LONERGAN WORKSHOP

The 'Not Numerous Center': For *Insight's* 50th Anniversary and *Method in Theology's* 35th Anniversary

volume 20

edited by
Fred Lawrence

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Editor's Introduction

The theme of the 34th Lonergan Workshop was "... the not too numerous center," the renowned phrase from Lonergan's essay, "Dimensions of Meaning." As usual, some of our speakers centered on that theme, and others were more "eccentric."

Philip Berryman, former priest and journalist of the liberation theology movement in Latin America and professional translator, related Lonergan's notions concerning the unity/differentation of knowledge to other current proposals in a way that is mutually illuminating in that one can see how Lonergan's thought might be helpful to these other influential projects summarized here, as well as how these undertakings could be helpful to those working at similar tasks out of Lonergan's methodological framework.

Pat Byrne, Chair of Boston College's Philosophy Department, uses Lonergan's ideas to sort out the complicated issues in science, philosophy, and theology associated with debates about stem cell research, sharing work on a project undertaken with Michael Stebbins of Gonzaga in Spokane. *David Coghlan*, Trinity College, Dublin, uses ideas from Lonergan to cast light on results of action research, discovering ways they might enhance the discovery of styles of interaction, leadership, and organization in organizations of all kinds.

Boston College Theology Department colleague, *M. Shawn Copeland*'s paper raises needed questions regarding unreflected-upon assumptions that may be inscribed in the 'center periphery' metaphor of our theme from the viewpoint of the reflective discourses of marginalized people. *John Dadosky*, who teaches systematics at Regis College, works out possibly relevant models of church based on images drawn from the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar as reflected upon using ideas from Lonergan as he works toward an ecclesiology in terms of the analogy of friendship.

Marquette University's new Distinguished Theologian, *Robert Doran, SJ*, brings to bear his years of experience as a teacher of systematics and of reflection upon many of Bernard Lonergan's unpublished papers to envisage the tasks of a systematic theology that will both interpret and guide in the making of history.

The lecture of *Charles Hefling*, of the systematics section of BC's Theology Department, balanced off his critical treatment of Schleiermacher with a positive account of what that great theologian was doing in his *Glaubenslehre*. Here he contributes further reflections on the Christology regarding the (self)-knowledge of Christ. The paper by *Joseph A. Komonchak*, emeritus of Catholic University of America, insists on the concrete historical reality of the church in order to resist misleading hypostatizations and reifications into which much traditional and current ecclesiological discourse falls.

Greg Lauzon, for many years audio technician for the Lonergan Researach Institute in Toronto and now assisting Bob Doran at Marquette, in a paper on the evolution of percussion technology in music, gives some idea of his absolutely spell-binding power-point presentation at the 34th Lonergan Workshop.

For many years, our expert on the thought of Boethius and patristics scholar, *Paul LaChance*, has been studying closely different aspects of Augustine's *Confessions*. One emphasis of this paper is the parallelism between Augustine's work and Virgil's *Aeneid* –with the former using the myth of the founding of the pagan community of Rome to illumine the meaning of the community founded on the humanity of Christ.

The paper of the Director of Seton Hall's Center for Catholic Studies and of its Lonergan Center, *Richard Liddy*, recounts the story of his and others' memory of the *Startling Strangeness* – the title of his latest book – at the heart of intellectual conversion. As Lonergan said of that key discovery regarding the two diverse forms of human knowledge, "one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness." *Michael McCarthy*, Emeritus in Philosophy at Vassar College, narrates how his lifelong engagement with Lonergan's thought provides the red thread running through the stages and styles of his exemplary career as a teacher at one of the nation's great colleges.

Canadian scholar of English now at a Baptist college in the Maritimes, *Gregory Maillet*, started the 34th Lonergan Workshop with the most remarkable lecture many had ever heard on T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets*. Its title compactly conveys the artful interweaving of the intelligibility-and-truth centered reading of this great poem in the light of Lonergan's thought. Fellow teacher in Canada, *Hugo Meynell*,

formerly of Religious Studies at Calgary, spoke rather anecdotally and lovingly about how the church's handling of the sex abuse crisis is connected to institutional recurrence schemes in need of further reflection and reform.

One of the West Coast Methods Institute's founders and present organizer now at Loyola/Marymount University in Los Angeles, *Mark D. Morelli*, has told me about the gestation of three great research projects. He gave an early taste of the results of his research on Oxford don J. A. Stewart at an earlier Lonergan Workshop; and his book on that subject, *At the Threshold of the Halfway House,* has just appeared in our supplementary series. The second great area of research is about the relationship between Lonergan and Hegel, another figure who exercised a great, if less remarked upon, influence on the writing of *Insight.* Here we get a first taste of the results of that research.

Many years ago, University of Chicago colleague David Tracy remarked that *William Murnion* (Philosophy/Works) had done a lot of work on the great Indian sage, Shankara. This paper pulls off an amazing and learned comparison of the respective wisdoms of Shankara and Aquinas. Pastoral theologian and Lonergan Fellow, *Gerard Whelan, SJ*, who was making the transition from teaching and pastoral work in Kenya to his new position at Rome's Gregorian University, took his time as a fellow to envisage the tasks of a contemporary pastoral theology, working from Lonergan's perspective.

Montessori expert now interested integrating ideas from Lonergan as well as the recent findings of research on the human brain, *Phyllis Wallbank*, closed the 34th Lonergan Workshop by sharing two sets of ideas on education geared to the development of the small child into a young adult.

Many thanks to Regina Gilmartin Knox, without whom volumes of Lonergan Workshop would never appear; and to business manager and director of Boston College's Lonergan Center, Kerry Cronin.

Fred Lawrence
Editor

Lonergan Workshop
Volume 20

CONTENTS

Editor's Introduction *iii*

Consilience? Edward O. Wilson, Lonergan, and Other Proposals for the Unity/Differentiation of Knowledge 1
Philip Berryman

Foundations of "The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research" 17
Pat Byrne

Action Research as a Method of Praxis 71
David Coghlan, SJ

Edging (Toward) the Center 87
M. Shawn Copeland

"Centering the Church": A Development in Ecclesiology Based on Balthasar and Lonergan 93
John Dadosky

Envisioning a Systematic Theology 105
Robert Doran, SJ

Another Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement : Lonergan on Christ's (Self-) Knowledge 127
Charles Hefling

Lonergan and Post-Conciliar Ecclesiology 165
Joseph Komonchak

Emerging Probabilities and the Operators of Musical Evolution 185
Greg Lauzon

Theology as Praxis in Augustine's *Confessions*: A Community Founded on the Humanity of Christ 197
Paul LaChance

Startling Strangeness: A Memoir 233
Richard Liddy

Toward a Catholic Christianity: A Personal Narrative 253
Michael McCarthy

"At the still point" where "there is only the dance": *Logos,* Lonergan, and T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets 271
Gregory Maillet

"A Perhaps Not Numerous Center" 295
Hugo Meynell

Theology, Philosophy, & Interiority: Experience Speaks to Experience 305
Mark Morelli

Shankara and Aquinas: A Case Study in Comparative Ethics 337
William Murnion

Robert Doran and Pastoral Theology: Reflections from Nairobi, Kenya 357
Gerard Whelan

The Adolescent and the Use of the Philosopher Lonergan's Questions 391
Phyllis Wallbank

Lonergan Workshop
20/2008

CONSILIENCE? EDWARD O. WILSON, LONERGAN, AND OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE UNITY/DIFFERENTIATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Phillip Berryman
Temple University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

IN THE INTRODUCTION to *Insight*, Bernard Lonergan states that the aim of his endeavor is to end up "not only with a detailed account of understanding but also with a plan of what there is to be known. The many sciences lose their isolation from one another; the chasm between science and common sense is bridged...." Decades before the World Wide Web, Bernard Lonergan felt the problem of the ever more rapid expansion of human knowledge that "mocks encyclopedias."[1]

His way of addressing it was not primarily a grand unified scheme into which every thing would fit – a "universe story," for example – but a cognitional theory, one of whose central features is differentiation: differentiation of the components of knowing, differentiation of the diverse kinds of knowing, and a vision of the sciences and scholarship as a scheme of collaboration across disciplines. In carrying out his project over several decades, Lonergan himself exemplified the restless quest to understand by drawing on not only philosophers and theologians, but historians, sociologists, psychologists, and particular authors who had synthesized large areas of work (e.g., Toynbee, Voegelin, Langer, Eliade).

In this paper I assume that we all share something of that same "unrestricted desire to know" and agree that Lonergan's work is decisive in enabling us to seek to understand and to offer our own minor contributions to the collective endeavor. Those of us who teach intend to communicate not only the results of our own

[1]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 23, 12. (Original publication, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957).

specialization but to expand the horizons of our students to further worlds of meaning. But we do so in our own time and circumstances, as Lonergan did in his.

In that sense, I first conceived of this presentation as a straightforward comparison of Edward O. Wilson's proposal for the unity of knowledge and that of Lonergan, but as I worked on it, the paper developed its own "moving viewpoint" and a larger cast of characters. I start with Wilson's programmatic proposal for the unification of knowledge, followed by some observations on Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences. I then take up three recent examples of synthesis: Nicolas Wade on the emerging view of early humans, sociologist Manuel Castells on the "network society," and William H. and John McNeill on the "human web" as a key for understanding history. These are admittedly disparate projects that may give the impression of arbitrary choice. But Lonergan's own influences were disparate and wide ranging. In each case, I shall make connections to Lonergan's work on the unity/differentiation of knowledge and seek to indicate the relevance to our own quest.

CONSILIENCE?

Having been impressed by Edward O. Wilson's writings on the diversity of life and his autobiography, I had great expectations for *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*[2] when it appeared about a decade ago. But about halfway through I had a visceral reaction to the blatant reductionism and returned it to the library.

In preparation for this conference, I thought it might be useful to reexamine the book, perhaps simply as a negative contrast to Lonergan. However, as I read it more closely I found certain things to admire and indeed sensed some qualities Wilson shares with Bernard Lonergan. Both are generous in spirit and are concerned about the full breadth of human knowing; they are both concerned about the relationship between specialization and a grasp of the whole. Both single out the importance of the Greek achievement. At one point Wilson says, "The greatest enterprise of the mind has always been and always will be the attempted linkage of the sciences and the humanities." Both see reality as a scheme moving upward from elementary particles through complex structures, plants, animals, human beings, and complex human societies. Both insist that

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[2]Edward O. Wilson: *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). This book builds on Wilson's earlier forays beyond his field of entomology: *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (1975) and *On Human Nature* (1978), both published by Harvard University Press.

science seeks an understanding of things in themselves; both have little patience with obscurantism. When Wilson says, "even today people know more about their automobiles than they do about their own minds," Lonergan would certainly agree.[3]

The word "consilience" was coined in the 1840s by a British polymath named William Whewell, who used it to refer to a situation in which induction from one type of facts coincides with induction from a different such class. Wilson has made it essentially synonymous with his own proposal. After some introductory chapters, *Consilience* moves from the natural sciences, to the human mind, the social sciences, the arts, and finally ethics and religion.

For Wilson, consilience means understanding that crosses various domains. One illustration comes first from his own work in entomology early in his career. Ants were known to communicate with other ants in a colony but how they did so was unknown. Suspecting that it was through chemicals, he enlisted the aid of a chemist to isolate the relevant chemicals (known as pheromones). He and a mathematician then modeled how the chemicals could be communicative over a distance. "We had crossed four levels – superorganism, to organism, to glands and sense organs, to molecules."

A second illustration comes from human fear of, and fascination with, snakes. Pablo Aramango, a shaman and artist in the Peruvian jungle, uses hallucinogenic drugs and dreams of snakes (which then appear in his paintings). Wilson notes that fear of snakes is universal among human beings, and is shared with other primates. In this case he is reaching across domains from human activity (art), through the neurology of the brain, to chemicals, and thus to molecules.[4]

To the charge that he is being reductionistic, Wilson unapologetically replies, "guilty," and defends the method of breaking things down to their smallest component. However, he says that the aim is also to move in the opposite (admittedly more difficult) direction of "predictive synthesis."

Wilson proposes to make the "bridge between science and the humanities" particularly through "gene-culture coevolution," offering instances of what he calls "epigenetic rules." One example is that of words for color in the many languages of the world. When languages have only two words for color, they are inevitably black and white; when they have a third word, it is red; languages with

[3]Ch. 1 of *Consilience* is "The Ionian Achievement," "… greatest enterprise …" *Consilience,* 8. "… even today…", 97

[4]"Four levels," ibid, p. 70; Aramingo, 72 ff.

only four words add either green or yellow, and so on up to seven. The relevant point is that there are rules:

> ...[O]ur genes prescribe that we see different wavelengths of light a certain way. Our additional propensity to break the world into units and label them with words causes us to accumulate up to eleven basic color units in a particular order."[5]

"The search for human nature can be viewed as the archaeology of the epigenetic rules. It is destined to be a vital part of future interdisciplinary research."[6]

At various points he sharply criticizes the existing social sciences for their lack of connection to the natural sciences, and because social scientists speak different languages, are bound by tribal loyalty and are "still in thrall to the original grand masters." The social sciences are still on the level of description and "have not yet crafted a web of causal explanation that successfully cuts down through the levels of organization from society to mind and brain. Failing to probe this far, they lack what can be called a true scientific theory."[7]

"Consilience" is thus Wilson's proposal for the unity of knowledge through the application of science across all realms of reality from elementary particles to any form of human activity. It clearly does not exist, except in some limited instances, but it is a program for research.

If one takes it in what could be called a "weak" form, it seems unobjectionable. That some human behavior is rooted in epigenetic rules seems clear. Perhaps the content of dreams can be traced toward our pre-human forbears at one end and at the other yet can be turned into art. But if taken in its "strong" form – which is that evidently intended by Wilson – consilience is indeed reductionistic and can hardly offer the key to the unity of knowledge. Indeed, although the book enjoyed considerable success among the general public, the notion of "consilience" has not proved at all persuasive to philosophers.

The following points may indicate in shorthand, some of the basic shortcomings in the consilience proposal, particularly in the light of Lonergan's theory of cognition:

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[5]Ibid., 163.

[6]Ibid, 165. Wilson vigorously rejects the assumption popular in some academic circles that there is no human nature or that it is arbitrarily constructed and extremely plastic.

[7]Ibid. All ch. 7 "The Social Sciences." "...in thrall...", 182; "...have not yet...true scientific theory", 189.

• Most crucially, in making the natural sciences the standard of knowledge, Wilson makes any other form of knowing deficient. One of Lonergan's great strengths is his robust appreciation for practical intelligence while giving full due to science. By differentiating them he highlights just what it is they do.

• Chapter 3, "The Mind," is actually on the brain, which Wilson characterizes as a "helmet-shaped mass of gray and white tissue about the size of a grapefruit" and "a machine assembled not to understand itself, but to survive." This example may serve as an example of the consistent physical reductionism that he asserts rather than establishes.[8]

• Insofar as humans are animals, human affairs can be studied using methods analogous to those in the natural sciences, for example, in epidemiology. However, insofar as humans create meaning, methods must be appropriate.[9] As a building, a library could conceivably be viewed as analogous to some animal shelters, but there is no animal analogue to the books it contains, or any individual book, or any paragraph in any book.

• I find one point especially revealing. Wilson asks: "When did symbolic language arise, and exactly how did it ignite the exponentiation of cultural evolution?" and immediately begins the next paragraph: "Too bad, but this great puzzle of human paleontology seems insoluble, at least for the time being."[10] The whole phenomenon of language, which for Lonergan was the means by which the child moves from the "world of immediacy" to the "world of meaning," is shrugged off. From a Lonerganian standpoint, this appears to be a particularly telling example of an "oversight."

"MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES" – DIFFERENTIATION OF COMMON SENSE

Over twenty years ago Howard Gardner, the Harvard developmental psychologist who studied with Piaget, Erik Eriksen, and Jerome Bruner, proposed a theory of multiple intelligences, which I believe constitutes a fruitful differentiation of what Lonergan calls "common sense." Gardner's starting point was his dissatisfaction with the assumption that intelligence is a single measurable factor, often called

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[8]Ibid., 97, 96.

[9]Cf. Bernard Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980"*, in Collected Works, vol. 17, 370-71.

[10]*Consilience*, 134

"g," particularly as embodied in IQ tests. As Gardner points out, such tests rate linguistic and mathematical ability. He thought it might be possible to isolate various "intelligences" and to do so he devised a set of criteria for what would constitute separate intelligence, namely that it be:

- at least partially separable in the brain (e.g., brain-injured people who may lose one intelligence but retain others)
- plausibly the product of evolutionary development
- highly developed in some people (child prodigies)
- valued by at least some cultures

With these criteria, Gardner distinguished seven intelligences: 1: linguistic; 2. logico-mathematical; 3. musical, 4. kinesthetic (as in dancers, athletes); 5. spatial (as in people who can navigate by starlight); 6. interpersonal (being able to read other people); 7. intrapersonal (insight into oneself).[11] The exact number is open, and indeed subsequently Gardner has considered the possibility of at least one further intelligence, the ability to read signs of nature. That skill was highly developed and prized among our forebears but is largely lost in those of us who have lived in a world of asphalt and concrete for generations.

Gardner's theory has greater acceptance among non-psychologists, particularly educators, than among his fellow psychologists.

I would propose that the theory meshes very well with what Lonergan calls common sense, or practical intelligence.

> There are intelligent farmers and craftsmen, intelligent employers and workers, intelligent technicians and mechanics, intelligent doctors and lawyers, intelligent politicians and diplomats. . . . There is intelligence in the home and in friendship, in conversation and in sport, in the arts and in entertainment.[12]

An intelligent furniture maker, for example, will employ spatial sense in design and in seeing how the legs will be joined to the seat and the spindles in the back and will use kinesthetic sense in sanding and finishing. Politicians and diplomats, and indeed good conversationalists, not only receive and convey information, but they read their interlocutors.

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[11]The basic theory is developed in Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), and discussed further in Howard Gardner, *Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice – A Reader* (New York: Basic Books, 1993). In *Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), he explores his theory through individuals, each of whom embodied a particular intelligence to an extraordinary degree.

[12]*Insight*, 196.

Gardner's theory could be dismissed as a relativistic attack on intellectual standards, for example, as if claiming that the skilled basketball player is as "intelligent" as the nerd who excels in physics, but that would be to miss what he is saying, and particularly the significance of his insistence that an "intelligence" must be shown to be grounded in a region of the brain, that is that it represents a Darwinian adaptation, and that it has been valued by some cultures. Gardner's work provides a richer sense of the matrix of human intelligence and the manifold ways in which it develops.

In Lonergan's cognitional theory, mathematics, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities are specializations of an initially undifferentiated practical intelligence that he calls common sense. Gardner's theory further specifies and empirically grounds the initial aptitudes and also their embodiment in the practices of societies. In short, I am suggesting that there is a good mesh between Lonergan and Gardner: as they solve problems in their ordinary activities, human beings manifest intelligence.[13]

I now turn to three recent works of synthesis. Although they have individual authors or coauthors, they reflect the cross-disciplinary work of many scholars and researchers.

EMERGING VIEW OF THE "ANCESTRAL PEOPLE"

In *Before the Dawn: Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors*[14] the science journalist Nicolas Wade has provided a synthesis of the current state of knowledge and theory on the period starting from the first appearance of characteristically human behavior first appeared through both the beginning of history based on written sources and the rise of cities. In doing so he draws on seven disciplines: paleoanthropology, archaeology, population genetics, historical linguistics, primatology, social anthropology, and evolutionary psychology. Insofar as their findings reinforce one another, they mutually reinforce the recently emerging picture of how humans that are modern in terms of behavior appeared and spread around the earth.

[13]They both seem to be at odds with Wilson, who apparently sees common sense as largely the realm of error, or at least the realm where error and superstition generally prevail.

[14]Nicolas Wade, *Before the Dawn: Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

The most impressive new development is the development of population genetics. Through studying the male Y chromosome and the female mitochondria of people around the globe today, population geneticists have been able to reconstruct a family tree of the humans branching off from an original group in northeast Africa.

Here I use three points to give a sense of Wade's work: 1. the emergence of "behaviorally modern humans" approximately 50,000 years ago; 2. their spread from Africa shortly thereafter; 3. efforts to trace lineages of human languages.

Portrait of the "Ancestral People"

Wade draws our attention to the difference between "anatomically modern humans," who existed perhaps 200,000 years ago[15] and "behaviorally modern humans" who developed approximately 50,000 years ago in northeast Africa. Genetic evidence strongly suggests that the ancestors of all modern humans lived in a relatively small group, perhaps just a few thousand people.[16] What made them "behaviorally modern" is that they had developed characteristically human behaviors, namely, language, religion, and warfare.

Wade outlines two approaches to consider what these people were like. The first is to consider the "human universals," features found in virtually all known human societies, such as cooking, dancing, divination, and fear of snakes. He notes the concept of "Universal People," (proposed by anthropologist Donald Brown as a counterpart to Noam Chomsky's "universal grammar").[17] The reasoning is that if certain behaviors are common to all known peoples they must have existed in the ancestral people. This is obviously not a watertight argument, but it is strongly suggestive. Here is a list of some of these universals:

- the family is the basic unit of social groups, where groups are defined by the territory they claim
- making shelter
- tools: cutting, pounding, string, weapons
- society organized along kinship lines
- sexual relations regulated
- reciprocity – exchange of goods or labor

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[15]Ibid., 30 ff. Since I am here distilling some points from Wade, who himself is reporting on finds from a number of disciplines, every statement in this section has the implicit qualifier: "insofar as the present state of research allows..."

[16]For explanation, cf. *Before the Dawn*, 51 ff.

[17]Ibid., 65 ff.

- sanctions (e.g., ostracism) for offenses such as rape, violence, and murder
- supernatural beliefs; magic; divination; attempts to control the weather
- healing of the sick, medicine
- dress and fashion adorning of bodies; standards of sexual attractiveness
- dancing and singing[18]

The specific content of these "universals" may vary widely – the point is that all human societies have them in some form.

The claim here is not that we can deduce directly from existing hunter-forager societies and those studied by anthropologists over the past century the shape of the institutions among the ancestral people, but rather some probable general features. For example, the hunting-foraging way of life imposes limits on the size of a group that can be sustained in a given territory: when a group grows larger than around 150 people it tends to divide. Another feature is that their relations with other groups are typically defensive and hostile. That tendency to define one group over and against others may help explain why languages have multiplied so astonishingly. If groups in an area are hostile to one another, and if language is a marker of differentiation, the result is likely to be linguistic balkanization, as is indeed the case in Papua New Guinea, where each language is on average spoken by 3,000 people living in from 10 to 20 villages.[19]

The other angle is to consider the contemporary human group which, according to genetic evidence, is the closest to the ancestral people, namely the !Kung San people,[20] an indigenous people in South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Namibia. It is intriguing that they are physically similar to some Asians and Australian aborigines.[21] The !Kung San live from foraging (60-70% of their food), are good trackers, and hunt with arrows with a powerful poison from the pupae of certain beetles. Between foraging from 12 to 20 hours a week and maintaining their tools and other goods for a similar period, they can meet their needs. They live in small groups, traveling, carrying all their possessions, including children;

[18]For a very extensive list of such universals as compiled by Brown, see appendix in S. Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Penguin, 2002), 435 ff.

[19]Ibid., 205.

[20]Sometimes called Khoisan or San. Theirs is a "click language," the sound of which is indicated by the !.

[21]Wade notes "The !Kung San themselves apparently recognize this similarity since they assign Asians to the category of Real People like themselves, as distinct from !ohm, the category of non-San Africans and Europeans." *Before the Dawn*, 67.

for example, a !Kung mother carries her child an average of almost 5,000 miles before it walks by itself.[22]

The argument is not that our common ancestors lived like the contemporary !Kung, but rather that the ancestral group may have resembled them and Australian aborigines in appearance and that their way of life offers clues to that of the ancestral humans.

Spread of "Behaviorally Modern" Humans

We have become familiar with the idea that bipedal hominids arose in the African savannah and around 1.8 million years ago left Africa and spread through Eurasia, developing into *homo erectus* and *homo neanderthalus.*[23] Wade's account points to a second "out of Africa": around 50,000 BCE, a small band, numbering perhaps as few as 150, who left Africa and crossed the southern part of the Red Sea into the Arabian peninsula. As already noted, when hunter-forager bands reach around 150 people they tend to divide, forming new groups. In this manner, humans spread are believed to have spread along the southern coast of Eurasia toward the Indian subcontinent.[24] These people are assumed to have made boats and practiced fishing, but any archaeological evidence was perishable or lies undersea with the raising of sea levels after the Pleistocene ice age. Some eventually reached the areas of Indonesia, and Australia, New Guinea, and Tasmania, which were then continents rather than clusters of islands, and eventually the Far East of Asia, and into the Americas. Another movement took place from India to Turkey, Central Asia, and Europe. It is assumed that they overcame the Neanderthals, perhaps in warfare or simply because of their superior skills (language, hunting techniques, and ability to cooperate).

Languages

What are the relationships among the world's 6,000 languages and to what extent can their relationships and history be traced? Wade notes that languages are not uniformly distributed: some languages are relatively widespread, while in New Guinea, for example, the pattern is of small groups of people, speaking

[22]Because of the demands of this itinerant way of life, women examine newborns for signs of defects and smother them. Such infanticide is not regarded as murder because life begins "when the baby is taken back to camp, given a name and accepted as a Real Person." Ibid., 68.

[23]It is speculated if modern humans had tried to leave African previously they were probably defeated by Neanderthals surrounding Africa.

[24]Whatever archaeological evidence there might be has been buried as sea levels rose at the end of the Pleistocene Ice Age.

separate languages – what linguists call a "mosaic pattern." If for tens of thousands of years humans lived in mutually hostile small bands, language itself might serve as a differentiation. How are we to account for areas where languages have overcome the mosaic pattern and spread widely? Climate change could drive out the existing groups and then be replaced by a single group later. Another obvious possibility is warfare: a single group would dominate others and impose its way of life, including language. Another possibility is that as some groups began to practice agriculture and/or domestication of animals, they could sustain larger numbers of people and their way of life spread, absorbing others as they did so.

We are familiar with the notion that European languages are members of the Indo-European language group, which includes Sanskrit and many languages which seem to have no obvious relationship to English. Linguists have generally tended to say that languages change so quickly that it is impossible to trace them back further than 5,000 years. However, Joseph Greenberg classified all the world's languages into fourteen superfamilies.[25] Although many linguists were skeptical of his approach, his findings mesh rather well with the human family tree devised by geneticists mentioned earlier. Greenberg divided African languages into four families, one of which is Afroasiatic, one branch of which is West Semitic, which includes Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic. Thus the ancestor of those languages of the "religions of the book" may not have arisen in the Middle East, but in peoples from northern Africa who invaded perhaps 9,000 years ago.[26]

Let me bring these considerations back to the topic at hand,[27] the question of the unity of knowledge that is closely related to our self-understanding as human beings. I have been describing three areas of findings about ancestral humans from a number of disciplines that tend to converge (e.g., genetics and linguistics). To summarize: around 50,000 years ago a single ancestral group of perhaps 5,000 or fewer people possibly similar in appearance to the contemporary Khoisan people with a similar way of life had evolved the language and the characteristic behaviors shared by all human groups since then. A small group departed and its

[25]Techniques include assembling lists of words (among those more resistant to change) from different languages, estimating the matches and calculating the degree of relatedness.

[26]Ibid., 110-11.

[27]In passing I will note that Wade devotes a chapter to race, which he finds has a genetic basis, thereby flying in the face of some who would claim that race is "socially constructed." All humans can mate and are one species, but different groups have developed genetically in different ways as a result of their interaction with their environment. The differences are reflected in features such as skin color, lactose tolerance and intolerance, and susceptibility to some diseases.

descendents spread along the southern seacoast of the Eurasian continent as far as the Indian subcontinent, and spread from there in various directions, eventually populating the globe. The people practiced variations of a foraging and hunting life, were generally hostile to one another, and their diverging languages reflected and reinforced their differences. They spread into all the continents until the beginnings of agriculture, the domestication of animals, and settled life approximately 15,000 years ago.

The emerging picture of human emergence lends a new level of concreteness to the sense of the unity of humankind affirmed by our own biblical and philosophical traditions. It likewise provides details to the differentiations traced by Lonergan.[28]

In recent decades we have become accustomed to conceiving evolution as occurring not simply in long seamless transitions but also during periods of rapid change and adaptation. Although Wade does not make the point expressly, his characterization of the emergence of behaviorally modern humans seems to be an instance of "punctuated equilibrium," which means that humans apparently developed language and many of the other features of "human nature" outlined above in a short time, perhaps just a few thousand years, and this was accompanied by genetic developments in brain capacity.

To pursue one line of speculation, let us suppose that human language emerged in a primitive form (pointing, single-sound "nouns" or uninflected "verbs" indicating actions) for tens of thousands of years. Then let us suppose that it then developed rapidly from the ability to form sentences, tell stories, ask questions, talk about things absent, propose chains of reasoning – in Lonergan's terms, not only to refer to data present to the senses but to grasp insights, make judgments, and raise further questions. Somehow it seems more fitting that if characteristically human behavior is indeed of a different nature from that of animals, it should be the result of an evolutionary breakthrough and not an imperceptible accretion of adaptive changes.[29]

[28]Lonergan only occasionally reflected on the emergence of humans and only in passing. Cf. "differentiations of consciousness," in "The World Mediated by Meaning," *Philosophical and Theological Papers – 1965-1980,* 112, ff. See also *Method in Theology* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 72.

[29]This is a matter of degree of course and even a few thousand years spans many generations. There is also the interesting question of how "human" our anatomically human forbears were before their behavior was undeniably human, i.e., approximately 50,000 BCE.

THE "NETWORK SOCIETY"

Around 1984, the Spanish-born U.C. Berkeley sociologist Manuel Castells turned his attention to nearby Silicon Valley, on a hunch that what was happening there was significant not simply for the worlds of technology or business. With colleagues he did studies of similar "technopoles" around the world, and he considered the impact of these developments on cities.[30] Meanwhile he was doing individual studies on five continents and devouring thousands of reports and studies.

In the mid-1990s fearing that his cancer left him little time to live, he produced *The Rise_of the Network Society* (1996), which laid out his basic theory, and also, in the following two years, two other volumes of a trilogy.[31] Early in the first volume, he uses Benetton clothing to illustrate a crucial insight: what is essential is not the factories or stores that the company might or might not own, but rather it is the network of relationships between suppliers from around the world to the stores, all monitored from headquarters in northern Italy. His key point is that it is not simply business or economies that are taking on network features but society itself. The technology of the information age has made this possible. Castells started his quest, it should be noted, more than a decade before most people had heard of e-mail, and his trilogy was written before the Internet became a mass-phenomenon in the mid-1990s.

When I picked up *The Network* Society in a bookstore in 1996, I was immediately struck by its ambition. Its overarching title ("The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture") echoes Max Weber; and the three volumes suggest Marx's *Capital.* Castells is emphatic, however, that he is not writing a theory for the ages but for our particular moment. His work is highly empirical: the approximately 2,000 works in the bibliography of the trilogy are often technical studies and reports. He illustrates his general ideas by very concrete examples, for example, a twenty-page discussion of East Asian business networks, contrasting Japanese, Korean, and Chinese models.[32]

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[30]Cf. Manuel Castells, *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), and (with Peter Hall), *Technopoles of the Worl: The Making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

[31]Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (1996); *The Power of Identity* (1997); *End of Millennium* (1998) (all Oxford, UK, Blackwells).

[32]*Network Society*, 172-90.

Volume two explores identities with a number of detailed studies, for example, of nationalism in Cataluña and of the Zapatista movement in Mexico. In the latter case, a dozen pages written in 1996 highlight many of the novel features of its relationship to the rest of Mexico, but he also shrewdly perceives the dilemmas of the movement. Castells argues that the nation state is losing much of its legitimacy, undermined by transnational forces.

Volume three is comprised of five case studies of network theory, the first of which is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which he co-wrote with his Russian wife, drawing on their earlier work in Russia. The root of the collapse was the "inability of statism to manage the transition to the Information Age." Along the way he explores a number of issues, including the power structure of the Soviet state and society. Certainly Castells will not have the last word, but his work is worth examining, particularly when many seem satisfied with a "great man" explanation of the collapse of communism, attributing it to Ronald Reagan or John Paul II.

Castells's connection to Lonergan might not be immediately obvious, especially since he himself is secular in orientation and mentions religion in passing only in connection with identities. First, I think his work is a remarkable example of inquiry. He mentions that volume three concludes "12 years of research effort to elaborate an empirically grounded, cross-cultural, sociological theory of the Information Age." Particular insights led to further questions and higher viewpoints. Although he is the primary author of the trilogy, his work there and elsewhere has really been a collaboration with a network of researchers and institutions on five continents.[33] In short, I am suggesting that Castells exemplifies the kind of collaboration across disciplines that Lonergan envisioned.

To illustrate the possible fruitfulness of what Castells is saying, consider its possible application to the churches today. The mainstream churches have tended to look down on Pentecostals for their simplistic theology, their lack of developed doctrine, their apparent rigidity, and to classify them as "fundamentalists." If Castells is right, however, Pentecostal churches might be an excellent example of network organizations: little hierarchy, flexibility, organization around function, focus on "customer satisfaction," even the use of media (TV, but also technological devices in worship services). From the standpoint of the "network

[33]In the acknowledgements to vol. 3 he thanks besides his own institution universities and think tanks in Madrid, Moscow, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Beijing, Cochabamba (Bolivia), and Geneva.

society" might Pentecostal churches be better adapted to the twenty-first century than are mainline denominations, including Roman Catholicism?[34]

INTENSIFICATION OF HUMAN WEBS

William H. McNeill and John McNeill conceived of *The Human Web: A Bird's Eye View of Human History*[35] independently of Castells, but it has an obvious overlap. The McNeills, father and son, have devoted their careers to larger movements in history. Their aim, they say, is to help people, including themselves, make sense of the overall movement of history. Unlike Castells, they were writing fully aware of the World Wide Web.

A web – a set of connections that link people to one another – may take many forms, "Chance encounters, kinship, friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity, economic exchange, ecological exchange, political cooperation, even military competition." The web dates back at least to the "development of human speech." The spread of bows and arrows throughout most of the world (except Australia) is evidence of a "first worldwide web." Agriculture and sedentarization were a first intensification of such webs, and the first cities, storing "information, goods, and infections" led to the formation of metropolitan webs, that is, empires starting with Sumer. An "Old World Web" comprising mostly of Eurasia and North Africa was formed around 2,000 years ago. The world was finally knit into a single web starting 500 years ago, and speedier communications starting with the telegraph 160 years ago have led to the present global web.

The foregoing set of headings drawn from the work of the McNeills and others, such as Castells, may indicate the use of networks or webs as a powerful tool of explanation.[36]

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[34]Cf. Phillip Berryman, "Churches as Winners and Losers in the Network Society," in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (vol. 41, number 4, winter 1999, Special Issue "Religion in America: Churches, Globalization, and Democratization," Manuel Vasquez, guest editor).

[35]J. R. McNeill & William McNeill, *The Human Web: A Bird's Eye View of World History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

[36]The virtue of the McNeill's book is its simplicity and succinctness in its the exploration of webs as an explanatory key. A grander approach is that of David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), which is a conscious attempt at a "creation myth." Christian, who has been instrumental in making "big history" a recognized field, spends a hundred pages from the Big Bang to human emergence, and more than another hundred before getting to what is normally understood as human history, which he proceeds to treat in very broad strokes. William H. McNeill provides a laudatory foreword.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Bernard Lonergan died in 1984 around the time that many of us were getting our first personal computers. That was also the time when Manuel Castells set out on the inquiry that ultimately issued in his trilogy. That coincidence may suggest why in an essay on the unity/differentiation of human knowledge and the work of Lonergan, I have devoted considerable attention to these three recent works of synthesis.

We are familiar with the works of synthesis to which Lonergan was attracted: Toynbee, Langer, Voegelin, Eliade, Piaget, and numerous others. They aided his articulation foundational methodology as well as his proposals for collaborative work in theology and across scientific and scholarly disciplines. In that spirit we should be looking for similar works that can help our own personal and collective endeavors. I suggest that Castells offers a very fruitful analysis and set of categories for attempting to name and understand our own age, and that works such as the McNeills' offer ways of unifying our view of human history. Wade's work of synthesis suggests that the ancestors of the today's six billion human beings were, albeit not a primordial couple, a single small human community.

Precisely because human beings create meaning and do so endlessly, there is not, and cannot be, a single overarching scheme for understanding human reality, as is perhaps possible for the rest of nature, certainly through the simpler forms of life. The unity of human knowledge is not to be found in any homogenizing scheme (e.g. "consilience") but in the human mind – or better, the human subject – and that unity itself is enabled by differentiations of human awareness.

Lonergan Workshop
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FOUNDATIONS OF "THE ETHICS OF EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH"

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PART I: HUMAN EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT AND STEM CELL ETHICS

A. Background

MICHAEL STEBBINS AND I have coauthored an article entitled "The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research." While we are explicit in that article about our reliance on Lonergan's work, it is aimed at a wide audience that would not necessarily be familiar with his work. As a result, there are several unstated and unargued assumptions that underpin the positions we adopt in that paper. The present article is intended to make explicit the ways in which Lonergan's work provides the foundations for our joint article. [1]

[1]See Patrick H. Byrne and J. Michael Stebbins, "The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," forthcoming. In a sense, our joint article is something like an exercise in the functional specialty, Dialectics. The present article is perhaps not so much an exercise in Foundations as it is one of Systematics. Although I draw attention to the Foundations we relied upon but did not make explicit, still the present article makes no pretense at introducing any new foundational categories over and above those Lonergan already worked out. Nor Stebbins or I propose any radically new doctrines, unless our two major hypotheses be such. The main doctrines – such as the Dignity Priniciple and the affirmation that human personhood begins at conception – are already in circulation and affirmed by significant numbers of individuals and communities. Still those doctrines are articulated in a variety of ways with certain difficulties. What I suppose this article attempts is to draw upon Lonergan's foundational work in order to refine and offer a coherent understanding the relationships among some of the doctrines relevant to the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research and therapies.

Briefly, our joint article argues against the destruction of human embryos either for purposes of scientific research or for clinical treatment. There are several reasons why this issue has attracted such animated public discussion. The first is that embryonic stem cells are of great interest to research scientists because they are either totipotent or pluripotent – that is to say, they are capable of developing into every type of cell in the human body. It is widely accepted within the medical scientific community (though with some notable dissent) that these cells could eventually be modified and inserted into human bodies to repair or replace defective cells responsible for such devastating diseases as Parkinson's disease, diabetes, osteoporosis, spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer's disease, leukaemia, and multiple sclerosis.[2] There are also nonembryonic stem cells (called somatic or adult stem cells), which though multipotent are neither totipotent nor pluripotent, and for this reason are considered by many to be less promising for many lines of research.[3] Much of the controversy arises from the fact that embryonic stem cells, unlike somatic stem cells, are procured by "harvesting" them from, and thereby causing the death of, living human embryos. As in the debate over abortion, a key point of contention involves the question of how to determine the identity, and thereby the moral status, of the embryo in the course of its development.

In addition to the potential therapeutic benefits themselves, proponents of embryonic stem cell research also point to another fact in support of their position. In vitro fertilization clinics routinely fertilize considerably more of a woman's oocytes than they plan to implant at that time. This is because the success rates of implantation are relatively low, and the costs are very high for repeated procedures. The excess fertilized embryos are preserved through cryogenic (freezing) technologies. Although estimates vary widely, it appears that somewhere between 200,000 to 500,000 human embryos are currently being

[2]See for example comment by British Health Minister Yvette Cooper, *The Times*, December 16, 2000; my appreciation to Prof. Neil Scolding for this reference.

[3]The distinction between totipotent, pluripotent, and multipotent is somewhat fluid in the literature. I am following the set of definitions adopted by the U.S. President's Bioethics Council, whereby: "totipotent" refers to stem cells of human embryos during about the first four days, when the cells can differentiate into any cell type in the body plus the placenta; "pluripotent" refers to the stem cells of the "inner cell mass" formed after about four days, which can differentiate into any cell type, except for totipotent stem cells and the cells of the trophoblast (which differentiate into the placenta, etc.); and "multipotent" refers to stem cells (usually in developed adults) that lack the full range of pluripotency but can produce two or more different types of differentiated cells. See http://www.stemcellresearchfoundation.org/About/FAQ.htm#1 and http://www. bioethics. gov/reports/cloningreport/glossary.htm.

cryogenically preserved. The vast majority of these will never be implanted in the oocyte donor or brought to birth. Proponents of human embryonic stem cell research argue that these embryos will be wasted, unless put to other uses that will greatly benefit humanity.

Almost no one would argue that anything would make it morally acceptable to "harvest" cells from a human adult or child if this would result in their deaths.[4] Those who argue that it is morally acceptable to destroy human embryos in order to obtain their stem cells do so because they hold that embryos are not yet full human persons. Rather, they hold that human embryos are at most only *potentially* human persons. Therefore the values of scientific knowledge and potential cure of debilitating diseases outweigh the dubious worth of "mere tissue" that is merely a potential human being. On the opposite side, many opponents of human embryonic stem cell research argue that *because* embryos are potential human persons, for that very reason the embryos cannot be dismembered for research or clinical uses. Proponents respond saying that by this line or argumentation is absurd because it would also mean that special elevated status would have to be accorded to an acorn or a pile of lumber or even an unfertilized oocyte, which are potential oak trees, houses, and human persons respectively. The ethical issue in this debate, therefore, soon becomes a metaphysical issue about potentiality and actuality, and about when the developing embryo becomes a full human person and therefore enjoys the moral status and protections appropriate to a human person.

In the approach that Stebbins and I adopted, we do not rely upon arguments regarding potential human persons. Instead, we claim that embryos are actual human beings because embryos are actively developing, and that human developing is the being of a human being. In order to do support this claim, we explicitly drew upon two aspects of Lonergan's work in *Insight*: (1) his technical distinction between explanation and description, and (2) his explanatory account of human development. We argued that each instance of human development is a concrete, unified, intelligible whole – an intelligible wholeness that unifies all of its data, processes, and stages beginning with fertilization. We further relied upon what we refer to as (3) "a version of Kant's Dignity Principle," namely, that

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[4]I say "almost no one" because I was recently on a panel where a bioethicist said that "parental attachment" is the only reason that it is not morally acceptable to kill newborn babies, if their tissues would lead to saving other human lives. He went on to say that "if somehow this attachment were no longer the social norm" then such use of newborns would be acceptable.

persons are always to be treated as ends in themselves, never only as means.[5] Since killing embryos as means to obtaining their stem cells for research or therapeutic purposes is a violation of the Dignity Principle, we therefore argue that this would be ethically unacceptable.

B. Unstated Assumptions

There are several key points underpinning our argument, none of which we were able to explicate fully in our joint article. In our article, we assumed rather than explicated:

(1) that the concrete, intelligible, unity-identity whole of a human self (human "thing") is identical with its concrete, intelligible, human development.

(2) that the human self is a human person.

(3) that "a version" of the Dignity Principle can be formulated that is appropriate for a developmental notion of human personhood that is so dramatically different from Kant's account of personhood.

(4) We also relied upon an intellectually converted reader, since this is indispensable to properly recognizing the full significance of the explanation/description distinction in general, and the explanatory accounts of development and thinghood in particular.

(5) Finally, in tacitly relying upon intellectual conversion, we also tacitly relied upon moral and religious conversion that is committed to a radically open heuristic anticipation of the good.

In the later sections of this article I will attempt to make explicit the foundations of our assumptions, and to indicate why they are important for an adequate ethics of human embryonic stem cell research. First, however, I offer a brief summary of some of the salient features of human embryonic development that have been resulted from over a century of biological research.

C. Early Human Embryological Development: Description versus Explanation

Much the debate regarding the ethics of embryonic stem cell research suffers from the limitations of what Lonergan calls "description" in contrast what he calls "explanation." Description regards things in their relations to our senses, needs, concerns or interests, whereas explanation seeks to understand things in their relations not only to us but also in the relations to all other things without

[5] Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), 36.

restriction.[6] Whereas the meaning of commonsense descriptions "is expressed, at least in the last analysis, by appealing to the content of some human experience" (102), the meaning of explanatory knowledge uses implicit definitions in order to express only the intelligibility that has been understood, prescinding from any experiences not "necessary for the occurrence of the insight" (55). Hence commonsense descriptive knowledge specializes in knowing what things look like, sound like, feel like, seem like, can be used like, and so on, whereas explanatory knowledge aims at situating descriptive relations within the larger realm of all intelligible relations.

Most of those who advocate using stem cells for research and therapy do so without regard to whether this entails the destruction of human embryos. Most of their arguments rely upon bases that are descriptive at root. As representative of this sort of position, consider the following remarks by journalist Michael Kinsley:

> An embryo used in stem-cell research (and fertility treatments) is three to five days past conception. It consists of a few dozen cells that together are too small to be seen without a microscope. It has no consciousness, no self-awareness, no ability to feel love or pain. The smallest insect is far more human in every respect but potential. Is destroying that microscopic dot the exact moral equivalent of driving a knife through the heart of an innocent 6-year-old girl?[7]

Kinsey uses the visual appearances of postnatal humans as the standard for human identity and dismisses early stage embryos solely on the basis of their descriptive dissimilarities. Using a more measured tone, Peter Singer describes the earliest stages of human development in similarly descriptive terms:

> If we take the fertilised egg immediately after conception, it is hard to get upset about its death. The fertilised egg is a single cell. After several days, it is still only a cluster of cells without a single anatomical feature of the being it will later become. The cells that will eventually become the embryo proper are at this stage indistinguishable from the cells that will become the placenta and amniotic sac...At 14 days, the first anatomical feature, the so-called primitive streak, appears in the position in which the

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[6]Bernard Lonergan *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, ed. by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 528; hereafter, page references to *Insight* appear in parentheses in the main text.

[7]Michael Kinsey, "The False Controversy of Stem Cells," *Time*, vol. 162, issue 22 (May 31, 2004), 88.

> backbone will later develop. At this point the embryo could not possibly be conscious or feel pain.[8]

Several other authors also approach the human embryo in similar fashions, describing it as a "cluster of cells," "just a clump of cells," or "mere tissue."[9] These descriptive characterizations are contrasted with the descriptive features associated with more mature human stages of development: early stages do not look like mature stages. Descriptive resemblance to later-stage features becomes both the ontologically and morally decisive criterion for personhood. On this descriptive basis alone, human personhood is denied to early stage embryos, thus exempting them from the protection of the Dignity Principle.

These descriptive characterizations fall far short of the requirements of explanatory scientific biological knowledge. Historian, William Coleman traces the emergence of biology as a distinct science at the very beginning of the nineteenth century. He observes:

> General descriptive activity constituted the essence of natural history [of the eighteenth century] and its practitioners may fairly be called Naturalists... [But] Those who coined the term biology were hoping to reorient the interests and investigations of all who studied life.[10]

Coleman shows how this reorientation was away from "external appearances" and toward functional and explanatory relationships among the parts of organisms. He documents the central role played by the investigation of embryological phenomena, in the quest to understand the relations among the successively differentiating tissues and organs during embryological development.

In the two centuries since, embryology (now more commonly referred to as "developmental biology") has made massive advances in explanatory understanding, at the same time making clear the vast amount that remains to be understood. Nevertheless, a few key findings call into serious question the key descriptive claims of proponents of human embryonic stem cell research.

(1) First and foremost, the attempts to characterize early stage embryos of any species as mere tissue or as completely homogeneous "mere clumps of indistinguishable cells" cannot be sustained in light of these researches. Even before fertilization, the molecules of the oocyte's cytoplasm are distributed in a

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[8]Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, *op. cit.*, 136-37.

[9]See Byrne and Sebbins, *op. cit.*, for details.

[10]William Coleman, *Biology in the Nineteenth Century: Problems of Form, Function, and Transformation*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 2.

genetic method is guided by a basic heuristic notion – the "notion of development." Genetic method is therefore organized to discover and verify the intelligibility proper to development.

According to Lonergan,

> a development may be defined as flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence (479).

This definition of development is daunting, which Lonergan himself acknowledged. It may prove helpful, therefore, to clarify each of the key terms in the definition "lest this prove a mere jumble of words" (479) as Lonergan put it.

First, then, the term *higher integration* means an interconnected set of schemes of recurrence. Each single cell comprises, not merely one single scheme of recurrence, but rather thousands of interlocking recurring schemes of biochemical reactions. These include schemes of energy (ATP) extraction and utilization; protein synthesis and repair; transportation of molecules across cell membranes, and so on. Some schemes involve interactions with the "expressed" sites of the DNA, while others take place solely among chemical constituents in the cytoplasm. Moreover, these numerous schemes interact with and mutually condition one another. The "higher integration" of a single cell, then, comprises these interacting, mutually interdependent sets of schemes of recurrence. At the higher level of multicellular complexity, the "higher integration" comprises the mutually conditioning schemes of interactions among cells and organ systems (each of which, in turn, also comprises a multitude of biochemical schemes). Each instance of development is a concrete whole, and it is made up of a temporal sequence of components that Lonergan calls "higher integrations." These higher integrations are, so to speak, the units or parts of a whole development.

Second, in a development the higher integrations are not static, but rather are *dynamic*. At each stage, a developing organism's mutually interacting schemes of recurrence function in such ways as to both *integrate* its constituent biochemical reactions, and also to *modify* these underlying biochemical structures and processes.[17] As this series of self-modifications mount up, there comes a point where the minimum conditions for the recurrence of the current integration have been eliminated, and the cellular environment becomes inhospitable to that stage's

[17]See §III. For more detailed illustrations, see also Byrne and Stebbins, "The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research," 6-14.

proper mode of functioning. What is remarkable in developing organisms is that they do not perish as a result of these modifications that undermine the conditions of integration (as do organisms suffering autoimmune diseases). Rather, the now transformed biochemistry sets conditions for the emergence of new, more differentiated schemes of recurrence – for new higher integrations. The marvelous thing about development is that new higher integration emerges, Phoenix-like, from by-products that are toxic for the old higher integration. The intelligible unity of development is this remarkable connection among the successive higher integrations – that each one prepares the way for the emergence of the next as it simultaneously brings about its own demise. This is what Lonergan means by referring to the higher integrations as dynamic.

A bit later Lonergan uses slightly more precise terminology, replacing "higher integration" with "higher system" as "integrator" and as "operator" (489-92). The term "higher system" is used to refer to the interacting and mutually conditioning set of schemes of recurrence that constitute the organism. As "integrator," the higher system is an organized multitude of chemical reactions that form recurrent, coherent, somewhat systematic, mutually conditioning patterns. But because one and the same higher system is simultaneously an "operator," its functioning is only somewhat systematic.[18] As operator, this same higher system is also functioning so as to bring about "the replacement of the prior integration by a more developed successor" (i.e., a more differentiated successor, 491). In the definition of development, therefore, the term dynamic draws attention to this self-modifying, self-transforming function of the stages in a development.

Third, this dynamic series of replacements occurs "through successive applications of the principles of *correspondence* and *emergence.*" Lonergan spelled out in great detail what he meant by the *principle of emergence* in his discussion of emergent probability. In Lonergan's analysis, the basic unit of emergence is a scheme of recurrence. Schemes of recurrence are marvelous and fascinating combinations of classical, intelligible connections among events that happen to cycle back around. Still, schemes of recurrence are never completely self-conditioning; rather, they are conditioned. Events in such schemes are linked by classical correlations ("laws") discovered and verified by the procedures of classical heuristic methods (60-64). But since all classical correlations are "abstract" in the sense that they hold only "other things being equal," then the

[18]For Lonergan's definition of purely systematic processes, see *Insight*, 71. For this reason, Lonergan's use of the term "higher *system,*" in combination with his sense of "dynamic" in the context of development, is slightly problematic.

connection of one event to its successor requires the prior fulfillment of other conditions (131). Not only concrete instances of classical correlations, but also concrete combinations of such correlations into schemes of recurrence also begin to operate ("emerge") only when requisite conditions are fulfilled (143-44). If the whole scheme is to not only occur but also to recur with spontaneity, then more is required than just the occurrences of any or all of its component events. In addition to the events of the scheme, the conditioning events external to the scheme must also be assembled. Once that assembly has come to pass, then the occurrence of any one of the constituent events in the scheme will serve to inaugurate the whole scheme's occurrence and indeed its indefinite recurrences.

In Lonergan's discussion of emergent probability in the early chapters of *Insight*, the prior conditions for the emergence of new schemes occur randomly and nonsystematically. It is a matter of statistical method to determine the frequencies with which prior conditions are likely to be assembled (143-44). But in his later account of development and genetic method, Lonergan adverts to the fact that conditions for the emergence of a new higher system are not being assembled just randomly or nonsystematically. Rather, the prior-stage higher system itself is assembling the conditions for the emergence of the next stage. It accomplishes this assembly by transforming its "underlying manifolds" through its dynamic, somewhat systematic, self-modifying mode as "operator."

Again, the emergence of the new higher system as integrator is in accord with the *principle of correspondence.* The principle of correspondence is a principle of limitation: one cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. This principle means that the possibilities for the new higher integrations are limited by whatever materials the previous system as operator bequeathed to it. The new higher system is limited to various ways that it can pull together the materials in inherits from the previous stage. The higher systems as integrators that do emerge have to be in correspondence with the "lower manifolds," the molecular processes needed in order for those higher schemes to occur and recur. For example, the placental cells rely upon the prior functioning of lower schemes producing specific types of proteins that emerge from the cells of the trophoblast. Without those lower schemes, the placental system cannot function. There is therefore a correspondence between the system of the placenta and those protein-producing schemes. On the other hand, the liver system cannot emerge from the trophoblast cells. The functionings of liver cells correspond to lower biochemical schemes of recurrence that will not emerge from trophoblast cells.

Fourth, development is not just one interesting higher system after another. The successive higher integrations in a developmental sequence are ever more *differentiated.* Differentiation means that a simple scheme of recurrence is replaced by the emergence of two or more interrelated schemes of recurrence, each of which can do something slightly different from what the original undifferentiated scheme could accomplish alone. This process is repeated over and over. The slight differences of self-modification accumulate and amplify.

This means of course that each successive higher integration can perform both more numerous and more differentiated operations than its predecessors. One clear sign of increased differentiation is the increasing range of environmental conditions under which the developing organism can function. (Compare, for example, the protective environments for larval or fetal stages with those of adult stages). Cellular division and multiplication is the basic and most obvious illustration of how organic development achieves increasing differentiation. Where a single cell could perform only its own operations, two cells can perform two slightly different sets of operations in coordination with each other. This differentiation grows exponentially with the successive cellular divisions, especially as the additional cells modify themselves into increasing diverging modes of functioning. In embryogenesis, the embryoblast cells of a mammalian organism differentiate into ectodermic, mesodermic, and endodermic cellular layers, which in turn further differentiate into multifaceted tissues and systems, especially those of the schemes of recurrence in the developing nervous system.

Fifth and most importantly, development as such is not merely this or that higher system, either as integrator or as operator, no matter how differentiated they may be. Rather, development is the entire *linked sequence* of dynamic higher systems. As Lonergan puts it, "the principle object of genetic method is to master the *sequence* itself, to understand the development" (486, emphasis added), for the "operators form a flexible *series*" (491, emphasis added). It is the whole of the interconnected *sequence* of operators that constitutes the intelligibility of a development as such. The prior operator is intrinsically and inextricably connected to the next operator. The prior operator is operating in such a way that, under given conditions, what emerges is the higher system as operator in the next stage. Likewise, the operator in the next stage is concretely and intelligibly constituted as what it is by having been brought about by the prior stage operator. Each higher system as operator is constituted to be what it is as a part, as a stage, within the whole, intelligible sequence which is, for Lonergan, the explanatory meaning of "development."

Thus the entire course of an organism's development has a unified intelligibility. One can be misled into thinking that one or another higher integration alone constitutes a complete, unified intelligibility. This however would be an incomplete view, for it would regard a particular stage of higher integration in abstraction from its own concrete wholeness. Explanatory investigation seeks insights that answer the questions, "What is this organism doing?" and "Why is this organism operating in these ways?" If one's answers were framed solely in terms of some particular stage of the concrete, intelligible integrations of the underlying biochemical reactions, these would only partially answer the questions for explanation. Answers in terms of the specific form of integration at a given stage do not even explain all of the data on the organism at that stage, let alone the data on the whole development. The search for complete explanatory understanding of all the data of a stage impels scientists to study each given stage as an *operator* as well as an *integrator*. When Lonergan identifies the central task of genetic method as "specify the operator" (491), he has in mind the task of identifying how presently functioning schemes of recurrence are gradually transforming the underlying biochemical materials and processes so as to bring about an entire *sequence* of successive operators. In order to understand any particular stage in a fully explanatory way, the investigator must also understand how the transforming activities of the operator are related to the subsequent stages of integrator-operator functioning. Thus the concrete and explanatory answer to the question "What is the organism doing?" is "It is exercising its higher system as operator, which concretely is but the present manifestation of its entire developmental sequence." In other words, concretely the answer is, "The organism is enacting its entire development, which is manifesting itself at this stage as this particular higher system as operator." Developmental biologist Maureen Condic captures the intelligible unity of the developing embryo.

> Embryonic development is one of the most fascinating of all biological processes. A newly fertilized egg faces the daunting task of not only generating all of the tissues of the mature animal but organizing them into a functionally integrated whole...
>
> If a developing embryo is not to end up a mass of disorganized tissues, it must do more than generate adult cell types. Embryos must orchestrate and choreograph an elaborate stage production that gives rise to a functional organism. They must direct intricate cell movements that bring together populations of cells only to separate them again, mold and shape organs through the birth of some cells and the death of others, and build ever

> more elaborate interacting systems while destroying others that serve only transient, embryonic functions. Throughout the ceaseless building, moving, and remodeling of embryonic development, new cells with unique characteristics are constantly being generated and integrated into the overall structure of the developing embryo.[19]

Finally, concrete developments are conditioned. Lonergan only hints at this contingency of development in his definition (i.e., when he speaks of the sequence of higher integrations as "flexible"). Nevertheless, the conditionality of development becomes quite clear in his expanded discussions (487). Just as every scheme of recurrence is conditioned by events outside of its own functioning, so also each and every concrete instance of development is also conditioned by factors not of its own making. This dimension of development is revealed especially in Lonergan's discussions of "minor and major flexibility." He refers to the experiments of Hans Driesch who subjected early stage sea urchin embryos to a variety of abnormal, stressful conditions.[20] While some of the most extreme of these conditions proved fatal, the embryos revealed a remarkable ability to adapt to less extreme conditions by embarking upon one of the alternatives from a flexible repertoire its characteristic developmental pathways. Developmental biologists have cataloged numerous other such instances of "minor flexibility" in a wide range of species including humans. Minor flexibility can arise in response to either external environmental (e.g., toxic) conditions, or from internal genetic or other mutations. The most commonly appearing pathways are called "normal" by a merely descriptive mentality, while the relatively rare pathways are given the descriptive appellation "abnormal." (Such descriptive terminology is invoked especially for those pathways yielding serious organic and neurological impairments). Yet from an explanatory perspective, a vast range of so-called abnormal developmental pathways are evidence of the flexibility of genuine human development. They are still instances of the minor flexibility that maintains our species' developmental intelligibility under a variety of conditions.

On the other hand conditions can vary so greatly as to substantially alter the intelligibility of the linked sequence itself. The clearest instance would be a genetic mutation that brings about a new, explanatorily distinct species. Such genetic mutations may be caused by cosmic rays or environmental toxins or simply by unusual coincidences during genetic replication. When conditions so dramatically alter the developmental pathway as to issue in a new species,

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[19]Maureen L. Condic, "The Basics About Stem Cells," *First Things* 119 (January 2002): 30-34, at 30.

[20]*Insight*, 475. For more complete details, see Gilbert, *Developmental Biology*, 58-61.

