our appetites and even accept bodily harm and pain in

¹Callicles, *Gorgias*.

order to achieve it. Nearly all the dialogues end in impasse, because the moral conversion of the interlocutors never occurs.

In the *Republic* the Platonic Socrates calls for an intellectual conversion on the part of aspiring philosophers. Non-philosophical mortals implicitly assume that sensible things are the final measure of reality, and that we know these things by sensibly perceiving them in space and time. In Books six and seven of the *Republic*, Socrates outlines the periagoge true philosophers must undergo. They must climb up and through the epistemic and ontological levels of the divided line; they must ascend from the darkness of the cave to the immediate vision of the Good; they must endure the transformative curriculum of mathematics and dialectic. Through this long and demanding process, their ontological allegiances shift from sensible things to intelligible forms. They learn to understand the sensible through the intelligible, the ontological source of each thing's specific identity and enduring unity. For the true philosopher it is *nous*, the power of intellect, rather than sensibility and imagination, that becomes the measure of what is real and what is known

Augustine, who was deeply influenced by Neo-Platonism, identifies three distinct but related conversions in his *Confessions*: the intellectual conversion to philosophy that begins with his reading of Cicero's *Hortentius*; the moral conversion to a life of chastity and ascetic virtue which he believes philosophy and Christianity commonly require; and the religious conversion to a life of *caritas* in which the redemptive grace of God enables him to devote himself whole-heartedly to the love of God and neighbor.

In Augustine's case, as in the dialogues, there is a constant temptation to draw back from the demands of conversion. For although the converted subject is partly transformed, the lure of pleasure and ambition, the daily attachment to sensible objects, the counter-pull of *cupiditas* remain at work. For Augustine, true conversion would be impossible without God's grace; for Plato, it seems to require the pedagogical inspiration and example of a maieutic teacher. Both thinkers recognize that even grace and inspiration may be insufficient.

Effective and enduring conversion transforms more than the soul of the subject. It also transforms the world in which the subject thinks and lives. To use a phenomenological idiom, it transforms the intellectual and moral horizon of the philosopher and the Christian, so that the true philosopher's life becomes centered on *the Good*, and the genuine Christian's life on the mysterious God of Abraham, Moses, the prophets and Jesus.

Loneragan's notion of conversion is clearly influenced by Plato and Augustine. In *Insight* he focuses primarily on intellectual conversion, a radical shift in our understanding of knowing and being. In *Method in Theology*, he follows Augustine in requiring a threefold conversion, intellectual, moral, and religious. He is also significantly influenced by phenomenology and existentialism. After his explicit turn to intentionality analysis, he recognizes the philosophical importance of horizon and insists on the radical difference between the horizon of the converted and unconverted subject. Although ontologically they both live within the comprehensive universe of being, phenomenologically, they live in different worlds with different centers of allegiance and concern.

What is it about human existence that makes these three conversions necessary, and for what ends precisely are they required? Answering the first question clearly should help us in responding to the second.

We are incarnate developing subjects with a disposition to bias and sin. Because we are incarnate, we have bodily needs and desires that remain with us throughout our lives. As gradually developing subjects, we must pass through infancy, childhood, and adolescence on the way to becoming mature adults. In this critical formative process, whose results are always uncertain, our organic, neural, perceptual and linguistic development precedes our intellectual and moral maturation, a maturation that itself depends heavily on the ambiguous cultural heritage of our community.

Because we are polymorphic subjects we respond to a multiplicity of desires and concerns. The unrestricted desires for knowledge and value coexist with more urgent and concrete demands centered on the needs of the incarnate self. This broad range of concerns shapes the different patterns of conscious experience of which the intellectual pattern is one among many. Very few people make the *eros* of mind the effective center of their lives, and the intellectual development of those who do is often not completed by self-appropriation.

At the same time, the transcendental notions of being and value are singularly important. They invariably summon us to self-transcendence and demand that we achieve it. Our authenticity as human beings depends on the consistent pursuit of self-transcendence, intellectually through objective knowing, morally through authentic living, religiously through the whole-hearted love of God and neighbor. It is the *eros* of mind that draws us beyond the world of immediacy and common sense into the unrestricted universe of being. It is the *eros* for value that reverses our customary moral and practical priorities. We no longer measure the good by the satisfaction of individual or group desire, but by detached and disinterested

judgments of value, our authentic appraisals of what is really worthwhile. Because the transcendental notions are unrestricted, they also summon us to know and love God, the ontological source of the created universe, and the supreme good in the order of value. Our natural desire for God is strengthened and fortified by grace, the unmerited gift of God's love, the ultimate ground of self-transcendence within us.

Thus we are inherently self-centered and capable of self-transcendence. As biological and sensitive subjects our horizon is confined to a universe of objects capable of satisfying our elemental desires and needs. As practical subjects immersed in ordinary life, it is confined to the world of common sense. As social beings, our focus is centered on the dramatic interplay of interpersonal relations. As aesthetic and artistic beings, we delight in the free play of the senses and the imagination. Each of these patterns of experience is correlated with its own world, its distinctive horizon of interest and concern. This correlation also applies to the intellectual pattern of experience in which the pure desire to know unfolds. The normative unfolding of that desire intends the knowledge of whatever exists, the unrestricted universe of being. As finite creatures, we actualize that intention, one step at a time, through the specialized forms of empirical method, the natural and human sciences, historical scholarship, philosophy and theology.

These specialized forms of knowing have their own horizons, the specific regions of being they intend to investigate. As the intellectual pattern of experience becomes differentiated, so does our awareness of the regional ontologies that constitute reality as a whole. This dynamic pluralism of knowing and being heightens the perplexity of the existential subject who alternately lives in different patterns of experience and phenomenologically different worlds.

From the perspective of the biological, practical, dramatic and aesthetic subject, the world of natural science is unreal and the concerns of the scholar largely irrelevant. From the strictly scientific perspective, scholarly discoveries seem too closely tied to common sense, while the judgments of philosophers and theologians appear to lack empirical support. Even within the intellectual pattern of experience we are tempted to restrict the range of legitimate inquiry and ontological possibility. We are constantly tempted to generalize from the limited pattern with which we are most familiar, thereby denying the full complexity of the human subject and the far greater complexity of being. Is there a way to check this temptation, to do justice to the whole of ourselves and to the unrestricted range of our concerns? Lonergan believes that there is, but it requires the subject's intellectual, moral and religious conversion.

Let us start with intellectual conversion. In discussing the intentional subject we constantly need to distinguish between consciousness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. This important distinction applies to the required conversions as well. The intellectually converted subject has made the pure desire to know the effective center of her life. She is at home in the intellectual pattern of experience and in the specialized applications of empirical method. She is habitually faithful to the transcendental precepts with their invariant demand for self-transcendence. She is oriented intellectually to the universe of being in its full concreteness. She knows implicitly through recurrent experience, of what knowing consists, what objective knowledge requires, and the internal complexity and interconnection of what is knowable and known. Hers is the existential stance of *conscious* intellectual conversion.

To become *self-conscious*, the converted subject must explicitly address the detailed philosophical questions that Lonergan has outlined. This thematic shift from the implicit to the explicit effectively extends the focus of inquiry from the world of cognitive objects to the desires, operations and norms of the intentional subject. In this process of self-reflexion, we thematize and objectify our own interiority, both our self-centeredness and our converted commitment to self-transcendence. We recognize that objective knowing is not the whole of our being, but that it is an essential aspect of our full authenticity. The consciously converted subject gradually achieves self-knowledge when she can correctly answer and verify in her own experience the essential questions about knowing, knowledge and the known. When conversion becomes self-knowledge, she can also clarify and repudiate mistaken accounts of cognition and being. She can show why the counter-positions in philosophy are truncated expressions of the defective self-knowledge of unconverted subjects. To be specific: the naïve realist identifies knowing with sensing, knowledge with veridical sense perception and the real with the totality of the sensible. The different forms of idealism identify knowing with conceiving, knowledge with verified conception, and the real with what human conception never attains. In contrast to the counter-positions, the critical realist identifies human knowing with experience, understanding and judgment; objective knowledge with the affirmation of true judgments reflectively grasped as virtually unconditioned, and the real with the intended object of the unrestricted desire to know that is known concretely through intellectual grasp and reasonable affirmation.

Without sustained personal development, self-appropriation and intellectual conversion, the existential subject cannot execute this philosophical dialectic

effectively. For the positions are reasonably affirmed on the basis of comprehensive self-knowledge; and the counter-positions are sympathetically understood as truncated accounts of human subjectivity, right in what they affirm, wrong in what they exclude or omit.

What is moral conversion and why is it practically necessary? Though the conversion of the subject depends on her prior development, its existential effect is more profound. Through the long process of teaching and learning, the intellect and character of the subject are formed; through intellectual and moral conversion, they are profoundly transformed. This transformation extends to the subject's operative horizon, the effective range of her interests and concerns. At the core of intellectual conversion is the increasing existential importance of the *eros* of mind. The converted subject becomes effectively attuned to the universe of being as a whole. At the core of moral conversion is the transcendental notion of value, the unrestricted desire to discover and actualize what is truly worthwhile. Just as the desire to know takes us beyond the horizon of common sense into the specialized realms of science, scholarship, philosophy and theology, so the desire for what is genuinely good takes us beyond concern for individual and group satisfaction into the concrete universe of value in its full sweep and complexity.

But what is value and how do we learn to discover and actualize it? Lonergan's answer builds on the preceding account of intellectual conversion. The foundational principles within the subject are the center and source of cognitional and moral life. As the pure desire to know unfolds in a normative pattern of recurrent operations, so does the unrestricted desire for what is good. To use Lonergan's technical language, the *eros* for value sublates the *eros* of mind. It preserves and complements the desire to know while raising its achievements to a higher level. The intellectual self-transcendence achieved in knowledge is augmented and perfected by the moral self-transcendence of a good life.

The knowing of reality is chiefly a matter of asking and answering questions for intelligence and reflection. To discover and actualize what is good we build on the attainment of knowledge by raising a new type of question, a question for deliberation. What course(s) of action should we pursue and avoid, what sort of persons should we resolve to become? The answers we give to deliberative questions are evaluative judgments. To reach true evaluative judgments in a particular context, we must attend to the relevant situation; understand the concrete possibilities for change that it offers, as well as the conditioning realities

such change requires; and through a series of deliberative insights determine which of the relevant possibilities is best under those concrete circumstances. Since the human good is always concretely situated, our knowledge of the good must be equally concrete.

But the good is also dynamic. Particular courses of action lead to new situations that require new insights, judgments and decisions. The concreteness of the good is also inseparable from its historicity. The moral agent is always a situated subject, living in a particular culture, participating in a network of social institutions, pursuing a good that is simultaneously personal and social. Within that social and cultural embeddedness, functional differentiation is clearly at work. Individual agents perform different tasks and bear different responsibilities. Because of their distinct social roles, they are responsible for different kinds of knowledge; they master different arts and skills. Although there is a common fund of virtues all subjects should possess, they exercise those virtues in different ways depending on their particular responsibilities and obligations.

To discover and actualize the good in a complex modern society requires a vast amount of objective knowledge. Since this knowledge is differentially distributed, the subjects who possess it must operate in concert, coordinating their insights, deliberations, decisions and actions so that the appropriate good is actually achieved. But high levels of knowledge and skill, even orderly social cooperation, are not enough. As Aristotle trenchantly observed, the skilled physician can kill as well as cure.

So while knowledge is necessary, it is not sufficient for responsible choices, virtuous actions, and laudable outcomes. Individually and collectively we must be as deeply committed to doing the good as we are to knowing what it is. And since there are many levels and types of good, vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious, we must recognize all of them and their hierarchical relations with one another. Based on this knowledge, we must also be willing to subordinate lesser to greater goods as circumstances require. This willingness is fortified by the development and refinement of our moral feelings. Both moral knowledge and moral choice are deeply enriched by our intentional responses to value. Under the sway of moral conversion, as a result of consistent fidelity to the transcendental precepts, the whole person, at all levels of consciousness, becomes committed to the actualization of value and distressed at the failure to achieve it.

The normative picture we have just presented, however, is unrealistic, for it omits the knotted state of our condition. Our desire for value invariably competes with self-centered decisions and needs. The knowledge required to discover and

actualize the good is hard to achieve and often pursued for quite different ends. Fidelity to the transcendental precepts is invariably compromised by bias and societal pressure. Our cultural heritage is morally ambiguous and frequently prejudiced against the pursuit of the highest values. And our moral feelings can be twisted and corrupted in subtle and devious ways. Sustained moral self-transcendence seems to be beyond our grasp.

Given our personal frailty, our susceptibility to bias and sin, and the uneven effects of our social and cultural belonging, we invariably fail as individuals, and even more frequently in our collective endeavors. Moreover, we are permanently tempted to rationalize our failures by justifying their occurrence. These ideological justifications extend beyond our personal sins to the structural injustices of whole societies, and to the distorted priorities of a decadent culture. Thus a first condition of authenticity is a candid acknowledgment of moral failure and an explicit repudiation of ideological excuses. Failures of self-transcendence can be remedied if they are openly acknowledged and responsibly addressed. Both human learning and living are self-correcting processes. By contrast, moral aberration becomes habitual and entrenched when fortified by self-deception and ideology.

In the authentic subject intellectual and moral development are profoundly deepened by moral conversion: by the existential commitment to orient our lives by the *eros* for value, by consistent fidelity to the transcendental precepts, by an habitual willingness to decide and act on the basis of true evaluative judgments, by the candid acknowledgement of our moral failings and flaws. Moral self-transcendence requires the repeated withdrawal from inauthenticity and careful attention to the existential and social factors that promote its occurrence.

Lonergan recognized two interdependent types of value, originating and terminal. Terminal values are known through true evaluative judgments and actualized through responsible decisions and actions. They are the objective ends that authentic subjects pursue. Originating values include the foundational principles in the self-transcendent subject, the enduring fruits of the subject's intellectual and moral development, and the existential conversion of her intellectual and moral being. It is originating values that make the discovery and achievement of terminal values possible. When this transcendental dependence becomes explicitly recognized, then originating values should also become common terminal values that we deliberately promote both personally and collectively.

The appropriation of moral conversion has an added dialectical benefit. It enables us to understand the source of the counter-positions in ethics and value theory. The central obstacle to knowing and doing what is good is the implicit or explicit refusal of moral self-transcendence. When this refusal is compounded by persuasive ideologies, then the factual evidence often suggests that skepticism, emotivism, and moral relativism are probably true. But this appearance of truth depends on the outlook and conduct of unconverted subjects whose explicit judgments violate one or more of the foundational principles at the core of their own being.

Religious conversion is particularly important in an ecumenical and secular age. The ecumenical spirit heightens our awareness of religious pluralism. Those who embrace it become increasingly aware of the varieties of religious experience and expression, both now and in the past. In a secular age, believers and non-believers live and work side by side. They marry, raise children, participate in common activities, and pursue common ends. In many countries they show mutual respect and affection for each other, though, in an important sense, they live in different worlds. Or better, they orient themselves within different horizons that only partly overlap and coincide.

In a secular culture, religious faith cannot be taken for granted. To use Charles Taylor's phrase, the conditions of religious belief are changed. The critics of religion become increasingly assertive. The masters of suspicion deny the authenticity of faith. Ontological naturalists exclude the possibility of transcendent being. Exclusive humanists assert the irrelevance of God in human affairs. Religious differences appear to defy rational resolution. The mutual relations between faith and reason, grace and nature, justice and charity, become sharply disputed, particularly within the community of faith. Even co-religionists cannot agree whether the intellectual and moral achievements of modernity strengthen or weaken the position of religion in our time.

What is religious conversion and how is it relevant to our cultural crisis? Lonergan emphasizes the foundational principles that shape the converted subject's horizon. Intellectual conversion puts the *eros* of mind at the center of our cognitive life. Moral conversion makes our evaluative judgments and practical decisions answerable to the unrestricted desire for value. As we have noted, moral conversion *sublates* its intellectual counterpart. The unrestricted pursuit of knowledge and truth, though intrinsically good, does not exhaust the universe of value. Objective knowing is a critical part but not the whole of authentic living.

Is the human quest for self-transcendence completely fulfilled within the horizon of these foundational principles? It is important to remember that the principles are unrestricted in their intended scope. We desire to know all that exists; we long to actualize all that is good. Though our actual knowledge and achievement are finite and imperfect, our intellectual and moral aspirations are limitless. We long to know God, if there is a God. We long to do God's will, if it is good and can be discerned.

Despite their inherent value, the philosophical quest for truth and the practical quest for goodness yield uneven results, as the tangled knot of history makes clear. Lonergan has shown a way, in principle, to resolve the conflict of positions and counter-positions, but the existential demands of his solution are daunting. Though we have a natural capacity for self-transcendence, and are universally called to authenticity, we are invariably prone to bias and sin. Exclusively human responses to the reality of error and evil, though clearly important, are of limited efficacy.

In our discussion of human subjectivity, we have omitted any reference to love. We have acknowledged the transcendental *eros* of the subject, its unrestricted longing for knowledge and goodness. But we have neglected the concreteness and singularity of falling-in-love, of being-in-love with a particular person, a particular family, intimate friends, our native land. These powerful forms of being-in-love are also horizon shaping. As long as they remain alive, they shape the dramatic and existential horizon in which we live. These loves also summon us to self-transcendence. The well-being of our spouse, our parents, our children, our friends, our country become central to our moral concern. We are ready to sacrifice ourselves, freely and generously, for all that we authentically love.

We can also love God in an analogous manner, though the God whom we love is surrounded in mystery. Lonergan insists that our love of God has its conscious origin in God's love for us. By nature, we have an *eros* for God; through grace we can fall in love with God in an unrestricted manner. The gift of God's love, freely given to all, is a supernatural principle consciously operating within the life of the incarnate subject. In theological terms, it is an operative grace that perfects and completes our nature, sublating its natural capacities and aspirations. In Biblical language, operative grace turns the fallen sinner's heart of stone into a heart of flesh. The heart of stone is in love with itself (Augustine's *cupiditas*); its effective horizon is restricted to the concerns of the "fat Ego" (Iris Murdoch). The heart of flesh (*caritas*) is in love with an unknown God whom it serves but cannot see.

The gift of God's love fully respects human freedom. Each of us responds to its call in a uniquely personal way. But when nature and grace cooperate and love's operative power lessens the counter-pull of bias and sin, then the love of God can become more important than any other reality in our life. Our intellectual and moral horizon expands beyond the realm of created nature and human achievement. We enter in awe and silence the mysterious realm of divine transcendence in which God is both known and unknown. Known in and through the experience of unrestricted love, unknown in essence, power, and glory.

Religious conversion occurs when the subject responds to the gift of God's love in a whole-hearted way, when being in love with God becomes the orienting principle of her life. But God's infinite love is generous and all embracing. God wills us to know and love all that is good. Through religious conversion, the love of God sublates the other ways of being-in-love. We now can love spouse, parents, children, friends, and country both in themselves and as created gifts entrusted to us by God for their care and protection. Nothing that God has created, nothing that is humanly authentic, nothing that is genuinely good is incompatible with religious conversion, which summons us to love God and creation to the best of our power.

From the perspective of religious conversion, the intellectual pursuit of truth, the moral pursuit of value and the authentic achievements they yield are blessed by God as good and holy. The gifts of creation are intended to be used for the stewardship of nature, the benefit of man and the glory of God. Divine grace cooperates with nature and strengthens its operation; it conflicts with bias and sin, which do violence to nature and limit its efficacy. However, grace can lessen the power of sin by healing the subjective and objective wounds that it causes. Sin inherently resists grace, as violence resists nature and art, and as bias resists the quest for self-transcendence. Grace is creative and horizon expanding; sin is destructive and horizon confining. And we are the tangled dramatic knots in which nature, sin and grace concretely and invariably converge.

The pull and counter-pull of grace and sin highlight another aspect of religious conversion. In the history of religion the language of conversion is inseparable from the call to repentance. The prophets call Israel to repent of its sins against the law and the covenant. Jesus commands his disciples to repent, to fast, pray and give alms, for the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. The stricken Saul is called to repent for his pharasaic hatred of Christ and the early Church. In writing his *Confessions*, Augustine sees the need to repent whenever he fails to love God with his whole heart, mind, and strength. As he humbly acknowledges,

full religious conversion is effectively resisted by all the loves of our past life. Our sinful self-centeredness makes it nearly impossible to devote our-selves wholly to God. Even the lives of the saints reflect this ongoing struggle between *caritas* and *cupiditas*, between the sources of holiness and sin.

In all three forms of conversion, authenticity requires the constant withdrawal from inauthenticity. We can understand the divine command to love God and neighbor; we can see the wisdom of obeying it faithfully. Yet, we repeatedly fail to honor our knowledge and commitment. "The good that we would we do not; the evil that we would not we do" (St. Paul). But God is merciful as well as exigent, forgiving as well as commanding. And if we, despite our wretchedness, are willing to forgive those who trespass against us, how much more will God forgive us whom God has created and loves unconditionally?

If the gift of God's love is given to all, then why is unbelief so prevalent? Some distinctions are necessary to clarify this question and answer it credibly. Like the unrestricted desires for knowledge and value, the experience of God's love occurs at the level of consciousness. Like the transcendental notions, it is immanent and operative but neither thematized nor known. As a spiritual principle, it orients our being in an unrestricted manner, but it gives us no sensible or imaginable object on which to focus our attention. We see and touch our spouse, we embrace our children and our parents, we enjoy the physical presence of our friends and companions. In each case we love them in and through their sensible presence to us. But the God whom we love cannot be seen, heard, or touched with our senses. Nor can God be fully understood through the critical judgments of our mind. At the level of experience we know God through love, a love that is singularly strange and mysterious, unrestricted in nature, indeterminate in content. This love draws us into wonder and silence; it fills us with awe and repentance; it calls us to personal holiness and transformation of life.

I have been describing religious experience as an individual phenomenon. Because it is given to all, it can draw human beings into communities and into the rites, myths and creeds of communal expression. Our intellectual, moral, and religious experience is always historically situated. But the common features of our spiritual life are interpreted differently in different societies and cultures and transmitted across the generations in strikingly different traditions.

In our contemporary Western culture, profoundly shaped by the critical revolutions in natural science and historiography, by a heightened sense of cultural pluralism, by a deep repugnance for the sins committed and justified in

the name of religion, by unresolved disagreement on philosophical and moral questions, and by a shared attachment to individual rights, democratic liberty, technological power and the goods of ordinary life, religious phenomena receive, not surprisingly, markedly different interpretations. Atheism, agnosticism, religious skepticism, a vague and occasional sympathy for our spiritual longing, as well as multiple forms of religious belief, worship, and confession, compete openly for our allegiance and commitment.

The existential dialectic of religious positions and counter-positions is particularly intense because the personal stakes are so high. Nothing matters more ontologically than the existence or non-existence of God. Nothing matters more epistemically than the truth of our religious beliefs. Nothing matters more existentially than the personal resolve to love God and our neighbor with the whole of our being. The hermeneutics of suspicion, the ethics of unbelief, the disenchantment of nature and history, the ambiguous past of the great religions, the unprecedented evil of the twentieth century, the apparent intractability of religious disagreements: these cultural realities affect us all, believer and non-believer alike. The institutional and cultural conditions of religious belief, as Taylor has argued, are strikingly different in our secular age. Although they certainly do not preclude religious faith, they make religious authenticity and existential conversion more challenging than ever before.

THE SECOND MOMENT OF INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION

Elizabeth A. Murray
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California

“INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION” IS a term that Lonergan develops in his post-*Insight* works especially in *Method in Theology*.¹ In *Insight* what roughly corresponds to intellectual conversion is self-appropriation. In order to examine the nature of intellectual conversion, let us begin with key remarks Lonergan makes regarding self-appropriation. He identifies self-appropriation as one’s own rational self-consciousness taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness. In the original preface to *Insight*, Lonergan describes rational self-consciousness as “a peak above the clouds.”² He develops this imagery further when he adds: “Yet if man can scale the summit of his inner being, also he can fail to advert to the possibility of the ascent or, again, he can begin the climb only to lose his way.”³ The reader of *Insight* is invited to commence or, as the case may be, to advance on a trek to scale the summit of one’s own rational self-consciousness and to take possession of that summit.

Lonergan’s preliminary characterization of this trek to the peak, however, presents a difficulty. The climb is described in two ways which may or may not conflict – as a momentous event in one’s intellectual life and as a gradual process of development. On one hand, it seems that we are invited to perform a single decisive act when he writes:

¹While Lonergan elaborates his idea of ‘intellectual conversion’ in *Method in Theology*, the term appears in his earlier writings as well. For a thorough account of its appearance in his earlier works, see William A. Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 254-57.

²Bernard Lonergan, “The Original Preface of *Insight*,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 3 (March 1985): 3.

³“The Original Preface of *Insight*,” 3.

The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the experiment will be performed not publicly but privately. It will consist in one's own rational self-consciousness clearly and distinctly taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness. Up to that decisive achievement all leads.... More than all else the aim of the book is to issue an invitation to a personal, decisive act.⁴

If self-appropriation hinges on the performance of a single act, what is the nature of that act? In the above quote the phrase "clearly and distinctly" echoes Lonergan's point in the preface that insight is the source of what Descartes called 'clear and distinct ideas.'⁵ Is this decisive act an act of insight? His fuller statement of the nature of self-appropriation later in the introduction supports this interpretation, for he talks of the discovery of two distinct realisms.⁶ He refers also to St. Augustine's discovery that the real is not any kind of body.⁷ Or, is the key act of self-appropriation an act of decision, of deliberately orienting oneself? Lonergan's talk of rational self-consciousness taking possession of itself as rational self-consciousness strongly suggests so.

On the other hand, the trek to the summit is described as a gradual ascent when Lonergan writes that:

The labor of self-appropriation cannot occur at a single leap. Essentially, it is a development of the subject and in the subject, and like all development it can be solid and fruitful only by being painstaking and slow.⁸

Further, he characterizes *Insight*, his "essay in aid of self-appropriation,"⁹ as a "book designed to aid a development."¹⁰ So, the self-appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness would seem to be a gradual development not a single act.

Lonergan's preliminary remarks on his aim in *Insight* present us with the question of the nature of self-appropriation. Are we to understand self-appropriation to be a matter of the performance of a memorable act, a key insight or a decision, or is it a matter of personal development? Is self-appropriation a

⁴*Insight*, 13.

⁵*Insight*, 4.

⁶*Insight*, 22.

⁷*Insight*, 15.

⁸*Insight*, 17.

⁹*Insight*, 16.

¹⁰*Insight*, 18.

gradual process that involves a series of pivotal insights and decisions? In terms developed later in *Insight* and in *Method in Theology*, is self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness primarily a genetic or a dialectical self-transformation?

Lonergan wrote *Insight* from a moving viewpoint. The appearance of inconsistency in his initial account of self-appropriation is a function of his pedagogical approach. *Insight* is not a closed conceptual system. As he explains: "For a single book may be written from a moving viewpoint, and then it will contain, not a single set of coherent statements, but a sequence of coherent statements."¹¹ Lonergan operates from a moving viewpoint "that successively sets up contexts only to go beyond them."¹² He would have his interpreters qualify his earlier statements in light of his later statements. Nevertheless, we are left with the question of whether self-appropriation is a gradual intellectual development or a dialectical process of radical transformation?

In Lonergan's account of the appropriation of truth, he describes a three-part process that involves both gradual intellectual development and existential commitment. "To appropriate truth is to make it one's own."¹³ The process of appropriation involves learning, the gradual accumulation of habitual insights; identification, the performance enabled by making the insights one's own; and orientation, the decision to adhere to what has been rationally affirmed as true. This last essential element of appropriation is not put in terms of conversion in *Insight*, but we can identify in it the deliberate choice of a radically different horizon. Without this personal commitment the achievement made possible through the painstaking accumulation of insights may slip away.¹⁴

Self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness is a process of intellectual development that requires personal transformation and deliberate existential commitment. In his "Lectures on Existentialism," Lonergan describes at some length how philosophic development involves conversion, a transformation of one's entire mode of life.¹⁵ Scaling the summit of one's inner being, then, involves a long climb that includes leaps. Certain necessary leaps are occasions of

¹¹*Insight*, 18.

¹²*Insight*, 18.

¹³*Insight*, 581.

¹⁴*Insight*, 582.

¹⁵Bernard Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip Mc Shane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 289-91.

severe exposure in which one leaves safe ground only to confront the challenge of regaining balance on an opposite pinnacle. The leaps are necessary not in the sense that anyone making the ascent will automatically make them, but rather that if one is to reach the summit one must make them. The required leaps are dialectical moves in the process of the self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness. And, if one is to stay at the summit a reorientation of oneself to the new-found truth must be made and remade.

The crucial discoveries one makes in the process of self-appropriation are specific to each of us. Each is a function of one's intellectual development and context, the philosophies one has been schooled in, the conflicts of one's time, and the ideal of knowledge under which one labors. For Augustine it was the discovery that he had been trying to imagine God, and that God could not be any kind of body not even the minimal body of an unlimited white light. While the pivotal insights in one's intellectual development may be materially unique, there are certain intellectual transitions indispensable to the appropriation of rational self-consciousness. Let us turn to another image Lonergan employs in his introduction to *Insight*, the image of the halfway house.

An overview of the ascent to be made and its way stations is provided in the familiar account of self-appropriation found in the introduction to *Insight*:

...Unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to an understanding, but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery – one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness – that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism.¹⁶

The peak Lonergan would have us reach is the standpoint of critical realism. In order to reach that summit one must pass through other positions. He identifies two halfway houses, that of naïve realism and that of idealism. Let us consider both in a preliminary fashion.

¹⁶*Insight*, 22.

The first halfway house is naïve realism which is an advance over materialism, but nevertheless as a philosophic position, remains incoherent. Both materialism and naïve realism are forms of empiricism. The latter is an advance over the former, because while both view knowing as a matter of perceiving the real, the latter allows a role for human intelligence. Materialism which has a history dating back to the Pre-Socratic atomists is generally a reductionism that issues in varieties of perspectivism, relativism, or skepticism. Typically materialism does not recognize any role for understanding in knowing. So-called mental acts are simply neurological events, and the only legitimate science of the mind is the study of the brain. This allows otherwise rational thinkers like A. J. Ayer to make comments like the following in his *Language, Truth, and Logic*: “I want the reader to get an insight into the fact that there is no such thing as a mental act.”

Lonergan credits naïve realism with being half-human, that is, with recognizing some role for understanding in knowing. A prominent representative of such a position is Gilson whose Scholastic realism while unabashedly dogmatic affirms a role of intellectual vision in coming to knowledge of the real. His wholesale rejection of the Kantian critique of intellectual *Anschaung* is based on the self-evident fact of our perception of the real.¹⁷

While Lonergan distinguishes materialism and naïve realism in the introduction, in later works he tends to conflate the two and refer simply to empiricism or to naïve realism. Varieties of empiricism, such as materialism, dogmatic realism, physicalism, phenomenalism, pragmatism, etc. share certain fundamental tenets. To move from one empiricist position to another may involve an advance in philosophic argumentation and the insights required for such developments, but the fundamental horizon is not thereby gainsaid. The fundamental assumption is that in sense-experience we directly perceive reality, which seems to be the natural view of people everywhere. As Lonergan remarks, “some form of naïve realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to very many.”¹⁸ Yet, this view is the result of a failure to distinguish between what is natural in our knowing as extroverted animals surviving in our habitats, and what is natural in our knowing as intelligent and rational human beings. But this brings us to the limit of the empiricist horizon. In order to continue the ascent, to advance to the next halfway house a dramatic, dialectical move is required.

¹⁷See Paul St. Amour’s “Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism” *The Thomist*, 69 (2005): 557-92.

¹⁸Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 239.

Let us return at this point to the quote featured from the introduction. Lonergan names a second halfway house: “there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism.”¹⁹ Note that he does not situate this second halfway house as midway between naïve realism and critical realism, but as midway between materialism and critical realism. The significance of this detail is twofold. First, he views materialism, which thrives in postmodern continental thinkers as well as in contemporary analytic circles, to be more obscure than the naïve realism of common sense and of scholasticism, which while pre- or a-critical do not reject some role for human intelligence. Secondly, as one advances through the steps of the ascent the distances between the viewpoints become greater. This happens to echo Plato’s analogy of the line in *Republic*, Book VI. Plato specifies that the line depicting the operations and their objects leading to the ultimate intuition of the One is divided into thirds. The lower portion of sense and imagination takes up one third, and the higher portion takes up two-thirds. As one ascends the distances become greater signifying the increasing significance of the operations and objects.

The climb to the second halfway house, the position of idealism, is more difficult. It is not simply a matter of refining one’s empiricist claims and discovering new arguments in their defense. It involves the radical transformation of one’s viewpoint and the repudiation of the empiricist position. It is a dialectical step, an intellectual conversion. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan distinguishes three types of conversion, religious, moral, and intellectual. In his account of intellectual conversion, he differentiates three basic philosophical horizons, and he points out that “Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects.”²⁰ Because the three horizons have no common objects, because each successive horizon repudiates central features of the previous horizon, there must be two dialectical moves necessary to reach the position of critical realism. Yet, Lonergan writes of intellectual conversion as a unitary achievement: “Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowing.”²¹ It culminates in the adoption of the three-part basic position outlined in “The Method of Metaphysics” in *Insight*.²² Because of the dialectical opposition of the three

¹⁹*Insight*, 22.

²⁰Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 239.

²¹*Method in Theology*, 238.

²²*Insight*, 413.

philosophic horizons of empiricism, idealism, and critical realism, intellectual conversion is better understood to be a two-phase conversion, a conversion with two distinct dialectical moments. The first moment is the leap from empiricism to idealism, and the second movement is the leap from idealism to critical realism. Both are necessary for the realization of the horizon of critical realism. If one has not at least visited the halfway house of idealism, one is not going to ascend to the summit.

We find in the works of Kierkegaard another thinker who dealt with conversion, and with the idea of a two-moment conversion. In order to articulate the two dialectical moments of intellectual conversion, let us turn for a model to Kierkegaard's treatment of how one becomes a person of faith in his book *Fear and Trembling*. Kierkegaard often uses the term "leap" when describing transitions from one standpoint to another, because such transitions involve nothing necessary or inevitable, conceptually, developmentally or historically.²³ Kierkegaard writes of leaps in thought as well as in existence. In the life of the intellect one encounter's very definite limits and the next sphere cannot be reached without a leap.²⁴ In *Fear and Trembling*, the focus of his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio is the dialectical leaps that are required to reach faith. The account in *Fear and Trembling* provides rich insights not only into the nature of religious conversion but also into the nature of conversion in general.

The key to Kierkegaard's notion of conversion is the concept of *Gentagelse* (repetition), which he celebrates as his one original contribution to the history of metaphysics.²⁵ Repetition is the act of freedom through which one becomes oneself anew. The self facing the future of infinite possibility transcends the finite self it has already become in the past and becomes itself anew in the present moment. The moment is an act of decision, which requires intense self-conscious reflection and which is experienced in anxiety. The decision is constitutive of the self and the world. Through it one's thought and existence is transformed. Conversion, for Kierkegaard, is not to be thought of as a terminal achievement. The radical act of choice must be remade repeatedly in order to continue to exist as the newly transformed self. So, the term "repetition" is doubly significant: the

²³Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self* (West Lafayette, IN: University Press, 1996), 39.

²⁴Westphal, *Becoming a Self*, 70-71.

²⁵Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 17-19. For an analysis of the concept of repetition, see Elizabeth A. Morelli [Murray], "The Existence of the Self Before God in Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death*," *The Heythrop Journal*, 36, no. 1 (January 1995): 15-29.

act of repetition is a repetition of the self – the self is made anew; and the act of repetition must be ever repeated in the next moment.

In de Silentio's account there are two essential moments of transition one must engage in if one is to become a knight of faith: the act of infinite resignation and the act of accepting all again in faith. De Silentio describes what is required for the act of infinite resignation:

In the first place, the knight will have the power to concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire....In the next place, the knight will have the power to concentrate the conclusion of all his thinking into one act of consciousness....The knight then makes the movement...and, then, will recollect everything, but this recollection is precisely the pain, and yet in infinite resignation he is reconciled with existence.²⁶

In concentrating all of one's desire into a single desire the self is able to renounce all of finitude, oneself and the world, with one act of total self-abnegation. In concentrating all of one's thought into one act of consciousness, the self attains the eternity of the philosopher. But this otherworldly suffering no matter how dramatically embraced is not faith; it is the last stage before faith. "The act of resignation does not require faith, but to get the least little bit more than my eternal consciousness requires faith."²⁷ One may ascend this far and live out one's life as a suffering ascetic: "In infinite resignation there is peace and rest and comfort in the pain...."²⁸ In order to maintain oneself in this existence of the suffering ascetic, one must remember all one has renounced, one must remain acutely aware of one's desire and one's denial. The act of resignation must be freely made repeatedly. The next moment of religious conversion is not necessitated; it too is an act of freedom.

The second moment is the decision to accept back again finitude, all that one most deeply desires and had renounced, by virtue of faith. According to de Silentio this transition is made only by virtue of the fact that for God all things are possible. One can become a knight of infinite resignation through one's own strength, but to make the second move is not solely through one's own choice, although one's free act of choice is required. "By faith I do not renounce anything; on the contrary, by faith I receive everything exactly in the sense in

²⁶Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 43.

²⁷Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 48.

²⁸Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 45.

which it is said that one who has faith like a mustard seed can move mountains.”²⁹ Both movements require virtue. Infinite resignation requires strength, energy and spiritual freedom, a purely human courage, but the act of faith requires in addition a humble courage. As the act of resignation must be repeated, the act of freely accepting and returning to embrace the finite in faith must continually be made.³⁰ The two-phase dialectic of coming to faith, then, involves a moment of withdrawal and renunciation and a moment of return and acceptance.

The purpose here of recounting Kierkegaard’s account of religious conversion is not to weigh the merits of his theology, but to glean from it both essential characteristics of conversion, and a model of a two-phased conversion. Lonergan’s account of the nature of conversion in *Method in Theology* agrees essentially with Kierkegaard’s account of repetition.

Lonergan defines conversion as a free act of will, as a decision or a choice:

It is a decision about whom and what you are for and, again, whom and what you are against. It is a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities exhibited in dialectic. It is a fully conscious decision about one’s horizon, one’s outlook one’s worldview.³¹

As de Silentio sees the knight of faith as a rarity, because the required act of infinite resignation and the act of acceptance in faith are strenuous and rare, so Lonergan describes intellectual conversion as a “high achievement.”³² It is not simply a matter of drifting into some contemporary horizon. Through an exercise of vertical freedom, a rationally self-conscious and deliberate choice, one adopts a new horizon that is not consonant with the fundamental tenets of one’s current horizon. A vertical exercise of freedom can serve to introduce a new horizon which is grounded in the potentialities of the previous horizon. The emergence of the variety of empiricisms, alluded to previously, illustrates such vertical yet consonant changes in horizons. But in the decision characteristic of intellectual conversion a horizon is adopted which is not consonant with the tenets of one’s previous horizon. Rather, one decides to repudiate characteristic features of the old horizon. “Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a

²⁹Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 49.

³⁰Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, 37.

³¹*Method in Theology*, 268.

³²*Method in Theology*, 269.

conversion.”³³ Conversion, then, for Lonergan as for Kierkegaard is a dialectical act of freedom through which one transcends the self one has been and the horizon one has adopted, to find oneself in a radically new horizon. Finally, to be authentic in terms of one’s intellectual life, is to embrace the basic position on the nature of being, objectivity, and knowing, but this choice is not made once and for all. As Lonergan reminds us:

Human authenticity is not some pure quality, some serene freedom from all oversights, all misunderstanding, all mistakes, all sins. Rather it consists in a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and the withdrawal is never a permanent achievement. It is ever precarious, ever to be achieved afresh....³⁴

To underscore the key characteristics, then, Lonergan and Kierkegaard both view conversion as a matter of free, self-conscious decision, as involving a radical dialectical shift in horizon or orientation which repudiates one’s former horizon or orientation, and as an act which must be repeated.

Is intellectual conversion a two-step process, a radical re-orientation that requires two dialectical moments? As noted previously Lonergan considers the basic philosophic horizons of empiricism, idealism, and critical realism to be three totally different positions having no common identical objects.³⁵ The radically different nature of these horizons means that to choose to move from one of them to another requires a conversional vertical exercise of freedom. We can distinguish two main moments of intellectual conversion: the first moment is the shift from empiricism to idealism, and the second moment is the shift from idealism to critical realism. Before we take up the question of the nature of these two moments, it would be helpful to review what is meant by empiricism, idealism, and critical realism.

Lonergan, of course, is simplifying the history of thought when he names just three major philosophic positions. As we have already seen in his introduction to *Insight*, he distinguishes materialism and naïve realism when locating the first halfway house. A plethora of empiricisms have emerged in the history of thought from Empedocles to Hume to Daniel Dennett and the Churchlands, but for the sake of this exposition let us take Lonergan’s lead and refer to empiricism as one possible philosophic standpoint. It is also a simplification to refer to the position

³³*Method in Theology*, 237-38.

³⁴*Method in Theology*, 252.

³⁵*Method in Theology*, 239.

of idealism. There are a number of notable idealisms in the history of thought: Plato's naïve idealism, Berkeley's deistic idealism, Kant's critical idealism, Fichte's subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. While Lonergan is aware of the significant differences in these different idealisms, he primarily has Kant's critical idealism in mind when he refers generally to idealism.³⁶

Critical realism is the horizon that affirms the three-fold position regarding the real, self-knowledge, and objectivity delineated in "The Method of Metaphysics" in *Insight*.³⁷ The other two horizons fail in some way to grasp and affirm the three basic tenets. Empiricism assumes that the real is already constituted, outside of the subject, that knowing is a matter of looking or perceiving and forming beliefs, and that objectivity is only reached when one's opinions and beliefs are confirmed with the hard evidence of sense. If certain beliefs such as that in causality cannot be confirmed in sense evidence, then knowledge of causality must be jettisoned, along with knowledge of God, of angels, of the human soul, and of anything that cannot be measured and tested. Idealism maintains the view that reality is already out there beyond the subject or, rather, that it may be but we cannot experience it directly or know it, we can only think of it. Knowing is not immediate as it is for the empiricist but, mediate. For Kant, for example, it is a matter of the constitution of phenomena through the imposition of a priori forms of sensibility and categories of understanding, through the transcendental synthesis of imagination and the guidance of principles of reason. Objectivity is achieved in morality on the basis of universal and necessary laws of reason, but our knowledge of fact is merely phenomenal. In summary, the horizon of empiricism is the view that we have objective knowledge of the real immediately through sense-perception. It is fundamentally naïve and extroverted. The horizon of idealism is the view that what we immediately experience as raw sense data has no meaning, that all meaning is constituted through the human mind. It is fundamentally constitutive and immanentist. The position of critical realism in contrast is both constitutive and attains objectivity.

There are obstacles standing in the way of any philosophic conversion. There is the anxiety one feels confronted with a new horizon, as Lonergan explains:

When a person is confronted with a new philosophy that also involves or necessitates in him a conversion for its total acceptance, he will cannot

³⁶*Method in Theology*, 264.

³⁷*Insight*, 413.

attend simply to the philosophic arguments. His consciousness will be concerned to maintain itself, and he will trot out what Husserl and Heidegger will call his *Selbstverständlichkeiten*, his obvious, self-evident truths....³⁸

In addition to the underlying dread of destroying one's successful synthesis in living, there is the theoretical assumption that the introduction of any new philosophic idea is simply a matter of argumentation. That no conversion is required, just sound reasoning. In fact if one dares to articulate the existential, subjective conditions of philosophic discourse, one is likely to be charged with psychologism.

Beyond the difficulty of any intellectual transformation, each of the two moments of intellectual conversion has its own set of difficulties and conditions conducive to its occurrence. Each moment also will be experienced differently depending upon the intellectual development, cultural milieu, and historical conditions of the subject.

THE FIRST MOMENT

Idealism, notably the critical idealism of Kant and the phenomenological immanentism of Husserl, maintains the basic empiricist identification of the real with an unknowable noumenal or transcendent realm. Despite this persistent residue of empiricism, the shift to the idealist standpoint marks a radical transformation. This radical shift to understanding the world as mediated and constituted by meaning is the first moment of intellectual conversion. It is a moment of withdrawal from the world as it has always been assumed to be. It attempts to suspend all commonsense and scientific presuppositions (except for the presupposition of the ocular model of intentional operations that persists in some idealisms).

One striking account of an experience of the first moment of intellectual conversion can be found in Fichte's letters:

It is incredible how profoundly Kant's philosophy...has influenced the total system of one man's thinking and how decidedly Kant's philosophy has initiated a revolution in my total philosophic thought. Since I read the

³⁸Bernard Lonergan, "Lectures on Existentialism," in *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip Mc Shane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 290-91.

Critique, I am living in a totally different world. The principles I hitherto believed to be absolutely certain have been totally uprooted and destroyed.... An inexhaustible joy fills me.³⁹

What are the specific difficulties that obstruct the withdrawal to idealism? The fundamental assumption of the empiricist horizon is the myth that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there, and that reality is what is already out there to be perceived. Lonergan describes this myth as exceedingly stubborn and misleading.⁴⁰ It is stubborn because we are not simply rational agents, but also we are animals having to survive in our habitats like all other animals. We are extroverted and this extroversion is a fact of our animal nature. The myth is misleading because it leads to an oversight of insight, to commonsense denigration of the merely theoretical, and to scientific reductionism. It leads to the truncation of the self as intelligent and reasonable. The difficulty of the first moment of intellectual conversion was not lost on Plato, who incorporated into his curriculum years of mathematical training for students in the Academy. In order even to begin the arduous, disorienting climb out of the darkness, one must break the chains of sense, imagination, and accepted opinion. One must as Lonergan puts it, “cut the umbilical cord to the maternal imagination.” Any moment of conversion entails anxiety, but there is a specific fear of idealism one may encounter in the first moment of intellectual conversion. Liddy recounts musing: “Am I becoming an idealist? Does this insistence on the intellectual pattern of consciousness lose contact with reality? ... [Am I] getting too wrapped up in my own ‘self’ and never reaching reality ‘out there’?”⁴¹ Lonergan too writes of the necessity of overcoming “one’s spontaneous estimation of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it.”⁴²

What are conditions that would be conducive to making the transition of the first moment of conversion? For Hegel, the mind is best prepared to test what truth is by adopting a “skepticism, directed to the whole compass of phenomenal

³⁹Available online: http://www.csudh.edu/phenom_studies/europ19/lect_2.html.

⁴⁰*Method in Theology*, 238.

⁴¹Richard M. Liddy, *Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan’s Insight* (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 2007), 206.

⁴²Bernard Lonergan, “Consciousness and the Trinity,” *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958 – 1964*, vol. 6 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 130.

consciousness.”⁴³ Fichte stipulates a moral prerequisite for intellectual conversion:

All individuals must be educated into being persons, otherwise they would not be persons;”⁴⁴ “...the kind of philosophy one chooses thus depends on the kind of person one is...Someone whose character is naturally slack... will never be able to raise himself to the level of idealism.”⁴⁵

In order to undergo the radical transformation of this first moment of intellectual conversion, I suggest that one adhere to Lonergan’s transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be rational, Be responsible, and even Be loving. If one is not paying attention when one reads or otherwise encounters the thought of another, one will likely miss the clues, anomalies, and disturbing features that could spark one’s interest. One must allow the questions that may disrupt one’s horizon to arise; follow the reasoning and evidence to conclusions even if they conflict with one’s cherished beliefs, and finally exercise openness and charity in considering the thought of others.

Above all, the exigence that seems most operative in motivating one to make the first transition is that of the pure desire to know as wonder, as the spirit of inquiry. This normative exigence enables one to take the plunge, to let go of the familiar shore and head out into the sea of conscious intentionality. It delights in minor discoveries and rejoices in the *Ureinsicht* that grounds a whole new world. This spirit of adventure is sustained through moral virtues. Courage is required to overcome the fear of idealism, and a self-discipline or self-control can aid one in the solitary hours of intellectual pursuit. In the first moment of intellectual conversion, then, one heeds the call of the unknown and bravely leaves the familiar real world behind.

THE SECOND MOMENT

⁴³See Kierkegaard, *Johannes Climacus*, 132 n. 14 (324)

⁴⁴Fichte, *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre* (1796), *SW*, III (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 51.

⁴⁵Fichte, *Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 20.

The second moment of intellectual conversion marks the transition from idealism to critical realism. There are few accounts of the experience of this moment,⁴⁶ but Giovanni Sala provides the following:

The surprising thing about this insight, which came to me at the end of a long search and in which the scales of intuitionism fell from my eyes, was that, in spite of all the complex particular forms and instances of human knowledge in all its various branches, the core of this doctrine proved to have a disarming simplicity: we know reality because and to the extent that we attentively observe the relevant data of experience, bring the data to an intelligible unity, and take the trouble of weighing the evidence for and against our interpretation of the data with intellectual honesty. Every human being who wants to know how it stands with reality spontaneously does precisely this! This same insight made it possible for me to see the chasm that intuitionism of every sort sets up between the cognitive acts which we de facto perform and the postulated intuition of the fact itself, whether it be Kant's merely sensible intuition or the neo-scholastic intellectual intuition.⁴⁷

This dramatic account conveys both poles of the dialectical transformation that constitute the second moment of intellectual conversion, what is renounced and what is affirmed. Sala describes letting go of intuitionism, of both the empiricist kind found in the sophisticated naïve realism of neo-scholastics like Gilson and the idealist kind found in Kant's critical, transcendental philosophy. He also articulates the positive content of what is gained in this conversion, namely, the appropriation of not only intelligence but also of reason's role in arriving at fact. Sala mentions the process of weighing the evidence in coming to knowledge.

⁴⁶My own personal experience of this second moment occurred when I was an undergraduate philosophy student at Santa Clara University. The first thinkers I had read carefully were Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Lao-tse so when I began reading *Insight* I was already in a way an idealist (albeit one with rudimentary understanding). The passage in *Insight* that I had the most difficulty with was in chapter 10.1 "The General Form of Reflective Insight." I read it over until I had memorized it, but I still did not understand it: "The function of reflective understanding is to meet the question for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status of a virtually unconditioned; and reflective understanding effects this transformation by grasping the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfillment" (305). After staying up all night studying for the final examination in Fr. Tim Fallon's "Theory of Knowledge" course, I literally got the insight into the virtually unconditioned on the threshold of the classroom. That transformative insight not only enabled me to sail through the exam, but helped to catapult me to graduate school in philosophy. The creative energy released by that key insight and the related insights that flowed from it, transformed every aspect of my life.

⁴⁷Giovanni Sala, *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge*, trans. Joseph Spoerl; ed. Robert Doran (University of Toronto Press, 1994), xvi-xvii.

The second moment of intellectual conversion is an equally radical shift. It is effected through the *Ureinsicht* that the known is reached through a grasp of the virtually unconditioned and the act of judgment. It is the affirmation of the self's cognitional self-transcendence in the act of affirming what has been reflectively understood as virtually unconditioned. In the first moment of intellectual conversion, one withdraws into immanentism through renunciation of the familiar world of sense and imagination. In the second moment of intellectual conversion, one returns to objective reality (actually obtains it for the first time) through a transcendence of all subjective conditions. In the reflective insight into the conditions for something to be the case, and the reflective insight that those conditions have been met, one is carefully, reasonably, detaching the fact from its subjective grounds. In the judgment in which one affirms what is so absolute objectivity is attained; the fact is not relative to oneself. Lonergan writes: "Objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility."⁴⁸

This "juridic" transformative moment has its own difficulties and conditions conducive to its occurrence. As is the case with the move to idealism, one must contend with the entrenched counter-positional myth. One may have already accepted the constitutive role of thought in experience, but, as Sala mentions, the confrontational model of knowing is still operative in idealist notions of intuition. This makes self-knowledge particularly problematic as the self-presence in reflective self-consciousness, if not delicately negotiated, leads conceptually to an infinite regress. A second obstacle is the modern ideal of knowledge as certain and necessary which is still operative in the idealist horizon. Necessity plays a role in the nature of the act of insight, and in the exigencies of syllogistic reasoning, but the knowledge attained in judgment of fact merely happens to be, it is contingent, historical, and may be revised. Adherence to the ideal of necessity in knowledge is so adamant, that the idealist would rather forego the possibility of arriving at knowledge than renounce this ideal. A third obstacle to the conversion to critical realism is the hubris of the idealist. As having attained the heights of theoretical ingenuity through clambering up the scaffolding of esoteric terminology, it is most humbling to find that knowing what is objectively true is a matter of carrying out the everyday cognitional acts of every Tom, Dick, and Harry. A parallel is found in Kierkegaard's account of faith. After describing in

⁴⁸*Method in Theology*, 265.

the most heroic terms the feats of the knight of infinite resignation, he describes the knight of faith as commonplace and unrecognizable.

As in the case of the first moment of intellectual conversion, the second moment has conditions which make its occurrence more likely. The idealist, if he or she is not too swept away with their own theory, can also heed the transcendental precepts. To leap beyond one's intellectual horizon requires the intelligence to understand the limitations and contradictions of one's viewpoint, and the reasonableness to accept the fact of performative contradiction. A normative exigence may also be at work. As the spirit of inquiry motivates the first moment, the exigence for rationality can motivate the second. It just may help one to move beyond obfuscation and indecision to affirmation of the fact and role of judgment in knowing. The transition to critical realism requires its own specific moral virtue, humility, or in Kierkegaard's terms a 'humble courage.' Beyond the transcendental ego of immanentism, I affirm myself as the concrete me of polymorphic consciousness. The self of critical realism is not only rational but also animal, and so engages in two forms of knowing which must be repeatedly distinguished especially in one's philosophic pronouncements. Acknowledgment of the duality in knowing and the fact of human development, leads one to admit the tension inherent in human existence. The real is not more or less than the horizon established by the set of judgments rationally affirmed. The paucity of the judgments any one of us can originally make, leads the critical realist to appreciate the value of collaboration, the fact of the reliance on belief, and the role of others in the self-correcting process of learning.

The critical realist, while critical of the naïve assumptions of the empiricist, and aware of the constitutive role of meaning, is thrust back into the objective world as just a single finite, polymorphic knower in a community of learners. While this may be a humbling transition from the idealist horizon, the critical realist must live with the tension of affirming that nevertheless he or she is a knower. As such, one bears the responsibility of an authority, and is not allowed the comfort of hiding behind one's ignorance. The critical realist occupies the precarious position beyond both the dogmatism of the empiricist and the relativism of the idealist.

In order to ascend to the peak of rationally self-conscious appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness, it is necessary to perform two dialectical transitions: the first is the move from empiricism to idealism; the second is the move from idealism to critical realism. We found that intellectual conversion is not a singular event in two senses. First, intellectual conversion has two moments,

the moment of withdrawal to immanence and the moment of transcendence to objectivity. And secondly, intellectual conversion is not a final achievement. The horizon of critical realism must be gained and regained through rationally self-conscious and free commitment. To maintain, secure, and develop this horizon, the critical realist welcomes and relies upon collaboration within a community.

BEYOND MORAL SUASION:
READING *METHOD IN THEOLOGY*
IN “RACIST AMERICA”

Jon Nilson
Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

SURELY, NO CAREFUL reader of his work needs to be reminded that, for Lonergan, the dirtiest four-letter word in the English language begins with the letter “B” – for “bias.” Bias is Lonergan’s word for the most serious obstacle to any understanding and progress worthy of the name. Bias is hard to detect and destroy. It creates and maintains distorted, incomplete horizons which are, however, deemed accurate and adequate by those afflicted with bias. The products of individual, group, and general bias always masquerade as truths to be embraced and values to be actualized. So the biased do not attend to relevant data nor do they undertake the difficult but necessary corrective courses of action because they have already excluded them *a priori* from serious attention.

The way we deal with bias is, therefore, the main issue on which progress on every level in every dimension of the human enterprise stands or falls. As Lonergan tells us,

No problem is at once more delicate and more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing. How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization? How can new strength and vigor be imparted to the detached and disinterested desire to understand without the reinforcement acting as an added bias?¹

¹Bernard Lonergan, *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 8-9.

It is no wonder, then, that, to make his case in the critical chapters on “Dialectics” and “Foundations” in *Method in Theology*, Lonergan refers us again and again back to the discussions of bias that appear in *Insight*.

Over the past eight years, I have come to understand and appreciate the wisdom and urgency of the warning that he gives near the end of *Method in Theology*: “...there is *always* a *great* need to eye very critically *any* religious individual or group and to discern beyond the very real charity they may well have been granted the various types of bias that may distort or *block* their exercise of it.”² For me, this sentence sums up that aspect of Lonergan’s legacy that is now most needed by us U.S. Catholic theologians in this “Racist America” of ours.

“How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias...?” Lonergan asks. He answers, “encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and horizon are put to the test”³ and encounter means “...meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one’s living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds.”⁴ Obviously, for Lonergan, these other persons are the gifts and graces we need for our moral conversion and individual and communal progress.

A case in point – and here I must become autobiographical. In December 2000, *Theological Studies* published a theme issue, “The Catholic Reception of Black Theology,” guest edited by M. Shawn Copeland. The only problem with this remarkable collection of articles was its title. It should not have been “The Catholic Reception of Black Theology,” but “The Catholic Indifference *to* Black Theology.” As Jamie Phelps, one of our most prominent and accomplished Black Catholic theologians, stated in her contribution to this issue (drawing on W. E. B. DuBois), “The silence of U.S. Catholic theologians about racism is parallel to the silence of leading German theologians and intellectuals during the Nazi atrocities and prosecution of the so-called ‘final solution’ against the Jewish people.”⁵

Now Jamie was – and is – my friend. At this time, her office and mine were next to each other at Loyola University Chicago. Our conversations were frequent and enjoyable. So her statement about U.S. Catholic theologians stunned me. Its implications were harsh and painful, for I took her to be saying, in effect, Jon, we

²Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1991), 284 (emphases added).

³*Method in Theology*, 247.

⁴*Method in Theology*, 247.

⁵Jamie T. Phelps, “Communion Ecclesiology and Black Liberation Theology,” *Theological Studies* 61, no. 4 (December 2000): 692.

are friends but, given your track record as a white Catholic theologian, I can't be sure that you would take my side if extreme circumstances forced you some day to make a choice.

So, of course, I tried to get off the hook! I thought, maybe that's not what she really meant. Maybe her comparison of racism in America to the Holocaust in Europe was a kind of rhetorical strategy to recruit her readers to her cause. Maybe there were some resemblances between racism in the U.S. and Nazism in Germany, but were there really enough to say that our silence was "parallel" to the silence of the Germans? To make a long story short, I learned that there was more than enough evidence to warrant her damning statement. Works like Basil Davidson's and Kenneth Stampp's' on slavery, Philip Dray's on lynching, Douglas Brandon's on legalized slavery after the Civil War, Ira Katznelson's on government benefit programs that deliberately excluded African Americans, Douglas Massey's and Nancy Denton's on residential segregation, Thomas Shapiro's on the economics of white privilege, William Julius Wilson's on life in our Black urban ghettos, and the indispensable work of Joe R. Feagin, especially his book *Racist America*, show that racism is indeed our nation's "original sin," as James Cone has named it. It is the social sin that decisively shapes this cultural matrix that is the United States.