Lonergan calls this "major flexibility." Both minor and major flexibility attest to the fact that development is not to be understood by looking to some rigid, fixed, predestined final stage outcome. Rather development is to be understood as a *flexible* linked sequence that can manifest its own form of intelligibility under a wide, but not unlimited, variety of conditions.

Explanatory understanding of development therefore intends the intelligible, flexible, connected wholeness of the entire *sequence* of higher integrators-operators. It is this intelligible wholeness of the entire sequence that is the explanatory meaning of development.

It should be clear how Lonergan's generic, heuristic account of development dovetails with the facts of early human embryology. First and foremost, the early stages form a unified intelligible sequence, as Maureen Condic makes clear. Moreover, the stages are both higher systems integrating biochemical and intercellular schemes, as well as self-modifying operators that set the conditions for the emergence of the next stage. Each cell in each early stage participates in the characteristically human modes of dynamic self-modification. Moreover, these modifications produce increasingly differentiated cells and biochemical schemes of recurrence which are nonetheless remarkably integrated. This is already manifest in the newly fertilized zygote, where the underlying epigenetic and cytoplasm molecules are already being transformed in a characteristically human fashion. It is already manifest in the second stage of cleavage, where rotational cleavage distinguishes human development from all of the alternative, nonmammalian modes of second stage cleavage. The entire linked sequence of human development continues to manifest itself in each of its successive stages of self-modification up to and including that of the preimplantation human blastocyst.

Hence it is a serious departure from the goal of explanatory understanding to characterize the earliest stages of human embryonic development in ways that abstract from their concrete wholeness. Human embryonic stems cells, whether totipotent or pluripotent, are parts in dynamic higher integrations. These dynamic higher integrations themselves, in turn, are stages in a linked series that constitutes a whole development. The concrete whole of human embryonic development is the whole linked sequence of increasingly differentiated higher systems.

Still it is important to repeat that explanatory understanding of human development is not formulated in terms of some fixed, inevitable, uniform outcome. Rather, explanatory understanding formulates development in terms of its conditioned, characteristically flexible, linked series of operators-integrators.

Each and every stage manifests itself precisely as a member of that flexible linked sequence. Each stage bears a conditional intelligible connection to future stages, *even if* those stages fail to actualize because conditions prove inhospitable. Hence, the intelligible, linked series of integrators-operators is the identifying feature of human development, not one or few late emerging stages. From the objective of reaching explanatory understanding, therefore, it is incorrect to say that a humanly developing embryo is not genuinely human because some violent intervention prevented the emergence of later stages of sensitivity or memory or rationality. The flexible, conditional intelligibility of the stages, not their ultimate outcome, is the defining notion of human development. The manner of developing remains intelligibly and characteristically human throughout its series of higher integrations, no matter how far they are permitted to continue.

Of course the intelligibility unity of human development extends beyond the stage of implantation to include the further higher stages of integrators-operators through fetal development, birth, infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood and advanced aging, to which we will return in Part III).

E. The Unity of Things and Developmental Unity

It is one thing to comprehend early human embryonic development as part of a unified developmental intelligibility. It is another to argue that this developmental unity enjoys the status and deserves the protection of a human person. It is to that task that I now turn.

The first step is the hypothesis that the concrete, intelligible sequence that constitutes the development of a developing thing *is* the concrete, intelligible unity-identity-whole of that thing. Or more briefly, my hypothesis is that the thinghood of a developing thing is identical with its development. This is perhaps the most radical of the positions Stebbins and I assume in our joint paper. It is a position about which I admit a certain tentativeness. Up to the present, I have not been able to think of what might be incorrect about equating human development with human selfhood ("thinghood").[21] Still, since I cannot claim for myself the absence of all further pertinent questions (which is the ultimate criterion for unconditional affirmation of an insight), I can only advance this only as a probably true hypothesis.

I have come to this hypothesis through reflection upon Lonergan's account of development in light of his definition of a thing:

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[21] Actually there is at least one major difficulty – having to do with the dialectic of the individual human being – to which I will return in § V.

> By a thing is meant an intelligible, concrete unity (278)...the notion of a thing is grounded in an insight that grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in the data; and this unity is grasped, not by considering data from any abstractive viewpoint, but by taking them in their concrete individuality and in the totality of their aspects...Thus things are conceived as extended in space, permanent in time, and yet subject to change (271).

The heart of our argument, then, consists in identifying the intelligible linked sequence of a development with the intelligible "unity, identity, whole" of a thing. I offer the following reflections in support of this hypothesis:

In general any "notion" in Lonergan's sense is some kind of an anticipation of an unknown to be known – of something not-yet experienced or understood or affirmed that will become determinate through anticipated acts of experiencing, understanding or judging. In particular the notion of a thing is the anticipation of something to be known through insights that grasp the unity, identity, wholeness of all the data pertaining to that thing.

Lonergan knew that this was a radical and profound departure from the ordinary, descriptive criterion of unity and reality. He emphasizes the dramatic difference between the explanatory unity of "thing" as intelligible and the descriptive unity of "body" as some "subdivision of the already out there now real."[22] The profundity of the contrast shows up most starkly when one considers the issue of temporality in relation to unity. To be a body (in the sense defined by Lonergan) is to be completely contained in the present, to exist completely in the present. This descriptive, bodily sense of reality as temporal presence is conveyed in the "already" and "now" defining features of body. By way of contrast, the explanatory intelligibility of "thing" is not captured or isolated in the present. The insight anticipated in the notion of "thing" will be an insight that grasps the unity-identity-whole of *all* of the data on that thing, including its data that are temporally distinct and spread across a wide duration of time. The data on a thing are not limited to any specific moment present in time, as are the data of a body. As Lonergan puts it, because of their intelligibility, things are conceived as "extended in space, permanent in time, and yet subject to change." Temporal differences are embedded in data; data are "given" at different times. Still, those

[22]Strictly speaking "body" is a function of the extroverted aspect of the biological pattern of experiencing, rather than of the ordinary commonsense descriptive orientation of understanding. However, the latter emerges from the former so easily and spontaneously that it is only with great effort and care that the distinction can be made effectively.

empirical differences in time ultimately pertain to the empirical residue. Hence, merely empirical temporal differences do not add any immanent intelligibility of their own to the intelligibility that unities temporally distinct data (51-52).

This means of course that the mere succession of time, in and of itself, does not modify the intelligibility of either things or developments. In other words, one and the same intelligible unity, whether of a thing or of a development, unites the different data on the different temporal stages of the thing or development. Although several philosophers would dispute this claim, at least for Lonergan there is neither a new thing nor a new intelligible development for each and every moment. Rather, there are new stages at different times, but not a new intelligible linking of those stages. We sometimes speak of "a new development," when we actually mean "the emergence of a new stage of a development." In other words, descriptively we sometimes use "development" instead of "emergence." Lonergan's usage, however, is fully explanatory: development is not *an* emergence, but an *intelligibly linked sequence* of emergences. Hence things and developments remain intelligibly the "same" (i.e., the same intelligibility permanent through time) despite the merely empirical differences in the data on their stages (i.e., data that differ *temporally* in virtue of their empirically residual temporal differences).

While both things and developments are permanent in time, nevertheless, all finite things really do change and all developments really are dynamic. As Lonergan puts it, "knowing change consists in grasping the same identity [intelligible wholeness]...at different times in different individual data" (307). What changes are the data at different times. Those different, changing data really are constituents of the fully concrete thing or development. The concrete thing or development is truly changing although its intelligibility does not. What remains permanent are the intelligibilities – whether thing or development – that connect these data across time.

On the other hand, if one adheres to the strict sense of "body" as "subdivision of the already out there now," then bodies cannot be said to either permanent in time or subject to change. For what is "*already* out there *now*" exists only in the present moment and is gone in the next moment. An ontologically novel body takes the place of the previous one in the next "now" instant.[23] Strictly speaking, then, bodies are never permanent but instead are evanescent. Neither can bodies strictly be said to change. They simply exist in their infinitesimally brief moment in time and instantaneously perish. For something to change, it

[23]However, given that the empirical residue of temporality is continuous, the concept of "the next instant of time" is incoherent, as Aristotle already recognized.

would have to have one characteristic at one moment and a truly different characteristic at a subsequent moment. But this is impossible for bodies in the strict sense. Of course people who operate from a commonsense descriptive mentality have no difficulty believing that bodies change – commonsense people think this all the time. However this is because, as Lonergan puts it, by "a 'body' is meant secondarily any confusion or mixture of elements taken both from the notion of a thing and from the notion of a 'body' in its primary meaning" (279). Common sense descriptive thinking can and does easily slip into confusions and mixtures whose practical consequences do not show up immediately.

These general metaphysical points are more easily understood through the concrete illustration of a baseball. The data on a baseball are temporally different. A baseball in motion curves, spins, follows a parabolic trajectory and vibrates violently from the force of the batter's impact. Over its lifespan it gets dirty. In addition, a small number of molecules evaporate from its surface, while it also absorbs a larger number of water vapor and other atmospheric gas molecules. These interact with its original molecular structure and change it, hardening or softening it, for example. Yet it remains one and the same baseball through its lifetime. This sameness, this unity-identity-wholeness does not consist in it having exactly the same, unchanging appearance – the same data throughout all time. Nor does its identity consist in having exactly the same underlying "matter" through all time – in being composed of exactly the same molecules or subatomic particles throughout all time. Its sameness, rather, is its own specific, concrete *intelligibility* that unites all these changing data into a single, unified intelligible interconnectedness.

Still, the intelligible unity of a baseball is not the kind of intelligible unity that is characteristic of any developing thing. The unity of developing things is the intelligible interconnectedness of a linked sequence of integrator-operators. Unlike biological organisms, baseballs do not "successively transform their underlying manifolds" so as to bring about "increasingly differentiated higher integrations."

Even so, there is a basic commonality between the thinghood of a baseball and the intelligible unity of development. Because the unity of things as well as the unity of developments is their unifying intelligibility, they both encounter the same resistance from non-conversion to their trans-temporal unity as real. To a descriptive mentality, the reality and unity of a baseball is just what it looks like in one, single snap-shot-like appearance, frozen in time. So also a descriptive mentality tends to regard some limited (and usually well-advanced)

developmental stage frozen in time as the genuine reality and the unity of a developing entity. In the case of a baseball, this metaphysical imprecision is usually quite inconsequential. But in the case of developing human beings, the bias toward description and bodily-reality can have dire consequences.

Description tends to treat the data on this or that stage as all there is to the entity. But this descriptive way of thinking is abstract in its arbitrary privileging of the present (the "already out there now"). It abstracts from the explanatory, concrete wholeness of development. Fully explanatory understanding grasps stages *as* stages *of* a development, not as isolated units or things. Lonergan argues that there are no "things within things," (283-84); likewise, stages are not "stage-things" within a "development-thing." Hence, the temporally distinct data on stages are more properly understood to be data on the intelligible wholeness of the development that unifies and constitutes the stages as stages. Therefore, just as is the intelligibility of things, so also the intelligibility of development is a unification of differences in data at different times.

If the thinghood, the concrete intelligible, unity-identity-whole of a developing thing is its development as I am proposing, why then didn't Lonergan say so? Perhaps this is because of the moving viewpoint. When Lonergan first introduced the notion of thing, he did so heuristically – in terms of the general kind of insight that would be ingredient in the knowledge of a thing. In this generic heuristic sense of course every thing has a unity that is "like" the unity of every other, since knowledge of all things involves the same generic sort of an insight. Yet the insight that grasps the intelligible linked sequence of integrators-operators does seem to comply with Lonergan's generic stipulation.

According to Lonergan what differentiates things from one another is not different kinds of insights into their unity. Rather, Lonergan says that things are differentiated by the components that they unify. The intelligibility of a thing unifies not only its diverse empirical elements but also its diverse conjugates: "the notion of a thing as an intelligible, concrete unity differentiated by experiential and explanatory conjugates clearly implies the possibility of different kinds of things" (280). Now developments also unite and are differentiated by their explanatory conjugates. The higher systems as integrators unite into complex integrated schemes of recurrence vast arrays of intracellular biochemical reactions and intercellular organic processes. The higher systems as operators connect the conjugates involved in the earlier stages of schemes to the conjugates of later stages of schemes. So we may say that developing things are not only differentiated by their underlying explanatory conjugates but are also differentiated by their characteristic developments – their characteristic sequences

of linking and connecting the explanatory conjugates ingredient in their successive higher systems. Clearly, there are inanimate things whose unities would not be developmental unities. Yet the things that do develop are distinguished not only by their possession of different explanatory conjugates but also by their developmental, intelligibly linked sequences of those conjugates as they function in higher integrators-operators. Again, it would seem that what Lonergan says about differentiation of things corresponds to the differentiation of developmental unities as well.

Hence, like things, developments are concrete intelligible unities. Like a thing, a development (i.e., the intelligible unity that links the successive stages) is extended in space, permanent in time, yet subject to change. Like things, developments are differentiated by their conjugates. Is the development of a developing thing, therefore, identical with its thinghood? Put more bluntly, *is* the thing its development, or does the thing *have* a development? Is a developing thing a still greater unity that has its development as a kind of meta-property? Are there any data on a developing thing that is left over to be understood after all of its concrete developmental intelligibility has been understood?[24] If so, then there is some further intelligibility to a developing thing than there is to be found in the intelligibility of its linked sequence of integrators-operators. If not, then it would seem reasonable to say that the intelligible unity-identity-whole of a developing thing is completely and exactly its development. The latter is the first of the hypotheses that I present in this article as probably true.

[24]Of course, the merely empirically residual aspects of the data on a concrete development are not immanently intelligible to the insight that grasps that development in all of its interconnected concreteness. Yet this is also true in the case of a nondeveloping thing; its intelligible unity also prescinds from its empirical residue. Still, it may be that the data on disease, degeneration, and death cannot be brought within the ken of genetic methods. If so, then the intelligible unity of developing things goes beyond their developmental intelligibility. The still further cases of biases, evil, sin require the introduction of dialectical methods and invite hope for up the possibility of a still more complex kind of intelligible unity than that of development. However, it should be noted that we are then no longer simply talking about developing things, but about dialectical things. For the sake of the present argument, which concerns the ontological and deontological status of the first five days of human development, these further considerations do not seem to constitute relevant objections.

PART III: DEVELOPMENTAL UNITY AND PERSONS

F. Unity of Self, Unity of Subject, and Developmental Unity

Although Lonergan avoids the impersonalism of the term "thing" when referring to human selves,[25] it is clear that he understood human selves to be highly specific and very advanced kinds of things – distinguished and characterized by their specifically human cognitional explanatory conjugates. Indeed, he uses the very terminology for things in his definition of a self:

> By the 'self' what is meant is a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole (343).

Insight's chapter on self-affirmation calls upon the reader precisely to affirm herself or himself as a concrete, intelligible unity-identity-whole. It is clear, therefore, that to be a human self is to have the special kind of intelligible unity that pertains to things.

Moreover, it is also clear that to be a human self is to be a developing unity. Lonergan explains that by self he means a unity-identity-whole that is "characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, grasping the unconditioned, and judging" (343-44).[26] For Lonergan, these conscious activities are constituted to be what they are in virtue of their places in the "formally dynamic"[27] integration of conscious acts that he calls "cognitional structure." The self's prior acts of experiencing, understanding,

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[25]To be precise, just as Kant can anticipate the existence of rational beings (persons) which are not human, Lonergan's definition of "self" does not exclude the possibility of non-human unity-identity-wholes that are also characterized by this same dynamic structure of conscious activities. What these other kinds of selves might be, and what would make them nonhuman, is beyond my comprehension at present. David Jones has suggested that they might be so different in their organic constitution and development that they would constitute essentially different species. However, Lonergan's way of specifying explanatory species would seem to exclude this possibility; whatever has the cognitional structure is a self, regardless of the formation of its underlying organic conjugates.

[26]For the moment I am leaving aside the question of whether a "self" so understood is also "person" in something like Kant's sense, that is to say, is an instance of a value so exalted as to merit privileged status of the Dignity Principle. I return to this issue in § IV.

[27]Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 206.

expressing, and judging are organized into habits of knowing which correspond to higher integrations in his account of development. Still, the even more foundational manifestations of human intelligence and reasonableness are to be found in the new questions for intelligence and reasonableness that arise. Guided by the direction provided by new questions, the cognitional self-as-operator draws upon all of the prior achievements of itself-as-integrator and calls forth new experiences and imaginative constructions as well as old memories, ideas, and judgments. In doing so, the self-as-operator is setting the conditions for the emergence of new direct and reflective insights, new judgments, still further questions, and so on in a recurring, dynamic, self-correcting process. In the long run this self-correcting process eventually results in the emergence of the epochal differentiations of consciousness – the diverse modes of common sense, as well as the religiously, artistically, theoretically, scholarly, and interiorly differentiations of consciousness.[28] The cognitional self-correcting process is therefore a prime instance of development – of the self as operator transforming its activities of consciousness and their contents along paths of increasing differentiation. The cognitional self is self-transcending. Hence, it is clear that cognitional selves are developing selves. Human selves are developing, intelligible unity-identity-wholes that are also dynamically intelligent.

Still, the activities and intelligible dynamic patterns of cognitional selves are only parts of a larger story. In reality, cognitional activities are always complemented and augmented by the further conscious acts and structures of value inquiry, value reflection, grasping and judging virtually unconditioned values, intentional feeling, choosing, and loving. In order to do justice to the more concrete unity that performs this enlarged structure of activities, Lonergan eventually shifted his terminology to that of the developing "existential subject."[29] The more complete human subject not only understands and knows but also evaluates, deliberates, chooses, and loves. As such, to be a human subject is also to be a developing unity – a unity-identity-whole characterized by dynamic, self-transcending acts of cognition and existential self-constitution. The human subject's acts of knowing, feeling and choosing what is of value are the most profound acts of self-transformation. Hence, the human existential subject is also a developing unity-identity-whole.

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[28]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 272-75.

[29]See for example Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject" in *A Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J Tyrrell (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), 79-84.

G. Unity and Embodied Human Development

Although the developing human subject is far more concrete than the developing cognitional self, still even the existential subject seems to lack the full concreteness of incarnate embodiment. Yet this is not so much an oversight on Lonergan's part as it is a misleading impression that arises from his choice to write *Insight* from a moving viewpoint. The fuller embodied concreteness of human subjectivity is dealt with at a later phase in that moving viewpoint. Lonergan was no fan of Cartesian dualism with its disembodied *cogito* desperately seeking some pineal gland to connect it with a body. Rather, as *Insight* unfolds, Lonergan situates the cognitional self within his brilliant account of human development as a whole. According to him, human development is to be properly understood as an integrated process proceeding along three distinct generic levels of schemes of recurrence: organic, psychic, and intellectual.[30] Once all three levels of schemes are operating, they interact and mutually condition one another.

> Organic, psychic, and intellectual development are not three independent processes. They are interlocked with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic [and neural]...What the existentialist discovers and talks about, what the ascetic attempts to achieve in himself [or herself], what the psychiatrist endeavours to foster in another, what the psychologist aims at understanding completely, the metaphysician outlines in heuristic categories (494-95).

Yet these three levels do not all emerge simultaneously. Organic development alone begins with fertilization. Human organic development proceeds for a considerable period of time before the schemes of recurrence that constitute the nervous system begin to differentiate from the schemes of the other organic systems.

As the nervous system continues to develop, it eventually reaches the point where it has set the conditions for the emergence of consciousness in psychic acts and schemes of recurrence. These psychic schemes are primarily sensory-motor – beginning with the undifferentiated conscious awareness and representation of neurological responses to changing environmental pressures by the primitive,

[30] *Insight*, 494-504. At this point Lonergan is using the term "intellectual" to abbreviate both the second and third levels of consciousness (intellectual and rational). Although he had not yet fully worked out in *Insight* the level responsibility of the existential subject, by implication the more differentiated structure of human intentionality is also to be situated in this incarnate context of chapter 15.

undifferentiated sense of touch. As the primitive nervous system further differentiates, it sets conditions for different conscious representative schemes, as undifferentiated touch-consciousness differentiates into consciousness of sound, pain, taste, smell, sight. But psychic schemes do not share the same explanatory genus as do the organic schemes. Psychic schemes meet the criteria that Lonergan specifies for an explanatory higher genus.[31]

As the psychic schemes further differentiate, they set the conditions for the emergence of acts and schemes of intelligence. It was Lonergan's great realization that what Aristotle meant by "*ta men oun to noetikon en tois phantasmasi noei*"[32] is that insights emerge when phantasms (psychic images) happen to fall into suitable constellations. Yet insights and their intelligible noematic contents themselves are *not* merely impoverished images, Locke to the contrary. Rather, insights and their intelligible contents "supervene" upon the schemes of psychic acts and representations. Intellectual acts and schemes are still higher systems that are generically distinct from psychic higher integrations. Likewise, the acts and recurring structures of the still higher conscious levels of reasonableness and responsibility also begin to operate once the lower levels set the conditions for their emergence. As Lonergan put it, "We need a flow of experiences to have a single insight, and a flow of insights to have a single judgment."[33] These flows are produced by the human subject as operator setting the conditions for the emergence of the higher acts.

Human development in its full concreteness, therefore, begins organically, but eventually the sequence of integrated organic differentiations sets the conditions whereby "through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence" generically distinct higher integrations of conscious, psychic activities emerge and begin to function recurrently. Likewise, psychic integrations differentiate and multiply until generically distinct activities and schemes of intelligence, reasonableness, and existential responsibility emerge and begin to develop.

All these higher integrations form one, single, concrete, unified, intelligible linked series of integrators-operators. The various higher levels of

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[31]See *Insight*, 280-84. There Lonergan uses "sensitive psychology" to refer to the generic level that he later calls "the psychic." In particular, the "lower viewpoint [of organic neurophysiology] is insufficient as it has to regard as merely coincidental what in fact is regular," (281) and hence the need for the higher viewpoint of sensitive psychology.

[32]Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III.7, 431b2.

[33]Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 178.

consciousness emerge as stages of differentiation and as components in this unified, developmental process. They emerge when the prior operators set the conditions for their emergence. But this is exactly what the operators were doing during the purely organic stages of development. The emergence of conscious, intelligent, and responsible higher integrations is no more and no less miraculous than the phoenix-like emergence of a new organic higher integration to replace its organic predecessor. Their emergences of conscious levels do not mark the beginning of new developing unity-identity-whole. It is not that there was no human subject, but then a human subject starts to exist once the conscious levels begin to emerge. As emergent differentiations, they are stages of one and the same intelligible development that begins with organic fertilization and continues through complex, differentiating stages of organic, psychic, intellectual, rational, and responsible higher integrations.

The various characteristics usually taken to be the human-defining features (such as rationality, tool-, language-, or symbol-use, etc.) emerge as differentiations within the more basic, unified and integrated developmental process that really does constitute the being of a human being. Descriptive approaches focus solely upon one or another of those emergent features apart from the integrated developmental process as a whole. But to do so constitutes a relapse into the abstractions that are the weaknesses of the descriptive approach. This descriptive relapse is characteristic of the numerous attempts to justify experimentation on human embryonic stem cells. They attempt to define personhood by focusing exclusively on some late stage, rather than attending in explanatory fashion to the whole of development. They arbitrarily select some truncated segment out of the whole, intelligible sequence of developmental functioning over the organism's entire lifespan. From a descriptive standpoint, personhood is thought to begin only when some recognizable quality or qualities of personhood appear to the senses at some later stage of the development, qualities that were not apparent to a descriptive approach at the beginning of the development. On this basis, only when the being manifests these descriptively recognizable qualities is it then deemed a person.

However, from the explanatory perspective, the very manifestation of such qualities is something that the developing human subject characteristically does. It gives rise to its own recognizable linguistic and other qualities by executing its development. The stage at which it manifests these qualities merely makes its *development* finally recognizable as the development of an embodied human subject – *finally* recognizable, that is to say, to someone who approaches it solely from a descriptive mentality. For someone whose approach is explanatory,

however, its development is ever and continuously recognizable as characteristic of a human subject. If some descriptive quality of a *stage* is an indisputable sign of human subjectivity, then much more so is it a sign that the whole developing being is a human subject – because that stage is what it is by being *a component of that whole development*, and because "subject" refers to the wholeness. Such a stage does not constitute what makes a human being be a human subject. Its ongoing, characteristically human development is what makes it be a human subject. It follows, of course, that destroying an embryo destroys a human subject by terminating the whole, developing being that it is.

The full range of human self-modification and development moves in flexible and intricate and fascinating ways to differentiate into a plethora of unique human achievements and personalities. While this way of drawing attention to the glories of human development may seem to suggest that human subjectivity is confined to only the most advanced and most differentiated paths of human development, this would be an incorrect impression. The so-called "abnormal" pathways are also characteristically human and no less constitutive of human subjectivity. The phrase "abnormal" arises out of merely descriptive approaches that privilege "normal" later stage appearances as properly human, and tends to denigrate different-appearing later stage appearances as not fully human. In a truly explanatory approach, a very flexible range of human developmental pathways are indeed characteristically human – including those that are descriptively referred to as "abnormal *human* developments." (But such descriptions still betray an implicit awareness of these pathways as human.)

Yet no matter how long, intricate, or unique this sequence of emerging differentiations is for any given individual, it is still one, single, intelligibly unified process of development that is characteristically human. This process is the very being of this developing human subject. Its various qualities of consciousness or sophistications of rationality are but the manifestations of the unity that makes their emergences possible, and to which they contribute by their own self-modifications.

This unified developing process is therefore the fundamental reality of human subjectivity. A embodied human subject, therefore, is *a developing being that is always doing one and the same thing: executing its own characteristically human development.* This is true of being human at all points in its development, even the earliest. It does not start its characteristically human developing only when a certain stage of differentiation has emerged. Being human does not begin at some arbitrary stage, as descriptive approaches would have it. According to an

explanatory approach, therefore, it is more accurate to focus upon the whole of "*its development* at this stage," rather than in isolation upon "this *stage of* its development."[34] Rather, all stages are stages of differentiations within a concrete unified, developing subject. If some quality of a *stage* is an indisputable sign of human subjectivity, then much more so is it a sign that the whole developing being is a subject – because that stage is what it is by being *a component of that whole development*. Such a stage does not constitute what makes a human being be a human subject. Its ongoing, characteristically human development is what makes it be a human subject.

Many people engaged in the debate have difficulty in grasping this idea – that at each stage the concrete activity of an organism (whether human or not) is properly understood as executing the intelligibility of its linked sequence of stages, and that it is not properly understood only in terms of how it appears at some particular point in time. Two analogues may provide some light. The first is the baseball on its parabolic path. At each instant of its flight, the baseball has a slightly different position and a slightly different velocity than it has at any other instant. One could say that what the baseball is doing at a given instant is moving with that instantaneous velocity, no more, no less. But this is just an abstraction. What the baseball is concretely and fully doing at each and every instant of its flight is moving along its intelligibly unified flight path (expressed algebraically in the equation for a parabola). In order to be fully concrete, each of its instantaneous movements must be understood as more than just instantaneous; each instantaneous movement really is integrated with the rest as components of the total parabolic movement. At a given moment, the baseball is not just moving with an instantaneous velocity; it is moving in that part of a parabolic arc.

A second analogy is that of a story. Toward the beginning of a story, the protagonist is doing various things – talking, thinking, feeling, moving. The meaning of these activities can seem to be fairly transparent or relatively obscure. As the story progresses – provided it is a genuinely good story – the meaning of these activities becomes clearer to the reader as later events reveal meanings that the reader suspected but was unsure about, or as meanings that the reader failed to consider earlier on. Nevertheless, the meaning of the character's earlier activities

[34]A number of other authors have made this point in roughly similar terms, although without basing it expressly on the distinction between descriptive and explanatory accounts of development. These include George and Lee, *op. cit.* and Robert P. George, "Embryo Ethics: On the Biological and Moral Status of Nascent Human Life," *Daedalus* (forthcoming); Mark Johnson, "*Quaestio Disputata*: Delayed Hominization? A Rejoinder to Thomas Shannon," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 708-14; and Nicola Poplawski, "Ethics and Embryos," *Journal of Medical Ethics* 17 (1991): 62-69.

do in fact have the meanings that they have in the context of the whole story. The protagonist is always doing one and the same thing in each and every one of those activities. The protagonist is always doing "the work of the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of her or his life"[35] as Lonergan put it so eloquently. This does not mean that the protagonist first writes the whole script of her or his life, initially working out the insights and feelings that constitute that whole life's plot line, and then acts it out. Rather, the story is written through being enacted (212). One's life story is composed and enacted through the conscious and self-correcting schemes of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, choosing and loving. When does this story begin to be enacted? Not when the story is first *fully* comprehended; indeed, that supreme level of self-understanding seldom happens in a person's own lifetime. Nor is it only being enacted when choices are deliberately and freely made, for a life story is already being fashioned in the child before it becomes capable of truly deliberate choice. Nor again is one's life story being enacted only when insights and judgments begin to emerge, for a child's pre-intellectual experiences are elements in its story as well.

In light of the foregoing, I can now state my second major hypothesis, namely: that the unity-identity-whole of an embodied human subject is the unity of its multilayered human development. It is necessary to expand the account that Lonergan gives, focusing on the cognitional self as "a concrete and intelligible unity–identity–whole...characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, grasping the unconditioned, and judging" (343-44). These acts occur as stages of the unity of human development, but they are far from its only acts or stages. The human unity is also characterized by the flexible, linked sequence of dynamic *organic* higher integrations that set the conditions for the emergences of these later psychic and intellectual stages. Moreover, the human unity is also characterized at the higher end by acts of intentional feeling, deliberating, valuing, choosing, and loving. Hence the human unity is the embodied human subject – a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, an entire developmental unity. That developmental unity is a linked sequence of higher integrations that begin as purely organic higher integrations only to become the interconnected higher integrations of organic, psychic, and higher conscious levels. The unity and identity of an embodied human subject, therefore, is the unity of this multileveled, characteristically human development.

[35]"The Subject," 83.

If there is a distinct or a more encompassing intelligible unity to a developing embodied human subject besides the intelligibility of its development, I have not been able to think of it. If there are concrete data on a developing, embodied human subject that are not brought into unification by the unity of the intelligible, linked sequence of human higher integrations, I have not been able to discern them. But if there is more to the intelligibility of a developing subject than the intelligibility of her or his development, then my second hypothesis is mistaken.

There is, of course, one serious problem with my second hypothesis. Unlike nonhuman developing organisms, at a certain point human beings begin to act not only intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly, but also unintelligently, unreasonably, and irresponsibly. The normativity of the self-*correcting* self-modifying functions of intelligence, reflectiveness, evaluating, and deliberating is not always respected. Biases introduce distortions into human actions and living. The unified intelligibility of authentic development gives way to the distorted dialectical processes that are all too familiar in human living. Actual human life stories are not pure instances of development. Actual life stories are mutually interfering sequences of progress, decline, and recovery. Do these patterns have a deeper dialectical unity, or do the surds of human living make human living irreversibly fragmented? These are larger questions that need to be addressed by the broader approach of theological methods. As such, they are beyond the immediate scope of this paper.[36] While these questions cannot be ignored indefinitely, they can be momentarily postponed for one simple reason: these questions do not immediately affect the response to those who argue in favor of human embryonic stem cell research. Those who argue that embryos can be destroyed to promote medical research argue that they are not yet human persons. They rest their arguments on the fact that conscious activities of rationality or the ability to experience pain have not yet emerged, and until they do emerge, there is not a full human person. These points I have already addressed, since acts and schemes of psychic and higher levels of consciousness are acts of intelligibly unified development, and because by definition these acts and schemes emerge before the biases raise their ugly heads to distort them into fractured, dialectical patterns. So while I explicitly acknowledge the importance of addressing the complicated questions of the unity of a dialectical self, these are not questions that are immediately pertinent to the present state of the debate over the uses of human embryonic stem cells.

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[36]I do however briefly sketch elements of a response in Part III §J.

H. Developmental Unity, Originating Value, and Personhood

Still more difficult to answer is the question of whether the unity of development that constitutes an embodied human subject is also a person. This question arises because of the exalted moral value that is attributed to personhood – at least as that term is now commonly understood. Persons almost by definition are to be treated with dignity. So we must address the further question: does the ongoing, characteristically human development that constitutes an embodied human subject also qualify as a person? Is embodied human subjectivity identical with human personhood and does it, therefore, deserve the dignity and respect that personhood merits?

The problem in answering these questions is the problem of determining what is meant by "personhood." In fact, there are a great many meanings in circulation that weave in and out of the debates concerning stem cells. What constitutes personhood for utilitarians is quite different from what deontologists take personhood to be. Even within these broad movements, individual authors differ and change their minds about the definitions of personhood – sometimes in the same article. So for purposes of this essay, I will take the more limited, though strategic approach. I will consider the Immanuel Kant definition of personhood and dignity because his version of the Dignity Principle has become classic and widely influential:

> Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.[37]

Kant carefully prepares the way for his enunciation of the Dignity Principle. The gist of his argument in his *Grundlegung* is as follows:

Kant claims that there "already dwells in the natural and sound" ordinary understanding a concept of duty, in virtue of which we are "well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good or evil."[38] He saw his task, not to teach to human beings the concept of duty, but rather to "elucidate" the concept that already exists. Duty carries with it the austere sense of obligation and necessity. Yet for Kant, necessity belongs only to universals, never to mere particulars. Thus the concept of duty receives its initial elucidation in the first formulation of the "one and only" Categorical Imperative, namely: "Act only

[37]Kant, *op. cit.*, 36.
[38]Kant, *op. cit.*, 39.

according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will it to become a universal law."[39]

Dignity and respect first arise in Kant's *Grundlegung*, not in connection with persons, but in connection with the universality of moral law (the Categorical Imperative). As he puts it, "Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect *for the law*."[40] Because of its necessity and universality, moral law merits respect. As Kant will argue, respect is the most autonomous, the most free (in fact, the *only* free) act that rational beings perform. Respect (*Achtung*), Kant argues, consists in "recognizing the law *as law for me*."[41] It is by one's own act of respecting the law that one makes the law one's own. One thereby makes the law constitutive of one's own rational being. By the act of respect, one incorporates the law into oneself. One becomes an embodiment, so to speak, of the law that is inherently deserving of respect. By the act of respect, one makes the law to "dwell within" one's ordinary understanding. The rational person who respects the law thereby embodies the law. Hence, the person merits the same respect as does the law. From these observations there follows the Dignity Principle, itself a variant formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means." In other words, treat each rational being with the respect that the law itself deserves as the end of moral action itself. The moral law is not a means to some other, less noble end; it is the end of moral action itself. Hence, persons also are ends, not merely means to something less noble.

However, it seems that the now well-established details of human development pose significant problems for Kant's grounding of the Dignity Principle. At what stage does a developing human being attain the level of universal reason that underpins Kant's Dignity Principle? At what developmental stage does a human being reach the level of autonomy, the level of "recognizing the law as law for me"? According to Jean Piaget's extensive studies of the development of childhood intelligence, knowledge of the categorical imperative, certainly in its first formulation, would have to occur at the level of formal operations.[42] Piaget proposes that children do not achieve this level before age

[39]Kant, *op. cit.*, 30.

[40]Kant, *op. cit.*, 13, emphasis added.

[41]Kant, *op. cit.*, 14, n. 14, emphasis added.

[42]In formal operations, children achieve the ability to operate intelligently both on propositions rather than concrete states of affairs, and also to operate with regard to the connections among not-yet realized possibilities by using operations on propositions. Kant's first version of the categorical imperative stipulates that one must operate on "one's maxim" (i.e., proposition of a proposed

twelve (and outside of Switzerland, probably a bit later). Do children prior to this age *not* merit treatment according to the Dignity Principle? It would seem not, since there does not yet "dwell within their understanding" a concept that presupposes this advanced level of intellectual development. Yet on the other hand, it is quite clear that Kant regarded young children as truly possessing the concept of duty, and therefore meriting the respect due persons.[43] (On a somewhat humorous note, twelve is also about the age when children begin to suspect that their parents do not merit treatment according to the Dignity Principle, and parents begin to wonder whether their children really are persons after all.)

Be that as it may, at least with regard to the self-correcting cycles of inquiry, insight, formulation, and higher viewpoints, there is great compatibility and complementarity between the works of Lonergan and Piaget. In fact, Lonergan frequently articulated his admiration for the work of Piaget. All this underscores the need to rethink the meaning of personhood on a dynamic, intellectual, developmental foundation, rather than on the static, conceptual foundation that Kant offered.

My suggestion, my third hypothesis, is that the new and proper foundational category for the austere value of human dignity is what Lonergan refers to as "originating value." Originating value is one of Lonergan's more tantalizing and enigmatic notions. He mentions it but rarely, and discusses it almost not at all. The term appears perhaps for the first time in chapter 18 of *Insight*:

> Values are terminal inasmuch as they are objects for possible choices, but they are originating inasmuch as directly and explicitly or indirectly and implicitly the fact that they are chosen modifies our habitual willingness, our effective orientation in the universe, and so our contribution to the dialectical process of progress or decline...terminal values are subordinate to originating values, for the originating values ground good will, and good will grounds the realization of the terminal values (624-25).

If there is any doubt about what Lonergan means by "the originating values that ground good will," it is cleared up a few pages later when he observes, "Good will

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course of action), so this is a clear instance of the level of formal operations. See, for example, Jean Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950). For an overview of Piaget's research, see John H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* (New York: D. van Nostrand Co., 1963).

[43]"Even moderately young children feel this impression [of a righteous act done with a steadfast soul], and duties should never be represented to them in any other way." Kant, *op. cit.*, 22, n. 2.

is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness that it implements" (652). Although he does not say so explicitly, "originating value" is the subject as subject, the intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly dynamic, self-correcting, developing human being. When we reach the highest stages of our development, we originate values through our acts of choosing. In one sense, we can be said to originate "terminal values" through our choices. When we choose a career in a healthcare profession, we originate a series of vital values. When we start a company or a political action committee or begin a career in law, we originate social values. When we compose a work of art, publish a scientific discovery, write a paper in philosophy or theology or literary interpretation, we originate cultural values.

Yet of course the most profound and most fundamental value that we originate as human subjects is the value of ourselves. We originate ourselves as healthcare professionals, entrepreneurs, politicians, lawyers, artists, scientists, or scholars. By our ongoing, developing linked sequence of acts of choosing, we constitute ourselves to be the persons we are to be. We modify "our habitual willingness, our effective orientation in the universe." Originating value, as Lonergan would later put it, *is* "the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of her or his life."[44] Originating value is *not* merely the value of some highpoint stage of our life. Originating value is the value of the whole development, the whole story that *is* our life. At later stages we incorporate and endow earlier acts and stages with meaning and value by our psychic, intelligent, reasonable, evaluative, deliberative, and choosing acts. Nevertheless, those earlier stages were actually and concretely preparing us and setting the conditions so that those later choices could be made. Those early stages are therefore also constitutive of us as ongoing, developing instances of originating value. The later stages are what they are as concretely and intelligibly linked to the earlier stages. As developing beings we are continually self-modifying ourselves to constitute who we are. This activity of self-modifying gradually becomes conscious, and then intelligent, and then reasoning, and then deliberate and responsible. But it remains that it is one and the same concrete, intelligible developing story that is being composed throughout the whole of our development. If some later stages of deliberate choosing are the crowning glory of our lives, still they are only parts of a story that is already being composed even before we come to know ourselves as selves, come to know the value of being a self, and deliberately and freely choose to take up the responsibility for continuing to compose the value that is our human living.

[44]"The Subject," 83.

Lonergan again briefly mentions originating value in *Method in Theology*:

> Correlative to terminal values are the originating values that do the choosing: they are the authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices. Since [persons] can know and choose authenticity and self-transcendence, originating and terminating values can coincide...At root this consists in the transcendental notions that both enable us and require us to advance in understanding, to judge truthfully, to respond to values. Still, this possibility and exigence become effective *only through development*.[45]

In these words Lonergan clearly shows that he understands originating value to mean the ongoing, developing subject whose value is the value of one who constitutes her or his own value by the dynamic, self-modifying, self-correcting series of higher integrations that are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving. Still, this series of operations is no more than one important part of the whole intelligible sequence of operations that constitute one's whole human development. Originating value is the intelligible, unified developing whose earliest stages begin organically in the fertilized zygote and are intrinsically parts of the same whole as are the later, deliberate, and responsible self-constituting stages.

Clearly, the notion of human subjects as originating values is a major shift from Kant's concept of personhood. For Kant being rational is what constitutes a person. Being rational in his sense means having concepts. In the specific matter of personhood and human dignity, conceptual rationality means "recognizing" the universal concept of the categorical imperative "as law for me." Once this rational, conceptual recognition occurs, personhood is realized and complete and remains unchanged for the rest of a life. Personhood is not a developing reality for Kant. (He did worry, however, about how persons could ever go beyond mere recognition to actually perform in accord with duty, given the massive counter-pulls of the inclinations.)

For Lonergan, on the other hand, personhood as originating value is itself an ongoing, intrinsically developmental value. As *constituted* thus far, we are the integrator, the quasi-terminal value embodied in our life story *up to this point*. But this is never all that we are. More deeply still, we are the operator, the *constituting*, self-developing subject that corrects and creatively improves upon that story. Our deepest value is our own developing origination of the value we

[45]*Method in Theology*, 51, emphasis added.

are. No single completed stage – not even the noble stage of consistently respecting the dignity of every person – can ever exhaust the depth of value that is the developing, originating value of human subjectivity.

While Lonergan differs profoundly from Kant's static conception of personhood, he nevertheless explicitly agrees with Kant on the exalted status of the value of human personhood. Lonergan explicitly affirms that "terminal values are subordinate to originating values." In the context of *Insight* at least, the subordinated terminal values "are hierarchic." Lowest are particular goods which are objects of desire and "are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible" good of order (624). Goods of order, in turn, are themselves hierarchic, because "some of these orders include others, some are conditioning and others conditioned, some conditions are more general and others less" (625). In other words, the standard for higher value in *Insight* is that which emerges from the prior conditioning of the lower. This means, of course, that originating value stands at the highest level of value. (In *Method in Theology*, this notion of hierarchy is enriched through his readings of Scheler and von Hildebrand into the scale of value preference: vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious.[46]) Later in *Insight* he extends his hierarchy of values "beyond human values" to encompass the universe of value.

> Finally, intelligible orders and their contents, as possible objects of rational choice, are values; but the universal order which is generalized emergent probability conditions and penetrates, corrects and develops every particular order; and rational self-consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent...So the good is identified with the intelligibility intrinsic to being (628–629).[47]

This of course implies that all the prehuman schemes of the physical, chemical, and biological universe are themselves values. It also implies that since these prehuman values condition human schemes and values, they too are subordinated to originating value. This, then, is the value of the dignity of the human person – originating value stands as the supreme value within the order of proportionate being.[48] In the order of proportionate being, therefore, it can be truly said that human persons (originating values) alone are properly to be treated always as ends

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[46]*Method in Theology*, 31.

[47]For a fuller discussion, see Patrick H. Byrne, "The Goodness of Being in *Insight*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81 (2007): 43-72.

[48]For Lonergan, of course, human originating value is not, however, the ultimately supreme value. That appellation belongs to God alone.

and never simply as a means. For this reason, I would contend, each developing human being, each human originating value, is properly regarded as a human person. Each developing human being, therefore, merits the respect of this modified Dignity Principle. It follows therefore that the originating value of the developing human being cannot be sacrificed for the sake of any lesser terminal value. The third hypothesis that grounds the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research, therefore, is the equation of originating value with the value of human personhood.

I. Originating Value, Personhood, and Personal Relations

There is yet one further dimension to the claim that the proper understanding of human person is as originating value. Lonergan hints at it when he writes that our originating value "modifies our habitual willingness, our effective orientation in the universe, and so our contribution to the dialectical process of progress or decline" (624). In other words, originating value is not a solipsistic enterprise. By our ongoing, developing exercise of ourselves as originating values, we thereby also constitute ourselves as contributors to the ongoing emergent probability of proportionate being. We also thereby participate in constituting the glorious and tragic drama of human history.

Therefore, the "larger and more concrete context" of personal relations (731n) is more fundamental still than our own individual subjectivities as instances of originating values. For it is within the rich heritage of value-laden personal relations that we exercise our own originating value. Personal relations refers, not to *what* we do with one another, but *how* we treat one another. In exercising our originating value we modify the destiny of humanity and contribute our part to the unfolding story that we write, not as isolated individuals, but corporately in personal relations with others.

In the most profound sense, therefore, to be a person is to be a "term implicitly defined" (36-37) within a rich network of the history of personal relations. And yet the network of personal relations depends upon the "terms" of who are and must be instances of originating value. Without originating values, there can be no personal relations; without personal relations, there are no originating values. Lonergan makes this abundantly clear in *Method in Theology*:

> When each member of the community both wills authenticity in himself [or herself] and, inasmuch as [one] can, promotes it in others, then the

originating values that choose and the terminal values that are chosen overlap and interlace.[49]

This is the more concrete specification of originating value and personhood. It is the transposition into Lonergan's context of Kant's norm of "the kingdom of ends" (i.e, his fourth formulation of the Categorical Imperative). This situates persons and personal relations into a fully developmental context.

J. Dialectic and Personal Relations

However, the suggestion that personal relations constitute the ultimate context of the dignity and value of personhood does raise a serious question. Does this suggestion imply that the value of a human person is no more than what it is constituted to be by the status assigned in a given society and culture? After all, human history is rife with evidence that humans treat other humans in the most vile, degrading, and demeaning fashions. Historically persons have been valued for no more than their expertise, or treated as slaves, or objects for sexual pleasure, or as mere animals or machines, or have been tortured, murdered, and discarded as worth less than refuse. Returning to the immediate topic at hand, there is little evidence that the context of personal relations in American society endows human embryos with the dignified status of human persons. Does the contextualization of originating value in the historical context of personal relations not therefore run the risk of reducing the universality of the value of persons to whatever value a society chooses to assign to this or that individual? Is this not the implication of saying that to be a person is to be constituted in an ongoing, historical network of persons?

Here I return to the dialectical and theological problems hinted at in §G but deferred to this point. Until now I have prescinded from some of the most obvious facts. Once human development reaches the stages of conscious, intelligent, and responsible developing, the distortions of bias and nondevelopmental decline also begin to appear. Pure human development is an ideal, but the distorted dialectic of human living is far more concrete. If we could abstract from this dialectic, then there would be no problem with claiming that the actual historical context of personal relations is the foundation for the full dignity of human persons. But as it is, the actual history of human relations is far from dignified. As Lonergan puts it:

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[49]*Method in Theology*, 51.

> But concrete human living has become the function of a complex variable; like the real component of such a function, its intelligibility is only part of the whole (255).

The other part of the whole of concrete human living is an inattentive, unintelligent, irrational, irresponsible, hateful, and violent residue. This residue is the "social surd" that plays a major role in how human beings "constitute" the personhood of their fellow players in the drama of human history. When faced with these brute facts, Kant's grounding of morality seems enticing and attractive. Kant's moral philosophy has its universal, rationalistic, static, conceptual specification of the dignity of the person and the kingdom of ends. As such, its normativity stands outside of the contingencies of human bias and historicity. While Kant worried about whether the kingdom of ends could ever be realized, at least the normativity of his ideal of personhood and dignity remains untouched by the deep biases of the human condition.

Lonergan of course was profoundly aware of this problem. What he meant by "the larger and more concrete" context of personal relations includes but does not end with the problematic context of exclusively *human* personal relations. He meant the complete and ultimately concrete context of personal relations, human and divine – "a new and higher collaboration of [humanity] and God" (742). The three divine persons are not limited by whatever a given human community so far may have made of the value of this or that human individual. The value of all human persons, all individual instances of human originating value, is to be settled by the ultimate story of human history, the history of personal relations. But the ultimate story of human history is not determined by human beings alone. It is to be the product of the collaboration of the human and divine persons. The missions of the Word and the Spirit are operative in human history, developing and transforming its meaning through the cooperation of authentic, self-modifying acts of human subjects. It is the missions of the divine persons that meet the problem of the dialectic of personal relations at its deepest level.[50]

Lonergan notes that human beings "can know and choose authenticity and self-transcendence, originating and terminating values can coincide."[51] If this is a possibility for human beings, it is a certainty for God. The ultimate story of human history is a story in which the profound dignity of all human beings is upheld by

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[50]This in no way addresses this issue fully or satisfactorily. Arguably Lonergan's whole career was devoted to this issue and to this issue alone. For a slightly more detailed treatment, see Patrick H. Byrne, "Human Rights or Personal Relations?" in *Christianity and Human Rights*, forthcoming.

[51]*Method in Theology*, 51.

God's evaluation and loving choice. This divine valuation includes all of those unjustly consigned to poverty, oppression, violation, torture, terrorism, and who seem to perish unnoticed. It also includes human embryonic developing beings who, because of the dialectic of history, are not regarded as meriting the dignity of human persons. Nevertheless, God's valuation of all persons will not be accomplished by some extrinsic divine fiat. It will be accomplished only through the ongoing, developing cooperative collaboration of individual developing human beings with the divine persons.

K. Conversion and the "Not Numerous Center"[52]

Since Stebbins and I wrote our paper, I have had several conversations about the position we have developed regarding the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research.[53] Perhaps it should not have surprised me, but I have nevertheless been quite discouraged to see how few have been persuaded. While I put most of the blame on myself and my failures to make a stronger case, it at least has made me more aware of how foundational are the roles that the three conversions will need to play in this ethical debate.

As mentioned earlier, the ethical issue in this debate soon becomes a metaphysical issue – an issue about what is real and especially about what a human person really is. Most of those who have rejected the position we have presented do acknowledge that real human persons merit the status accorded by the Dignity Principle – which means that real human persons deserve the protections articulated in the form of human rights. They do not, however, accept

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[52]"Not Numerous Center" was the theme for the Lonergan Workshop conference at Boston College, June 18-22, 2007 at which this paper was presented. The phrase comes from Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 245: "But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait." Concerning solution to the question of the value of early stage human embryos, it seems to me that ultimately commitment to the reality of what is known in verified explanatory understanding is indispensable, and this in turn presupposes as foundation triply converted subjects – who may not be numerous at the present time.

[53]Actually some of the conversations were about a talk by Princeton Prof. Robert P. George, who articulated a position quite similar to ours, without the fully differentiated Lonergan background. See his "Embryo Ethics: On the Biological and Moral Status of Nascent Human Life," *Deadelus*, forthcoming.

our argument that human embryos really are human persons. Their resistance comes in the forms mentioned briefly in §I.C of this article.[54]

Several of those with whom I have discussed these issues are far more intellectually serious than, say, Michael Kinsey.[55] Even so, like Kinsey, they also rely on a fundamental notion of reality that privileges the descriptive orientation of commonsense. In itself, common sense is an intellectual differentiation, albeit only part of the larger enterprise of inquiry and correct understanding. Nevertheless, the common sense descriptive orientation does have a tendency to constrict into the criterion of reality proper to the biological pattern of experience. When this happens, the insights and judgments of the explanatory orientation take on the aura of unreality. As Lonergan puts it,

> while explanatory knowledge includes descriptive, descriptive knowledge is the part that is prone to fall under the illusion of being the whole...[Then] there is erected a pseudo-metaphysics whose elements stand in a happy, if ultimately incoherent, conjunction with sensitive elements and imaginative presentations. Then the real is the already out there now [and] knowing is taking a good look.[56]

This is what happens when the commonsense descriptive approach regards a six-year old girl as a person, but is unconcerned to ask how this stage of the girl's life is explanatorily related to both earlier and subsequent stages. Is a five-year old girl also a person? Is a newborn?[57] A three-day embryo? Where does commonsense description draw the line? Why does it draw the line there rather than elsewhere? These are questions that are not only foreign to but also disturbing to the general bias of common sense, especially when it becomes caught up in the allure of the biological pattern's notion of reality.

For Lonergan, of course, the remedy to this incoherence is acceptance of the objectivity and relevance of explanatory knowledge. Still, any such acceptance presupposes intellectual conversion. As with any conversion, intellectual conversion is a decision. It is a matter of knowing and deciding to accept oneself as one really is. This means knowing and accepting oneself as an intelligible, developing, unity-identity-whole characterized by the conscious activities of cognitional structure. It is a matter of knowing and accepting that objectivity

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[54]See the fuller discussion in Byrne and Stebbins, *op. cit.*

[55]See note 7.

[56]*Insight*, 529.

[57]At least one university professor, a bioethicist no less, does not regard a newborn as a person; see note 3.

consists in authentically following the immanent norms of that cognitional structure. But perhaps most fundamentally, it is a matter of knowing and deciding to accept the implications of self-knowledge – namely, that reality is whatever is to be known by understanding correctly. It is a decision to be committed to the position that reality is intrinsically and completely intelligible, and that there is no more adequate criterion of reality than unconditioned intelligibility. Explanatory knowledge is one kind of correct understanding and therefore meets the criterion for reality, even when it lacks the qualities of the "already out there now" reality which are so comforting to merely descriptive knowledge. The dramatic difficulty in coming to this knowledge and decision has been well described by Lonergan:

> From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms (22).

The decision for intellectual conversion is played out in accepting the fuller view of reality that is intended in explanatory understanding and judging. At least as Lonergan understands it, explanation is committed to the pursuit of the pure intelligibility of relations and things. Any claims that reality is the intelligible and that intelligibility is what is to be known best in the explanatory approach will appear preposterous to a commonsense descriptive orientation caught in the grips of the biological pattern's criterion of the "already out there now" reality.

At bottom, then, the foundation for the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research is intellectual conversion. This brings home to supreme importance to "make conversion a topic, and thereby promote it"[58] in intellectual circles. Primarily, intellectual conversion entails a vast expansion of what one will regard as real. Secondarily, it will involve a relegation of what one once took as to be fully real to the status of but a component of that fuller reality: "It is just as much a matter of judgment to know that an object is not real but apparent, as it is to know that an object is not apparent but real."[59]

I should have said "*almost* at bottom" the foundation is intellectual conversion. For I have begun to better understand the complex interplay between intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This has been brought home to me by some of the other ethical positions that are taken by those who reject the personhood of human embryos because they do not "look like" human persons. I have already mentioned the professor who does not think newborn infants are

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[58]*Method in Theology*, 253.

[59]Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 218.

persons.[60] Others claim that the elderly who suffer dementia, criminals of various categories, and even the indigent are not persons. Concretely then people make judgments about what is and is not real within a more basic horizon that settles for them the prior question of what is and is not good and worthwhile.

Perhaps moral conversion can be characterized in a way that parallels Lonergan's criterion of intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion involves a vast enlargement of what counts as the real. Likewise, we might say that moral conversion involves a vast expansion of the notion of what is good, what is worthwhile. Moral conversion consists in a decision that shifts from the good that is merely limited to one's own self-centered interests and concerns. It is a decision to orient oneself toward the goodness of everything about everything. In other words, moral conversion chooses as good *whatever* is to be known by unconditioned judgments of value, and this means to choose the entirety of being as good – the entirety of the reality embraced in intellectual conversion. One's own self-centered particular goods ("satisfactions") are recognized to reside within and are relativized by this vastly larger realm of goodness. Yet the reverse can also be true. One's ethical orientation can be settled by a choice that the "good" is but some fragment of the totality of the good. In this case the ethical orientation will also distort and contract the notion of reality into conformity with this restricted notion of the good. Hence, if the argument that Stebbins and I have developed has intellectual conversion as its foundation, still more basic is the ethical orientation of moral conversion.

Lastly, religious conversion is also involved in the foundations of this debate. Is it an accident that most opponents of the destruction of human embryos in order to obtain their stem cell research have religious affiliations? Certainly the proponents of human embryonic stem cells think this is no accident, for they frequently disparage their opponents' arguments as privileging merely private, sectarian, dogmatic, religious beliefs into the arena of public rational debate, where such emotional opinions do not belong. In all too many cases, of course, these proponents have legitimate criticisms.

Still, it is quite unfair to characterize all religious conversion in this way. Like intellectual and moral conversion, religious conversion is also a decision. It is a decision that responds to something very real and true about oneself – namely,

[60]See note 4. Princeton's Peter Singer has also voiced a similar view. See his "Unsanctifying Human Life," in John Ladd (ed.), *Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 46.

that one finds oneself gifted by "being in love in an unrestricted fashion."[61] Religious conversion responds to the "the question of God in a new form."

> Will I love [God] in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of [God's] love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw?[62]

Religious conversion is the decision to accept the gift of unconditional love, to live it out – or at least to try, and when one fails (as one will), to repent and try again.

Many proponents of embryonic stem cell research regard their opponents as benighted religious fanatics who follow ignorant religious beliefs out of a fundamental fear of being condemned by a vengeful God. No doubt, some opponents are so motivated. But this is not a fair representation of the totality or the most authentic of religiously motivated people. Authentic religiously converted persons are people who, in the words of Rosemary Haughton, are convinced that "Love *exists*. It *works*. I *know* it."[63] Authentic religious conversion is the choosing the reality of love and its ethical efficacy. If love is real and good, if it is the deepest reality and goodness, then the decision for unconditional love eventually presses against the arbitrary restrictions that one has placed upon one's own notions of the good and the real. Religious conversion does not necessarily or inevitably produce or guarantee moral or intellectual conversion. The witness of history makes this abundantly clear. Nevertheless, the developmental tendency of religious conversion is toward moral and intellectual conversion.

The case Stebbins and I have developed will probably not be convincing absent the foundation of the three conversions. On the other hand, because there never is unambiguous and unconditional evidence for the absence of conversion, it is best to proceed in the hope that one can reach the reality of unconditional love, and the unrestricted desire to know and value unconditionally that resides in each and every person, no matter what ethical or metaphysical counter-positions they tend to express. The ultimate foundations of stem cell research therefore are the "foundational reality" of the conversions, as Lonergan argues so powerfully.[64]

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[61] *Method in Theology*, 106.

[62] *Method in Theology*, 116.

[63] Rosemary Haughton, *Transformation of Man: A Study of Conversion and Community* (New York: Paulist Press, 1967), 95.

[64] *Method in Theology* , 267.

L. Concluding Summary

This essay has attempted to supply the unarticulated foundations for the article, "The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research" by Michael Stebbins and myself. In that article we argue that any use of human embryonic stem cells that involves the destruction of the embryo is ethically impermissible. We argue that from the earliest stages human embryos are human persons, and therefore merit protection according to a modified version of the Dignity Principle. We argue that embryos are human persons because human personhood is identical with human development. We further argue that the knowledge of human development requires the adoption of an explanatory approach to knowledge, because in such an approach embryos are understood to be stages of the more fundamental unity of human development. Most if not all of the arguments by proponents of human embryonic stem cell research suffer from the limitations of a strictly descriptive approach.

The crucial premise of our argument is the claim that every concrete instance of human development is a human person. This claim is crucial to our argument, since we thereby identify every stage of development, including the earliest embryonic stages, as stages of a human person. Yet our basic premise rests upon still more basic affirmations. In this article I have endeavored to both articulate those more basic judgments and to show how they supply the conditions for our basic premise. Since I cannot myself claim to have reached virtually unconditioned certainty about all of these judgments, I advanced three of them only as very probably true hypotheses.

In Parts I and II, I presented brief overviews of salient scientific facts from the scientific researches of developmental biology and situated those facts within the more general context of Lonergan's account of development and genetic method. In Part III, I then proceeded to articulate the more basic judgments and to explain their connection to the basic premise equating human development and human personhood. First, I argued that the concrete, explanatory intelligible unity of a developing organism is equivalent to the intelligible unity that Lonergan calls a "thing." Second, I extended the argument to claim that the concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole that Lonergan calls a "self" is also properly understood as the unity of its development. Third, I further argued that this developmental unity is called a cognitional self as long as it is being characterized merely in terms of its cognitional activities; but that one and the same developing unity is more completely characterized by the prior developmental activities of

organic and psychic development, as well as by the higher activities of responsible, existential subjectivity. Therefore the concrete and intelligible developmental human unity is more appropriately called the embodied human existential subject. Fourth, I argued that the concrete, intelligibly developing human subject is what Lonergan means by "originating value." I further argued that originating value is a far more adequate understanding of "person" than was offered by Kant. That is to say, there is a profound "position" regarding the high moral status of persons in Kant's moral philosophy. However, his position on "person" is vitiated by his conceptual, idealist, and static counter-positions about reason. Nevertheless his fundamental position can be recast in an intellectually converted and more differentiated context that relies upon the notion of originating value. Fifth, I further argued that the human subjects who are properly called "originating values" are also persons in the more profound sense of having their value realized and constituted in the context of the historical reality of human and divine personal relations.