What, then, is a Catholic theologian to do? If Metz is right in saying that one can no longer do theology with one's back turned to Auschwitz, so too a theologian in the United States cannot do theology with one's back turned to the west side of Chicago and the many other places in this country where the workings of "Racist America" are most evident and vicious. Yet, over fifty years after the Montgomery bus boycott, nearly forty years after James Cone's *Black Theology and Black Power*, and forty years after the killing of Martin Luther King, Jr., it is clear that moral exhortation and persuasion are ineffective against racism in theology and in the churches. As Cone explains:

Although the un-Christian behavior of whites caused us to question their Christian identity, we still assumed that if the contradiction between racism and Christianity were clearly pointed out to them, they would change and act in a Christian manner. We were naïve because our analysis of the problem was too superficial and did not take into consideration the

links between racism, capitalism, and imperialism, on the one hand, and theology and the church on the other.⁶

In his contribution to the *Theological Studies* theme issue, Bryan Massingale discerns the same problem with most pastoral letters of the U.S. bishops on racism. As well-intentioned as they may be, they rely far too heavily on the moral suasion that has proven its ineffectiveness decade after decade.⁷

What, then, is a Catholic theologian to do? I went back to *Method in Theology* with this question. Is there anything about theology itself, as Lonergan understands it, that demands and guides theologians' engagement with racism? Do our identity and competence as U.S. Catholic theologians make the struggle against racism and white privilege obligatory for us all?

I say that I "went back" to *Method in Theology*. The book had first appeared in 1972 while I was writing my dissertation. Since the focus of my dissertation was *Insight*, my committee did not demand that I take *Method* into account. When I did get to study *Method* later, I was convinced by Lonergan's critique of field specialization in theology as a paradigm that had long outlived its usefulness and by his vision of theology as a set of interrelated functional specialties. The trouble was then (and the trouble is now!) that the old paradigm still reigns in our theology departments. Many of us have experienced this in departmental discussions about hiring needs; for example: "We can only make one full-time appointment this year. Which do we need most: someone in Second Temple Judaism or a medievalist?" But this old paradigm governed the academic world in which I had to live and work and, not incidentally, support three children. So *Method in Theology* was certainly intriguing to me, but not a vision and program that I could adopt for myself.

Now, however, it has become indispensable to me on a number of counts and I cannot cover them all in the space of this essay.⁸ Let me simply focus on the first sentence of the body of the book. "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."⁹ Theology mediates by way of "a set of related and recurrent operations cumulatively

⁶James H. Cone, *For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984), 88.

⁷Bryan N. Massingale, "James Cone and Recent Catholic Episcopal Teaching on Racism," *Theological Studies* 61.4 (December 2000): 727-28.

⁸See my *Hearing Past the Pain: Why White Catholic Theologians Need Black Theology* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2007) for a fuller discussion of these issues.

⁹*Method in Theology*, xi.

advancing towards an ideal goal."¹⁰ The implications of these statements are revolutionary for theologians' practice, as well as for their theories about their discipline. Here is a vision of theology that demands and guides our struggle against racism.

The old paradigm of field specialization is a recipe for frustration and alienation. The frustration increases as scholars find it more and more difficult to keep up with developments in their field. So the range of relevant data gets divided and subdivided so that, Lonergan says, the specialist is the one who knows more and more about less and less.¹¹ Thus, earlier this year, my colleagues and I were introducing ourselves to a new visiting professor at a department meeting. We went around the table, each one telling their names and their specializations, like "Reformation" and "East Asian religions, especially Hinduism." When it was his turn, one of my colleagues said, "I'm Cam von Wahlde and I specialize in the Gospel of John [long pause] Chapter Six [long pause] verse 54."

This older paradigm also alienates theologians from two of their three audiences (or "publics," as David Tracy calls them). Recall Tracy's argument in *The Analogical Imagination* that theologians speak to the academy, the Church, and the wider society, although one of these three publics will be primary for each theologian. Certainly, the world and the Church need the insight and wisdom that only theology can provide. Yet, as the dominant paradigm pushes theologians into narrower and narrower specializations, the more do they tend to speak to and write for only their peers, simply because those peers are the only ones who can understand what they are saying. Meanwhile, the Church and the wider society are left too often to fend for themselves.

But if theology is not so much a "field" with different portions assigned to different laborers, but a process of mediation "between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix," then the eighth functional specialization, *Communications*, takes center stage, "for it is in this final stage that theological reflection bears fruit..." and without this stage, the work of the first seven stages are "in vain."¹²

Now this vision of theology has at least three major implications.

¹⁰*Method in Theology*, 125.

¹¹*Method in Theology*, 125.

¹²*Method in Theology*, 355.

First, it demands that theologians give painstaking attention to the dynamics of the cultural matrix within which they work. We cannot assume that we know our own culture simply because we were born into it and lived most of our lives within it. Lonergan rightly demands “an accurate and intimate understanding of the culture and the language of the people.”¹³ Likewise, David Tracy calls for cultural analysis within the theological community for the sake of theology itself.¹⁴ So, for example, a book like Andrew Hacker’s *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* belongs on theology’s required reading lists. When we theologians do our historical and sociological homework, Lonergan warns, we will find the dialectical differences that lie at the root of the deep fissures that scar our society.

Second, this study will demand that we theologians abandon the myth of neutrality. The more we develop an empirically based grasp of this cultural matrix that is the United States, the less defensible will any so-called “neutral” posture become. Robert Doran says it well: “. . . any pretension to impartiality on the part of theology reflects from the start a commitment to the preservation of the status quo”¹⁵ Like our sisters and brothers in Central and South America, we will discover that our society is fractured by deep and severe conflicts of race, class, and gender, masked and hidden though they may be. And, having discovered that racism is our “original sin,” we will discern the necessity of making our own option for the poor in our cultural matrix, such as an option for the young Black men and women trapped without hopes and possibilities in “Racist America.”

Third, it becomes incumbent upon every theologian to be able to explain how and why her or his work contributes to the mediation between *this* U.S. racist matrix and the significance and role of the good news of Jesus Christ in this matrix. Racism and its obverse, white privilege, are nothing less than the dominant social sin, the generalized bias, that pervades our matrix. If one’s work in theology simply ignores the massive injustices of racism and white privilege, how can that work be deemed authentically Christian theology? And how can one be truly called a “Catholic theologian,” rather than simply a chaplain to “sick middle class egos,” as James Cone has it?¹⁶

¹³*Method in Theology*, 362.

¹⁴David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 61.

¹⁵Robert M. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 425.

¹⁶James H. Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (New York: Seabury, 1969), 80.

Our situation is not wholly bleak. There is the ongoing productivity of the seasoned members of the Black Catholic Theological Symposium, like Phelps, Copeland, and Massingale. There is now a group of younger Black Catholic theologians at the dawn of their careers. There is also a small but deeply committed cadre of white Catholic theologians who are confronting white privilege. Two of them, Laurie Cassidy and Alexander Mikulich, have edited a volume entitled *Interrupting White Privilege: Catholic Theologians Break the Silence*,¹⁷ which was chosen as the College Theology Society's book of the year for 2007. There is good reason to hope that our future will not be like our past when it comes to engaging theologically the complex, multiple biases of racism.

To aid us in this indispensable task, Bernard Lonergan has left us a rich, transformative legacy. As we appropriate that legacy in its fullness, we will find that we do not have to "make Lonergan practical." Rather, we will discover that he was – and is – far more practical, perhaps, than we are – and we will find new strength and courage to address the challenges put to us white Catholic theologians in this cultural matrix of ours, Racist America.

¹⁷Laurie Cassidy and Alexander Mikulich, eds., *Interrupting White Privilege: Catholic Theologians Break the Silence* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007).

POTENCY AND STRUCTURE

David Oyler
Phoenix, Arizona

THE REMOTE CONTEXT for this discussion is Lonergan's chapter 8 on things in *Insight* and his account of development in chapter 15. The proximate context is the development of a model of creative human performance. Embodied intelligence requires a potency for form. This essay explores the openness of structure with a view towards further explication of the potency afforded by, for example, free images, language (and signs in general), as difference, and consciousness as an unmediated immediacy, all of which are biologically conditioned and instrumental to human knowing.

For humans, self-actualization involves the free, conscious, coordinating of operations and acts in a performance. A performance has a beginning and an end. Consider juggling, for example. Most of us can toss a ball in the air underhanded and catch it, but fewer of us can do this continuously with three or more balls as a juggler does. The juggling performance begins with the initial toss and ends with the catching of the three balls or it is interrupted with a miss.

A performance is the smallest concrete intelligible sequence (unit) of activity in terms of which operations and acts derive their functional meaning.¹ As we develop, performances become more intelligent and meaningful. The body, and particularly the brain, enables performance via the flexibility of processes embodied in performance. In other words, operations are available which can be freely and creatively combined.

With animals the situation is more constrained. There exist flexible sets of schemes of recurrence adaptable to the specifics of a situation. While the animal's creativity may be restricted or nonexistent in the development of new schemes,

¹The meaning of act differs implied here differs from Lonergan's in that acts are free operations. This contrasts with operations that are not free but are constitutive of a performance. Thus, within a skilled performance there are operations that occur "automatically" and other points where the person provides control within the course of its unfolding.

there is an inherent flexibility in the development and application of the operations that make up the scheme. At any time there is a set of integrable, but not integrated, operations at the ready for dealing with types of situations. Let's characterize this as minor flexibility. The fact that the operations do not have to be integrated in the same way all the time admits a major flexibility. In Piaget's terms, the flexible set of schemes is a schema. The minor flexibility is assimilation and the major flexibility makes accommodation possible.

This behavioral potency indicates that the organism is not fully systematic. In turn there are two senses in which it is not. There is the minor sense as described above where elements are integrable, but not integrated. These define the range of behaviors available in the moment, for example. There also is a major sense where the lack of system permits the emergence of new forms, new behaviors and, at the limit, creativity itself. It is this sense we want to explore in understanding the organism as not fully systematic.

In a not fully systematic whole, everything is not related to everything else, but everything is related to something that is related to something else, so that all the parts do not need to be interrelated. This permits an aggregate of elements and relations that in turn constitutes the potency of the whole to perform in relation to itself and to the other, or what is not it, and to develop. Remotely it makes evolution possible. In such a whole it is possible to have structure, system and systematic processes without the whole being fully systematic. This permits organisms to live in situations which are not fully systematic. It also provides evolutionary gradients towards greater complexity, greater variability and greater flexibility.

Though parts of the whole may be isolated from one another, they are not isolated from the whole itself. Though they can be studied abstractly as if they were isolated, there comes a point where their fuller context needs to be invoked to explain their operation. These are classic tenets of holism. To them we add the notion that there is no central organization of the organism. There are operators and what may be considered centers of organization and even of self organization. Its as if they work in contexts they did not create for reasons they may not know to meet ends or goals they may not foresee. Intelligence operative in a universe whose intelligible unity is one of emergent probability provides a clear example of this. Our concerns and examples will be more mundane but are relevant to developing an adequate context for explaining embodied intelligence.

Lonergan defines a thing as a unity, identity, whole. He notes that we have a notion of a thing, meaning that we do not have a fully differentiated and

integrated conception of it. We understand the unity of a thing via insight, but the unity that is grasped ranges from a relatively cognitively undifferentiated “oneness” to unified structures such as that of a functioning plant. It is the grasp of a unity in data where all the data pertains to the thing. Yet for this understanding to transcend the immediate situation, we know from the work of Piaget and others, that the understanding of the conservation of objects, a grasp of aperiodic identity, takes months for the human infant to achieve. Grasping that the same thing is manifest in different instances over time requires additional insights. The thing is also a whole. To understand it as a whole we face greater challenges because we need to enter an explanatory framework. The understanding of it as a whole can be implicit, as it could be in the botanist’s understanding of a plant. Or it can be explicit as in the philosopher’s understanding of a whole as such. It is to the latter realm that we will turn to understand the thing as a whole. Lonergan notes that the notion of the thing is ambiguous.² As we shall see, so is the notion of structure and the corresponding notion of whole. That ambiguity is evident in his notion of development where a prior integration brings forth the conditions for the subsequent integration, which in turn comes into being via the law of effect. The organism is a whole, but it is not a fully integrated system. This lack of total integration constitutes the openness of structure, which accounts for the flexibility we experience in our self-transcendence. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this is to start with a comparison of Structuralism’s notion of structure and Lonergan’s of a functional whole.

STRUCTURE AND WHOLES

Levi-Strauss provides three aspects of structures.

First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system. It is made up of several elements, none of which can undergo a change without effecting changes in all the other elements.

Second, for any given model there should be a possibility of ordering a series of transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type.

²Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 106.

Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react if one or more to its elements are submitted to certain modifications.³

If we consider structural transformations as systematic, then we could conceive of development as fully systematic where a prior state causes the next via a set of operations. These operations may be supplanted by the next stage, but the link between them and the subsequent stage is fixed. Development in this sense approaches a cybernetic model.

Lonergan distinguishes a whole as a collection from a functional whole. As a collection it can be an aggregate that is arbitrary or conventional. A quart of milk is conventional since as a measure one can consider it as divided into parts arbitrarily. The milk itself is a mixture. As such it is a collection or aggregate of different types of entities. A functional whole, however, approaches Levi-Strauss's definition of structure. He notes that the whole as structure is illustrated in "...highly organized products of art and nature where every part is related to the others. Every part is just what it is because of its relations to the other parts."⁴ How are we to conceive these relations? In this account they appear to be fully interrelated.

He further characterizes the functional whole as "...constituted by mutually mediating parts."⁵ In a beautiful holistic account he notes:

The respiratory system supplies fresh oxygen not merely to the lungs, but to the whole body. The digestive system supplies nutrition not merely to the digestive tract but to the whole body. The nervous system supplies control not merely to the nervous system but to the whole body. And the muscles supply locomotion not merely to the muscles but to the whole

³Claude Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (Harper Collins, 1963), 279. Structuralism views structures either synchronically or diachronically. The synchronic view lays out the structure at a particular time while the diachronic explores the changes over time. At its most general, the synchronic would provide a model applicable to the structure at any particular time. At its most particular, it would explain its current state. Lonergan's account of cognitional structure typically is synchronic. But if we consider its development we confront dead ends, discontinuity, breakthroughs, coincidental but unrelated developments in different areas and so on. Consideration of the non-systematic requires a statistical approach and a subsequent consideration of the relating of states of mind to one another insofar as this is possible. Emergence of multiple schemes of recurrence yields states. This enables another type of "organization", the emergence of recurrent states which are functionally interrelated.

⁴Bernard Lonergan, "Philosophical Positions with Regard to Knowing," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 216.

⁵Bernard Lonergan, "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 165.

body. The result is something that has fresh oxygen and is nourished, is under control and is moving, because you have a number of immediate centers....and the centers make the whole, giving the whole all the properties of each of the centers of immediacy.⁶

Lest we think this means Lonergan think the organism is, or approaches being, a fully systematic whole, he notes that "...there are anticipatory developments that have no great utility at any particular given stage but are extremely useful later on....In other words, there is something more to the organism than mutual mediation."⁷ With this statement appears the possibility of a residue of aggregates outside the range of particular states of self-mediating centers placing the functional whole within a broader context. This broader context includes the whole as material, as potency for form which is found in the coincidental and non-systematic. Let me briefly provide three examples.

EARLY LIFE

The first regards one possibility of the form of early life. The gap between life as systematic and the non-systematic convergence of its conditions is huge. The notion of schemes of recurrence, or cyclic processes, provides some insight into emergence. If a scheme is possible where A causes B which causes C which causes D which causes A, then all that needs to happen is for any of these events to occur to initiate the scheme. Now, the scheme does not cause itself in the sense that it generates its own conditions, but it is part of the cause in that it becomes itself. Thus, emergence has two causes, the conditions for the initiation of the self-sustaining process and the process itself in its becoming. Emergence can be fully explanatory though there is a logical gap between the assembly of the conditions, the conditions as unorganized, and the resultant scheme as organized. That is an abstract account. The emergence of life probably did require the actualization of multiple schemes of recurrence which constituted its systematic elements. But the actualization is understood in terms of schedules of probabilities and all the schemes need not be interrelated. They can be independent. In that case a non-systematic model is plausible.

⁶"The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," 165.

⁷"The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," 167.

The emergence of life is not simply the emergence of schemes, but is the emergence of a whole. The most basic question is what kind of structure does the whole need to have to be self-sustaining whole. As self-sustaining, life does, in a sense, reproduce itself within itself. As reproductive it produces another. Stuart Kauffman's hypothesis regarding the form of early life revolves around the notion of sets of autocatalytic processes.⁸

Autocatalytic sets produce the biochemicals needed for their own operations. These would be structures of interrelated bio-chemical processes which recurrently replicate states of polymers sufficient to maintain existence as a whole. In this case we need to shift from a consideration of schemes of recurrence where the schemes are linked sets of events to the recurrences of non-systematic states yielded by the processing of sets of independent schemes of recurrence. The notion of a whole as having recurrent non-systematic states is compatible with a unity of independent recurrent processes yielding results in the context of a schedule of probabilities. It is this notion which underlies Kauffman's hypothesis of the origin of life consisting not in the emergence of a self-replicating entity embodying complex strands of DNA, but of a bound set of biochemical processes open to the environment that maintain a threshold of cycles of reactions that maintain existence within a range of states and that self-replicate. The states can be cyclic while not being fully systematic. There is enough order to maintain existence and to replicate and enough "disorder" to permit adaptation. His working hypothesis is that organisms exist "...on the edge of chaos."⁹

DEVELOPMENT

The second example is found in Lonergan's account of development. As a succession of integrations the form of the organism at any one time is an integration of parts, which themselves can be integrations. In the discussion of development in *Insight*, this higher integration is characterized as a higher system

⁸"We reach a new and fundamental conclusion: for any fixed probability of catalysis P , autocatalytic sets must become possible at some fixed complexity level of numbers of kinds of polymers. The achievement of the catalytic closure required for self-reproduction is an emergent collective property in any sufficiently complex set of catalytic polymers." Stuart A Kauffman, *The Origins of Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 310.

⁹Kauffman, *The Origins of Order*, 30, provides a general account using chaos theory. The metaphysical view does not require considering any particular types of distributions (i.e., strange attractors) but notes only that a statistical understanding is required.

which fulfills the two major roles of being the operator of development and the integrator at each developmental stage. Development is from lower to higher integrations. It is not fully systematic. First, the operator is an upwardly directed, but indeterminate, dynamism. Second, the operator as bringing forth the conditions for the higher integration "...provokes the underlying instability."¹⁰ The higher integration occurs not deterministically, but via the law of effect. "The law of effect states that the ground of functioning advances to a new ground of functioning where functioning occurs successfully."¹¹ The higher integration is conditioned and is itself a *de facto* accomplishment. This indicates that it could be different. If the operator of development in moving from one stage to another is understood as the "assembling of conditions" and if these conditions come from parallel, unintegrated processes, then the "operator" is diffuse and non-systematic. As in our prior example it is conceivable that there can be schemes of recurrence that operate concurrently but in relative isolation from one another producing independent results which provide the aggregate, or set of conditions, for the emergence of a possible range of structures or integrations. In these instances, development is the exploitation by organisms of the key evolutionary event, emergence. While evolution relies on large numbers and long periods of time for significant change to occur, development manages large numbers within short periods of time. This is because the organism assembles its own conditions for emergence within a constrained environment. There is no reliance on the chance occurrence of the conditions, and there is a limitation of the possible interactions the conditions can have.

NEURAL STRUCTURE

A third example is found in the development of neural networks. If we consider that sensory-motor behavior became conscious with the emergence of the first neural network, then the evolution of the brain and consciousness both occurred with the evolutionary differentiation of functions and increasing complexity of behavior. Specialized neural networks evolved to enable more complex behavior.¹²

¹⁰Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 490.

¹¹*Insight*, 492.

¹²It is possible that consciousness was a quality immanent in the original neural networks. Its emergence was coincident to the interrelated firing of neurons. We find primitive networks today

Using Edelman's model as a working hypothesis, we find that neural function which underlies perception and behavior relies on neuronal groups which map complexly to one another constituting a primary repertoire of operations. This repertoire is dynamically structured via mappings of neural activity across the groups. It is refined via the development of mappings. This occurs via a selective process where the degree of neural activity determines which mappings develop via both enlargement, by incorporating more neurons, and facilitation. Induced by the activation of neurons, facilitation results from individual neurons creating more synapses increasing the likelihood of innervating their other neuronal contacts. These changes facilitate the reoccurrence of similar patterned activity. The neuronal refinements support the secondary repertoire. Since the instigating aggregate can be exogenous as in sensing or endogenous as in hormonal changes, the model can be used to explain sensing as well as biologically based behavioral development. The primary repertoire is illustrated by a baby's ability to move their fingers and to grasp objects at birth. The secondary repertoire is illustrated in the development of fine motor coordination.¹³

Edelman's notion of the degeneracy of neuronal groups is similar to the notion of equipotentiality. Neuronal groups need to be of sufficient size to manage multiple complex mappings of activity. For example the visual system has to have sufficient complexity to distinguish an indeterminate range of possible objects where many may not have been seen before. This requires supporting large numbers of combinatorial possibilities. The neuronal group as a part of the primary repertoire is a set of neurons, any one of which can become

in jellyfish. The simplest has two types of neurons. The first type is sensitive and the second is motor. They are directly connected to each other. An incipient intentionality is immanent in this primitive network as the sensitive neurons are related to what is other and the motor neurons permit transformation of the organism and its behavior in terms of the other as mediated via the sensitive neurons. The next most complex network has neurons between the sensing and motor neurons permitting self mediation of sensitivity and movement. Rather than terminating directly on motor neurons, sensory neurons terminated on the intermediate ones which in turn innervate the motor neurons. Thus, the intermediate neural net emerged which led to the evolution of the brain. Since the state of these operations can be conditioned by what is not the organism, the other as mediated via the senses, there is an analogical structure linking the organism and the other. Since the neural net can also "sense itself", it can organize itself in terms of its own state, which encompasses the state of the other for it. This enables the organization of movements in terms both of the other and of the state of the organism itself. The analogical relation between birds' movements and the building of a nest would be a sophisticated example of this.

Minimally, in the case of the initial neural networks motor patterns could vary based on sensory patterns. The sensory patterns also would vary based on motor activity. Given this, it makes sense that the evolution of the brain and the evolution of behavior are linked.

¹³Gerald M. Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind* (Harper Collins, 1992), 83-85.

specific to the mapping of one of a range of mappings. Since they have no specific function, they are “degenerate”. This is akin to the notion of neo-natalism in evolution where the former ontogenic development is arrested permitting the subsequent specification of function at a later time. The neuronal group, then, supports a bound indeterminacy of operations. The degeneracy of the group enables the development of the secondary repertoire via the further structuring of activity at the neuronal level. The recurrence of similar patterns is facilitated through the development of connections (i.e. synapses) between neurons. It cannot totally explain it because this type of processing enables multiple states but does not determine what those states are. The specification of the secondary repertoire can partially explain development, learning, memory and other operations.¹⁴

Combinations of neurons map to operations. There is an indeterminate number of possible combinations that are limited via constraints. Consider the network of motor neurons that enables the coordination of hand movements. The motor neural network is an “organizer of the hand”, but it cannot organize independently of its materials. The range of positions is dependent on the structure of the muscles, bones, tendons and so on in the hand. Though there are limitations, the range of combinations is very large. Consider the finger positions required to play all musical instruments, for example. We find a similar situation with vision. Due to the matrical neural relations and the combinations they support, the visual system can support a bound “indeterminacy” of visual experience. First, there are more than a million rods and cones in the eye. Second, they are specialized in terms of function, creating more possibilities for sets of combinations. Third, they interact with an elaborate set of neural structures for further processing and for integration with other neural modes giving us the potential to see all possible movies or all possible sunsets.

These considerations support an operational model for memory. For example, we could have a set of elements, or neural operations, which are dynamically structured in complex patterns to support a virtual infinity of possible memories. Different memories can emerge at different times from the same complex due to different combinations within the complex. Memories, then, would not be stored, but would emerge. As described memories would simply be specifications of the network. However, if new memories are formed via the introduction of new patterning to the network, then there needs to be the potency to embody a new

¹⁴Gerald M. Edelman, *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection* (Harper Collins, 1987), 67-68.

pattern via “rewiring” of the network. The hypothesis is that this is done via the growth of new synapses which is related to the frequency of the concurrent firing of the neurons. The growth of new synapses facilitates the synchronized firing in the future.

IMPLICATIONS

We have looked at three instances where the organism is not fully systematic. Development of the first would show how life in its inception and evolution embodies the non-systematic. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that it is intrinsic to life and enables evolution to select for increasingly flexible organisms. Reflection on the evolution of development would show how the potential for evolutionary variation extends beyond mutations to every situation where there is organic adaptation to the variable “internal” and “external” milieus. It also would show how evolutionary differentiation occurs within the context of wholes just as development is a process of differentiation and integration within a whole. Reflection on the third would provide a neural model for learning and subsequent modification of behavior during the life cycle. At its term it would provide the neural conditions for intelligence.

With the evolution of intelligence major modification to current and invention of new behavioral cycles need not rely on evolution, but on the organism itself. This involves neural processing which is enabling rather than causal. For example, the mere difference of signs permits them to be meaningfully arranged, since they are not constitutive of their meaning. Speech involves signs and expression. Neural processing (along with physiological structures) is constitutive of expression, but it does not determine its meaning. Rather it enables the expression of any meaning we can conceptualize. We have a hint here of how intelligent consciousness is neurally conditioned but transcendental. Combined with a further understanding of the potency of neural processes as conscious, the possibility arises of understanding how the emergence of form became a matter of the moment of insight, respecting, but transcending the limitations immanent in both evolution and development in its achievement.

ON THE VALIDITY OF EXTRINSIC CAUSALITY IN PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Paul St. Amour
Saint Joseph's University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

OVER FIFTY YEARS ago Lonergan attempted to respond to “the widely diffused contemporary view that the existence of God cannot be proved.”¹ The emergence and popular acceptance in the last decade of a so-called new atheism seems to indicate that this view has not receded, but rather is steadily consolidating its status as an unquestioned cultural assumption.² At this point, the polemic seems not so much to pertain to the cogency of this or that particular proof for the existence of God, as to place into doubt the very *possibility*, in principle, of offering any kind of *rational* grounds for affirming God’s existence.

The core of Lonergan’s own argument for the existence of God is found in section 10 of chapter 19 of *Insight*: “If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists.”³ I would like to focus in this particular paper however, not directly on that proof, but rather upon the prior philosophical issue that Lonergan was attempting to work through in section 8 of chapter 19. Lonergan acknowledged that the hypothetical premise of his main argument “If the real is completely intelligible, God exists” was at root “a variant on the appeal to causality.”⁴ He was also well aware that in the modern

¹Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1992), 697.

²Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens are widely regarded as representative of the new atheism.

³*Insight*, 695.

⁴Bernard Lonergan, “The General Character of the Natural Theology of *Insight*,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*, vol. 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard*

philosophical context, the appeal to causality, especially insofar as it involves any transcendent application, had been rendered theoretically problematic. So section 8, appropriately enough, is simply titled "Causality." At issue in that section is the normativity of our human exigence for complete intelligibility, the range of applicability of causal reasoning, the ultimate interpretation of contingency, and the validity of any and all causal arguments for the existence of God – some fundamental issues to say the least.

CONTINGENCY AS OCCASIONING "A VERY FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION"⁵

The *question* of God arises from the apprehension of contingency. The notion of contingency (roughly speaking, at this point) concerns the non-necessary, the arbitrary, the random, the given, the thrown, the absurd, the mere matter of fact, the mysterious thing you were on to when the grown-ups or the positivists or the idealists told you to stop asking those kinds of questions. Speaking more precisely, contingency is apprehended whenever our exigence for complete intelligibility remains unsatisfied, not because it has been unable to understand and judge, but precisely because it has done so, yet has been unable to discern *why* what it knows to be the case should be as it is, rather than some other way. One may wonder why some particular thing exists, or ask why some particular event occurred. One may pose the question universally and ponder "Why does *anything* exist? Why does *anything* occur?"⁶ One may come to know classical and statistical laws, but wonder why this universe has this *particular* set of laws, rather than some other possible set. Cosmological, geological, biological, and human history are also permeated with contingency. Our own individual lives, and even the very fact that we exist, are inextricably conditioned by these histories. One may wonder then, why did *this* event or sequence of events occur, rather than some other in the seemingly infinite manifold of continuously diverging possibilities? Finally, self-appropriation leads to the affirmation that I

Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), 5.

⁵Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, vol. 5 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990), 243.

⁶"The General Character of the Natural Theology of *Insight*," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*, 9. Emphasis added.

am, *de facto*, a knower of being. Yet this only sets up another fundamental philosophical problem: If we are not knowers of being necessarily, but merely as a contingent fact, how or why have the ontological conditions for the isomorphism of knower and known mysteriously fallen into place to make this possible?⁷

Even more precisely, to recognize contingency is to reach the virtually unconditioned in judgment, to apprehend *that* the conditions for rational affirmation have *de facto* been fulfilled, but to go beyond this to raise further questions about *why* the conditions have been fulfilled. And very often, satisfying answers to these further questions are extremely difficult or impossible find. Questions which ask *why* fulfilled conditions have been fulfilled are inherently questions about causality; they intend some cause as their answer.

Questions concerning causes are not rare. Every day just about everyone will pose many questions that intend a cause. But it is also possible to inquire, in a generalized and philosophical manner, into the possibility of a complete or ultimate causal explanation that would ground all contingency universally. One may wonder: Can the contingency of the world be fully explained without an appeal to brute facts, that is, without abandoning the rational exigence for complete intelligibility? This question presses up against the limitations of human knowing, and it fathoms the depths of the known. It is equally a question that regards the existence of God. Can the contingency of the universe of proportionate being be rendered fully intelligible by the sublation of a causal explanation? And if so, what is the source of that explanation? Is it to be had merely by appealing to a philosophy restricted to proportionate being and/or to empirical science, even some hypothetical fully developed science of the distant future? Or, would the ultimate causal explanation of contingency require affirmation of a transcendent being?

EXTRINSIC CAUSALITY

Lonergan draws a distinction among different types of causality. He clarifies that questions concerning contingency, that is, questions concerning the fulfillment of conditions for existence and occurrence, anticipate employment not of what he

⁷See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972; reprint ed., Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1979), 101-103.

termed “intrinsic causality,” but rather of “extrinsic causality.” *Intrinsic causality* is formal causality. Metaphysically, it concerns questions which specify central and conjugate potency, form, and act. It is the type of causality operative in the empirical sciences as they raise and attempt to answer questions concerning the intelligibility immanent in data of sense. By *extrinsic causality* Lonergan means exemplary, efficient, and final causality (or, more accurately, his own gnoseological transposition of these classicist terms). As a concrete example of extrinsic causality, Lonergan offers the following:

A community may be divided by a river and see in a bridge the solution to many of its problems; an engineer will examine the site and design an appropriate structure; finally contractors will assemble laborers and materials to build it. The final cause in this case will be the use to which the bridge is put by the community; the efficient cause will be the work of building it; the exemplary cause will be the design grasped and conceived by the engineer.⁸

Extrinsic causality is a principle of human thinking routinely employed in anthropological contexts of all sorts. For the most part it is a helpful and epistemologically unproblematic heuristic. Anyone who wonders why that bridge exists could be told about the need, purpose, or use of the bridge; about the building of the bridge; and/or about its design and planning. Exemplary causality is clearly evident in human inventions. Efficient causality is evident in human industry. Final causality is evident in the purposeful use to which we put the products of invention and industry.⁹ The question at hand however, is whether extrinsic causality has any legitimate applicability other than within anthropological contexts of this sort.

Arguments from analogy are only valid to the extent that the terms of the analogy are sufficiently similar in all relevant respects. Lonergan is well aware of this, and he does not commit the philosophically naïve error of simply *assuming* that the kind of inferences we apply in the context of analyzing human action are also applicable to the contingent universe as a whole. He acknowledges that an argument is required; after the bridge example he states: “However, one may *not assume* that the universe is just like a bridge, and so if one is to affirm efficient, final, and exemplary causality *as generally valid principles*, one must go to the

⁸*Insight*, 674-75.

⁹*Insight*, 675.

root of these notions and determine whether or not they are of general validity.”¹⁰ This is the task of section 8 of *Insight*, chapter 19. There Lonergan is raising “the question of the universal validity of extrinsic causality.”¹¹ Can extrinsic causality be applied to the contingent universe as a whole? Can extrinsic causality serve as a principle of valid inference effecting a transition from knowledge of proportionate being to knowledge of transcendent being? Is it possible to argue from contingency, that is, from various facts about the world which exhibit certain defects of intelligibility, by means of causal inference, to a sufficient cause beyond the world? Or, to the contrary, would any transcendent application, any employment of extrinsic causality beyond an anthological context, constitute an illegitimate extension? “That is a very fundamental question.”¹²

CAUSALITY IN THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT

In a 1967 lecture at the University of Chicago, Lonergan stated of his *Insight* 19 proof that “substantially this argument is quite traditional, but it differs from the old proofs of the existence of God. . . to meet later developments.”¹³ Yet *Insight* 19 never specifies in any precise manner what those later developments were. There can be little doubt however, given the intent of the rest of that book, that Lonergan was attempting to engage the modern scientific and philosophical contexts, and the challenges these presented to a rapidly unraveling classicist worldview.

While in the medieval context Aquinas had employed the Aristotelian four causes with remarkable fruitfulness in his “five ways,” the understanding of causality would undergo tremendous alteration with the emergence of modern empirical science and with modern philosophical reflections upon the epistemological conditions for the possibility of science. These new understandings of causality would be more recalcitrant to application in proofs for the existence of God.

With the emergence of classical heuristic method in thinkers such as Galileo and Newton, there was effected a transition from the scholastic emphasis on

¹⁰*Insight*, 675. Emphasis added.

¹¹*Understanding and Being*, 242.

¹²*Understanding and Being*, 243.

¹³“General Character of the Natural Theology of *Insight*,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*, 5.

causality to a new emphasis upon *correlation*. Modern scientific understanding would seek implicit definitions of explanatory terms, mathematically expressible in invariant correlations, that would be amenable to empirical verification.¹⁴ While classicists would lament the resulting loss of the Aristotelian four causes, the de-emphasis upon causality in general, and the apparent conflation of causality (insofar as it remained relevant) to mere efficient causality, it is important to note that Lonergan did not place himself in this camp. In chapters 2 through 5 of *Insight* there can be found no nostalgic looking back. To the contrary, what we find there is a thorough and nuanced attempt to understand and appreciate the fruitfulness, the complementarity, and the inherent limitations of classical and statistical methods. Lonergan clearly considers the transition to post-Aristotelian science to be normative, and he strongly affirms the methodological autonomy of empirical science. Through an extended historical self-correcting process, the community of scientists had gradually worked out the methodical exigencies of their desire to know; it would no longer be the metaphysician's business to tell the scientists how to do their work. As specified by the "canon of relevance" the work of science would be an "empirical inquiry [that] primarily aims at reaching the intelligibility immanent in the immediate data of sense."¹⁵

The quest for immanent intelligibility generated a new and properly scientific notion of causality, a causality that would be "internal" rather than "extrinsic," that would be expressed in lawful correlations rather than in inferences concerning agency or purpose, that is, efficient or final causality.¹⁶ Concomitant with this shift there occurred a methodological separation of science from both metaphysics and theology – disciplines which had been distinguished, but not separated, in the medieval period. The separation was in large part simply a consequence of methodological incompatibilities that came to light as the scientific community gradually articulated a prohibition of non-empirically-verifiable causes from inclusion in scientific theories. The separation was implicit

¹⁴See *Insight*, 60-70; Joseph Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 46-65.

¹⁵*Insight*, 100.

¹⁶*Understanding and Being*, 242-43. While the canon of relevance does marginalize final, material, instrumental, and efficient causality, removing these from the core to the periphery of pure science, Lonergan suggests that (given the proper qualifications) classical laws might be interpreted and appreciated as a legitimate new heuristic that intends *formal* causality. It is significant to note that this differs from the more prevalent view that modern science had effectively renounced formal causality to focus exclusively on efficient causality. See *Insight*, 101.

in Newton's *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, yet Lonergan identifies Laplace as the one who really drove the point home. While thinkers even of the caliber of Descartes and Newton had on occasion appealed to divine attributes or agency in certain of their scientific hypotheses, when Napoleon took Laplace to task for never even mentioning the author of the universe in his book *Mécanique céleste*, Laplace retorted "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis."¹⁷

Many theists have found Laplace's remark troubling, for it proleptically demarcated the separation of theology and philosophy from science, boldly asserted the independence of scientific rationality, and seemed to exclude divine agency from involvement in the natural order. If the recent interest in the Intelligent Design movement is any indication, this reaction is not simply a thing of the past. Lonergan, however, can not be counted among those theists troubled by the independence of modern empirical science.

The value of Lonergan's thought on this important issue is difficult to overestimate, for he incisively and judiciously identifies the issue as one of methodology, and nothing more. The exclusion of occult causes from empirical science is entirely normative and has been tremendously fruitful. Lonergan expressed this exclusion in his account of the "canon of selection," which states that "empirical method prescind from all questions and answers that do not involve distinctive sensible consequences; and it discards all that involve such consequences logically yet fail to be confirmed by the results of observation or experiment."¹⁸ Taken merely as a methodological statement, this maxim is hardly objectionable. The situation only becomes problematic when methodological naturalism is construed as ontological naturalism, when the scientific worldview is twisted into scientism, when proponents of what Charles Taylor terms an "exclusive humanism" assert the extra-scientific opinion that science is the only adequate epistemic horizon. It is one thing, rightly, to claim that science will be bounded by a methodological naturalism. But it is quite another to claim that what science so-bounded discloses will be co-extensive with the real. By effectively confining the issue to methodology, and by so clearly stating the canon of selection as a prescinding from questions that are beyond the competence of empirical method, Lonergan effectively safeguards both science and the

¹⁷Eric T. Bell, *Men of Mathematics* (New York: Dover Publications, 1937, reprinted 1961), 181, cited in Lonergan, "The General Character of the Natural Theology of *Insight*," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*, 5, n 4.

¹⁸*Insight*, 94.

legitimacy of extra-scientific modes of knowing. His critique of scientism is incisive:

Questions that do not satisfy the canon of selection do not arise within the confines of empirical science, but it does not follow immediately that they do not arise at all. Issues that cannot be settled by observation or experiment cannot be settled by empirical method, but it does not follow immediately that they cannot be settled at all.¹⁹

HUME ON CAUSALITY

While the methodological transition from causality to correlation and the exclusion of non-empirically verifiable causes from consideration in scientific explanations contributed to the normative development of modern science, the failure to appropriate the new-found independence of scientific rationality precisely as a *methodological* achievement contributed to the emergence of scientism and its attending cultural ramifications. To focus specifically upon the issue at hand, I would like to examine how the project of philosophical theology was rendered implausible in the modern context by examining arguments advanced by David Hume and Immanuel Kant that explicitly deny the validity of any application of causality in arguments for the existence of God.

We begin with a brief overview of Hume's account of causality. Hume divided the objects of human reason into what he called "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact," a distinction corresponding roughly to Kantian *a priori* analytic and *a posteriori* synthetic judgments respectively. The former, relations of ideas, were comprised of mathematics and "every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain," that is, tautologies. The latter, matters of fact, include affirmations made, not on the basis any demonstrable necessity, but rather on the basis of what can be sensed or remembered. Matters of fact must meet a criterion of empirical givenness.

The mind is not limited however, merely to contents that are (or have been) empirically made present. Hume acknowledged that we also *reason* concerning matters of fact, that we make inference from present or past matters of fact to other matters of fact not directly present to us. Such inferences are possible on the

¹⁹*Insight*, 95.

basis of the ideas of cause and effect, and Hume sought to give an empiricist account of how such causal inferences were possible.

Causal inferences seem *prima facie* to involve a kind of rational intuition into the essential inner “power” of things, and a grasp of the “necessary connection” obtaining between events as a consequence of those powers. The cause necessarily leads to the effect due to the essential powers of the cause. This was the prevailing rationalist notion of causality that Hume sought to undermine. He argued that we do not know cause and effect by reasoning *a priori* and that the mind unassisted by extensive experience is incapable of making causal inferences.

In support of this, Hume argued that it would be impossible, upon encountering an unfamiliar object for the first time, to predict what that object would cause to happen. “When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object...”²⁰ Adam, for example, who had nothing wrong with his intellect, “could not have inferred from the fluidity, and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him.”²¹ Likewise, anyone experiencing for the first time a pile of gunpowder, or a magnet, or a strange and unfamiliar tool, would be utterly at a loss to predict what effects these things would cause. In short, the mind unassisted by experience can have no knowledge of cause and effect.

On empiricist principles, all ideas must ultimately be grounded either in outward sense or inward sentiment. Any idea that can not be so-grounded is not an idea at all, and is to be rejected as meaningless. The necessary connection entailed by the idea of causality however, is never given in experience. Even repeated experience of the same outcome does not demonstrate a *necessity* of that outcome. It seems then, that the idea of causality must be rejected as meaningless, for in experience all we can affirm is that “one event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*.”²²

Having brought causality to the brink, Hume generously attempted to salvage causality from the scrapheap of meaningless ideas by offering an alternative interpretation that would situate causality on an empiricist footing. Although

²⁰David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 50.

²¹Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 17.

²²Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 49.

necessary connection can never be affirmed in experience, however extensive it may be, the *repeated experience* of observing a *constant conjunction* of contiguous things or successive events leads one, as a matter of habit or custom, to begin to call one the cause, and the other the effect. One sees the fire and feels the heat, and begins to associate the two, calling the fire the cause of the heat. It is on the basis of such associations, and on that alone, that we make causal inferences. My repeated association of fire with heat, for example, allows me to make the useful inference that if I stick my hand into this fire, it will probably cause my hand to feel hot. But it is not because I understand the nature of fire that I can make this inference. For Hume, causal inference is nothing more than a matter of psychological association. "The mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist."²³

HUME'S SKEPTICISM REGARDING CAUSAL ARGUMENTS IN GENERAL

Hume considered his critique of causal reasoning to be evidence "of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding."²⁴ He had argued, compellingly to many, that causal reasoning is at root not rational. "Causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience."²⁵ The Aristotelian notion that causal inferences are grounded in an objective understanding of the nature things was, on Hume's account, unjustified. Prior to experience we have no idea what effects are to be expected. Repeated experience of a *constant conjunction* of A followed by B leads us *to suppose*, by dint of habit, that there exists a *necessary connection* of B to A. But, Hume argued, it is merely the repeated association of B with A that leads us *to call* A the cause, and B the effect. We can not *know* whether or not there obtains a necessary connection between A and B. Any number of observed instances of repeated conjunction does not justify affirmation of a necessary connection, mainly because the purported necessity of the connection is not itself something that can be observed. What we gain with repeated experience of conjunction is not any deepening of

²³Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 50.

²⁴Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 51.

²⁵Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 17.

our understanding, but rather a more vivid *feeling* that there must be a connection between the conjoined things or events. What changes with experience is merely this feeling. Consistent with that recognition, Hume provided the following definition of a cause. A cause is “an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other.”²⁶ Hence what is most deeply at work in our supposed causal reasoning is really nothing more than a psychological principle of association.

Once this is recognized we must come to terms with the fact that our causal reasoning is not ultimately about the objective world, but rather merely about the subjective and habitual patterning of our own ideas – ideas which may, for all we know, be far from isomorphic with the world as it actually is. Although Hume recognized that we could hardly go on living our daily lives without employing the ideas of cause and effect, and suggested that the notion of causality be kept ready to hand for its undeniable pragmatic utility, the upshot of his critique was that any speculative assertions made on behalf of causal reasoning must be counteracted by a heavy dose skepticism. The terms “cause” and “effect” may be retained, but they are to be interpreted in a nominalistic rather than an ontological manner. Insofar as causal reasoning is generative of metaphysics and philosophical theology, these projects should be abandoned. Thus the final lines of Hume’s *Enquiry* read:

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.²⁷

HUME ON THE INVALIDITY OF CAUSAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

As cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God are invariably *causal* arguments, we are now in a position to consider the

²⁶Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 51.

²⁷Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 114. Hume’s emphasis.

ramifications of Hume's empiricist re-interpretation of causality for such arguments.

First, if on empiricist principles the idea of causality is to be regarded as meaningful only insofar as it is grounded in the repeated experience of constant conjunctions of things or events, any argument that asserts God to be the cause of the universe would be invalid for the simple reason that we have no experience whatsoever of God creating anything even once, let alone repeatedly, as would be required to induce the feeling of necessary connection that leads us to posit a cause.²⁸

Second, Hume not only undermines the metaphysical notion of causality by interpreting causal inferences in all particular cases as merely customary, but he also employs this interpretation to critique the seemingly incontrovertible principle that *whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence*. While the principle is purported to be intuitively certain, Hume argues that "all certainty arises from the comparison of ideas," that is, that certainty can not be had in any propositions save those that Kant would later term *a priori analytic*.²⁹ As the proposition that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence is not an analytic proposition however, it is not a proposition about which we can be intuitively certain.

Nor is the principle philosophically demonstrable. The only way to demonstrate that every thing that exists must have a cause would be to demonstrate that it is impossible for any thing to exist without some cause. But Hume, following Descartes, takes clear and distinct ideas to be the criterion of possibility.³⁰ He then argues that it is "easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle."³¹ As it is not impossible for the imagination to clearly and distinctly imagine something existent without relation

²⁸Aquinas recognized this problem in his own way when he acknowledged that a valid demonstration for the existence of God could not proceed *a priori*, i.e., from cause to effect. He got around the difficulty however, simply by offering various arguments *a posteriori*, from effect to cause, which is possible when the effects are better known to us than the cause. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 2, 2.

²⁹David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. by D. C. Yalde-Thompson (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1951), 199.

³⁰Lonergan advanced a critical realism in which the real is not coterminous with the sensible or the imaginable, but rather with the rationally verifiable. Hume's presupposition that clear and distinct ideas are the criterion of possibility is susceptible to Lonergan's critique of naïve realism with its denial that knowing must be analogous to ocular vision, however clear or distinct.

³¹Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, 200.

to a cause, so too it can not be apodictically demonstrated that this would be impossible in actuality, for “it implies no contradiction nor absurdity.”³²

If the general principle that whatever begins to exist must have a cause is neither intuitively certain nor philosophically demonstrable, how then does this principle arise and enter so strongly into our beliefs? Here Hume reverts to his account of causality in particular cases. It is merely custom that leads us to expect that all things and events must have a cause, and to suppose, on the basis of nothing more rigorous than psychological habit, that there can be no uncaused things or events. We have therefore, no epistemic justification for asserting that there is any objective or metaphysical necessity that every beginning of existence must have a cause.³³

Hume’s critique, if sound, would be devastating to the project of philosophical theology, as all cosmological proofs for the existence of God explicitly or tacitly presuppose the necessity of a causal principle. In *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hume’s interlocutor Cleanthes rejects the cosmological argument as expressed by Demea, employing Hume’s critique to do so.

Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.³⁴

Thirdly, to whatever extent that the acknowledgement of contingency should seem to require affirmation of some necessary being, our lack of knowledge concerning both the essence of God and the inner powers of nature gives us no justification for leaping to the conclusion that necessary existence is to be attributed to the former rather than to the latter. Hume suggests that we have just as much reason to suppose that the material universe itself might be the necessary existent Being, if there must be such a being.³⁵ To one who insists upon the

³²Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, 200.

³³It is ironic that Hume can not justify his own theory in terms of his own theory, for his account of the origin of beliefs was indeed quite original, and by no means merely a matter of custom. Hume, of course, prescinds from the deeper demands of self-appropriation, and so is spared from recognizing the performative inconsistency entailed by his own intelligence and reasonableness.

³⁴David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 55.

³⁵Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 56.

alternative, that God must necessarily exist, Hume points out that this could only be due to “some unknown, inconceivable qualities which can make his non-existence impossible...: And no reason can be assigned why these qualities may not belong to matter.”³⁶

Fourthly, in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hume also critiqued teleological proofs for the existence of God. Such arguments are essentially arguments from analogy. As the artifacts of human craft are unmistakably made for some deliberate purpose, and by some intelligent agent, so too the universe as a whole, likewise wisely constructed, reasonably can be affirmed to be dependent upon final, efficient, and exemplary causality. Hume scoffed at such arguments: “Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order of arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore, the universe could not attain its order and arrangement without something similar to human art.”³⁷

More precisely, he argued that the argument from analogy inherent in all teleological proofs is logically fallacious insofar as it employs knowledge about the *parts* to reach a conclusion about the *whole*, a whole which, for the little we know, may be extremely different from the parts. The main “part” from which we extrapolate in such arguments is none other than human thought. Hume speaks of human thought as if it were just another part of the universe, and perhaps a fairly insignificant part at that.

Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?³⁸

Hume questions whether it is legitimate to make inferences about the cause of the entire universe on the basis of something seemingly as parochial and quotidian as

³⁶Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 56.

³⁷Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 20.

³⁸Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 19.

our own peculiar human way of thinking about our own motivation, planning, and activity when we do things like build bridges. His charge is quite simply that philosophical moves of this sort are blatantly *anthropomorphic*. "What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call 'thought,' that we must make it the model of the whole universe?"³⁹

KANT ON CAUSALITY AND CAUSAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Kant clearly recognized that Hume's interpretation of causality, and his skepticism more generally, were incompatible not only with metaphysics and natural theology, but also with Newtonian physics. Motivated clearly more by the latter than the former, Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* attempted to overcome skepticism by explicating the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. In the process he elevated causality to a status seemingly more noble than had been assigned to it by Hume, who in Kant's words, had reduced the notion to "a mere phantom of the brain."⁴⁰ While Hume had regarded causality as nothing more than a psychological habit enforced by repeated experience, Kant argued that causality was an *a priori* category of pure reason. As one of the three categories of relation, causality synthesizes and unifies the manifold of sense intuition by formally making possible phenomena in which there can be apprehended relations of causal dependence.

Kant also claimed to have restored the *necessity*, and thereby the *rationality*, of causal relations by insisting that causality was not derivable *a posteriori*, from experience. Rather, as an *a priori* category of pure reason, causality was *eo ipso* a condition for the very possibility of experience. Hence he writes: "To the synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity which cannot be empirically expressed, namely, that the effect not only succeeds upon the cause, but that it is posited *through* it and arises *out of* it."⁴¹

Kant's critique however, was not merely of skepticism, but also of speculative dogmatism; and while his restoration of causality as a rational principle may have made the world safe for Newtonian physics, the same could not be said for

³⁹Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 19.

⁴⁰Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), 125.

⁴¹Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 125.

metaphysics. Drawing upon Leibniz's proof *a contingentia mundi* as his main exemplar of the cosmological argument, Kant offered the following account of the general form of arguments from contingency:⁴²

If we admit something as existing, no matter what this something may be, we must also admit that there is something which exists *necessarily*. For the contingent exists only under the condition of some other contingent existence as its cause, and from this again we must infer yet another cause, until we are brought to a cause which is not contingent, and which is therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument upon which reason bases its advance to the primordial being.⁴³

Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof (and this would also extend to the physio-theological proofs insofar as they too are causal arguments) is quite simply that it involves a transcendental application of the category of causality. While the categories of pure reason are indeed constitutive of phenomena when applied in sense intuition, Kant argues in the *Transcendental Dialectic* that the categories can have no constitutive function whatsoever beyond their application to sense intuition. Any transcendent use of the categories produces – not knowledge of transcendent or noumenal objects – but merely “transcendental illusion.” Reason “stretches its wings in vain in thus attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power of speculation.”⁴⁴

While (in contrast to Hume's position) the premise that every contingent being has a cause is indeed applicable as applied to sense experience, this proposition loses all meaning once it is cut loose from application to sense experience. “The principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed.”⁴⁵ However natural or customary this tendency to extend our employment of the principle of causality, any transcendent application inevitably results in sophistical reasoning. Kant reiterates: “All laws governing the transition from effects to causes, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge, refer to

⁴²Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 508.

⁴³Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 496.

⁴⁴Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 500.

⁴⁵Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 511.

nothing but possible experience, and therefore solely to objects of the sensible world, and apart from them can have no meaning whatsoever.”⁴⁶

For Kant, the God at whom we arrive in the conclusion of philosophical proofs is nothing more than “a mere creature of (our) own thought.”⁴⁷ He suggests that “we flatter ourselves”⁴⁸ in presuming to have arrived at such a goal, and he speaks of “the unjustified self-satisfaction of reason”⁴⁹ in its presumption to have attained the unconditioned when in fact it has merely only deluded itself by hypostatizing “what can be an idea only.”⁵⁰ While for Kant the true God was strictly noumenal, the sophisticated God of philosophical theology must be exposed as thoroughly immanentist. However necessary the existence of God may be demonstrated to be, “the concept of necessity is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it does not allow of being hypostatized as a material condition of existence”⁵¹ From here the path to Feuerbach was short.

While it is difficult to adequately convey succinctly any complex intellectual horizon, I have attempted to explicate some of the focal moments in the reappraisal of the conception of causality that occurred in the modern scientific and philosophical contexts. I have also attempted to clarify the extent to which such a reappraisal, which departed from the four-fold Aristotelian heuristic, has rendered the project of philosophical theology problematic. This was the horizon into which Lonergan was attempting to situate his own theistic existence proof. These moments, I believe, were the “later developments” in light of which Lonergan recognized that he had to depart from the far simpler path of merely repeating “the old proofs.”

CRITICAL REALISM AND CAUSALITY

This section aims 1) to question the originating problematic of Hume and Kant’s project, 2) to disclose naïve realist assumptions at the core of both Hume’s and Kant’s conceptions of causality, and 3) to clarify how Lonergan’s gnoseological transposition of causality challenges the shared assumption of Hume and Kant

⁴⁶Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 519.

⁴⁷Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 495.

⁴⁸Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 498.

⁴⁹Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 511.

⁵⁰Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 514.

⁵¹Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 518.

that causal relations must be imaginable and subjectively imposed relations of necessitation.

First, in the pivotal eleventh chapter of *Insight*, Lonergan offers two incisive remarks concerning Hume and Kant. Linked together, I believe they significantly undermine the anti-metaphysical critiques of those two geniuses. The first remark is simply this: “Kantian critique... was largely engaged in the problem of transcending Hume’s experiential atomism.”⁵² The comment is innocuous enough in itself, and fairly incontrovertible. But, linked to the following remark asserting the tenuousness of Hume’s experiential atomism itself, what results is fairly significant. “If at moments I can slip into a lotus land in which mere presentations and representations are juxtaposed or successive, still that is not my normal state. The Humean world of mere impressions comes to me *as a puzzle* to be pieced together.”⁵³ Lonergan is suggesting here that Hume’s depiction of experience is abstract and phenomenologically inaccurate. It fails to express conscious intentionality as we actually experience it in our concrete living. Self-appropriation discloses a self for whom experiential atomism is simply *not given*. This is a fairly devastating charge to level against an empiricist, against one for whom the given is nearly everything.

What then, if not atomism, *is* given in experience? The key in the passage above is that impressions come to us “as a puzzle to be pieced together.” Experience always concretely occurs within some *horizon* of memory, of anticipation, of affect, of previous understanding and judgment, of already constituted desire and commitment, and (not least) of emergent wonder. Experience is always and inextricably of that which lies open to an exigence for questioning, that is, to the desire to know. Actual questioning dynamically generates further data of consciousness (e.g., heuristic images, possibly relevant insights, questions for reflective understanding, etc.) which are no less puzzling than the sense impressions that initiated the inquiry. Insofar as the exigence for intelligibility is itself rationally affirmed as given immediately and concomitantly with experience, the phenomenological inaccuracy of experiential atomism must be acknowledged. But if experiential atomism can not be confirmed, it ceases at once to be a legitimate philosophical problem. Hume’s problematic simply evaporates, and with it, the need for a Kantian overcoming of that problematic.

⁵²*Insight*, 363.

⁵³*Insight*, 348. Emphasis added.

Second, although Kant intended to offer a solution diametrically opposed to Hume's interpretation of causality as merely customary, both Hume and Kant, in their respective considerations of this issue, tended to construe knowing along the lines of a prevalent but mistaken conception of objectivity – a view Lonergan capsulized as “taking a good look.” For Hume, the problem of causality arises due to the fact that one can not see causal relations when one takes a look. And so causality, and the necessity it entails, are not “already out there real now,” and that is a problem for an empiricist. Kant attempted to solve the problem by asserting causality to be an *a priori* category – “already *in here* real now.” And in the *Transcendental Dialectic* Kant insists that the categories are only applicable to sense intuition – that is, you have to be looking at something (or listening, touching, etc.) for the category of causality to be applicable.

Alternatively, in Lonergan's critical realism we are immediately related to the real, not by experience, not by taking a look, but rather through questioning, that is, through the intention of being. Self-appropriation discloses that “it is not true that it is from sense that our cognitional activities derive their immediate relationship to real objects; that relationship is immediate in the intention of being.”⁵⁴ On this position, the naïve realist and the idealist have more common than either would care to admit: “... it is in looking that the naïve realist finds revealed the essence of objectivity, and it is in *Anschaung* that the critical idealist places the immediate relation of cognitional activity to objects.”⁵⁵ Both the naïve realist and the idealist construe objective knowing in a manner analogous to ocular vision. They differ only on the question of whether this criterion of the real can be satisfied. The naïve realist maintains that it can, whereas the idealist maintains that it can not.⁵⁶ Lonergan challenges the ocular criterion of the real, and argues that “intellectual operations are related to sensitive operations, not by similarity, but by functional complementarity” in a conscious and intentional dynamism which intends being.⁵⁷ It is by questioning

⁵⁴Bernard Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure,” in *Collection*, vol. 4 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 218.

⁵⁵“Cognitional Structure,” in *Collection*, 218.

⁵⁶“The naïve realist correctly asserts the validity of human knowing, but mistakenly attributes the objectivity of human knowing, not to human knowing, but to some component in human knowing. The idealist, on the other hand, correctly refutes the naïve-realist claim that the whole objectivity of human knowing is found in some component of human knowing, but mistakenly concludes that human knowing does not yield valid knowledge of reality”(“Cognitional Structure,” in *Collection*, 214).

⁵⁷“Cognitional Structure,” in *Collection*, 217-18.

that human knowers are immediately related to being. Lonergan's position has radical implications for how we are to understand causality and the world as mediated by causal relations. We explore these presently, again in contrast to Hume and Kant.

Third, while both Hume and Kant assumed that causal relations must be necessary relations, I will argue on critical realist grounds that they were fundamentally mistaken in doing so. For Hume, causality could not be affirmed in matters of fact because there could be observed no *necessity* in matters of fact, only contiguity or succession. From this he reasoned that the absence of necessity entailed the absence of causality. For Kant causality becomes a category immanent in pure reason, and this makes possible synthetic *a priori* judgments that posit relations of necessity in phenomena. It is significant to note that as a consequence of this shared assumption that causality must involve a grasp of necessity, neither Hume nor Kant found it possible to affirm a universe that is *both* contingent *and* caused – which clearly our universe seems to be. In Hume's universe there is no real causality. In Kant's universe (barring the anomaly of human freedom) there is no real contingency.

Lonergan however, never was bewitched by the prevalent but mistaken assumption that causal relations must be relations of necessitation. His philosophy of science; his account of the interplay of classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods; his worldview of emergent probability – all converge to offer a decisive critique of mechanistic determinism and of reductionism, and positively, a conception of the universe in which can be rationally affirmed *both* contingency *and* causality. While these developments are certainly germane to the issue at hand, and well worth consideration in their own right, I would like to focus presently not so much upon Lonergan's methodological-ontological refutation of causal necessity, but rather upon his “gnoseological” transposition of the notion of causality and its implications.

Subsequent to the publication *Insight*, Lonergan would clarify that his chapter 19 proof hinged upon a properly philosophic notion of causality that differed both from the scholastic metaphysical notion of causality (i.e., the Aristotelian four causes) and from the scientific surrogate for causality discussed above (i.e., classical and statistical correlations).