Lastly, I acknowledge that even this fuller and more explicit grounding would be but sound and fury signifying nothing, apart from the truly foundational and interdependent realities of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Unless readers share something of the expanded horizons regarding love, the good, and reality, the basic judgments underpinning our ethical argument will make little sense. Any serious foundational work of ethics, therefore, must take seriously the challenge of moving from dialectic to dialogue, making conversion a serious topic, and thereby promoting it.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX: HUMAN PERSONHOOD AND THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

In response to the original presentation of my paper at the Lonergan Workshop in June 2007, Fred Lawrence raised a possible objection, namely, that Lonergan himself says that there is a real distinction between nature and person:

> It remains, then, that the required real distinction between nature and person is an inadequate minor real distinction.[65]

[65]Bernard Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato*, unpublished manuscript, Thesis 3, Preliminary note 1. See also *Insight*, 514: "Minor real distinctions are between the elements or constituents of proportionate being, that is, between central and conjugate potency, form, and act." In addition, he

Furthermore, at least once in his various discussions of this distinction Lonergan explicitly uses the phrase, "the developmental unity of a person's life" to refer to human nature.[66] Taken together these remarks would seem to undermine my arguments in this paper, and so this appendix addresses this problem. While it would be advantageous to explain the fuller context of Lonergan's theological discussions, this paper is already quite lengthy, and I will offer only an abbreviated response.

In the context of his discussions of natures and divine persons, Lonergan draws upon his explanatory metaphysics in *Insight* to clarify the various possible meanings of "one" that occur in Christological formulations – that "one and the same" Christ is truly divine and truly human. Although he does not employ the precise terminology of his metaphysics, Lonergan says, in effect, that "one" can mean either central potency, central form, or central act.[67]

Central potency is the oneness that is known solely through intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. Hence, a merely coincidental aggregate (e.g., a "pile of stones"[68]) has a merely empirical kind of oneness of accidentally all being gathered together in the same expanse of space and time. A second pile of stones would be a second "one" also by its merely empirically residual difference from the first – being collected in a different place and/or at a different time. Yet in the case of a coincidental aggregate, there is by definition no corresponding single, unified, intelligible answer to "Why are they *all* here and now?" Each stone had its own intelligible line of causality that brought it to this resting place at this time. Its prior history need not have any intelligible connection with that of any other stone, if this is truly just a coincidental collection. Again, two entities could be precisely alike in every explanatory, intelligible respect (e.g., two isolated protons both in exactly the same quantum states), and yet they could each be one instance of that kind of proton in virtue of mere empirically distinctness. Each proton is an additional instance that is

calls a minor real distinction "inadequate" if it is a distinction between a unified proportionate being and one of its elements. In the theological writings he generalizes the point in order to apply it to the distinction between a transcendent being (person) and a proportionate element (human nature).

[66]Bernard Lonergan, "The Origins of Christian Realism," *A Second Collection, op. cit.*, 258.

[67]For the background, see *Insight*, 457-63

[68]Lonergan's own example; see Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7, trans. Michael G. Shields, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 31.

additional, not by some intelligible difference, but only in virtue of its merely empirically residual difference from others in the collection.

Central form is the oneness that is known solely in explanatory understanding of unity-identity-wholeness. In the present context, this would be the intelligible oneness of explanatory development, that is, the intelligible unity of a linked sequence of operators-integrators (the "developmental unity of a person's life").

Central act is the oneness known in virtually unconditioned acts of judging insights about some intelligible unity-identity-wholeness. Central act is known in judgments such as "A is; B is; A is not B." Central act is the "proper content" added by such judgments (300). The affirmative judgments know the existences of intelligible unities A and B; the negative judgment knows those unities to have their own existence as distinct from the existence of the other.[69] For example, a scientist could design a possible, intelligibly linked sequence of organic operators-integrators – possible embryological development of a possible biological species. This design would be the conceptualization of an intelligible unity. But if this intelligibly unified embryological design never came to exist, there would never be "one" of these intelligible, developing unities. Again, good authors compose intelligible and "realistic" plot lines for characters that do not exist. These plot lines are "one" in the sense of intelligibly unified, but the characters never are "one of us" because unlike us they do not really exist, nor can they therefore be really distinct from us. "One" in this sense pertains to central act.

In these theological writings, Lonergan argues that the proper understanding of "person" as it emerges in the church's early doctrinal development is "one" in the sense of central act. His discussions of "nature" are mainly in this context of the divine persons. Hence, there is no extended discussion of human persons. Lonergan is primarily concerned to explain why Christ is a divine person with a divine and a human nature ("developmental unity"), but that Christ is not a human person. Still, the implication of this discussion is that there is also an inadequate

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[69]In his theological discussions, Lonergan uses "identity" as a substitute for central act. His reasons for doing so have to do with the logical principles of identity and difference. It is in virtue of affirmative judgments that the existential identity of A is established and that non-A is thereby excluded. In doing so, Lonergan changes the meaning of "identity" from its meaning in chapters 8 and 11 of *Insight*. There "identity" is used interchangeably with "unity" and "whole" without distinction in order to denote what later he would call central form. As a result the changed meaning of "identity" in these later theological writings can cause some confusion. It is possible that in chapter 8 Lonergan was already using "unity-identity-whole" to denote intending both central form and central act in a compact and undifferentiated way. But this does not seem to be the most likely reading of the passages.

minor real distinction between person and nature in those beings, apart from Christ, who actually exist and who have a human nature (developmental unity).

Does this assertion undermine my argument? While I do not think so, it does call for a more technical qualification of my argument. In the main paper I used phrases like "concrete and intelligible developmental unity" to abbreviate the compound of central form and central act in a compact and undifferentiated fashion. In doing so, I was following Lonergan's own lead in chapter 8 of *Insight* about things, without adding in the technical distinctions that the later chapters call forth.[70] To be more precise, a human person is not merely her or his central form; nor strictly speaking would it be correct to say that a human person is her or his central act. Rather, the human person is the unity of her or his central potency, central form, and central act (534-38). Central potency is the empirical residue of places and times which are a person's own. Central potency as empirically residual places and times are the indispensable conditions in order that embodied human subjects can "live and move and have their being" in the universe and in human history. Central form is the intelligible unity of the linked sequence of organic, psychic, intellectual, rational, responsible, and loving integrators-operators. It is the intelligible, multileveled uniting of this linked sequence that constitutes the meaningfulness of a human life story. Still, that life story might be nobody's life story. Unless the central form of this human story also has a central act, unless some person is enacting this development, there is only an interesting story but no actual person. Still, as the body of this article has argued, the enacting of the intelligible story is not to be thought of as solely the work of a fully conscious, intelligent, responsible subject making choices. Rather, the enacting of the story is the central act stretched across time that constitutes the real existence of an entire development. That unified development is already real as it is being enacted in its organic and psychic stages, before the levels of intelligence, rationality, and responsibility emerge. Just as the developmental unity is intelligibly one across all of these stages, so also the enactment of that unity across and through all of its time is actually one existence.

While it is true that there is no human person without central act, still central act does not float in a vacuum. Central act of a human person is the central act of

[70]To be completely accurate, there are of course no nonexisting things, so Lonergan would have been more exact in chapter 8 to have said "the notion of a thing is grounded in an insight *and judgment* that grasps *and affirms*, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in the data." It should be noted, however, that the terminology of chapter 8 on things precedes his discussions of the act of judgment.

a concrete developmental unity that is manifest in the central potency of its own spaces and times. While I have argued that the *intelligible* unity of development (which, strictly speaking, means central form) should be counted as a person, it would have been more accurate to say that the unity of central potency, central form, and central act is a human person. While I did neglect this technical discussion in the body of my article, I hope this can be excused given my objectives. The first of those objectives was to argue that one and the same human person is the executor of the earliest stages of human embryonic development that is also the executor of the more descriptively familiar advanced stages of human personhood. In order to make that argument, the proper stress had to be on intelligible unity – central form. The second of my objectives was to move the issue from the ontology of personhood into the realm of the value of personhood. My second objective was not Lonergan's primary concern in his theological writings about nature and personhood, although I believe it is consistent with his positions. I hope that with this technical clarification this possible objection to my hypotheses has been answered sufficiently.

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ACTION RESEARCH AS A METHOD OF PRAXIS

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MOST OF OUR lives are spent engaging with the continuous and endless sets of practical issues, meeting the exigencies that arise in the concrete course of our personal and professional lives, where we seek to apply intelligence in the service of practice. A particular focus of attention is how we apply conscious intentionality to issues of concern where we seek to solve problems and change structures and patterns of behavior and thereby contribute both to more effective action and to our knowledge of structures, behaviors and the process of changing them. A question arises, how can we engage in attending to the practical of the everyday in a manner that has some quality and rigor and which may be considered "scientific." In "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods" Lonergan states that after experimental, historical and dialectical method, there is praxis which asks the question, "what are you going to do about it?"[1] He locates the question in the context of the end of the age of innocence, where it is only then that praxis can become an academic subject. He describes the twofold hermeneutic, a hermeneutic of suspicion as well as a hermeneutic of recovery which work from above downwards, where authenticity cannot be taken for granted and where judgments have to discern between products of authenticity and inauthenticity. He argues that praxis is a distinct method where there is a compound of theoretical and practical judgments of value. In this paper, I introduce the theory and practice of action research as a way of exploring praxis as an academic subject.[2][3]Action research is an established approach to conducting social science research and, as

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[1]Bernard J. Lonergan, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," in *A Third Collection*, ed. F. E. Crowe (Chapman: London, 1985), 146-65.

[2]O. Eikeland, "Action Research as the Hidden Curriculum of the Western Tradition," in *The Handbook of Action Researc*, ed. P. Reason and H. Bradbury (London: Sage, 2001), 145-55.

[3]David Coghlan, "Insider Action Research Doctorates: Generating Actionable Knowledge." *Higher Education* (54, 2007): 293-306.

such, it is taught as an academic subject. The paper is structured as follows. First I review the area of commonsense knowing as the practical world of the everyday where we seek to exercise praxis. Secondly, I provide an introduction to action research, describing its main tenets and practices. Thirdly, I explore how action research and Lonergan's work have resonances that may form the ground of a science of praxis.

COMMONSENSE KNOWING

What we know and how we know in day-to-day living is the domain of common sense, in Lonergan's terms. It is the intelligence applied to the particular. It is a specialization of knowledge. Its interests and concerns are of human living and the successful performance of daily tasks and discovering immediate solutions that will work. It differs from scientific knowing in that it has no theoretical inclinations and does not aim at the universal. Rather it is focused on the particular, is often content with only what it needs for the moment and is practical. It has no use for technical language, though it typically does use it. It moves fluently between saying and meanings and undertakes communication as a work of art, drawing on resources of language, support of tone and volume, eloquence and facial expression, pauses, questions, omissions.

One of the particular characteristics of common sense is that it varies from place to place and from situation to situation. What is familiar in one place may be unfamiliar in another. Commonsense knowledge consists in a set of clusters of insights, such that one is able to decide that no further insights are needed or that one or more are needed to deal with the situation at hand. A remembered set of insights are only approximately appropriate to the new situation. They are insights into situations which are similar but not identical. No two situations are identical. Time has passed, place has changed, we remember differently. As Lonergan puts it,

1. with a good look around, shrewd eye, one can decide what's up and needs to be done. Add a further insight, adjusting general to the concrete situation.
2. Egocentric concerned with how I am to behave

3. Mode of all concrete understanding and judgment – I'm in this situation which is before me and don't want universal truths and science.[4]

Subjectively we operate within several patterns of experience, and I highlight the symbolic and dramatic in this context. I also advert to the four dialectical tensions within the dramatic pattern which inhibit inquiry:

1. the dramatic bias that blocks, censors and diverts questioning,
2. individual bias of our egoism and efforts to control and exploit,
3. group bias that polarizes intergroup relations,
4. the general bias that splits common sense from theoretical knowing and fails to value both.

In *Understanding and Being*, in response to questions, Lonergan notes that common sense cannot develop its own theory, for to do so would take it beyond its own domain.[5] He also says the problem in social science is where the "object is an empirically, intelligently rational conscious subject that develops in his intelligence and reasonableness" and has to be approached differently from the study of atoms.[6] It is compatible with common sense to have a sophisticated understanding of its practices and operations within a specialized domain. This paper is based on the assumption that common sense can be the foundation for social science.[7] It seeks to explore how action research can provide a method of praxis by integrating the concern for the practical, particular and everyday with a quality of inquiry that can rightly be termed "scientific." Action research provides a way of engaging in theoretical reflection on the subjective and objective poles of common sense, where the concern is for the desire to act, and ultimately to transform, with a view to articulating a method of praxis.

Commonsense knowing has not been explored much in the Lonergan literature outside of the basic commentaries and discussion of *Insight*. Fitterer's master's thesis appears to be the only direct investigation of the topic.[8] Morelli explores how Lonergan has succeeded in recovering common sense and how he (Lonergan) affirms the possibility of a self authenticating, cognitive self-

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[4]Bernard J. Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, ed. F. Crowe and R. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 72.

[5]Bernard J. Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, The Complete Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, ed. F. Crowe and R. Doran (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1990).

[6]*Understanding and Being*, 363.

[7]F. van Hoolthoon and D. Olsen, *Common Sense: The Foundations for Social Science* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).

[8]R. J. Fitterer, *The Notion of Common Sense in Bernard Lonergan's Insight*. Unpublished M. Div. dissertation, Regent's College, Canada, 1996.

appropriation by people of common sense on the level of common sense.[9] Morelli concludes,

> The direct mediation of cognitional self-appropriation is not the cosmopolitan *withdraw from practicality* to save practicality *from itself*, of Lonergan's *Insight*. It is *an immersion in practicality* to assist practicality in its spontaneous normative efforts *to save or authenticate itself.* (original emphases) [10]

ACTION RESEARCH

I now introduce action research as the focus of cognitional self-appropriation by common sense at the level of common sense. What is action research? As the name suggests, action research is an approach to research which aims at both taking action and creating knowledge or theory about that action. Torbert refers to it as "a kind of scientific inquiry conducted in everyday life."[11] The outcomes are both an action and a research outcome, unlike traditional research approaches which aim at creating knowledge only. In the words of two of its leading scholars, action research is,

> a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concerns to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities...and to a more equitable and sustainable relationship with the wider ecology of the planet of which we are an intrinsic part.[12]

In effect, action research is about creating forms of inquiry that people can use in the conduct of their lives and involves changing what we take as knowledge. It

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[9]Mark Morelli, "Authentication of Common Sense from Below Upwards: Mediating Self-Correcting Folk Psychology" *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 15, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston College, 1999), 117-39.

[10]Morelli, *op. cit.*, 139

[11]W. R. Torbert, *The Power of Balance: Transforming Self, Society and Scientific Inquiry* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), 220-21.

[12]P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds.), *The Handbook of Action Research* (London: Sage, 2001), 1-2.

reflects a concern for the "action turn" to replace the linguistic turn of postmodernism.[13] It has origins and roots in such diverse fields as the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey, the social psychology experiments of Kurt Lewin and organization development, the liberationist work of Paolo Freire and feminist thought.[14] Eikeland locates action research in the work of Aristotle.[15] Through exploration of Aristotelian terms such as phronesis, techne and episteme, he shows how Aristotle's praxis-orientation is central to action research through dialogue and dialectics which is focusing on learning, inquiry and research.

Argyris et al. summarize Lewin's concept of action research.[16]

1. It involves change experiments on real problems in social systems. It focuses on a particular problem and seeks to provide assistance to the client system.

2. It, like social management more generally, involves iterative cycles of identifying a problem, planning, acting and evaluating.

3. The intended change in an action research project typically involves re-education, a term that refers to changing patterns of thinking and action that are currently well-established in individuals and groups. A change intended by change agents is typically at the level of norms and values expressed in action. Effective re-education depends on participation by clients in diagnosis, fact-finding and free choice to engage in new kinds of action.

4. It challenges the status quo from a participative perspective, which is congruent with the requirements of effective re-education.

5. It is intended to contribute simultaneously to basic knowledge in social science and to social action in everyday life. High standards for developing theory and empirically testing propositions organized by theory are not be to be sacrificed nor the relation to practice be lost.

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[13]P. Reason and W. R. Torbert, "The Action Turn: Toward a Transformational Social Science," *Concepts and Transformation,* 6, no. 1 (2001): 1-37.

[14]D. Greenwood and M. Levin, *Introduction to Action Research.* 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007).

[15]O. Eikeland, "Phronesis, Aristotle and Action Research," *International Journal of Action Research*, 2, no. 1 (2006): 5-53.

[16]C. Argyris, R. Putnam, and D. Smith, *Action Science* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), 8-9.

FIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTION RESEARCH

Action research is a varied field, covering many approaches which may apply in specific research domains, such as education, business and organization studies, social studies and so on. Across the varieties of practice, five broadly shared characteristics can be drawn.[17]



Figure 1 Five Dimensions of Action Research (Reason and Bradbury, 2001: 2):

Knowledge in Practice

A primary purpose of action research is to produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives. A wider purpose of action research is to contribute through this practical knowledge to the increased well-

[17]Reason and Bradbury, *Handbook of Action Research*, 2.

being – economic, political, psychological, spiritual – of human persons and communities, and to a more equitable and sustainable relationship with the wider ecology of the planet.

Many Ways of Knowing

Action research starts with everyday experience and is concerned with the development of living knowledge. It draws on diverse forms of knowing as we encounter and act in our world, not only empirical and rational ways of knowing, but including the experiential and tacit, the presentational and aesthetic, the relational and dialogical, the spiritual, the propositional, and the practical. In action research this is typically referred to as an "extended epistemology" and juxtaposes itself in relation to positivist science that values propositional knowing only.

Participation and Democracy

As we search for practical knowledge and liberating ways of knowing, working with people in their everyday lives, we can see that action research is participative research. Human persons are agents who act in the world on the basis of their own shared meaning; human community involves mutual sensemaking and collective action. Action research is only possible with, for and by persons and communities, ideally involving all stakeholders both in the questioning and sensemaking that informs the research, and in the action which is its focus. A participatory worldview places human persons and communities as part of their world—both human and ecological—embodied in their world, co-creating their world. A participatory perspective asks us to be both embedded and reflexive, to be explicit about the perspective from which knowledge is created, to see inquiry as a process of coming to know, serving the democratic, practical ethos of action research.[18]

Human Flourishing

Action research is not about knowledge for its own sake, but knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile purposes-which may be described as the flourishing of human persons, communities, and the ecologies of which they are part. What we choose to attend to is, of course, a form of inquiry in its own right. Action research is emancipatory, it leads not just to new practical knowledge, but to new abilities to create knowledge.

Emergent, Developmental Form

In action research knowledge is a living, evolving process of coming to know that is rooted in everyday experience; it is a verb rather than a noun. This means action

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[18]Reason and Bradbury, *Handbook of Action Research*, 6-7

research cannot be programmatic and cannot be defined in terms of hard and fast methods. Good action research is heuristic and emerges over time in an evolutionary and developmental process, as individuals develop skills of inquiry and as communities of inquiry develop within communities of practice.

These five characteristics provide a flavor of the broad scope and intent of action research with the ultimate aim of "the flourishing of individual person and their communities." Action research approaches are radical to the extent that they advocate replacement of existing forms of social organization. Action research challenges normal science in several action-oriented ways. Sharing the power of knowledge production with the researched subverts the normal practice of knowledge and policy development as being the primary domain of researchers and policymakers. Action researchers work on the epistemological assumption that the purpose of academic research and discourse is not just to describe, understand and explain the world but also to change it. The issue is not so much the form of the knowledge produced or the methodology employed to gather data/evidence but who decides the research agenda in the first place and who benefits directly from it. In short, the contrast of roles is between that of detached observer in positivist science and of an actor and agent of change in action research. As Riordan expresses it, (action research) is

> ...a kind of approach to studying social reality without separating (while distinguishing) fact from value; it require a practitioner of science who is not only an engaged participant, but also incorporates the perspective of the critical and analytical observer, not as a validating instance but as integral to the practice.[19]

In its original Lewinian form, the action research cycle comprises a pre-step and three core activities: planning, action and fact-finding.[20] The pre-step involves naming the general objective and reconnoitering the situation. Planning comprises having an overall plan and a decision regarding what the first step to take is. Action involves taking that first step, and fact-finding involves evaluating the first step, seeing what was learned and creating the basis for correcting the next step. So there is a continuing "spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of

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[19] P. Riordan, "The Philosophy of Action Science, *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 10, no. 6 (1995): 6-13.

[20] K. Lewin, "Action Research and Minority Problems," in K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics*, ed. G. Lewin (Original publication 1946; reprinted Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1997), 144-54.

planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action".[21] Stringer uses a simple "look, think and act" as his framework for action research.[22]

Coghlan and Brannick present an action research cycle comprising a pre-step, context/purpose and four basic steps, diagnosing, planning action, taking action, and evaluating action.[23] Drawing on the work of Mezirow, they identify three forms of reflection: content, process and premise. These are useful categories. *Content* reflection is where the issues are reflected on. *Process* reflection is where strategies, procedures and how things are being done are considered. *Premise* reflection is where underlying assumptions and perspectives are critiqued. When content, process and premise reflections are applied to the action research cycle, they form the meta cycle of inquiry. This inquiry into the steps of the cycles themselves are central to the development of actionable knowledge. It is the dynamic of this reflection on reflection that incorporates the learning process of the action research cycle and enables action research to be more than everyday problem solving. Hence it is learning about learning, in other word, meta learning.

There are several modes by which action researchers can participate and inquire into their experience. These three modes integrate the "in-here" subjective world, the "among-us" interactional world and the "out-there" objective world that we take as our reality.[24] *First person inquiry/practice* is typically characterized as the forms of inquiry and practice that one does on one's own and so addresses the ability of the individual to foster an inquiring approach to his or her own life, to act out of awareness and purposefully. [25] First person research can take researchers "upstream" where they inquire into their basic assumptions, desires, intentions and philosophy of life. It can also take them "downstream" where they inquire into their behavior, ways of relating and their action in the world. *Second person inquiry/practice* addresses their ability to inquire into and work with others on issues of mutual concern, through face-to-face dialogue, conversation and joint action. Second person poses an important challenge as to who is involved in the research and how. As action research is integrally

[21]Lewin, *op. cit.,* 146.

[22]E. T. Stringer, *Action Research,* 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000).

[23]D. Coghlan and T. Brannick, *Doing Action Research in Your Own Organization,* 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2005).

[24]P. Reason and W. R. Torbert, "The Action Turn: Toward a Transformational Social Science," *Concepts and Transformation* 6, no. 1 (2001): 1-38.

[25]J. Marshall, "Living Life as Inquiry," *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 12, no. 2 (1999): 155-71; W. Torbert and Berrett-Kohler, *Action Inquiry* (San Francisco, 2004).

collaborative and democratic, the quality of second person inquiry and action is central. Through *third person research/practice* they can move beyond immediate first and second person audiences to the impersonal wider community and make a contribution to the body of knowledge. Contributions might include shared knowledge and continuous learning via the facilitation of shared sense making, interpretation and continuous experimentation and how the ability to suspend pre-conceived and well indoctrinated categories and analytic rules such that new knowledge can be created and acted upon. Traditionally, research has focused on third person – researchers doing research on third persons and writing a report for other third persons. In a more complete vision of research as presented by action research and many other transformational inquiry approaches, authentic third person research integrates first and second person voices.

Reason asks what constitutes good action research and suggests that instead of using the term "validity," which in his view has strong allusions to positivist research and which suggests that there is only one validity, we explore how quality in action research may be grounded in the choices an action researcher makes.[26] Choices with regard to pursuing worthwhile purposes, democracy and participation, many ways of knowing and emergent developmental form need to be transparent and subject to critique. As no one can engage in an inquiry that addresses all the dimensions fully and completely, there will always be choices about what is important to attend to at any given moment. Accordingly, in Reason's view, quality in inquiry comes from awareness and transparency about the choices that the action researcher makes at each stage of the inquiry.

EXAMPLES OF ACTION RESEARCH

There are many settings in which action research is conducted and there are many accounts of its practice. In organizational settings, one of the earliest accounts is Lewin's own work in industrial plant. [27] The researchers were essentially asking how to introduce technological change into the factory where there was perceived strong resistance to change. They set up two approaches to introducing change – representation and total participation in discussing the implementation. Using the

[26]P. Reason, "Choice and Quality in Action Research Practice," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 15, no. 2 (2006): 187-203.

[27]L. Coch and J. R. P. French, "Overcoming Resistance to Change," *Human Relations* 1 (1948): 512-32.

two approaches they were able to show the differing effects of each approach on productivity and the acceptance of change. The results indicated that productivity increased faster beyond previous levels in groups where total participation was used as a means for introducing the change. A contemporary example is where a biopharma company sought to develop its learning capabilities and by engagement in three projects through action research developed cognitive, structural and procedural learning processes. [28]

Baker Collins engaged with a group of women who were members of a food cooperative in Niagara Falls, Canada and who lived in poverty.[29] Together they explored tissues of well-being, the stress of living in poverty and sole of social assistance and discussed the contribution of local knowledge to an understanding of poverty as well as the limitations of participation in changing social policy. Coghlan and Jacobs provide an account of an action research project in a residential healthcare provider in which service users, staff, members of management committees, trustees, managers and central office staff participated in listening to each another and in working together toward building capacity for creating their own vision of how the organization might move into the future according to its values and ethos.[30] The project was called "learning through listening" to reflect the ethos of the founder. In doing so they developed ways of engaging in reflective conversation that enabled progress toward a strategic direction. The organization consequently articulated "listening" as a key result area and institutionalized "listening" as a criterion for its annual evaluation. The project articulated how conversation may be used to develop organizational learning, particularly like organizations and those that seek to involve their residential service users in the development of the service.

HOW IS ACTION RESEARCH "SCIENTIFIC"?

How is action research scientific? In what has become the most referenced article on action research, Susman and Evered discussed how the positivist approaches which have dominated organizational science are "deficient in their capacity to

[28]J. Roth, A. B. (Rami) Shani, and M Leary, "Facing the Challenges of New Capability Development within a Biopharma Company" *Action Research*, 5, no. 1 (2007): 41-60.

[29]S. Baker Collins, "An Understanding of Poverty from Those Who Are Poor," *Action Research* 3, no. 1 (2005): 9-31.

[30]D. Coghlan and C. Jacobs, "Building Capacity for Learning and Change through Reflective Conversation," *International Journal of Action Research* 1, no. 2 (2005): 243-62.

generate knowledge for use by members of organizations"[31] They suggest the following perspectives on organizations.

1. Organizations are artifacts created by human beings to serve their ends. They obey laws that are affected by human purposes and do not existent independently of human beings. This accords with Lonergan's account of community created by meaning.
2. Organizations are systems of human action in which the means and ends are guided by values. Hence they operate as schemes of recurrence.
3. Empirical observation and logical reconstruction of organizational activities are not sufficient for a science of organization because
   a. Organizations are planned according to their members' perceptions of the future
   b. Organizations can be understood experientially by organizational researchers so that the truth of many propositions about organizations need not be supported empirically or validated logically.
4. Organizations can be legitimate objects of scientific study only as single cases without considering whether such cases are subsumable under general laws.

They argued that the conditions from which people try to learn in everyday life are better explored through a range of philosophical viewpoints: Aristotelian praxis, hermeneutics, existentialism, pragmatism, process philosophies and phenomenology. They propose that action research provides a corrective to the deficiencies of positivist science by being future-oriented, collaborative, implying system development, generating theory grounded in action, agnostic and situational. Susman and Evered conclude that action research

> constitutes a kind of science with a different epistemology that produces a different kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is contingent on the particular situation and which develops the capacity of members of organizations to solve their own problems.[32]

Schon contrasts how researchers can view practice from the high ground, where they can study issues from a distance, for example because they are not organizational members or because their data are based on pre-constructed

[31] G. I. Susman and R. D. Evered, "An Assessment of the Scientific Merits of Action Research," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 23 (1978): 582-601.

[32] Susman and Evered, *op. cit.*, 601

surveys or interviews.[33] Or they can be immersed in "swampy lowlands" where problems are messy and confusing and incapable of a technical solution, because they are either organizational members, whose actions influence the reality they see or are outsiders who are contracted to influence what they see. He concludes that unimportant issues may be studied from the high ground according to predetermined standards and rigor, while the critically important ones, such as how to generate whatever changes in practice we wish to see, can only be confronted by being immersed in the swampy lowlands. In his view work in the swampy lowlands involves a new scholarship which requires a new epistemology.

TOWARD ACTION RESEARCH AS A METHOD OF PRAXIS

There are several ways in which action research resonates with Lonergan's work so as to provide the basis for a method of praxis.

- Action research has explicit concern for the good of order and it seeks to influence schemes of recurrence. Through its action and reflexive process it seeks to enhance cycles of progress and halt cycles of decline.
- The generalized empirical method whereby we attend to data, grasp their intelligibility, affirm by judgment, and make decisions and take action on the basis of judgments of value is at the core of action research cycles of action and reflection.
- In its emergent and unfolding form action research is heuristic.
- In specific terms, engaging in action research draws on the twofold hermeneutic of suspicion and recovery, whereby action researchers engage with the challenges of bias (individual, group and general) in confronting issues which inhibit inquiry into issues of concern. In an earlier paper I have addressed this specifically and explored how Argyris's notion of action science provides valuable insight into the movement from insight to judgment by identifying inferences and attributions.[34]
- The three forms of inquiry, first-, second- and third-person, integrate the "in-here" subjective world, the "among-us" interactional world and the

[33]D. A. Schon, "Knowing-in-Action: The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology," *Change*, November/December (1995): 27-34

[34]D. Coghlan, "Toward a Science of Practice: Lonergan's Common Sense Knowing and Argyris' Action Science," Paper presented at Lonergan Centre, Milltown Park, Dublin, Ireland, March 2007, *Milltown Studies* (forthcoming).

"out-there" objective world and so the object of research, the process of research and the person engaging in the research may be viewed as a single horizon. This is integral to differentiation of consciousness and realms of meaning where by commonsense, theory and interiority are integrated in action research.

- The "swampy lowlands" of everyday life capture the dynamics of the realm of common sense – where situations change and what is familiar in one place may be unfamiliar in another and no two situations are identical. In these settings, commonsense knowledge consists in a set of clusters of insights, such that one is able to decide that no further insights are needed or that one or more are needed to deal with the situation at hand. Action research provides a method for inquiring into such shifting settings.
- Further work is needed to explore the role of history and dialectics.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As action research is a form of inquiry into practical everyday actions aiming at both improved action and the generation of actionable knowledge, I have explored the relationship between commonsense knowing and the forms of inquiry into everyday actions that constitute the field of action research. Both emphasize the operations of the knowing and acting subject. Lonergan's emphasis on the cognitional and affective operations of the self-transcending subject is pertinent to the first person praxis-reflection methodology of the action researcher (first person), how the action researcher engages in shared inquiry with others (second person) and how the process and outcomes can be disseminated to articulate actionable knowledge to an impersonal audience (third person).

Lonergan's work is unknown to the action research community and action research is unknown in the Lonergan community. This paper seeks to develop my own self-appropriation and to share it with the Lonergan community in order to provoke exploration of how we can we can be scientific in the realm of common sense. Lonergan has an answer in his notion of consciousness differentiation and realms of meaning. Action research provides methods of engaging in inquiry-in-action that can elaborate on Lonergan's call for praxis as an academic subject. Lonergan's method of praxis moves from above downwards. It is grounded in the judgment of value that assents to an issue of concern that invites or demands action. It marks a commitment to dialogue, constituted by a desire to understand, a

capacity to judge reasonably and to evaluate, openness to value and love and a desire to act.[35] Ultimately, it is this desire, capacity, openness, love and desire to act that underpins engagement in practical knowing through participation that seeks to contributes to human flourishing and the ecologies of which we are part.

[35]P. Riordan, "Reconstruction, Dialectic and Praxis,"*Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 9, no. 1 (1991): 1-22.

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EDGING (TOWARD) THE CENTER

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FIRST PUBLISHED FORTY years ago, "Dimensions of Meaning" was an address that Bernard Lonergan gave at Marquette University in 1965.[1] Lonergan concluded his remarks with these now familiar and intriguing words:

> There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.[2]

My hunch (more work is necessary) is that during the late 1950s and through the mid to late 1960s, a majority of theologians and exegetes would not have recognized the term *center* as a possibly analytic tool. To be sure, they would have caught Lonergan's contrasts of center to left and right, that is, contrasts to stances or standpoints, that correspond to nostalgia, on the one side, and innovation, on the other. Theological debates regarding potential and results of the Second Vatican Council would have made the notion of center, left, and right, quite palpable to Roman Catholics. Moreover, during this same period, increasingly various peoples throughout the world rose up to claim their human dignity and autonomy. These were years of religious, cultural, and social (i.e., political,

[1]Bernard Lonergan, *Collection,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 2nd rev. ed. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 308.

[2] Ibid., 245.

economic, and technological) ferment in which meanings and values were tested and contested.

For some time now, several contemporary theologians and exegetes have employed the paired terms – *center* and *margin* – to identify breakdown and decline in the social good of order; to uncover the role of bias in that breakdown and decline; to call attention to the oppression that such breakdown, decline, and bias inflict upon human persons; and to pose the relevance of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion for reversing decline. These theologians and exegetes have exploited these paired terms – *center* and *margin,* alternatively *center* and *periphery* – in order not only to recount individual and collective human experiences of alienation and deracination, of lives invisible and unassimilated, but also to foster human agency and belonging, healing and creating, transformation and change in society.

The widespread reception, use, and interpretative capacity of these metaphors may be grasped even by citing the titles of works of critical theory, exegesis, theology, and literature written over the past five decades. Nominally, the list is lengthy, but three works should suffice to illustrate: *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, Voices from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World, Opting for the Margins: Postmodernity and Liberation in Christian Theology.*[3] These works connotatively utilize the relation of space and movement to narrate the struggles of women and men for control of their own cognitive, constitutive, communicative, and effective meaning.[4] Since, on Lonergan's account, "culture is the set of meanings and values that inform a way of life,"[5] these struggles can never be abstract, for the very survival of both individuals and whole peoples is at stake.

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[3]bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (Boston: South End Press, 1984); R. S. Sugirtharajah, *Voices from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World* (Maryknoll / London: Orbis & SPCK, 1995); Joerg Rieger, ed., *Opting for the Margins: Postmodernity and Liberation in Christian Theology* (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press and the American Academy of Religion, 2003).

[4]For some other examples see, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (London: James Currey / Heinemann, 1986), Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of a Postracial Future* (London / New York: Routledge, 2001).

[5]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), xi.

Sri Lankan biblical exegete Rasiah Sugirtharajah grasps the import of the breakdown of meaning in Thomas Macaulay's famous 1835 statement on Indian education:

> [I]t is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.[6]

Sugirtharajah recognizes the way colonialism not only shoves and holds the masses of people to the margins through territorial, military, and political domination, but manipulates the control of meaning. [7]

Nigerian Igbo novelist Chinua Achebe grasps the consequences of such manipulation in *Things Fall Apart*. In this first novel, Achebe narrates the arrival of the European road and religion, and their invasions into village vital living, cooperations, religio-cultural customs, and personal as well as into communal habits; the novel also recounts the villagers' breaches of common loyalties and commitments, of common moral and religio-cultural traditions.

Achebe tracks the pressure from colonial and personal forces in the collapse of common meaning in the village of Umuofia through the life of Okonkwo, whose fear and pride overtake him, bringing about personal, familial, and tribal tragedy. In his effort to redress an offense, Okonkwo kills a messenger sent by the district colonial administration. When the men of Umuofia refuse to take up his call to war, Okonkwo, in fear and shame, hangs himself, and so a great man becomes an abomination to his people. Religio-cultural custom forbade Umuofia's people to touch the body of a suicide; they ask the district commissioner to have his men bury Okonkwo. The commissioner complies, but does not understand. Returning to the court, he thinks only of the book he plans to write:

> Every day brought him some new material. The story of this man who had killed a messenger and hanged himself would make interesting reading. One could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps, not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to

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[6]Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Minute of 2 February 1835 on Indian Education," *Macaulay, Prose and Poetry,* selected by G. M. Young (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 721-24, 729, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1833macaulay-india.html/ (accessed 12 June 2007).

[7]Sugirtharajah, *Voices from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World*, 459.

include, and one must be firm in cutting out details. He had already chosen the title of the book, after much thought: *The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger.*[8]

For the British district commissioner, the villagers are but samples for an anthropological study; *he* marginalizes the meaning of Okonkwo's act, of customary Igbo responses, of traditional Igbo life. Moreover, the European religious, cultural, and social seduction of titled members of the village shatters their unity and disrupts the common meanings and values constitutive of individuals as members of the Igbo people and concretized in individual Igbo children, women, and men. Obierika, the dead man's closest friend, observes, "[The European] has put the knife on the things that held us together and we have fallen apart."[9] Achebe chooses as the epigraph to his novel the well known lines from W.B. Yeats's "The Second Coming": "Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer / Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold / Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world."[10] With such poignancy these lines capture the gravity of the cultural disruption and collapse of meaning that Achebe recounts.

Marginality does not always connote a position of powerlessness and vulnerability. The poor, Gustavo Gutierrez insists, have power.[11] The knowledge and practices of subjugated peoples may prove transformative. Sugirtharajah observes, "[I]nnovation can be easier on the fringes . . . where the centre's hegemony is less fierce."[12] On the other hand, Edward Said cautions that marginality may turn into separatism, and resistance may harden into dogma.[13] Or the center may be reified as the negative, the oppressive and any so-called move toward the center reduced to collusion with one's own oppression. Thus, the terms – *center* and *margin* – as employed by contemporary theologians and exegetes resonate ambivalently. These terms and their usage are as disconcerting as they are suggestive. Yet the use of these terms has consequences for theology's own praxis: terms may slip from description to putative explanation, or the weight of

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[8]Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 208-209.

[9]Ibid., 177.

[10]William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," 820, in *The New Oxford Book of English Verse 1250-1950*, chosen and edited by Helen Gardner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). Achebe takes this stanza of the poem as the epigraph to his novel.

[11]Gustavo Gutierrez, *The Power of the Poor in History* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993).

[12]Sugirtharajah, *Voices from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World*, 2.

[13]Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 63.

their technical meaning may be blunted when misused in the realm of common sense.

The meaning Lonergan assigns to the word *center* in the phrase "not numerous center" differs from that given to the term by certain liberation or liberal or constructive or postcolonial theologians and exegetes. The "not numerous center" is neither spatially literal, nor merely metaphoric. The "not numerous center" is not so much an aggregate or group of theologians and exegetes and scholars as it is a group of theologians and exegetes and scholars and church members in all fields and in all specializations engaged in common and complementary experience, common and complementary understanding, common judgments, common decisions – *a group of theologians and exegetes and scholars and church people collaborating in all fields and in all specializations.*

If the "not numerous center" is an incarnate instance of intelligence in collaboration, taking Lonergan's account of our global situation as monstrous,[14] then that "not numerous center" in potency can only realize itself in collaboration with certain liberation or liberal or constructive or post-colonial theologians and exegetes, who, although neither students nor disciples of Lonergan, share at least three of his concerns. These are: attention to the concrete, the particular; attention to experience; and self-correction. Something on each of these:

1. Attention to the concrete, to particularity: Contemporary theologians have made us aware of the "other," of concrete human children, women, and men. Indeed, Anselm Min writes, they have made it possible for us "to encounter them in all the concreteness of their mediating social conditions."[15] But, Lonergan reminds us, humanity as a concrete reality embraces the billions of human beings who ever have lived or are living or will live.[16] Each and every human person is a part of the whole of interpersonal relationships, which constitute human history. Humanity is more than an aggregate of autonomous, atomized, isolated monads. We are intrinsically and metaphysically connected. Lonergan's articulation of the natural and essential unity, the interdependence of humanity ought to recast debates about human rights, affirmative action, immigration, or even so-called reverse discrimination in quite a novel light.

[14] *Method in Theology*, 40.

[15] Anselm Min, *The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after Postmodernism* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 15.

[16] Matthew L. Lamb makes this same point in, "The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan's Theology," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 8, no. 1 (March 1990): 55.

2. Attention to experience: The ubiquity of the term "experience" in contemporary theology and critical social theory detracts from its capacity to be technically precise. Lonergan takes note of the polymorphic character of human consciousness, which flows in different dynamic patterns of experience. He identifies seven distinct patterns – the biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, and mystical.[17] These patterns may blend or mix, may intrude upon one another, may clash or collapse. Such specificity about experience might well aid in clarifying the analyses of contemporary theology as well as enhance those analyses and strengthen their conclusions.

3. Self-correction: This concern is at once obvious and difficult. No theologian – none of us – wants or seeks to be wrong, to be incorrect in understanding, judging, deciding, and, yet, at times, sadly, we are. But absolute certitude is possible only if we board the flight from understanding; if we covet and cultivate blindness (scotoma); if, to borrow a phrase from Phillip McShane, we "live without minding." Judgment remains a risky endeavor; it depends upon serious inquiry, adequate understanding, a supple moral grasp, and love.

Attention to particularity, to experience, to self-correction can help us meet and collaborate with those with whom we may differ, to be at home in both the old and the new, to painstakingly work out needed transitions, to be strong in resisting half-measures, to insist on complete solutions, and to support one another in creative work and waiting.[18]

[17]Lonergan, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, *Insight*, ch. 6.

[18]Lonergan, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, *Collection*, 245.

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"CENTERING THE CHURCH": A DEVELOPMENT IN ECCLESIOLOGY BASED ON BALTHASAR AND LONERGAN

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IN THE WORK of Hans Urs von Balthasar (1904-1984) there is a short reflection on the Church that is subtle yet profound in its implications for Roman Catholic ecclesiology. In this presentation I would like to flesh out that significance and begin to develop it in light of previous articles I have written on two basic theologies of the church. I cannot be certain that Balthasar or his students would agree with me, nor do I claim to be a Balthasar scholar. I view his entire opus as a treasure chest, and I would like to share with you some of the jewels I have discovered. I would like to reformulate these in terms of some insights from the thought of Bernard Lonergan in order to continue the twofold *ressourcement* – *aggiornamento* development of post-Vatican II Catholic ecclesiology. The resource will be the theology of the church in the Gospel of John as interpreted by Balthasar; the "bringing up to date" will consist in incorporating the notion of *mediation* into that of two churches articulated by Balthasar in order to ground two dimensions of ecclesial understanding going forward at Vatican II: *communion* and *friendship*.

Balthasar identifies two ecclesiologies of the church from his reading of the Gospel of John – the *official church* and the *church of love*.[1] He draws out the distinction between the two as reflected in the figures of Peter (the official church) and John (the church of love) in two separate scenarios: 1) their approaching the

[1] Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Offical Church and Church of Love (According to the Gospel of John)," in *The Balthasar Reader*, ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Löser (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 277-76.

tomb together and 2) in the Appendix chapter, in the same Gospel's narrative of the gathering of the fish.

Balthasar's account uses metonymy to interpret allegorically the episode on Easter Sunday, when John and Peter run to Jesus's tomb together. "Love unencumbered" (John) runs faster, while "office" (Peter) approaches more slowly because of having more things to consider. When they reach the tomb, love, seeing "well what can be seen," lets office go into the tomb first. Office, because it "takes everything into view," enters the tomb and gives a kind of *nihil obstat* based on the evidence present. Love enters the tomb and assents to the evidence that office points to (faith). "This first episode results in a two-peaked church, official church and church of love, in harmonious tension: office working for love, love respectfully giving precedence to office" (276).

Balthasar extends the allegory to the Appendix chapter of John's gospel. Peter leads the fishing vessel (the ship of the church) which is unsuccessful without the Lord. They are directed by the "hidden" Christ on the shore to cast their nets to the other side (the obedience of the church to the signal of the hidden Christ). Following the miracle of the fish, John (love) identifies the hidden Christ and directs Peter's attention to him. Peter immediately dresses himself and runs to the shore to embrace Christ. The disciples follow, eventually joining Peter and Christ on the shore with the catch, which is an eschatological symbol for Balthasar. In Balthasar's distinctive interpretation, John's private love for the Lord is transferred to Peter who extends that love to the entire flock. In this way, "the unity of love and office is thereby sealed" in Peter. Yet the Beloved Disciple remains and so Peter asks, "Lord, what about this man?" To which the Gospel concludes with the last words of Jesus to Peter, "What is that to you?" For Balthasar, the answer must remain veiled from Peter because it resides in the "freedom of the Lord of the church." Peter has been given his marching orders, to love and serve the people of God. "Peter should love; he should thus as far as he can manage be the church of love."

Therefore, John's Gospel leaves us in what Balthasar describes as a "suspended middle-point" between "two impossible ecclesiologies." On the one hand, Peter does not have the liberty to declare that all religions are equal insofar as they are based on love. He should uphold the specific love of Christianity and its salvific implications. On the other hand, Peter cannot espouse the opposite opinion that the visible members of the church have the guarantee of love and salvation.

Hence, in light of this allegory of the two churches one can ask: Can we compare living in the suspended middle point to living in the lonely center of creativity and fidelity that Lonergan hints at in his famous quote regarding the "not numerous center"?

> There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait.[2]

MEDIATION AND THE TWO CHURCHES

In my own work of reflection on the basic ecclesiology going forward at Vatican II and since, I have argued that there are two basic ecclesiologies. One has been identified by the official church in 1986 as *communion ecclesiology* and the other, which still needs to be developed, would be based on friendship. The latter invokes the Gospel of John as the scriptural basis for the analogy of friendship.[3]

In terms of the church's self-understanding, one can speak of an *authentic self-mediating identity* in which the church has a specific identity and mission rooted in the person and message of Jesus with a task to proclaim the truth of this message to humanity throughout the ages until Christ's return. However, what is unique about Vatican II is that the for the first time the Church officially recognizes that it also has mutual relations with the Other – both in the sense of 'the world' and in the sense of other faiths. This is exemplified by "The Church and the World as Mutually Related," the final chapter of *Gaudium et Spes*. In other words, Vatican II is an unprecedented development in the church's self-understanding in that it issues forth the explicit recognition for an understanding of the church that involves *authentic mutual self-mediation* in addition to the one of self-mediation. Therefore, there remains a need in the post-Vatican reflection

[2] Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 245.

[3] John Dadosky, "The Church and the Other: Mediation and Friendship in Post-Vatican II Roman Catholic Ecclesiology," *Pacifica* (October 2005): 302-22.

on the church for a self-conception that accounts for the mutual relations with the Other.

In Lonergan's famous quote on "the not numerous centre," the "solid right" would refer to those with a classicist and *strictly self-mediating* ecclesiology. That ecclesial stance presumes doctrines of the church as laws or first principles, which one mediates uncritically to an Other. This occurs when the official church gives one-sided priority to its role as teacher over its as learner, as suggested by Fred Crowe.[4] Learning involves mutual self-mediation inasmuch as one cannot truly learn without being changed, enriched, and challenged oneself. On the other hand, the "scattered left" of Lonergan's quote refers to those who are in danger of losing their identity in the face of pluralistic worldviews and multiculturalist methodologies that would throw out the very traditions that gave them life, so that identities become diffuse or diluted.

In this context, then, the "not numerous center" would comprise those few who are "centered" in the tradition of the church and simultaneously engage the both the contemporary world and other faith traditions. Perhaps this is analogous reframing of Balthasar's "suspended middle point."

In terms of today's ecclesial practice, the "solid right" clings to its conception of the tradition and tries to communicate it in a strictly self-mediating way. In contrast, the "scattered left" overly accommodates itself to the contemporary context and therefore risks its identity either by lacking familiarity with its traditions, or simply by disregarding them. In this way, the "not numerous center" is at home both in the old and the new, so that Church tradition is not a preservation of ashes, but a fire constantly rekindled by the fresh oxygen drawn from ever-changing historical circumstances.

In terms of Balthasar's reading of John and the two churches, I suggest that if we think of the the self-understanding of the Petrine, official church, as functioning like "the not numerous center," it would enact the authentic self-mediation of the church in its charge to protect the treasures of the deposit of faith given to it by Christ and also to communicate and share these treasures with all of humanity. Similarly, the self-understanding of Balthasar's Johannine church of love (that I will argue below must also be considered in conjunction with Mary) functions as the mutually self-mediating church.

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[4]Frederick E. Crowe, "The Church as Learner: Two Crises, One Kairos," *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 370-84.

THE TWO CHURCHES AND THE TWO GIFTS

The medieval church reflected on questions that we have forgotten, or may even dismiss as pious tales. Nevertheless, the medieval theological argument concerning the "two gifts" is both subtle and profound in implications for developing Balthasar's imaginal distinction of the two Churches. Recall Benedict Ashley's recounting of the story of Blessed Christina of Stommeln (d. 1312), a medieval Dominican, noted for her piety and knowledge of spiritual matters.[5] Occasionally she would host other friars and they would debate various theological mysteries. A popular debate concerned whether Christ's gift of the Church to Peter, or Christ's gift of his Mother to John was the greater gift. The story of the two gifts – Christ's declaration of Peter as the *petros*, the rock upon which he will build his church, and the second gift at the foot of the Cross when Jesus gives Mary to John – gives us a glimpse at medieval biblical hermeneutics and also provides a hint for connecting the two churches in John.. Regarding the latter gift, Balthasar emphasizes that Mary also adopts John – he receives a mother. This means, of course, that Mary adopts us all. The other side of the coin is that Mary receives a home; more significantly, in this way a mutual self-mediation is enacted at the foot of the Cross. I interpret this to mean that Jesus sanctions a mutually self-mediating relationship between John and Mary, thus providing a scriptural basis for the self-understanding of the church as mutually self-mediating.

If this interpretation is valid, there are several implications specifically for the church of love and Mariology: First, Balthasar's Johannine church of love is inextricably intertwined with Mary. Just as John takes Mary into his home, so the church of love embodies a love between Mary and John; hence, central to a Johannine ecclesiology is Mary, or the relationship of mother and the son; one might even add, mystical friendship. Because this relationship is mutual the two cannot be separated.[6]

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[5]Benedict Ashley, O.P., The Dominicans (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier, 1990), 43.

[6]There is a sense in which Mary is the principle of mutual self-mediation. This is apparent both at the foot of the Cross in the sanctioning of mutuality by Jesus, but in the account of the Visitation as well. Mary's "Yes" to God (and to humanity) accepts to bear the Son of God, leaving her in a class by herself, alone. However, when she goes to visit Elizabeth she exemplifies mutual self-

This does not mean that the official church of Peter does not nurture and cherish the role of Mary. The official church upholds the Marian dogmas, affirms them as objective truths, promotes devotion, and protects her unique status in the church. Historically, it defended against iconoclastic attacks on the image of the Mother of God, and against Protestant attacks on Mariology during the Reformation. However, especially when functioning in terms of what Avery Dulles identifies as the institutional model of church, the strictly self-mediating official church's Mariology tends to view Mary with one-dimensional emphasis on her obedience to God and to set her up as such a paragon of virtue that human beings cannot relate to her. While the explication of the role of Mary in the authentically self-mediating official church is needed, the church of love is more liable to take seriously the deep personal relationship that John has with Mary. In the Johannine ecclesiology, the Marian dimension is based on a two-way intimate relationship as the mutual love between the child and the adoptive parent. This reflects the tradition of Christian spirituality that regards Mary as inextricably related to her Son; as for example, as in St. Louis-Marie de Montfort's (1673-1716) *The True Devotion to Mary*.[7] John Paul II in his encyclical *Redemptoris Mater* (§ III, 3; March 25, 1987) sanctioned the specific devotion characteristic of this text.

At the foot of the Cross, John enters into a new relationship of love that reorders and reorients his life; he takes his new mother into his home from that day forward. Bernard Lonergan calls unrestricted being-in-love the first principle that reorients and transvalues our values. In the Johannine-Marian ecclesial reality, a relationship with Mary can be the first principle in light of which people "fall in love" with the Mother of God, not as deified but because "consecration to Christ through the hands of Mary [is] an effective means for Christians to live faithfully their baptismal commitments" as John Paul II states (RM, § III, 3) – an intense relationship with Mary, however, that is an individual choice to which not everyone is called. The Marian dimension to the church of love exemplifies a theological component within the church of love. To be sure, individual devotion to Mary may vary, but I believe that it represents a development of Balthasar's

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mediation. That is, Elizabeth receives the joy of having Mary to assist her in her pregnancy. Mary receives solace in her aloneness since Elizabeth will bear a special child as well (the Baptist). Together, they can mutually rejoice in the gifts that both of them bear and are consoled in their respective solitary vocations.

[7]St. Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort, *True Devotion to Mary*, trans. Fr. Frederick Faber (Rockford, IL: Tan Books, 1985).

reading of the church of love. The Johannine church inextricably includes a central Marian dimension. Together at the foot of the Cross, Mary and John set the precedent for the church of love as the mutually self-mediating aspect of the church's ecclesial identity. As I will argue below, they are co-sufferers with the marginalized.

CONCEIVING THE UNITY OF THE TWO CHURCHES

If we extend Balthasar's reflection on the two churches to Luke-Acts we find John and Peter working together, speaking and healing in unison, as a team (e.g., Luke Acts, chap. 3, 4). Therefore, the question arises, if Peter and John (John-Mary) represent two churches, then how are we to conceive of them without creating a kind of split personality in the church's self-understanding? I propose conceiving their unity by 1) clarifying the distinct ecclesiology in terms of analogous categories drawn from a contemporary lineage of Japanese Zen, and 2) then by complicating matters a little by identifying a third ecclesial dimension to the two churches in John's Gospel pertaining to the hidden Christ.

Amidst the cultural ruins of postwar Japan, Doshin So (1911-1980) attempted to revitalize the cultural values of his devastated country by creating a martial art named Shorinji Kempo and a corresponding religious philosophy that was based on the techniques of the art – Kongo Zen. Both the martial art and the religious philosophy upon which the art is based are very complex. For the purposes of this paper we need only be concerned with one of the basic tenets, riki ai funi.[8] Literally riki, means "power" or "strength," ai means "love," and funi, means "not two." This is glossed, "love and strength are not separate" (or they are one)." But perhaps it is better, "should not be separated" rather than thinking they are one, at least if one thinks of oneness as the dissolution of one into the other. The rationale is that love and strength should not be separated because love without strength leaves love open to be attacked, victimized, violated, and so forth; with strength (power) love is protected. Conversely, strength alone without love becomes brute strength and open to abuse.

Hence, this philosophy of *riki ai funi* makes good sense for martial arts practitioners, to prevent them from being helpless victims on the one hand, or

[8]On Shorinji Kempo and a summary of its philosophy, the basic manual in English is World Shorinji Kemp Organization, *Shorinji Kempo Fukudoku-hon (Textbook)* (Tadotsu, Japan: WSKO, 1991), esp. 12.

abusive bullies on the other. In fact, Shorinji Kempo has been very successful in Japan and remains an important part of the postwar cultural movement to transpose the Samurai warrior archetype into a more peaceful and acceptable mode, as exemplified by Aikido's success in the West.

For our purposes, the analogy of riki ai funi guides us to understanding the distinct roles and the relationship between the official church and the church of love.

In terms of the distinct roles, the official church has the function of protecting the church of love. Conversely, the church of love has the role of constantly directing the official church to the hidden Christ, in accord with the image of the official church running to embrace him on the shore.

Moreover, we can apply here an insight from Lonergan's "dialectic of authority," which grounds the distinction between power and authority[9] by saying that in terms of structures and governance the official church has the ecclesiastical power, while in terms of the Spirit the church of love represents the church's authority. When the church is in crisis, the church of love has the *authority*, even if does not wield official sanctions. Think of the mediating role that Catherine of Siena played historically in trying to reunify the papacy. What authority did she possess besides her saintliness as a woman of prayer, mystically espoused to Christ?

Conversely, just as the separation of *riki* (strength) from *ai* (love) leads to the misuse of power, so, when the official church functions independently of the church of love, it runs the risk of abusing its power and of corruption. In fact, the constant reforms in the church throughout its history can be viewed in part in terms of withdrawals of the official church from the church of love and subsequent returns in which when the church of love reorients and redirects the official church back to the hidden Christ (*Ecclesia semper reformanda*). This process of renewal has usually occurred through religious communities that began on the margins of society. Recall the early movement within post-Constantinian Christianity of Egyptian monasticism to resurrect the spirit of the preceding period of martyrdom within a rapidly expanding age of politicization.

The authority of the church of love is figured in the following ways: 1) it recognizes Christ and directs the official church to him, 2) it mediates between the official church and Christ, just as John mediated between Peter and Jesus at the Last Supper, and 3) it remains with Jesus at the foot of the Cross, just as did the

[9]Bernard Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," in *A Third Collection* (Mahwah, NJ, Paulist Press, 1985), 5-12.

Beloved disciple and Jesus' Mother. Nevertheless, if the church of love is to perdure throughout human history, it needs the "institutions" proper to the official church, with its structure and organization for protection and stewardship. I believe that Vatican II started the reconception of some of those official structures in terms of mutual self-mediation, I will expand on this below.

From the perspective of mediation, we may begin to understand how the official church, as authentically self-mediating, can fall into the danger of becoming *strictly self-mediating* if it fails to make room for the mutually self-mediating principle foundational to the church of love. In fact, I wonder whether this is not the crossroads that the post-Vatican II Church finds itself in now? The *Catholic moment* for an ecclesiology does not reside in some idealistic conception of church, nor is it located solely in the soil of constantly revisited historical sources exploited at the cost of the transcendent aspect of the church. More probably, the moment will issue forth in a development of the church's self-mediating understanding by integrating the principle of mutual self-mediation into its structures, whereby the foundational principle of the Johannine-Marian church of love will permeate and "bring up to date" the structures of the official church of Peter. Such a development in self-understqanding, if set in motion at Vatican II, has unfortunately continued to inspire the "solid right" to dig in their heels and the "scattered left" to flounder from trend to trend. Just what impact the integration of mutual self-mediation into the self-mediating structures of the official church will have is beyond the scope of this paper to describe. Instead, I conclude this paper by drawing out a "hidden" third ecclesial dimension in Balthasar's reading of John.

THE CHURCH OF THE HIDDEN

Balthasar is aware of the importance of the role that the figure of John plays in the mediation between the Petrine Church and the Marian Church. As stated above, my reflections differ from Balthasar's in that I think the church of love is grounded in the mutual self-mediating relationship between John and Mary. Nevertheless I concur that John's role of mediator. Rather than agreeing with Balthasar that John recedes as Peter comes to the forefront,[10] I conceive of the

[10]Balthasar views John as a mediator between the Petrine and the Marian churches. He also sees John's roles as one of simultaneously uniting and vanishing. John recedes while Peter comes to the forefront. It is John who "stands under the Cross in place of Peter and on his behalf receives the

church of love as also mediating between the official church of Peter and what I call the 'unofficial church of the Hidden.' Suffice it to say that there are several senses of the "hidden" as regards ecclesial reality that are not necessarily distinct from the official church; for the most part it relies on the mediation of the church of love, in solidarity with the love of John and Mary standing with *the hidden* suffering of our world at the foot of the Cross.