If God's existence is to be proved, there has to be formulated a complementary, philosophic notion of causality. Within the Scholastic tradition this commonly is done by a metaphysical formulation. My own formulation is, however,gnoseological: it speaks of the complete

intelligibility of the real. It does so because, for me, a metaphysics is not first but derived from cognitional theory and epistemology.⁵⁸

This distinctive philosophic notion of causality is manifested compactly in a succinct clue that Lonergan drops at the beginning of section 8 of chapter 19: “In general, causality denotes the objective and real counterpart of the questions and further questions raised by the detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know.”⁵⁹ While he does not explicate the matter any further in *Insight*, it is clear that Lonergan intends to give causality a cognitional theoretic foundation and to situate it in the context of critical realism. When he states that “causality denotes the objective and real counterpart of... questions and further questions” he means that causes are known by us precisely as *answers* to certain kinds of questions. It follows that causes *eo ipso* are mediated by intelligibility. If causes are answers to questions, then causes are to be understood and judged, and not experienced *per se*. If causes are intrinsically intelligible it also follows that causes can be *real*, even if they are not *imaginable*. Contrary to empiricist expectations, causes are simply not the kind of thing one should expect to *observe* (although they can be *inferred* from observations). Neither are causes to be imagined as some kind of push or pull or colliding or emanation or influx.

Furthermore, the “absolute component of objectivity” is attained in judgment.⁶⁰ Because causes are answers to “questions and further questions” for *reflective* understanding, that is, because our apprehension of causes is mediated by a judgment concerning the fulfillment of conditions in a prior judgment, Lonergan, on critical realist grounds, can assert that causality is an “objective and real counterpart” of the desire to know the cause. If this is the case however, if causality is indeed an “objective and real counterpart” of the desire to know, then causality is *not* an immanentist principle subjectively *imposed* upon phenomena, but rather a reality disclosed by intelligent and reasonable questioning. But if causality is not an immanentist principle to begin with, Kant’s prohibition against any transcendental application of causality suddenly becomes needless – and rather dogmatically odious insofar as it persists.⁶¹

⁵⁸“The General Character of the Natural Theology of *Insight*,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*, 5-6.

⁵⁹*Insight*, 674.

⁶⁰See *Insight*, 402-404.

⁶¹See *Insight*, 707-708.

AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSAL REFLECTION

What Lonergan may have intended by a gnoseological formulation of causality might perhaps be clarified by an attempt to explicate causality in a cognitional analytic manner. While I have just argued that quite potent critical implications lie dormant in the position that “causality denotes the objective and real counterpart of the questions and further questions raised by the detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know,” I believe even more flesh could be picked from these bones by reflecting on what precisely, that is, operationally, Lonergan may have meant by “questions and further questions.”⁶² A plausible interpretation is suggested by differentiating and relating the following series of intentional events:

1. “Questions” for reflective understanding pertaining to matters of fact.
2. Answers to those questions (of #1) through affirmative judgments that grasp the fulfillment of a virtually unconditioned.
3. “Further questions,” both for direct and for reflective understanding, that inquire precisely into the underlying *conditions* that happened to fulfill the virtually unconditioned (of #2).
4. Answers to those further questions (of #3). These would specify *causes*. These answers would be rationally verified affirmations of understandings of the underlying conditions verified as fulfilled in a prior judgment (i.e., in #2, the judgment with respect to which one has inquired about a cause).⁶³

⁶²*Insight*, 674.

⁶³A simple example from the common sense realm of meaning may be helpful. We might follow up with the man who, in chapter 10 of *Insight*, Lonergan finds making the excessively parsimonious concrete judgment of fact “something happened” upon returning to the smoldering ruins of his house. That man might proceed to raise “further questions” of the sort I have outlined; he might engage in causal reflection. 1) Was it a fire? 2) Yes, it must have been a fire. The air is still thick with smoke. The fire department is leaving the scene. All of my nice furniture is now charred. 3) How did this happen? What *caused* this fire? Was it the candles? Was it the toaster? Was it the gas line? 4) It must have been caused by a plane crash. I don’t recall leaving that twin-engine Cessna in my dining room! If the man then proceeds to wonder about the cause of the

This analysis offers an interpretation of what Lonergan may have meant by “questions and further questions” and indicates, I propose, the general pattern of intentional events operative in all causal reflection.⁶⁴ The pattern indicates a series of alternating questions and answers, linked in the manner specified, such that the later stages functionally presuppose the earlier. Questions and answers for reflective understanding (stages 1 and 2) are already familiar. In stages 3 and 4, which constitute causal reflection *per se*, I do not posit any new cognitional operations or intentional events but rather suggest that there occurs a reduplication of direct and reflective understanding with respect to new data. What is distinctive about this reduplication is that data for causal reflection is precisely that which has fulfilled the conditions affirmed in the prior judgment of fact. This data, either of sense or consciousness, becomes that into which further inquiry is directed. I continue with a brief explanation of the entire pattern.

Our understandings of concrete situations and of the matters of fact that constitute these are as such not necessarily relevant to what is actually the case. And so we ask, with respect to such understandings, “Is it so? Have I understood correctly?” This question for judgment at least implicitly acknowledges that the truth of any particular understanding is *conditional*. We proceed to marshal and weigh evidence in order to determine whether or not relevant epistemological and ontological conditions for affirmation have been fulfilled. An affirmative answer, the “yes” of judgment, expresses a grasp of the *virtually* unconditioned. This is not a grasp of necessity – even if one is certain – but rather merely of the *de facto* fulfillment of relevant conditions.

Now, subsequent to judgment, there seem to be a number of options regarding further questions. One could rest content with having made a judgment, with having gained some factual knowledge regarding what exists or has occurred in some concrete situation. Or one could proceed to ask further relevant questions of the same sort, to acquire additional knowledge. Or one might even enter into

plane crash, the cycle of operations would recur. Theoretically his inquiry need not ever end, although for practical reasons he will cut it short at some point.

⁶⁴Answers to questions about causes need not be limited to extrinsic causes (i.e., to efficient, instrumental, and final causes), but may extend as well to intrinsic or formal causes. Answers may specify not merely concrete existences and occurrences, but classical and statistical scientific laws as well. For instance, in my house fire example, inquiry into the causes of the fire could find true and informative answers by making reference to the chemistry of oxidation or of petrochemicals, to the physics of momentum, to the statistics of air travel, to the neurochemistry of the pilot’s brain, etc. (I would like to thank Patrick Byrne for his suggestion that extrinsic causality is not exclusive of formal causality and that commonsense causal explanations are not exclusive of concomitant theoretical explanations.)

questions for deliberation, attempt to discern what course of action to take in the context of a concrete situation where responsible action is required. And any of these would be fine. But there is also the option of inquiring more deeply into some matter of fact that one has already come to understand and affirm. One could ask the “further question” Lonergan mentioned by wondering “why?” precisely with respect to the fulfillment of those conditions that rendered the “yes” of judgment possible. One could ask: Why the yes? Why have the conditions *de facto* been fulfilled? And here one would be asking a question that intends a cause.

This “further question” is a peculiar sort of question. It is not motivated by discontented ignorance, but rather by discontented knowledge. In judgment one has rationally affirmed what is *de facto* the case. Yet this knowledge is merely *de facto*. And so there always remains a further question that could be raised subsequent to any concrete judgment of fact. Given that it was not necessary for the ontological conditions to be fulfilled in the way that they were, *why* were they fulfilled? What is the cause?

As causality, so too contingency is not something that is sensed, experienced, or otherwise extra-rationally or primordially known. I suggest that it is *the very act of raising the why-question* that mediates our apprehension of contingency. It is the young child’s relentless asking of ‘why?’ that inculcates her “sense” of the contingency of the world, and the persistence of this “sense” depends upon the persistence of that peculiar form of inquiry, its more or less regular and habitual recurrence. As our apprehension of contingency is mediated by questioning, so too, answers to such questions, when they are forthcoming, specify causes. Causes then, are *answers* to those further strangely relevant questions occasionally raised with respect to the contingent existences and occurrences of proportionate being. On this account, which I take to be a plausible interpretation of Lonergan’s gnoseological transposition, contingency and causality are not merely mutually compatible, but are correlative. *Contingency is to causality as question is to answer.*

The view that knowing is analogous to ocular vision however, seems to inculcate an insidious tendency to construe causality as a relation of necessitation. Consequently, if necessity is banished from the universe on empirical grounds (as in Hume), causality is banished along with it. If necessity is allowed to enter into the phenomenal universe on rationalist grounds (as in Kant), it thereby excludes contingency. Only on the critical realist position that causality is intrinsically

mediated by intelligibility can the universe be affirmed as exhibiting both contingency and causality.

Etienne Gilson, in *Being and Some Philosophers*, offers an analysis of the history of metaphysics in which he divides philosophers into those (Aquinas especially) who seemed to appreciate the significance of contingency and the corresponding need for considerable reflection upon on the act of existence, and those who did not. The vast majority found themselves in the latter camp, and Gilson argues that as a result their metaphysical positions remained crippled in various ways by a truncated essentialism. Perhaps the failure to appreciate the significance of contingency and the meaning of causality, a failure that seems to have been endemic from the fourteenth through the nineteenth centuries, from Scotus to Hegel, can be attributed to the absence of self-appropriation, especially at the level of judgment. So we might ask what role self-appropriation plays with respect to the issues we have been discussing. Self-appropriation seems not to be a necessary precondition for the apprehension of contingency in particular cases. Nor is self-appropriation proximately required for inquiry into and discovery of causes.⁶⁵ However, self-appropriation (and especially of judgment) seems indispensable to anyone who would offer a general metaphysics of contingency and causality while avoiding the bog of necessitarianism. If so, what Lonergan brings to the table is a clear, nuanced, and personally verifiable account of judgment, of causality, and of the contingency of proportionate being.

LONERGAN'S ARGUMENT FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEGITIMACY OF EXTRINSIC CAUSALITY IN THEISTIC EXISTENCE PROOFS

We have already introduced the notion of extrinsic causality (i.e., efficient, exemplary, and final causality) and have clarified why Lonergan does not simply assume that extrinsic causality is applicable beyond anthropological contexts but rather acknowledges the need to provide an argument for its general validity. Such an argument, if cogent, would be of tremendous philosophical importance because it would establish the possibility of a rational transition from proportionate being (i.e., being as proportionate to a cognitional process mediated

⁶⁵Remotely however, it is not unusual for "intellectual conversions" (which are the fruit of self-appropriation) to be indispensable to breaking through those theoretical controversies that mark crisis points in the historical development of emerging explanatory sciences.

by intentional operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging) to a transcendent being that is the causal ground of proportionate being.

There may be need however to caution that the cogency of the argument of section 8 of *Insight* 19 is not to be apprehended simply by a consideration of that argument alone in isolation from the rest of *Insight*, as if it were simply a piece of self-contained, horizonless, context-free logic. *Insight* is written from a “moving viewpoint.”⁶⁶ Later chapters progressively unfold implications of earlier chapters in which normative positions on knowing, objectivity, and being are painstakingly differentiated from a variety of counterpositions. Here, in chapter 19, near the end of the book, we discover that the argument rests upon a premise that Lonergan regards as already firmly established, that is, “being is intelligible.”⁶⁷ The truth of this premise however, can neither be apprehended in isolation from the full systematic context of *Insight* – that is, from its cognitional theory, its epistemology, and its metaphysics – nor from the task of self-appropriation that any fruitful pursuit of these philosophical subdisciplines requires. Hence the apparent straightforwardness of Lonergan’s 19.8 argument (and *a fortiori* of its summarization here) is potentially misleading. Only subsequent to the publication of *Insight* did Lonergan himself adequately acknowledge the extra-logical difficulty of chapter 19 introduced by the polymorphic subject’s dual notion of the real. Germane to the present argument, he would write in *Understanding and Being*: “If you do not mean ‘being’ by the word ‘reality,’ I do not know of any way to prove that extrinsic causality expresses principles that are universally valid and relevant.”⁶⁸ The issue is not merely one of semantics. With this proviso, we proceed to the argument of *Insight* 19.8.

The argument has three major stages. First, Lonergan reaffirms the position on being, rejects the counterpositions, and argues that any positing of “mere matters of fact” is inherently counterpositional. The position is that: “Being is intelligible. It is neither beyond nor apart nor different from the intelligible. It is what is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. It is the objective of the detached and disinterested desire to inquire intelligently and to reflect critically; and that desire is unrestricted.”⁶⁹ Being is the objective of an unrestricted desire to know. It is intended in questions for direct and reflective understanding, especially as these arise in the intellectual pattern of experience. Being is

⁶⁶See *Insight*, 17-20.

⁶⁷*Insight*, 675.

⁶⁸*Understanding and Being*, 243.

⁶⁹*Insight*, 675.

apprehended, in a partial and fragmentary manner, whenever intentional operations culminate in graspings of the virtually unconditioned in acts of judgment. Judgments accumulate to expand the intellectual horizons of knowers and communities of knowers through learning, research, and theoretical systemization. Insofar as such horizons are amenable to the systematic exigence, progressively “higher viewpoints” come to be apprehended. Yet even in the apprehension of higher viewpoints being is not known in its totality. For being could be *intended* exhaustively only by the posing of an absolutely complete set of questions. And being could be *known* exhaustively only by an absolutely unrestricted act of understanding.

Counterpositions deny the intrinsic intelligibility of being by asserting that the real is something other than being (understood in the aforementioned manner). Counterpositions arise on one or more of the following assumptions: 1) that *the real* is “already out there” presently constituted in some manner unmediated by intelligence, 2) that *objectivity* must be a matter of extroversion, or 3) that *knowing* is some operation reducible or analogous to mere experiencing. In the present argument however, the counterpositions are to be rejected, for they are performatively self-contradictory. On the one hand, any denial that maintaining a counterposition requires intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation contradicts the cognitional exigencies illuminated by self-appropriation. On the other hand, any explicit attempt to justify a counterposition as having been grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably discloses a contradiction between one’s performance of intelligent and reasonable justification and the propositional content of the counterposition itself. This performative contradiction, having entered as such into consciousness, simply becomes the occasion for the reversal of the counterposition.

Having affirmed the position and rejected the counterpositions on being, Lonergan next argues that any positing of “mere matters of fact” would be inherently counterpositional. If, on the position, being is intrinsically intelligible, and if what is apart from being is nothing, it follows that what is apart from intelligibility is also nothing.

It follows that to talk about mere matters of fact that admit no explanation is to talk about nothing. If existence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing. If occurrence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing. If it is a mere matter of fact that we know and that there are to be known classical and statistical laws, genetic operators and their dialectical perturbations, explanatory genera

and species, emergent probability and upward finalistic dynamism, then both the knowing and the known are nothing.⁷⁰

Human knowing is permeated by judgments of the sort: “x exists,” “y has occurred,” “z happens to be the case.” X, y, and z, as grasped by virtually unconditioned judgments, are matters of fact. But if x, y, and z are posited as ultimate *mere* matters of fact, if they are thought not to admit of any further explanation, if it is supposed that x just happens to exist, or that y just happens to have occurred, or that z just happens to be the case – or that we just happen to know x, y, or z – then x, y, and z, and our knowledge of these, are not intelligible. But insofar x, y, and z, and our knowledge of these, are not intelligible, then x, y, and z are *not in being*, and our knowledge of them is *not of being*, and so is not knowledge. In short, the denial of the exigence for complete intelligibility and the assertion of brute facticity require a counterpositional defection from being, and render speech into talk which, in the final analysis, is talk about nothing. So it is that “every positivism is involved essentially in the counterpositions.”⁷¹

In a second stage of the argument Lonergan proceeds to draw out the implications of the intelligibility of being and of the metaphysical untenability of mere matters of fact. The question at hand, we recall, concerns the possibility of a human knowledge of transcendent being. The existence of transcendent being rationally could be *denied* if proportionate being (i.e., that range of being proportionate to a hypothetical full implementation of human cognitional operations) were demonstrated to be coterminous with being *per se*. Given a commitment to the position on being and to the rejection of the counterpositions however, any assertion that proportionate being is coterminous with being *per se* would necessarily require a sound argument that proportionate being is completely intelligible in itself or as such. If this were the case there would be no defect of intelligibility within proportionate being and so no explanatory reason to posit the existence of transcendent being. If however it could be demonstrated that proportionate being is *not* completely intelligible in itself or as such, the position on the intelligibility of being would still obtain and would require the rational affirmation that being transcends proportionate being. If such an affirmation were rationally required however, the possibility of human knowledge of transcendent being could not be excluded.

⁷⁰*Insight*, 675.

⁷¹*Insight*, 676.

The relevant question here could be posed in several ways: Is the universe of proportionate being completely intelligible in itself? Can human knowledge be confined within the limits of proportionate being? Could the normative exigencies of our unrestricted desire to know be fully satisfied even by postulating a hypothetical fulfillment of the full range of heuristic methods by which we come to know proportionate being? If an affirmative answer could be given to these questions there would be no explanatory need to posit any transcendent being. If a negative answer obtains however, and the position on the intelligibility of being is not abandoned, this would rationally require affirmation of transcendent being.

Consistent with his methodology of unlocking epistemological and metaphysical problems with the key of cognitional theory, Lonergan approaches these questions by way of an analysis of judgment. Our knowledge of proportionate being occurs only insofar as acts of judgment grasp the correctness of prior acts of understanding. Yet judgmental affirmation is a grasp, not of necessity, but rather merely of the virtually unconditioned – and this fact is highly significant in the present context.

For we do not know until we judge; our judgments rest on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned; and the virtually unconditioned is a conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled. Thus every judgment raises a further question; it reveals a conditioned to be virtually unconditioned, and by that very stroke it reveals conditions that happen to be fulfilled; that happening is a matter of fact, and if it is not to be a mere matter of fact without explanation, a further question arises.⁷²

Our knowledge of proportionate being is mediated by judgments. Yet the act of judgment grasps, not what is *necessarily* the case, but rather merely what is true *de facto*. The act of judgment affirms the correctness of a prior possibly relevant understanding, affirms that what has been understood is actually what happens to be the case. Yet judgments are possible simply in virtue of their verification of the *de facto* fulfillment of relevant conditions. While any given judgment affirms *that* relevant conditions have been fulfilled, as such it does not account for *why* those conditions have been fulfilled. Hence “a further question arises”: *Why* have the conditions been fulfilled? This is the causal question, an analysis of which was attempted in the previous section of this paper. Causal questions may certainly be pursued, with additional understandings and additional judgments, but those new judgments, no less than the ones that gave rise to them, will elicit yet further

⁷²*Insight*, 676.

questions inquiring into their own ground of unconditionality. Strangely, to the extent that human knowers attempt to converge upon an exhaustive knowledge of proportionate being, such "further questions" tend to proliferate and diverge in a non-systematic manner. The growth of knowledge is shadowed by the apprehension of mystery.⁷³

Given that the positions on knowing and on being affirm an isomorphism of knower and known, the preceding analysis of judgment bears ontological implications. The grasp of the virtually unconditioned is not a grasp of necessity, not a grasp of the "formally unconditioned," not a grasp of being which has no conditions whatsoever, but rather merely a grasp of the *de facto* fulfillment of conditions. While judgment is a grasp of the unconditioned, and of what is, it does not follow that what is known through judgment is itself unconditioned in an unqualified sense. In fact knowledge of proportionate being is knowledge of conditioned being. "As our judgments rest on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, so every proportionate being in its every aspect is a virtually unconditioned. As a matter of fact, it is, and so it is unconditioned. But it is unconditioned, not formally in the sense that it has no conditions whatever, but only virtually in the sense that its conditions happen to be fulfilled."⁷⁴ Insofar as judgment grasps merely the virtually unconditioned, that which is known through judgment, that is, proportionate being, is *contingent*. Both our knowing and the universe that is proportionate to our knowing is permeated, "shot through," with contingency.

Within proportionate being, every existence, and every occurrence, remains contingent.⁷⁵ Statistical laws are employed to assign frequencies to various classes of existent beings and various sorts of events and occurrences; but statistical laws do not explain existences and occurrences as such. In particular cases empirical scientists employ classical laws to deduce some events and occurrences from others, but those others are themselves no less conditioned than the events and occurrences they purport to explain. Classical and statistical laws can be combined to situate certain routine occurrences within schemes of recurrence. But schemes of recurrence are themselves conditioned by a multiplicity of matters of fact not amenable to systemization. Furthermore, everything that could *in principle* be known by empirical science or by a

⁷³For Lonergan's nonpejorative understanding of mystery see *Insight*, 569-72.

⁷⁴*Insight*, 676.

⁷⁵See *Insight*, 676-77.

philosophy restricted to proportionate being is permeated by the contingency of existence and occurrence.

Classical laws are not what must be; they are empirical; they are what in fact is so. Genetic operators enjoy both a minor and a major flexibility, and so in each concrete case the operator is what in fact it happens to be. Explanatory genera and species are not avatars of Plato's eternal Ideas; they are more or less successful solutions to contingent problems set by contingent situations. The actual course of generalized emergent probability is but one among a large number of other probable courses, and the probable courses are a minority among possible courses; the actual course, then, is what in fact it happens to be.

Our knowledge of proportionate being then – even on the supposition that classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods could expand to their hypothetical limits – happens to be a knowledge founded upon a vast array of matters of fact. About these matters of fact “further questions” certainly can be raised, and often are. But answers to such questions tend merely to proliferate our awareness of ever further matters of fact, and hence to impress even more deeply upon us the inextricable facticity of proportionate being.

Hence the universe of proportionate being, permeated as it is by the contingency of existence and occurrence, is not self-explanatory. We are “confronted at every turn with mere matters of fact with no possible explanation.”⁷⁶ Yet mere matters of fact with no possible explanation are not intrinsically or completely intelligible. But, on the position, being is intrinsically or completely intelligible. Therefore the universe of proportionate being is not coterminous with being *per se*.

While this argument is ontological, it is preceded by an analogous argument in the epistemological order. The grasp of the virtually unconditioned is a grasp merely of conditions that happen to be fulfilled. “To regard that happening as ultimate is to affirm a mere matter of fact without any explanation. To account for one happening by appealing to another is to change the topic without meeting the issue, for if the other happening is regarded as mere matter of fact without any explanation then either it is not being or else being is not the intelligible.”⁷⁷ Hence to maintain a commitment to the position on the intelligibility of being entails that one can not affirm the facticity of proportionate being as ultimate.

⁷⁶*Insight*, 678.

⁷⁷*Insight*, 676.

The second stage of Lonergan's 19.8 argument arrives then, at a negative conclusion. If being is intrinsically or completely intelligible, and proportionate being is not intrinsically or completely intelligible, "knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded."⁷⁸

In the third stage of his argument Lonergan moves beyond the merely negative conclusion of the second stage to inquire into the ground of being itself. If knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded without gainsaying the intelligibility of being and thereby lapsing into the counterposition, in what does this knowledge consist? What minimal attributes must transcendent being possess if it is to remedy the deficit of intelligibility that arises from the contingency of existence and occurrence permeating all proportionate being?

A transcendent being relevant to the problem at hand must possess two basic attributes.

On the one hand, it must not be contingent in any respect, for if it were, once more we would be confronted with the mere matters of fact that we have to avoid. On the other hand, besides being self-explanatory, the transcendent being must be capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything else; for without this second attribute, the transcendent being would leave unsolved our problem of contingency in proportionate being."⁷⁹

We have discussed Hume and Kant's critique of extrinsic causality, and especially of its transcendental application. While it is clearly a mistake to suppose that Lonergan simply advocated a return to the Aristotelian four causes or to the "five ways" of Aquinas, he did effect a remarkable transposition of the classical notion of causality by recognizing that each type of causality constitutes a distinct way of answering a fundamental question posed by the conditionality of proportionate being. On the basis of this gnoseological transposition Lonergan would advance philosophical theology to a level of full generality and make the claim that "besides Aquinas's five ways, there are as many other proofs of the existence of God as there are aspects of incomplete intelligibility in the universe of proportionate being."⁸⁰ Lonergan argued that the position on the intelligibility of being can be maintained, and the incomplete intelligibility of proportionate being can be superseded, only by affirming the general validity of extrinsic

⁷⁸*Insight*, 678.

⁷⁹*Insight*, 678.

⁸⁰*Insight*, 701.

causality. Efficient, exemplary, and final causality are not merely of anthropological significance, are not merely applicable within the domain of applied science or human affairs, but are of a universal significance that mediates a knowledge of transcendent being. We consider now Lonergan's arguments for the transcendent applicability of each type of extrinsic causality.

Efficient Causality: If proportionate being is being, it must be intelligible. Yet as affirmed by virtually unconditioned acts of judgment, the existences and occurrences of proportionate being exist and occur merely as matters of fact. To that extent proportionate being is in itself nonintelligible. But what is nonintelligible is apart from being, is nothing. To attempt to resolve this deficit of intelligibility by appeal to an infinite regress in which each conditioned has its conditions fulfilled by some prior conditions results only in an even more extensive array of mere matters of fact. The intelligibility of being, therefore, can be maintained only if proportionate being is assigned an *efficient cause*, which itself is without conditions, and which grounds the conditions for everything else that is or could be.⁸¹

Exemplary Causality: Furthermore, if the fulfilling of the conditions of conditioned beings were fulfilled simply at random, proportionate being would remain permeated by matters of fact lacking explanation. But matters of fact lacking explanation are as such unintelligible; and what is unintelligible is not being but nothing. If proportionate being is being however, it must be intelligible, and so its conditions must be fulfilled, not randomly, but according to some *exemplar* that grounds the intelligibility of the pattern in which all conditions are fulfilled.⁸²

Final Causality: On Lonergan's generalized ontology of the good, being is not merely intelligible but also is good.⁸³ Manifolds of particular goods are subsumed under intelligible goods of order. Such orders are characterized by all the flexibility of concrete development and by endless possibilities for both breakdown and subsequent dialectical reorientation. Yet if the concretely actualized order of this universe as a whole is not to be regarded simply as one vast brute matter of fact, as merely one actualized possibility among an almost infinite array of alternative possibilities, then the order of this universe "must be a

⁸¹*Insight*, 678-79.

⁸²*Insight*, 679.

⁸³Lonergan's treatment of the general ontology of the good can be found in chapter 18, see *Insight*, 628-30.

value and its selection due to rational choice.”⁸⁴ If being is both intelligible and good, the ultimate ground of any possible contingent universe can not be arbitrary but must proceed freely from the reasonable choice of a rational consciousness. “The final cause, then, is the ground of value, and it is the ultimate cause of causes for it overcomes contingency at its deepest level.”⁸⁵

It is important to appreciate here that while Lonergan’s transposition of the notion of causality is effected through an appeal to interiority, this does not relegate causality to a merely subjective significance.⁸⁶ On the contrary, the import of the transposed notion of causality is profoundly ontological. If being is intelligible, the contingent universe can not fundamentally or ultimately be groundless, random, or arbitrary. If being is intelligible, the universe must be, rather, *a reasonably realized possibility*. “Its possibility is grounded in the exemplary cause, its realization in the efficient cause, . . . its reasonableness in the final cause.”⁸⁷

In the opening sections of this paper we critically examined Hume and Kant’s objections to any transcendent application of the principle of causality. While that critique must stand on its own merits, at this point we may add that for Lonergan the universal applicability of extrinsic causality not merely is *valid* but also is *necessary*. It is rationally required. A universal application of extrinsic causality is not merely legitimate, but *must* be invoked if we are to avoid renouncing the position on the complete intelligibility. Consequently, it is not the transcendental employment of extrinsic causality that is obscurantist, but rather the restriction of causality to anthropological contexts. To refuse as illegitimate the transcendental application of extrinsic causality is to insist that certain questions, i.e. questions into the causes of contingent matters of fact, are meaningless. As Lonergan states the case in *Understanding and Being* however, “the intelligible is not something with respect to which I answer a certain group of questions and, for no reason whatsoever, refuse to answer further questions. If being is the objective of the

⁸⁴*Insight*, 679.

⁸⁵*Insight*, 679-80.

⁸⁶ “The conception of causality in any of its types must be the fruit of interiority. Thus, just as the internal causes are conceived in relation to experience, understanding and judgment, so final, efficient and exemplary causes must be conceived in similar fashion: final cause in relation to the conditionedness of judgments of value, efficient cause in relation to the conditionedness of judgments of existence and occurrence, exemplary cause in relation to conditioned intelligibility.” Bernard Tyrrell, *Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy of God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 147.

⁸⁷*Insight*, 680.

pure and unrestricted desire to know, then the questions continue to arise. There is no point where you can arbitrarily say, 'No more questions – supply exhausted!'"⁸⁸ Hence the indiscriminate cessation of questioning amounts to an abdication of the exigence for complete intelligibility. Such a cessation is not without ramifications, for it is precisely this exigence for intelligibility that is at the root of all striving to understand, of all science, of all scholarship, of the radical openness of the human spirit itself.

⁸⁸*Understanding and Being*, 245.

LEAVING SELF-CENTEREDNESS: LONERAGAN AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE ON ART

Cloe Taddei Ferretti

*Seminario Permanente di Epistemologia, Istituto di Filosofia, PFTIM-SL,
and Istituto di Cibernetica "Eduardo Caianiello", CNR, Pozzuoli
Naples, Italy*

1. OVERFLOWING

THE LAST SENTENCE, "... and, as I have said, God's own glory, in part, is you," of a passage – which belongs to Lonergan's paper¹ and has been taken as expression of the meaning of the 35th Annual Lonergan Workshop – refers to what Lonergan wrote more extensively few paragraphs before it. There he states that "[i]n Christ Jesus ... [t]he fount of our living is ... love of an end that overflows." This overflowing, flowing over brim, bounds, limits, is ascribed primarily to God, who (from love of the infinite) loved "even the finite"; it is ascribed to Christ, who (from the vision of God) loved "us"; and it is ascribed to those in Christ, who, participating in the love of Christ, (from the love of God *super omnia*) "can love their neighbors as themselves."²

All that overflowing is my starting point, but I will consider in particular the overflowing when it is referred to human interpersonal behavior, that is to the love of neighbors as oneself, and thereafter I will call this particular type of overflowing as the "leaving self-centeredness."