A first aspect of the church of the Hidden is the church persecuted whenever anyone is persecuted in the name of Christ. Historically, the practicing Christians under the persecution of Christianity in feudal Japan were actually called "Hidden Christians." This aspect of the hidden approximates Peter's experience of undergoing martyrdom himself, his final amends for abandoning Jesus during his last hours before death.[11]

The second aspect of the ecclesial reality of the hidden concerns all the manners in which God chooses to manifest divine love for us, including the invisible missions of the Spirit and the Son – the Spirit blows where it wills. The *spermatikos*, as both the seeds of the Word and the fruits of the Spirit, can be hidden in any religion, culture, or media God chooses. God's ways are not our ways. The foundation for the ecumenical relationship with other Christian faiths, other religions, and other cultures lies in this dimension of Christian experience, which presupposes that sometimes Christ is hidden from the eyes of official church; then the church of love becomes the mediator that identifies and directs the official church to the hidden Christ in the Other.[12]

Marian Church." Hans Urs Von Balhthasar, *The Office of Peter and the Structure of the Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 225. My reflections diverge from Balthasar on this interpretation. I see the emergence of two churches, the self-mediating one, Christ's gift of Peter to the Church, and the mutually self-mediating ecclesial reality in Christ's giving of his mother to John (Marian-John).

[11]It is noteworthy that John and Mary as closest to Jesus suffer with him and in this way perhaps one could say they are spared from a martyr's death by having already co-suffered with Christ. Nevertheless, since in Peter's role as steward and protector the official church should always be willing to die for the faith at a moment's notice. To be sure, not everyone is called to a martyr's death, and it is fair to say that most Christians are called to *a martyr's life*, that is, one with a continued kenosis of excessive self-interest and one that "witnesses" to the Gospel if not always in word, necessarily in deed. In this regard St. Francis, whom Jaroslav Pelican described as the most significant figure in Christian history after Jesus Christ, is the example *par excellence.*

[12]This is partly why I have argued in previous work that we need a second ecclesiology that captures the full impulse of the ecumenical spirit of Vatican II. An ecclesiology of friendship can complement the ecclesiology of communion not only to ensure an ecclesial understanding that is faithful to the full spirit of Vatican II, but friendship as a *method* for engaging the Other. Moreover, the importance of discernment should be noted in this endeavor. While I do not have

The third aspect of the ecclesial reality of the hidden is perhaps the most provocative. *The hidden* are the marginalized that society rejects, and at times even those whom the official church rejects *in cases when it functions without the mediation of the church of love*. The church of love on the other hand, like Mary and John at the foot of the Cross, opts in favor of the presence of *the hidden*, just as Jesus did to the dismay of the religious officials of his day. Of course, if the mutual self-mediating ecclesial dimension becomes integral to the structures of the self-mediating official church, there would never be any rejection of the hidden.

Besides *the hidden* there are *the hiding*. The interpretative perspectives of René Girard and James Allison are helpful here. When, in virtue of the fact that they are hiding, *the hiding* scapegoat *the hidden*, they become *the violent*.[13] When *the hidden* suffer at the hands of *the violent*, the church of love suffers with them. As integral, the official church also suffers with *the hidden*, as when Peter, *once he recognizes him as such*, runs to the shore and embraces Christ without hesitation. Nevertheless, it is John who identifies Christ, and John is never asked whether he loves Jesus. The official church always bears the burdens of proving its love.

I think I have said enough to stimulate your imaginations and inquiry. My intention has been only to give you a peek at the direction of my explorations with these reflections. I am convinced that the jewels I have taken from Balthasar's and Lonergan's treasure chest, as well as that of others, will be fruitful in providing foundations for a post-Vatican II ecclesiology *centered* in the richness of the authentic spirit of the Gospel message and of the tradition that continues to reflect on that message to meet the exigencies of our time.

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space to develop it here, appropriation of one's consciousness in discernment stands to what Lonergan called *a fourth stage of meaning*, as the critical appropriation of one's consciousness in understanding and judging stands to the third stage of meaning. For future theology, this means that the fourth stage of meaning will require a critical appropriation of one's faith tradition. Moreover, among other things, this may mean that the sacraments of initiation will be more individualized.

[13]It goes without saying that physical violence is just one form of violence.

Lonergan Workshop
20 /2008

ENVISIONING A SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

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A RECENT REVIEW of my effort entitled *What Is Systematic Theology?* indicated impatience with the way Lonergan-based theologians like myself continue to postpone actually doing theology in favor of more and more sharpening of their tools.[1] The comment is reminiscent of something Karl Rahner was reported to have said about Lonergan himself. Rahner's comment as reported to me ran something like this: "He's always sharpening his knife. When is he going to cut something with it?" Rahner's comment, if serious and accurately reported, was unfair to Lonergan, who cut through a great deal in his long and wonderful life. But the reviewer's comments on my book echo my own criticism of myself over the past couple of years: "Okay, you've set the stage for what you want to do, now do it!"

In response to my own self-critique I have made at least a feeble effort to begin a book entitled *The Trinity in History*, which would be the first installment on a proposed systematic theology whose overall title, I suspect, will be *The Law of the Cross: A Systematic Theology*, or perhaps even *Lex Crucis: A Systematic Theology*. I propose in the present paper simply to share with you something of what appears in the draft completed to date and to ask for your feedback, whether positive or critical.

I propose to set forth in detail in this volume what I would call the "unified field structure" of a contemporary systematic theology. I sketched the unified field structure in *What Is Systematic Theology?*[2] But now it has to be unfolded in an ordered, systematic, and relatively complete manner. The unified field structure is

[1]Michael McGuckian, Review of Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology? Heythrop Journal* 48 (2007): 497-99.

[2]See Robert Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), index under "Unified Field Structure."

an open set of conceptions – open in the sense that additions are expected as questions emerge that demand new categories – that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in systematic theology. It integrates in systematic fashion what, in his 1962 lectures on "The Method of Theology" at Regis College, Toronto, Lonergan called the dogmatic-theological context.[3] "Context," Lonergan says there, is a remainder concept; it is the rest. When someone says, "Your interpretation is all out of context" or "Your objection disregards the context of the remark," the word "context" refers to "all the rest that is relevànt to understanding correctly what is being said." Lonergan's point is, "If a person makes any statement that regards either dogma or theology, there is a whole circle of other statements that are relevant to the exploration of exactly what each word means, to the defense of that proposition, to the solution to all the objections that can be brought against it. There is an immediate and rather large circle that goes around any particular dogmatic or theological statement, and it forms the context of that statement. But all these other statements each have their own circle, and so one goes out to a circle of circles. But the thing does not go off into infinity. There is such a thing as the dogmatic-theological context at any given time."

This "rest," this remainder, is usually not very well defined, and it seems to me that a systematics would do well if it could articulate this context at the outset, as this context exists and functions at the present time. Articulating it will, of course, entail making doctrinal and systematic statements, but if these statements really are part of the dogmatic-theological context, then they furnish something of the remainder that provides a setting for the other statements that the theologian will make. Thus, on the structure suggested here, statements in ecclesiology or sacramental theology are set within a circle of circles of Trinitarian and Christological presuppositions. Furthermore, in our time there is going forward the work of transforming the dogmatic-theological context itself from its previous classicist form to a new, historically minded way of proceeding. That transition is still under way, and it is bound to take time – something that in perhaps feeble self-defense I would call to the attention of the reviewer whose challenge to me I narrated at the beginning.[4] It is one of the transitions that Lonergan is talking

[3]An audio recording of these lectures has been made available through the work of Greg Lauzon, and an edited transcription of them will appear in volume 22 of the Collected Works.

[4]McGuckian seems to shy away from the implications of that transition, if I understand correctly the upshot of his article "The Role of Faith in Theology: A Critique of Lonergan's Method," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 71 (2006): 242-59.

about in the quotation that provides the theme of this workshop: "... what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait." We proceed at this workshop, I trust, with the conviction that Lonergan's method *is* capable of guiding these transitions. In fact, it may be that history will show that this method was preeminent in preserving the center between the solid right of classicism and the scattered left of relativism and ultimately of nihilism.

Lonergan indicated in 1962 that the dogmatic-theological context not only is passed on but also develops. Moreover, in Lonergan's view in 1962 (a view that remains true today, I believe), basic doctrinal parameters within which further development is possible are firmly established in only some of the areas of the church's constitutive meaning: namely, with regard to Trinitarian and Christological doctrine and with regard to the doctrine of grace; but there are other areas that call for development even with respect to basic doctrinal commitments; in one discussion session at the 1962 Institute on "The Method of Theology," Lonergan singled out church and sacraments as areas calling for such doctrinal determination, but, it seems to me, we may add such theological elements as revelation, creation, redemption, and eschatology; and even within Christology, there is a great deal of work to be done on the historical causality of Jesus and on the relation of the divine and human consciousnesses and the divine and human knowledge of Jesus. It is not the case, of course, that there are no doctrines, either ecclesial or theological, to be submitted to systematic understanding in the areas of sacramental theology and ecclesiology, or for that matter in these other areas. It is rather the case that in these areas there has not yet occurred in the doctrinal history of the church as clear a demarcation within which further development may unfold as that which marks the church's doctrinal commitments regarding the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in grace.[5] The development of theological doctrines in these areas is one way in which the

[5]"The degree of thematization differs in different cases. The fundamental developments are the Trinitarian doctrine in which the key element is the 'consubstantial'; Christological doctrine: 'one person and two natures'; the idea of the supernatural habit and act. There is then the field in which the categories are not yet fully developed. For example, categories as to the instrumental causality of the sacraments; they have to be developed more fully. There is also everything regarding history and the mystical body, and the church; all these need further development." Quotation taken from question session 4 of the 1962 Regis College Institute, "The Method of Theology."

church's dogmatic-theological context can develop. There is for Lonergan, then, as for myself, something about the doctrinal commitments that the church has already taken in regard to the Trinity, Christ, and grace that clearly sets parameters within which further development, both doctrinal and systematic, may legitimately occur, and outside of which what might pass for development is really deformation. As John Courtney Murray is reported to have said with respect to the conciliar dogmas regarding Trinitarian and Christological matters, "Having come this far, we cannot but come this far before we move on." A similar statement with respect to the other issues that I have mentioned can of course be made, at least up to a point, but it would lack the fullness or "thickness" of meaning that attaches to the church's Christological and Trinitarian commitments and to the doctrinal developments that have occurred with respect to the outpouring of God's grace in the gift of the Holy Spirit. And, I suggest, it is particularly in the mutual self-mediation of theology with the natural and human sciences and with contemporary cultural movements not specifically attached to the church that these developments will occur, in a manner analogous to the developments reached by Aquinas through his appropriation and transformation of the Aristotelian corpus.

The nuanced character of the dogmatic-theological context, according to which it is more pronounced and clear in some areas than in others, throws light also on the matter of what, with David Tracy, we may call the focal meanings of a systematic theology.[6] Some of the mysteries of faith have been formulated in dogmatic pronouncements, and I agree with Lonergan that systematics must for the most part begin here. But it must be added that at least two of the mysteries of faith that have been included from the beginning in creedal affirmations have not been dogmatically formulated, namely, the resurrection of Jesus from the dead and the redemption wrought through the cross and resurrection of Jesus, and that these are of a standing in the church's constitutive meaning equal to that of the dogmatic pronouncements on the Incarnation and the Trinity. Thus they must be included along with the dogmas among the primary focal meanings of any systematic theology that would attempt a synthetic understanding of the realities that are central to the constitutive meaning of our faith community. They furnished, if you will, the dogmatic-theological context, the remainder, even for the definition of Christological and Trinitarian dogma.

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[6]Tracy employs the notion of focal meanings throughout his book *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981).

We come, then, to the question of how the dogmatic-theological context might be expected to develop in our day. If we consider the areas that need even doctrinal development, I think we may find the solution to the problem of how to move systematic theology forward in our time. And I think there is evidence in Lonergan's notes written at the time of his breakthrough to functional specialization that he espoused a similar solution. The issues in the areas of ecclesiology, sacramental theology, soteriology, revelation, creation, and an eschatology built on the creedal affirmation of the resurrection of Jesus all have to do with *history*. And in the notes that he wrote in 1965 as he was working out the significance of his insight into functional specialization, Lonergan assigned as the mediated object of the functional specialty "Doctrines" what he called "redemption in history," and as the mediated object of the functional specialty "Systematics" *Geschichte*, history, the history that is written about. In other words, the doctrines, ecclesial and theological, that the theologian working in the functional specialty "Doctrines" affirms are not an unorganized list of affirmations but are already organized into some kind of integrated pattern governed by a doctrinal commitment that affirms that God works redemptively in human history. And the attempt to understand these doctrines will take the form of a theological theory of history, of *Geschichte*, of the history that is lived and written about, that history that throughout his career Lonergan understood in terms of the three approximations of progress, decline, and redemption. In order to elevate ecclesiology, sacramental theology, soteriology, the theology of revelation, the theology of creation, and an eschatology based in the resurrection of Jesus to a status in the contemporary dogmatic-theological context that enjoys the clear parameters already characteristic of the doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation, and grace, there is required in theology a development of a position on the immanent intelligibility of human history.

At any rate, for an elaboration of the unified field structure that would integrate the contemporary dogmatic-theological context, I turn to two developments: first, to Lonergan's four-point hypothesis linking the four divine relations and four created participations in and imitations of divine life, and second, to the theory of history to be found in Lonergan's own work and in my book *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. The four-point hypothesis provides a potential systematic unification of the understanding of the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnate Word, the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit in grace, and the eternal life that is promised us in the resurrection of Jesus. It includes principally though not exclusively the *special* basic terms and relations of a systematic

theology, that is to say, those terms and relations that are peculiar to theology. But more is needed to constitute a unified field structure. The "total and basic science"[7] of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics that grounds the theory of history includes the *general* basic terms and relations as well as some derived general terms and relations; and the theory of history itself provides a principal set of derived terms and relations both general and special. But that theory of history must be further articulated to include another set of *derived* special terms and relations, which will be largely constituted by a systematic position on the constituents of what the New Testament calls the reign of God: a heuristic, if you wish, of the social grace that is anticipated in Lonergan's chapter on the divine missions in *The Triune God: Systematics*, and that would stand over against the social sin that the present dogmatic-theological context already acknowledges.

Thus we have special basic (and some derived) terms and relations in the four-point hypothesis; general basic (and some derived) terms and relations in the "basic and total science"; derived terms and relations both general and special in the theory of history; and further basic and derived special terms and relations (the consequences of Christian witness in history) in a transposition of the notion of the reign of God into a theology of social grace. Such is a rough sketch of the parameter of the categories. I have no doubt that it needs further nuancing, but for now I am content to leave that for the process of implementing the vision here offered.

The manuscript in its present form has four chapters, all of them in draft form, though the first is more complete than the other three. The first is entitled "The Starting Point," the second "Initial Issues," the third "Mimesis," and the fourth "Sacralization and Desacralization in History." These four chapters, along with a fifth that will present the materials to be transposed from the biblical narrative into a systematic position on the reign of God, would constitute a first part of the book or perhaps even a short introductory volume. By analogy with *Method in Theology*, this first part may well be conceived as "Background," because these chapters represent a synthesis of the background set in my own mind by previous work on aesthetic-dramatic operators and elemental meaning, on the structure of history, and on methodological questions in systematics. While

[7]For Lonergan's claim to have provided the total and basic science, see Bernard Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 355, 357, 381.

this may sound like just more postponing of the actual systematic work, just more attempts to sharpen a knife, it is essential to the unfolding of the systematic vision that I now hope to present. In fact, a good deal of that systematic vision is contained in these chapters themselves.

I will summarize each of the four chapters completed in draft form to date, and will comment briefly on the issues entailed in the major steps of the argument.

1. THE STARTING POINT

Chapter 1, "The Starting Point," consists of the article that I published in *Theological Studies* in December 2006, "The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,"[8] supplemented by material contained in a lecture that I delivered at Marquette University in October 2006 entitled "Being in Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding." The latter lecture was also presented in abbreviated form at the Third International Lonergan Workshop in Mainz in January 2007, and has been submitted for publication elsewhere. In this chapter, I present Lonergan's four-point hypothesis and indicate the need to integrate it into a theological theory of history. I also suggest that the hypothesis provides us with a new form of the psychological analogy for understanding the divine processions, an analogy from within the order of graced experience itself. And I propose that systematic theology itself has evolved to the point where it can begin with a position that integrates the divine processions with the divine missions from the outset of the systematic enterprise. Let me address briefly each of the three components of this first chapter.

1.1 The Four-Point Hypothesis

There are four divine relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Three of these – paternity, filiation, and passive spiration – are really distinct and are identical with the three divine persons. Active spiration is not really but only conceptually or notionally distinct from paternity-and-filiation, the

[8]Robert M. Doran, "The Starting Point of Systematic Theology," *Theological Studies* 67 (2006): 750-76.

Father and the Son together, *Agapē* and its affirming Word, "breathing" the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit. There is a created supernatural participation in and imitation of each of these divine relations.

Lonergan speaks of a "secondary act of existence of the incarnation," and he refers to it as the created supernatural participation in and imitation of divine paternity. What does this mean?

We begin with an affirmation of faith. The divine Word, the Son sent by the Father, is incarnate in the human being Jesus of Nazareth. Nothing more is required for the mission of the Son to be *constituted* than the relation of origin according to which the Son proceeds from the Father. But the affirmation expresses three contingent truths: there is an incarnation, the incarnation is in the human nature derived from Mary, and the incarnation is the incarnation of the divine Word, of the Son, alone. There is required a created consequent condition for the contingent truth of the affirmation "the divine Word, the Son sent by the Father, is incarnate in the human being, Jesus of Nazareth." The created consequent condition, in the real order, of the contingent truth of that proposition is called the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, the *esse secundarium incarnationis*. And what is that? It is the real relation of the assumed nature to the Son alone. As such, the secondary act of existence is the external, created, contingent, appropriate term required if it is contingently true that there is an incarnation of the divine Word in Jesus, that the complete humanity of Jesus is the complete humanity of the divine Word.[9]

In the four-point hypothesis presented by Lonergan in the final chapter of *The Triune God: Systematics*, this real relation of the assumed nature to the Son alone is also a created participation in and imitation of divine paternity, of the Father. That hypothesis – and it is nothing more than a hypothesis – expresses the kind of Christology that is most apparent in the Gospel of John but not absent from the synoptic Gospels, and in fact could even be argued to provide a kind of elemental theological context for the portrayal of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels. "The Son can do nothing by himself; he can do only what he sees the Father doing; and whatever the Father does the Son does too. For the Father loves the Son and shows him everything he does himself" (John 5:19-20). "My teaching is not from myself: it comes from the one who sent me" (John 7:16). "To have seen me is to have seen the Father" (John 14: 9). Etc., etc., etc. The divine Word

[9]See Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), part 4 passim.

immanent in the Godhead does not speak; the divine Word is spoken; in Thomas's and Lonergan's Trinitarian theology, its distinguishing notional act is *dici*, not *dicere*: to be spoken, not to speak. The incarnate Word speaks, but he speaks only what he hears from the Father. The relation of the assumed humanity to the person of the divine Word alone is also a created participation in and imitation of the divine Father, a participation in and imitation of the relation to the Son that we call paternity.

Next, the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son. Nothing more is required for that mission to be *constituted* than the relation of origin according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But as with the mission of the Son sent by the Father, so here too a mission as contingent and temporal requires an appropriate external term, not as constitutive of the mission but as a consequent condition of the truth of the proposition that affirms the mission. "... just as a divine person is and knows and wills and operates by the divine essence, and is distinguished as generating or generated, or as spirating or spirated, by a divine relation of origin, so also a divine person is constituted as sending or as sent by a divine relation of origin ... [But] the fact that a divine person sends or is sent cannot have the correspondence of truth through the divine perfection alone, and therefore requires an appropriate external term."[10]

Since the mission of a divine person is the eternal procession of that person with the addition of an appropriate, consequent external term in time, the Holy Spirit is sent as what the Holy Spirit is, proceeding Love. Essential divine love is common to the three divine persons, and it is by this love that the Father and the Son and the Spirit love all that they love. Proceeding love, however, is the Holy Spirit spirated by the Father and the Son breathing love, and it is by this spiration that the Father and the Son love themselves and one another and us by the Holy Spirit.[11] The Holy Spirit is thus sent as a "special and notional divine love," where the term "notional" refers to that by which we know the distinctions among the three divine persons. The special divine love as which the Holy Spirit is sent is "that according to which the just are loved as ordered to the divine good."[12] The appropriate, consequent external term of the mission of the Holy Spirit is what has been known as sanctifying grace. But, says Lonergan, "although the Spirit alone

[10]Bernard Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 465, 467.

[11]See ibid., 473, 475.

[12]Ibid., 481.

according to his proper perfection is gift, still, since to give one's entire love is the same as to give oneself, and since the Father and the Son give their entire proceeding Love, they also give themselves and therefore are said to come and dwell in the just."[13] Thus, in Lonergan's hypothesis, sanctifying grace is the created supernatural participation in and imitation of active spiration, that is, of Father and Son breathing the Holy Spirit; and the habit of charity is the created supernatural participation in and imitation of passive spiration, that is, of the Holy Spirit, the divine Gift. The dynamic state of being in love without restrictions, qualifications, reservations, or conditions is the created supernatural participation in and imitation of the Father (*Agapē*) and the Son (Word), as together they "breathe," spirate the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit. Father and Son are the divine *Agapē* and its Word, its Logos, its Judgment of Value, its *Verbum spirans Amorem*. Sanctifying grace is conceived as a created participation in and imitation of the divine *Agapē* issuing in the judgment of value, as from these together a proceeding love is breathed forth. What is breathed forth in created participation in and imitation of the divine Gift is charity. As the Holy Spirit is the *Amor* that proceeds from divine *Agapē* and its *Verbum spirans Amorem*, so what in the terms of *Insight* is called the gift of a universal willingness proceeds from the created participation in and imitation of Father and Son together breathing the Holy Spirit.

The bulk of the quite lengthy first chapter is devoted to an attempt to articulate the dynamics of these special basic relations. More work will remain to be done on that issue, I know, but because I believe that it is precisely here that we will find special basic relations in the first place, the effort is in my view eminently worthwhile.[14]

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[13]Ibid., 471.

[14]Note that Lonergan does not mention "special basic relations" in his methodological statement regarding systematic categories, *Method in Theology*, 343: "As has been worked out in our chapters on method, on religion, and on foundations, general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God's gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states." My hypothesis, linked to Lonergan's four-point hypothesis, is that special basic relations lie in created participation in and imitation of the divine relations of active and passive spiration. These divine relations *are* the Blessed Trinity, since active spiration is identical with Father and Son, and passive spiration with the Holy Spirit. Special basic relations, then, emerge from our participation in the indwelling Trinity precisely as Trinity, that is, precisely as spirating and spirated. To Lonergan's statement, then, may be added a final sentence: "Special basic relations name created participations in and imitations of the divine relations of active and passive

Finally, in the four-point hypothesis, the light of glory, which is the created, consequent condition of beatific knowledge, is conceived as the created supernatural participation in and imitation of filiation, of the Son, the divine Word, as he bring us, children by adoption, and his brothers and sisters, perfectly back to the Father.

1.2 An Analogy

A second step taken in this first chapter is the suggestion that the dynamics of the special basic relations that obtain between the gift of God's love and the proceeding disposition of self-sacrificing love on our part might provide a new locus for the psychological analogy that may be used as we reach for a feeble, halting, obscure, but perhaps fruitful understanding of the mystery of the divine processions. It stands to reason that this should be so, if indeed there is any merit to the very hypothesis of these special basic relations themselves. For if the relations between sanctifying grace and charity are created participations in and imitations of the relations, active and passive spiration, then they are remote images of the Trinity, and so to articulate them carefully might provide an analogy for the divine processions. I do not have the time to develop the analogy here, but its basic lines of development may be seen in the *Theological Studies* article that will inform this first chapter.[15]

1.3 Theological Evolution

Finally in chapter 1, there is presented an argument that has to do with the genetic sequence of systematic achievements. The argument is to the effect that, if the four-point hypothesis can be developed as providing one element in a unified field structure for systematic theology, then perhaps we may envision a systematics that begins, not with the divine processions alone, but with the processions and missions considered together. If this is correct, then introducing history into theology will affect in a profound way the very ordering of theological ideas. I suspect Lonergan was on to this, however remotely, in some of the things that he

spiration." That statement, of course, is more than methodological. It is theological, very theological, and it is not impossible that Lonergan may have had something like this in mind that he could not include in a work on method, where methodological and theological questions are sharply distinguished on several occasions.

[15]See above, note 8.

wrote in *Divinarum personarum*, where there are very interesting speculations about the role of history in theology that for some reason were removed from the text when he rewrote it as *De Deo trino: Pars systematica.*[16] This remains a suspicion at present, a surmise, something that has to be pursued in order to see whether it leads anywhere.

The problem may be formulated by pointing to a basic contrast between the respective approaches of Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Randall Rosenberg expressed the difference clearly in the paper he presented this spring in Los Angeles. Lonergan and Balthasar both start with explicit affirmations of the Christology of Chalcedon. But Lonergan "gives strong attention to an ontological and psychological analysis of the human person with a careful defining of the terms used and tightly and systematically ordered theses," while in Balthasar we find a determination to avoid what might appear extra-historical, static, essentialist, a "part one" Christology "smoothly unfolding into a soteriological 'part two.'"[17] Rosenberg writes, "In order to preserve the drama of the life of Christ, [Balthasar] shifts from ontological terms to obediential terms. Hence, Balthasar offers what might be called a mission-structured Christology."[18]

To cut to the chase, within the limits of this relatively short paper, I believe that both the ontological emphases of Lonergan and the mission-oriented

[16]See *The Triune God: Systematics,* 753-61. Consider, for instance, the following passage: "... the fourth way [that is, in addition to commonsense exegesis, doctrinal theology, and systematic theology as traditionally conceived] in which the same truth is understood is a new step in comprehension. Besides systematic exegesis ..., there is historical exegesis, which, far from omitting the accidentals, includes them synthetically [note that "synthetically" is what distinguishes this from commonsense exegesis, which includes the accidentals in piecemeal fashion]. Besides systematic theology, there is a theology that is more concrete and more comprehensive, which deals with and seeks to understand the economy of salvation as it evolves historically. This new step in comprehension has over a lengthy period of time been gradually prepared by copious studies in the biblical, conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical, and other areas of research, but in such a way that its synthetic character is not yet clearly apparent, since today's scholars seem to resemble more the twelfth-century compilers than they do the thirteenth-century theologians in the proper sense. Still, just as the diligence of Peter Lombard and other collectors of 'sentences' initiated and laid the groundwork for the theology that followed, so also those today who are engaged in learned and solid research in scripture and patristics and other fields can surely look forward to a theology at some time in the future that is at once more concrete and more comprehensive."

[17]Randall S. Rosenberg, "Bernard Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar on Christ"s Beatific Knowledge: A Dialectical Conversation," unpublished paper distributed and read at West Coast Methods Institute 2007, Loyola Marymount University, 14 April 2007, 1.

[18]Ibid.

emphases of Balthasar can be respected, not only in Christology but more fundamentally even in Trinitarian theology. Precisely because of the Trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan, theologies that begin with the processions, move to the relations, progress to the persons, and end with the missions, and especially because of the four-point hypothesis articulated at the end of Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity, we are now able to come full circle, I believe, and begin a systematics of the Trinity somewhere else: namely, with a synthetic position that treats together the divine processions and the divine missions, the ontology and the historical and obediential contexts. The missions are the processions in history. The "somewhere else" where we begin does not depart from the starting point found in Aquinas and the early Lonergan, but sublates the ontological starting point in the divine processions into a more comprehensive dogmatic-theological context that has emerged or is emerging partly as a result of their, and especially of Lonergan's, work. The four-point hypothesis itself is part of what I am proposing as a starting point, not part of a conclusion, as it is in Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity, where it appears toward the end of the final chapter. And it aims at an obscure understanding not only of the divine processions but also of the divine missions and of the created consequent conditions of the missions precisely as they (1) provide a new set of analogues from which we can gain an obscure understanding of the divine processions and relations themselves, and (2) constitute the realm of religious values that my earlier work on the scale of values relates to the dialectical structure of history by means of the other levels of value: personal, cultural, social, and vital. This will mean too that the biblical category of the reign of God, the central element in the preaching of Jesus, can now be transposed to the very heart of a theology of history.

Theology is an ongoing enterprise, and what was not possible for Aquinas, simply because of the historical limitations of the dogmatic-theological context of his time, and what Lonergan arrived at only toward the end of his systematics of the Trinity, may well be the starting point for another generation, precisely because of Aquinas's own gains in understanding and Lonergan's firmer rooting of these gains in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. Just as the way of discovery in Trinitarian theology through the early centuries of the Christian church ended with Augustine's psychological analogy, which then in Aquinas became the starting point of the way of teaching and learning, so Lonergan's particular embodiment of the way of teaching and learning ended with the four-point hypothesis, which now informs the starting point of a new venture

along the same kind of path: an *ordo doctrinae*, a venture that also allows systematics to appropriate and transpose a central New Testament category as the key to a systematics whose mediated object is *Geschichte*. If we are beginning a systematics in its entirety at the point where Lonergan ended his systematics of the Trinity, it is only on the basis of the development in his own Trinitarian theology that we are able to do so. He began with the processions. Balthasar begins, as do the scriptures, with the missions. I am suggesting we begin with the processions and missions together, affirming with Lonergan's assistance that they are the same reality, except that the mission includes a created contingent external term that is the consequent condition of the procession's being also a mission.

In other words, the basic hypotheses that will have a profound effect on the remainder of the systematic theology envisioned here are more complex than those found at the beginning of Aquinas's or Lonergan's Trinitarian systematics. That greater complexity is a function of a theological history, which has been decisively influenced by Aquinas and Lonergan. This history now permits us a new beginning by adding to the natural analogies employed in understanding the divine processions and relations the graced participations in those relations; and so we begin our Trinitarian systematics with the processions and missions at once. These graced participations constitute the realm of religious values in the theory of history constituted internally by a normative scale of values. That theory of history displays the historical significance and influence of these participations in and imitations of the divine relations. From above, the special basic relations of sanctifying grace and charity condition personal integrity and authenticity, which itself is the condition of possibility of genuine and developing cultural values. The latter, in turn, influence the formation of integrally dialectical communities at the level of social values, and such communities functioning in recurrent schemes of a good of order alone guarantee the equitable distribution of vital goods to the entire community.

Such an analysis will result in a doctrine of social grace. As recent theology has enlightened us about social sin, so now it is time to propose a theology of social grace. I am suggesting a way of going about that task, a way that also connects with Lonergan's redefinition of "the state of grace" as not an individual but a social reality. It is the divine-human interpersonal situation that resides in the three divine subjects giving themselves to us. That gift itself, Lonergan writes, while "intensely personal, utterly intimate," still "is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications

and fulfilling the promises of their new life. Finally, what can become communal can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances, confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or epoch."[19] It is no exaggeration to relate social grace, thus understood, precisely to the reign of God proclaimed by Jesus and accomplished in his own person in the Jewish context of his time and place.

2. INITIAL ISSUES

Chapter 2 introduces the notion of "autonomous spiritual procession" as an expression of the way what is meant by *emanatio intelligibilis* is to be understood; in fact, it is a translation of that term into something close to contemporary English. *Emanatio intelligibilis* is the key notion to be grasped in order to understand any variant on the psychological analogy, including the one proposed here. This chapter, then, begins with an extensive presentation and interpretation of Lonergan's Trinitarian theology, but of that theology sublated into the explanatory starting point that considers procession and mission together. In this chapter the notion of "act from act" (*processio operati* and by analogy *processio per modum operati*)[20] is introduced, and the convention "autonomous spiritual procession" is suggested as a way of characterizing in more or less contemporary language those instances of *emanatio intelligibilis* that provide appropriate analogies for the divine processions. Inner words, for instance, proceed as acts from acts of understanding, and they do so "*from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient.*"[21] This second chapter as presently constituted comments briefly on the various examples Lonergan provides of such processions of act from act, and I suggest how the examples can be extended to cover the autonomous spiritual processions that I am suggesting in the order of grace. "Autonomous spiritual procession" is defined by modifying slightly Lonergan's definition of *emanatio intelligibilis*: *the conscious origination of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both*

[19]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 130-31.

[20]See ibid., 144-81.

[21]Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 207, emphasis Lonergan's.

within the spiritual dimension of consciousness and also by virtue of the spiritual dimension of consciousness itself as determined by the prior act.[22] I try to explain in this chapter Lonergan's meaning in the complicated discussion of *per modum operati* in *The Triune God: Systematics*, chapter 2; the conclusion of the chapter highlights the contemporary significance of the notion of *emanatio intelligibilis* or autonomous spiritual procession in terms, first, of the relation between language and understanding and, second, of issues raised in René Girard's mimetic theory. It is especially in terms of the resolution of the latter issues that I believe the "imitation of the divine relations" of which the four-point hypothesis speaks can be rendered extremely fruitful.[23]

Thus, based on Lonergan's explicit affirmation of two ways of being conscious[24] (in *The Triune God: Systematics* "through our sensibility" and "through our intellectuality") and to his distinction of spontaneous and autonomous processions within both ways of being conscious,[25] I argue that the discrimination of the two "ways of being conscious" is an extraordinarily sensitive and delicate business. For the first "way of being conscious" permeates the second, and it does so either in support of the transcendental orientation to intelligibility, truth, being, and the good, or in conflict with that orientation. Or again and more precisely, it precedes, accompanies, and overarches the intentional operations that constitute the second "way of being conscious." In that sense it is

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[22]See *The Triune God: Systematics* 141. The word "natural" here is opposed not to "supernatural," but to "intentional." See ibid. Thus the definition can apply as well to processions in the order of grace.

[23]Helpful here, however, are the cautionary remarks on imitation of the divine or of Christ in Raymund Schwager's wonderful book, *Must There Be Scapegoats? Violence and Redemption in the Bible*, trans. Maria L. Assad (New York: Crossroad, 2000), 177-78. I am talking here about created imitation known as such to God, not about deliberate external imitation.

[24]"... we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act." Ibid. 139.

[25]Within both sensitive and spiritual process, a distinction is to be drawn between the emergence of act from potency and the emergence of act from act. At the level of the spiritual, this becomes a distinction of spontaneous and autonomous processions. Spontaneous procession is exemplified in the procession of understanding from questions; it is a procession of act from potency. Autonomous procession is the procession of act from act such as is exemplified in the three instances that Lonergan presents: concept from understanding, judgment from grasp of evidence, decision from the judgment of value. What confers autonomy on the procession is precisely the fact that the procession is of act from act.

partly constitutive of the vertical finality, the "tidal movement" or "passionateness of being" that Lonergan refers to in, respectively, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness"[26] and "Mission and the Spirit."[27]

Distinguishing intellectually and negotiating existentially the two "ways of being conscious" calls for what the Christian spiritual tradition has called discernment. For what "we undergo rather passively" in "what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness" affects the entire range of vertical finality as it actually unfolds. Under optimal

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[26]"... must not the several principles [of intentional consciousness, of the second "way of being conscious"] be but aspects of a deeper and more comprehensive principle? And is not that deeper and more comprehensive principle itself a nature, at once a principle of movement and of rest, a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these? I think so." Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 174-75.

[27]"... [the] passionateness [of being] has a dimension of its own: it underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, rationally, morally conscious.

"Its underpinning is the quasi-operator that presides over the transition from the neural to the psychic. It ushers into consciousness not only the demands of unconscious vitality but also the exigences of vertical finality. It obtrudes deficiency needs. In the self-actualizing subject it shapes the images that release insight; it recalls evidence that is being overlooked; it may embarrass wakefulness, as it disturbs sleep, with the spectre, the shock, the shame of misdeeds. As it channels into consciousness the feedback of our aberrations and our unfulfilled strivings, so for the Jungians it manifests its archetypes through symbols to preside over the genesis of the ego and to guide the individuation process from the ego to the self.

"As it underpins, so too it accompanies the subject's conscious and intentional operations. There it is the mass and momentum of our lives, the color and tone and power of feeling, that fleshes out and gives substance to what otherwise would be no more than a Shakespearian "pale cast of thought."

"As it underpins and accompanies, so too it overarches conscious intentionality. There it is the topmost quasi-operator that by intersubjectivity prepares, by solidarity entices, by falling in love establishes us as members of community. Within each individual vertical finality heads for self-transcendence. In an aggregate of self-transcending individuals there is the significant coincidental manifold in which can emerge a new creation. Possibility yields to fact and fact bears witness to its originality and power in the fidelity that makes families, in the loyalty that makes peoples, in the faith that makes religions.

"But here we meet the ambiguity of man's vertical finality. It is natural to man to love with the domestic love that unites parents with each other and with their children, with the civil love that can face death for the sake of one's fellowmen, with the all-embracing love that loves God above all. But in fact man lives under the reign of sin, and his redemption lies not in what is possible to nature but in what is effected by the grace of Christ." Bernard Lonergan, "Mission and the Spirit," *A Third Collection*, 29-30.

circumstances, this whole dimension bolsters and supports the second "way of being conscious," where "we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and will in order to act." But those optimal circumstances are rare indeed, and to the extent that they do not obtain, we can speak of a statistical near-inevitability of distortion precisely in the spiritual dimensions of human operation. There *is* a realm in which human desire and human operation are autonomous, not in the sense of a self-asserting effort at what Ernest Becker called the *causa sui* project,[28] which belongs precisely under the Girardian heading of the illusion of autonomy, but in the sense of our operating under transcendental exigencies for the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good. There are moments in that transcendental operating in which act flows from act: concept from understanding, judgment from grasp of sufficient evidence, decision from judgment of value. But that realm, as Lonergan says of human authenticity, is ever precarious; it is reached always by withdrawing from inauthenticity. It is the realm of the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know that Lonergan highlights in *Insight*, and of the equally pure, detached, disinterested sublation of the desire to know by the transcendental intention of value. No one, not even the greatest saint, lives in that realm untroubled, serene, and free of temptation and some distortion.

Treating this question close to the beginning of the work might forestall difficulties that some (especially Girardians) might bring against an appeal to an "autonomous" dimension of consciousness; and it will also highlight precisely in what consists the created participation in or imitation of the divine and how this is distinguished from elements of consciousness that are more a function of the passive undergoing of "our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness," where our desire is again mimetic, but now not of the divine processions. In that sense, taking this approach will help us to fine-tune our portrayal of the psychological analogy. *What is it to imitate the divine relations through created participations in them, and how does that differ from other forms of mimesis?* That is the question that I wish to introduce at this point, partly in order to get hold of the analogy of *autonomous spiritual procession* and partly to indicate the profound significance of such a Trinitarian theology for the understanding and guidance of historical process.

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[28]Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), passim.

3. MIMESIS

Chapter 3 takes up Girard's mimetic theory to make a theological contribution to that theory. I will not go into detail here, because the contents, though not the exact wording, of this third chapter will appear soon in an article in *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* entitled "Imitating the Divine Relations: A Theological Contribution to Mimetic Theory."[29] Here, let me simply indicate my views regarding the momentous theological significance of Girard"s work. (I say this without taking a position on the more controversial elements in his work, such as the theory of hominization.) The original temptation is represented in the Book of Genesis as awakening a desire to be like God (or like gods). The first murder recorded in the Bible is prompted by mimetic rivalry. The Gospels of Mark and Matthew tell us that Pilate knew that the chief priests had handed Jesus over out of jealousy (Mark 15:10, Matthew 27:18). Even the extraordinarily insightful N. T. Wright does not emphasize this verse and the dynamics that it reflects as much as I believe he should in his otherwise brilliant discussion of "The Reasons for Jesus' Crucifixion."[30] I regard as essential the contributions Raymund Schwager has made to the overall project that Wright and the late Ben F. Meyer have so laudably begun, precisely because he does take these emphases seriously. Lonergan was on the same track, I believe, without having studied Girard's work, especially because of his recognition of the importance of Max Scheler's book *Ressentiment*. I support the efforts of John Ranieri to rearticulate Lonergan's theory of the biases in terms of Girard's mimetic theory; and those like James Alison who have turned to Girard to understand the meaning of "original sin" in the Christian tradition, even if the etiological dimensions of Girard"s contribution stand in need of qualification.

If these observations are true, then any systematic theology purporting to be a theological theory of history must take Girard's work with utmost seriousness. If

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[29]Robert M. Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations: A Theological Contribution to Mimetic Theory," to be published in *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 23, no. 2 (Spring 2005).

[30]See Wright's book *Jesus and the Victory of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), and especially chapter 12.

the divine relations of active and passive spiration, means what Jesus says it means, then it is set directly over against the deviated transcendence that is rooted in another form of mimesis. For being perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect means precisely "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be children of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on the honest and the dishonest alike" (Matthew 5:44-45). Again, it means precisely uttering the *verbum spirans amorem* that issues in the universal willingness of charity. I fully expect these emphases to permeate the work that I have begun, and I only hope that I will have learned them well enough in my own life that I can adequately integrate them into the theology to which I hope to contribute.

4. SACRALIZATION AND DESACRALIZATION IN HISTORY

The fourth chapter reworks a paper that I delivered at the Lonergan Workshop several years ago on sacralization and desacralization in Lonergan and Girard. Again, I judged that, before I can proceed any further with the systematic themes already introduced in chapter 2, I had to outline the historical significance of autonomous spiritual procession in the supernatural order, precisely in the constitution of authentic religion under God. The Catholic Church today is still debating the issue of sacralization and secularization, and in my view has yet to reach an adequate formulation of what Lonergan called "(1) a sacralization to be dropped and (2) a sacralization to be fostered; (3) a secularization to be welcomed and (4) a secularization to be resisted."[31] Again, omitting details of the contents of this chapter, I can only indicate that it takes the same directions that I suggested in the 2004 paper, emphasizing the sacral prerogatives of life lived under the law of the Cross and calling into question all other pretensions to sacral status of person and work if they are unrelated to the central dynamics of self-sacrificing love.

[31]Bernard Lonergan, "Sacralization and Secularization," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 264.

5. ENVISIONING CHAPTER 5

In conclusion, I envision a fifth chapter in this "Background" portion, in which I transpose insights principally from N. T. Wright, Ben F. Meyer, and Raymund Schwager regarding the kingdom of God proclaimed and inaugurated by Jesus into the systematic framework constituted by the four-point hypothesis and the theory of history proposed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. With this "Background" work completed, I hope to proceed to unpack in detail the four-point hypothesis and to integrate its significance into the same theory of history, precisely in the realm of Lonergan's scale of values, thereby completing this part of the volume.

One final comment is in order. Why am I selecting precisely these New Testament exegetes and not others? What has influenced that decision?

Let me ask, then, whether there is not possible today a far more detailed dialectical engagement of exegetical methods and results on the part of the systematic theologian than was possible when Lonergan wrote *Method in Theology*. If the answer is yes, then in my view the work of the late Ben F. Meyer should be given the principal credit. Meyer's writings employ a straightforward and unapologetic employment of Lonergan's critical realism in the task of New Testament exegesis; and Lonergan has influenced the work of scholars such as N. T. Wright and James D.G. Dunn largely through Meyer.[32] These and others (especially Larry Hurtado[33]) represent at least a minor revolution in New Testament exegesis, one that in Meyer, Wright, and Dunn is based explicitly in critical realism. Going out on a limb here (that theologians working in either phase might want to cut while I'm sitting on it), I think their work enables the doctrinal theologian actually to do what Lonergan approvingly cites Pope Pius XII

[32]Ben F. Meyer, *Critical Realism and the New Testament* (San Jose, CA: Pickwick, 1989); *Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship: A Primer in Critical Realist Hermeneutics* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994); *The Aims of Jesus* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2002); N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992); *Jesus and the Victory of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996); *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003); James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003).

[33]Larry W. Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003).

as encouraging theologians to do, namely, to show how the doctrine defined by the church is contained in the sources. This was not, of course, the explicit intention of these authors. But because they employed a consistent critical realism in their work they have made this still very noble theological task possible for others to do. Because of their work, it also becomes possible to integrate New Testament Christology with the dogmatic and systematic Christology of Lonergan's theology not only as already achieved, but as envisioned in his methodological prescriptions that the mediated object of the functional specialty "doctrines" is redemption in history and the mediated object of systematics is *Geschichte* itself.

Reading Meyer and Wright, I start to believe that a task that I dare say none of us was ready to undertake thirty-five years ago is beginning to be possible. Lonergan-inspired theologians can take heart now in the possibility of a new integration of first-phase and second-phase work in theology, and this precisely in the manner that Lonergan intended. That means in a way that (1) the second, dogmatic phase does not unduly influence work in the first phase; and that (2) still manages to integrate the two phases without detriment to the church's doctrinal commitments; and that (3) provides some content from Jesus' proclamation and inauguration of the kingdom of God in the context of first-century Judaism, which is actually transposable to the context of a systematic theology whose concern is the mediation of the reign of God with the contemporary global network of cultural matrices.

Together with Meyer and Wright, Schwager constitutes my principal exegetical inspiration because, while his method is not explicitly rooted in Lonergan's critical realism, it is compatible for the most part with what Meyer and Wright are doing. He adds what I believe are essential hermeneutical determinants from his critical appropriation of René Girard's mimetic theory. The fifth chapter will attempt to integrate, then, the work of three New Testament exegetes –Meyer, Wright, and Schwager – and to suggest the appropriate direction in which to transpose their disengagement of the meaning of the kingdom or reign of God into the theological theory of history that constitutes one dimension of the contemporary dogmatic-theological context.

Lonergan Workshop
20/2008

ANOTHER PERHAPS PERMANENTLY VALID ACHIEVEMENT: LONERGAN ON CHRIST'S (SELF-) KNOWLEDGE

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God the Word has become a man
so that taking on what is ours he might give us what is his.

BERNARD LONERGAN

SOME YEARS AGO I wrote an article with the title, "A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement."[1] Its functional specialty was *Interpretation* in so far as I was concerned with "the doctrine of *X* on the topic of *Y*," where *X* was Lonergan and *Y* the atonement. More technically, the topic was Christ's "satisfaction." This has not been an altogether satisfactory notion, so to say. Anselm introduced it into theology in a way that left it open to distortions, some of which are still with us. Mel Gibson's *Passion of the Christ* exemplifies one of them. My argument was that if Lonergan managed to do nothing else, he did at least correct past distortions, and that his positive treatment of satisfaction could do much to counteract the same sort of distortion today. That is what I meant by borrowing his own phrase to refer to his treatment of satisfaction as, perhaps, a permanently valid achievement.[2]

[1]Charles C. Hefling, Jr. "A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement: Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 10 (1992): 51-76.

[2]See "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," in Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection,* 209-30, at 211-13.

This paper undertakes much the same kind of project. As before, my topic is Christological. *Y* is Christ's knowledge, with special reference to his knowledge of himself. Like satisfaction, it is a topic that is likely to have only limited appeal, even for theologians. What Christ knew and how he knew it are not the objects of animated discussion at present. For one thing, Christology as a whole seems to be *passé*. If any of the traditional doctrines treated in systematic theology has taken center stage, it is the Trinity. But what really lowers the probability of anyone's taking Lonergan's theological work seriously is that at its best it represents an attempt, against formidable odds, to bring theology out of the seventeenth century and into the twentieth. His aim was to address significant traditional questions in a modern way. That whole endeavor is now regarded, in many quarters, as a mistake. What for Lonergan was a project of *vetera novis augere et perficere*, a contribution to *aggiornamento*, can now be, and is, dismissed as hopelessly pre-postmodern. And of course the same is true of the idea that there could even *be* a "permanently valid achievement."

I do not propose to make a case that Christ's knowledge is, in fact, a relevant topic or that Lonergan takes a relevant approach to it. The question of relevance, even relevance for Lonergan specialists, is not the relevant question here. I will be content with expounding a few aspects of Lonergan's position. Thus the paper is mostly buildup. There is no exciting revelation at the end. Nor will I try to press Lonergan's views much beyond the point he reached himself. Frederick Crowe has already done that,[3] and what follows here is in some ways a set of notes that fill in the background.

LONERGAN'S LATIN CHRISTOLOGY

Although Lonergan wrote a great deal *about* doing theology, the theology he actually did is contained, nearly all of it, in Latin works written between *Insight* and *Method in Theology* while he was teaching in Rome. There are two book-length treatments of Christology and a bipartite treatise on the Trinity, all of which have remained comparatively unknown, mainly owing to the demise of Latin as a scholarly language. Recently, however, the shortest and earliest of the three major Latin writings has been published in a dual-language edition: *The Ontological and*

[3]Frederick E. Crowe, "Eschaton and Worldly Mission in the Mind and Heart of Jesus," in his *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 193-234.

Psychological Constitution of Christ.[4] This supplement, as Lonergan titled it, was written for the benefit of students in his course on the incarnate Word, which he taught using an existing textbook. Not long afterwards, he wrote a textbook of his own, *De Verbo incarnato.* Their subject-matter overlaps on at least part of the topic I will be discussing, and although there will be much to say about *De Verbo incarnato* for reasons that will appear in due course, I begin with the newly available *Constitution of Christ.*

It is not easy to know what to make of this book. Crowe has stated the opinion that it is one of the most neglected masterpieces of the twentieth century.[5] Lonergan himself says in the preface that it was written rather hastily and alludes wearily to teaching obligations and the pressure of imminent examinations. Afterward, with one very notable exception, he hardly mentioned it in English,[6] although his treatise on the Trinity as well as the textbook on the incarnate Word refer to certain parts of its argument. There is a logic to the organization and contents of its six parts, which Lonergan lays out in advance, but it would be possible to argue that it is not so much a book as a set of three or four pamphlets, more or less independent.

In any case, one critic found it a baffling book. More ominously, he found its position heretical and his critique consequently drew from Lonergan an unwontedly fierce counterattack, "Christ as Subject: A Reply." As republished in *Collection* and now in the Collected Works, "Christ as Subject" has probably served, for most, as their only glimpse of *De constitutione Christi* generally and what Lonergan held about Christ's knowledge in particular. The article, however, is not altogether representative either of his method or his views, if only because the selection and the ordering of material are governed mainly by the aim of refuting a misrepresentation. One of the issues that will concern us here is a case in point.

[4]Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ,* trans. from the fourth edition (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) of *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* by Michael G. Shields; Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). In citations hereafter, page numbers separated by a virgule are Latin and English, in that order.

[5]See his notes to Bernard Lonergan, "Christ as Subject: A Reply," *Collection,* 2nd ed., Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 290-294 at 290. The article itself is ch. 11, 153-84.

[6]I will discuss this exception in a moment. There is an interesting but very brief reference in the lectures on education that Lonergan gave in the summer of the year after *De constitutione Christi* was published. See Bernard Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 18 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 243.

in point. Lonergan's critic had found "an obscurity in [his] view of the relationship between Christ's human consciousness and Christ's beatific vision." This is the tenth of ten objections that Lonergan addresses, and his reply is that the relationship will be "plain as a pikestaff"[7] if one has followed the argument of his replies to the previous nine objections. Those replies, however, are framed in terms of the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas expounded in his *Verbum* articles. It would seem that what Lonergan is especially concerned to establish in "Christ as Subject," understandably enough, is the authentically Thomist lineage of his views on knowledge as applied to Christology. In other words, the emphasis falls on *vetera* rather than on *novis augere et perficere.*

De constitutione Christi itself gives a somewhat different picture. The relationship between Christ's human consciousness and his beatific vision is a central concern, indeed the culmination of the book, which comes at the end of a long, brilliant exercise in "dialectic" as Lonergan conceived it at the time.[8] The argument goes forward, however, not so much on the basis of Thomas's authority or anyone else's, as on the gnoseological basis of radical difference between position and counterposition on what it is to know. From there Lonergan proceeds to applications that regard consciousness as such, human consciousness, and the humanly conscious knower who was Jesus Christ.

The conclusions are speculative, in the technical sense with which Lonergan, at the time, used the term for one branch of theology. Today they might also be regarded as speculative in the looser and usually pejorative sense of gratuitous surmise. Nevertheless the speculation might still bear on questions that people who read the gospels find themselves asking. Broadly, it is the question of how much Jesus of Nazareth knew about himself and his mission. More specifically, it is the question whether he knew who he was. And most specifically, if he was in fact the Son of God, *how* did he know it?

It is this last question that I propose to begin with, partly because in *Constitution of Christ* Lonergan gives an answer that is very explicit, very clear – and somehow not very convincing. It raises further questions that I will try to address later on in the paper. But I will start *in medias res* with the answer itself, and then outline the Christological context it presupposes. This will entail a brief discussion of Lonergan's understanding of the classic doctrine of the Incarnation,

[7]"Christ as Subject," *Collection,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 178.

[8]There is probably no better example in Lonergan's work of how "dialectical method," in the sense the phrase has in *Insight* and prior to *Method in Theology,* might be applied to a concrete issue. This *methodological* relevance of *Constitution of Christ* will come up again below.

with attention to his philosophy of God, and a somewhat longer discussion of his transposition of this doctrine into what is in effect a context of intentionality analysis. After touching on the difference between being conscious and knowing, properly so called, and on knowing God by "beatific vision," I will return to the conditions which, according to Lonergan, are required and sufficient for Jesus' knowing himself to be the divine word made flesh. The second half of the paper will propose that a thesis on Christ's knowledge in *De Verbo incarnato* moves beyond the point where *Constitution of Christ* left off some eight years before. In the later textbook, Lonergan considers not just the possibility but the actuality of Christ's human knowledge. The thesis does not directly address the question of Christ's *self*-knowledge, but I will suggest that it does provide all the elements of a satisfactory answer. Moreover, it serves to bring Lonergan's Christology to bear on some important questions that arise in connection with his Trinitarian theology and his theological theory of history.

CHRIST'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Answering the question whether Jesus knew himself to be God depends on what is meant by the affirmation that he did. What is meant, methodologically speaking, is that the conditions of the possibility of this act of knowing were fulfilled. An explanatory understanding of the question *whether* they were fulfilled, whether the affirmation is true, would therefore consist in enumerating these conditions of possibility and explaining how they *could* have been fulfilled. In *Constitution of Christ* Lonergan formulates in the following *assertum* the two most proximate conditions:

Christ as man, through his human consciousness and his beatific knowledge, clearly understands, and with certainty judges, himself to be the natural Son of God and true God.[9]

The syntax is odd, but the translation is accurate. The assertion is that Jesus of Nazareth understands himself to be, and arrives at certain judgment that he himself

[9]*Constitution of Christ,* 204/205; the italicization is not Lonergan's. "Beatific knowledge" translates *beata scientia.*

himself is, truly God, God's own Son; and that this occurs by reason of his human consciousness and his "vision of God."[10]

The broad lines of what is meant here will be evident. On Lonergan's cognitional theory, knowing, properly so called, is a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging. In the case of knowing oneself, the relevant experience is not sense-experience but that experiential presence-to-self which, for Lonergan, is consciousness. Consciousness provides the empirical component, the data. In this conscious experience is verified some hypothetical conception, some definition of *P*, such that "I am *P*" is known to be true by the same one whose consciousness it is. Thus the *assertum* quoted above would seem to parallel the judgment that Lonergan invites readers of *Insight* to make for themselves in chapter 11. There *P* is a knower. What it is to be a knower has been explained. I, the reader, understand what the explanation means; that is, I grasp the link between a set of conditions, and the truth of affirming myself to be a knower. I am invited to verify this understanding in my own experience by grasping, further, that the conditions are fulfilled. In so far as I do in fact discern the evidence for their fulfillment, I know myself to be a knower. And this self-knowledge is mine, not on the basis of experience alone but through a true judgment. Since *Insight* had been written (though not yet published) when *De constitutione Christi* first appeared in print, we can perhaps presume that there is at least some similarity between the self-affirmation of the knower and Christ's knowing of himself. But there are two important differences, which should be made explicit.

(1) Judging that something is *P* rests on understanding what it is to be *P*. In this case, *P* is God. But what it is to be God, *quid sit deus*, is understood by human intelligence only through *beata scientia*, generally called the vision of God. It is so understood by Christ as man, according to Lonergan's *assertum*. The understanding, however, is not a matter of grasping intelligibility in data. The beatific vision is *like* an insight, in the sense that it attains the intelligible, indeed Intelligence itself, but *unlike* an insight in that there are no data on God. It follows that a true understanding of God does not fall within the range of human intelligence precisely as human, since, as human, intelligence has the intelligible *in* experiential data as its proportionate object. Beatific knowledge, then, is *dis*proportionate to knowers such as we are. To that point we shall return.

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[10]The equivalence of what is meant by the name "Jesus of Nazareth" and the technical term "Christ as man" will be explained presently, as will that of the commonsense phrase "vision of God" and the more theological *scientia beata*, "beatif knowledge."

(2) The *Insight* question, "Am I a knower?", is a general question. It asks *what* I am. By contrast, the judgment which, according to Lonergan, Jesus arrives at is a particular judgment: it answers a question of *who* I am. If Jesus, *per impossibile,* had read *Insight,* he would have arrived at exactly the same judgment, "I am a knower," in exactly the same sense in which anyone else arrives at it. But the relevant question here is, *Who* is being this knower? Who is performing these acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging? To that question, as Lonergan puts it, the incarnate Word gets an answer different from anyone else's, not because his consciousness is different but because he whom his consciousness makes present is different.[11]

Here the point to notice is that if Christ knew himself to be God, two *different* conditions had to be met. In the first place, there had to be human consciousness, "interior experience of oneself and one's acts, where 'experience' is taken in the strict sense of the word" – the sense of "a preliminary unstructured sort of awareness that is presupposed by intellectual inquiry and complemented by it."[12] This awareness is *ex parte subiecti,* on the side of the subject; what comes to awareness is the intender, the operator, irrespective of what is intended or what operation is being performed. In the second place, there had to be beatific knowledge *ex parte obiecti,* on the side of the object. This object is intended by the operating subject in the case of the operation of "seeing God face to face." So, on the one hand, any conscious operation –here Lonergan would provide such a list as I will presume readers are familiar with – makes the man Christ Jesus present to himself. The one who *is* present to himself through any such operation is the eternal Son, who is true God. But on the other hand, the one who is present to himself *knows* himself to be God the Son if and only if, besides interior *experience* of himself and his acts, he *understands* what it is to *be* God and Son of God. Moreover, if it is the man Christ Jesus – the incarnate Word precisely as incarnate – who knows this, then it must be by a human operation that he understands what it is to be God; and according to Lonergan there is only one such operation, namely the operation of "seeing" God by his essence. Without that knowledge, Christ might *conjecture* that who he was and what it is to be God are the same, but he could not *know* it in the sense of reaching the certainty of judgment.

[11] *Constitution of Christ,* 268/269-270/271.

[12] *Constitution of Christ,* 156/157. "Unstructured": *informis.* "Awareness": *notitia.*

ONTOLOGICAL CONDITIONS: CHRIST'S CONSTITUTION

The two conditions mentioned in Lonergan's *assertum* are the epistemological conditions of Christ's knowing himself to be who he in fact was. But "who he in fact was" denotes some particular construal of the Incarnation. What the *assertum* says about Christ's self-knowledge makes sense, that is, on the position Lonergan takes with respect to Christ's constitution but not on other positions. Thus before arguing for *how* Christ knew who he was, Lonergan devotes some 200 pages to who it was that Christ would know by knowing himself.

To anyone who has taken note of the brief discussions of Christology in his English writings, it will come as no surprise that on the constitution of the incarnate Word Lonergan was thoroughly traditional and in that sense "orthodox." In Christ there is one *person,* but there are two *natures,* as the council of Chalcedon declared. Christ is one being, one reality, who nevertheless can and must be understood in two quite different ways: as being like *us* in all things, sin excepted, and as being all that the Father is. That is what the Nicene creed says, without using Chalcedon's quasi-technical terminology.[13]

For theologians, of course, things are more complicated than this. It is one thing to define *person* in the purely heuristic sense of what there is one of in Christ, and *nature* as what there are two of; it is something else to understand in an orderly, systematic way just what is *one* in Christ, what is *two,* and what sort of difference there is – for logically there must be *some* difference – between them. Such an orderly, systematic understanding depends on method, that is, on wisely choosing and deploying basic terms and relations. Thus Parts 1 and 2 of *Constitution of Christ* are concerned with clarifying the terms *person, subsistent, one, intellectual nature,* and so on. Part 3, however, addresses the methodological question of what *theological* understanding consists in, and how it stands in relation to a (philosophical) analysis of (finite) being.