¹Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento" (of 1965), in *Collection*, vol. 4 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1993), 222-31, quotation at 231.

²Cf. *Collection*, 230.

2. LEAVING SELF-CENTEREDNESS, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Such leaving self-centeredness, if considered as the consequence of the overflowing love of those in Christ for their neighbors, is concretely performed through interpersonal relationships.

Lonergan in *Insight* insisted on self-appropriation, based on self-affirmation of the subject not so much as a *cogitans*, a thinker, but as a knower. However, this position does not credit a monadic interpretation of the subject by Lonergan. In fact, in several works he expressed his interest in intersubjectivity, and treated this topic from several points of view.

According to Lonergan, one has to distinguish a spontaneous intersubjectivity at psychic level, and deliberate interpersonal relations at higher level.

Moreover, the self-affirmation of the subject should lead to subsequent levels of self-transcendence, brought about by intellectual conversion (involving the three levels of experience, understanding, and factual judgment), moral conversion (involving the level of judgment of value, and existential decision and action), and religious conversion (involving the level of interpersonal relations and total commitment, which from the Christian viewpoint is characterized by being in love in an unrestricted manner), to which one has to add the psychic conversion (suggested by Doran and acknowledged by Lonergan, involving the psychic level³).

In particular, the religious conversion is characterized by a love without limits or qualification, and can be regarded as the highest level of leaving self-centeredness.

At this point, I will deal with two more issues (which I developed more extensively elsewhere⁴), the first one on what Lonergan wrote about

³Cf. R. M. Doran, *Subject and Psyche* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994); Idem, *Theological Foundations*, vol. 1, *Intentionality and Psyche* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995); Idem, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 90, 184, 225 n. 2; B. J. F. Lonergan, "Mission and the Spirit" (of 1976), in *A Third Collection*, F. E. Crowe, ed. (New York: Paulist Press; London: Chapman, 1985), 22-34; "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon" (of 1977), in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, vol. 17 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. R. C. Crocken and R. M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 391-408; Idem, "Reality, Myth, Symbol" (of 1978), in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, quoted 384-90.

⁴Cf. C. Taddei-Ferretti, "Intersubjectivity in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan and in Cognitive Science," in *International Workshop Going Beyond Essentialism: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, an Atypical Neo-Scholastic*, Naples, Italy, 13-15 May 2008.

intersubjectivity, and the second one on the way in which, according to cognitive science, an intersubjective relationship may arise.

Then, I will concentrate on the possibility of expressing by art the above overflowing referred to human interpersonal behavior. First, I will analyze the reflections of Lonergan on art. Second, I will give an outline of some waves of cognitive science on art. As a conclusion, I will take into account art and the leaving self-centeredness through intersubjectivity, as well as the role the body in the artistic expression of both interpersonal relationships and absence of relationships, presenting some examples of both situations in pictorial art.

2.1. Lonergan on Intersubjectivity

One has to note that the stress of Lonergan on the data within a single consciousness, on the intellectual and rational aspects of the cognitive process, and on the importance of self-affirmation of the subject as a knower, does not imply his indifference to the intersubjective relationships between different conscious subjects, while, on the contrary, the intersubjective phenomena are studied by him and their importance is highlighted throughout several of his numerous works. We may recall in brief few points of his thought on this theme.

1. The person is not a Leibnizian monad, but a social animal.
2. The obscure origin of interpersonal relations (especially between mother and child), and of human sociality and social institutions lies in spontaneous intersubjectivity.
3. Due to spontaneous intersubjectivity, the experience of everyone resonates the experience of others, and there is an elemental feeling of belonging together, a sense of unity with another person. The spontaneous intersubjective reactions arise suddenly without thinking to them; they are prior to the level of the distinction between the "I" and the "thou", and are proper of an "earlier we."
4. Self-knowledge emerges within an intersubjective community. It arises through the subject's discovering the meaning of his/her gesture in the interpretative-response gesture made by another individual to the original gesture, and through the subject's coming to self-consciousness and consciousness of the other within communication interplay.
5. The mere bodily presence of a person (with his/her spontaneous countenance, stance, facial or bodily movements, gesture, variations of voice) both reveals such person to another subject, and affects the other subject.

6. Intersubjectivity pertains to the psychic level of human development. The meaning on the psychic level can be attained by reenacting it in ourselves.
7. However, the elemental experiences of belonging together and immediate responses, which are proper of spontaneous intersubjectivity, with its meaning at the psychic level, do not constitute the whole of human knowing and behaving, but are the premise for, and dispose to, higher orders of knowing and behaving. There are the meaning levels proper to understanding and judging, the sympathy that leads to deliberate sharing of feeling and disposes to interpersonal deliberate relationships, the common enterprises, the mutual aid, the succour, the structured interpersonal, and civil, and cultural communities, the “later we” of mutual love between an “I” and a “thou.”
8. An intensification of intersubjective awareness of the suffering and needs of others⁵ is brought out by grace, and this higher transformation penetrates up to the physiological level.

2.2. Cognitive Science on Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity has been defined as the process in which mental activity (that is, conscious awareness, emotions, cognitions, motives, interests, intentions) is transferred between minds (intermental coupling)⁶. The intersubjective transmission of mental contents is attained through dynamic patterns of facial, vocal, and gestual emotional expressions, which are recognized and employed from birth on.

Daniel Stern has explored the matrix, the phenomenology, and the function of intersubjectivity. He invites to pass from the viewpoint according to which intersubjectivity is a fact that may be realized in the long run, in particular circumstances, when two independent minds may happen to interact, to the viewpoint according to which each mind emerges completely only from an intersubjective matrix. According to him, a mind is not yet fully developed until the turning from one-way to two-way intersubjectivity has not been realized, that is the turning from the situation in which a first person experiences that another one experiences, and what the other one experiences, to the situation in which the experience is shared and a first person experiences that another one experiences what the first experiences: it is at this point that one experiences him/herself, by

⁵As an expression of the above overflowing.

⁶Cf. C. Trevarthen, “Intersubjectivity,” in R. A. Wilson and F. C. Keil, eds, *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 415-19.

self-mirroring in the eyes of the other who experiences him/her; through a recursive process, the first person experiences that the other one experiences that the first experiences what the other experiences, and thus the intersubjectivity is strengthened in an always renewed way.⁷

For what it concerns the underlying mechanisms, at the first level there is the complex multiphase process beginning from the reception of the elemental retinal information and ending in the recognition of objects.⁸ However, those particular objects which are human faces are recognized in specific areas of the central nervous system,⁹ in a global way and without the previous decomposition of parts as in the analysis and recognition of all other objects.¹⁰

Mirror neurons¹¹ have a crucial role in those mechanisms. They have been found in some areas of the central nervous system of apes and humans, and are active both if an individual performs a simple action, for example, with a hand, and if the individual sees the same action performed with a hand by another individual of the same or the other zoological species.

In humans, mirror neurons are active also both when a subject feels a basic emotion, for example, a disgust, and when observes the disgust experience of another subject: it is a case of unmediated resonance, that is, a direct experience of a body state. The same happens both when a subject experiences a pain stimulus, and when sees the same stimulus being applied to another subject; and even both when a subject experiences the pain stimulus, and sees a signal which symbolizes the application of the same stimulus to another subject. The explicit cognitive interpretation of an emotion is phylogenetically more recent, but it needs a basis in direct, nonpropositional experience, which is carried out by the mirror neuron systems.

⁷Cf. D. N. Stern, *Il momento presente in psicoterapia e nella vita quotidiana*, Italian trans. (Milano: Raffaello Cortina, 2005, first English edition 2004), 68, 127.

⁸Cf. D. Marr, *Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).

⁹Cf. J. V. Haxby, E. A. Hoffman, and M. I. Gobbini, "The Distributed Human Neural System for Face Perception," in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 4 (2000): 223-33.

¹⁰Cf. M. J. Farah, *Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and What They Tell Us About Normal Vision* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 127-28.

¹¹Cf. V. Gallese and A. Goldman, "Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading," in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 2 (1998): 493-501; G. Rizzolatti, L. Fadiga, V. Gallese, and L. Fogassi, "Pre-motor Cortex and the Recognition of Motor Actions," in *Cognitive Brain Research* 3 (1996): 131-41; B. Wicker, C. Keysers, J. Plailly, J.-P. Royet, V. Gallese, and G. Rizzolatti, "Both of us Disgusted in My Insula: The Common Neural Basis of Seeing and Feeling Disgust," in *Neuron* 40 (2003): 655-64.

Thus, the systems of mirror neurons have a role for both execution and representation: the equivalence of neural representations of motor actions both of the subject and of the other individual is the basis of the possibility of sharing the feel of another's action without the need of imitating that action. All that corresponds, from the phenomenological viewpoint, to the experiential sharing, and to the feeling of familiarity, of belonging together.

A further step, besides the above neural mechanism underlying the direct unmediated us-centered experience, is the distinction between the self and the other, which is realized at neural level through the activity of other brain areas different for the self and for the other.¹²

A still further step is the capability of attributing mental states to oneself and to the other, that is, of having a "theory of mind."¹³ A subject having a "theory of mind" is able to understand that others have beliefs, desires, intentions (mental states), to interpret others' mental contents as the cause of others' behavior, and to foresee others' mental states and, thus, others' behavior. The "theory of mind," that is, such capability of interpreting mental contents as invisible cause of the behaviors experienced in interpersonal relationships, is at a higher level than the level of direct shared experience.

For what it concerns the development of such capability,¹⁴ children have concepts about perception, desire, emotion before the age of three (precocious mentalism). At the age of three they have beliefs, but do not understand which is their source, nor that there could be wrong beliefs and a difference between appearance and reality. At the age of four there occurs a fundamental turning point and a new cognitive capability arises: children understand that others may have wrong beliefs, manipulate other's beliefs, discriminate between supposition

¹²Cf. J. Decety and J. A. Sommerville, "Shared representations between self and other: A social cognitive neuroscience view," in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 7/12 (2003): 527-33.

¹³Cf. S. Baron-Cohen, A. M. Leslie and U. Frith, "Does the autistic child have a 'theory of mind'?", in *Cognition* 21 (1985): 37-46; O. Carruthers and P. K. Smith, eds, *Theories of Theories of Mind* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 1996; V. E. Stone and P. Gerrans, "Does the normal brain have a theory of mind?", in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10 (2006): 3-4.

¹⁴Cf. H. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman, *Children Talk About the Mind* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995); A. Gopnik and J. W. Astington, "Children's understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction", in *Child Development* 59 (1988): 26-37; H. M. Wellman, *The Child's Theory of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); H. Wimmer and J. Perner, "Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception," in *Cognition* 13 (1983): 103-28.

and knowledge, appreciate the fact that others could not know some particulars, and discriminate between perceptually and conceptually based viewpoints.

To have a “theory of mind” (in addition to the functioning of other neural mechanisms) is important also to go beyond social cognition, and to realize the joint action, for example, in baseball, in a piano duet, in the dance in couple.¹⁵

3. ART

According to Doran,¹⁶ in the artistic differentiation of consciousness there is “a more specialized appreciation of beauty ... an ability ... to recognize and enjoy the realms of color, sound, shape, bodily movement, and story ... and especially to participate in the powers of human creativity in these realms.”

3.1. *Lonergan on Art*

Let us now consider, in several works of Lonergan, how he treated the topic of art.

3.1.1. *Insight*

In chapter 6, “Common Sense and Its Subject,” Lonergan clarifies that sensations do not occur in isolation from one another or from other events, rather they have a bodily base, are functionally related to bodily movements, and occur under the organizing control of conation, interest, attention, purpose, effort, which shape the various elements in the experience organized by a particular dynamic pattern.¹⁷ In particular, the aesthetic pattern of experience is a matter of joy, freedom, delight; experience can occur just for the sake of experiencing, as a liberation from both the biological purposes and the “constraints of mathematical proofs, scientific verifications and commonsense factualness,” and resulting in the spontaneous, self-justifying joy of conscious living and of free creation. In fact, the validation of the artistic idea is just the artistic deed, in which the artist

¹⁵Cf. N. Sebanz, H. Bekkering, and G. Knoblich “Joint action: bodies and minds moving together,” in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10 (2006): 70-76.

¹⁶Cf. R. M. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 532.

¹⁷Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Toronto University Press, Toronto 1992 (1957¹), 205 (§ 2.1 Patterns of Experience).

embodies his/her insight. Moreover, Lonergan clarifies that art is also symbolic, “but what is symbolized is obscure,” and may be reached “not through science or philosophy, but through a participation,...a reenactment of the artist’s inspiration and intention.” This obscure meaning has to do with human freedom of doing and being what one pleases, and so with the question “What is [human being] to be?” a question to which art may offer attractive answers, or repellent answers, or may simply express the moods in which the question arises.¹⁸ Moreover, the first work of art of a human being is his/her own living.¹⁹

In chapter 8, “Things,” Lonergan reminds again “the aesthetic liberation of human experience from the confinement of the biological pattern,” which we may consider a way of self-transcendence.²⁰

In chapter 15, “Elements of Metaphysics,” he highlights that “aesthetic experience and the pattern of practical activity tend to be mutually exclusive.”²¹

In chapter 17, “Metaphysics as Dialectic,” he notes several times that human being lives, for the most part, in an alternation or blend of aesthetic, dramatic and practical patterns, and only occasionally in the biological or intellectual pattern of existence.²²

3.1.2. *Understanding and Being*

In Lecture 2, “Elements of understanding,,” and Discussion 2, Lonergan states that an artistic insight is into particular situations or data, and is expressed and communicated to the percipients not in a conceptualized way, general formulae and abstract (scientific or philosophical) terms, but simply in the work of art itself. The commentary and judgment of the work of art is left to the critics.²³

¹⁸Cf. *Insight*, 207-209 (§ 2.3 The Aesthetic Pattern of Experience).

¹⁹Cf. *Insight*, 210 (§ 5 The Dramatic Pattern of Experience).

²⁰Cf. *Insight*, 291 (§ 6 Species as Explanatory).

²¹Cf. *Insight*, 495 (§ 7.4 Human Development).

²²Cf. *Insight*, 589 (§ 3.2 The Notion of the Universal Viewpoint); 589 (§ 3.4 Limitations of the Treatise); 602 (§ 3.6 The Sketch); 607-608 (§ 3.7 Counterpositions).

²³Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. E. A. Morelli and M. D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1990²), 38-39 (§ 3 The Difference between Insight and Conception), 283 (§ 1 Insight and Its Conceptual Expression), 290 (§ 4 Insight in Art).

3.1.3. Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

In “Time and Meaning,” Lonergan acknowledges the view of Susanne Langer: according to her *Feeling and Form*,²⁴ perceiving and experiencing are a construction, a selection of meaning among all the impressions received by sense receptors; this selection can occur in different ways: it can result in a set of automatic responses to sensible signals (e.g., of red/green lights for stop/go), in a subservience to some higher purposes (e.g., of scientific inquiring, verifying), and in the freedom of developing one’s own meaning, liberating one’s sensitive life and transforming one’s world and one’s subjectivity (in artistic activity, both the creative and the appreciative one).²⁵

In “Exegesis and Dogma,” he affirms that, in order to grasp and appreciate an artistic meaning, which is on psychic level, one has to enter into it, to reenact and reproduce it in him/herself: “[n]o conceptual account of a Bach sonata, a Beethoven quartet, a Brahms symphony is the equivalent of the sonata or the quartet or the symphony.”²⁶

In “The Analogy of Meaning,” Susanne Langer *Feeling and Form* and René Huyge’s *L’Art et l’âme* are quoted, and the artistic meaning is described as a break from the routine meaning, so that a new subject arises with fresh meaning; the artist has to take, sharpen, bring to the point, unfold, develop, present, express this meaning.²⁷ Meaning is constitutive of communication, of human being, of human leaving.²⁸ There are the types of meaning on the psychic level (intersubjective, incarnate, symbolic, artistic meanings, and their influence on literary meaning), and the scientific, the philosophic, and the theological types of meaning.²⁹

²⁴S. K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1953). On this work of Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985), see R. Liddy, *Art and Feeling: An Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Art of Susanne K. Langer* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1970).

²⁵Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, “Time and Meaning” (of 1962), in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, vol. 5 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. R. C. Crocken, F. E. Crowe, and R. M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 102-103 (§ 1.1.4 Artistic Meaning).

²⁶Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, “Exegesis and Dogma” (of 1963), in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, quoted 151 (§ 4 Romantic Exegesis).

²⁷Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, “The Analogy of Meaning” (of 1963), in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, quoted 191 (§ 1.5 Artistic Meaning).

²⁸Cf. “Analogy of Meaning,” 196 (§ 2 Meaning as Constitutive of Human Potentiality).

²⁹Cf. “Analogy of Meaning,” 210 (§ 8 Conclusion).

3.1.4. Topics in Education

In chapter 7, “The Theory of Philosophic Differences,” it is affirmed that in the artistic work, as in the literary one, the experiential level is most prominent (while the intellectual level prevails in mathematical and scientific work and the rational level in philosophical work).³⁰

In chapter 9, “Art,”³¹ Lonergan reports that art has been defined by Susanne K. Langer, in *Feeling and Form*, as “an objectification of a purely experiential pattern”³² (or, according to the exact words of Langer, it “is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling”³³). This pattern, when expressed in art, is a set of internal relations between colors, or volumes, or movements, or tones, and these internal relations are important whether or not a work of art is representative (that is, whether or not it has also external relations).³⁴

This experiential pattern is merely experience, both “unknown to other people” and “not fully known even to the one who does experience it.” The process of objectifying, that is expressing, such experiential pattern, which is analogous to the process from understanding to defining, implies not so much to merely manifest one’s feeling in a spontaneous way, but to behold, inspect, dissect, enjoy, repeat, recollect, and so to unfold, make explicit, unveil, reveal. The expression also introduces a psychic distance between oneself and one’s experience, while it grasps what is or seems to be important in the purely experiential pattern.³⁵

“Art is the abstraction of a form.” Such abstraction is performed not by conceptualizing, but by doing. The abstracted form is the pattern of internal relations which became idealized. The important point is that the work of art, that is what is done, “is isomorphic with the idealized pattern of experience”; in the particular case in which the work of art is representative, it is isomorphic also

³⁰Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, vol. 10 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. R. M. Doran and F. E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 178 (§ 3.1 The Basic Group of Operations).

³¹Cf. also G. Hughes, “Lonergan and Art”, in J. J. Vila-Cha, ed., *Commemorating 50 Years of Insight, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 63, no. 4 (2007): 991-1000.

³²Cf. *Topics in Education*, quoted 211 (§ 2 A Definition of Art).

³³Cf. *Topics in Education*, 211, note 9 (§ 2 A Definition of Art).

³⁴Cf. *Topics in Education*, 211 (§ 2 A Definition of Art).

³⁵Cf. *Topics in Education*, 217-18 (§ 2.7 Objectification).

with something else, but this “is not the point.” Moreover, the pattern of experience “is not a conceptual pattern, and it cannot be conceptualized.” The symbolic meaning of the work of art is on a concrete level, not at conceptual nor at reflexive level; it is immediate, it is an invitation to participate.³⁶ Art “is an exploration of potentialities for human being”;³⁷ it is “an opening, a moment of new potentiality,” and its breaking away from ordinary life is a heading on to God.³⁸

Apart from poetry³⁹ and dance,⁴⁰ art is concerned with space, in the picture, the statue, the work of architecture.⁴¹ It is also concerned with time: “[t]he basic time that is the ‘now’ of a being [that changes] has a nonspatial objectification in music. Music is the image of experienced time [... it is a nonspatial] movement from one note to another.”⁴²

In chapter 10, “History,” the artistic product is presented as an expression of living (feeling, orientation, mentality), and what it expresses and puts forth is a pattern that is isomorphic with the pattern of the living.⁴³

3.1.5. A Second Collection

In “Belief: Today’s Issue,” Lonergan affirms that “the meaning in a work of art before it is articulated by the critic” is immediately felt.⁴⁴

In “An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S. J.,” he repeats that, according to Langer’s analysis of artistic creation, art is a liberation from all the mechanizations and routinizations of sensibility, is a revelation to human being of his/her openness “to more than the world he/[she] already is functioning properly in.” Moreover, different people develop differently, are different (some are literal, some are artistic), have different potentialities and opportunities, “[b]ut even though you write a book like *Insight*, you may enjoy Beethoven,” and this

³⁶Cf. *Topics in Education* 218-19 (§ 2.7 Objectification).

³⁷Cf. *Topics in Education*, 222 (§ 2.9 Ulterior Significance).

³⁸Cf. *Topics in Education*, 224-25 (§ 3.1 The Picture).

³⁹Cf. *Topics in Education*, 228-232 (§ 5 Poetry).

⁴⁰Cf. *Topics in Education*, 228, n. 52 (§ 5 Poetry).

⁴¹Cf. *Topics in Education*, 223-27 (§ 3 Art and Space).

⁴²Cf. *Topics in Education*, 227-28 (§ 4 Art and Time).

⁴³Cf. *Topics in Education*, 252 (§ 5 The Problem of General History).

⁴⁴Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, “Belief: Today’s Issue” (of 1968), in *A Second Collection*, W. F. J. Ryan and B. J. Tyrrell, eds (London: Darton, Longmans & Todd, 1974), 91.

autobiographical remark adds the contribution of Lonergan's personal experience to his theoretical account on (appreciative) artistic activity.⁴⁵

3.1.6. *Method in Theology*

In chapter 3, "Meaning," Lonergan borrows again from Susan Langer the definition of art "as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern." "[T]he meaning of an experiential pattern is elemental," and the proper expression of such elemental meaning is the work of art, which objectifies, unfolds, makes explicit, unveils, reveals through a conscious process of the artist, which involves "psychic distance," separation from experience of the elemental meaning (and later, a critic will interpret the expression of elemental meaning carried out by the work of art⁴⁶). Moreover, "[w]hile the smile or frown expresses intersubjectively the feeling as it is felt, artistic composition ... is a matter of insight into the elemental meaning, a grasp of [a] form [... Art] is grasping what is or seems significant ... [T]he proper expression of the elemental meaning is the work of art [... which] is an invitation to participate, ... to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world."⁴⁷

In chapter 4, "Religion," art is also included among the carriers of religious meaning and value, together with intersubjectivity, symbol, language, and remembered deeds.⁴⁸

In chapter 5, "Functional Specialties," art is considered in its interdisciplinary relations with theology within the eighth functional specialty, Communication.⁴⁹

In chapter 9, "History and Historians," Lonergan affirms that a creative achievement of an artist of high individuality cannot be easily subsumed under universal principles or general rules, however it can be understood and its intelligibility can be grasped.⁵⁰

In chapter 11, "Foundations," it is reminded that the realm of art, as other realms, has its own language, mode of apprehension, and cultural, social,

⁴⁵Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S. J." (of 1971), P. McShane, ed., in *A Second Collection*, quoted, p. 224 (§ On the Place of Imagination and Affectivity).

⁴⁶Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Darton, Longman & Todd, London 1972), 74 (§ 7 Elements of Meaning).

⁴⁷Cf. *Method in Theology*, 61-64 (§ 3 Art).

⁴⁸Cf. *Method in Theology*, 112 (§ 6 The Word).

⁴⁹Cf. *Method in Theology*, 132 (§ 2 An Eightfold Division).

⁵⁰Cf. *Method in Theology*, 209 (§ 4 "Verstehen").

professional group speaking and apprehending in such particular ways.⁵¹ “Artistically differentiated consciousness is a specialist in the realm of beauty [... and] its higher attainment is creating.”⁵²

In chapter 12, “Doctrines,” the significance of the function of expressing, carried out also by art, is stressed, because without expression the human feeling and knowing are incomplete.⁵³

3.1.7. Phenomenology and Logic

In chapter 13, “Subject and Horizon” (lecture on existentialism), according to Lonergan the aesthetic flow of consciousness is a liberation from purely biological determinants (as in children’s play), is the freedom of the flow of consciousness from merely biological goals.⁵⁴ It could be said, in a metaphorical way, that the human being realizes his/her art primarily in him/herself, in the sense “that the flow of [human] consciousness is not determined by environment and sensible data,” but is “a free creation.”⁵⁵

3.1.8. Caring about Meaning

Lonergan made other autobiographical remarks related to music during some conversations. In 1981 he reminded that the music made the writing of *Insight* possible: listening to Beethoven gave him “a lift” to make his own “show”; he reminded also the music records to which he could attend at Kingston, and the piano music his mother was playing.⁵⁶ In 1982 he added that the last time he saw his mother (in 1933, before he went to Rome, coming back to Canada only after her death) he asked her to play piano, but she could no more do it, due to finger disease.⁵⁷

3.1.9. In Summary

⁵¹Cf. *Method in Theology*, 272 (§ 3 Pluralism in Expression).

⁵²Cf. *Method in Theology*, 273 (§ 3 Pluralism in Expression).

⁵³Cf. *Method in Theology*, 303-304 (§ 4 Differentiation of Consciousness).

⁵⁴Cf. B. J. F. Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Philip McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 286. (§ 2 The Existential Gap).

⁵⁵ Cf. *Phenomenology and Logic*, 287 (§ 2 The Existential Gap).

⁵⁶ Cf. P. Lambert, C. Tansey and C. Going, eds, *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1982), 194-95.

⁵⁷Cf. *Caring about Meaning*, 236-37.

At this point we could sum up in brief the position of Lonergan on art.

Art is the objectification of a purely experiential pattern.

This experiential pattern is not fully known even to the person who does experience it.

The pattern of experience cannot be conceptualized.

The meaning of an experiential pattern is immediate and elemental; it is at concrete level.

The proper symbolic expression of such elemental meaning is the work of art.

Art is grasping what is or seems to be significant in the purely experiential pattern.

The work of the artist implies a free selection and creative construction of meaning among all the impressions received by sensory receptors.

Artistically differentiated consciousness is a specialist of beauty and its higher attainment is creating.

Art is the abstraction of a form.

The abstracted form is the pattern of internal relations which became idealized.

This pattern, when expressed in art, is a set of internal relations between colors, or volumes, or movements, or tones.

Such internal relations are important whether or not a work of art is representative.

The work of art, that is what is done, is isomorphic with the idealized pattern of experience.

In the particular case in which the work of art is representative, it is isomorphic also with something else, but this is not the point.⁵⁸

Both creative artistic activity and appreciative one are a withdrawal from practical living, a liberation from all the mechanizations and routinizations of sensibility.

The process of objectifying, that is of expressing, such experiential pattern implies to behold, inspect, dissect, enjoy, repeat, recollect, and so to unfold, make explicit, unveil, reveal.

The expression of the experiential pattern, through a conscious process of the artist, introduces a psychic distance, a separation between the artist and his/her experience of the elemental meaning.

⁵⁸According to "The philosophy of art of B. Lonergan" of J. Flanagan, forthcoming, "[b]y rendering representations non-essential to art Lonergan thereby established the autonomy of the artistic objective.

The work of art is an invitation to participate, to reenact the artist's inspiration and intention.

A critic will interpret later, at conceptual and reflexive level, the expression of the elemental meaning carried out by the work of art.

3.2. Cognitive Science on Art

A piece of art is a complex stimulus both sensorial and cultural, and implies a reaction both at the level of mind and of body, including rational and vegetative control. In the artistic experience one may distinguish between an expectation phase and an experience phase (linked to the activity of the limbic system and the arousal of the neocortex) and a final phase of artistic pleasure. Each perception is an active process of categorization and of interpretation, which occur according to the rules of the *Gestalt*, and through which one may discover an intrinsic order and particular proportions, regularities, irregularities, symmetries of the perceived pattern. A model of beauty is produced by the sum of various experiences, as well as by the human capability of creating symbols. Different models are characterizing the different cultures of history (beginning from Upper Paleolithic on): in fact, in each culture some environmental stimuli are common to everyone and, thus, should produce similar changes in the memory and brain organization of everyone.⁵⁹

For what it concerns pictorial art in particular, when it is not abstract, it may attempt to capture the three-dimensional structure of a scene through pictorial depth cues (such as perspective, occlusion, texture gradients), while depth perception by binocular disparity is no longer possible. Also representational errors are used to convey the information on three-dimensional forms, such as the use of lines which are interpreted as sharp discontinuities in depth or texture or brightness also by infants, stone-age tribesmen, and monkeys, even if there are no lines in the real world corresponding to the lines of a drawing.⁶⁰

3.3. Art and Intersubjectivity

⁵⁹Cf. L. Maffei and A. Fiorentini, *Arte e cervello* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1995), 67-73.

⁶⁰Cf. P. Cavanagh, "Pictorial Art and Vision," in R. A. Wilson and F. C. Keil, eds., *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences*, quoted, 648-51.

According to Elizabeth Morelli, there is a tension in the opposition between self-centeredness and self-transcendence, and such tension is experienced as an affect anxiety.⁶¹

Such tension can be found also in some tendencies of artistic production. Dall'Asta⁶² notes the relevance that the body has assumed in the art of XX century. It is a body deconstructed and reconstructed in several ways, treated in several manners, arriving also to the body obsolescence, as if the natural becomes subservient to the technological. According to this author, very often the search for human identity fails, and the person's self-knowledge is not reached, because the manifold artistic research on body is performed in a narcissistic and self-referential way, which is not able of producing communication towards the exterior.

Yet, as Dall'Asta highlights, the incarnated I can recognize the foundation of his/her own identity only in the Other: it is only in another person that the I may find the mirror of him/herself; it is only through the reciprocal act of coming out of oneself, and recognizing the other, who is different, being also recognized by the other, that one experiences his/her own identity.⁶³ Finally, the reciprocal encounter and recognition imply in turn the reciprocal becoming responsible one another.

3.3.1. Body and Intersubjectivity in Pictorial Art

Clearly, the body has a basic relevance in a work of art for the expression not only of the fruitless narcissistic search for one's own identity, according to Dall'Asta, but also of the finding of oneself through the relationship with another, in which the body is no more treated from a closed, self-centered view.