(Here a short excursus is in order. Part 3 of *Constitution of Christ,* "Theological Understanding," cannot but be of interest to students of Lonergan as theological methodologist, whether they are interested in his Christology or not. We know that he intended *Insight* to be "an exploration of method in other fields,

[13]For the continuity of meaning between the Nicene creed and the council of Chalcedon's *definitio fidei,* see Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," *A Second Collection,* 11-32 at 26.

prior to trying to do method in theology."[14] The intention could not be carried through, and *Insight* ends philosophically, with a proof for God's existence in chapter 19 and an apologetic argument for the supernatural in chapter 20. The short epilogue that follows contains important hints, but not much as to how the hints might be implemented. We also know that by the time Lonergan came to write the first part of his Trinitarian treatise – the second part was already written, and underwent little change – his ideas on theological method had begun to move in the direction of *Method in Theology*.

There is no evidence for any such move in *Constitution of Christ*, which preceded the first part of *De Deo Trino* by several years, and there are explicit statements which indicate that no movement had yet begun. I will hazard the guess that Part 3 of *Constitution* is the closest thing there is to what might have been chapter 21 of *Insight*, if Lonergan had not "rounded off" the book with an epilogue so he could start his teaching in Rome. In particular, the scheme of analysis and synthesis – resolution *into* "causes" and composition *from* them –and the role assigned to "positive" theology are very much in line with the position outlined in the epilogue of *Insight*.

Between the program of *Insight* and *Constitution of Christ* on the one hand, and the program that is emerging in *De Verbo Incarnato* and, more ambiguously, in *De Deo trino*, on the other, the difference might be put in an epigram: the "later Lonergan" was working to get history into (theoretical) theology, whereas earlier his aim was to get theory into (theological) history. End of excursus.

To resume the main thread: Part 3 of *Constitution* considers what theological understanding consists in, and how it stands in relation to philosophical analysis. More clearly than in *Insight* itself, Lonergan points out exactly why proportionate metaphysics *cannot* serve, in relation to God, the function it serves in relation to everything else. Briefly stated, the reason is that everything we know in the usual way – by understanding and judgment – is both composite and contingent. Because every concrete being is composite, insight must grasp a unity in its multiplicity. Because it is contingent, the existence of its unity must be verified by judgment. God, however, is neither composite nor contingent but simple and necessary. It follows that there is no *explaining* God, either by the intrinsic, formal causality that insight grasps, or by the extrinsic causality posited by arriving at a *virtually* unconditioned judgment.

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[14]Among other places, see "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," *A Second Collection*, 213.

Certain conclusions follow that bear on theology generally and on Christology in particular. If it is true that the Word is God, and true that the Word became flesh, then it is true that in the incarnate Word there is both transcendent and proportionate being, both that which is not and that which is isomorphic with the structure of the cognitional activities by which human intelligence comes to know the real. More particularly, according to the conciliar definitions of the Incarnation, the man Jesus of Nazareth includes a divine person. Any attempt to *conceive* the Incarnation will consequently have to make use of an odd "grammar." Two of its oddities should be mentioned.

(1) On the one hand, the Incarnation was not necessary. It was not soteriologically necessary, since there were other ways for God to save the human race; but that is not our present topic. The Incarnation was not necessary, either, from the standpoint of the person who was incarnate. It is necessary for God to be God; it is also necessary for the Word to be Word, that is, to proceed eternally from the Father, to be begotten, to be "spoken." It was not necessary for God to create a universe, and it was not necessary for the Word to become a being within that universe. God is intrinsically the same, whether he has created or not, and the Word is intrinsically the same whether or not he has become a man. In both cases – affirming that God has in fact created and affirming that the Word was in fact made flesh – the affirmation is a "contingent predication" of the divine.

(2) On the other hand, no such contingent predication is *true* unless there exists a suitable reality that is not God. "[I]f at any instant it is true that God understands, affirms, wills the existence of Alexander's horse Bucephalus, then the metaphysical conditions of the truth are [1] the existence of God and [2] the existence of Bucephalus," and though Bucephalus's existence had a beginning and an end in time, still God's understanding, affirming, and willing it are eternal.[15] Exactly the same reasoning applies to the Incarnation, which similarly had a beginning (though not an end) in time. A contingent fact, the existence of everything in the incarnate Word that is proportionate to human knowing, is one condition of the truth of the (contingent) statement that God understands, affirms, and wills the Incarnation. As with Bucephalus, the only other metaphysical condition is God's existence.

That being said, it should be emphasized that the meaning of the statement that God effects the Incarnation is not the same as the meaning of the statement that the Word became incarnate. For the *Word,* not the Father or the Spirit, became a

[15]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 5th ed., Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 685.

became a *man* and nothing else or other.[16] If this further, specifically *theological* statement is true, there does need to be a suitable "external term," a reality that is not God. But it cannot be a proportionate being. If it were a proportionate being, the Incarnation would be just an instance of creation. Lonergan's proposal is that this being, this reality, this external term is the *being-assumed* of a concrete human nature, of body and soul, of central potency and central form. This *esse secundarium* is constitutive of the Word's being-a-man, though not of his *being* or his *being one*.[17] That which *is*, both as God and as man, that which "subsists" in both divine and human natures, is the person of the Word, and that *whereby* he is whatever he is – eternally or contingently, as God or as man –is the divine *esse*. It is not, then, that divine being has been received in and limited by a finite, human essence – a sort of process-philosophy "Incarnation." Rather, to put it as the Athanasian creed does, Christ is one, "not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God."

CHRIST'S PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION

So much for the *ontology* of the Incarnation. The question worth asking, in a context that does not favor metaphysical discourse, is how all this bears on the *psychological* constitution of Christ, and consequently on his knowing. Here *consciousness* is the central notion. Crowe has observed more than once that *Constitution of Christ* is by far Lonergan's most extensive and detailed account of consciousness. Certainly it adds depth and nuance to what he says in *Insight*. As for *Method in Theology* and the essays that followed it, there Lonergan seems to

[16]To put this a little more technically, the Incarnation is not only soteriologically contingent but ontologically contingent, and that in three senses: (1) the Father or the Spirit, or both, or all three divine persons *could* have become incarnate, but only the Word did; (2) the Incarnation *could* have involved a nature other than human, but the Incarnate was and is a human, not a feline, a bovine, or whatever; (3) there *could* have been no Incarnation at all, but there is. See *Constitution of Christ,* 138/139.

[17]*Constitution of Christ,* 114/115, 232/233. Note that to say that this "substantial act" is constitutive is not to say it is a constitutive *cause.* Later, in *De Verbo Incarnato,* Lonergan seems to deny that there is any sense in which the *esse secundarium* makes the Word be a man, and there are passages in *Constitution of Christ* that point in the same direction. See 146/147 and 138/139; also *De Verbo Incarnato,* 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press *ad usum auditorum,* 1964), 265. (The whole of Assertion 9, 259-66, is on the *esse secundarium.*)

handle the notion almost automatically, as though using it in a sense that had already been settled. For present purposes there are three points to be noted.

(1) Only in *Constution of Christ* does Lonergan discuss the ontology *of* consciousness. Prescinding for the moment from God, it would seem that consciousness is in some sense optional. After all, nobody is conscious all the time. Lonergan acknowledges that no (finite) being is conscious *per se,* but he also denies that consciousness is an accident, in the technical sense. Rather, consciousness is a matter of *ontological perfection.* Animals, being conscious, are more ontologically complete than plants, which have no consciousness. Human beings, who are (sometimes) intellectually as well as sensitively conscious, are, as beings, more complete still.

(2) It was in this book, it seems, that Lonergan first began to characterize consciousness as presence of oneself to oneself.[18]

(3) Related to the previous point, and also new in *Constitution of Christ,* is the sharp distinction Lonergan draws between the conceptions of consciousness he names *conscientia-perceptio* and *conscientia-experientia,* consciousness-as-perception and consciousness-as-experience. The root of the difference is the dichotomy between Platonist and Aristotelian views of knowing with which the concluding chapter of *Verbum* begins.[19] On the Platonist view, knowing is confrontation; it presupposes a duality of knower and known and finds knowing in a further, consequent movement. Since consciousness is a kind of knowing, it too is a matter of encounter with something that is somehow other than the subject who encounters it. On the Aristotelian view, which of course is Lonergan's, knowing is grounded primarily in identity. Accordingly, "it is not too difficult to conceive consciousness as experience strictly so called, which is in the operating subject on the side of the subject, and through which the operating subject is rendered present to itself," not yet as understood, conceived, or (properly speaking) known, but

[18]*Constitution of Christ,*186/187: *quaedam sui-praesentia-sibi;* also 254/255. In his notes to "Christ as Subject," which was published in 1959 and in which the notion of consciousness as self-presence is more prominent, Crowe tentatively dates the first unambiguous use in Lonergan's English work to the Halifax lectures he gave in the summer of 1958 and suggests that the source may have been an article by Georges Van Riet that appeared in the same summer and is quoted in "Christ as Subject." But the first edition of *De constitutione Christi* had already been published in 1956.

[19]Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,* 2nd ed., Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 192.

speaking) known, but simply as experienced.[20]

Such is the conception of consciousness that Lonergan introduces into the theology of the Incarnation. As he would later put it, "the doctrine of one person with two natures transposes quite neatly into a recognition of a single subject of both a divine and a human consciousness."[21] The transposition can be summarized as follows.

(1) By an ontological *subject* is meant the subject of acts or operations. By certain of these acts or operations, their subject is rendered self-present, which is to say conscious. A *psychological* subject, then, is an ontological subject – person – who is operating psychologically and who thus is conscious.

(2) Existing and operating both belong to a person by reason of that person's *nature.* To have an intellectual nature is to be capable, at least, of operating psychologically. The incarnate Word, as defined at Chalcedon, has two natures, both intellectual. According to the same definition, they are the natures of one and the same person. That one person, it follows, acts or operates in two ways. Each renders him present to himself. As the subject of divine operation, he is divinely conscious; as the subject of human operations, he is humanly conscious.

One and the same being, the incarnate Word, thus exists at two levels of ontological perfection: as divinely conscious and as humanly conscious. In the present context, the main interest lies in his human consciousness and the cognitional operations by which he is humanly conscious. But his divine consciousness should at least be mentioned.

THE INCARNATE WORD'S DIVINE AND HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESSES

God, then, is both *ipsum intelligere* and *ipsum amare,* an infinite act of intelligence itself and love itself. Accordingly, God is conscious. In one of Lonergan's later formulations, divine self-presence is analogous to "that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love."[22] Notice that this is an incoherent conception if consciousness is a kind of

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[20]*Constitution of Christ,* 254/255. Where the translation has *itself,* the word might equally (and perhaps better) be *himself* or *herself.*

[21]Bernard Lonergan, "Dehellenization of Dogma," *A Second Collection,* 25.

[22]Bernard Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in *A Third Collection,* ed. by Frederick E. Crowe (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 74-99 at 93

consciousness is a kind of perception. In that case, Sartre was right: an utterly simple God cannot be conscious, because there is no *other* for such a God to perceive.[23]

In order to understand the Incarnation, however, it is not enough simply to acknowledge that God is, analogically speaking, conscious. Consciousness is self-presence. But in God the divine consciousness makes not one but three subjects present to themselves: the Father who begets the Son, the Son who is begotten, and the Spirit who is "spirated." Moreover, each of these three is conscious, not only on the basis of what is technically called *essential* act, the utterly simple act of understanding-and-loving that is God, but also on the basis of a *notional* act proper to himself. On the psychological analogy, the Father is *dicens,* a Speaker who utters a word and does so consciously; the Son is an expressive word of rational affirmation or judgment, whose being uttered is conscious. As Word, his divine consciousness is analogous to "the dependence of the judgment on the grasp of sufficient evidence."[24]

The important point is that the *person* of the Word, a person really distinct from the Father and the Spirit, is conscious. Only the Word, not the Father or the Spirit, has become a man. To affirm the Incarnation, then, is to affirm that one divinely conscious subject, but not the other two, is also the subject of a human consciousness. The *one who* is present to himself in all that Christ consciously did and suffered, and who is present to no one else, is identical with the *one who* is eternally begotten by the Father.

With this *one*, however, we are concerned inasmuch as he *is* present to himself in human acts. We are concerned, that is, with the man Christ Jesus. Ontologically, Christ as man is a divine person subsisting in a human nature that is like ours except for sin. Provided that he was not dreamlessly asleep, Christ was experientially aware of himself through acts of seeing, hearing, understanding, judging, deciding, and so on. It follows that a divine person, *one who* is God, is present to himself through those same acts. Certain things do *not* follow, however, and they should perhaps be made explicit.

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[23]Lonergan mentions this Sartrean conclusion in *Constitution of Christ,* 254/255; see also "Christ as Subject," *Collection,* 172-73.

[24]Bernard Lonergan, "Consciousness and the Trinity," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 122-141, at 135. Note that this "paper" is the transcription of a lecture, and that the phrase quoted was spoken in response to a question from the audience. For a much more differentiated discussion of consciousness in the Trinity on the basis of essential and notional acts, see *Constitution of Christ,* 194/195-200/201.

(1) In the first place, from the fact that Christ's humanly conscious acts made a divine person present to himself it does not follow that these acts were supernatural. Whether they were or not is a further question. What specifies an act as supernatural is not the conscious subject who consciously intends, but the object, that which is intended. The object of seeing is color. Since colors are not God, seeing them is not supernatural. Nevertheless, if Christ the man saw colors, he saw them consciously. By seeing them he was aware of his seeing and –which is the point – aware of himself, seeing.[25] The same argument applies to his other conscious, human acts.

(2) In the second place, to say that Christ, in performing any or all of the human acts he did perform, was conscious of himself is not to say that he *knew* himself. Consciousness alone is not self-knowledge, any more than sense-experience alone is knowledge properly so-called. The point is important because the question whether Christ *knew* he was God is not the same as the question whether he was aware of the person he was. If he was conscious, he was so aware, because it was the person he was who was (experientially) aware of himself. What this same person did or did not (intellectually) know, including himself, is again a further question. Addressing it will take the discussion back to the *assertum* in *Constitution of Christ* from which I began.

Since human knowing is a compound operation, Christ as man did not know anything without adding insight and judgment to experience. If, in particular, he knew himself, he had to understand who he was; and if to be who he was is to be a divine person, he had to understand what it is to be divine. That understanding, as I have mentioned, belongs to beatific knowledge, the "vision of God," a notion that calls for further explication.

Knowing God by his essence, heuristically defined, is an end. It is the adequate object of the desire to know, the goal of what Lonergan calls in *Insight* the notion of being and in *Constitution of Christ* the "intending intention of being." In those of us who are still alive, this intending is in process, manifesting itself in questions, to which our answers give us a glimpse of "the eternal rapture" that is God.[26] Those, on the other hand, who have arrived at the end of human becoming and desiring – the blessed – "know the triune God through the divine essence and, in proportion to the perfection of this knowledge, ... know all other things in God

[25]For a more technical statement, see "Christ as Subject," 182 or §95 in *Constitution of Christ,* 232/233-242/243, which deals with a series of similar difficulties and potential misconstruals.

[26]*Insight,* 706.

things in God as secondary objects."[27] In other, *Insight* words, they know the primary and secondary components of the idea of being. They may know this more or less completely. In any case, their knowledge is strictly and absolutely supernatural, because "proper knowledge is an act of understanding in virtue of a form proportionate to the object; hence proper knowledge of God must be in virtue of an infinite form, in virtue of God himself; [and] such knowledge is beyond the natural proportion of any possible finite substance."[28] To say, then, that in his earthly life Christ enjoyed the beatific vision is to say that he already had the "face to face" knowledge of God that belongs eschatologically to the redeemed.

FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF CHRIST'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE

It has taken nearly half this paper to explain what the question whether Christ knew he was God means. That is not surprising, perhaps. As a question about knowing, its meaning will vary depending on one's cognitional theory. As a question about Christ, it will vary with different philosophies of God and different explanations of the Incarnation. Such are the underpinnings of Lonergan's lapidary statement of the conditions of the possibility of Christ's having known, as man, what Christianity has traditionally taught about him. Those conditions, as Lonergan lists them,[29] are four:

(*a*) human consciousness, of which
(*b*) the subject is, in fact, God and Son of God;
(*c*) clear understanding of what it is to be God, that is, beatific knowledge; and
(*d*) a grasp of the identity between (*b*) and (*c*), between the subject of Christ's human consciousness and what is clearly understood through his "vision of God."

The linking of these conditions with the conditioned, that is, with true knowledge of himself on the part of Christ the man, will perhaps be clear from my discussion so far. The fourth condition, however, calls for closer scrutiny.

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[27] *Constitution of Christ,* 206/207.

[28] Bernard Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God," *Collection,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 81-91 at

[29] For his own list, which instead of letters uses numbers (in a slightly confusing way), see *Constitution of Christ,* 214/215. The confusion is pointed out in note 8 on 217.

It seems clear that condition (*d*) is the act that makes Christ certain of (*b*), which is to say certain that he is who in fact he is. What is most interesting about Lonergan's argument is his assertion that condition (*d*) is fulfilled at once, *statim*, when the other three are met. "For through his beatific knowledge Christ as man knew not only the triune God as primary object but also the incarnate Word as incarnate as a secondary object. In this secondary object of his beatific vision, therefore, Christ as man saw everything that became manifest to him through his human consciousness."[30] But what became manifest to him through his human consciousness, as with any other human consciousness, was the subject of that consciousness (that is, himself), together with that subject's conscious acts (that is, his own). In this case, the subject was God the Word; the acts were human and humanly conscious; and so a divine subject was present to himself, as subject, through human consciousness. But through beatific knowledge, which is an act within this same (human) consciousness, the same (divine) subject, the Word, was present as object, as intended, and present not only as Word but as incarnate, that is, as subject of human consciousness. Thus the humanly conscious subject that was the object of Christ's vision of God, and the humanly conscious subject that was the subject of his conscious acts, were one and the same. As soon as both are present to him within his one human consciousness – the object, through beatific knowledge; the subject, through any conscious act whatever – Christ instantly grasps their identity.

Such is Lonergan's position in *Constitution of Christ.* There is something vaguely unsatisfying about it. The reasoning, no doubt, is cogent. Still, it would seem that Christ's act of knowing himself (himself experienced as subject) to be identical with himself (himself "seen" as object) occurs automatically, as it were. Furthermore, it would seem that a clear grasp of who he was, both as God and as man, must have belonged to him from birth, if not before. If Christ was like us in every way, sin excepted, then condition (*a*), consciousness, was met as soon after his conception as he began to operate psychologically, whenever that happened. As for condition (*c*), the beatific vision does admit of degrees, but unlike (human) consciousness it is perpetual, not intermittent but always "in act."[31] The implication is that at whatever point it was during his earthly life that Jesus became humanly present to himself through any natural, psychological operations, at that point it began to be true, and has been true ever since, that "through his human

[30] *Constitution of Christ,* 216/217–218/219; "became manifest" translates *innotescebant.*

[31] According to Lonergan, this is Thomas Aquinas's position, which he follows without significant modification.

human consciousness and beatific knowledge Christ as man clearly understands and with certainty judges himself to be the natural Son of God and true God."[32]

On the one hand, then, Jesus' self-knowledge was human. Granted the *ontological* condition (*b*) that he *was* a divine subject, the *psychological* conditions of his knowing himself in a human way, (*a*) and (*c*), are themselves human. On the other hand, however, there was evidently no cognitive process that led up to this clear understanding and certain judgment; nor was there any development in what Jesus knew, once he knew it – which he did from the first. His human knowledge of himself seems to be human only in a Pickwickian sense.[33]

This objection has, of course, a context. It presupposes, among other things, the sort of debate about the "historical Jesus" that has been going on since the nineteenth century and shows no signs of abating. But while it is true that the successive quests have rested on methodological foundations that are in many ways dubious, still they were pursuing legitimate questions, some of which have a real bearing on systematic theology as the homely exercise of seeking to understand beliefs.[34] Let it be granted that Christ the man was a divine person subsisting in a human nature. Let it even be granted, following Lonergan, that he was a divine subject of a human consciousness. Can this judgment of belief be understood in terms of Christ's having lived a human life, where by human life is meant a historical process of growth and development, self-constituted within a world mediated by meaning? And, if it can, how? In particular, how could Christ, as man, be like us in all things apart from sin, and yet know clearly, certainly, and perpetually, his eternal identity in the Word? There would seem to be a *prima facie* case that he could not, and *Constitution of Christ* provides no help at all towards understanding how he could.

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[32] *Constitution of Christ,* 216/217; compare 204/205.

[33] Later on in *Constitution of Christ,* Lonergan does speak of Christ's "getting an answer" to the question, "Who am I?"; but his point is to draw a distinction between "Who am I?" and "What am I?" and not to suggest that either of these questions, as articulated, arose for Jesus of Nazareth. See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7, 268/269. Moreover, the translation here could be misleading. What Lonergan wrote, more literally translated, is that "Christ's human consciousness differs [from ours], not because the question, *What* is [this], would be responded to otherwise [than for us], but because the question, *Who* is [this], would be otherwise responded to; and it is otherwise responded to, not because something other is perceived through Christ's human consciousness, but because someone other perceives."

[34] On the homeliness of functionally specialized systematics, see *Method in Theology,* 350.

To infer that Lonergan was not aware of this difficulty when he wrote the book would be to argue from silence. Such an argument is all the weaker here, in that Lonergan was writing about the hypostatic union, about how Christ is constituted, not about his human life. Moreover, he was writing "supplementary notes."[35] His students already had a textbook written by his own dissertation supervisor, Charles Boyer. Whether Lonergan thought Boyer had dealt adequately with questions pertaining to Christ's human knowledge, as distinct from his human consciousness, we do not know. We do know he went on to write his own textbook, *De Verbo Incarnato,* the first version of which appeared four years after *De constitutione Christi.*

CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN THE FIRST VERSION OF "DE VERBO INCARNATO"

The relation between these two Christological works is complex and interesting. Once his own textbook was in print, Lonergan added a note at the end of the preface to *De constitutione Christi:* "I have set forth this same material, though for a different reason and in a different order, in a set of mimeographed notes, *De Verbo incarnato* … ."[36] The note is a little misleading. *De Verbo incarnato*'s six hundred pages deal with many more topics than *De constitutione Christi.* Nor does everything in the earlier booklet reappear in the later treatise, which occasionally refers to it.[37] On consciousness in general, however, and on Christ's consciousness in particular, the two books do for the most part overlap.

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[35]"Christ as Subject," 153.

[36] *Constitution of Christ,* 6/7; "this same material" translates *[e]andem ac hanc doctrinam. De Verbo incarnato* was printed by cyclostyle and bound (as were all three of the major Latin works) in paper-covered fascicles. The same note goes on to mention "Christ as Subject," which had been published in 1959.

[37]There is also nothing in *De Verbo incarnato* that corresponds to the third, methodological part of *De constitutione Christi,* and the omission is more significant than it might seem. *De Verbo incarnato* does not in any obvious way follow the program for "speculative theology" that *De constitutione Christi* had set out. Whether this is because *De Verbo incarnato* is "only" a textbook, a set of notes, or because Lonergan had completely abandoned the scheme of analysis-and-synthesis he had followed in *De constitutione Christi* (and in *De Deo Trino,* though with important modifications) is too complicated a question to address here.

In *De Verbo incarnato* there is a forty-four page thesis *De conscientia Christi* at the end of part three, "Theological Conclusions regarding the Hypostatic Union," which is divided into a section on "Person" with four theses and another on "Subject," with the one thesis on Christ's consciousness.[38] So far as Christ's *consciousness* is concerned, this thesis presents to all intents and purposes the "same material" as *De constitutione Christi.* It says nothing, however, about Christ's *knowing* the conscious subject of his human consciousness. The *acts* by which Christ was humanly present to himself are reserved for the following, fourth part of *De Verbo incarnato,* which treats grace, freedom, sinlessness, and knowledge, each in a thesis of its own.[39]

The thesis on Christ's knowledge in the final, 1964 edition of *De Verbo incarnato* is the last piece of theological writing (as distinct from methodology) that Lonergan finished.[40] It differs almost entirely from the thesis that had appeared in the edition of 1960 and again, unchanged, in 1961. The difference is worth noticing.

Quite a lot of *De Verbo incarnato* is conventional. Arguably the whole of thesis 12, "Christ's Knowledge," in its earlier version, belongs to the category of "practical chores."[41] Lonergan acknowledges that he has borrowed its basic terms from Thomas, and suggests that the only problem, really, is that different authors conceive in incompatible ways what is meant by these terms. On the other hand, after covering much the same ground that Thomas had covered, he ends the thesis on a note of frustration. A correct understanding of the Thomist position is all well and good, but advancing beyond it would mean taking on a series of large and disputed questions. It would be necessary to have "a clear exposition of the differences (1) between the Greek and medieval conception of science, and the reality of modern science, (2) between scientific and philosophical knowledge, and (3) between these disciplines and common sense with its variations according to

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[38]Lonergan was not consistent in giving titles to the various divisions of *De Verbo incarnato.* I have conflated the list in the *Index* (table of contents) of the third edition (Rome: Gregorian University Press *ad usum auditorum,* 1964), 311-312, with what appears on 211 and 267.

[39]Note that these correspond precisely with the set of post-conciliar questions belonging to "a distinct but dependent context of theological doctrines" that Lonergan mentions in *Method in Theology,* 314.

[40]There exists an extensive but unfinished treatment of redemption, in Latin, closely related to the last three theses in *De Verbo incarnato* but not structured according to the thesis-format of that book. It seems most likely that this was a revision or recasting of those theses, but since the theses themselves were written for the first version of *De Verbo incarnato* and allowed to stand unchanged in later versions, the fragmentary typescript is impossible to date more closely.

[41]"An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," *A Second Collection,* 211.

to places, times, and cultures." In brief, understanding Christ's knowledge depends on understanding understanding. It would be helpful to read *Insight.* Furthermore, "all this should be attempted only through a clear and exact method; and since theology does not yet seem to have arrived at the highest perfection of its method, perhaps it might begin there."[42] Understanding *theological* understanding is necessary.

Given these limitations, Lonergan's main concern in the earlier thesis is to establish that the incarnate Word *had* human knowledge – any human knowledge at all. But the argument he uses, interestingly, is an *a priori* argument from conciliar doctrine: to deny human knowledge in Christ amounts to Apollinarianism, the heretical opinion that the constitution of Christ was such that he lacked a "rational soul." As for *what* Christ knew as man, and how he knew it, the thesis says next to nothing. There are just five sentences on "acquired knowledge," one of which is to the effect that only on the basis of acquired knowledge could Christ the man himself have exercised common sense (Lonergan uses the English term), which does not understand itself.[43]

CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN "DE VERBO INCARNATO" (SECOND VERSION)

All in all, the thesis I have been discussing seems to be an example of Lonergan "doing what he could" – affirming what the best tradition had affirmed, and indicating what it would be to understand the affirmations in a modern context, but not working out the understanding in any concrete detail. The later thesis on Christ's knowledge is quite another matter. Lonergan did not simply revise the earlier version. He replaced it. The new thesis is twice as long, not counting some twenty pages of Patristic quotations. The only substantive repetition is a very short scholion about the desirability of further considering the "historical causality" exercised by Christ the man.

There is a sense, however, in which the thesis has begun to supply what this scholion calls for. To hazard a guess, between the earlier and later treatments of Christ's knowledge in *De Verbo incarnato,* "what was going forward" was an effort on Lonergan's part to work out what would be entailed in attributing

[42]Bernard Lonergan, *De Verbo incarnato,* 2nd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press *ad usum auditorum,* 1961), 361-62.

[43]*De Verbo incarnato,* 2nd ed., 360.

"historical causality" to Christ as man and more exactly as knower. He seems to have recognized that the historical causality exercised *by* Christ depends on what might be called historical causality exercised *in* Christ.

What I mean is this. If Christ was like us in all things, we may presumably think of his human, historical life as interacting with other human, historical lives in such a way as to mediate meaning in a human, historical way. He was, after all, a teacher. But if Christ was like us, his historical life was mindful. It had a cognitive component, like ours. It was an ongoing process, constituted by conscious acts of meaning. The question for systematic theology would be whether and how those *acts* and their meaning can be conceived, while maintaining the ecumenical doctrines on Christ's constitution, transposed to embrace its psychological manifestation. I do not say that Lonergan puts the aim of his new thesis in just this way, but I do think that is what the thesis achieves –and it is, perhaps, a permanently valid achievement.

The new thesis on Christ's knowledge is most notable for its explicit break with the medieval problematic. For the medievals, Thomas included, inquiring about Christ's knowledge is not a matter of asking what he was doing when he was knowing. Knowledge, *scientia,* is a *habitus* or, in the conceptuality of *Insight,* a conjugate form. When in the earlier version of thesis 12 Lonergan distinguishes between "infused" and "acquired" knowledge, the distinctions are distinctions of *habitual* knowledge, which is precisely not conscious knowing, not knowledge *in act* but only knowledge in (second) potency. It is quite possible to know, in the sense of having a habit of *scientia*, without actually knowing, in the sense answering any question for intelligence; and it is possible to be quite certain of this, that, or the other without, at the moment, actually conceiving the borrowed content of those judgments.

Twice in the later version of the thesis on Christ's knowledge, Lonergan tells his readers that if they want to learn about *that* kind of knowledge – if they happen to have that question – they can go and read Thomas Aquinas. His own question, which he evidently thought readers would share, is not about habits. It is a question about the cognitional acts by which the man Christ Jesus lived. Lonergan has no intention of abandoning Christ's *scientia beata.* But whereas *Constitution of Christ* seeks to distinguish and relate beatific knowledge and Christ's *consciousness,* the final version of the thesis in *De Verbo incarnato* seeks to distinguish and relate Christ's beatific knowledge and his other acts of *knowing.*

ACTUAL KNOWING IN CHRIST THE MAN

"The alternative to distinguishing is confusion."[44] Following his own precept in the new thesis, Lonergan introduces quite a bevy of distinctions: eternal life / historical life; beholder / pilgrim; ineffable / effable; supernatural / natural; immediate / mediated. Though ultimately they serve to prevent confusion, they can themselves be confusing. A small inverse insight is therefore needed. I have listed the distinctions in pairs, but the pairs do not – as one might spontaneously anticipate – line up. How they do sort out I have tried to show in the diagram. It is an attempt to elucidate the basic terms and relations in Lonergan's thesis, which is this:

> In his earthly life, Christ had both effable and ineffable human knowledge as well as his divine knowledge. As a beholder, he knew God immediately, by the ineffable knowledge that is also called beatific. In the same act, but mediately, he knew everything else that pertained to his work. As a pilgrim, however, he elicited by effable knowledge the cognitional acts, natural and supernatural, that constituted his human, historical life.[45]

[44]"Cognitional Structure," *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 205-21 at 214.

[45]*De Verbo incarnato*, 3rd ed., 332. This is the opening statement of Thesis 12.

Christ as Knower in Lonergan's *De Verbo incarnato*



Five comments on the position summarized in the diagram will lead back to the *assertum* in *Constitution of Christ* that presented the problem we began with.

(1) The thesis on Christ's knowledge presupposes what precedes it, and what precedes it is not substantially different from Lonergan's position in *Constitution of Christ*. There is one Lord Jesus Christ, a divine person subsisting in two natures and so also a divine subject of two consciousnesses. The natures, and so also their psychological manifestations in consciousness, are in Chalcedon's words "without confusion, without change." It is therefore possible to prescind from divine consciousness and conceive the one Christ *inasmuch as* he is the subject of human consciousness, which is to say precisely inasmuch as he is incarnate, having become a man. Similarly, it is possible to prescind from human consciousness and conceive him *inasmuch as* he is the subject of divine consciousness. The distinction is a theological commonplace. It appears on the left-hand side of the diagram in the standard terminology: Christ as God, Christ as man.[46]

(2) To speak of Christ's divine life and divine knowledge – the top row of the diagram – is to speak of (*a*) the Trinitarian life that the Word shares with the Father and the Spirit, (*b*) the knowledge that all three persons share by reason of the one essential act of understanding love that is God, and (*c*) the knowledge that pertains to the Word by reason of the proper act of being uttered or begotten that pertains to the Word alone.[47] None of this is in any way limited or conditioned by any created being, including Christ's humanity. On the other hand, of course, if the Incarnation is a reality then the Word, as God, knows this reality by divine knowledge, in the same way and for the same reasons that he knows everything else that exists.

(3) Everything *below* the top row of the diagram pertains to the incarnate Word *as* incarnate, and thus as humanly conscious. Each of the four boxes in the middle of the diagram represents actual knowledge, knowing in act, on the part of Jesus in his earthly life. They fall into two divisions, as indicated on the left-hand side of the diagram. Lonergan retains this much of Thomas: a distinction between Christ as *comprehensor* or "beholder" Christ as *viator*, "pilgrim." The meaning of this metaphorical language was alluded to above. Christ, *as* man, lived both *in via* and *in patria*, both on the way towards his last end and *at* that end. Still, it is one thing to affirm so paradoxical a notion and something else to have a glimmer of

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[46]For more on this distinction see Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ*, 298/209–210/211.

[47]The technical term is not *proper* but *notional*. See *Constitution of Christ*, 194/195– 200/201.

insight into what might be meant by it. Lonergan's thesis endeavors to provide the glimmer.

(4) Inasmuch as his life was everlasting life, life that had a beginning but will go on endlessly, Christ lived in and by knowledge that Lonergan terms "ineffable." It is really the same as "beatific vision," but differs notionally in three ways. First, it sidesteps the possibly misleading ocular metaphor. Knowing God by his essence is a matter of *intelligence* in act. Second, it avoids the implication that, as conferring beatitude, this knowledge was incompatible with suffering.[48] Third, on the positive side, it suggests the point on which the whole argument turns, namely expression and mediation. The now-archaic English word *effable* refers to that which is capable of being uttered, spoken, expressed, "worded." What is *ineffable* cannot be so mediated. Hence the distinction in the third column does line up with the one in the second.

(5) Turning to the first, "upper" division, Christ's ineffable knowledge as "beholder," I mentioned earlier that to know God immediately, by his essence, is also to know what comes within the scope of God's power, which includes everything that God has in fact created. This further knowledge (the second box from the top) is mediated by the divine essence. A tradition that goes back to Augustine refers to it as knowing "in the Word." It is knowledge of finite realities, things and events that are not God, and it admits of degrees, but it does not admit of multiplicity or sequence. There is nothing empirically residual. Things known "in the Word," whether they are possible or actual, are known "not immediately in themselves, not one by one, not one after the other, but all together."[49] What this implies will need to be considered in greater detail.

AN OBJECTION REVISITED

Let me return, then, to the misgivings that the passage in *Constitution of Christ* mentioned earlier might evoke. The objection was to the effect that to conceive Christ as "already" knowing he was God, "already" knowing the Word, and "already" knowing the incarnate Word, is to be guilty of docetism. Such a Christ could only have *seemed* to be human. In a way, *De Verbo incarnato* magnifies this difficulty. The earlier book asserts only that Christ knew the Incarnation. The later

[48] *De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 340.

[49] *De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 341.

one adds the further consequence of his having enjoyed the "vision of God": he knew all of Christology, so to say. He knew not only his person, that is, but also his work, and everything that pertained to it. Now there *is* a difficulty here. But if it is to be addressed in a differentiated way there are at least two red herrings that need to be disposed of.

(1) One source of difficulty in assimilating Lonergan's position on Christ's ineffable knowledge is the "umbilical cord" of imagination.[50] It is all too easy to paint a mental picture of Christ as knower that makes his knowing "in the Word" fantastic. The Magi come to Bethlehem bearing their gifts, and the baby in the manger says to himself, "Yes, I see it all. They have brought me gold, because I am a king, and incense, because I am God, and myrrh, because my death will be a sacrifice." The fact that this is obviously an exaggeration is not the reason why it is mistaken. The mistake is more radical. *Ineffable knowledge* is a technical, not a rhetorical phrase. It means what it says: such knowledge is inexpressible, *even to oneself.* It is neither perceptual nor discursive, for reasons to be elaborated presently. Attempting to imagine what exercising it would be is attempting the impossible.

(2) Ineffable knowledge can be *conceived,* though not imagined. Yet even if it is conceived as Lonergan conceives it there can be a reluctance to accepting that Christ had it. For having it would seem to have given Christ special advantages, and once again there is conflict with his having been like us in all things. Logically speaking, the conflict arises only if "like us in all things" is construed as equivalent to "not unlike us in anything." That construal is, however, very common at present. The argument is thus that Christ's having made use of any sort of "insider's" knowledge is no different from cheating on the stock market. This ultra-anti-docetic Christological egalitarianism is perhaps as much a feeling as a considered judgment. In any case, the reply is simply that we cannot have it both ways: Jesus either did or did not introduce into the human conversation something that goes beyond the knowledge humankind has achieved, or ever could achieve.[51] We may not *want* that to be the case; but, if so, our dissatisfaction is not so much intellectual as moral, and it comes down to the Nietzschean objection against Christianity as a whole.

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[50]See*Insight,* 15.

[51]Compare Bernard Lonergan, "Belief: Today's Issue," *A Second Collection,* 87-99 at 97: "God could and did enter into the division of labor by which men come to know, [and] his contribution was one that could not be replaced by human effort."

Otherwise stated, the point at issue is *revelation*. A traditional way of saying that Christ has made an irreplaceable contribution to "man's making of man" would be that he revealed "mysteries hidden in God, which, were they not revealed, could not be known by us."[52] A biblical way of saying it would be that there is no discontinuity between the Father and the words spoken by Jesus.[53] Either way, what is affirmed is cognition on the part of Christ the man that is extraordinary as well as beneficial. Grant that, and the question becomes one of how best to conceive the extraordinariness.[54]

As for Lonergan's way of conceiving it, the point to be emphasized is that if Christ the man, a "beholder" in his earthly life, exercised ineffable knowledge, we can say nothing whatever about what he knew. That which is ineffably known is by definition unutterable. What this means can best be explained by contrasting knowledge "in the Word" with knowledge that readers and author alike are familiar with.

The central act around which human knowing revolves is the act of understanding. By this act we grasp intelligibilities. But any intelligibility we grasp, we grasp in data, in the experiential. Thus it is mediated *by* what is experienced in one form or another. Readers may or may not grasp the intelligibility of this paper but, if they do, they grasp it through the mediation of certain black marks, suitably arranged on a white background by the author. It is this empirical component that ineffable knowledge omits. Christ's knowledge "in the Word" of what pertained to his work – his knowledge of human moral impotence, say, or the Law of the Cross, or the grace of union, or the Father's love for the Son, or what not – was not mediated by anything sensible, anything imaginable, anything finite, but by the divine essence. If, however, Christ the man, *as* man, *expresses* what he knows, what he knows becomes effable *ipso facto*. It does not matter whether the vehicle of expression is articulate sound, or gesture, or deed. It does not matter whether he expresses it to anyone besides himself. What comes to expression, any expression, is mediated by something other than its own intelligibility.

[52]*Method in Theology*, 321, quoting the first Vatican council's constitution *Dei Filius*.

[53]See Preliminary Note 2 to the thesis on Christ's knowledge, *De Verbo incarnato*, 3rd. ed., 385-89.

[54]There is a further discussion of revelation and its connection with Lonergan's Christology in Charles Hefling, "Insight and/as Revelation," in *The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin*, ed. John J. Liptay Jr. and David S. Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 7-115.

Lonergan's argument is that "rendering in an effable and palpable way what in him was ineffable" was "the principal and original thing in the life of Christ the man."[55] In my judgment, that is also the principal and original thing in Lonergan's position on Christ's knowledge. As the Word, *in* God, is precisely *word,* the expression of what "eternal rapture" grasps, so also the point of the Incarnation was for the Word to express, in time, the Father's eternal love and will. The expressing was thus a process, and "this process in Christ the man, a process of rendering effable what was ineffably possessed, was ... the human and historical life of Christ itself."[56]

In a sense, this is no new contention. It amounts to saying that Christ, as man, is the Mediator between God and humankind. In Lonergan's reformulation of an ancient epigram, "God the Word has become a man so that taking on what is ours he might give us what is his."[57] One thing he gave us was an expression of inexpressible insight. In order to give it, however, he had to know, effably, what he was giving. There had to be some kind of becoming-expressible, some transition from knowledge mediated by the divine essence to knowledge mediated by images, phantasms, diagrams, words in the sense of vocabulary items, gestures, intersubjectivity, and all the rest. How to conceive this transition is the next question.

FROM BEHOLDER'S KNOWLEDGE TO PILGRIM'S KNOWLEDGE

The point that needs to be clarified, in so far as it can be, is the relation between the knowledge by which Christ the man was a "beholder" and the knowledge by which he was a "pilgrim." The beholder understood, consciously, but did so without intending any presentations or representations in which he grasped the intelligibility of what he understood. As a first, oversimple, and possibly misleading approximation, we might say that whereas other human minds draw insights out of diagrams, Christ had to find diagrams to put his understanding into. He had to discover the means that would best mediate, effably, the ineffable intelligibility he grasped without any such mediation. *Discover* might seem too strong a word, but Lonergan observes that "it was not without novelty" for Christ to come to know things as we do – not all at once but one after another; not by

[55]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 408.
[56]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 408.
[57]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 313.

intelligence alone but by inner and outer experience, inquiry and understanding, conception, reflection, weighing the evidence, and judgment; and not in a single, perpetual act but in many acts that depended on various occasions, times, places, persons, and objects.[58]

In any case, this transition from knowing ineffably to knowing effably begins from a "vision" that is absolutely supernatural. Any way of conceiving it that improves on the one mentioned above will therefore be analogical at best. Three analogies, drawn from different aspects of conscious intentionality as we can experience it, may, taken together, be helpful.

(1) First, there is the analogy of knowing something in one way, and then coming to know the same thing otherwise. Geometry is one of Lonergan's examples. From ordinary Euclidean geometry, you might advance to analytic geometry, and from there to Riemannian. The intelligibilities remain the same; their mediation differs. Another example is translation. Suppose you were thoroughly acquainted with the whole *Divine Comedy.* You would know everything that you had to translate, but nothing as yet about how it would be expressed in your translation. Nor would you know this, until the translation – the new diagram, as it were – was finished. Extrapolating from this example, Lonergan proposes the droll analogy of an eminent theologian, well versed in the *Summa theologiae,* who is also a very accomplished cinematographer and sets out to turn the *Summa* into a film. This polymath "knows in its entirety what has to be represented, yet the entirety of how to represent it remains to be discovered."[59]

(2) Each of the examples mentioned so far involves comparing two instances of knowing, both of which depend on some sort of empirical data. An analogy that differs in that respect, and is in some ways closer, is the "light of intellect" itself, the intention of being, the desire to know. This "light" does for us what *scientia beata* did for Christ. "For just as we proceed from the intention of being to the acquisition of our effable knowledge, so also Christ the man proceeded from his ineffable knowing to the formation of *his* effable knowledge."[60] Our desire to know is in itself ineffable; by it all knowledge is in some way imparted; of it our lives are the expression. Just so, Christ's human life was the expression of that which was ineffable in him. Our desire to know does not provide us with facts or concepts or

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[58]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 342.

[59]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 343. Characteristically, Lonergan adds that such examples, though of course they limp, may nevertheless be useful in so far as readers determine for themselves how far they illustrate the point under consideration, and how far they fall short.

[60]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 338; emphasis added.

concepts or formulas, much less with pictures, and so unobtrusive is it that most people never notice it and would probably say it has no place or role in their consciousness. Conceive Christ's ineffable knowledge on that analogy, and the objection vanishes, it was a kind of database, somehow downloaded into his mind.[61]

Still, as with any analogy, along with similarity there is a difference. In us, the intending of being, the light of intellect, is a desire *for* knowledge of God, which, as mentioned earlier, is its adequate end and object. We operate, therefore, from intending *to* attaining, whereas "Christ the man diffused goodness from an end achieved, beheld, and loved."[62] That diffusing was, again, his human and historical life. It was also, to draw a metaphor from Lonergan's later work, the pure case of "development from above downwards."

(3) To these two analogies, explicitly drawn in *De Verbo incarnato,* I think a third can be added. It is the analogy of faith and belief, conceived as distinct in the way *Method in Theology* outlines in the chapter on religion. Lonergan's discussion there has caused no little perplexity. Faith, he writes, is apprehensive; it is knowledge; it is "born" of love; what it apprehends is value. Belief, including religious belief, is acceptance, on the ground of value apprehended and judged, of judgments that others have held and communicated. In the case of religious belief, a judgment that to accept what others have accepted would be good is a judgment which itself rests on faith.[63] Beliefs, by definition, are mediated, chiefly though by no means only, through language. It follows that their content can be stated. Whether faith, for Lonergan, has a cognitive content of its own is more difficult to determine. Although his formulations are quite general, they nevertheless belong to one tradition –a broad tradition, but nevertheless different from others. Faith, it seems, turns out to be a name for the basic conceptual stratum of an identifiable set of beliefs. On that reading, the distinction Lonergan draws is a distinction without a difference.

But another reading, and I think a better one, is possible. It is true that there is no way to express the knowledge in which faith consists, except by formulating statements which, as statements, would have to be classified as statements of belief. But that is not because faith *is* belief, in an undifferentiated form. Rather, the reason is that faith, in itself, is ineffable knowledge, in the sense in which *De Verbo incarnato* uses the term, whereas belief is effable. The ineffability of faith is the

[61]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 338; see also Crowe, "Eschaton and Worldly Mission," 205-206.
[62]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 406.
[63]*Method in Theology*, 115, 118, 119.

is the cognitional counterpart of the unrestrictedness of the love from which it is "born." On this interpretation, to articulate one's own faith – and that is arguably what Lonergan was doing when wrote the general characterization of faith that appears in *Method in Theology* – would be to effect a transition from ineffable to effable knowledge. Such a transition, of course, need not take place only in the intellectual pattern of conscious experience. To take the act of expressing one's faith as an analogy for the transition in Christ's human consciousness is not to say he was a theologian. In so far as the analogy is valid, its point is that just as people of faith live their lives by what they believe in the light of that faith, so Christ, who had no need of faith, lived his life by effable knowledge held in the light of his "vision of God."

There is support for this third analogy in the fact that Lonergan's distinction between faith and belief is not altogether new. What he terms faith, the ground of belief, an "older and more authoritative tradition" would have termed *lumen gratiae* or *lumen fidei,* the light of grace or of faith.[64] And at one point in *De Verbo incarnato* the light of faith is coupled with the light of intelligence as the ineffable dynamic that functions in our conscious living as ineffable knowledge of God does in Christ's.[65] Moreover, this third analogy would seem to be, in principle, even closer than the second, since faith, in the *Method in Theology* sense, is presumably still supernatural, like *beata scientia* and unlike the light of intelligence. There is, on the other hand, a disadvantage in that while Lonergan had a great deal to say about the light of intelligence, his remarks on faith, as distinct from belief, are few and sometimes cryptic. But he would almost certainly have said in reply that what finally counts, in both cases, is self-appropriation, heightening of consciousness, attention to one's own inner experience.[66]

[64]*Method in Theology,* 123.

[65]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 406.

[66]In this regard, see Crowe, "Eschaton and Worldly Mission," 208, 221-226, and especially 223, n. 44. Crowe's use of Lonergan's later writings on faith and belief in the context of conceiving Christ's knowledge is compatible with what I have written above, but he moves for the most part in a different direction.

CHRIST AS MEANER AND THE WORLD MEDIATED BY MEANING

Meanwhile, lest this paper become even longer than it is, we should return to the diagram. I have been concentrating on a movement "from above downwards," from the (first and) second box to the third. That is where "the principal and original thing in the life of Christ the man" takes place, so to say. But something remains to be said about the lower two boxes. Christ, then, being like us in all things, not only had a human body, soul, and consciousness but also lived in a human world. It would seem to follow that "the way from above downwards" operated, not only immediately and interiorly but mediately – not only in respect of the transition from his ineffable to his effable knowledge, but also in the sense that his effable knowledge, precisely *as* effable, was *his* knowledge largely through socialization and acculturation, through finding his way into a tradition, through accepting what others knew and valued. This is what I meant earlier by speaking of historical causality *in* Christ the man.

While Christ's historical development might seem to be a straightforward and irreproachable conclusion from his ontological humanity, Thomas Aquinas is notorious for having said that any receiving from other men and women was not necessary and not even appropriate for Christ, whose humanity Chalcedon pronounced to be perfect or complete. This unwillingness to admit cooperation and cognitive growth in Christ the man lasted right to the end of Thomas's life. Only in the *Pars tertia* does he (twice) retract his former view. Still, the earlier tradition held its ground. Lonergan, in the first version of his thesis on Christ's knowledge, has to insist that Christ *had* human knowledge. On how this knowledge might have been acquired, the thesis has nothing to say. When Lonergan replaced it, however, he opened a floodgate. In the later version Christ in some sense learned *everything* in, and from, a world mediated by meaning.

Notice I have said that in *some* sense Christ learned from others. There is a theological point at issue, and an important one, which was mentioned earlier but bears repeating. The whole reason for positing the "vision of God" or ineffable knowledge or *beata scientia* in Christ's human consciousness is that Christ is to be believed. The logic of believing which Lonergan lays out in *Insight,* and from which he never departed, is such that the truth of any belief rests on the truth of immanently generated knowledge. Otherwise the situation would be like the economy of the fairytale island where everyone makes a living by taking in each

other's laundry. *Someone* must know, in the proper sense of the word *know*, or there is no one to trust and all belief is equally conjectural. The "someone" may be a community, as in the case of scientific knowledge, which as Lonergan points out is largely a matter of belief, and the same might be said for religious knowledge. But just as scientific knowledge depends ultimately on original discoveries made by empirical investigators, so too, on the Christian position that Lonergan takes, knowledge of divine mysteries depends ultimately if remotely on Christ's knowledge.

In Crowe's formulation, "[w]hat Jesus knows as a religious teacher, he knows on his own, without asking anyone, without having someone to vouch for him, without even needing, as the prophets needed, to have the word of the Lord come to him."[67] Nevertheless, as Crowe goes on to say and as I have been saying here, Jesus' knowing-on-his-own did not include words or concepts, sensations or feeling. All these he had to acquire. Here a lengthy quotation from Lonergan will be appropriate.

> We say, then, that Christ did not accept an adult but an infant humanity, and that he made himself an adult by his own acts of experiencing, knowing, and choosing. We say that he not only had but also formed his own disposition, his own character, his own way of behaving, acting, speaking, and living. ... We say ... that Christ accepted not only the humanity of an infant but also a humanity descended from David, in the land of Palestine, in the time of Augustus, such that he spoke Aramaic, was educated under Jewish law, ad grew up among Galileans. We say not only that he was born in that determinate human world, but also that he made that world, that language, that culture, his own.[68]

Within this "making his own," however, Lonergan distinguishes between formal and material components. As sense is only the material cause of intellectual knowing, so also everything said and done by parents, friends, teachers, and anyone else is the material cause of the process by which any of us forms his or her own disposition and character, talent, and mind-set. Some people, "drifters" in the Kierkegaardian term Lonergan would later borrow, never get very far beyond accepting their subjectivity from others. "By contrast, the more I exercise my own originality and constitute for myself my own end for my own life, the more is my accepting from others a material accepting only, and the more radically do I convert

[67]Crowe, "Eschaton and Worldly Mission," 202.

[68]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 345, 346.

radically do I convert and transform to my own uses and ends everything I accept."[69] What Lonergan is suggesting, then, is that if we extrapolate from the "drifter," through the person who authentically "ex-ists,"[70] we may arrive, in the limit as it were, at the self-constitution of Jesus of Nazareth, a pilgrim freely and responsibly "producing the first and only edition" of the beholder he was.[71]

Let me gather the threads of what I have been saying in these last few paragraphs. On the one hand, what Christ knows as a religious teacher –"everything that pertains to his work," in Lonergan's phrase – he knows on his own, without asking anyone. But that knowledge is inexpressible. On the other hand, then, the *expression* of what he knew depended for its material component –the vehicles of its meaning – on his seeing, hearing, tasting, and touching, on his inquiry and reflection, insight and judgment, on the world mediated by meaning in which he lived and on those who directly or indirectly mediated it, and finally on his decisions to speak and act and *be* in particular ways. In those decisions, which constituted Christ's human, historical life, ineffable knowledge was manifested.

The life of Christ was the word through which the Word humanly worded the Word he was and knew. Christ's *Existenz,* we might say, was an instance of what in *Method in Theology* Lonergan calls – and his language is surely deliberate – incarnate meaning.[72] The difference is that in this case the meaning that was incarnate was the meaning of God that is God.

CHRIST'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS HISTORICAL

I have been discussing how it might be possible to think of Christ as expressing to others the inexpressible knowledge that was his by the gift of "seeing God." From the standpoint of Christianity's "outer word," its doctrines and theology, beliefs and practices, this communication of meaning is of course what is most important. But Jesus' teaching included teaching about himself, and what he expressed as teacher he did not, presumably, express without thinking about it. Thus we return to the

[69]*De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 408.

[70]Although he seems never to have done so in English, in Latin Lonergan occasionally borrowed Jaspers's convention, spelling *ex-sist* with a hyphen to have a verb corresponding to *Existenz.* See Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ,* 19, n. 12. The context of *De Verbo incarnato,* 3rd ed., 408, on which I am drawing, is very similar.

[71]"The Subject," *A Second Collection,* 83.

[72]*Method in Theology,* 73; 113, which likewise alludes to Newman's motto *cor ad cor loquitur,* is also relevant.

to the question of his self-knowledge.

By entering a world mediated by meaning, by learning a language, Jesus learned not only words and grammar but ways of thinking about God, about the human condition, and about how God deals with the human condition. If, then, he thought discursively or imaginatively or conceptually about *himself*, about who he was and what he was for, his thinking was an acceptance and a transformation of commonsense notions and imagery in the light of his ineffable knowledge. There is no more reason to suppose that as a baby Jesus had well-thought-out career goals than there is to suppose he could program a computer. But neither is there any reason to suppose that he entered his ministry with a clear conception, in humanly expressible terms, of where it would lead. The statement in the gospel of Luke that the twelve-year-old Jesus grew in wisdom (which occasioned endless consternation for the Fathers[73]) need not be limited to his adolescence. Moreover, even if Christ did know, "in the Word," what would result from his going to Jerusalem, it does not follow that when he went there he knew it effably. The Gethsemane episode, if nothing else, suggests that even then he did not regard the outcome as determined in every respect.

The same line of reasoning can be applied to his self-knowledge. Recall that according to *Constitution of Christ*, Jesus of Nazareth, "through his human consciousness and his beatific knowledge, clearly understands, and with certainty judges, himself to be the natural Son of God and true God." That understanding and judgment were not, as I have tried to explain, expressed as Lonergan expresses them, either in English or in Latin, or for that matter in Hebrew or Aramaic. They were not – because they could not be – expressed at all. If this ineffable self-knowledge ever did come to expression, it did so by the process of "translation" for which three analogies were mentioned earlier. There was some material component of articulate sound or imaginable marking, some linguistic or symbolic diagram, some commonsense combination of these. That material was already a vehicle of meaning; in it, some finite intelligibility available in first-century Palestine could already be grasped. To it, however, by a kind of converse insight, a new, further intelligibility was added.[74]

Stated more concretely, it would seem that we can best think of Christ's *effable* self-knowledge as a trans*form*ation of existing, meaningful images and

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[73]Most of the Patristic excerpts that Lonergan transcribes in the later version of Thesis 12 of *De Verbo incarnato* are comments on Luke 2:52 and often attempts to explain away.

[74]Note in this regard Lonergan's brief observations on "the original meaningfulness of any language, ordinary, literary, or technical," in *Method in Theology*, 255-56.

narratives and concepts that were available to him. To judge by the canonical gospels, the ones that proved to be most suitable were *bar-nasha,* "son of man," the servant of Yahweh in the book of Isaiah, the notion of an eschatological prophet, and perhaps (though the point is hotly disputed) the notion of a, or the, messiah. These, it seems, each with its circle of connotations, were the "diagrams" that could and perhaps did convey, effably, Christ's ineffable knowledge of himself, both to himself and to others.

All this, of course, is largely speculative, a hypothesis that does not exclude alternative hypotheses.[75] Such is the nature of systematic theology. In any case the concepts I have mentioned, like any other concepts, are *qua* concepts abstract. Concretely, the "diagram" in which Jesus had to find a sensible mediation of the ineffable meaning that he grasped ineffably was the unfolding series of humanly conscious decisions by which he constituted his earthly life, including his willing acceptance of suffering and death. It would be a mistake to think of the incarnate Word's human consciousness as intellectually differentiated. There is much to be said for Austin Farrer's suggestion that Christ's self-knowledge was more a matter of *knowing-how* than of *knowing-that.* According to the Letter to Hebrews, he "learned obedience by the things he suffered," and we might say, generalizing the point, that his life was a process of learning how to *be* God's Son, how to be the expression of his Father's love and understanding, in a world mediated by meanings that include the surd of unintelligibility and failure of love.

My paper thus returns to the point it set out from. Lonergan's "permanently valid achievement" with respect to atonement lies in showing how Christ's acceptance of his passion and death – not his suffering as such, but his acceptance of suffering – can be understood as an expression of meaning, a judgment of value regarding human sin and, at the same time, an answer to the question of what is to be done about the evils that sin looses on the world. This expression is all of a piece with the rest of Christ's human, historical life, and not least importantly with his uttered words. The "permanently valid achievement" I have been discussing here lies in Lonergan's explanation of how it was possible that "the just and mysterious Law of the Cross," which Christ expressed by making it is own, could

[75]In "Eschaton and Worldly Mission," Crowe is reluctant to hypothesize in this regard: "I do not see any religious reason for supposing that the Lord Jesus went around trying to understand himself, or searching the scriptures for passages that pertained to him" (210). But while there may be no *religious* reason, there is, I think, a *theological* reason to ask, for example, whether Jesus, in accepting his Passion, not only knew what he was doing but knew who was doing it. I have tried to indicate the outlines of an argument on this point at the end of "Christ and Evils: Assessing an Aspect of Marilyn McCord Adams's Theodicy," *Anglican Theological Review* 83 (2001): 869-82.

own, could be known to him, not only as a mystery hidden in God, but as a mystery intrinsic to his own identity as the meaning of God incarnate.

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LONERGAN AND POST-CONCILIAR ECCLESIOLOGY

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IN THIS PAPER I am not going to attempt a review of the flourishing field of theology devoted to an understanding of the Church. To try this in one lecture would be certain to result in a superficial survey. Instead, I wish to take the proposal that Bernard Lonergan made in the last chapter of his *Method in Theology*, namely that the Church be considered "a process of self-constitution within worldwide human society," and, after briefly explaining the notion, to show how it can ground an approach to three of the most important discussions in Roman Catholic ecclesiology since the Second Vatican Council.

* * *

Lonergan formally introduces the topic of the Church in the last chapter of *Method in Theology*.[1] (There are, of course, categories [terms and relations] presented earlier in the book that can be exploited in an ecclesiology.[2]) Lonergan begins the chapter with short sections on meaning and ontology. After summarizing what he had said earlier about the cognitive, constitutive, communicative, and effective functions of meaning, he turned to common meaning as the formal constituent of community. The four functions of meaning were then applied to community the genesis of whose common meaning is "an ongoing process of communication, of people coming to share the same cognitive, constitutive, and effective meanings." Lonergan then offered a clarification of three terms: society, state, church. Society was once conceived as "the organized collaboration of individuals for the pursuit of a common aim or aims," a notion that underlay traditional discussions of Church and State as two "perfect societies," that is, autonomous in their own spheres.

[1]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 355-68.
[2]See my Foundations in Ecclesiology (Lonergan Workshop, 1995).

societies," that is, autonomous in their own spheres. Lonergan preferred to borrow from sociologists and social historians an empirical notion of the social as "anything that pertains to the togetherness of human beings, which in our day increasingly yields the idea of a single worldwide human society," with sovereign states simply "territorial divisions within human society." This provides the larger context in which to think about the Church.

"The ideal basis of society," Lonergan went on," is community," which can be based on moral, religious, or Christian principles. The moral principle is individual and collective self-responsibility and grounds universal dialogue; the religious principle is God's gift of his love and grounds interreligious dialogue; the Christian principle adds to the inner gift of God's love "its outer manifestation in Christ Jesus and in those that follow them," and this grounds Christian ecumenism. But community is always imperfect. To the ignorance and incompetence that make it difficult for many to achieve a fully responsible freedom are added the individual, group, and general bias that lead to human decline.

To offset this decline and to ground and constantly to renew community within general human society and within states, Lonergan continued, there are needed "individuals and groups and, in the modern world, organizations that labor to persuade people to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and that work systematically to undo the mischief brought about by alienation and ideology. Among such bodies," Lonergan drily adds, "should be the Christian church."[3]

The Church is then described as "the community that results from the outer communication of Christ's message and from the inner gift of God's love." The focus is on the message whose meaning is cognitive – what is to be believed; constitutive – crystallizing "the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian fellowship"; and effective – "directing Christian service to human society." To communicate the message to others requires that those who do so themselves know the message (cognitive), live it (constitutive), and practice it (effective). On this basis, Lonergan can write the paragraph pertinent to our purpose today:

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[3]John Coulson criticized this introduction of the Church as bureaucratic: "...in describing the task of the eighth or 'major' specialty – communications – Lonergan rarely rises above what might be called the language of middle-management"; "Front-Line Theology – a Marginal Comment on Newman and Lonergan," in *Looking at Lonergan's Method*, ed. Patrick Corcoran (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1975), 189. One does get the impression that by the time Lonergan reached chapter 14, he was eager to be done with his book on method. This final chapter has something of the character of an outline; the prose is often telegraphically concise, and there is little in it to warm the cockles of anyone's heart.

> Through communication there is constituted community and, conversely, community constitutes and perfects itself through communication. Accordingly, the Christian church is a process of self-constitution, a *Selbstvollzug*. While there still is in use the medieval meaning of the term, society, so that the church may be named a society, still the modern meaning, generated by empirical social studies, leads one to speak of the church as a process of self-constitution occurring within worldwide human society. The substance of that process is the Christian message conjoined with the inner gift of God's love and resulting in Christian witness, Christian fellowship, and Christian service to mankind.
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> (The last sentence should be noted, lest anyone think it Pelagian for the Church as a process of *self*-constitution: the substance of the process, Lonergan says, is the Word and the grace of God.[4])

This description has no doubt confused many people. Not only does the old meaning of the word "society" still linger in their minds, but they are more used to thinking of the Church (and, for that matter, other social relations and bodies, e.g., institutions) in terms of something more solid than process, as an almost tangible, visible, reality in the world, a community, a people, an institution, etc.[5] They may also think that to speak of it as a "process of self-constitution," a *Selbstvollzug* (self-realization) is singularly uninformative. So let me try to tease things out.

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[4]Two quotes indicate well that Lonergan was aware of the full theological richness of the Church. Speaking of what a Christian existentialism might mean, he wrote: "That is the existing of one whose heart is flooded by God's love through the Holy Spirit given him or her (Romans 5:5). It is a being-in-love manifested, to the discerning, in joy and peace, patience and kindness, goodness and fidelity, gentleness and self-control (Galatians 5:22). It is a being-in-love that is eschatological, looking toward a last end in hope, that responds with faith to the preaching of the gospel, that joins with all the faithful in desiring and praying for and contributing to the human destiny we name salvation, a salvation that consists in God's gift of himself to us in this life and, more fully and overtly, in the next." A paragraph later he expands on the theme: "For it is authentic Christian experience that is alive. It is that experience as shared by two or more that is intersubjective; that, as shared by many, is community; that, as transmitted down the ages, is historic; that, as intended for all Christians, is ecumenical and, as intended for all men, is universalist; it is the same experience, as headed for an ultimate goal, that is eschatological. So a single human reality, in its many aspects, and through its many realizations, at once is alive and intersubjective, communal and historic, ecumenical and universalist and eschatological"; Bernard Lonergan, "A New Pastoral Theology," in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 221-39, at 232

[5]This would consider the Church as something already out there now real, instead of as a unity, identity, whole characterized by certain features.

I was once on a university campus and on the door of a room I was passing was pasted a sign that read: "EVENT IN PROGRESS", meaning, I suppose, that one shouldn't enter and disturb the meeting. I thought that might make a good description of the Church: "EVENT IN PROGRESS."[6] Here is why.

First of all, for Lonergan meaning has a constitutive function. Meaning and value are part of what makes a person the distinct individual that he is; his personal horizon is a construction of meaning and value. But this is also true of larger human realities:

> Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. Religions and art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, histories, all are inextricably involved in acts of meaning. What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change involves change of meaning – a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or request. The state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, again, by working on men's minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty.[7]

For Lonergan, community is a construction within the world constituted by meaning and motivated by value. His view goes against the tendency to reify it –to forget that it is the product of human activity[8] – and insists that it exists because certain events take place within the subjectivity and intersubjectivity of several people. They have some experience in common; they understand it in common or complementary ways; their common judgments yield a common world; on the basis of these common experiences, understandings, and judgments they commit themselves to common goals. This is what makes an aggregate of people a

[6]Fifty years ago there was a discussion within ecclesiology as to whether it was more appropriate to speak of the Church as "event" or as "institution," a distinction there is reason to question. Institutions, after all, exist only as events in progress.

[7]*Method in Theology*, 78. One might think of the current debate on what constitutes a marriage.

[8]See the notion of reification in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967). 89: "the apprehension of the products of human activity *as if* they were something else than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will."

community, and community begins and ends with common meanings and values. In John Searle's language, the ontology of community is subjective.[9]

But community can continue to exist only if and to the degree that events of meaning and value continue to occur and continue to be shared. It is not a fixed reality; it has no existence outside the acts of shared meaning that link its members. The communication of meaning and value constitutes community, and community realizes itself through continued communication. A community can be described, then, as a process of self-constitution. Community is process, community is event.

An Italian ecclesiologist, Severino Dianich, has constructed an entire treatise on the Church on the basis of an analysis of the Church as an event of communication.[10] The primary event that gives birth to the Church is the communication and appropriation of the message about what God has done in Jesus Christ. On Pentecost, Peter interpreted the extraordinary events as signs of the messianic age; he then narrated the life, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, and ended with the solemn announcement: "Let all the house of Israel know most assuredly that God has made both Lord and Messiah this Jesus whom you crucified," and by faith, repentance, and baptism that day were added about three thousand souls (Acts 2:14-36).

Another text describes the genesis of the Church even more succinctly; it is the first verses of the First Epistle of St. John. They begin almost with a stutter: "What was from the beginning; what we have heard, what we have seen with our own eyes, what we have looked upon and our hands have touched – about the word of life – and the life was made known and we have seen and now testify and announce to you, the life eternal which was with the Father and has appeared to us." And then the essence: "What we have seen and have heard we announce to you, so that you also may have fellowship with us, and this fellowship of ours is with the Father and with his Son, Jesus Christ. And we write these things to you so that our joy may be fulfilled" (1 John 1:1-4).

Here the apostles are inviting others into fellowship (*koinonia*) with themselves on the basis of what they experienced and are now announcing – the word of life; they are offering others the opportunity to believe and thereby to enter into fellowship with them because of the eternal life that appeared to them, and the fellowship that the apostles already enjoy is not just another human fellowship: it is fellowship with the Father and the Son. The *koinonia* basic to the

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[9]John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[10]Severino Dianich and Serena Noceti, *Trattato sulla Chiesa* (Brescia: Queriniana, 2002).

Church is constituted by the communication and appropriation of the message about Jesus Christ.

That is the basic communication that makes the Church exist as a community across generations; in fact, it is the basic communication that gives birth to the Church every day.[11] Where that event occurs, the Church comes to be; where that event does not take place, the Church does not exist; where that event has ceased to take place, the Church has ceased to exist. The continued communication and appropriation of that message is the process by which the Church realizes itself – makes itself a reality in the world constituted by meaning and motivated by value. The Church is "a process of self-constitution occurring within worldwide human society."

One great advantage of this approach is its concreteness. The Church's genesis, self-realization, is an event within this world, a distinct moment in mankind's self-realization. There are larger dimensions of the event, of course: the message about Jesus Christ has roots in the story of his people and their God; the community yielded by the communication and appropriation of the message about Christ began almost two millennia ago, exists in many other places and among many other peoples all over the world, and will be brought to perfection as the Kingdom, that is, the people blessed by the immediate presence of God. But even when expanded out to its full universality, to include all the saved from Abel to the last of the just, the Church remains something concrete: it consists in human beings brought together by the message about Christ received in faith thanks to the inner gift of the Holy Spirit.[12]

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[11]The Venerable Bede expressed this self-constitution: "Everyday the Church gives birth to the Church."

[12]Consider the concreteness of this text of Augustine: "The house of God is itself a city. For the house of God is the people of God; because the house of God is the temple of God. And what did the Apostle say? 'God's temple is holy, which you are' (1 Cor 3:17). The house of God is all the believers, not only those who now exist, but also those who were before us and have fallen asleep, and those who will be after us, those who have still to be born until the end of the world, innumerable believers gathered into one, numbered by the Lord, however, about whom the Apostle says: 'The Lord knows who are his own' (2 Tm 2:19); those grains which now groan among the chaff, which are to form a single mass, when at the end there is a winnowing (Mt 3:12); the whole number of holy believers, who are to be changed from being men to being equal to the Angels of God, to be joined with the Angels who now do not wander but await us when we return from our wandering; all of us together make one house of God, and one city" *En. in Ps. 126*, 3; PL 38, 1668-1669.

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A first advantage of this approach is that it enables one to make a basic distinction that puts some order among the various images and concepts of the Church that are sometimes put into competition with one another: People of God, Body of Christ, Temple of the Holy Spirit, mystery, sacrament, communion, etc. These are all concepts that either have been presented in the books of the New Testament or have arisen out of efforts to understand Christian community. Some of them are instances of what Lonergan said required the elaboration and application of "special theological categories,"[13] that is, dimensions of the Church that are "objects proper to theology" and do not "come within the purview of other disciples as well as theology." But besides the effort to understand such concepts as elaborated in the Scriptures or in the Tradition, there is also the question: to what do these concepts refer; what are they describing? The easy answer is that they refer to the Church, but what is meant by this "Church" that is the referent of the variety of images and concepts?

I believe the question can be answered by a primary notion of the Church, one that is suggested precisely by reflection on the Church as an event of self-realization. It is the idea of the Church as the *congregatio (convocatio, communio) fidelium*, the Church as the assembly, community, or communion, of believers. This notion is primary in both a sociological and a theological sense. Sociologically, it identifies the meanings that constitute this human community and distinguish it from all others: this community consists of people brought together because of a common faith in what God has done in Jesus Christ. Theologically, apart from God's grace, there is nothing prior to faith, the beginning of justification, as the Council of Trent called it. All of the sacraments presuppose faith; Aquinas called them *sacramenta fidei*, and he also said that the strength of the whole edifice of the Church was the strength of its faith.[14] All of the relations that constitute the community that is the Church presuppose communion in the grounding and centering faith in the gospel of Jesus Christ.

It is to this community, so constituted and defined, that the other concepts of the Church apply. It is this community that is the People of God, the Body of Christ, the Temple of the Spirit, communion in divine mystery, sacrament, sign

[13]*Method in Theology*, 282, 288-91.

[14]"*Fides est sicut fundamentum, ex cuius firmitate tota firmatur ecclesiae structura*"; St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Colossians, ch. 1, l. 5 (Marietti n. 57).

and instrument, of salvation. Efforts to explore the meaning of these concepts must include efforts to show what they mean as descriptions of that community of believers. Hans Urs von Balthasar once published an essay entitled "Who are the Church?" Long before, and much more concretely, Augustine had asked, with reference to an image of the Church as a "fruitful vine": "*Sed in quibus?*" In whom is this true?[15] And of any other image, description, concept, model of the Church it is possible, and necessary to ask, "Of whom is this true? In whom is this a reality? And how is it true of them?" Such questions are necessary if ecclesiology is not to be a study of abstractions.

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A second set of questions to which is pertinent this emphasis on the Church as the assembly of believers that results from a process of self-constitution concerns the relationship between local Churches and the so-called universal Church. The matter has been an object of great debate since the local Church has become the focus of ecclesiological attention in the decades after the Second Vatican Council.[16] The Council itself did not develop a full theology of the local Church; in fact, its perspective was largely universalistic; but in its statement about particular eucharistic communities and about the need for the Church to embody itself in the variety of cultures, it laid some foundations on which a large number of theologians have built.

This development has aroused fears in some, not least of all in Joseph Ratzinger and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, of a one-sided emphasis on particularity that ends in considering the local Church as an entity sufficient unto itself. As a response, the man who is now pope and the Congregation he used to head repeatedly defended the priority of the universal Church over the local or particular Churches. They spoke of an ontological priority, of a universal Church that preexists creation and gives birth to particular Churches. In the course of discussions about this matter – including the question who could possibly be in a Church that preexists creation? – Ratzinger clarified this to mean the preexistence of God's intention of a Church that is universal in its

[15] Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Who is the Church?" in *Spouse of the Word (Explorations in Theology*, II) (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 143-91; Augustine, *En. in Ps* 127, 11; PL 38, 1684).

[16] See Joseph A. Komonchak, "The Local Church and the Church Catholic: The Contemporary Theological Problematic," *he Jurist*, 52 (1992): 416-47.

scope; he now calls it "teleological priority": protology is eschatology, as some scholars put it. He also defends the historical priority of the universal Church, seeing in the account of the events of Pentecost the creation of a Church that is already universal and that then gives birth, first, to the local Church of Jerusalem and then to all other particular local Churches. This grounds the Congregation's claim that the universal Church is, historically, the mother of all the particular Churches.

Many find the fear to which this position is a response exaggerated. Only a very few theologians who have written on the matter defend the priority of the local Church. The vast majority of ecclesiologists think that the question of priority is itself poorly posed and indicates an inadequate understanding of the realities under consideration. Almost all of them agree on two statements: (1) the universal Church is not the result of a federation of preexisting local Churches; (2) the local Church is not simply an administrative subdivision of a preexisting universal Church. They try to retain the nice balance that is found in two statements in *Lumen gentium* 23, where it is said, first, that the particular Churches are formed in the image of the universal Church, and, second, that the universal Church exists in and out of the particular Churches. The first statement seems to assign a priority to the universal Church, which supplies the image other Churches must follow. The second statement seems to imply a priority to the local Churches since it is not only in them but out of them that the one universal Church exists. Most ecclesiologiss think the only way properly to address the issue is to say Yes to both statements and then to try to understand how they can both be true.

Although Ratzinger vigorously denied this, more than a few observers regard his position as simply a more sophisticated way of defending the universal authority of the pope and the Vatican, so little theological valence does he give to the local Church. A decade before Ratzinger began to set out his position, Louis Bouyer had a position like that in mind when he criticized a view that sees the Church from the outset as "a sort of enormous apparatus of global reach, a '*Gesellschaft*' destined to establish branch offices everywhere, which for this purpose would deploy a centripetal network for systematic evangelization, so as little by little to set up a chain of cultic or charity 'stations.'" Against a view to which modern ecclesiology often approximated, Bouyer went on:

> St. Peter did not found the Church by rushing right away to Rome, as to the center of the ancient world, in order to establish there a network of committees that might then methodically implant their subsidiaries

> throughout the universe. He founded the Church, on Pentecost, by announcing the risen Christ to those around him, by himself baptizing or having his apostolic collaborators baptize "those who came to believe," by having them share in the first celebrations of the eucharistic banquet, and by thus involving them in a common life of thanksgiving and of charity. The Church of all times and all places was founded, then, in a first local Church, the Church of Jerusalem, and it has been propagated from then on in other local Churches, similar to it, as if by cutting and planting.

Against the modern view, Bouyer insisted that the Church "proceeds from essentially local communities and, truly speaking, has never had actual existence except in them: in "*Gemeinschaften*" where concrete people concretely live a common life of shared faith, of unanimous prayer, of communion in praise and charity. Everything else in the Church is only in the service of these communities and has no real spiritual existence except in their actual life." Bouyer suggests that Catholic ecclesiology could learn from Congregationalists "who deny to the Church any existence apart from the concrete 'congregations' in which believers come together to hear the Word, to pray, to celebrate the Lord's Supper, and thus to be involved in a life, indissolubly communal and personal, of faith and charity."[17] These are the persons and the communities *quibus constat Ecclesia*, to use Augustine's phrase quoted below, in whom the Church consists. An "ontology" of the Church requires study of the subjectivity by which a person becomes a Christian through faith, hope, and love and of the intersubjectivity by which believers are brought together as assemblies. There is no suprapersonal entity above and apart from these believers and their assemblies. The *Ecclesia universa* is the communion of all such believers and their assemblies, and this communion is an event within a shared consciousness, the communion that results from or, rather, consists in, the common faith, hope, and love that God's word and grace enable and effect.

The basic question, I believe, is: Where, in whom, and how does the Church come into being today? When the question is translated into the terms employed by Lonergan, and developed in some independence by Dianich, it asks: Where, in

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[17]Louis Bouyer, *The Church of God, Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 278-79. See also p. 281: St. Paul and his contemporaries "never envisioned the 'Church' as a generalized abstraction, detached (or detachable) from every concrete assembly of worship and charity, nor as an organization of these 'Churches,' envisioned independently and separately." For St. Paul the Church "is never an abstraction nor, still less, some sort of organization which, while capping all these assemblies, could be conceived as having existence outside them."

whom, and how does the event of communication that is the *Selbstvollzug* of the Church take place? And the answer to that seems to me to be obvious: It always occurs locally, in a specific place and time, as one or more persons announce the Good News of what God has done in Jesus Christ, and it is received in faith by one or more persons. The Church is not constituted by the divine initiative in Word and grace alone but also by the free human response created by that Word and that grace. As such, it is always a concrete reality: *this* group of men and women, at *this* time and place, within *this* culture, responding to the Word and grace by which God gathers them into Christ. It is not an abstract Word that is preached and accepted in faith, but a Word that illumines a particular situation, responds to particular questions, and is expressed in particular languages, symbols, gestures, rites, etc. Redemptive grace also is always concrete, an overcoming of particular instances of sin, a liberation from particular bonds and addictions. The Church that comes to be through faith, hope, and love is not a realm beyond culture, history, and society, but a concrete manifestation in human communities of particular places, times, and cultures of the one transcendent and redemptive grace of God.

Now, I insist, this is *not* to consider the universal Church something secondary, something derivative. The divine initiative itself is universal in purpose and scope, both the divine Word and the divine grace. But it is to say that what is called the universal Church is the communion of all the local Churches; that is, it is a *concrete universal.* If one wishes to take the parish as the typical small community, then a diocese is the communion of such local communities of faith, and the one Church is the communion of communions of local communities. Apart from the local Churches the universal Church does not exist; it is, as Pope Paul VI said, an abstraction, an *ens rationis*. Apart from the local Churches, the so-called universal Church does not act. The one who presides over the universal communion may urge "the Church" to do such-and-such, or to avoid such-and-such, but the Church only does what he urges or avoids what he counsels against only if and to the degree that the local Churches do it or avoid it.

Yves Congar has illuminating comments that point up the consequences of the shift when the Church ceases to be considered the assembly of believers. He was writing about the notion of the Church as "Mother."

> To the Fathers the Church was the "We of Christians."... Jerome writes: "The Church of Christ is nothing else but the souls of those who believe in Christ." In the juridical ecclesiology of the modern age, the aspect of the Church as made up of believers has been almost entirely forgotten in

> favor, almost exclusively, of the aspect of the Church as making believers. The Church is considered as the suprapersonal reality which mediates the salvation of Christ to men. The latter are nothing more than her children; she is set up over them. Of the two dialectically opposed viewpoints from which the Fathers contemplated the motherhood of the Church, one has been evacuated, namely that according to which the believers are seen as giving birth to the Church...When the Church is no longer considered as made by believers, but is seen chiefly as a mediating institution, then the mission and motherhood of the Church are seen as being exercised in the external valid acts of the established ministry instead of being drawn from the Christian character of love and prayer by which her members are living.[18]

Something similar, it seems to me, takes place when the universal Church is considered to have a priority that sets it over and against the local Churches. In Ratzinger's view the universal Church takes precedence at every point. While he says that it forms the local Church in its own image, he gives scant attention to the fact that it is itself formed by the local Churches. The relationship has ceased to be dialectical. As, in Congar's description, a suprapersonal motherhood of the Church neglected the subjective acts of believers, so today the dimension of the one Church as constituted by the subjectivity of the many Churches is being neglected to the degree that the only thing being stressed is their being *ad imaginem Ecclesiae universalis*.

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Another topic in ecclesiology that may be illumined by the approach we have been pursuing is the question of sin and the holy Church. The question, sometimes posed as whether the Church itself may or must be said to be sinful, was already

[18]Yves Congar, "Au lecteur," in Karl Delahaye, *Ecclesia mater chez les Pères des trois premiers siècles: Pour un renouvellement de la Pastorale d'aujourd'hui* (Unam Sanctam 46; Paris: du Cerf, 1964), 10; an English version can be found as "Mother Church," in Joseph Ratzinger, et al., *The Church Today* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1967), 38. Here are three texts in which Augustine describes the ecclesial dialectic by which Christians are at once children of the Church and themselves Mother Church: "The Church is to herself both a mother and her children; for all of those of whom the Church consists, taken together, are called a mother, while those same individuals, taken singly, are called her children" (*Quaestionum Evangeliorum*, I, 18:1; PL 35, 1327). "All the Christians hurrying together to Church are said to be children rushing to their mother, even though the one who is called mother consists of those same children." (*De diversis quaestionibus*, 59, 3; PL 30, 48). "We are called children of that mother even though she consists of us" (Ibid., 75, 2; PL 40, c. 87).

being agitated before Vatican II and was an object of debate at the Council itself. The Council avoided calling the Church itself sinful and was content with the neat phrase "*sancta simul et semper purificanda*" (at once holy and always in need of being purified), spoke of the Church's having always to pursue the path of repentance and renewal, and admitted possible failures in its activities, etc. After the Council John Paul II became so intent on admitting the failures of Christians in a host of areas that he was accused by some in Rome of "mea-culpism"; the Pope generally avoided the term "sinful Church," although in one talk he did speak of the Church as at once "holy and sinful."

The reigning interpretation seems to be the one proposed by Charles Journet: "The Church is without sin but not without sinners."[19] In a large degree this interpretation rests on the view that the Church has a personhood of its own distinct from the persons of its members; Journet was of the view that to speak of the Church in terms of its members is to use a restricted, even an impoverished, sense of the term.[20] It is the Church in its full sense that is unfailingly united to Christ as Body to Head, that is indefectibly holy in its being and in its activity. To it belong individual Christians in virtue of that in them which is holy, which lives by supernatural charity; in that in them which is unholy, however, they do not belong to the holy Church. They may be said to be members of the Church, but their sin is theirs and not the Church's. In that sense it can be said that the Church is without sin but not without sinners.

A passage in Journet's writings illustrates rather well the difference between this view and the way in which Augustine and Aquinas approached the question. In his commentary on the Apostles' Creed, at the point at which he was explaining the holiness of the Church, St. Thomas continued to make use of the notion of the Church as the assembly of believers: To explain why the Church is said to be holy he passed easily from "Church" to "the faithful of this assembly," and he said that the latter are holy first because "washed in the blood of Christ," second, because of "a spiritual anointing that makes them holy," third because of the indwelling of the Holy Trinity, "since any place where God dwells is a holy place," and, fourth,

[19]See a collection of his papers in Charles Journet, *L'Église sainte mais non sans pécheurs* (Paris: Éd. Parole et Silence, 1999).

[20]See Charles Journet, "On Three Ways of Defining the Word 'Church' and on the Corresponding Ways of Assigning her Causes," in *The Church of the Word Incarnate*, vol. I,: *The Apostolic Hierarchy* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 45-59.

because they are called by his holy Name.[21] Notice how concrete this is. That the Church is holy means that the faithful who are assembled in it and as it are holy.

But in a move that I think was quite unconscious, so habituated was he to view the Church as distinct from its members, Journet wrote: "The Church is holy," wrote St. Thomas, "because it washes believers in the blood of Christ, as is said in the Apocalypse, 'He loved us; he washed our sins in his blood, and he has made us kings and priests for God and his Father,' and in Hebrews: 'Jesus, having to sanctify the people by his blood, suffered outside the gate.'"[22] What in the biblical texts and in Aquinas's commentary is the work of Christ, in his saving passion, Journet attributes to the Church in her sanctifying, sacramental role, and the Church which Aquinas had identified with believers as the recipients of that great act of redemption, has now been set over and against believers to the point that it is now the Church that washes believers clean.

The concreteness of Aquinas's approach is also apparent when he says that "to be the glorious Church, 'without spot or wrinkle,' is the final goal to which we are being drawn by the passion of Christ. This will, therefore, be the case in the state of the homeland, but not in the state of the journey during which 'if we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves' (1 John 1:8)."[23] Journet, on the other hand, believed the Church to be already without spot or wrinkle.

One can see how the traditional view, represented by Aquinas, corresponds to an approach to the Church as the community that results from the "process of self-constitution" we have explained as the communication and reception of the Gospel. The process and its result are something quite concrete: it consists in the assembly of believers. This assembly is holy because it consists of people blessed beyond merit by God in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. But what might be called the objective holiness of God's justifying and sanctifying love has to be lived out in a response of love for God and for one's neighbor. The Church will be as holy as are its members, and the Church in the singular will be as holy as are the individual Churches in which alone does it exist and act.

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[21]Note, not so by the way, that Aquinas's notion of holiness is very biblical here; it does not refer to an ethical quality, but to the fact that the holy God has blessed it in the ways described; that is why the Church is said to be holy.

[22]Charles Journet, *L'Église sainte mais non sans pécheurs* (Paris: Éd. Parole et Silence, 1999), 50.

[23]Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, III, q. 8, a. 3, ad 2m. Augustine was just as concrete. If the Pelagians admit that they were sinners, he asked them: "How then is the Church of this time without stain and wrinkle, since you are its stain and wrinkle?" (Sermon 181; PL 38, c. 980).

The authenticity in which this holiness consists in the maturing and developing person is, of course, an ongoing thing:

> So human authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession. It is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals. Our advance in understanding is also the elimination of oversights and misunderstandings. Our advance in truth is also the correction of mistakes and errors. Our moral development is through repentance for our sins. Genuine religion is discovered and realized by redemption from the many traps of religious aberration. So we are bid to watch and pray, to make our way in fear and trembling. And it is the greatest saints that proclaim themselves the greatest sinners, though their sins seem slight indeed to less holy folk that lack their discernment and their love.[24]

That is why, Lonergan says, "there is always a great need to eye very critically any religious individual or group and so discern beyond the real charity they may well have been granted the various types of bias that may distort or block their exercise of it."[25]

The quote calls to mind Lonergan's outline of a dialectic of history in terms of progress, whose principle is intelligence, of decline, whose principle is the irrationality that is sin, and of redemptive recovery, whose principle is the converted self blessed by the word and grace of God. Lonergan developed the analysis of evil in terms of individual, group, and general bias, and .he did not think the analysis without relevance to the Church: "Not only is there the progress of mankind but also there is development and progress within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and as there is decline, there also is the problem of undoing it, of overcoming evil with good not only in the world but also in the church."[26]

Perhaps it is not necessary to dwell on individual sins, familiar enough to us all. But it is worth noting that Lonergan does not exempt religious leaders from this sad fact; in fact, one of the three ways in which he sees a particularly perilous threat to the unity of faith is "when the absence of conversion occurs in those that govern the church or speak in its name," a subject, as I have remarked elsewhere,

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[24]*Method in Theology*, 110.
[25]*Method in Theology*, 284.
[26]*Method in Theology*, 291.

on which the literature is not great.[27] We Catholics have in recent years become all too well aware of the possibility of sin in our religious leaders. (This is an important point because many people have misunderstood the statement that the Church itself cannot be considered sinful to be referring to the hierarchy or to the "institution," which is certainly mistaken.)

The analysis in terms of group bias can also be verified within the Church, not only among various groups – religious orders (one could think of the Chinese rites controversy), various kinds of movements, theological schools, bureaucratic centralization (monopolizing the selection of bishops), clerical careerism ("the shabby shell of Catholicism"[28]), etc. – but also in various defensive postures and policies adopted to preserve the Church's own prerogatives, whether in the Middle Ages and at the Reformation,[29] the creation of that separate little world of Roman Catholicism,[30] the decline into inauthenticity, which then becomes canonical, in religious orders, theological traditions, etc. ("Unauthenticity can spread and become a tradition."[31])

Finally, there is the general bias that common sense, with a dash of holiness, suffices for the Church to meet its redemptive responsibilities. "If one does not attain, on the level of one's age, an understanding of the religious realities in which one believes, one will be simply at the mercy of the psychologists, the sociologists, the philosophers, that will not hesitate to tell believers what it really is in which they believe."[32] This is perhaps where one might place Lonergan's insistence on what happens when intellectual conversion and differentiations of consciousness do not accompany religious and moral conversion,[33] or when

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[27]*Method in Theology*, 330. I have developed some ideas on this in "Authority and Conversion, or: The Limits of Authority," *Cristianesimo nella Storia*, 207-29.

[28]*Method in Theology*, 327.

[29] "If from no other way at least from experience we have learned that professions of zeal for the eternal salvation of souls do not make the persecution of heretics a means for the reconciliation of heretics"; Bernard Lonergan, *A Third Collection*, 106.

[30]Newman: "We are sinking into a sort of Novatianism, the heresy which the early Popes so strenuously resisted. Instead of aiming a being a world-wide power, we are shrinking into ourselves, narrowing the lines of communion, trembling at freedom of thought, and using the language of dismay and despair at the prospect before us, instead of, with the high spirit of the warrior, going out conquering and to conquer."

[31]Collected Works, vol.17, 87.

[32]*Method in Theology*, 351.

[33]After discussing the necessity of pluralism in communications, Lonergan pointed up its difficulties: "On the one hand, it demands a many-sided development in those that govern or teach. On the other hand, every achievement is apt to be challenged by those that fail to achieve. People

divine healing is thought sufficient without human creativity, when the Church's redemptive action is not matched by its constructive action.

> For just as the creative process, when unaccompanied by healing, is distorted and corrupted by bias, so too the healing process, when unaccompanied by creating, is a soul without a body. Christianity developed and spread with the ancient empire of Rome. It possessed the spiritual power to heal what was unsound in that imperial domain,. But it was unaccompanied by its natural complement of creating, for a single development has two vectors, one from below upwards, creating, the other from above downwards, healing. So when the Roman empire decayed and disintegrated, the Church indeed lived on. But it lived on, not in a civilized world, but in a dark and barbarous age in which, as a contemporary reported, men devoured one another as fishes in the sea.[34]

Already in *Insight*, Lonergan regretted the fact that Catholic apologists always seemed in the unfortunate position of arriving at the latest scene of battle "a little breathlessly and a little late."[35] His "Epilogue" to that book ended with a brief description of what theology might contribute to empirical human science and of what empirical human science has to contribute to the rescue of mankind.[36] It is surely significant that *Method in Theology* ends with a similar preoccupation now stated in terms of the need for the Church to become "a fully conscious process of self-constitution," which I take to mean that the Church has to understand itself as an event of meaning within worldwide human society and to undertake there a redemptive and constructive role. What this means Lonergan immediately sets out:

> But to do so it will have to recognize that theology is not the full science of man, that theology illuminates only certain aspects of human reality, that the church can become a fully conscious process of self-constitution

with little notion of modern scholarship can urge that attending to the literary genre of biblical writings is just a fraudulent device for rejecting the plain meaning of scripture. Those with not tasste for systematic meaning will keep repeating that it is better to feel compunction than to define it, even if those that attempt definition insist that one can hardly define what one does not experience. Those, finally, whose consciousness is unmitigated by any tincture of systematic meaning, will be unable to grasp the meaning of such dogmas as Nicaea and they may gaily leap to the conclusion that what has no meaning for them is just meaningless" (*Method in Theology*, 329-30).

[34]Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," *A Third Collection*, 107-108.

[35]*Insight*, 733.

[36]*Insight*, 743-47.

> only when theology unites itself with all other relevant branches of human studies.

The integrated human studies that Lonergan proposed, "correspond to a profound exigence in the contemporary situation." marked by "ever increasing change due to an ever increasing expansion of knowledge." But to meet this challenge, the Church will have to embark "on a course of continual renewal" that "will remove from its action the widespread impression of complacent irrelevance and futility."[37] On the other hand, he was not in favor of reducing the philosophical and theological training of Jesuits who would be pursuing "professional" studies:

> Without that development [the one philosophy and theology can effect in the Jesuit] only too easily will they tend to be not only specialists in other fields but also secularists, unable to bring their special knowledge within a Christian context and so give the Christian community (in its effort to sublate the whole of human living) the advantage of the technical knowledge they possess and the community wished them to attain. Unless Christian specialists are something of generalists, they are like the seed that does not fall into the ground to die but itself remaineth alone.[38]

These last considerations bring us back to the statement that the Church is a process of self-constitution *within worldwide human society.* "Worldwide human society," of course, is what human beings have made and are making with their individual and collective decisions. That achievement of common meaning and value bears all the marks of human grandeur and misery, and its misery needs healing if the greatness is to be achieved and sustained. As Christ represented God's intervention in man's making of man, so the Church is the community of people in the world that is supposed to be the instrument of Christ's healing word and grace and to make a constructive contribution to reversing human evil and advancing human progress. The Church undertakes this task, however, in quite specific and concrete communities of faith, hope, and love, communities that are themselves subject to the dialectic of authentic greatness and inauthentic misery. But this sad fact should only be a reminder that nothing – no institution, no tradition, no sacramental system – nothing substitutes for conversion, intellectual, moral, religious, and Christian, the conversion that is at once the basis and the

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[37]*Method in Theology*, 364-67.

[38]Bernard Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 352-83, at 372.

fruit of “the community that results from the outer communication of Christ’s message and from the inner gift of God’s love.”

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EMERGING PROBABILITIES AND THE OPERATORS OF MUSICAL EVOLUTION

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OPERATORS

THERE IS A dynamism that pushes music forward. Parameters within a given musical system have a finite range of variables. The more these variables are explored the harder it becomes to create music that does not sound cliché. That thirst for the "new sound" compels the artist to explore new frontiers for how music is made. There are numerous operators in the evolution of music. I have chosen four as being most relevant to this paper:

1. New technology
2. Development of new playing methods
3. A radical combination of seemingly unrelated musical styles
4. Role of audience

I thought the first three operators were my own ideas. However, through my subsequent research I found examples that were similar to these three. I also found the fourth and many others. I chose to focus on these four because they seem most relevant to what I would like to contribute to music at this time through the development of new instrument designs and playing methods:

1. Polyrhythmic Knob Twiddling
2. The Spring Dulcimer
3. The Tabludu Kit

Pictures and sound bites of instruments and music discussed in this paper can be found at http://www.greglauzon.com.

Composer Burt Bacharach once said that his hands were his greatest enemies. What he meant by this statement was that it is difficult to avoid revisiting the same parameters with which you are most oriented. The hands of the composer tend to want to go to the same places they are most comfortable on the instrument. They form habits. However, experimentation with new parameters can foster insights into new developments. Musicians and composers must face these challenges in order to grow. And through these struggles new ideas are born. Carl Jung once said, "We need difficulties; they are necessary for our health."

POLYRHYTHMIC KNOB TWIDDLING

The ability of drummers to play a rhythm with one hand while playing another rhythm with the other hand is a foundational skill. The drum rudiments associated with this skill are called polyrhythms. A common example of this is the paradiddle, which combines single and double strokes alternated between the left (L) and right (R) hands.

R L R R L R L L

Traditionally, the art of drumming is thought of in terms of the up and down motions of drumsticks or hands-striking services. There is a familiarity within the range of these motions and the percussive sounds associated with them. What if the parameters of these motions were expanded or adapted to a new form of instrumentation? Instead of up and down, perhaps left and right, back and forth, or a circular clockwise/counterclockwise motion. Within these motions lie a new range of sensory affects to be discovered. The familiarity of motions changes. Such an example can be found in the method of rhythmically manipulating the control knobs of an effects module, Hence the name: Polyrhythmic Knob Twiddling.

To illustrate this method imagine a sound generated by an oscillator plugged into a pitch shifter controlled by the left hand, which is then plugged into a manual Jet Phaser controlled by the right hand. A Jet Phaser simulates the phasing sound associated with a jet taking off or a race car coming and going. The paradiddle described above is played through alternating turns of these modules' knobs. There is also the option of different knob rotation patterns within the same

polyrhythm. The pattern can start with both knobs set to the left, to the right, pointing toward each other or away from each other.

L = Left hand

R = Right hand

< or > = Direction of knob rotation

Rotation Pattern 1

R L R R L R L L

> < < > > < < >

Rotation Pattern 2

R L R R L R L L

< < > < > > < >

Rotation Pattern 3

R L R R L R L L

> > < > < < > <

Rotation Pattern 4

R L R R L R L L

< > > < < > > <

This is the transposition of rhythmic patterns that evolved from one form of instrumentation to a new form. A new gestalt emerges within the musician's

method mediated by the limitations and parameters of the new instrumental form. And from this new gestalt can emerge a new set of patterns that may be more suitable for that instrument. The primary operator of Polyrhythmic Knob Twiddling as a contribution to music is that it is a new playing method.

Most electronic music such as Techno and Industrial has become very computer based. Compositions are often a collection of electronically produced drumbeats and samples. The sounds are manipulated by a programmed computer sequencer. Sounds that are manually manipulated through effects are often brief slap shot samples strung together via computer sequencing as well. A rudimentary system of manually manipulated knob rotation patterns provides the option of including more performance-based parts to electronic music.

One might wonder what advantage there is to learning this new performance skill if these rotation patterns could easily be programmed with computer sequencing. The issue is not one of practicality but of creativity and knowledge. Nonmusicians could theoretically create and program their own polyrhythmic rotation patterns via computer sequencing and then deliberate their artistic merit and what changes to make when listening to the sequencer play them back. This process is much slower and mechanical than manual performance. Real time performance more intimately integrates the action/reaction dynamics between the musician and the instrument as the musician responds to creative insights. This creative process influences the outcome. Performance bears different fruit than sequencing. It is a matter of an artistically differentiated consciousness.

SPRING DULCIMER

Percussion can be either tonal or atonal but is usually one or the other exclusively. A hammered dulcimer is strictly for melody while a Tabla set is strictly for rhythm. What if a percussion instrument could combine tonality and atonality? A kind of semiinharmonic sound that could go either way depending on its application.

Springs have a unique sound because of their tonal fuzziness or inharmonicity. Proper selection of spring type based on coil diameter, wire thickness, and length will bring the spring into a tunable tonal range when stretched across a soundboard. This is the spring dulcimer. It is the antithesis of a traditional hammered dulcimer, which has a sweet, ethereal sound with long bridge pieces in fixed positions. The variable tension of the wire strings is tuned with pegs. The

spring dulcimer, however, has a heavy, dirty sound. The springs have a fixed tension. Adjustable bridge pieces for each spring assist tuning by creating nodes within the spring.

The tonal fuzziness of the springs influences how the spring dulcimer can be played. Unlike a traditional hammered dulcimer, the spring dulcimer cannot be used to play a rapid succession of notes. The characteristics of its timbre are such that it would sound too undefined. It is more suitable for slower note progressions. A similar example can be found with distortion and the electric guitar. A distorted guitar will work for certain applications in rock music such as power chords and lead solos. However, unmuffled strumming of dissonant chords often lacks clarity when played through distortion. A clean guitar sound would seem more appropriate. The parameters of limitation help define an instrument's place in musical style.

The trade-off to this partial tonal vagueness of the spring dulcimer is that it is appropriate for certain types of music such as performance-based Industrial. Stefan Weisser from California is credited for pioneering a metallic sounding form of percussion as a high art in the early 1970s. But as a distinct musical style the Industrial sound emerged in pop culture around 1980 in Europe and has often been referred to as Noise music. The most notable acts from this period were Test Department from Britain and Einsturzende Neubauten from Germany. Performances were often very percussion based and involved scraping and bashing of metal, clanging pipes, and any other form of found percussion or unconventional instrumentation.

The prehistory of this approach to music dates back to early twentieth- century Italian composer and Futurist painter, Luigi Russolo and his 1913 manifesto, *l'arte di rumori* (The Art of Noise). He wanted to find the music hidden in the elemental sounds of nature and modern urban environments. He believed that the use of "pure sounds" in music placed too many restrictions on emotional expression. It certainly has been the case that there has always been an esthetic appeal to some inharmonic sounds. Gongs have been used for thousands of years in spiritual practices. Russolo's reverence for all sounds as having musical potential was later echoed by some twentieth-century experimental composers such as John Cage. Many of Cage's early compositions were purely percussive involving the use of various objects found at the junk yard such as brake drums, hub caps, and spring coils.

But at what point is this approach considered musical and at what point is it considered a kind of quasi conceptual/performance art or merely sound

exploration? For music to be present there must be the apprehension of a rhythmic or melodic gestalt or pattern. John Cage attempted to give form to the dissonant chord structures of twelve tone music by using moments of silence as markings in the composition. Whereas other composers relied on harmony and consonance to give music its form Cage used innovative time-based structures that he referred to as micro/macrocosmic rhythms.

In 1983 came the advent of MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) – a binary protocol that allowed instruments to communicate with each other and computers. Subsequent widespread use of digital sequencing and sampling soon followed. Sounds could now be manipulated by computer in ways that were previously not possible. This gave Industrial music the potential for greater musical coherence and to incorporate more melody blended with industrial sounds. This technology allowed commonly heard everyday sounds, such as car horns for example, to be recorded or "sampled" and then played on a keyboard. The pitch of the sound could be either lowered or raised by pressing a lower or higher key on the keyboard. Many Industrial musicians as well as film composers and postproduction engineers responsible for film sound effects adopted this technology, which continues to this day. Performance-based Industrial music was eclipsed. Whereas MIDI has touched other forms of performance music in some way, it has not become their foremost tool of creation to the same extent. Perhaps this result could have been offset for Industrial music had there been developed a more systematic method of performance-based instrumentation. Enter – the spring dulcimer.

Established forms of performance music are closely identified with an instrument(s) with specific methods and rudimentary systems in which they are played, that is, the guitar and blues or the violin and classical music. Early Industrial never reached that stage of development before it became digitized. This is not to imply that the spring dulcimer is destined to be the savior of early Industrial music. But every development in music needs an audience for its acceptance. It is from the audience that new players emerge bringing their own talents and ideas to further develop the style. The audience along with the musical style, the playing method, and the instrument become closely identified with each other. The spring dulcimer would likely be embraced by an Industrial music audience because of the instrument's sound. But it need not be limited to this. The double bass, which was used in classical music, was adopted by jazz musicians. A new playing method emerged. The hands were used instead of the bow giving jazz its characteristic walking bass line. And from this a new audience emerged.

TABLUDU KIT

The integration of two established musical traditions into one requires the creation of a new musical language. This includes not only the development of new playing techniques but also a new form of instrumentation. The tabludu combines the tabla from India for hand percussion and the udu from Nigeria as a kick drum. This enables Eastern and Western drumming techniques to be incorporated into one drum kit. However the idea of fusing these two radically different traditions was the main operator for the tabludu because that is what set its developments in motion. The sequence of events determines the operator's status.

The Western drum kit is a combination of drums from various cultures and traditions. The kick pedal for the bass drum was a key component because it made it possible to play several drums at one time. It was first used by the early trap drummers or the one-man bands of the late nineteenth century. Traditionally, the bass drum, cymbals, and snare were each played by separate people in early ragtime bands. The kick pedal allowed one to do the job of two or three. Additional drums were added and modified to form what eventually became the modern drum kit. From this evolved traditions of playing techniques that co-developed with the music of the times along with additional modifications to the drum kit design and set up. Jazz drum kits and rock drum kits are designed differently from one another because the playing techniques associated with them are different from each other.

In India there is a family of cylindrical drums called the mridang. They have skins on either side that are played with the drum in a horizontal position. Over the course of several thousand years there evolved many variations of cylindrical drums with different tonal qualities and names. Each of these designs were associated with specific musical traditions. Playing techniques vary between traditions but the hand strokes bear some basic similarities. The tabla is believed to have evolved from the pakhawaj, which was from the cylindrical family of drums. The tabla is unique because it is two drums, each with one skin, which are played in a vertical position. The design and tonal quality of the tabla influenced how the playing techniques were adapted from the cylindrical family of drums. The most notable characteristic of the tabla is the technique for bending the sound of the lower tones.

The udu drum is a clay pot with a hole in the side. It produces a round bass sound that rises in pitch when the hole is stricken with the hand and then released. The sound is similar to the bending of pitch sound produced by the tabla. It

originated from Nigeria as a standard water jug that evolved into an instrument when its musical potential was discovered. Integrating Eastern tabla playing with Western kit drumming into one style poses interesting challenges. Each style has its own rhythmic syntax. Certain combinations of strokes and rhythmic phrases particular to each style need to be adjusted in order to work for the tabludu. The groups of operations within the tabla player's style are mediated by the addition of the udu as a kick drum. The groups of operations within the kit drummer's style are mediated by the parameters playing techniques of the tabla as a form of hand percussion – but also slightly by the sound of the Udu because of its ability to bend pitch. The udu is used as a kick drum because its sound is more compatible with the tabla. A specially built floor level stand keeps the udu in a stationary position. A silicon gel pad attached to a flat beater mallet is used with a kick pedal, which is attached to the udu stand. The use of the gel pad kick pedal simulates the traditional hand slapping technique.

There are factors that could impede the acceptance of the tabludu. Most percussionists do not know both Eastern and Western styles of drumming. Western kit drumming is often learned by ear, which makes it more accessible. However, the tablas have a variety of strokes that need to be learned before rhythms can be played effectively. This often requires some basic training with a teacher to get the proper technique down. Tabla teachers are not as available in the West.

EMERGING PROBABILITIES

Polyrhythmic Knob Twiddling is a method that has not quite found a home in an instrument yet. The present form of instrumentation is a bit crude and underdeveloped. Audience response has hitherto been either lukewarm or downright negative. However, there have been developments in recent years with CD player scratchers, which are used by some DJ's as an alternative to turntable scratching. This would allow CDs with customized sounds to be used for what could be called "Polyrhythmic Scratching" or "Scratch and Twiddle." CD player scratchers are a technology that has already been established as an instrument. And it can be used for a polyrhythmic method of playing when used in tandem with effects modules. This would be the entry point for acceptance. Modifications could be made to make the technology more suitable for that style of playing.

The spring dulcimer as an instrument is an operator in musical evolution because it is a new technology. This sets it apart from a traditional hammered dulcimer both in sound and playing method. It is best suited as a one-handed accompaniment to another percussive instrument such as a steel pan drum. The pan drum could have a metallic sounding snare plate among its notes. A customized bass pan drum could be used as a kick drum. This setup could be a kind of Industrial sounding steel drum kit that could be used for both rhythm and melody within the same instrument. The adjustable bridge pieces of the spring dulcimer along with the fixed tension of the springs make tuning easy and stable. This makes it a suitable candidate for exploring micro-tuning schemes such as quarter tones, or as American composer Charles Ives put it, "The notes between the cracks of the piano keys."

Tabludu playing could include the use of cylindrical drums such as the Khol drum instead of the tabla. The khol drum produces sounds that are similar to the tablas but was designed to be played in an elevated horizontal position. The tablas were meant to be played sitting down. The tabludu requires that the tablas be elevated, which results in the loss of some bass. Perhaps a tabla skin could be fitted onto a drum with a funnel protruding down to the floor such as a dumbek or djembe drum. This could help reclaim some of the lost bass. The result of this modification would be a new kind of drum. It is difficult to accurately speculate how this would affect the sound or whether modifications to playing technique would be required. The technique is closely linked to various tones the tablas produce. However as Albert Einstein once said, "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them." Thus, continues the journey into emerging probabilities.

Controlled Microphone Feedback

I would like to talk a bit now about some areas of exploration that I have recently become interested in developing. One has to do with a phenomenon that we have all experienced at some point at conferences and lectures. I'm referring to microphone feedback.

Some years ago during an improvisational jam session with some friends I was running the vocalist's microphone through various effects devices. This caused the microphone to feedback terribly which was quit unpleasant to listen to. This happened to be recorded on tape. I later took this recording and decided to try and smooth out the loud volume spikes. Upon doing this I discovered that the feedback mixed with the voice and the effects sounded rather pleasing and

interesting. It was then that I decided to try and find a way to use microphone feedback musically. I subsequently began experimenting with various ways to control and manipulate feedback to create melodies using various methods and equipment. The results were unpredictable and difficult to replicate, but I did manage to record a handful of melodies successfully. I have some ideas that I would like to explore to possibly improve the method.

I like to compare this experience to the process of evolution in nature. Mutations and accidents may be unsuccessful in one environment but may adapt very well to a new set of circumstances. The microphone feedback was an accident that occurred when I was looking for something different. When I transferred the recording of the microphone feedback to an environment where I was able to control the volume spikes I was able to look at it in a different way. And from this I was able to experience new insights. This evolutionary process can also be found in science. Many paradigm shifts in science have occurred as the result of these "happy accidents."

Urban Sound Exploration

Another area of interest that I discovered only recently is the exploration of old abandoned factories and their acoustic properties. With the exception of theaters and cathedrals, modern architecture tends to focus on the visual appearance and or functional purpose of buildings. What I would like to explore is the overlooked artistic potential of industrial sounds found in factories.

At a recent visit to an abandoned brick factory I found several objects within its walls that had great potential as percussion instruments. These included large networks of air ducts and large metal doors. What I also discovered was the influence that these objects had on the types of rhythms I played on them. I brought with me a bass drum kick pedal with a modified rubber ball beater mallet to make it more suitable for beating on metal. I also brought with me modified drumsticks that were covered with a rubbery plastic – again to make them more suitable for beating on metal objects.

Some of the rhythms that I felt moved to play seemed to have a temporal ambiguity uncharacteristic of the rhythms that I often played on a traditional drum kit. At times it was difficult to tell whether the rhythm had a standard 4/4 time signature or a triplet groove. This temporal ambiguity was similar to that found in many African rhythms. It is for this reason that African rhythms do not easily fit into linear Western classical time signatures. These are often referred to as

groove-based rhythms because of the "ground up" approach in which they are created.

African drumming by and large uses the hands instead of drum sticks. This tends to make the rhythms seem more temporally organic reflecting the natural rhythmic inclination of the player. Drumsticks behave according to exact laws of physics as far as how they strike services and bounce. The player's natural rhythmic inclination is mediated through the exact behavior of the drumstick thus resulting in less temporal ambiguity. The drumsticks that I used in the factory had less bounce because of their plastic rubbery covering thus simulating some of the temporally ambiguous qualities found in hand percussion.

Elemental Meaning and Music

I was once asked to explain how one knows when they have it right when creating music. I was a bit stumped by this question and so I decided to explore it. In the course of my search I came across some articles on the relationship between music and language.

When speaking, the pitch of one's voice rises and falls. This appears to be isomorphic with one's emotional responses. In this there is elemental meaning. The emotional responses to music are the result of tension and release created by the relationship between notes in melodic progression as well as tonal quality and rhythm.

Examples of elemental meaning in music can be found in interspecial communication. We are all familiar with the comical experience of a dog howling to music. A more sophisticated example can be found with attempts to communicate with whales through music. An organization called Interspecies has successfully used music to communicate with Orcas using underwater speakers in which guitar music was played. The Orcas's responses seemed to indicate that they were trying to imitate the notes. This would seem to be indicative of elemental meaning in the relationship between music and language. Whales have a fairly sophisticated form of oral communication compared to most other species. Interspecies has a website: http://www.interspecies.com

Eugene Gendlin developed a process called Focusing as a way of identifying the true nature of one's feelings. According to Gendlin, we feel emotion throughout our bodies. He refers to this state as "felt sense." And through focusing on the subtleties that we feel in our bodies during this state we gain greater clarity about why we feel the way we do. This state of "felt sense" as a form of elemental

meaning is akin to the creative process by which a musician knows when he has it right.

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THEOLOGY AS PRAXIS IN AUGUSTINE'S *CONFESSIONS*: A COMMUNITY FOUNDED ON THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

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[T]o ask whether theology is a praxis ... is to ask whether there are basic theological questions whose solution depends on the personal development of theologians.[1]

The church is the community that results from the outer communication of Christ's message and from the inner gift of God's love. Since God can be counted on to bestow his grace, practical theology is concerned with the effective communication of Christ's message. The message announces what Christians are to believe, what they are to become, what they are to do.[2]

1. INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF this essay is to introduce a reading of the *Confessions* by which the text may be seen in its entirety as a unified whole, in which the first ten books about the author are intimately related to the last three books in which Augustine turned from himself to Scripture structured. In further study I would like, with the help of a classicist, to expand this understanding of the text by adverting to Augustine's use of and departure from the conventions of epic poetry and what he

[1]Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Praxis," in *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 184-201; here 185.

[2] *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 361-62.

saw as the literary tropes of the Bible. In this paper I will attempt to make a case for a twofold structure of the *Confessions* according to which the books themselves and the complexly interwoven themes may be related within a literary whole. I will begin with an overview of the structure of the *Confessions*. This structure, I will argue, has some relationship to the structure of Virgil's *Aeneid*; therefore I will indicate, in part 2, some intertextual correspondences between the *Confessions* and the *Aeneid*. There is a hermeneutic difficulty that we must face in speaking about Augustine's wanderings, and that is the problem of interpreting the precise nature of descent and ascent in the text. The question that the reader encounters is, "When does Augustine begin his Christian ascent?" Only after addressing this question, will I set out in positive terms the essential relationship among the individual books of the *Confessions* by means of which the text may be read as a unified whole. Thus, section 3 contains the explanation of a chiastic structure relating the first and second halves of the work and the individual books to each other. In the fourth section I will offer brief remarks on the problem of dialectic and the interpretation of the *Confessions*. This is a text that deliberately and pedagogically makes demands on the reader to undergo the kind of personal development that Lonergan indicated is necessary for resolving theological difficulties. It is in the willingness to undergo these developmental changes that one becomes an increasingly luminous and voluntary participant in the work of providence in the world and in the evocation of a community founded upon the humble Christ.

1.1 Overview of Structure

The *Confessions*, I suggest, is a work in two parts in which the relationship of the books in each part forms a chiasmus. The two-part structure is informed by Virgil's *Aeneid* and alerts the reader to the author's intention to supply a Christian edition of the Latin classic that had become so central to the cultural formation of Augustine's readers. This underlying structure consists in a division of the text into two parts constituting a wandering narrative and a founding myth. In the case of Virgil's *Aeneid*, several similarities between the first and the seventh books indicate that at this later point in the text Virgil is making a new beginning. Leaving those similarities aside, we need only remark that in the proem to book 7 Virgil announces a greater order of things and his greater work (*Maior rerum mihi*

nascitur ordo,/ Maius opus moveo).[3] Augustine's wandering narrative interprets his early upbringing and education and his intellectual encounters with the natural philosophers, Manicheans, Academics, and Platonists. This narrative constitutes the autobiographical material in books 1 through 7. Books 8 through 13 contain Augustine's greater theme – inner transformation and the founding of the church. This part contains three books of awakening, or of Christ's overcoming of Augustine's self, and three books on the foundations of the church from eternity and the divine dispensations in time. The first three of the last books then center on the inner word of grace, and the last three on the outer word, the witness of Scripture and the ministers of Christ. God's transformation of Augustine's heart in books 8 to 10 is followed by God's foundation of the church from eternity and in history in books 11 to 13.

The sequence of themes in the second part of the text indicate that whereas Augustine conceived of his wanderings in Virgilian terms, he understood his participation in divine providence in terms of the stages of the Christian life suggested to him by the rich imagery of the days of creation in Genesis 1. The commentary *On Genesis Against the Manichees*[4] contains a brief summary of the stages of the Christian life that become the topics of the last six books of the *Confessions*. Thus there is a progressive movement in books 8 through 13 from faith in things made visible by the light to an appreciation of the distinction between the lower and upper waters of flesh and spirit, culminating in the vision of and desire for eternity. On the strength of this the mind, as if it were standing on dry land, separates itself from the disturbances of the temptations of the things of the flesh. Experience in the discernment of sensible things leads the mind to recognize the difference between the unchangeable truth shining in the soul like the sun, and the dim perception of things in this life illuminated, as it were, by the lesser lights. This leads the mind to greater insight into the eternal source of beauty, goodness and order. In this way the soul is made stronger and begins to produce fruit and living things, activities that promote friendship and engender the quest of the truth in Scripture. Finally, a live soul is produced that is moved by spirit and serves truth and justice, ministering to the higher and lower needs of other souls leading them to human perfection.

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[3]Virgil, *Aeneide: Testo a fronte*, trans. Rosa Calzecchi Onesti. (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editores s. p. a., 1967 and 1989), book 7, lines 44-45.

[4]*On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees*, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 2002), 1.25.43.

The second structure underlying the *Confessions* is a chiastic relationship between the first six and the last six books. The two parts of the *Aeneid* may be said to be related as prophecy and fulfillment. Similarly, Augustine's greater theme fulfills the promises of the first part – the fulfillment retraces in reverse Augustine's wanderings, healing the effects of sin, from its most recent manifestations in the life of the hero, his reluctance to believe the Scripture and to be duped by the church as he had by the Manicheans, to its root causes in the reign of sin. Augustine conceived of Christ's office of mediation, in part, as a reduplication and reversal of human weakness. That is, as St. Athanasius formulated it, Christ saves what he assumes. Books 8 through 10 include a reversal and healing of Augustine's own weaknesses. Thus, books 8, 9, and 10 correspond to books 6, 5, and 4. The latter books take up and heal the principle difficulties in the earlier books in reverse order. Books 11, 12, and 13 take up in reverse order the principle difficulties in books 1, 2, and 3 in reverse order. Thus whereas books 1 through 3 contain a narrative of Augustine's initiation into the ways of human custom, books 11 through 13 present the City of God as the reversal and healing of human society.

2. A CHRISTIAN AENEID

In speaking of the structure I am referring to an x-ray of the text. Now an x-ray image is a function of the possibilities and limitations of technology. Likewise, the skeletal image offered here is a function of the heuristic or questions that I brought to the text. I have chosen to identify aspects of the various books and parts of the *Confessions* that answer to two specific sets of questions. The first set of questions I have brought to the work concern the author's retrospective interpretation and esteem of his earlier self and his understanding of his personal development in the context of culture and providence. The second set of questions concerns the way in which narrative and didactic passages illustrate and clarify those interpretations and evaluations. Other heuristics might yield other valuable readings. Robert McMahon in *Augustine's Prayerful Ascent*[5] offered a literary

[5](Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1989). McMahon identifies a structure of ascent in the *Confessions* from memories (1-9) to Memory, the inner faculty that makes memories possible, (10) to time as the condition for memory (11). From time Augustine moves to that which is prior to time: the Heaven of heavens and the formless void (12) and God's eternal will to form the church (13). McMahon also notes an interior movement in books 11 through 13 from human

reading employing a different set of questions. He explored Augustine's use of imagery from the book of Genesis and showed how the various books lead up to and are recapitulated in the final book.