In fact, according to Dietmar Mieth,⁶⁴ one may deduce from the analysis of sociality that any relationship among human beings is only possible by the mediation of corporeity. This holds also for a relationship occurring only through the telephone or the writing: even a purely spiritual relationship can never be

⁶¹Cf. E. Morelli, *Anxiety: A Study of the Affectivity of Moral Consciousness*, PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981, 136.

⁶²Cf. A. Dall'Asta, "La ricerca artistica contemporanea," in *La Civiltà Cattolica* 3725 (2005): 386-98.

⁶³See also Daniel Stern, in § 2.2 above.

⁶⁴Cf. D. Mieth, "Immagine dell'uomo e dignità umana. La prospettiva cristiana della bioetica," Italian trans. and ed. R. Gibellini, *Prospettive teologiche per il XXI secolo* (Queriniana, Brescia 2003), 213-26.

direct, independent of corporeity. Thus, corporeity, in addition of being an absolutely necessary component of human identity, is an indispensable vehicle of the relation which, in turn, is the mean for self-identification.

At this point, one may stress the relevance of many bodily elements, such as reciprocal glance, face expression, position of body, arms, and hands, for the artistic expression of both a narcissistic absence of relationship and a hetero-referential intersubjective relationship. The openness of a hetero-referential relationship is the starting point of the overflowing, in those who are in Christ, from the love of God *super omnia* to the love of the neighbors as themselves.⁶⁵ One may notice that the turning from narcissism to hetero-referential relationship corresponds to the same viewpoint change performed by Jesus through the question that he asked after the end of the parable of the good Samaritan with respect to the question posed to him and which he took as a starting point for the parable itself.⁶⁶

As a conclusion, in Table 1 some examples of both absence of relationships and interpersonal relationships are presented. The first type of examples are taken from the pictorial work *The Dystopia Series* of the Venezuelan Anthony Aziz and Sammy Cucher, in which some men and women, instead of having the face openings constituted by eyes, mouth, and nostrils, have only five depressions of the face surface. The second type of examples are taken from the pictorial work of Giotto at the Cappella degli Scrovegni, Padua, Italy (*Encounter of Johachim and Anna, Birth of Jesus, Washing of feet, Judas kiss, Deposition from the Cross, Resurrection*, all in whole and as a detail), and of Masaccio, *Crucifixion*, at the Museo di Capodimonte, Naples, Italy (in whole and as a detail), as well as from a concrete life situation of the little David Goddard Pérez-Lawrence in interplay with his uncle Gregorio Pérez-Corrasco, in which situation the reciprocal glance appears to be the same as that of Jesus and Mary in Giotto's *Birth of Jesus*.

⁶⁵See § 1 above.

⁶⁶Cf. Luke 10, verse respectively 36 and 29.

MEETING LONERGAN'S CHALLENGE TO EDUCATORS

Raymond Topley
St Patrick's College
Dublin, Ireland

THE TASK ASSIGNED to each of the speakers at the 35th Lonergan Workshop was that of identifying and addressing an element of Bernard Lonergan's legacy in need of emphasis today. The approach that this paper takes to this question is influenced by the professional background of its author. Accordingly, it is necessary to reveal at the outset that I come to Lonergan neither as a philosopher nor a theologian and, most decidedly, neither as a mathematician nor an economist. My field is education and so it is as an educator that I engage with his work and it is from the perspective of education that this paper is presented. My response to the brief comprises, therefore, a reflection on the appropriately adjusted question, "What aspect of Lonergan's Legacy in respect of education needs to be stressed right now?"

Fortunately, from an educational standpoint, Lonergan has much to offer. In 1959 in Cincinnati, Ohio, he dialogued extensively with educators. The content of his presentations over those two-weeks now comprise volume 10 of the Collected Works, namely, *Topics in Education*. At the opening session of that school, Lonergan engaged in a double "put-down," firstly of himself and then of teachers when he famously declared:

"I am not a specialist in education, but I have suffered under educators for very many years."¹ He then issued the following challenge to his audience:

You can listen to me as I speak about philosophy and its relation to theology and to concrete living. But most of the applications, the ironing

¹Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 24.

out of things, will have to be done by you who are in the fields of education and philosophy of education.²

Now the educational community seems to have been slow off the mark in picking up on this challenge. Thirty years later in 1989, Moira Carley records that out of more than seventy doctoral theses on Lonergan's work which she had located, none applied his findings, for instance, to teaching or to teacher education.³ So the kind of practical partnership that Lonergan had hoped for and expected from educators did not, to any great extent, materialize, at least not in the short term. Just what such an 'ironing out of things,' might entail, however, is the focus of this paper.

Support for such a response to Lonergan's practicality call may be garnered from the likes of long-time Lonergan disciple, Fred Crowe when he declared that the "structure of human consciousness in intentionality analysis would be useless unless there was found a way to utilize it"⁴ and Mary C. Boys who once queried, "What would it be like to formulate a pedagogy drawn from a Lonerganian epistemology?"⁵ In other words, the intent, to borrow a phrase from a recent paper by Daniel Helminiak and Barnet Feingold, is to "operationalize Lonergan."⁶ In this vein it is encouraging to note that among the afternoon listings here at Boston College's 35th Lonergan Workshop this week is one entitled 'Making Lonergan Practical.'⁷

I would suggest that these concerns are entirely in keeping with the spirit of Lonergan especially in light of his observation found in the opening pages of *Insight*, "I...hope that... my conclusions provide a base for further

²*Topics in Education*, 24.

³See Moira Teresa Carley, "Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.: On Teaching" (Ed. D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1989), 5.

⁴Frederick E. Crowe, *Lonergan*, (London: Chapman, 1992), 111.

⁵Michael Corso, "Christian Religious Education for Conversion: A Lonerganian Perspective" (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1994), ii. Corso acknowledges that this comment of Boys, when she was teaching him, functioned as a generative factor in his tackling this issue in his dissertation.

⁶Daniel Helminiak and Barnet Feingold, "Being Authentic about Authenticity: Opportunities, Requirements, Applications, and a Progress Report on Measurement," paper presented at the 50th Anniversary Lonergan Halifax Conference, May 30th – June 1st 2008. "As social scientists and disciples of Lonergan, we believe that Lonergan's conceptions, if respectfully and thoughtfully operationalized, can contribute dramatically to improvements in such diverse areas as education, creativity, problem-solving, interpersonal relations, organizational effectiveness, self-care, and counselling and psychotherapy..." 16.

⁷Morag McConville and team, "Making Lonergan Practical," afternoon workshop delivered at 35th Annual Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 15th -20th 2008.

developments.”⁸ Some attempts have been made over the past couple of decades at applying Lonergan to a variety of areas in education such as science, mathematics and economics. In the particular application that follows, however, it is moral education that provides the setting. But which of Lonergan's theories suggests itself as being of most benefit to those in the business of education and teaching? The answer to this question is fairly simple and straightforward. At the heart of education is the question of knowing along with the translation of that knowing into appropriate action. The art and science of education intends the development of the human subject as a knowing and acting being. Little wonder then that it is Lonergan's theory on cognition and the related levels of consciousness that holds out most promise for those working in the classroom and lecture hall. Before considering how an “ironing out” of what Lonergan has to offer in this area might look like it is necessary to revisit his cognitional and behavioral theory as this forms the basis for his take on knowing and doing.

LONERGAN'S THEORETICAL BASIS FOR KNOWING AND DOING

On the presumption that readers of this paper are already sufficiently familiar with Lonergan's cognitional theory and the related levels of consciousness no detailed or extensive description of these will be offered here. Nevertheless, a simple recall of the salient features, no matter how brief, is necessary so as to undergird what is to follow. Lonergan identified four levels of consciousness through which a person passes in authentically coming to knowledge and, subsequently, in deciding how to use this knowledge as a basis for action. He listed these levels as the experiential, the intellectual, the reasonable and the responsible. To each of these he attached what he called a transcendental precept or imperative. Each of these is a “must-do” on the part of the human subject if genuine knowledge of the truth and doing of the good is to ensue. For instance at Level One human subjects or, within an educational context, learners are required to be attentive to the data presented. At Level Two it is necessary for them to be intelligent in probing the detail and significance of the data so as to unearth meaning and attain insight. Level Three requires the exercise of reasonableness in checking that the findings at the previous level are correct and sound thus

⁸Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study in Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 24.

establishing certain knowledge of the truth. Finally, the move to Level Four sees the exercise of responsibility whereby learners decide on courses of action in light of the preceding reflections and judgments.⁹ Throughout all of this intellectual activity the role of the transcendentals is pivotal. Accordingly, one might recall here Hugo Meynell's address in 1976 to the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain when he perceptively noted, "The cultivation of these four dispositions . . . is . . . the basic aim of education"¹⁰ as well as Lonergan's own observation that "authenticity is reached only by long and sustained fidelity to the transcendental precepts."¹¹ The seamless linking of knowing and doing that the levels' theory discloses with great lucidity might also be borne in mind. Knowing and doing are interconnected. Knowing, which is the desired outcome of the first three levels, is preparatory to that of doing which is the business of the fourth level.

However, in order to appreciate as fully as possible how all of this might operate within an educational context it is necessary to make Lonergan's own terminology a bit more user-friendly. Accordingly, appropriate adaptation is necessary. A propos this particular point, Vernon Gregson encouragingly exclaims,

Lonergan suggests that there is a sense in which the levels he has named are revisable and a sense in which they are not. They are certainly revisable in terms of the names he has given them.¹²

In this regard, an alternative term to "Levels of Consciousness" might be worth considering. Australian Lonerganian, Tom Daly, for instance, proposes that of "Learning Levels."¹³ Arguing from the first of Lonergan's famous trinity of

⁹Readers seeking a succinct treatment of Lonergan's Cognitional and Levels of Consciousness Theory are referred to "Cognitional Structure" in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 4 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 205-21; and *Method in Theology* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1991), chap. 1.

¹⁰Hugo Meynell, "On the Aims of Education," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, vol. x (July 1976): 81.

¹¹Bernard Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," in *Authority*, Boston College Studies in Philosophy, vol. 111, ed. F. J. Adelman (Boston: Boston College, 1974), 27.

¹²Vernon Gregson, ed., *The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 24.

¹³See Tom Daly, "Learning Levels," in *Australian Lonergan Workshop*, ed. William Danagher (New York: University Press of America, 1993). Lonergan's theory, he claims is "a theory of learning – in a serious sense of the word, a theory of coming into the possession of knowledge," 233.

questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing?" he maintains that it might more accurately be expressed as "What am I doing when I am coming to know?" or better still, "...when I am learning." This seems a helpful and reasonable suggestion.

Secondly, the labeling of the levels themselves might be reconsidered from the perspective of the principal operation of each one. Accordingly, in place of the Experiential at Level One, it might be better to speak of Data (Attending). Understanding could replace the Intellectual at Level Two, while the simple term Checking captures adequately what Level Three attempts to accomplish. Responding sums up what the final level is all about. Such re-naming as Data (attending), Understanding, Checking and Responding, clearly indicates the challenges that have to be met at each level so as to ensure that genuine intentional educational engagement does in fact occur.

As well as adapting the terminology to the agenda of education, there is also need for some augmentation of the theory and structure itself so as to enhance it and make it more effective in practice. Worthwhile additions of this nature are in line with Lonergan's observation and expressed hope, already noted above, that his own work "provide a base for further developments."¹⁴

The first of these additions concerns the transcendental imperatives. It is essential that these are undertaken by the learner-participants in the course of the educational engagement. This presents a particular challenge for teachers concerning how one can be sure that the imperatives have been adhered to and exercised by the learner participants. In this regard, therefore, this paper proposes a mechanism that might be termed, "Trigger Questions," so called because their function is to trigger the transcendental imperatives, especially if they have not been triggered already. They function in the following manner.

At Level One the teacher presents Data and the learners are meant to be attentive. In all probability some will be attentive, others will not. The way to test if the required degree of attentiveness has occurred is by means of 'Recall Questions' focused on the Data such as who, what, when, where and the like. In respect of those students who have not been attentive up to this point these questions then trigger the required attentiveness. This, in turn, allows for movement to Level Two. Here the search for insight and the exercise of intelligence is triggered by what might conveniently be termed "Research Questions," not so much in the conventional academic sense of that word but

¹⁴*Insight*, 24.

more so in terms of exciting and mobilizing the curiosity and intelligence of learners. At Level Three, 'Reality Questions' such as "Is it real?" "Is it so?" "Is it true?" trigger reasonableness while at Level Four the required educational and learning tasks are brought to the fore by means of "Response Questions" leading to the exercise of responsibility. Some additional light will be shed on the usage of such questioning further on when an exemplar will be considered.

The second educational development applicable to Lonergan's structure concerns Level Four specifically. The task of Level Four is to bring the human subject to the point where he or she is prepared to act in order to bring about the good under consideration. Dealing with learners, particularly ones of a tender age, however, requires wisdom and sensitivity on the part of the pedagogue. Invitation to decision, a key element at this level, should always be that – namely invitation – nothing more, nothing less. It should also be incremental, never too starkly direct and never ever personally intrusive. To achieve this end, however, it needs to be further subdivided into evaluating, deciding and doing. The ultimate educational goal of this level, particularly in the context of, for instance, moral or religious education is the actual doing of the good. However, such doing needs to be preceded by personal decision, which in turn is dependent on an evaluation having been made as to what actually constitutes the good in the situation under consideration. The evaluation stage, therefore, needs to be considered first of all.

Evaluation, understood as judgment of value, kicks in when participants are asked a question requiring either a "yes" or a "no" response. For example, concerning a particular character in a story learners might be asked if the person in question was right to do what they did. Depending on the answer given they are then challenged to ground their response by supplying an additional answer to the justification question, Why?/Why not? It is never enough just to offer an opinion, for example, "she was right" or "it was wrong." So, by this juncture, a judgment of value, a commitment, has been made as to the rightness or otherwise of an action. The journey from this objective judgment to subjectively following through in personal action is then made via the process of decision-making. This is what now occurs. As has already been indicated, decision making needs to be approached sensitively. This can be achieved through incrementalizing the decision-making process by sectioning it according to the imaginary, the general and the particular thus enabling the participants to come at decision both tangentially and gently.

First of all, the learners are placed in the imaginary situation as depicted in the story presented as data and asked how they might act in that particular context

were they to find themselves as actors therein particularly in light of the judgment of value they have just made. This imaginary zone thus provides a safe environment, somewhat akin to a moral laboratory, in which to consider options, and is, consequently, less threatening for them. The next stage is that of generalization. Learners are taken out of the story and asked to articulate how they think they themselves might desire to act in somewhat similar circumstances were they to emerge in their lives. Again, consistency with the value judgment made in the first instance should follow through here. Both the imaginary and the general are aspirational and idealistic. However, the final decisional stage, particularization, does not shirk the difficult personal decisions in need of address. Here participants are challenged to be specific regarding the details of their response. They are encouraged to actually think of and name for themselves an actual person they might assist as well as detailing the particularities of time, place, action and the like. Concerning this it is sobering to recall Lonergan's emphasis on the importance of the concrete particular especially in respect of the doing of the good, a point that also claims the attention of William Blake in his poem, *Jerusalem*,

The one "who would do good to another, must do it in Minute Particulars, General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer."¹⁵

This relationship between the general and the particular is also well commented upon by Terry Tekippe, a long time student of Lonergan's work, when he says,

The morality derivable from the structures of knowing . . . remain general. But actual moral choices are between particular courses of action, to be performed by a particular person, in a particular situation.¹⁶

Finally, the stage of doing is reached. However, within a classroom setting and session the process can only go as far as decision but no further. The actual implementation of the decision, the doing of the good, is something that normally occurs elsewhere and at another time. Nevertheless, before bringing the curtain down on the teaching and learning event there is one further consideration and it involves providing an opportunity for educational or artistic expression of the decisions made. Participants can express their decisions, for example, by means of creative writing, drawing, dramatizing or acting out. Also, depending on the

¹⁵William Blake, "Jerusalem," chap. 60-62.

¹⁶Terry Tekippe, *What Is Lonergan up to in Insight?: A Primer* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 153.

nature of the topic and on social sensibilities, there may be some merit in returning to the topic at a later date when an opportunity for sharing on efforts made to implement decisions could be afforded to the learners. Decisions relating to social justice issues, care of the earth and the like, might suggest themselves as being appropriate for just such an exercise.

THE APPLICATION IN PRACTICE

Having mapped out theoretically how educators might fruitfully respond to Lonergan's Cincinnati "ironing out" challenge there now remains the task of illustrating graphically how this might work out in practice. This will be done by means of an exemplar. The particular topic chosen for this purpose derives from moral education and focuses on the ever-demanding social task of extending the hand of forgiveness to one's contemporaries. The particular story chosen as the data for the lesson is that known popularly as the Prodigal Son but which, perhaps, might more accurately be named the Forgiving Father. The story will be shorn of its religious context and so will be presented with reference neither to its originating religious storyteller nor to any of its religious interpretations. It has been chosen simply because it is so well known (hence dispensing with the task of having to provide a new or less familiar story) and also because it is such a good illustration of an actual true life social drama. What the exemplar seeks to illustrate is not just the progression of a class lesson along 'Lonergan lines' but also the respective roles of teacher and learners. Accordingly, goals will be articulated and an ordered strategy of teaching will be spelt out.

The lesson in question has just two simple aims or objectives, a cognitional one and a behavioral or lifestyle one. Arising from this lesson it is hoped that participants will acquire a knowledge of the story and its moral and that they would then so engage with it as to come to a personal stance regarding whether or not to adopt the virtue of forgiving in their own living. The following teaching strategy seeks to achieve these goals.

Level One focuses on some particular datum or other. In this instance the teacher presents the story of the Forgiving Father, verbally, visually, dramatically or, perhaps, a combination of some of these. All that the learners have to do is attend to the data presented. To ensure that this is indeed the case the teacher poses Recall Questions such as "Who are the people in the story?" "When and where does it take place?" "What happens?" etc. These are simple recall

questions, mostly pedantic and uninteresting. However, one might recall here Lonergan's observation in chapter 6 of *Insight* that "to meet interesting questions," as will be the case further along the structure, "one has to begin from quite uninteresting ones."¹⁷ Once satisfied that the required degree of attending has been accomplished it is time to move on to the next level.

At Level Two basic understanding of the dynamic of the story and its underlying meanings are sought as well as connections with the life and experience of the participants themselves. This may be accomplished by means of open-ended questions such as, "What do you think is really going on here?" "Why do you think the father wanted his son back?" Ideally, some insights will emerge. At some stage, however, the teacher needs to move on from being the main questioner to endeavoring to evoke from the learners themselves, questions of their own sparked off by the data or story or associations emerging within themselves and derived from their own experiences. "Are there any questions arising in your own minds about all of this that have not yet been mentioned?" or "Is there anything interesting or curious buzzing around in your head about it?" Incidentally, at this stage there is no tackling of values, just opinions and ideas being brought to the surface by way of assisting in the attainment of insight. The acquisition of some insights, meanings, solutions and connections prepare the ground for the next level.

Level Three is about making judgments. It consists in checking the evidence unearthed at the previous levels and the raising of questions such as "Is all of this true?" or "Have we got to the heart of the matter?" or "Can we say with certainty that . . . ?" It can be initiated by the teacher providing, for instance, a summary of the class discussion and leading to such questions concerning this particular story as, "Is it true that the father in the story did genuinely and lovingly forgive his son and invite him back with no pre-conditions?" "And can we say that this kind of thing happens not just in stories like this but in every day life as well?" These are judgments of fact requiring the assent or otherwise of the participants. The learning community is involved here in a way different than at the preceding levels. Here a commitment to a personal judgment has to be made. Once this stage has been reached then it is time to move on into the end zone where judgments of value, based on what has been unearthed at Levels One to Three, precede the making of personal decisions leading possibly to some behavioral adjustment and culminating ultimately in action. Such is the work of Level Four.

¹⁷*Insight*, 197.

The role of the teacher prior to the Responding stage is relatively straightforward. From hereon in, however, the teacher has to exercise a very disciplined line of questioning if the goals of the lesson are to be fully achieved and within a reasonable timeframe. It is essential to keep in mind the particular focus of the lesson and to stay with it without straying into other areas or concerns. As regards this particular lesson, the issue is that of taking a stand on whether to be a forgiving type of person or not. Accordingly, the focus and ensuing questioning has to be on that character in the story who best exhibits this quality of forgiveness and on no one else. It is this character who is given center-stage. The remaining characters function in supportive roles merely. Intentional questioning therefore will proceed along the following lines as the lesson progresses from evaluation through decision to doing.

a) Evaluating: Was the father right to forgive the son in this instance? The answer does not allow a fudge and has to be either a yes or a no. Once that commitment answer is given the justification or grounding question is put, "Why?"/"Why not?" It should be noted here that the freedom of the individual learner should be accorded the utmost respect. The no answer is as valid as the yes answer once a satisfactory justification reason can be offered. However, what must be borne in mind is that once the commitment answer of yes or no is given then the rest of the answers should be consistent with this evaluative stance taken by each individual learner in the journey to doing.

b) Deciding: In assisting learners, particularly younger ones, to come to a position on an issue such as this, use can be made of certain "crutch"¹⁸ or support words, that then serve to introduce each of the subsections. The following three are suggested: "If," "When," and "Name." "If" introduces the imaginary stage along the lines of: "If you then had been there in the story as the father would you have done the same as he did?" "When?" is the crutch word in respect of the general: "When you find yourself in a similar situation sometime in the future how do you think you would like to act?" "Name" serves to highlight the need for particularity in that learners are asked to be quite specific and to actually name someone they might be in a position to forgive sometime. Such a person could, for instance, be a family member, neighbor or an acquaintance. The participants would detail

¹⁸*Insight*, 202, where he refers to "the crutches of method."

and name what they would do, when, where, how, etc. thus visualizing their response in a form of "antecedent willingness."¹⁹

c) Doing: The classroom lesson thus brings the participants to the brink of the doing of the good. It can proceed no further. The doing of the good normally occurs beyond the confines of the learning environment. However, before formally concluding the session there is one further educational possibility. The decisions made by the participants could be given, if circumstances and sensibilities permit, educational or artistic expression as a way of enhancing the lesson and reinforcing the decision made. The teacher might announce to the class something along the following lines: 'For now, why not write about what you have decided or draw it or act it out. If anyone wants to share this with the others they are welcome to do so. In a few weeks time we might return to this again and anyone who wishes to talk about their efforts to put their decision into practice will have a chance to do so then.' By this stage the lesson has run full circle from Data to Doing. We are now in a position to analyze its benefits in respect of education itself as well as of learners and teachers.

ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS

As regards education the main benefit is that what might be called here the Lonergan approach recognizes and values educational process. Awareness of what this approach has to offer places in relief two distinct approaches to learning, one of which might be termed the Short-Cut, the other the Long-Trek. The Short-Cut merely shoots directly from Data to Doing, similar to the banking system of education critiqued by Ivan Illich. Sometimes referred to as the doctrinal approach, particularly in the context of religious education, for instance, it consists mainly in one person or group telling others what they are expected to know and believe on the one hand and how they are expected to behave and act on the other. It is a top-down indoctrinational approach. Contrasted with this is the Long -Trek way of proceeding. As exemplified above it entails journeying from Data through Understanding and Checking and on then to Evaluating,

¹⁹See Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, vol. 5 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), where Lonergan speaks of "a development in the will of willingness, a habituation of the will, that comes as a result of making choices" (229-30).

Deciding and Doing. It is more demanding on both teachers and learners and it may even appear more tedious. Educationally, however, it is a much more enlightened approach.

This leads on to the second benefit, that which accrues to the human subjects as learners. The process as outlined here respects learners as fully functioning human subjects. Participants in the process are allowed to remain in charge of their own destiny which they strive to attain through an exercise of freedom as opposed to being subjected to an indoctrinational approach which would bypass or ignore the essential stages of personal development and choice. In this way they are enabled to constitute both themselves and their world.

The full extent of the cognitional, moral, and other benefits inherent in such an educational engagement in the long-term may be glimpsed by reference to what Lonergan terms 'pursuits' appropriate to each of the four levels.²⁰ He sees Level One as entailing an artistic pursuit of beauty and so one might conclude that what is brought to birth at this level in the learner-participant is the artist. Likewise the second level's scientific pursuit of understanding can engender the scientist in each one. The philosophic pursuit of truth at the next level brings the philosopher to the fore while at the final level with its moral pursuit of goodness there emerges the saint, mystic, lover or, simply, the truly altruistic or good person. The seeds of each of these qualities and vocations may thus be understood as being planted and nurtured in and through the faithful, frequent and skilful implementation of such an approach to teaching by educators.

The final beneficiaries of this way of educating are teachers themselves. A Lonergan-based approach provides them with a solidly grounded methodology. As such they know what they are about, where they are headed and how to get there. Of particular benefit to teachers is the theoretical framework that the levels' approach provides in respect of questioning. Questions drive forward the search for new knowledge and contribute to the elucidation of the way forward in the constitution of oneself and one's world. Not only are teachers enlightened as to what type of questions to ask at the various levels and for what purpose but they also find that what they have at their disposal is a tool for analyzing where individual learners or specific groups of learners are located or suspended at any given stage of the lesson. This in turn facilitates the application of remedial adjustment along the way, should such a course of action be necessary.

²⁰*Method in Theology*, 13.

Besides identifying benefits through rational analysis of the approach under consideration one can also have recourse to feedback from practitioners on the ground. The following examples are provided by student-teachers who taught a number of lessons along the lines outlined above.²¹ Their findings are both illuminating and encouraging. One teacher noted: "At first I was skeptical. It seemed too structured, too rigid. However, having put it into practice, I found it a very easy and comfortable way of teaching a lesson. What the child says becomes the basis for the next question. It is a very child-centered approach to teaching" while another declared, "I was amazed at some of the responses given by the children in the response part of the lesson. The children were divided in half regarding whether the father was right in welcoming back the son. One response given by a child was, 'The father was correct in welcoming back his son because otherwise he would lose his son as well as his money'."

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion the following claims are made: Firstly, arising out of Lonergan's own invitation to partnership, the 'ironing out of things' is a legitimate and necessary aspect of his legacy. Secondly, the educational proposal offered here is a workable and worthwhile attempt at such an 'ironing out.' Thirdly, without ongoing commitment to making Lonergan practical, the Lonergan Enterprise itself risks becoming just another unfinished symphony! And finally, in response to the Conference's brief, such a response is in need of emphasis today.

²¹The first sharing is from DNS, Mary Immaculate College, Limerick (1993) and the second from MK, Colaiste Mhuire, Marino, Dublin (2000). For more along the same lines see Raymond Topley, "Bernard Lonergan's Cognitional Theory applied to Christian Religious Education," (Doctoral dissertation, Graduate Theological Foundation, 2004), appendices. Copies shelved at the Lonergan Institute, Bapst Library, Boston College, the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto, and the Lonergan Centre, Milltown Park, Dublin.

IMPLICIT THEOLOGY,
AUTHENTIC SUBJECTIVITY,
AND KARL RAHNER'S
"ANONYMOUS CHRISTIAN"

Nikolaus Wandinger
University of Innsbruck
Austria

SOME TIME AGO, the Communicative Theology research group at our faculty in Innsbruck asked me to write a kind of introductory article¹ to what we called *implicit theology*, as they but also me were often using the term – and we had some kind of implicit understanding but had never explicated that. (As you can see, the very act of writing the article was already an exercise in implicit theology). When Fred Lawrence then asked me about a topic for my presentation at the 2008 Lonergan Workshop, it occurred to me that this implicit theology in fact has a lot to do with the Lonergan quotation that – at least in recent years – engages me most: it is his insistence in the chapter on *Foundations in Method in Theology* that “genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”² And both of these things – implicit theology and authentic subjectivity – also have to do with what Rahner calls his theologoumenon of the anonymous Christian. With some rearrangement this makes already for the structure of my paper: First I want to give you a brief introduction to what we meant by *implicit theology*; already here I will try to find some common ground with Lonergan. Second, I would like to connect this idea to Karl Rahner’s theologoumenon of the anonymous Christian. And thirdly I will aspire to relate those two to Lonergan’s notion of authenticity and the three kinds of conversions he analyzes; from here I can

¹Nikolaus Wandinger, “Zur Rede von einer ‘impliziten Theologie’. Versuch einer Begriffsklärung”, in C. Drexler, and M. Scharer (ed.) *An Grenzen lernen. Neue Wege in der theologischen Didaktik* (Kommunikative Theologie 6, 2004), Mainz: Grünewald, 189-212. Also available online: <http://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/leseraum/texte/689.html>.

²Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 292.

express why I think that Lonergan's insistence on objectivity being reached only through authentic subjectivity is so important for our day.

“IMPLICIT THEOLOGY”

The general idea behind that concept is that there might even be religious or theological assumptions behind a human conduct that does not see itself as religious or theological. Here I am not yet thinking of nonreligious persons – that would be begging the question with regard to Rahner's anonymous Christian. For the moment I am thinking about believing Christians when they are engaged in their everyday lives in such a way that they do not reflect about their being Christians or about how to live their faith. You might be shopping, or consider whom to invite for your birthday party, or how to resolve a conflict you had with a family member or friend. One could, of course, do all of these things taking one's faith explicitly into account. However, I think it is likely that most people will not do so most of the time, and still the way they do these things might be influenced by their faith – or might not, meaning that the commitment with which they live their faith is – at least relatively – independent from the degree to which they thematize it.

Philosophical Considerations

Let us go from here to a more general frame. A religious faith can philosophically be understood as a *Weltanschauung*, that is, a framework of convictions, attitudes, judgments by which a person lives, according to which he or she shapes her or his life. Otto Muck has described a *Weltanschauung* as the framework by which persons spontaneously understand what they encounter in life.³ This framework is not merely conceptual; it is a “set of life-carrying convictions and values” on which persons rely “to evaluate all that they experience”⁴ and to react to it. A *Weltanschauung* moreover is a person's “most extensive [...] framework [of that kind], since it is not specialized for one range of experience or questions, but is the all encompassing horizon for the totality of one's life and experience.”⁵

³Otto Muck, “Assumptions of a Classical Philosophy of God,” *Milltown Studies*, 33 (1994): 48.