In addition to my two basic sets of questions, I have attended to additional clues to the structure of the *Confessions* that arise from a consideration of the relationship between this Christian work and Virgil's *Aeneid.* It is not uncommon to hear Augustine's work described as a Christian *Aeneid.* Virgil was a dominant feature of Augustine's education (1.13.20-22), and at Cassiciacum Augustine and his friends were reading Virgil together. At first blush, it is easy to see how the text might be taken as a Christian edition of the themes of wandering and of quest. Augustine presented himself as a sort of Aeneas, wandering from philosophical school to philosophical school, and questing for happiness amidst the vicissitudes of daily life.[6] Yet the *Aeneid* is about more than the wanderings of Aeneas. That is, Virgil brought together in one work Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and rewrote the Homeric epics for the Latin world. In doing so, Virgil wove together themes of wandering and of founding as the frameworks for his deeper concern – to replace Homeric virtue with a Roman form of virtue and piety and to invest Caesar's empire with mythic legitimacy by writing a founding narrative. If Augustine did intend to write a Christian *Aeneid*, then we would expect to find in his text these Virgilian themes recast for a Christian culture. I will provide here a few observations that may bolster the face-validity of the claim that there may be some

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attention (11), to volition (12), to divine will (13). McMahon has recently brought light to Augustine's text by comparison with Eric Voegelin's. Drawing on Voegelin's philosophy, McMahon observes that human life participates in the process of reality, a universal divine-human movement and explains the movement of the *Confessions* as simultaneously individual and corporate., "Augustine's Confessions and Voegelin's Philosophy," *Modern Age* 48, no. 1 (2006): 37-47. The church is implied in the restless heart's desire to praise God and is embedded in "Augustine's understanding of the meaning of creation and the purpose of human history (38)." Whereas McMahon's article employs Voegelin to identify the invariants shared by Augustine and his readers, I have chosen Lonergan's philosophy which I find sympathetic, though more explanatory.

[6]In his prologue to "On the Happy Life" (*De Beata Vita,* 4), a work written in the year prior to his conversion, Augustine summarizes his intellectual wanderings from the natural philosophers, to the Manicheans, to the Academics, and finally to the Platonists. The language and imagery in this autobiographical account are from Virgil. This suggests that at one time he was inclined to imagine and occasionally did imagine his own intellectual and spiritual journey in Virgilian terms and saw himself as a new Aeneas. By focusing on Virgil, I do not mean to suggest that he was Augustine's only literary model. It seems that a close inspection of the parallels between the *Confessions* and Apuleius's *Metamorphoses* (the *Golden Ass*) are in order. Both works are a narrative and confessional involving the conversion of a sinner who commits himself to divine service.

such relationship between the two texts[7] and restrict my interest to the *Confessions* itself. On the hypothesis that Augustine's *Confessions* was strongly influenced by the *Aeneid* and is a book about a founding myth as much as it is a book about Augustine's spiritual and intellectual wanderings, we might expect, and do find, that Augustine's work is composed of two parts. In the first part, Augustine recounts his intellectual and spiritual wanderings under the dialectical influence of sin and providence. In the second part, Augustine undertakes to offer an account of Christian piety and to establish the mythic foundations of the Christian kingdom, the city of God, the church.[8] Augustine's role as founder is to allow Christ to lay the foundations for the Temple of the Spirit in his own heart and to take his place within a preexistent community.

2.1 Virgil's Aeneid and Augustine's Confessions: A Few Observations Concerning Books 1 through 3 in Each Text

Virgil's *Aeneid* opens with scenes of tumult in heaven and on earth. In heaven, Juno is complaining that the Aeneas and his ships have escaped the destruction of Troy and seem destined to make their way to Italy and found the world's greatest empire. Juno would have her sponsored city, Carthage, become the center of the world instead. Augustine knew the opening verses of the *Aeneid* well; for, in addition to committing the entire tale of the wanderings of Aeneas to memory, he received accolades for rendering into prose Juno's complaint (1.17.27). Juno takes her anger out on the Trojans by convincing Aeolus, the god of the winds, to embroil the sea. In this Aeolus exceeds the bounds of his own charter usurping the power of Neptune. Amidst the tumult the reader is assured in a prophecy uttered by Jupiter that Aeneas will found a city in Italy that will remove rage or fury from the earth through law and might. Nevertheless, the reader must wonder how, with such turmoil in heaven, Aeneas is to fulfill his destiny to bring order to land and sea.

[7]On the relationship between Augustine and Virgil, see Sabine MacCormick, *The Shadows of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Though MacCormick brings out the prominence of Virgil in Augustine's early works leading up to the *Confessions* and in his latter works, her book does not deal with the *Confessions* in any detail. David Leigh also expresses a belief that there is a relationship between the two works. See, "Augustine's *Confessions* as a Circular Journey," *Thought* 60 (1985): 73-88, here 74.

[8]As Virgil offered his own epic as a critique of and in response to Homer, so too Augustine might be expected to critique and respond to Virgil. Thus, a closer analysis of the relationships between the two works might indicate the precise nature of Augustine's criticism and response.

The *Confessions* opens upon the infant Augustine already at sea on the waves of human custom with no evident means of getting his bearings or of finding safe harbor: "Woe, woe to you, you flood of human custom! Who can keep his footing against you? Will you never run dry? How long will you toss the children of Eve into a vast, terrifying sea, which even those afloat on the saving wood can scarcely cross?" (1.16.25) However, the cause of the trouble is not, as in Virgil, an eternal corruption subjecting heaven and earth to divisive passions. The human situation is one in which God, who loves and is unmoved, angry and unaffected (1.4.4), rules all things ineluctably; and humanity is the cause of its own exile by virtue of its vicious customs and parental mismanagement. Children will, of necessity, follow the examples of their elders. And, what examples! Amidst his pains, confusions, and errors the narrator assures us that Providence sees and rules all by an unfailing law leading them to their perfection and rest (1.20.31). To Virgil's question, "Is there such fury among the gods?" (*tantaene animis caelestibus irae?* 1.11), Augustine answered a clear "No! There is no passion in heaven."

In book 2 of the *Aeneid* Aeneas enjoys the hospitality of Dido's court and relates to her the tale of the fall of Troy. The Trojans were taken in by a false friend against the priest Laocoon's famous advice, "Beware of Greeks who bear gifts" (*timeo Danaos et dona ferentis*, 2.49). But this perjury of a Greek spy was apparently corroborated by a hideous sign, a sea serpent which came ashore and devoured Laocoon together with his two sons. Still worse, it would appear that the gods actually approve of the iniquitous subterfuge (2.257). An important question in this book, then, is whether the cause of the Trojan ruin was Greek deceit and misplaced trust, divine collusion in human treachery, or simpleminded credulity (2.54-56). If the gods do not support iniquity as the root to human success, they seem either to send uncertain oracles or to remain altogether silent in the face of treachery.

In book 2 of the *Confessions*, we see Augustine emerging into puberty and committing adolescent crimes with his companions. Echoing the *Aeneid*, Augustine wove into this book themes of false friendship and God's apparent silence. Friendship is a divine gift for the correction of vice and a guide in virtue. In consequence of peer pressure, however, Augustine felt embarrassed to appear sexually inexperienced and willingly stole pears from a neighbor's orchard: "What an exceedingly unfriendly friendship that was! It was a seduction of the mind hard to understand, which instilled into me a craving to do harm for sport and fun"

(2.9.17).[9] Augustine also wonders whether God, amidst these false leadings, was silent. He reassures the reader though that in reality it was Augustine who failed to heed the sure and salutary oracles of St. Paul and Monica regarding continence and marriage (2.2.3 and 2.3.7). In these he later discerned the clear voice of God.

In book 3 of both texts the heroes are said to set out from their native lands. In these books both heroes also emerge from the domain of their sires, for better or worse, as self-governing individuals. Another similarity is the presentation of the power of spectacle. It is in book 3 that Aeneas leaves Troy and arrives first on the Thracian shores where he encounters the Ovidian marvel of a soul, that of Polydorus, entrapped in a myrtle bush. For Aeneas this marvelous omen (*mirabile monstrum,* 3.26) is a sign that the land is polluted by the violation of hospitality and is not the spot where he is destined to found his city. For its part, Augustine's third book includes a critique of theatrical performances, such as Augustine enjoyed in Carthage and which enjoyment he referred to as *mirabilis insania* (3.2.2).[10] Augustine's critique is founded on the notions that truth exists in the mind and not in things and that human desire is mutable and may be shaped by art for better or for ill. The spectator who is living outside himself and looking for truth and beauty in perceptible things, themselves, is susceptible, as was Aeneas, to mistake signs for truth. And, individuals who are not aware that one ought to love better what is of greater value, and that what is of greater value is apprehended by reason, are susceptible to the corrupting influence of artistic images on the passions. Morally suspect performances teach spectators to love or to pity what is base, or else to experience sympathy without the ability or intention to render service (3.2.2-3.5). Of course, Aeneas acts to perform the rites whereby to grant rest to the entrapped soul, but the impression left on the reader is that souls reside in merely sensible things. Augustine recognized that this is a mistake of extrinsicism: living outside himself, he sought to love sensible things, "yet these were soulless (*non haberent animam*), and so could not be truly loved." (3.1.1) Augustine transformed Virgil's *mirabile monstrum* to a *mirabilis insania.* He was amazed, not at the transformation taking place on the stage or in the poem, but at that taking place in the hearts and minds of the audience. This theme of gaping in amazement at the transformation that human nature is capable of

[9]English translation are taken from *The Confessions*, trans. Maria Boulding, O.S.B. (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).

[10]Latin excerpts are taken from *The Confessions of Augustine: An Electronic Edition*, ed. James J. O'Donnell, originally published by Oxford University Press,1992. Available at Stoa Consortium http://www.stoa.org/hippo/.

undergoing was frequent in ancient literature and the central theme of Apuleius's *Metamorphoses*, a text with which Augustine was quite familiar.[11]

Another salient image in these third books of both the *Aeneid* and of the *Confessions* is food. By misinterpreting an oracle of Phoebus, Aeneas is led by his father toward Crete on which he endeavors to establish his newfound city. Here plagues of wind, heat, and insects destroy crops and livestock leaving the Trojans in the desperate situation of starvation. From Crete they sail to the Strophades and are beset by Harpies as they attempt to make for themselves meals of the herds of oxen grazing in the fields. In addition to spoiling their efforts to avoid starvation, the Queen of the Harpies issues a prophecy that the Trojans will only build walls for a city on Italian land when hunger so gnaws at them that they eat their own tables (3.255-257). Like Aeneas, Augustine finds himself in book three in the situation of starvation but with no appetite for divine truth which alone will satisfy his hunger, his desire having been conditioned to love sensible things (3.1.1). In this book Augustine also accused the Manicheans of supplying their devotees with food that does not nourish and of himself as supplying the slop of rhetoric to others. The themes of metamorphosis and of food are eventually united in a comparison between the fictions of the poets and those of the Manicheans:

> I was certainly roving far from you, and debarred even from the pods I was feeding to pigs. He fables of schoolmasters and poets are far better than the snares then being set for me; yes, verses, songs and tales of Medea in light are undeniably more wholesome than myths about the five elements being metamorphosed to defeat the five caverns of darkness. These latter have no truth in them at all and are lethal to anyone who believes them, whereas I can turn verse and song into a means of earning real food.
>
> *et longe peregrinabar abs te, exclusus et a siliquis porcorum quos de siliquis pascebam. quanto enim meliores grammaticorum et poetarum fabellae quam illa decipula! nam versus et carmen et Medea volans utiliores certe quam quinque elementa varie fucata propter quinque antra tenebrarum, quae omnino nulla sunt et occidunt credentem. nam versum et carmen etiam ad vera pulmenta transfero* (3.6.11).

It is possible that the mature Augustine indulged his imagination in thinking about the Manicheans as Harpies who snatched from him any sort of real nourishment.

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[11]*Figures fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversam et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas ut mireri.* (Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 1.1).

Virgil's epic seems to operate with what Eric Voegelin termed the anthropological principle as the source of order in society. Virgil was not content to establish the legitimacy of Roman supremacy on the will or actions of the gods or the designs of fate. Roman greatness rests squarely on the virtue of its citizens. Virgil's founding myth evokes the necessary form of piety that will ensure the stability of the Empire and the happiness of its people.[12] The communication of the myth has the dual purpose of legitimizing the Roman Empire and of creating the conditions for its continued success. Those conditions reside both in the transformation of the individual by virtue and the shaping of the Roman civic cult. Augustine is up to something similar in the *Confessions*.

Augustine's *Confessions* is a Christian *Aeneid*, and to this Virgilian framework he wedded Christian, specifically Pauline, themes. A text from Paul's writings that proved determinative to Augustine's thought is the passage in Romans 7 concerning moral impotence and the source of salvation in Christ. In Virgil's myth the principle obstacles to Roman peace are failures to understand virtue and the nature of human happiness, and misconceptions of providence and the passions of the gods. Augustine recognized that human happiness and the stability of the Christian kingdom rest on Christ's overcoming the self, God's eternal will to unite all believers to himself, and the dispensations in time that constitute the history of salvation and the history of the church.

Like Virgil, Augustine was concerned with human happiness, both individual and corporate. The first book of the *Aeneid* announces that the main obstacle to human happiness is the irrational anger and fractiousness of the gods. Happiness lies in correctly thinking about human nature and the gods, and in establishing political society on virtue and piety, strength of arms, and good laws. By contrast, in book 1 Augustine's identified his main themes as God's incorporeality and impassibility. The source of human misery lies in sin, especially pride, and the destructive effects of human custom. The problem for Augustine is not the passion, rebelliousness, and mismanagement in the realm of the gods, but the passions and pride of his own soul and the mismanagement and leadership of his caretakers and teachers. Human happiness is the result of providence in personal and human history and of an inner transformation of the heart and mind brought about by the grace of Christ.

Aeneas's wanderings are a matter of reeducation, but they are a journey of self-discovery from which the hero emerges as a willing participant in destiny's

[12]For an illuminating analysis of this theme, see Eve Adler, *Vergil's Empire: Political Thought in the Aeneid* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

provident plan for the human race. Aeneas's heroism is founded on the insight and virtue he has acquired in the course of his travels. Augustine adopted the Virgilian wandering-motif and the imagery of the sea, but he did not present himself as emerging a new man from a series of difficult adventures. Aeneas's wanderings are formative, Augustine's are deforming. They are deforming in the way that all good things in creation may be perverted by human ignorance and vice. Yet they are subject to the divine law by which even evil may be transformed into good. Augustine's wanderings are shaped by a series of dialectical relationship: a natural desire for happiness or rest and the soul's insistence against the universal order of things that its own preferences be the source of its happiness, the integrity of human intelligence and the wickedness of the soul's deliberate ignorance, the beauty of created goods and distorted love of these good things, and, finally, every instance of rebellion and an ineluctable providential order. The image of God in the human person may be distorted but never expunged and no human being can escape God's providential care. Thus Augustine is never wholly without natural and divine assistance. However, there remains a specious character to all the indicators of Augustine's healing or ascent in the wandering narrative. Only when the theme of wandering is joined by the grace of the Incarnation and the humility of Christ, do the experiences become truly salutary. The trials of the early books do not lead to personal development without the inner change of heart narrated in the first three books of the second half.

2.2 Wanderings – The Odyssean Half

The task of interpreting Augustine's wanderings and ascent is complicated by the fact that there exist many diverse opinions concerning where in the text Augustine's ascent actually begins. Augustine declared that he wished to write in a deliberately rich, symbolic, and ambiguous style so that no reader would be excluded from finding some meaning appropriate for her or his spiritual journey (12.31.42). For this reason, one would not wish to say, against the intentions of the author himself, that these opinions were simply excluded by the text.[13]

[13]C. Jan Swearingen notes in her article, "Homiletics and Hermeneutics: The Rhetorical Spaces in Between": "All meanings perceived by readers convey part of the truth and help in the common enterprise of understanding. A diversity of readings, in Augustine's teaching, is not confusingly contradictory but rather is to be understood as a gift of divine plenitude: "For what could God have more generously and abundantly provided in the divine writings than that the same words might be understood in different ways which other no less divine witnesses approve?" (De Doctrina III 27)." *Studies in Literary Imagination* 28 (1995): 27-42, here 30. Leigh, in "Augustine's *Confessions* as Circular Journey," draws the reader's attention to evidence of a reverse parallelism in books 1 to 9

However, I suggest here that if we follow the assessments of the author, we may safely say that the ascent proper does not begin until book 8, and that the first part of the text is a wandering narrative conceived in terms of exile and a flight from God, who notwithstanding is never far from Augustine and who proceeds Augustine's every step.

Augustine does not begin to wander; rather, he comes to consciousness as a wanderer. His ordeal began before he had any say in the matter, in the social sickness inflicted upon him. His odyssey begins at birth or, rather, before birth. Though Augustine maintained an agnostic position with respect to the origin of the human soul, he knew one thing both by observations of other infants and on the authority of Psalm 50(51) that he was born in sin. From this bleak starting point things go from bad to worse, as the impressionable child is handed over to moral incompetents. Thus sin grows as individuals formed according to human customs measure their world and their God according to their own likes and dislikes. As a result of his education and of the examples set before him, Augustine learned to love more ardently what is of less value and to neglect the true love and goodness of God.

For Augustine the source of human misery lies in disordered love. In adults there resides an ill-formed love of what is in itself of less value, and they raise their children to desire what they desire. As a child, Augustine preferred games to study, although study was of more value; and he preferred the delights of literature over the tasks of grammar, although the latter is of more value and would serve him better in his later life. Augustine was taught to admire the wandering Aeneas but to neglect his own spiritual errors, to pity the god-despising Dido, and to find enjoyment in the illicit acts and irrational passions of the gods. The spiritual health of children is also mismanaged through ignorance, as in the case of Augustine's forestalled baptism – instead of being washed in the waters of baptism, the boy is commended to the hideous ocean of human custom lest something sacred be consigned to the waves and torrents.

In book 2 the autobiographical topics are Augustine's puberty and forestalled marriage arrangements and the theft of a pear in the company of the

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with a turning point at book 5, representing an exile and return motif in the autobiography. I would not dispute Leigh's findings, though it appears to me that Leigh has identified an important subplot in the text relating to the effective difference in Augustine's self-understanding of providence and grace. There are salutary effects of providence present amidst Augustine's farthest wanderings. Nonetheless, Augustine insisted that the Christian ascent proper is a humble response to the grace of Christ incarnate. Further, the esteem Augustine had for the name of Christ even from his childhood is not identical with the love for Christ that lifts him from his sinful attachments.

companions of his youth. Emerging into his adolescence, Augustine found little in his life to help him to discern the beauty of chaste affection. His parents failed in their duty to instruct him in virtue. Concerned more for his career than for his self-control, they do not arrange for him to marry; otherwise, he might have been benefited from the restrain on passion offered by the institution of marriage. But the model for this book is clearly the story of the Fall in Genesis and not Virgil. The theme of the absence of social restraints on disordered desire is coupled with a deliberate and unmotivated willfulness on the part of the sinner. Augustine himself could have listened more carefully to the words of St. Paul's advice to the Corinthians concerning the cares of marriage and the freedom of the bachelor. But Augustine believed that God was silent, and he did not take Scripture seriously.

The first mention of rising up to God occurs in book 3 in which Augustine encounters Cicero's *Hortensius*. The text taught him to love the whole of philosophy and to care more for meaning than for style and even changed the character of his pray and of his love of God. "I began to rise up in order to return to you" (*surgere coeperam ut ad te redirem*, 3.4.7). As salutary as it was, however, this inspiration to fly from all worldly things on the wings of philosophical wisdom turns out to be contrary to Augustine's mature understanding of the Christian ascent.[14] Further, after discussing Cicero, Augustine admits that he had not begun to ascend:

> Yet through loving humility we find our way back to you. You purify our evil dispositions; you are merciful toward the sins of those who confess to you; you hear the groans of captives and set us free from the bonds we have forged for ourselves, provided only we no longer defy you in the arrogance of a spurious freedom, greedy to have more and thereby incurring the loss of everything, loving some advantage of our own better than yourself, who are the good of all (3.8.16).

Cicero did not introduce Augustine to this pathway back to God.

This newly awakened desire for God was not integrated into his life, nor did he have an adequate notion of the God whom he desires. While in Thagaste a very dear friend died, and Augustine could find no consolation in his idea of God. Despite the lesson of the *Hortensius*, he still mistook the part for the whole and loved creation more than the Creator: "Woe to the madness that thinks to cherish human beings as though more than human!" (4.7.12) He had not yet ascended

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[14]On Augustine's rejection of the notion of ascent as flight from the world, see Martha Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love" in Gareth B. Matthews, ed. *The Augustinian Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 61-90.

beyond the senses, and did not yet recognize that truth is not sensible and does not reside in things. Accordingly, his love was guided by his senses rather than his intellect. But, the author does not remember this as an innocent mistake. Augustine was responsible for not learning what creation and attention to his own mind were meant to teach. His pride kept him from going beyond the life of the senses. In accordance with his own vanity he thought of God in corporeal terms. He knew himself to be subject to change; and, motivated by pride, he preferred to believe that God was also mutable (4.15.26). The pain he suffered for his own failing is manifest. This changeable God was no sure place of rest and offered no consolation in the face of his loss.

Similarly, in book 5 Augustine's impiety carried him further away from God to the point that, under the influence of the Manicheans, he attributed sin not to himself but to some separate substance. He thought of this evil substance in material, fleshly terms. This made it impossible for him to accept the Incarnation. At this point Augustine was completely cut off by his own thinking from the source of healing. In fact, even in his encounter with Ambrose, he seems to have taken a step back from the *Hortensius*, the first book he admired not for its style but for its substance: "I was taking no trouble to learn from what Ambrose was saying, but interested only in listening to how he said it, for that futile concern had remained with me, despairing as I did that any way could be open to humankind" (5.14.24). As we shall see, the genuine ascent includes the replacement of despair with hope.

Book 6 marks perhaps the lowest point in Augustine's life and perhaps the final stage of his wanderings. Augustine experienced a series of disappointments: an inability to give his assent to the Catholic faith out of fear of being misled, the revelation of his own vain pursuit of rhetoric, frustrations with his teaching, and the separation from the woman whom he had loved for four or five years and the mother of Adeodatus. This separation led him into a cold despair. His desire for happiness was frustrated in all the areas in which he had hoped to find it: "Though I was so enamored of a happy life I feared to find it in its true home, and fled from it even as I sought it" (6.11.20). Only after his conversion was Augustine able to discern in all this the hand of providence, saving him by mixing into all his earthly pleasures a little bitterness, for wisdom is a jealous lover and God will not deign to be held together with falsity. In book 6 Augustine indicated the truth that he would only later (in book 8) come to accept and to love, that happiness belongs to those "brought to a new birth by grace" in the church (*quos de matre catholica per gratiam regenerasti*, 6.3.4).

For these reasons, it appears that the movement of the first six books is, from the human perspective, quite simply an aimless wandering more away than towards God, and I take it that Augustine's ascent begins in earnest only in book 8. Book 7 is a curious turning point. There is no clear point prior to book 8 at which Augustine unequivocally affirms that he had begun his real ascent to Christ. However, the difficulty in interpreting the text is a consequence of a central thesis of the *Confessions*. God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves. God is never distant from us though we may withdraw from God. And, God's presence is always providential.

Augustine's encounter with Cicero (book 3), a non-Christian though wise physician (book 4), the natural philosophers (book 5), the Academics (book 6), and even a proud Platonist (book 7) are all indications of the hand of providence. God never stops giving good things, which are true and beautiful as far as they go. The fault lies in loving created things as if they were uncreated and temporal things as if they were eternal. The message of the *Hortensius* and that of the Platonists is healing medicine for many who are ignorant of the powers of the intellect and attracted to lesser goods, while, at the same time, it is inadequate and potentially misused.

The effect of providence in providing goads and instruction should not be doubted, nevertheless, it is distinct from the loving return to God by way of humility empowered by grace. For this reason there is something in John J. O'Donnell's analysis of the three lusts in books 2 through 4 and of the healings in books 5 through 7. O'Donnell notes that from books 2 through 4 Augustine sins according to the disordered desires of the flesh (2), of the eyes or curiosity (3), and of secular ambition (4). Augustine's moral recovery "follows a reverse pattern: his zeal for his public career fades first at Milan, then his adhesion to the spirit of curiosity that had led him to the Manichees, and only last his enslavement to the desires of the flesh."[15] However, return by grace to God is along the devout path of humility by which the soul is healed and elevated. Further, no one does well who does well who does not enjoy the God that he does. The problem of return in the text is that simply being subject to the eternal law which mixes bitterness into every illicit pleasure, desiring to possess God, and performing the right actions are not enough. Drawing from his attention to his soul, Augustine offered a narrative

[15]O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions*, vol. 1. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), xxxv-xxxvi.

of his return to God from the point of view of interiority with attention to the transformation of desire by grace.[16]

2.3 Turning Point: A Homeland, of Sorts, in Book 7

We may say that there is a dividing point between the two parts of the text at book 7, though this is a rhetorical not necessarily a biographical center. Book 7 includes a summary of the Christian ascent and the path toward happiness, but Augustine indicates that at this point he was not yet on that path. This is a liminal book. Augustine introduced the books of the Platonists in which he found a solution to his most serious intellectual difficulties concerning the nature of God, the soul, and evil. From the books of the Platonist, Augustine had been admonished to return to himself and to apprehend the spiritual character of the human mind. In virtue of this turn to his own mind, he discovered an analogy for God and was released from the habit of thinking about God in corporeal form. However, the goal of the *Confessions* is not the solution of intellectual difficulties, or intellectual conversion, but the formation of a heart that loves and enjoys God above all else and admires creation in relation to God. The intellectual clarity, in fact, only illuminated the moral and spiritual fog in which he has been living. Book 7 thus brings to a close Augustine's intellectual search only to call attention to his sickness and his need for healing before he could devote himself to and enjoy what he knew to be true.[17]

In retrospect Augustine recognized that he had come to a dangerous part of his journey. O'Donnell points out that Augustine "thought he was on the straight path to orthodox Christian truth; it was only in retrospect that he saw that he was not."[18] The danger of a false confidence is characterized in a passage that also contrasts the earthly wilderness of human custom with the order of God's city:

> It is one thing to survey our peaceful homeland from a wooded height but fail to find the way there, and make vain attempts to travel through impassable terrain, while fugitive deserters marshaled by the lion and the

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[16]There is also reason to suspect that the ascent begins in book 7, in which Augustine describes his discovery of the books of the Platonists and explains how the soul rises with Christ the Mediator. More will be said about this book, but the important thing is that again Augustine explains that this pathway home is along the broad road of humility and that he was not yet ready to imitate the humility of Christ and set out along this road.

[17]A similar autobiographical point is made in *The Soliloquies* in the transition from the first to the second book.

[18]*Augustine Confessions*, vol. 2, 471.

> dragon obstruct and lurk in ambush; and quite another to walk steadily in the way that leads there, along the well-built road opened up by the heavenly emperor, where no deserters from the celestial army dare commit robbery, for they avoid that way like torment (7.21.27).

Augustine's careful attention to the restless stirrings of his heart showed him that he had not yet reached his homeland:

> Accordingly I looked for a way to gain the strength I needed to enjoy you, but I did not until I embraced the mediator between God and humankind, the man Christ Jesus, who also is God, supreme over all things and blessed for ever. Not yet had I embraced him, though he called out, proclaiming, *I am the Way and Truth and Life*, nor had I known him as the food which, though I was not yet strong enough to eat, he had mingled with our flesh; for the Word became flesh so that your Wisdom, through whom you created all things, might become for us the milk adapted to our infancy. Not yet was I humble enough to grasp the humble Jesus as my God, nor did I know what his weakness had to teach (7.18.24).

The only sure path home is along the open and well-built road in the company of believers nourished by Christ's humanity. Yet, to embrace this humble way requires strength that Augustine professed he did not posses. Augustine returned to Christ's role as Mediator in book 10, which brings to a close the self-overcoming allowing Augustine to embrace, enjoy, and learn from the weakness of Christ (10.42.67).

2.4 Ascent – The Illiadic Portion

As indicated above, Augustine's ascent may be read in terms of the stages of the Christian life identified in the earlier commentary on Genesis: (1) faith in the visible things proclaimed by Scripture and the church is reflected in Augustine's conversion and newfound willingness to accept the teachings of the church; (2) the disciplined appropriation of the things of the spirit culminates in the vision of eternity at Ostia; (3) in book 10 Augustine grants the reader privileged access to his own examination of conscience by which he attempts to effect the separation of the mind from the torrents of fleshly temptation; (4) the themes of book 11 cover the perception of unchangeable truth and the eternal source of goodness, beauty, and order; (5) the works befitting the soul in the interest of fraternity and fellowship include the harmonious proclamation of heavenly truth, as seen in the relationship among friendship, voice, and the quest of truth in Scripture of book 12; and, finally, (6) the production of a living soul in the image of God, filling the

earth with spiritual offspring and leading them to human perfection is accomplished in the ministers of the church. Additionally, the Christian healing and ascent is founded on faith, hope, and love, as Augustine had explained in an earlier text.[19] The one seeking healing must believe that one may be healed by adhering to Christ, must have hope that Christ will make this grace available, and must love and desire Christ's light more than the accustomed darkness. As we see in the course of books 8, 9, and 10 Augustine makes his ascent as he moves from confused notions of God to knowing and accepting Christ to be the source of moral continence and happiness and from despair at being able to raise himself Augustine learns to trust in Christ's promise of grace and hope for recovery (book 8), and from accustomed attachment to success and honor to delight in the sweetness of Christ and even a taste of eternity (book 9).

In virtue of his love of God, Augustine learns to love God's creation. In book 10 Augustine reassesses everything he had come to expect about the life of the sage and the happy life. By paying careful attention to Scripture and his own inner life, Augustine attempted to articulate the lesson that Christ's humility and his life in the flesh were meant to teach. Happiness consists not in a Stoic or Platonic escape from material conditions and a desire to cease to be human but in an ordered love of creation and willingness to be the kind of creature God created, that is, a member of a community of pilgrims and servant to God's people (10.4.6). Augustine also explains in the course of his investigations how one can be happy while seeking God. Prior to his conversion Augustine thought of happiness in terms of possessing something. What he learned about God's immateriality convinced him that God could not be possessed. On his account of human nature in book 10, the key to knowledge and to happiness consists in giving full reign to this restlessness desire of the heart for truth. Augustine articulated his understanding of the desire for truth from an explanatory perspective. This desire is the foundation and source of knowledge as well as of curiosity and of the experience of forgetfulness. The desire for God is part of human nature, but it does not operate automatically to bring about ascent, it will not lead us to happiness in spite of ourselves or against our will, for no one is made involuntarily happy. In order to allow this desire to become the controlling principle in one's life, all other desires must be put in order, quieted, or replaced where necessary. The font of well order desire and virtue is humility and acceptance of the True Mediator.

[19]*The Soliloquies,* 1.6.12.

The last three books are ostensibly a commentary on the first verses of Genesis. The lessons that Augustine drew from these texts concerned principally God's eternal providence. Naturally, he began with a reflection on the relationship of time and eternity in book 11. In book 12 he argued for God's creation from eternity of the Heaven of heavens or the house of God, which he called our true Mother and the heavenly Jerusalem, and which he describes as the heavenly origin of the church on earth and the heavenly goal of wayfaring Christians. In this way Augustine unfolded the foundations of the truly unchanging kingdom of peace. In book 13 Augustine shifted his focus from the eternal foundation of the church to its dispensation in time. The various acts of God in time are allegories of the many ways in which God has providentially provided for the health and happiness of the souls of believers.

In the course of these three books Augustine also offered his readers lessons in charity. Book 11 thus contains teaching on justice (temporal dispensations of the eternal law). In a just human society acts are in accord with divine reason and the acts flow from the desire to please God. The fruit of good actions is the enjoyment of God's law. Thus a right action is not necessarily a good action. Moral rectitude that proceeds from any other desire than the desire to please God is flawed. Book 12 contains teaching on friendship and the spirit of charity that should govern the community of Christians who seek knowledge of God in the Scriptures. Finally, in the city of God, in which believers are acting rightly and enjoying the fruits of their acts, individuals are motivated by charity to care for the material and intellectual needs of others (13.17.21) and to assist others in the use and control of the passions of the soul, which are the servants of reason (13.21.31).

3. A CHIASTIC PATTERN

The preceding sections have focused on the different halves of the *Confessions* and the way in which Augustine separated the tale of wandering from that of the founding of the eternal city. In the following sections I would like to explore the way in which the text folds in on itself, taking up in reverse order in the second half difficulties from the first – this according to the popular logical maxim that the first to arrive is the last to leave. Here I will follow Augustine's ascent from books 8 through 13, taking up each book together with its mirrored opposite in the first part so as to highlight the relationship of problem and solution. What we are

noticing is the manner in which Augustine addressed philosophical and theological problems that required for their solution his personal development.

3.1 Books 6 and 8: Self-Control

Book 8 marks the genuine beginning of Augustine's spiritual ascent, although as in the case of book 7 the way of humility is portrayed as a broad road that precedes Augustine's journey and which he does not construct. The achievement of Christ goes before the hero of the narrative and others are baptized before him and provide assistance, making his path a bit easier by their example.

Here Augustine places before the mind of his reader a host of images in support of his text: the conversion and public confession of Victorinus, the Prodigal Son, Antony of Egypt, and the monks of Ambrose.[20] This proliferation of image recalls the many images of strife in the eighth book of the *Aeneid* at which point Aeneas takes up the sword to establish peace in Italy. There is a special advantage, Augustine claims, in the stories of persons of note who are converted to Christ, since the "enemy is more thoroughly trounced in a person over whom he had a more powerful hold, or through whom he had a hold over a greater number of others; and stronger is his grip over those who on pretext of nobility are proud, stronger too his hold over many another on pretext of their authority." (8.4.9) It is rhetorically persuasive then that the well-respected Victorinus stands in the breach between the *Aeneid* and the *Confessions*. Victorinus was once a staunch defender of the popular Roman cults drawn from the theology of the poets,[21] "yet he was not ashamed to become a child of your Christ and be born as an infant from your font, bending his neck to the yoke of humility and accepting on his docile brow the sign of the ignominious cross" (8.2.4).

The appearance of Lady Continence concludes the parade of images and dominates the book, taking up and healing what Augustine had presented as the lowest point of his descent into exile. The problem was not that solutions to his problems were wanting, but that Augustine lacked the willingness to believe (6.4.6). In book 6 Augustine had declared that he had despaired of being able to

[20]Several connections with *Aeneid* 8 are present in this book: the verdant settings and the confused and divided minds of the heroes, the proliferation of images relevant to the central themes of the respective works (Virgil's images of strife on Vulcan's shield and Augustine's images of conversion and humility), the vision of a mystical figure to offer guidance and support (Virgil's god, Tiber, and Augustine's Lady Continence), and Augustine's final reference to the *Aeneid* (8.698f.), which marks the limits of classical culture's influence on Augustine's Christian self-understanding.

[21]Augustine here quotes from the *Aeneid* 8. 698f concerning the monstrous deities.

attain self-control on his own and was virtually reconciled to his weakened state. In the earlier book Alypius was an icon of the failure of self-reliance. Augustine included here the story (curiously out of sequence) of Alypius's introduction to the gladiatorial games. Alypius believed that he could overcome the lure of the entertainment by refusing to give his eyes then his mind to the violence of the scene. He found, however, that he was unable to restrain himself from becoming intoxicated by the savagery. His cure came a long while later when God taught him to rely not on his own strength but on God (6.8.13).

If the first stage of healing consists in knowing that Christ is the divine physician of souls, the second stage consists in maintaining the hope that Christ can and will administer the healing. This hope was granted to Augustine in the image of Lady Continence, the Bride of Christ and mother of many spiritual children[22]:

> There I beheld the chaste figure of Continence. Calm and cheerful was her manner, though modest, pure and honorable her charm as she coaxed me to come and hesitate no longer, stretching kingly hands to welcome and embrace me, hands filled with a wealth of heartening examples. A multitude of boys and girls were there, a great concourse of youth and persons of every age, venerable widows and women grown old in their virginity, and in all of them I saw that this same Continence was by no means sterile, but the fruitful mother of children conceived in joy from you, her Bridegroom. She was smiling at me, but with a challenging smile, as though to say, "Can you not do what these men have done, these women? Could any of them achieve it by their own strength, without the Lord their God? He it was, the Lord their God, who granted me to them (8.11.27).

This is the image that was present in all the other images, but which Augustine did not have eyes to see. It is an image at once of an inner virtue and of the Christian community as bride and mother, which Augustine finally embraced as the broad way of Christ's empire. In the construction of this image, Augustine indicated how the witness of the Christian community led him to embrace Scripture. On leaving the garden, he takes up Paul's letters, and reading the command to put on Christ and to make no provision for the flesh (Romans 13:13-14) his heart is flooded with certainty (8.12.29).

Book 8 contains a discourse on the conflicts within the will that lead many to conclude that there are multiple wills. This reflection helps Augustine to

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[22]The church as the mother of spiritual children echoes 6.3.4.

articulate the relationship of disordered desire to providence. The restless heart is a natural gift by which human beings are led to seek and to praise God. This restlessness leads to dissatisfaction when God is sought is the wrong place. Augustine presented his own unhappiness as a matter of mistaken perception. His desire for a comfortable life in pursuit of wisdom and his belief that happiness might consist in an earthly concord of love among friends prevented him from learning the lessons his unhappiness was meant to teach. The lesson that happiness does not consist in an intellectual escape from discomfiture or in a stoic denial of suffering, but in humble acceptance of the yolk of Christ is only learned in the course of moral self-transcendence. He became convinced later that God had been working secretly to lead him from vice to virtue. The more miserable he was, the nearer he was to God, for God was leading him (6.16.26). What he could not even guess at was that the mercy of God is the source of virtue and happiness and that virtue must precede wisdom and does not follow as a natural consequence (6.11.18-20). In book 8 he accepts that there is no pleasure or achievement without prior discomfort and distress (8.3.7). His acceptance of humility and of the Christian community in book 8 thus provides the solution to the problem of happiness in book 6 and provides the way forward in the release of his will from attachment to its own powers.

3.2 Books 5 and 9: Curiosity and Piety

In book 5 we see Augustine engaged with the natural philosophers, the Manichean Bishop Faustus, and the Academics. What is common to the schools of thought contained in this book is the absence of wisdom. The natural philosophers are those who are able to discourse about creation without any recognition of the Creator. These lack both piety and knowledge of God, and Augustine commented that these must be the unhappiest of people. However, by the time he met Faustus, Augustine's own training in the liberal arts had provided him with sufficient knowledge of creation to protect his mind from Faustus's fabulous explanations of reality. Faustus too is convicted of impiety in his own vanity. The folly and impiety of the Academics needs little comment.

As a result of the conversion in the garden, his free will, buried deep within the habit of accustomed corruption, was "called forth in a moment, enabling me to bow my neck to your benign yoke..." (9.1.1). This is the definition of a moral conversion in the *Confessions*. His intellectual assent in book 7 was not followed by delight and proper yearning. Whereas previously Augustine openly affirmed that eternity was of more value than time and the unchangeable was greater than

the changeable, he had no love of God's eternity. What follows is the freedom to love and to delight in Christ and in the Psalms. Augustine contrasts this freedom and delight with his inability, a year earlier, to be moved by hymns and psalms sung by Ambrose's congregation amidst persecution by the Empress Justina (9.7.15) and by the stories of healings associated with the discovery of the incorruptibles (9.7.16). Following his baptism, his delight in the things of God culminated in the vision at Ostia. Augustine enjoyed a conversation with Monica filled with a fervent longing for eternal Wisdom: "as we talked and panted for it, we just touched the edge of it by the utmost leap of our hearts..." (9.10.24). Delight in God's eternity enabled Augustine to discover the images that led to some partial insight into the nature of eternal life.

3.3 Books 4 and 10: Truth

Book 10 is a wonderful recapitulation of the many themes interwoven into Augustine's autobiography. In this sense it stands to the first nine books as the last book stands to the previous twelve. Book 10 also bridges the discussion of Augustine's life spread out through the times and the union of his heart and mind with eternity. The universal desire for happiness seems to be frustrated by temporal existence. The gift of continence gathers into a unity the self scattered and dispersed through time (10.29.40). However, there is an eschatological character to this promise of unity and its fulfillment, which is highlighted by Augustine's examination of conscience and admission of weakness. Augustine's account of the happy life in the first ten books of the *Confessions* begs for completion in the final three.

Nonetheless, there is a central theme that unites this book to the fourth, its counterpart in the chiasm. The philosophical problem that unites these two books is the problem of verbal expression and inner meaning. If truth is in the mind and not in things, then the attainment of truth is a matter of the right ordering of the mind and not of correct statements. In book 4 Augustine wrote that he was for a time attracted to the Astrologers. This was a period in his life when he loved not the immaterial but "brilliant material objects," not the true eternal God but "make-believe gods" (4.1.3). Astrologers held his curiosity since he could not figure out how it was that they so often seemed to make predictions that later proved true. In a fortuitous encounter with a wise physician, Augustine was offered the solution: chance. Just as there is a distinction between the chance meaning discovered by a curious reader in a poem and the deliberate intention in the mind of the poet, in the same way "we should not wonder if, in response to some prompting from

above, an utterance issues from the human mind unaware of what is happening in it, and this utterance corresponds to the circumstances and actions of the client" (4.3.5). Augustine did not appreciate the solution and remained confused as to how truthful statements could issue from a human mind and not be the consequence of skill. But he did not forget the explanation holding it in his memory as "an outline of the truth I was later to search out for myself" (4.3.6). That later search is recounted in book 10.

Another theoretical point of contact is the immateriality of the mind and the illumination of the mind by divine light. During the period narrated in book 4, Augustine attempted a short book on beauty, with which even at the time he seems to have been dissatisfied. He later wrote that he could not explain the nature or cause of beauty because he was fixated on corporeal forms. This vice clouded his thoughts: "if the rational mind itself is vicious, errors and wrongheaded opinions corrupt our life. Such was the condition of my mind at this time. I did not realize that it needed to be open to the radiance of another light in order to become a partaker in the truth, for it is not itself the essence of truth" (4.15.25). Attracted by the power of the senses, Augustine believed that truth exists in things and is perceived by the senses. He did not realize that the senses perceive only a part of what the soul is meant to love and rejoice over (4.11.16). Under the influence of this kind of perceptualism, Augustine was unable to solve the problem of human happiness. How can one be assured of happiness amidst the vicissitudes of daily life without either fleeing them or denying them any relevance? The correction of the perceptualist error together with the solution to the problem of happiness amidst change is the main focus of the longest book in the *Confessions*.

Book 10 contains the prayer:

> Late have I loved you, Beauty so ancient and so new,
> late have I loved you!
> Lo, you were within,
> but I outside, seeking there for you,
> and upon the shapely things you have made I rushed headlong,
> I, misshapen. (10.27.38)

These first few verses of Augustine's prayer summarize his difficulty – extrinsicism – and its solution – interiority. Augustine sought truth and happiness in external forms. He did not yet grasp that beauty, unity, and truth are apprehended by the mind and not in the senses, for he did not yet understand his

own soul, particularly the relationship between knowing and loving, and the distinction between these powers and God, the source of these powers.

The focus of Augustine's reflections is, of course, memory. Memory refers to the repository of all images of things experienced, imagined, feared, hoped for, willed or rejected; but memory also refers to the capacity of the mind to consider not just objects but questions about objects, to think not just about words but about grammar, to ascend from arguments to the science of logic, and from things that ought to be believed to the nature of belief. Memory, thus, also means insight. It is the ability of the mind to understand what is meant by a line even though none of the images given to the senses fits the definition (10.12.19).

Memory, finally, is self-presence. It is memory's presence to itself and the mind's ability to know itself. For, by the term memory the mind understands something in itself that is not seen by the senses (10.15.23). It is the ability to remember how a mathematical truth was learned, how it was communicated through the use of the senses and how to acknowledge its truth no longer requires the cooperation of the senses (10.13.20). Remembering how one has come to know also means the ability to be aware of the difference among giving assent to the content of another's mind, knowing something for oneself, and assenting to a truth spoken by God inwardly though uttered (knowingly or unknowingly) from the mouth of another person. In this way, Christ is the universal Teacher (10.4.5). What is perhaps most important for the *Confessions* as an autobiography in this book is Augustine's account of memory as the power that made it possible for him to become aware of the difference between how he previously understood and loved things as a young man and how he understood and loved things later. He was able therefore to offer an account of his previous mistakes and to pass correct judgment on himself.[23]

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[23]In his commentary on book 8, O'Donnell states, "The central issue, `conversion', is presented in terms that were only possible for A. after he reached the positions he expressed in div. qu. Simp. 1.2. To modern readers, the tension between the events as lived and the later interpretation A. imposes is irksome. It is far from clear that A. would have felt our objections, which are no less valid and perplexing for that reason. The reading of this text was perhaps for a long time free of this tension, but it can never be free of it again" (*The Confessions of Augustine: An Electronic Edition*). Part of the modern difficulty may be the lost sense of ancient rhetoric and an author's poetic self-presentation as something of more value than straightforward history, and a specifically twentieth-century focus on individual as opposed to common meanings with a consequent forgetfulness of the communal character of knowledge. See Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) for a fuller discussion of these themes. Augustine seems to have been

As a foundation to the *Confessions* as a work of theology, Augustine offered an account of the nature of forgetting and used this to elaborate an explanation of the human desire for God whom we can not fully comprehend. The experience of forgetting is founded on self-presence. What is understood passes, we might say, into the fabric of the mind and becoming habitual knowledge that, when recalled, is recognized as familiar (*simul adseufacta notitia,* 10.19.28). When something is forgotten, the mind is aware that something familiar or habitual is absent. A part of what it was accustomed to hold together as a whole is missing. The missing piece is sought after in virtue of what has been retained and in virtue of the feeling of "limping along" (*quasi detruncate conseutudine claudicans,* 10.19.28). Being in possession of partial happiness, we desire the fullness of happiness. We desire to possess the whole of what we possess now only in part. The complete joy that we desire is founded on the partial joy that we remember.

Augustine then moved to explain how the things that we desire as the fulfillment of our joy may be deemed worthy of that desire. Since all people admit that they would rather rejoice over truth rather than take joy in falsity, the desire for happiness is a desire to enjoy truth (10.22.32). But this universal experience also points to the distinction between knowing and loving. It is possible to take pleasure in and to rejoice over depraved actions or spectacles. As the desire for truth may be deformed into a desire to be right, a possessive lust for truth, so the will not to be deceived may be deformed into a refusal to be convicted of falsehood. The desire to love and to be loved must be directed wisely to what is truly good. God's presence to the mind enlightens the mind, even in the subtle awareness that one is not one's own creature. In virtue of this partial apprehension the whole of God's being is desired even though this cannot be comprehended, and God's creation is loved because of God. The desire for truth, the desire for the whole of things, is a dim light that is never put out of the minds of human beings and that is strengthened by awareness of God's presence. For this reason the restless heart is an inner light, even though it may result in constant dissatisfaction with partial goods and half-truths.

On this account of human nature, the key to wisdom is to give full reign to this restlessness desire of the heart for truth, which leads to curiosity and the experience of forgetfulness. At the same time, experience teaches that the individual possesses insufficient strength to achieve the desired happiness and is in constant need of assistance and of a mediator. Here, at the end of book 10

aware of the tension between poetry and history and sought in book 10 to explain the foundation for the difference in the power of memory and the mind's quest for God.

Augustine returned to the influence of Astrologers and of other false guides who "beguile their clients, who were seeking a mediator to purge them of their impurities but found none..." (10.42.67). The recognition of the need for assistance is universal. The desire for happiness in the possession for truth reveals human weakness; but if pride is not conquered, individuals will become deluded in their search for assistance. Christian happiness is constituted by humble acceptance of one's existence as created and as historical, and constant submission to Christ. The font of well-ordered desire and virtue is humility and acceptance of the True Mediator.

3.4 Books 3 and 11: Time and Eternity

Up to book 10 Augustine seemed to write as a layman, or at least not explicitly out of his role as bishop, but in book 11 he reflects on his Episcopal responsibility of teaching as a service to God and the church (11.2.2). Following the twofold movement of ascent – inner grace and outer word – the last three books mark a departure from the inner life to the public life of the Christian community. In this book Augustine's focus shifted from autobiography to the biography of the church. The proper place to begin in a consideration of the church is eternity, since the church represents God's will to redeem humanity and that will either had a beginning in God or is co-eternal with God.

The problem that he set for himself and his readers is the problem of the relationship of eternity and time – the theme that connects this book with its earlier counterpart.[24] In his youth Augustine had been ignorant of eternity, not yet loving the unchanging and so lacking the insights that love engenders. We recall in book 3 that he was troubled by the apparent license granted to the Patriarchs. Their polygamy was an object of ridicule by those who would discount Scripture or at least the Old Testament. The solution to the problem is that there is one law, unchanging from eternity though dispensed through time according to divine wisdom. Augustine was unable to recognize how similar the relationship between God's law and the various times is to the order in a household. Some members are allowed to do some things that others are not, and behaviors permitted in one

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[24]Kenneth Steinhauser also notes a relationship of problem and solution among the beginning and concluding books of the work. He argues, "In books 11-13 Augustine once again takes up the preoccupations of his youth responding to the questions raised in *De Pulchro et apto*. However, this time Augustine is more concerned with the Creator than creation." "The Literary Unity of the Confessions," in Joanne McWilliam (ed.), *Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Lourier University Press, 1992), 15-30, quotation on 21.

room are proscribed for another. (3.7.13). Similarly, divine dispensations are like the principles of poetic composition. Poetry does not demand uniformity but a proper placing of meter and foot (3.7.14). Augustine had no love for eternity and fled from the divine perspective which judges the passing times and discerns their order. He also had no love for God's abiding Wisdom which surpasses the norms and customs of human society and in which he might have placed his trust. (Lacking this perspective he perceived only the passages of times and of peoples and was virtually inconsolable at the loss of his friend in the following book 4.)

Having embraced Christ as Mediator and as Savior, Augustine now grasps something of the meaning of the truth that in his savior, who is the eternal Word and Wisdom, time and creation have their existence and all times and things are ordered properly (11.8.10). Augustine presented his own growth in understanding of God's immutability as his soul was freed from inordinate attachment to sensible things to love eternity. As he advanced in understanding, he was able to make explicit use of God's simplicity to grasp that temporal predicates are illicit in God. There was no "when" when God decided to create. God's will does not change, and the Wisdom that orders creation is invariant. The most explanatory insight in this book is the recognition that God is the maker of time (11.13.16).

In consequence of his phenomenology of inner meaning in book 10, of his assertion that time is a creature of God and of his partial insights into the nature of eternal life and of God's relationship to time, Augustine was able to add to his understanding of the problem of diviners and fortunetellers and of God's knowledge of particulars in time. What is called prediction, or knowledge of future contingents, is not really knowledge of a future and nonexistent event. It is knowledge of the presence of their causes or of signs that indicate their imminence. Future events may be predicted on the basis of present events that are known from past experience to have some relationship to them (11.18.24). Since the cause of time is eternity, it is not in the motion of the stars (11.23.29). Finally, the maker of time stands outside time and knows all things from an eternal present (11.31.41). Whatever we may learn about human knowledge of past, present, and future, God must be acknowledged to know in a far more wonderful and mysterious way.

The problem of the knowledge of future contingents leads to the question of how God teaches his prophets about nonexistent future events (11.19.25). In virtue of his humility and his understanding of the mind's power of memory, Augustine was able to recognize that he must think of God's knowledge, love, and actions on the analogy of human knowledge, love, and actions, but that in God

these things belong to his very substance (11.10.12; 11.31.41). God's knowledge does not change with the times, nor does divine providence alter. God does not await the future, but knows it from the unmoving point of eternity. Finally, as Augustine's understanding of his relationship to God is no longer contained within the narrow purview of the senses, he apprehends that when the mind reaches out to God, it does not reach out into a not yet existing future but into the never passing present of eternity (11.29.39).

3.5 Books 2 and 12: Friendship

The achievement that characterizes this understanding of eternity illuminates the meaning of the church as communion of saints. Given eternal beneficence and temporal dispensation no human being should be though to be without aid, though that aid be unseen. That aid may be in the negative form of restraint when disorder rebels against the divine law, or in the positive form of faithful believers cooperating with God. The difficulties or Augustine's early years were due in part to the absence of the positive assistance. Augustine wrote that the souls of friends set a mutual restraint or bound that measures passions (2.2.2), but he had no true friends. True friendship may only be possible in eternity, though that is not a far distant future, and Moses and St. Paul with all the citizens of the Heavenly Jerusalem count as friends.

The themes of book 2 include the lesson that friendship, commonly considered the greatest earthly good, is meant by Providence for our health and salvation, but is corrupted by human custom. Vice is a perverse imitation of virtue, and Augustine was seduced by an unkind friendship which imposes not restrain for the sake of virtue, but shame for the sake of immoderation. He dared not admit to his sexual inexperience or decline the summons to commit a theft. Friendship is also sweet bond issuing in the union of many hearts, which when perverted renders the individuals isolated. Book 2 is a curiously lonely and quiet book. God is said to be silent, though in reality Augustine was unwilling to listen. Augustine is not seen reading any books and ignores the words of St. Paul and the Gospels. He is the victim of parental neglect despite the freedom to spend more time at home. Finally, despite the claim that Augustine was motivated by a desire to love and to be loved, there is little affection expressed for his parents and only fear and shame in relation to his companions.

At a later point in book 4, Augustine again reflected on the blessings of friendship. After the loss of his friend, Augustine receives great comfort from the companionship that he shared with those around him (4.8.13). Yet this

spontaneous return of love to those who love us and mutual goodwill, while it witnesses to the natural goodness of sociality, does not deserve the name of true friendship.[25] This unity founded on mutual need is not guided by knowledge of the beloved as created and loved by God is not yet a blessed love (4.9.14).

Book 12 is a meditation on the created heavens in Genesis and the Heaven of Heavens invisible to human eyes, which is the Lord's and for the Lord (Psalm 113: 16). In book 12 God is no longer silent but speaks with a loud voice in Augustine's inner ear, and here he reminds the reader that previously he could not hear God's voice amidst the noise of those who know no peace (*tumultus impacatorum*, 12.10.10). Augustine returns to the question of the perversion of the good things of the earth and explains that this is made possible by their changeable natures as created goods. Nothing besides God is unchangeable and incorruptible. Even the Heaven of Heaven, which Augustine considers to be an intellectual creature that enjoys continual contemplation of God and that exists in perfect harmony is by nature changeable and does not share God's eternity.

This penultimate book, no less than does the second book, concerns friendship. This Heaven of Heavens is also the house of the Lord and the goal and desire of pilgrims; it is created wisdom and God's celestial city, and our mother.[26] The Heaven of Heavens or house of God is the celestial foundation of the church on earth. Augustine offers a brief theory of interpretation indicating the concord that must exist among those reading Scripture and seeking the truth. The first principle of Augustinian hermeneutics is that any interpretation ought to be subjected to the truths spoken in the inner mind. Augustine affirms that God alone is eternal and changeless and takes this as a fixed point in his reading and interpretation of Genesis. Second, a distinction is to be made between the truth that is sought and any particular author's meaning. The one may be clearly perceived even if what the author actually had in mind is obscure. Third, where the author's meaning is obscure, Augustine counseled charity and recommended crediting the authors of Scripture with holding to what is true. Fourth, if it happens that any text is open to multiple interpretations, none of which contradict what is known to be true, Augustine encouraged his readers to be more concerned with concord than with insisting on their own interpretation simply because it is their own. Fifth,

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[25]On the characteristics of true friendship see Donald Burt's *Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine's Practical Philosophy* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 59-68.

[26]*ergo quia prior omnium creata est quaedam sapientia, quae creata est, mens rationalis et intellectualis castae civitatis tuae, matris nostrae, quae sursum est et libera est et aeterna in caelis*, *Conf.*, 12.15.20.

their own. Fifth, Moses wrote what God revealed, so that if Moses (or any author of Scripture) had only one meaning in mind, God may intend that others find additional meanings. These principles promote friendship and charity among the readers of Scripture, and it is to this community that Augustine attaches himself, with whom he wishes delight in God.[27] Finally, what holds the community of readers together is the concord of mind and heart and not of statements. Augustine indicates how he would respond if someone were to insist on an interpretation to the exclusion of others. Such an assertion arises from conceit and carelessness, so that even if the statement were true, truth would not reside in the mind and heart of the speaker. Such a person takes as his own what belongs to all. For truth is common. Augustine brings us around again to the lawlessness that the issues from unkind friendship and destroys true friendship. The mark of true friendship is that both have submitted their minds to the truth.

Finally, friendship rooted in the unchanging house of God is a concord of mind and heart unbounded by time. Augustine brings Moses himself into the circle of friends. There really is not fundamental difference between reading the words of Moses and listening to a friend. In both cases trust and belief are necessary for words are signs of thoughts and no one can see into the mind of another. By extension, Augustine offers himself in friendship to his readers.

3.6 Books 1 and 13: Two Cities

The culmination of the text is in the establishment on earth of the perfect city in which justice and friendship serve to lead the believer to union with the divine Trinity. The rest promised in book 1 is found in Augustine's contemplation and love of the Trinity, though it is not complete rest but holy longing for union with the Trinity. In the final book we are told that the truth of God is made available by ministers and preachers of the church who hand Scripture on and who give testimony to the truth. By the Scriptures, God destroys pride and reorders human desire. He also explains why, though God has made available the healing of human custom and of pride, the world is still a gathering of good and bad alike.

The problems (human custom) and promises (total healing through baptism into Christ's humility) in book 1 are met in book 13. The promise of rest is fulfilled not in sagelike tranquility but in enjoyment of the things of God. Augustine founds his notion of enjoyment on the distinction between actions and intentions. Those

[27] *coniungar autem illis, domine, in te et delecter cum eis in te, qui veritate tuas pascuntur in latitudine caritatis, Conf.,* 12. 23.31.

intentions. Those responsible for Augustine's upbringing did not act well, since they taught and punished him with immoral intentions. In book 13 the enjoyment of the fruit of charity is to give to a prophet in the name of a prophet, or to a disciple in the name of a disciple. Thus fruit is a matter of enjoyment of truth which is nourishment of the soul. This leads Augustine to make a double distinction between the role models of his youth and the ministers of the church, and between the ministers of the church witnessing before a drowning world and amidst a community of believers. Within the church, ministers do not covey God's message through miracles and symbolic expressions but by making "themselves an example to the faithful by living alongside them and arousing them to imitation." (13.21.30) And, St. Paul is presented as a spiritual parent of the church feeding and nourishing his spiritual children through his writings. Those who instruct others in right behavior make provision for the body but do not feed the soul, since they do not know why good things ought to be done and do not govern with a holy and upright intent (13.27.42).

Books 1 and 13 both contrast the disorder and mismanagement of the human community to the surety and order of providence. To the infant God provides nourishment in the body of the nurses, the instinct to suck, and the desire in the nurse to give to the infant what God has given to her. The individual has a restless desire for God, the capacity for speech and need to communicate, curiosity, and intelligence that are surer paths to learning than are the lesson plans of the teachers. Even the mismanagement of Augustine's teachers falls within God's providential care. God makes use of the ill-conceived tasks and punishments of instructors for the correction of vice – although the schoolboy does not see it this way. Even the child, impressed with an image of divine unity, perceives through many senses, delights in truth, is not willingly deceived, and has the power of memory. Finally, God has provided several paths to learning – personal experience, belief in the witness of authorities, and comparison with analogous cases. These ways of knowing are reintroduced here in Augustine's reflections of the Trinity.

In the final book we find the theoretical explanation of the coexistence of the two cities in the eternal will to save and the merciful decision of God to allow both cities to coexist for the sake of the faithful. The earthly and heavenly cities exist together, though in such a way that the heavenly sets bounds around the earthly and provides for its judgment and redemption. Providence makes use of the natural desire for temporal felicity to restore human relationships and to lead individuals to God through the innate sociality by which people must work together to satisfy

together to satisfy their own material needs. In all this way individuals are led into community for the sake of personal fulfillment. The law by which vice is healed and a community of faithful is established is the law of Christ spoken to the rich man who ask how he might enter the kingdom of heaven (obedience to the Ten Commandments and rejection of all else for Christian discipleship). The final promise is fulfilled in the mind, which, completely conformed to Christ and judging all things spiritually, is now no longer in need of any human authority. This is the complete renewal of the curious and intelligent mind nourished on Scripture and supported in its own right operations in pursuit of the fulfillment of the desire implanted in it by God.