⁴Muck, “Assumptions of a Classical Philosophy of God,” 48.

⁵Muck, “Assumptions of a Classical Philosophy of God,” 48.

In Lonergan's terms, I think, a *Weltanschauung* would be an "integral heuristic structure."⁶ Muck introduces his *Weltanschauung* in the same context in which Lonergan refers to the integral heuristic structure: the meaning of classical metaphysics. So, a general ontology, based on concepts that have not only been nominally but operatively defined is the common ground for Muck's and Lonergan's transposition of scholastic metaphysics into a modern discourse. Lonergan also talks about an implicit definition in this case.⁷ An implicit definition defines a concept by pointing out the relationship between the objects referred to; in many cases these relationships are functional or operative.

So, in a metaphysics, terms can be implicitly defined by explaining the function they have in relation to one another and to the whole structure. Once they are also nominally defined, the integral heuristic structure becomes an explicit metaphysics. What does all this have to do with implicit theology?

A metaphysics is certainly an excellent example for a *Weltanschauung* or an integral heuristic structure, but it is not the only one. Most -isms, like secularism, Marxism and so on, are also frameworks by which a person might live and act, and so are religious faiths. I will argue that every *Weltanschauung* that deals with questions of "ultimate concern" in fact is religious, whether its adherents acknowledge this or not. The question, of course, immediately arises: if all those are *Weltanschauungen*, are there criteria to distinguish valid or adequate structures from inadequate ones? Indeed there are, but this is not my point here.⁸ Here I merely want to make clear that all conceptually developed heuristic structures that purport to provide general orientation in life can be addressed as explicit *Weltanschauungen*, while the heuristic structure that actually guides a person is their lived *Weltanschauung* – which might or might not coincide with the explicit one.

In fact, Muck has provided us with an operative definition of *Weltanschauung*, which furthermore enables us to distinguish a merely operative one from an explicated one – or in different words: an implicit from an explicit

⁶Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, vol. 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 417.

⁷*Insight*, 37.

⁸Otto Muck, "Assumptions of a Classical Philosophy of God," 49. Lonergan mentions as minimal conditions for adequacy: freedom of contradiction, internal coherence, grounding in experience, openness to all realms of human experience.

Weltanschauung.⁹ Muck argues: A lived *Weltanschauung* “should not be confused with an ‘official’ *Weltanschauung* or ideology. Still, a lived *Weltanschauung* often entails the complete or partial acceptance or rejection of such explicitly formulated views of life, for example, basic doctrines of a certain religious creed. If so, these formulated convictions are understood in a certain interpretation.”¹⁰ Conversely an explicit *Weltanschauung* can be understood as the attempt to cast an implicit one into words. Both do have theoretical and operative (i.e., practical) content. However, the theoretical seems to be primary in the explicit, the operative in the implicit *Weltanschauung*.¹¹ This and the fact that every interpretation is limited in its adequacy are reasons why we have to expect grave variances of meaning and therefore difficulties in communicating *Weltanschauungen*.

Yet, not everyone adheres to a “creed,” be it religious or not. So, do these people still have a *Weltanschauung*? According to Muck’s introduction of the term, they do: because everyone has a set of convictions by which they react to the world, integrate new experiences into their overall knowledge and act. So, according to that definition: everyone lives by a *Weltanschauung* but not everyone names their set of convictions and calls them a *Weltanschauung*. Still, is it true that everyone lives by a set of convictions by which they react to the world? Some people live in a kind of postmodern patchwork attitude: they claim to have no fixed set of convictions but decide anew, as any new situation allows and demands. However, this attitude exactly meets the operative definition of a *Weltanschauung* we gained from Muck, although that *Weltanschauung* does not fulfill the criterion of non-contradiction, as could be shown by an argument of retorsion¹² – but this again is not our task today. Adherents of such a patchwork attitude would, of course, not admit that. They would deny that they lived by a *Weltanschauung*. Just by living according to these precepts, however, they prove that it is an implicit *Weltanschauung*. The disagreement between me and them

⁹John Henry Newman, “Sermon XIII: Implicit and Explicit Reason,” *Newman’s University Sermons. Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford 1926-43* (large paperbacks 18), (London: SPCK, 25, 1970), 1-277. Already John Henry Newman distinguished Implicit and Explicit Reason in his 13th Oxford sermon. Cf. Newman 1970,

¹⁰Otto Muck, “Rationale Strukturen des Dialogs über Glaubensfragen,” in *Rationalität und Weltanschauung. Philosophische Untersuchungen*, ed. W. Löffler, (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1999), 106-51, 132, my own translation.

¹¹Muck, “Rationale Strukturen des Dialogs über Glaubensfragen,” 134-35.

¹²Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method*, trans. W. D. Seidensticker (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 129-30.

about whether they live by a *Weltanschauung* is precisely a consequence of the limitations of any interpretation and the resulting difficulties. A decision about which interpretation – theirs or mine – is more adequate could be made by clarifying which interpretation can answer more relevant questions¹³ – it seems likely, however, that agreement could only be reached by expanding the range of common experiences.¹⁴

We can summarize: In order to qualify an attitude as an (implicit) *Weltanschauung* it is not required that the person who lives by that attitude agrees with that qualification. It suffices that the operative definition of *Weltanschauung*, “framework by which a person lives” is fulfilled.

If the lived and thus implicit *Weltanschauung* is the set of convictions that guides persons in their lives, then it should theoretically be possible to draw inferences from their conduct toward their *Weltanschauung*. This is certainly no easy matter because it can only work when several conditions are fulfilled, among them certainly: 1) The interpretation I accord another person's conduct must be correct. 2) The person's conduct really must be in accordance with their convictions and come from the depth of their person, otherwise it could be merely accidental or superficial. These conditions are very hard to fulfill – and even harder to ascertain – so these back-inferences to other people's *Weltanschauungen* are very problematic and volatile. But that is a problem for concrete judgments, not for the general concept of an implicit *Weltanschauung*.

IMPLICIT *WELTANSCHAUUNG* AS IMPLICIT THEOLOGY

Let us now devote some energy to the question of whether every *Weltanschauung* can be called an implicit theology. The question is: Is every *Weltanschauung* also a theology or just some?

Wolfhart Pannenberg adopts Rudolf Bultmann's description of God as “the all-determining reality.”¹⁵ Pannenberg takes this description in an objective sense and concludes from it: The answer to the question “which objects of our experience relate us to God?” can only be: all. If the term “God” refers to the all-determining reality, then everything must prove to be determined by that reality;

¹³Muck, “Wahrheit und Verifikation,” esp. 83-93.

¹⁴Cf. the schema in Muck, “Rationale Strukturen des Dialogs über Glaubensfragen,” 142-43.

¹⁵Wolfhart Pannenberg. *Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie*, 1st ed. (Frankfurt/M, 1973), 304.

without it, it must be incomprehensible in a final analysis.¹⁶ For Pannenberg, however, this is only a hypothesis to be strengthened or weakened by further inquiry. It supports our hypothesis that even the so called secular is not without a relation toward the divine. Yet, this is not sufficient to argue our claim that there is such a thing as an implicit theology. From Pannenberg we can only infer that every objective reality is related to God. We cannot infer that every implicit attitude of a person also contains implicit propositions about God. For that we would need a subjective interpretation of Bultmann's dictum.

Let us try such a subjective reading: The entity that occupies the position of the all-determining reality within the framework of a person's *Weltanschauung* functions in this *Weltanschauung*, as God functions in monotheism. Thus it is possible to discover implicitly theistic content in explicitly atheistic *Weltanschauungen* (e.g., what is the all-determining element in Marxism or Capitalism?) and to detect such elements in not explicitly formulated attitudes that nevertheless ground a person's life (what might be the all-determining reality in the everyday life of a Western teenager or an Asian slum dweller?).

Other priorities and precepts will be developed from the basis of the perceived all-determining reality of one's life, and thus depend on it: What is worth living (or even dying) for? How do I conduct myself in certain situations, and so forth? Thus we can even argue that such an implicit theology does not only contain an implicit doctrine of God, but also an implicit moral theology or a theology of the human person, etc.

Paul Tillich goes a step further because his definition of faith already contains a reference to the believing subject. He defines faith as being grasped by that which is of ultimate concern to us.¹⁷ Thus, while Pannenberg emphasizes the relation all objective reality has toward God, Tillich emphasizes the human subject's relation to God. His definition can be understood in an objective and a subjective sense, too. Objectively, "to live by the true faith" would thus be to be grasped by that which *really* concerns us ultimately. Subjectively it means: every *Weltanschauung* that contains elements of which the person holding that *Weltanschauung* is convinced that they are of ultimate concern contains elements of religious faith. This is, of course, a Biblical insight: the question of what I think is of ultimate concern to me is the question about my faith: "For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also." (Luke 12:34)

¹⁶Pannenberg, *Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie*, 304.

¹⁷Paul Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 8: *Offenbarung und Glaube. Schriften zur Theologie II*, (Stuttgart. 1970), 111.

Both Pannenberg's and Tillich's definitions contain theoretical and operative elements, whereby I think Pannenberg emphasizes the former and Tillich the latter. Both also show that theoretical and operative elements are closely linked with each other, though not necessarily bound together. From the two I gain the confidence to state now: Every *Weltanschauung* in which something functions as all-determining reality or which contains something that the person holding the *Weltanschauung* believes to be of ultimate concern implicitly contains theological elements and can in that sense be called an implicit theology. Since *Weltanschauung* was defined as an attitude that guides one's whole life, every *Weltanschauung* fulfills these criteria, for "to be of ultimate" concern and "to guide one's whole" life seem to be coextensive expressions.

That entails by no means that all *Weltanschauungen*, or all implicit theologies, are the same. The all-determining reality, which is of ultimate concern to us, can be understood very differently (e.g., as a benign or a malevolent person, as indifferent or a non-personal entity etc.) and this has further repercussions for one's outlook on life and other attitudes (e.g., a pessimistic or an optimistic outlook). It may seem strange that all this could be implicit in a person's consciousness without their realizing it. Karl Rahner, however, has shown that this is not so strange after all. Rahner's theology of grace builds on his conviction that human beings have experiences, insights, and attitudes which are not explicitly known to them but influence their conscious behavior in such a way that they must be called "conscious" in some sense. I prefer to call them indirectly conscious.¹⁸ Rahner, however, claims even more:

"Unexpressed impulses, basic dispositions and attitudes, which escape total clarification by reflexion, are of more comprehensive significance for the totality of our spiritual life in certain circumstances than what is objectively recognized and expressed. A conscious logic, for example, holds sway in man's mind even when he has never spent a moment's thought on logic."¹⁹

¹⁸For my discussion of Rahner's use of "conscious," "known," and "unknown" and the introduction of the terminology "directly" or "indirectly conscious" See Wandinger *Die Sündenlehre als Schlüssel zum Menschen. Impulse K. Rahners und R. Schwagers zu einer Heuristik theologischer Anthropologie*. Beiträge zur mimetischen Theorie 16, (Münster: LIT, 2003), esp. 119-24.

¹⁹Karl Rahner, "The Theological Concept of *Concupiscentia*," *Theological Investigations 1: God, Christ, Mary, and Grace* (Baltimore, MD: Helicon, 1961), 378.

Rahner's mention of logic here makes clear that indirect consciousness is not some abstruse construct, but a fact of our everyday lives. Indeed most people, even children from a certain age on, utilize the basic precepts of logic without being able to state them as logical laws, because very few people are trained logicians. Therefore their directly conscious thinking is guided by an indirectly conscious logic, which most of them could not even verbalize when asked to do so. Then, Rahner claims that the indirectly conscious might even be more important than the directly conscious. Why is that so? One reason is certainly that every verbalization is, as Muck explained, a limited interpretation. Another reason, which bears special theological significance, is that human persons are influenced to a greater degree by impulses that are not immediately accessible in self-reflection than by those we can directly reflect on. That insight is not, as one might suspect, a result of modern psychoanalysis; rather, Rahner has shown, it follows from the conception of freedom that the Christian faith entails.

Long before psychoanalysts discovered the unconscious, theology supposed that the ultimate tendencies and desires of the human heart are eventually beyond our reach of self-examination. The real reason for the Christian theological tenet that we cannot know about our soteriological state is not God's sovereignty or arbitrariness, as some theological schools have maintained, but the unfathomable mystery the human heart poses to itself.²⁰ Such an idea is behind the liturgical use to ask God's forgiveness of those sins that are hidden before ourselves.²¹ This allows for two interpretations: 1) I simply sometimes do not act in accordance with my *Weltanschauung* – a phenomenon we all know. This might especially be the case when our conduct does not really come from the core of our person and might be more or less accidental. However 2) it might also be the case that I do not act in accordance with my *stated, explicit Weltanschauung* because in fact I do not live by the precepts I think I live by. I might have a different agenda, hidden even from me, yet nevertheless operative in my behavior. In that case, my implicit *Weltanschauung* would be different from my explicit one. There would be a discrepancy between my stated faith and the integral structure that in fact guides my life.

This will, of course, be always the case to a certain degree, unless I were already a fully perfected saint. But if the degree is a large one, I would have a real

²⁰Karl Rahner, "Theology of Freedom", *Theological Investigations 6: Concerning Vatican Council II* (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), esp. 191.

²¹Cf. already Psalm 19:13, see also: Karl Rahner "Vom Geheimnis Menschlicher Schuld und Göttlicher Vergebung," *Geist und Leben*, 1982, esp. 45.

problem: I might, for example, state that I believed in a loving, merciful and forgiving God, but in fact live my life in a subdued, fearful and scrupulous way. Chances are that my implicit theology is different from my explicit one; chances are that I believe in a suppressive, frightening and vengeful God, although I profess the opposite. I hope you will agree with me that such a discrepancy is the very sign of unauthenticity in Lonergan's sense, and therefore is a sign of a deficient conversion. However, before I attend to that more closely, let me briefly turn to Karl Rahner's theologoumenon of the anonymous Christian.

KARL RAHNER'S ANONYMOUS CHRISTIAN

In a Nutshell

It might even be worse with me than in the stated example: I might profess faith in God's grace and based on that hope for eternal life, and yet I might live my life in a way that betrayed a very different implicit theology of death: one that considered death as a final, irrevocable threshold, the end of my existence; as no different than any materialist or naturalist would. My conversion would be so unauthentic that while I professed to be a Christian, I in fact lived like a materialist and had an implicit *Weltanschauung* negating God's saving power – or maybe even God's very existence.

Now, I think, what Karl Rahner has in mind when he talks about the possibility – not the certainty – that there are anonymous Christians,²² is just the opposite situation. Someone might profess their conviction that death is the ultimate end of their existence because there is no higher being to be addressed as God, and yet they might conduct their lives in a way that betrayed their hope for an eternal significance of their lives, combined with a trust in existence that was different from a believer's trust in God only by not naming it thus.

Rahner, of course, has his own way to interpret that possibility. He is certain that, if and when such trust occurs, it cannot be by pure chance or by human achievement alone, it is a gift of divine grace. And as such, it is by its very nature

²²Karl Rahner, "Anonymous Christians," *Theological Investigations 6: Concerning Vatican Council II* (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), 390-98; and "Observations on the Problem of the 'Anonymous Christian,'" *Theological Investigations 14: Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church, The Church in the World* (New York: Seabury, 1976), 280-94.

supernatural. It is, indeed, salvific faith, Rahner argues referring to *Ad Gentes* No. 7 where the council declares:

Therefore, though God in ways known to Himself can lead those inculpably ignorant of the Gospel to find that faith without which it is impossible to please Him (Heb. 11:6), yet a necessity lies upon the Church (1 Cor. 9:16), and at the same time a sacred duty, to preach the Gospel.²³

This contains two important points: 1) The main clause emphasizes the importance of the church's work of evangelization. 2) The concessive clause acknowledges that God can save people without their knowing the Gospel, yet not without their having faith. So the council emphasizes that those saved outside the church – a possibility of which it speaks repeatedly (cf. LG 14-16; GS 22; NA 1) – that is, those who are saved without professing the Christian faith, still have a kind of faith that is salvific. And since the Council in the mentioned passages also reinforces the teaching that salvation is impossible without grace, it follows that divine grace can lead people to live by a faith that they nevertheless don't profess. This amounts to an implicit faith, whose tenets we could call an implicit theology, and Rahner calls persons who live in such a way anonymous Christians.

The question occurs of whether Rahner's theologoumenon can do justice to the council's insistence on the importance of evangelization as well? I think it can, for Rahner writes:

the theory [of anonymous Christians] ascribes to these justified pagans [...] a real, albeit unexplicitated or, if we like to put it so, rudimentary faith. This is of course not to deny that this faith as it exists in the pagan is properly speaking designed to follow its own inherent dynamism in such a way as to develop into that faith which is objectified and articulated through the gospel, that faith which we simply call the Christian faith. The seed has no right to seek not to grow into a plant. But the fact that it is not yet developed into a plant is no reason for refusing to give the name which we give to the plant destined to grow from it to the seed as well.²⁴

So in fact, if the church conducts her work of evangelization well, it becomes the much needed help for that seed to grow, for the anonymous Christian to discover what really guides his or her life, for the inherent dynamism to unfold – or in my

²³All documents of the Second Vatican Council quoted according to Catholic Information Network 1997.

²⁴Rahner "Observations on the Problem of the 'Anonymous Christian,'" 291.

terminology for implicit faith and its implicit theological assumptions to become explicit.

Biblical Support

I want to mention two more instances of Biblical support for what we are talking about. The first will be about implicit theology in general, the second about Rahner's anonymous Christian.

For me, one of the most impressive parables the Gospels tell us is that of the Prodigal Son or Merciful Father or – as Pope Benedict named it in his recent book on Jesus – that of the Two Brothers.²⁵ It is situated in an argument Jesus has with scribes and Pharisees who chastise him for consorting with sinners. In defense of his conduct Jesus tells three parables: of the lost 100th sheep (Luke 15:3-7), of the lost silver coin (Luke 15:8-10), and the one I am concerned with. All three parables latch on to an everyday situation for Jesus' contemporaries. In all three the situation gets highly problematic but finally finds a happy ending and subsequent jubilation. Only at the end of the first two parables does Jesus introduce a theological level by drawing comparisons with the joy in heaven for converted sinners. Thus a comparison, no implicit theology – one might say, if it were not for the third parable.

This parable contains no explicit comparison, no reference to God or heaven whatsoever. Readers of the parable have to add that reference themselves from the context – which is of course no matter of ingenuity. Thus everyone understands that the father in the parable stands for Jesus' heavenly father and the two sons for types of sinful human persons; everyone understands that not only the emotions of the characters in the parable, but their whole conduct, their attitudes, the web of their relations are mirror images of the conduct, the attitudes and webs of relations between God and human beings. But this is more than a mere comparison. It is a real analogy that is easily understood from the context without resorting to explicit theological language.

One could argue that in this parable Jesus utilizes the theology implicit in this (dysfunctional) rump-family to engage in explicit theology. Jesus did this not only in this parable, though it is a very striking example. Rather Christian theology, from the beginning, was to a high degree implicit theology, because Jesus' life and conduct, for example, his habit of attending meals together with sinners, was

²⁵Benedict XVI (Ratzinger, Joseph), *Jesus von Nazareth. Erster Teil: Von der Taufe im Jordan bis zur Verklärung*. (Freiburg: Herder, 2007), 242-52.

a theological statement. Jesus' passion and death were not accidents without any connection to Jesus' message either. On the contrary they were the result of the rejection of his message by the religious and political establishment of his day and his upholding of this message even unto death. Thus his conduct in the passion becomes itself a part of the message, which modifies this message in an important way.²⁶ Thus, in fact, the Christology we encounter in the New Testament is to a large degree an implicit Christology, the explicit formulations of Christological professions are scarce and their meaning is still unclear, which necessitated a long history of controversies until an explicit Christological dogma could emerge.

Yet, isn't merely Jesus' conduct theologically relevant for Christians because they profess him to be the Son of God? Might these things be theologically relevant only in his person but not in anybody else? Such a viewpoint overlooks the seriousness of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. It affirms that in this divine act human nature "has been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too" (GS 22). Therefore what happens in our everyday lives is not theologically insignificant either.

Jesus' divine sonship, however, entails one very important difference with respect to the question of implicit theology: For professing Christians it is a foregone conclusion that the implicit theology found in Jesus' conduct is true and adequate to its "object" in a unique way. God is just like Jesus has shown him to be in his conduct, which constitutes his implicit theology. In our implicit theology, however, we will find some true and some false, some adequate and some inadequate elements in a seamless fusion. Here the difference between us sinners and Jesus, the completely sinless son, is immense.

But this detour to the Bible has shown that the idea of an implicit theology is not a modern invention, but belongs to the bedrock of Christianity. To avoid some misunderstanding, it should be clearly stated that an implicit theology need not be a Christian theology or a true theology. It simply is constituted by the human relatedness to God through creation in His image, being graced by His Spirit, and being elevated by the Incarnation of the Son. Only after a concrete implicit theology has been explicated, we can decide what kind of theology it is. For that reason Rahner's theologoumenon of the anonymous Christian by no means wants to say that everyone who is not a professing Christian is nevertheless one

²⁶Raymund Schwager, *Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption*, trans. J. G. Williams and P. Haddon (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1999), 102-14.

implicitly. It merely says that it is possible that there are people who do not profess the Christian faith but live in a way that – adequately expressed – would amount to the basic core of the Christian faith.

The Bible also provides foundation for this view in the parable of the Last Judgment (Matthew 25:31-46).²⁷ Rahner draws the readers' attention to the fact that "love of neighbor is given in St Matthew as the only explicit standard by which man will be judged"²⁸, as both the judged on the right-hand side and those on the left-hand side betray their complete ignorance and utter bewilderment at the statement that whatever they have done or not done to "one of the least" they have done to Christ. By establishing that link – Rahner argues that it is an identity – Christ enables us to read the implicit meaning of the explicit criterion. What is explicitly known as love of neighbor is discernible as love of God because love of God is implicitly contained in true love of neighbor (which is only made possible by divine grace). For that reason the parenetic use of this parable, which is often made in sermons and exhortations, is completely against its intention. It is not told to instruct Christians to love their neighbors in order to attain heavenly bliss – on the contrary "loving" one's neighbor as a means to an end devalues the good work, and the parable unveils the belief that it is done for love as self-deceptive. It is told to instruct Christians that the criterion for entering heavenly bliss is not words but deeds, and not deeds calculated for supernatural gain but deeds motivated by genuine love – which, the theology of grace tells us, is made possible by a preceding supernatural gift.

AUTHENTIC SUBJECTIVITY

Let us now finally accede to Lonergan and how this would resonate with his idea of authentic or unauthentic subjectivity.

Formally both cases – that of the Christian who lives like a materialist and that of the atheist who lives as an anonymous Christian – seem to be the same: we have a grave discrepancy between an implicit and an explicit *Weltanschauung*

²⁷This Biblical passage is the one Karl Rahner referred to most frequently in his writings (cf. Neumann, *Der Praxisbezug der Theologie bei Karl Rahner*. Freiburger Theologische Studien 118 [Freiburg Br.: Herder, 1980], 126).

²⁸Karl Rahner, "Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbor and the Love of God", *Theological Investigations 6: Concerning Vatican Council II* (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), 234.

containing elements of ultimate concern, that is, between an implicit and an explicit theology. So we can say, both the anonymous Christian and the anonymous materialist are to a considerable degree unauthentic subjects. The difference is that the one lives by what saves him/her without realizing it – the other lives by what would doom him/her, while professing the opposite.

According to Lonergan, authenticity is attained by threefold conversion: intellectual, moral, and religious.²⁹ Lack or incompleteness of either constitutes a degree of unauthenticity. I would argue that Lonergan's threefold conversion helps us to distinguish between the anonymous Christian and the anonymous materialist, for the difference lies in the aspect of conversion each is lacking. Let us consider what we have said about Rahner's anonymous Christian: he or she has been touched by God's grace in such a way that they live by a salvific faith, although they do not profess this faith nor call it Christian faith. This corresponds very well with what Lonergan says about religious conversion:

Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender [...] as a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts. It is interpreted differently in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit [...]. It is the gift of grace, [...]. [...] Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions.³⁰

At first glance surprising, on second glance obvious: anonymous Christians, those in whose life grace is actually operative although they do not expressly realize it, have undergone religious conversion. They might still stand at the inception of their gradual movement to the completion of their transformation, just as the seed is at the beginning of its growth into a tree, but it is this graced transformation on the level of ultimate concern that is working in them. Their lack of explicitly grasping this movement might be due to a lack of intellectual conversion. It might be because they think that "reality" is only what can be empirically ascertained and that therefore notions about the transcendent – be it called God or otherwise – can never be objectively real.

²⁹Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 237-44, 267-269.

³⁰*Method in Theology*, 240-41.

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at. Now this myth overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy [...] and [...] the world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy [...] conforms well enough to the myth's view of reality, objectivity, knowledge. But it is a tiny fragment of the world mediated by meaning. For the world mediated by meaning is a world known [...] by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the community.³¹

Still, I am rather cautious by saying that lack of intellectual conversion *might* be the cause for their not expressly knowing about their lived faith. For there are a number of other possible reasons for that which entail no lack of intellectual conversion: it could be experiences of religion, and Christianity in particular, that let faith appear as adverse to life and subjugating human freedom. There might be misconceptions for which there is good reason in the person's life, they need not necessarily be brought about by lack of intellectual conversion but could be engendered by believers who have given a counter-witness to the Christian faith.³² But if we had a case where these other possible causes could be ruled out, lack of intellectual conversion would be the reason for anonymous Christians to remain anonymous and not walk towards the explicit completeness of the faith they actually live.

Conversely the anonymous materialist might have attained intellectual conversion – although, of course, his/her profession of faith could also be engendered by adherence to tradition and group bias alone – but he/she has not undergone genuine religious conversion, and that is why they profess a faith that they do not live by.

Today faith and the theology reflecting on it face the situation that many contemporaries find them unconvincing and implausible. Two important reasons for that, I think, are closely related to Lonergan's dictum about genuine objectivity through authentic subjectivity. One is the lack of authentic subjectivity

³¹*Method in Theology*, 238.

³²This is one of the sins that Pope John Paul II took very seriously and deplored in his Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millennio Adveniente* (John Paul II, *Apostolic Letter "Tertio Millennio Adveniente,"* 1994, The Holy See, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jpii_apl_10111994_tertio-millennio-adveniente_en.html, no. 33).

on the level of religious conversion in some who profess the Christian faith or even represent it in ecclesial positions. Another is the lack of authentic subjectivity on the level of intellectual conversion in many contemporaries who as a consequence demand a kind of “objectivity” from theology or the humanities in general that cannot exist. This claim is quite the opposite of the general bias in today’s larger society, which oftentimes takes believers to be less capable intellectually than non-believers. There are certainly many instances where this is true, because not every genuine believer is – nor needs to be – able to reconcile his/her religious beliefs with the latest scientific results. Still in some public discussions it might just be the other way round: the one who professes faith is intellectually justified in doing so but his/her inadequate adherence to that faith betrays a lack of religious (or moral)³³ conversion; and the one who attacks faith on presumed scientific grounds has not realized that he/she has left the ground of science quite some time ago and is now engaged in a philosophical argument about *Weltanschauung*, which demands the admission of more relevant questions than a single science. The situation is still worse, of course, when the scientist not only lacks intellectual conversion but religious as well, but the point here is that even well-meaning and implicitly believing persons might lack the kind of intellectual conversion needed and therefore be unable to see that the Christian faith adequately expresses important precepts they live by.

I think Lonergan’s analysis of the different myths about reality and of the only way to reach objectivity in the realm of meaning – through authentic subjectivity – is of exceeding importance because it avoids the infamous extremes of both subjectivism and positivism, while it affirms the important role that both subjectivity and an objectivity gained through authentic subjectivity play in cognition. By comparing this analysis with Rahner’s theologoumenon of the anonymous Christian and the concept of implicit theology, I hoped that the three approaches would throw additional light on one another. Rahner’s main concern in developing the idea of the anonymous Christian was a soteriological: he wanted to argue how salvation for non-Christians is possible without giving up the strict doctrine of the necessity of grace and of Christ as the sole mediator of it; he emphasized that soteriologically the implicit faith is more important than its

³³I am not discussing moral conversion here in greater detail. Let us presuppose for the sake of the argument that the persons involved do not act out of moral failure. This creates a simplification, which allows taking the other two types of conversion into a closer focus. Of course, in a more elaborate analysis, we would have to give up this simplification to tackle the question in all its complexity.

adequate expression, but still it is incomplete without that. Lonergan's main concern in describing the necessary three-fold conversion as precondition for sound foundations of theology is theoretical. Since theology as an academic discipline demands an adequate expression of the intended reality, the explicit formulation here takes precedence;³⁴ still, without the necessary conversion of the subject, which might be merely implicit, it is just words without their proper understanding. By developing the concepts of implicit and explicit theology and linking them to Lonergan's view of three-fold conversion, it is possible to see that Rahner's anonymous Christian is not an absolutely unique phenomenon but one of several possibilities where implicit and explicit theology diverge, or where conversion has not been attained on all three levels but on merely two – or even one – of them.

³⁴This is also the reason why there can be no anonymous Christianity. There can be individual persons who are anonymous Christians, but Christianity presupposes a cultural community that checks the meaning of its precepts ever again. And while a correction might well mean adjusting an inadequate expression to the much more adequate attitude that has been lived already but not expressed correctly, such a cultural community needs the explicit formulation of its attitudes, otherwise it cannot exist. For more elaboration on that see Wandinger "'Concupiscence' and 'Mimetic Desire': A Dialogue Between K. Rahner and R. Girard," *Contagion*, 11 (2004): 158-59.