4. FURTHER QUESTIONS: DIALECTIC

As indicated earlier, Augustine's *Confessions* is open to many interpretations. However, it is also a text that addresses head on the issue of dialectic. The reader who would seek to understand the text faces an existential task. The presence of moral, religious, and intellectual conversions as themes in the text suggests that the text is written from a converted viewpoint. The challenge to the reader, then, is to discern the presence or absence of those conversions in her or his life. We may expect, if the author may be believed to be a reasonable and responsible pedagogue motivated by love of the reader, to find in the text rhetorically skilled passages that enflame the readers' desire for those conversions. The question of dialectic confronts the reader with the reality of conversion as a principle of interpretation.

The theme of this Workshop is, among other things, the ability of painstaking, patient, and "poly-differentiated" individuals to operate comfortably in diverse cultures. Lonergan insisted that in communicating the faith, theologians needed not only to be aware of the relative global and differentiated consciousnesses of those to whom they are communicating, but also to be aware of the same thing in the authors of the tradition that they are appropriating and communicating. Thus the ability to be at home in the old means possessing the habits of a scholarly differentiation in order to apprehend the common sense of that part of the tradition that one is appropriating. It also means patiently and painstakingly developing in oneself those additional differentiations out of which previous authors generated meaning and value. For, the proximate context of meaning is the human consciousness of the speaker.

The task is daunting. It is tremendously helpful, therefore, when we find an author from the ancient world who is attentive to the mind as the context of meaning and who writes out of a thematic attention to that context. Augustine was such an author. It is further helpful when that ancient author is conscientious about the tasks of communication and who writes in such a way as to lead his reader to those same discoveries that he himself has made in a careful pedagogical manner. Augustine was such a pedagogue. Finally, no small assistance is given when an author mediates not only his own culture but also the invariants of human consciousness. For Augustine, God is the environment of the mind, and he undertook to bring his readers to an awareness of the presence and providence of God. For Augustine, also, meaning and truth reside in the mind and not in things, there is a distinction between assent and consent, and our efforts at intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and adoration are resisted by our own inclinations to lust, curiosity, and pride, and are facilitated by humility, faith, hope, and love. Augustine's texts mediate these realities to us, and apprehending these realities is important for interpreting Augustine's texts, for learning Augustine's meaning. The tasks, then of learning the common sense of an older culture and of developing in oneself the differentiations of the author are made easier to the extent that we allow Augustine to speak to us about himself and about ourselves.

Augustine thus provides us with clear illustrations of the principles illustrated in the quotations at the head of this paper. Augustine engaged in theology as praxis to the extent that his conversion of mind and heart by God to God was a prerequisite for his ability to love and to know the one with whom he was in love. In the narrative of his life, Augustine highlights for us how his failure to develop virtuously contributed to his intellectual and moral blindness and hence his inability to resolve philosophical and theological difficulties. Augustine also engaged in a form of discourse that intended to bring about a transformation of the individual reader and of the human community. A central aim of the *Confessions* is the constitution of the church through communicating the message of Christ and evoking a desire to embrace the humble way of the humble Jesus. Augustine presented his own life, not simply as a model for individuals, but as a model for members of a Christian community founded on the humanity of Christ. Further, he envisioned community, not simply as a set of particular goods or a conceptualized good of order, but as founded on friendship and personal relations.

Personal relations foster both authenticity and cooperation, and hence bring about a good of order.[28]

5. CONCLUSION

If the Bishop of Hippo drew heavily upon Virgil, he did so with a distinctly Christian end in mind. Whereas Virgil treated the foundations of the Roman Empire, Augustine in the *Confessions* concerned himself with the foundations of the city of God, the church, in a way that anticipates his later work. The principle insight into the *Confessions* illuminated by comparison with Virgil is that Augustine's text is finally about the church, the Body of Christ on earth, and not simply about Augustine and the meaning of select passages in Genesis. Like Virgil, Augustine was concerned about the foundations of a society.

The *Confessions*, of course, is about Augustine's personal development and conversion, but purpose of the text is not exclusively to make Augustine's personal story available as an allegory of the Christian journey. It is more than that. Augustine's work is more than a personal story for two reasons: first, Augustine's story is not an exclusively personal story. His education, conversion, and Christian development are deeply connected to the communities in which he lived. Second, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, Augustine does not expect that Christianity will survive and spread by the conversion and formation of individual, insular Christians. Faith comes through hearing (*quomodo credent sine praedicante*? 1.1.1), and that alone presupposes community. Faith is begotten

[28]See *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 50-52. Augustine approaches this notion in his view of friendship (2.2.2) and of the relationship of eternal law and changeable human customs (3.7.13); but I would like to know whether Augustine was closer to Aquinas in conceiving of friendship under the heading of common good or closer to Lonergan's notion of personal relations as generators of social structures (see Frederick Lawrence, "The Human Good and Christian Conversation," in Farrell and Soukup, eds., *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age* (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1993),. 248-68, here 251-52). Burt's *Friendship and Society* supports the contention that the question of friendship rather than that of structure is the foundation of Augustine's social theory: "Recognizing the goal or end of humanity and unity as the means to that end, [Augustine] came to see that the great tragedy of the human condition was alienation. Every human being is a cracked pot. We want to be whole but we live fractured lives, afflicted by separations within ourselves, separations between ourselves and other individuals, and separation from the one being who can bring final happiness, the infinite God. The history of humanity as Augustine saw it was a process of separation and coming together (2-3)."

and nourished by the sacraments, and that presupposes both community and incarnation. Augustine did not think about his own postponed baptism apart from the community into which he was to be baptized. Finally, character is shaped in community, for human beings are naturally social. Thus Augustine's concern for foundations reflects what he believes about human and divine reality. Now, what is meant by foundations is not simply a founding event or myth. Foundations for both Virgil and Augustine concern causes: principally the causes of peace. Those causes exist in nature, in men's souls, in the mind of God, and in the form and character of the polity or community.

The *Confessions* is also quite explicitly about Scripture and about the right way to read Scripture. And Augustine demonstrates for us how to read Scripture in his exegesis of the first verses of Genesis. But it is more than that. The exegesis lays out the eternal foundations of the church, both in the sense that the church was part of the plan of salvation from the very beginning, temporally speaking, and in the sense that the foundations of the church are in the heaven of heavens, cosmologically speaking. In Augustine's final summary his allegorical interpretation of Genesis, heaven and earth symbolize the head and body of the church. The Heaven of heaven enjoys immutability without sharing in God's own eternality. In the creation of the heavens, the firmament symbolizes Scripture. Earth, broadly, refers to God's actions in time and to the providential dispensations within the Christian community. The gathered waters refer to the hoards of unbelievers; the dry land to the visible, organized form of the community of the faithful; the heavenly lights to the ministers with their various spiritual gifts; and teeming plants to the sacraments drawn from corporeal matter but pointing toward spiritual realities. The highpoint of God's creation is the believing soul for whom God provided everything that soul would need as it progressed toward maturity (13.34.49).

Augustine makes clear in the course of the narrative that although conversion is a matter of an inner transformation, he did not undergo these transformations in the privacy of his own inner world but in the context of a Christian community. As we saw in Augustine's allegorical reading of Genesis, the highpoint of creation is the believing soul for whom God has made every provision in the text of Scripture and the ministers and sacraments of the church. The final task of the *Confessions* is to evoke that church, the living body of Christ, as the true parentage and proper context for the Christian life and ascent. This city of God is the true eternal city of peace founded on Christian piety and Christ's law.

Lonergan Workshop
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STARTLING STRANGENESS: A MEMOIR

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IN THE INTERNATIONAL Lonergan Conference held in Mainz, Germany, in early January 2007, Mark Doorley from Villanova University gave a paper on "Spiritual Exercises in Cosmopolis." After outlining the volatile world situation, the fragility of the arts in an increasingly technological society, and the subordination of the university to political and economic forces, he recalled Bernard Lonergan's notion of "cosmopolis," that dimension of human culture built on a radical commitment to intelligence. In that light, he turns to Bernard Lonergan's *Insight* and asks "Who picks up a tome like *Insight* in the first place?" In other words, what are the personal, social, and cultural conditions for picking up and reading *Insight* and accepting the invitation it offers?

> I know I didn't pick it up until I was in graduate school, a very special place indeed. I had few concerns, since I was fed, had a place to sleep and was at least notionally committed to the intellectual enterprise. The invitation was extended to me and the conditions of my existence at the time were such that self-appropriation was more probable. But I don't think I'm the average prospective reader...Therein lies the problem, doesn't it? If *Insight* is the kind of book that must be read in order to respond to the personal invitation it extends, how do we get people to pick the book up, and better, stay with it through the dense and frustrating initial chapters? If cosmopolis is to fulfill its role in the correction of the longer cycle of decline, it must have a way to extend the invitation of *Insight* to people.[1]

Doorley's article is an attempt to outline a way of extending that invitation. Such a way, he contends, consists first of all in personal *witness* to self-

[1]Mark Doorley, "Spritual Exercises in Cosmopolis," unpublished paper presented at the Third International Lonergan Conference, Mainz, Germany, January 2-7, 2007, 8.

appropriation. Doorley provides evidence for this conclusion in his own encounters with others who have taken up this invitation.

> Each person who has taken up the invitation to self-appropriation was in relationship with someone, as teacher, as confessor, as friend, as peer, who was a living witness to the authenticity that is the fruit of self-appropriation. The witness was so powerful that the person was able to overcome the inertia of the general bias of common sense to undertake the difficult and strenuous journey into a startlingly strange land.[2]

Doorley makes the point that such witnesses are not limited to Lonerganians, but includes all who are truly committed to the pure desire to know. He refers to Pierre Hadot's *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (1995), and to Hadot's contention that the ancient philosophers understood philosophy as primarily a way of life, and only secondarily as a discourse about philosophical subjects. Applying Hadot's insight to Lonergan, Doorley outlines the spiritual exercises that would characterize the way of life that Lonergan witnesses to in *Insight*. The first of these exercises is silence.

> First there is a need for silence. This is true whether one is engaged in understanding Lonergan's metaphysics or in figuring out how to help one's son find a job. It is in the silence of meditation that the conditions for the emergence of questions and images and insights are ideal. This silence can be accomplished on one's deck, in the chapel, while driving the autobahn, while listening to music.[3]

The second spiritual exercise Doorley recommends is putting one's life honestly before another.

> What is necessary is that one allows one other person, one who is him or herself engaged in the life of self-appropriation, to listen to one's story...To be open about one's motives, one's fears, one's hopes, one's decisions, makes more likely the ability to follow the demands of authenticity.

Doorley outlines other exercises as well: listening to others, attending to the present moment, controlling one's desires, attending to the responsibilities of one's life, and so forth. I have outlined Doorley's article at some length because it has helped me to contextualize what I was doing in the book I recently published,

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[2]Doorley, "Spiritual Exercises in Cosmopolis," 11.
[3]Doorley, "Spiritual Exercises in Cosmopolis," 21.

Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan's Insight.[4] For there I attempt to recount my own journey to that startling and strange moment around 1967 when the reality of intelligence came home to me. For besides being an account of reading *Insight* itself and the specifics of that moment when it seemed to me "I got it," the book is also an account of how I came to that moment, the personal, social, and cultural forces that made it possible for me to pick up and read *Insight.* Doorley's article heightened for me the values imparted to me by my family, my schooling, my friends, and even by my pre-Vatican II seminary training. For the story of any person coming to read *Insight* is the story about the formation of a horizon and the many elements that went into the formation of that horizon. In this article I will outline that formation in my own life and the specifics of wrestling with an understanding of understanding.

1. CONSTRUCTING AN HORIZON

So the question is: how did it come about that I was exposed to Lonergan's *Insight* in the first place and was, at least to some degree, open to what he was saying? To take one thread, let me point to my own Irish American roots and staunch Roman Catholic parents. Given that context, it was not surprising that I was someone who from an early age wanted to be a Catholic priest. The early image of our parish priest, Fr. Thomas Gillick, seriously serving communion to people in our parish church of Our Lady of the Valley in Orange, New Jersey, remained with me through the years. Somehow that image touched me and I never wanted to be anything else than a Catholic priest. At the same time, especially in my teenage years, I wrestled with that calling. Celibacy was part of the package and there was no talk then of that ever changing. Perhaps it was the whole nature of "the Catholic thing" that so many others have written about, but I experienced the inner conflict in my own particular way.

And so as I entered high school in the early 1950s, for one reason or another I began to read "conversion stories" – the stories of persons such as Dorothy Day, Thomas Merton, Claire Booth Luce, Avery Dulles. I was trying to figure out why people who were not Catholic would ever in the world want to become Catholic. It seemed to be quite a bit to chew off – unless there were reasons. And I was interested in those reasons. Perhaps I first began to read these

[4]Richard Liddy, *Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan's Insight* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007).

stories because these were the books that were lying around our house - these were the books my mother and father were reading - and what else was there to read on a lazy summer day? But gradually I took a personal interest in them because they were stories of interesting journeys: Thomas Merton's *Seven Storey Mountain* and Father John O'Brien's collections of conversion stories, such as *Where I Found Christ* and *The Road to Damascus.*[5]

Such an interest in conversions to Catholicism quite naturally drew in its wake an interest in philosophical questions: questions such as the existence of God. For if there were no God, then the ballgame was up. I have vivid memories of staying up late at night with my friends in the Seton Hall University dormitory wrestling with questions about human life, about science and what its implications were, and about the proofs for the existence of God.

Consequently, on finally being exposed to formal philosophy when I entered the seminary in 1958, I was happy to be exposed, not only to neo-scholastic philosophy with its overtones of a manualist memorized "system," but also to the quite challenging historical and philosophical writings of two lay Catholic philosophers, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. One of our professors, Monsignor Joseph Przezdziecki had studied with Gilson in Toronto. Gilson's was a dogmatic realism with a tremendous resistance to anything that smelled of Kant or German idealism. I have a vivid memory of walking back from philosophy class one day and saying to a friend: "You're over there; I'm here; I see you there – *that's* realism!"

At the same time, this philosophical exposure was complemented by a literary exposure to the writers of the Catholic literary revival of the mid-twentieth century, especially the French Catholic writers, Leon Bloy, Georges Bernanos, Charles Peguy, Paul Claudel, and Francois Mauriac.

My university years, then, exposed me to the intellectual pattern of experience, that is, to spending long hours exposed to closely reasoned texts. Even the pre-Vatican II seminary, with its rigid schedule and even rigid philosophical writings, provided me with extended exposure to some very fine writers. No wonder the English philosopher, Anthony Kenny, wrote of his time in the Catholic seminary in England as the best educational experience he had ever had: "I have never since been as well read, in the sense of retaining so much literature in my head at the same time."[6]

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[5]John O'Brien, *The Road to Damascus* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949) and *Where I Found Christ* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950).

[6]Anthony Kenny, *A Path From Rome* (Oxford *University* Press, 1986), 41.

Among the 300 or so students in our seminary in New Jersey at the time, there were many who were similarly brilliant, and they influenced the rest of us. Even in spite of *The Index of Forbidden Books* then in effect among Catholics – and symbolized by "the cage" in the library where these books were kept – still something new was happening. The reading of many of the bright students in the seminary was both deep and extensive. Even Gilson represented a new approach to Saint Thomas Aquinas, a new historical consciousnesses that was undermining facile neo-scholastic interpretations and overtaking the classicism and rigidity that found expression in many dimensions of Catholic life. There was a yearning to move beyond a "ghetto Catholicism" and to engage the world on its own terms.

Throughout this time in the seminary habits were being formed – habits that Mark Doorley pointed to in his article. One such habit was the habit of not only enduring but also of profiting from solitude. This habit was formed not only by extended periods of time in prayer but also by study: the habit of becoming familiar with the intellectual pattern of experience. In other words, even the pre-Vatican II seminary inculcated important habits, habits of learning how to learn, habits of raising issues that are long-term, habits of concentration. Are these not the disciplines of "cosmopolis?"

Another habit that began to be instilled in me in those years was the habit of beginning to be honest with other people. Doorley mentions this as another habit that contributes to cosmopolis, that is, the habit of being open and honest with at least one other person, and through the years of the seminary there was not only the sacrament of reconciliation – then called "Confession" - but also the encouragement of spiritual direction, of sharing with a priest what was going on in one's soul. Could this also have prepared the way to encountering *Insight*?

Books also were in the air that encouraged "getting in touch with oneself." I think immediately of Carl Rogers's *On Becoming a Person*, a book which encouraged getting in touch with one's feelings and learning to speak out of one's feelings. Rogers wrote of "appropriated learnings," that is, learnings verified in one's own inner life.[7]

So my narrative is of "a good Catholic boy" with decent marks, who in 1960 was sent off to study in Rome, there to meet Bernard Lonergan, who had written *Insight* and was saying different things about the human mind than I had

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[7]See Bernard Lonergan, "*Insight* Revisted," *A Second Collection* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 269: "My aim, I surmise, is parallel to Carl Rogers' aim of inducing his clients to advert to the feeling that they experience but do not advert to, distinguish, name, identify, recognize."

learned in New Jersey. In Rome, Lonergan was held in the highest esteem by the brightest students, such as David Tracy, Joseph Komonchak, and Fred Lawrence. At the same time there was in the air all the ferment of the Second Vatican Council with its visionary orientation towards the world and its battles between "liberals" and "conservatives." The exciting reading I had begun in New Jersey took a quantum leap when I arrived in Rome and the Council began. Through our years there we experienced first hand the conflict between scholastic theology and the more historically rooted "new theology" so influential in the Council.

It was an exciting time and, meeting Lonergan as my teacher for courses on the Trinity and on Christology was part of the excitement. Let me insert here a short description of Lonergan by William Shea that, I believe, captures the experience.

> Bernard Lonergan looked like a man who knew what he was doing and enjoyed it. In the score of times I saw him I could not take my eyes off him. That is understandable, perhaps, because he was the big man in my small world. But he was not what one would expect a great teacher to be. He had none of the sense of theatrical drama, no flash, no bamboozle, none of the Great Man aura. He had a monotonous voice; his hands shook distractingly; he looked overweight, not at all prepossessing in his physical appearance, and he had little physical grace. Oddly, then, it was a pleasure listening to him and watching him. I think it was because he was very smart and clear about what he was doing, and he did it with pleasure. In the academic world one does not often run into really smart people, though one regularly does run into intelligent and capable people. I had the conviction, both from the time I read *Insight* and from the first time I listened to him lecture and answer questions, that he was the smartest person I had run into.[8]

Still, though I had Lonergan as my professor in class at the Gregorian University during two successive years – in Latin, no less - I knew that I did not "get" his speculative theology on Christ and on the Trinity. That theology involved a new and different theory of the human mind than the Gilson-influenced one I had learned in New Jersey. Besides, there was the rumor floating around that Lonergan was an "idealist" and I remember wondering about that as I sat in his class. Heaven forbid! Could anything be worse than idealism?

[8]William Shea, "Horizons on Bernard Lonergan," *Horizons*: (Journal of College Theology Society 15, no. 1 (1988), 77.

At the same time, kernels began to fall from the table. I remember David Tracy one day describing to me what Lonergan meant by an "intellectual emanation" – a term he employed to explain the processions within the Trinity.

> In a detective story, all the clues can be present, but the detective just doesn't get it. Then, through questioning, thought and investigation, suddenly all the pieces fall into place: he gets it! "The butler did it!" *That's* an intellectual emanation!

Still, I didn't get Lonergan's whole theory of the human mind. It was over my head. Eventually, after my ordination to the priesthood in December of 1963, I was asked by my Archbishop to return to Rome to get a doctorate in philosophy in preparation for teaching in the seminary. It was not something I really wanted to do, since most of my classmates were now out in the world addressing the "real" problems of America's cities. Philosophy seemed so irrelevant. Returning to Rome in 1964 and sitting in a class on scholastic cosmology precipitated in me a mild case of depression. Some priests I knew were beginning to leave the priesthood to marry. My issues did not seem to be philosophical but rather "existential." Nevertheless, at that point David Tracy, said to me: "If you read anything, read *Insight.*" I took his advice and dedicated the next couple of years to wrestling with that book.

2. CONFLICTING PHILOSOPHIES BECOME A CONFLICT IN ME

So it was Lonergan in *Insight* who led me back to questions of mind, objectivity, and reality – questions I had earlier encountered in a neo-scholastic context, but had since ignored. In the context of the times they were not questions that I saw as particularly relevant. Lonergan would later write about the "trap" of getting caught in merely existential reflection:

> But the very wealth of existential reflection can turn out to be a trap...Is this whole process from the nebulae through plants and animals to man, is it good, a true value, something worth while? This question can be answered affirmatively, if and only if one acknowledges God's existence, his omnipotence, and his goodness...It is, then, no accident that a theater of the absurd, a literature of the absurd, and philosophies of the absurd flourish in a culture in which there are theologians to proclaim that God is dead. But that absurdity and that death have their roots in a new neglect of the subject, a new truncation, a new immanentism. In the name of

> phenomenology, of existential self-understanding, of human encounter, of salvation history, there are those that resentfully and disdainfully brush aside the old questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics. I have no doubt, I never did doubt, that the old answers were defective. But to reject the questions as well is to refuse to know what one is doing when one is knowing...; it is to refuse to know why doing that is knowing; it is to refuse to set up a basic semantics by concluding what one knows when one does it. That threefold refusal is worse than mere neglect of the subject, and it generates a far more radical truncation. It is that truncation that we experience today not only without but within the Church, when we find that the conditions of the possibility of significant dialogue are not grasped, when the distinction between revealed religion and myth is blurred, when the possibility of objective knowledge of God's existence and of his goodness is denied.[9]

And so, invited by others, I began to read *Insight;* and I did so very intensely. I also met with other students who were also struggling to read *Insight* at the time. We formed a community around that book.

At the same time I undertook to write a dissertation on the philosophy of art of Susanne K. Langer.[10] Lonergan had been positively influenced by Langer's work on art and it was on that work that I focused. Soon afterwards, Langer published a new work, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Volume One*, and after reading and rereading that work, I made what was to me a disorienting discovery. I discovered that Langer's was a naturalistic view of human knowing and human life. In that work Langer reduces all "higher" human intellectual activities, including insight, to imagination, imagination to feelings, and feelings to electro-chemical events.[11] And all of these positions cohered with her basic view of human knowing. For Langer, knowing is a bipolar activity in which the "concepts" of scientific or philosophical thinking are the subjective pole, "matter" is the objective pole, and some type of vision or "looking" is the mediating activity. Thus we "see: forms of feeling in works of art; and in metaphorical

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[9]Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974; reprinted by University of Toronto Press, 1996), 85-86.

[10]The following represents a reworking of a previous account; see Richard Liddy, "'A Shower of Insights: "Autobiography and Intellectual Conversion," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, Volume 21, no. 2 (Fall 2003 – © 2004), 125-43.

[11]Susanne K. Langer, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967). See Richard M. Liddy, *Art and Feeling: An Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Art of Susanne K. Langer* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1970).

activity we "see one thing in another" life in the candle flame, death in sleep, and so forth. This, she asserts, is the basis of all "higher" differentiated activity.[12]

Langer represented the whole naturalistic tradition in philosophy, a tradition carried on with gusto in the contemporary world by such writers as Richard Dawkins in *The God Illusion* and Daniel Dennett in *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon.* As Langer wrote:

> That man is an animal I certainly believe; and also that he has no supernatural essence, "soul" or "mind-stuff," enclosed in his skin. He is an organism, his substance is chemical, and what he does, suffers, or knows, is just what this sort of chemical structure may do, suffer, or know. When the structure goes to pieces, it never does, suffers, or knows anything again.[13]

This was a view that obviously conflicted with my religious convictions as a young Catholic priest. But I was also a philosopher and I had to ask how things stood philosophically. For Langer was an esteemed author - her books on the philosophy of art are still published by Harvard University Press. The upshot was that conflicting philosophies became a conflict in me.

I remember one evening in particular. I was studying in my room sometime in the spring of 1967 as twilight spread over the city of Rome. I remember saying to myself quite clearly:

> Who's right here? - Lonergan or Langer? Both can't be right - between them there's a basic conflict about the human person, the human mind, indeed about reality.

And I questioned my own motivation:

> If you come down on Lonergan's side, is that because he's a religious, a Jesuit priest, and you yourself are a life-long Catholic and a priest as well?

I could admit all these underlying motivations that might incline me toward a more religiously amenable answer. But the question itself was not directly a religious one. It was a question of *fact.* What were the facts? What was the truth about the human mind? In fact, it was a question about what I was doing then and

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[12]See my review of Susanne K. Langer, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling*, Volume I in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1970), 481-84. Also Richard Liddy, "Susanne K. Langer's Philosophy of Mind," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Winter, 1997), 149-60).

[13]Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: New American Library, 1948), 44.

there. It was a question whose adequate answer I could find only within the operations of my own mind.

Previously in philosophy courses and in my own reading I had learned many opinions about the mind and about the human person. I had learned what the great philosophers had said. But their sayings and opinions had passed through my own mind and on to test papers without connecting with my own basic self-knowledge. I could regurgitate their various positions, but my own opinions were not rooted. They were vulnerable to basic challenges. The challenge I faced that evening in Rome was the challenge of modern naturalism.

In some ways naturalism with its empiricist emphasis was easy to understand - or at least to imagine. Its emphasis on sensation and imagination was rather obvious: the "blooming buzzing confusion" of sense experiences linked together by associative habits. Easy to understand also were the emphases of the other philosophies I found rolling around within me: the traditional scholasticism I had been taught, with its "intuition of being;" Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the knowing subject who cannot intellectually get to "things in themselves;" and the various existentialist writers who seemed to say, "A pox on all your houses - what counts are your own personal decisions!"

Yet the study of all these philosophies was very important for me. For they each represented *people taking a stand*. All represented a challenge to come to a decision about myself and my own foundations. I was twenty-eight years old and as a philosopher – a person asking deeper questions about my self and reality - I needed to make some basic decisions on the meaning of "mind" and "reality." Lonergan once wrote about these foundations:

> It is a decision about whom and what you are for and, again, whom and what you are against. It is a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities exhibited in dialectic. It is a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-view.[14]

In other words, you had to know something about these possible worldviews before you could take a stand in their regard, either positively or negatively. I had been reading around in ancient and modern philosophy during the previous ten years and the major emphases of these various schools were not too difficult to understand.

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[14]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972; reprinted by University of Toronto Press, 1990), 268.

In contrast, Lonergan's position was difficult to understand. I sensed that he was on to something in his emphasis on understanding. Still, he seemed to imply that there was a residual materialism, or "naive realism," even in someone like myself who had studied many years of Catholic philosophy and theology. I sensed that he was calling for a change *in me* if I were to truly understand what he was talking about.

I knew I had learned something from the study of *Insight.* I had learned something about understanding in mathematics, in science, and in common sense. But to a great extent what I had learned had been what *Lonergan* had written. And as Jesus said to Peter when he recounted various opinions circulating about him, "But who do *you* say that I am?" Similarly I felt the question in me,

> But who do *you* say that *you* are, Dick Liddy? What do *you* say about *your* own knowing? *your* own mind? *your* own self?

This inner dialogue was not about what Lonergan or anyone else had said about knowing; it was rather about what I was coming to know about my own knowing. And the evidence for answering these questions was to be found within me. It was a question of putting the book down and "thinking" about the meaning of the book.

> Intellectual habit is not possession of the book but freedom from the book. It is the birth and life in us of the light and evidence by which we operate on our own. [15]

And so I kept asking the question "Is this all true?" In particular, is it true, as Lonergan states, that understanding is distinct from imagination? Is my understanding distinct from my imagination? Couldn't understanding be just another form of imagination? Couldn't I imagine that? And I played many mental games - trying to imagine and re-conceive other explanations for the structure of my own mind. Again and again I said to myself that all the later elements in Lonergan's book, including the existence of God, depended on the correctness of the earlier analyses of insight. And so, as I read the second half of *Insight* I could not help repeating to myself:

[15] Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, edited by Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 193.

> Is the understanding of understanding in the first part of *Insight* correct? The circle, for example, is Lonergan correct on that? Is there a specific act called "understanding" or is understanding just some kind of "imagining?"

And my imagination threw up on the screen of my mind all kinds of conflicting images and questions: "Perhaps what I call 'understanding' is just a kind of imagination - for example, an imagining of perfectly equal radii?" But that did not seem to make sense. The fact that mathematics deals with intelligibilities that can be symbolized but not represented seemed strong evidence for a distinct intellectual level of consciousness. But what was this intellectual level? Where was it? "What did it look like?"

Beneath the surface of my mind there percolated an unease that I formulated in the question, "Where is this act?" I was not sure I had a real "handle" on it. I was not sure what insight was *like*. I was not sure I could situate it clearly within my own consciousness. I was not sure I "had" it. In some real way, I was looking for something with a label on it:

> *"THIS IS THE ACT OF INSIGHT!"*

But the reality turned out to be more subtle.

3. THE SHOWER EXPERIENCE

And that is when I remember having an "Archimedean experience." It was late one afternoon in Rome in the spring of 1967, and I had been working on this stuff for most of the day. So I decided to take a shower.[16] Like Archimedes, I was relaxing in the water as various questions and images went through my head. Then, at one point I asked myself: "*Where is this act of insight*?" And then it hit me:

> *You're asking the wrong question!* Look at the question you're asking! You're asking a question that cannot be answered! You're asking "where?" and that's your attempt to visualize what can't be visualized! You're attempting to imagine what of its nature goes beyond imagination. Indeed, you can be aware of insight; you can understand it in its

[16]Someone once told me of one of Rollo May's books on human creativity where he specifically speaks of "the shower experience." I have not been able of locate the reference. Someone else referred to "the three 'b's' - the bed, the bath and the bus - all places in which you're relaxed and insights can emerge.

relationships with other cognitional acts; you can come to judge that understanding of understanding as correct; but *you can't see it!* The very question you're asking is formulated in imaginative and visual terms and, as such, can't be answered!

That is my formulation now of what I said to myself that afternoon some forty years ago. Perhaps my words then were somewhat different; and certainly my acts of insight were quite global; but that was the substance of it. I realized that the question I was asking, that I spontaneously felt could be answered, could not be answered. I was in the shower, in a room, in a place that could be designated spatially. But an explanatory understanding of my own understanding could not be so designated.

And *that* I was understanding!

And that's why that moment that afternoon forty years ago stands out in my mind today. It is part of my "psychological present."

An important dimension of my insight was the discovery that *I had not understood.* For a long time while reading *Insight* I had been bothered by an underlying question, a question I hardly realized was in me – a question that was literally part of me, part of "my guts." In the shower it found expression in "*Where is this act of insight?*" But the question had been rolling around within me before that as an uneasy feeling, an unsure-ness that I really had a handle on what I was looking for. And the question that flowed from that uneasy feeling was a question that as such could not be answered. Perhaps a neurobiologist could indicate certain areas of the brain stimulated by such reflective thinking, but the insight itself cannot be explained by such underlying conditions.[17]

Such was the nature of my wrestling. I was wrestling with the feeling I had that everything can be analyzed from an "already out there now" perspective.[18] It was a skill or schema I had developed: to ask what something looks like, where it is located, what it feels like. And that was the discovery I made: that these were the wrong questions. It was an inverse insight.

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[17]As Lonergan replied when asked about the biological basis of thought: "The biological basis of thought, I should say, is like the rubber-tire basis of the motor car. It conditions and sets limits to functioning, but under the conditions and within the limits the driver directs operations." *A Second Collection*, 35.

[18]In *Topics in Education* Lonergan presents the work of Jean Piaget on the infant's employment of groups of operations by which "the already out there now" becomes the criterion of reality. See Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10 (University of Toronto Press, 1993), 169. This is an excellent contrast between early development to "the already out there now real" as a primal criterion of reality and its later stubborn persistence as the only criterion of reality.

Such was the key move in my mind from a naïve to a critical realism: with the fear of idealism thrown in for the ride. If insight was not "already out there now," maybe it was "already in here now?" And this was an issue that faced me in the aftermath of my experience in the shower. For I kept asking myself, Is this real? Am I on to anything here? Or am I just getting wrapped up in my own mind? Am I becoming an idealist? Does this insistence on the intellectual pattern of consciousness lose contact with reality? Or is it the way we primarily know reality? Lonergan himself noted that in his early years of philosophical study he himself had experienced this fear that he was becoming an idealist.[19] I found that same fear in myself. I feared that somehow I was getting too wrapped up in my own "self" and never reaching reality "out there."

But then I realized that idealism itself involved the same imaginative "inner-outer" schema on reality that had bedeviled my efforts to figure out "where" insight was. Idealism still holds on to the idea of reality as "out there," and since we do not have any intellectual intuition, any intellectual "look," we consequently cannot get "out there" to "the really real." We are, as it were, trapped in our own minds.

If, on the other hand, reality is mediated by reasonable judgment about what we have understood, rooted in a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence, then we attain reality through the truth of reasonable judgments. And such a reality-ordered process becomes a critical realism through the process of self-appropriation. The breakthrough to understanding the un-imaginability of insight was intimately connected to the breakthrough to a critically realist philosophy.

4. THE TESTIMONY OF OTHERS

In my book I include a number of anecdotal testimonies from others who have told me about similar experiences in reading *Insight.* I have recounted these stories as (in Doorley's terms) "witnesses" to the "startling strangeness" that Lonergan claimed will mark the life of one who has come to understand

[19]See *Caring About Meaning, Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 110-11. There is also a reference to this fear of idealism in Lonergan's seminar on method in theology from 1962, now available as CDs from the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto.

understanding.[20] There was, for example, the professor of philosophy who told me of an afternoon, many years ago, when he was reading *Insight* on the grounds of the North American College in Rome. "I was absolutely carried away by it," he said. "When I walked up to my room that afternoon after reading *Insight,* everything was different - everything!" Another student of *Insight* remembers attending the horse-races at a track in Dublin. "In the middle of the races," he said,

> I began to think of the meaning of "reality." Then it hit me - like a ton of bricks. I realized I understood what Lonergan was talking about! - and it was quite different from the ordinary meaning of "reality." I can remember that moment quite vividly.

Another person told me he remembered very distinctly the turning point in his own journey. "I was in a class at Boston University," he said.

> The professor was a very open man, encouraging us in our own opinions, while at the same time going on about his own. And his opinions on philosophy and human knowing were quite distinct from what *Insight* held. I remember saying to myself: "I know what this man is saying and what he holds; and I *know* he's wrong. I know I hold a whole set of positions on consciousness and insight that are directly opposed to what he's teaching." Perhaps it was his teaching itself that so set up for me the contrast. I can remember that moment years back quite clearly. It was a key moment in my own self-knowledge.

And Philip McShane writes about his experience, not while reading *Insight*, but while reading Lonergan's articles, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Saint Thomas*.

> I recall vividly the strangeness of the beginning of my own escape, and the concomitant shift in sensibility, when I was 26, with four years of mathematical science and two years of philosophy behind me. The pivotal text, oddly enough, was not *Insight,* but the fifth element in the general notion of inner word in the first of the *Verbum* articles. Since then I have found it easy to keep track of the few students I have helped towards and into that strangeness, and I have no doubt that Maslow's statistic, "less than 1% of adults grow," holds sway for the population of philosophers with regard to this bridge. The statistic can change only if we seriously and

[20]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,* vol. 3, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 22.

incarnately make this bridge a topic, and the difficulty of its crossing a topic.[21]

Elsewhere, McShane writes about arriving at "a serious explanatory concept," such as one arrives at in studying *Insight.*

> What, then, do I mean by a concept, a serious explanatory concept, such as we struggle towards in these chapters? I can perhaps appeal to the description that I regularly, in the past twenty years, invited my students of philosophy to ponder over. There are two characteristics of a serious explanatory concept. You will remember the weeks, months, even years, that you spent – with feats of curiosity, not feats of memory – in struggling towards it. You will be able, even years later, to speak of it illuminatingly, through illustrations, for perhaps ten hours. Maybe you are led by this to suspect that serious explanatory concepts are rare achievements? And certainly they are not passed on from generation to generation in compact learned nuggets.[22]

There is also the testimony of the Jesuit, William Ryan, whose breakthrough, like my own, took place in relation to Lonergan's favorite example, the circle.

> Then in 1963 I went to Europe for Tertianship and for doctoral studies in philosophy at Louvain. In Louvain, for the first time, I read Father Lonergan's *Insight* from cover to cover. Shortly afterwards, I ran into a quaint phrase of his: "An insight into a circle has no bumps or dents." I was astonished. I grasped cleanly that an insight is not just more sensing, like staring at the bumps and dents on a wheel. And finally I grasped that by having insights and recognizing them, one enters into the world of Lonergan's method, the world where sensing and insights perform such radically disparate functions.[23]

Another of Lonergan's students, Giovanni Sala, recounts how important Lonergan's insistence on judgment was for his own breakthrough. For years he had studied Kant's philosophy and was convinced, along with most neo-scholastic philosophers, that the only guarantor of the transcendence and objectivity of our knowledge was some kind of intellectual intuition. His encounter with Lonergan as his teacher in Rome, however, threatened his naïve realism.

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[21]Philip McShane, *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Matthew Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981), 548.

[22]Philip McShane, *Economics for Everyone* (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998), 36.

[23]William F. Ryan, "Personal Tribute," *Compass: A Jesuit Journal* (special issue honoring Bernard Lonergan, Spring 1985), 7.

> It was therefore a cause of amazement and confusion to me when later, as a student at the Gregorian University, I heard Lonergan speaking repeatedly of the "*vim judicii existentialis quo per verum judiciium cognoscitur existens" [the power of an existential judgment by which through a true judgment an existent is known]* or of "*verum absolute positum quo innotescit ens" [an absolutely posited truth by which being is known].* My first reading of *Insight* could not restore firm ground under my feet after Lonergan had called my realism into question, a realism that rested on nothing other than the principle of intuition! For years I remained stranded in midstream, so to speak, until gradually the indirect approach through the study of theology, a few seminars with Lonergan...the study of the articles "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas" (which gave me an easier access to Lonergan's thought because of my neo-scholastic background), and another round of wrestling with *Insight*, revealed to me the truth, indeed the extreme simplicity, of the thesis that knowledge of reality occurs through the performance of our intentionality.[24]

Sala sums up his discovery:

> The surprising thing about this insight, which came to me at the end of a long search and in which the scales of intuitionism fell from my eyes, was that, in spite of all the complex particular forms and instances of human knowledge in all its various branches, the core of this doctrine proved to have a disarming simplicity: we know reality because and to the extent that we attentively observe the relevant data of experience, bring the data to an intelligible unity, and take the trouble of weighing the evidence for and against our interpretation of the data with intellectual honesty. Every human being who wants to know how it stands with reality spontaneously does precisely this! This same insight made it possible for me to see the chasm that intuitionism of every sort sets up between the cognitive acts which we de facto perform and the postulated intuition of the fact itself, whether it be Kant's merely sensible intuition or the neo-scholastic intellectual intuition.

Finally, Patrick Byrne in a talk in the 1999 Lonergan Workshop recounted his own experience of this transformation and the accompanying feelings. He spoke about it as "the incredible lightness of being." "Everything looked different," he said. "In fact, I was not sure the stairs beneath me would hold my weight." Even simple equations, such as $2 + 5 = 10 - 3$ were wonderful and

[24]Giovanni B. Sala, *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge*, trans. Joseph Spoerl, ed. Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), xvi-xvii.

mysterious – not to mention other instances of the mysteriousness of the world of theory.

> 'The complete and intrinsic intelligibility of being' – Say it early and often – It awakens something in you and is the key to the general knowledge of God.

Byrne goes on to say that "space and time fall away, that is, spatialness and temporalness in the ordinary sense of 'substance,' that is "hard stuff pushing on hard stuff."

> The unbearable lightness of being is the intrinsic relatedness of everything to everything...

5. CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY AND COSMOPOLIS

I began this article by recalling Mark Doorley's article, "Spiritual Exercises in Cosmopolis," especially the spiritual exercises of witness, silence, and sharing the depths of one's being with others. I cannot over-emphasize the importance of those practices in my own journey to the experience of "startling strangeness." I came to that experience through the witness of others, and that experience itself led to the formation of new community. This is the story I tell in my book; others have similar stories, but each unique.

Lonergan remarked in *Method in Theology* that such an experience is not enough: it has to be applied to all areas of culture and of life – and for that community is necessary.[25] The key thing is to keep taking it seriously and to allow it to affect all one's thinking and acting. As Peter Berger wrote of religious conversion, to have such a conversion is one thing; to continue to take it seriously is something else again. And that can only take place in the context of community.

> It is only within the religious community, the ecclesia, that the conversion can be effectively maintained as plausible. This is not to deny that conversion may antedate affiliation with the community...But this is not the point. To have a conversion experience is nothing much. The real thing is to keep on taking it seriously; to retain a sense of its plausibility. This is where the religious community comes in. It provides the indispensable plausibility structure for the new reality. In other words, Saul may have

[25] *Method in Theology*, 318.

> become Paul in the aloneness of religious ecstasy, but he would remain Paul only in the context of the Christian community that recognized him as such and confirmed the "new being" in which he now located this identity.[26]

"The indispensable plausibility structure for the new reality:" this is a function of community. The small Lonergan community in Rome that was so helpful to me when I was first reading *Insight;* and the Lonergan community through the years that has helped me to continue to take the invitation of *Insight* seriously and to catch a glimmer of its far-reaching implications. As Doorley brought out in his article, the pure desire to know heads toward sharing one's life with others in community; it also leads to creating citizens of Cosmopolis.

Nor is this unrelated to the question of God. Somewhere Lonergan remarks that through this breakthrough to one's own mind "You're almost all the way home," that is, home to the question of God and to identifying God's solution to the problem of human living. Speaking about the search for "the unknown god" among the ancients, particularly Plato and Aristotle, Lonergan remarked:

> Insofar as they reached the unknown god, they were already within the horizon of being, of being that is immaterial beyond all knowledge. And you have the long-winded approach in *Insight* because people today do not know about the unknown god. You have to open up their minds, let them find out what their own minds are before they can begin to be open to thinking of anything beyond this world. [27]

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[26] Peter Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 158.

[27] Bernard Lonergan, from a transcript by Nicholas Graham of discussion at Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 13, 1978.

Lonergan Workshop
20/2008

TOWARD A CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

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Unity without multiplicity is tyranny. Multiplicity without unity is confusion.

Pascal, *Penseés* #510

The incomplete and inadequate becomes mistaken insofar as it tends to be exclusive, as it tends to narrow down, to become fixed and static, instead of growing and developing and becoming whole.

Bernard Lonergan (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6, 7)

AGGIORNAMENTO

ANGELO RONCALLI BECAME Pope John 23rd when I was sixteen. After eight years of parochial school and three years studying with the Jesuits, I thought I knew what it meant to be Catholic. And in one sense, I did. I knew the liturgy of the mass, the biblical stories, the seven sacraments, the apostles creed, a partial history of the church, the importance of love and forgiveness. This early formation begun at home has never deserted me. Still, the unexpected selection of Pope John began a personal process of transformation that continues to this day. Kierkegaard says that the great human calling is to *become* a Christian. He also said it was very difficult to rise to this calling if one were born in Christendom, in a culture where *being* a Christian is taken for granted. I was educated in primary and secondary schools where being a Catholic was taken for granted. The question I want to explore in this narrative is what it means to become more fully Christian by becoming more genuinely Catholic.

Jesus commanded his disciples to bring the gospel, the good news of redemption, to all the world. Their mission was universal, for "all the world" meant Jew and gentile, male and female, slave and free, tax collector and Pharisee. And it still does, though today we have a broader range of categories to express the awesome scope of his universal imperative. From the beginning, the Christian mission was to become *katholou*, Catholic, to integrate into a living community of faith the full diversity and pluralism of the human race with all its concreteness and all its differences, in the full equality achieved through Christ's redemptive work.

The complex history of Christianity reveals how difficult it has been to fulfill this mission. Although the dynamic thrust of the gospel is unrestricted and all-inclusive, it is hard for Christians, for Catholics, to rise consistently to its demands. It is extraordinarily hard for us as individuals to do this; it is even harder for traditional Christian communities, especially where they feel themselves under attack. Perfect love, it is said, drives out fear, but human love is always imperfect, and fear tends to stifle love when danger is perceived on every side.

The church John 23 was asked to lead seems to me, in retrospect, a striking blend of love and fear. Love for its traditions and its history, fear of so much that lay outside it. I am speaking, of course, in general terms. I am trying to capture a spiritual atmosphere created over several centuries in which the Roman Catholic Church struggled to adapt to the defining events of modernity: the northern Italian Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the imperial colonization of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, the critical revolutions in natural science and historiography, the rise of democracy and industrial capitalism, the secular ideologies of liberalism and Marxism, the horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz, the global insistence on full equality and liberty for women.

There were important exceptions, of course, but by and large the leadership of the church set itself in opposition to the emerging world that these events and movements had created. The church saw itself as standing apart from that world, critical of its sins and excesses, and suspicious of its guiding principles: critical reason and autonomous freedom. Important movements within the church that tried to reverse this oppositional stance were either repressed or condemned as "modernist."

John 23 changed the tone and atmosphere within the church. He led by personal example. He exuded goodwill to all, Christian and non-Christian alike. He was open to dialogue; he did not pontificate. His encyclical messages were ecumenical in spirit and focused on contemporary problems. And, most

importantly, he summoned the whole church to *aggiornamento*, to a deep and comprehensive process of renewal.

When John spoke of *aggiornamento*, he used images of freshness. He called for opening the windows of the church to allow fresh air and brisk wind to enter. Spring is the season of renewal when abundant life returns to the earth. That which was dead comes to life again; that which was dormant reawakens. A critical part of *aggiornamento* was the ecumenical council that John called into being. The purpose of this pastoral council, as he described it, was to bring Christ's saving message to the world with new vitality and new forms of expression. John 23, unlike so many of his predecessors, used papal leadership to engage the modern world rather than condemn it.

Since John's death in 1963, after the first year of the council, the meaning and scope of *aggiornamento* have been intensely debated. How bold and far reaching was the renewal John intended; how deep must it go in order to be effective; how discerning must it be to preserve the enduring legacy of the past while critically appropriating the genuine achievements of modernity? And if authentic renewal must be critical, comprehensive, and deep, what will this require of individual Christians and of the church as a living pluralistic community?

We can't know for certain what Pope John intended, but in retrospect we can see what critical and comprehensive renewal requires: a spirit of honesty, humility, and mutual respect. A willingness to examine critically both the history of the church and the history of the modern world. To understand how they became estranged and how each side bears responsibility for their unwelcome separation. Genuine renewal begins with repentance and culminates in wise and effective reforms. Constructive dialogue requires mutual understanding, candid acknowledgement of tensions, a sustained and heroic effort to meet the profound challenges created by five hundred years of suspicion and distrust.

It is also clearer in retrospect what should be avoided if renewal and ecumenical dialogue are to bear enduring fruit. Superficiality must be avoided. There are multiple ways of describing modernity and Catholic Christianity that fail to address the heart of the matter. But the alternative to shallowness is understanding in-depth, which takes time, persistence, and a strong dose of learned ignorance. Pride, impatience, and a flawed sense of history preclude understanding in-depth.

Anger, recrimination, toxic and partisan criticism, all make constructive dialogue impossible. This caution applies to dialogues within the church as well

as with others. Conservatives are bound to fear the loss of the old, liberals the disparagement of the new. But as Bernard Lonergan predicted, "what will count is a critical center, big enough to be at home in the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 244-45).

The Second Vatican Council

The Second Vatican Council began in 1962 and ended in 1965. It opened under the leadership of John 23 and closed during the papacy of Paul VI. While it unfolded, I graduated from Notre Dame, served in the army, and began graduate studies in philosophy at Yale. Although I knew the council was important, my attention was often directed to other concerns. It was only later when I studied Catholic history since the council of Trent, especially the Catholic response to the French revolution and the nineteenth-century developments in critical history and hermeneutics, that I understood how momentous an event Vatican II really was.

It signaled a new beginning in the church's relation to the modern world. Modern Europe and North America had largely developed in independence from the Catholic Church. This was true of modern science, the political movement toward democracy, the rise of industrialism, the liberalization of popular culture and society, the demographic shift to urban patterns of living, the symbiotic connection between modern theory and practice. While these formative trends developed over several centuries, the church clung to a model of society fashioned in medieval Christendom. It tended to view modernity as a deviation from the medieval model and to judge modern history in a negative light.

The reappraisal of modernity initiated during Vatican II was long overdue. The good news of the gospel should not be confused with medieval patterns of thinking and living. The gospel is intended for every society and every culture; the church's obligation to become *katholou* means that it must understand and communicate respectfully with the modern world as fully as it did with its classical predecessors. But since the process of respectful dialogue, of reciprocal teaching and learning had been long neglected, especially by the church's clerical leadership, this renewal of dialogue could not be easy.

For many Catholics, Vatican II precipitated a crisis in self-understanding. I agree with Lonergan that, initially, this was not a crisis of faith but of culture (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 244). For those who had been educated to view medieval culture as normative, the new openness to modernity,

the new imperative to understand modern intellectual and political developments, the new ecumenical spirit toward other Christians and nonbelievers was deeply unsettling. Taking modern history seriously meant acknowledging how deeply rooted in history the Christian religion really is.

This immense undertaking, too long delayed, was only begun by Vatican II. But a new pastoral agenda had been set, a new tone of candor and civility had been adopted, and the church had recognized that authentic *aggiornamento* begins with repentance for past sins and mistakes and reform of its own internal practices.

I want to speak briefly about two conciliar documents, *Lumen Gentium*, the dogmatic constitution on the church, and *Gaudium et Spes*, the pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world. How did their teaching help to shape a more Catholic understanding of Christianity? What is the church? How should we understand the living community of faith that traces it origin to Jesus of Nazareth? *Lumen Gentium* teaches that the church is the pilgrim people of God in history. It is the spirit driven covenant community that carries forward the historic mission of the Jews, to be a light unto the nations. It is a free and responsible community governed by the twofold law of Christ, wholehearted love of God and neighbor. All of its members are called to holiness; all are called to participate in the redemptive work Jesus entrusted to his followers.

These traditional biblical images express an understanding of the church that is less hierarchical, less juridical, less centralized, less clerically focused than many Catholics expected. The leadership roles of pope, bishops, and priests are by no means rejected in *Lumen Gentium*, but there is a new emphasis on collegiality, on collaborative governance, on the different charisms of the spirit, and on universal participation in the church's redemptive mission. The church's striving for unity is recognized, but true unity is achieved in and through the respectful interplay of differences. The church is one body with Christ at its head, but its many living members are not the same.

How can the pilgrim people of God best serve the modern world to which they belong? That is the defining question of *Gaudium et Spes*, the last of the conciliar teachings to be approved. The opening lines of *Gaudium et Spes* affirm the church's explicit solidarity with its contemporaries. Their joys and hopes, their sorrows and concerns are the joys and concerns of the entire church. A genuine effort is made to understand the dynamic aspirations of the modern world, to recognize the principles of freedom and responsibility that animate it, to explore the challenges it faces in bringing social, economic, political, and cultural life into

accord with its declared ideals, and to distinguish carefully its real achievements from its limitations. The contradictions of modernity are also acknowledged as well as the distinctive biases that make their resolution intractable.

If the Tridentine church unduly lamented the excesses of modernity, *Gaudium et Spes* may have overcompensated in articulating its merits. The dangers confronting a global civilization driven by science, technology, unregulated capital, electoral democracy and popular culture need more careful attention than they received. But correctly understanding those dangers and effectively addressing them, require the collaborative dialogue *Gaudium et Spes* set in motion. We can't fairly appraise what we don't understand and appreciate. The earlier one-sided rejection of the modern world was hardly a Catholic response to its needs.

The Second Vatican Council began a long difficult process of internal reform and renewal. An institutional and cultural change of this magnitude was bound to face resistance under the most favorable conditions. But John 23 had died, Paul VI appeared to waver in his leadership, and the church was confronted with the antiauthoritarian spirit of the late sixties. All forms of authority came under attack; the counterculture was sweeping in its negations and uncritical in its enthusiasms; and needed reforms were sometimes implemented pathologically. It became easy for conservative critics to collapse the essential reforms of the council with the excesses of the counter culture. A divisive split occurred in 1968 with the promulgation of *Humanae Vitae.* Catholics tended to divide into progressive and conservative factions, particularly on issues related to gender and sexuality. The inherent difficulty of comprehensive reform is heightened by these divisions and the rancorous passions they evoke. Forty years after the council, we're still waiting for the harvest it promised.

Notre Dame

I entered Notre Dame in 1959 and graduated in 1963. It was there that I discovered the joy and excitement of learning and committed myself to pursuing the life of the mind.

At the heart of my college experience was the great books seminar. I joined Notre Dame's great books program at the end of my freshman year, and it served as my intellectual home while I was there. Our teachers were powerful examples of intellect and faith. My peers were young Catholic men from throughout the

United States. We met twice a week for two hour discussions of the critical texts that shaped the West.

Our teachers did not lecture, but asked questions. There were no limits to what could be thought or said. The discussions were uneven in quality, but they continued long after class had ended. We often met in a bar off campus to pursue unfinished lines of inquiry, among other things.

I learned intellectual freedom in that seminar. I began to think independently and critically. It was so unlike the arguments we had at home. We could disagree passionately without being disrespectful. We could leave an argument unfinished; no one had the last word. No arbitrary power determined what was true.

These open, unrestricted, unfinished dialogues deepened my faith. I learned from my teachers and my friends a new way of being Catholic, a way rooted in inquiry, discussion, and the honest exploration of differences. I particularly remember an observation by Mary Lavin, an Irish writer. "Catholics are most alive when they are questioning." Not complaining but questioning. It became and remains our second nature.

I also learned at Notre Dame the communal nature of inquiry. The thoughts that come to us in solitude need to be shared and tested. What light they bring is best determined by the test of experience and the critical scrutiny of peers. There is no better place to think than in an intellectual and spiritual community committed to the life of inquiry and the quest for truth. To create and sustain such distinctive communities, in my judgment, is the central purpose of the Catholic college.

I want to recognize two other sources of my Catholic education. The first is extracurricular. As much as I learned from reading and discussing books, I learned even more from male and female friends, from theatre, music, art, film, athletics, the contemplation of nature, personal prayer, the liturgical and sacramental life. Once the mind is intensely alive, nearly everything in existence can be a source of insight.

But there is no substitute for human teachers whose power of example outlasts their words. I had many extraordinary teachers at Notre Dame whom I remember with gratitude. Given the purpose of this narrative, I want to mention one in particular, John Dunne, a professor of theology. He had a remarkable spirit, open, exploratory, peaceful, sympathetic. For Dunne, no human achievement however alien and unfamiliar, should be set aside as devoid of insight. We need to open ourselves to the light whatever its source. But our hearts will resist this Catholic precept as long as they are committed to the quest for certainty. In order

to enlarge our minds, we need first to relax our hearts by surrendering the ideal of certainty and adopting the more human quest for understanding.

Through his classes and his books, Dunne taught us the importance of passing over and coming back. When certainty is our goal, otherness, difference, plurality make us uneasy. They seem to threaten the loss of what we prize. But Dunne insisted that our human perspective on reality is always finite and relative. We have more to learn than we have to fear from engaging the other sympathetically, whether it be other lives, religions, cultures, or ways of responding to death.

Dunne didn't simply assert this principle; he lived it with a spirit of adventure and humility that was infectious. We learned from Dunne that Catholic theology is not a closed system but a dynamic, historical quest rooted in learned ignorance and the passion for greater understanding. At a critical time in our lives, he calmed our spirits while heightening our *eros* for what is good.

Philosophy at Yale

I entered Yale University in September of 1964. I came to Yale from Fort Polk, Louisiana, after completing six months of infantry training for the National Guard. Fort Polk is isolated, humid, and snake-infested. My fellow soldiers were nearly all from the Deep South, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. The summer of 1964 was a critical period in the civil rights struggle, when Cheney, Goodwin, and Schwerner were murdered in Mississippi.

The divisive passions evoked by the movement for racial equality were palpable at Fort Polk. I was seen as a Yankee, an outsider, as my support for civil rights was explicit and clear. Several young southerners whom I respected and liked were venomous on the subject of black equality. Christian loyalty cut both ways as the bible was cited for and against the Negro cause. I learned, to my dismay, that the Christian faith is an uncertain guide on matters of justice. Given the history of slavery, imperialism and anti-Semitism, I should already have known what I learned firsthand that freedom summer.

It's a long way from Leesburg, Louisiana, the home of Fort Polk, to New Haven, Connecticut. Even longer than the intellectual path from Notre Dame to Yale. Prior to Yale, I had always studied in Catholic settings. Catholics were a clear minority at Yale, though their Newman Center, Thomas More parish, was vibrant and brilliantly led. To my mind, the similarities outweighed the differences. Both Notre Dame and Yale were intellectual communities dedicated to the life of the mind. Both had excellent students and teachers, committed to

high standards and academic integrity. Both honored the liberal arts and a common set of intellectual virtues.

Notre Dame was warmer than Yale, more welcoming. But graduate school is driven by disciplinary exigences, and professional expectations that are impersonal and often severe. Yale was reasonably humane, as grad schools go, and I am grateful for the philosophical education I received there.

What I missed at Yale was the integration of the intellectual and spiritual life. At Notre Dame I had witnessed Christian humanism at its best, particularly in the teachers I most admired. Humanism was honored at Yale, but the intellectual and spiritual spheres were separate. Not hostile, in my experience, but segregated and deprived of reciprocal interaction. Though faith and reason are distinct, they complement each other, as grace complements created nature and mercy complements justice. As a student learning philosophy, I benefited, in some respects, from this clear separation, but personally I missed the complementarity.

I met my wife Barbara at Yale. She was a graduate student in French who shared my faith and love of learning. We married at the end of our second year and later started a family with the birth of our daughter Sarah. Marital and parental love profoundly deepened my Catholic education. When two become one and then three, the meaning of interdependence and shared responsibility becomes concrete. Jesus' parables of love, forgiveness, and trust assume new relevance. I began to understand the more abundant life Christ promised.

Bernard Lonergan

Before I left Notre Dame, John Dunne introduced me to the name of Bernard Lonergan and to the title of his ground-breaking work, *Insight*. The smallest of seeds to be sure. Later, at Yale, I found a copy of *Insight* in the library and began to read Lonergan on my own. Over the next forty years, I studied his work carefully while pursuing my philosophical and personal education. In my judgment, Lonergan is one of the great minds of the twentieth century and one of the great thinkers in the history of the church.

My intellectual debts to Lonergan are immense and incalculable. His rhetoric and example encouraged me to pursue the life of inquiry with unrestricted ardor. In the mid to late sixties when so much was in flux, in the church, in the academy, in our country, I relied on Lonergan to point the way to sanity, balance, and critical discernment.

Let me explain. The history of the modern world is marked by dynamic change, intellectual, cultural, and practical. From the Counter-Reformation to the

papacy of Pope John, the Catholic Church largely resisted or remained aloof from this historic transformation. The church prided itself on its immobility, on its permanent possession of essential truth.

Pope John's summons to *aggiornamento* initiated a period of great change within the church itself. In Lonergan's judgment, the required change was long overdue. Because Christianity is an historical religion, Christians must continually rise to the level of their times in both thought and practice. Yet, for several centuries Catholics had failed to do this, and now, belatedly, they were trying to catch up. Momentous developments in science, scholarship, and human self-understanding had occurred since the Renaissance, creating equally momentous challenges for the church. Although Lonergan supported *aggiornamento*, he believed the church was unprepared for its radical demands. Unless the dynamic sources of modernity were understood and critically appraised, the Johanine renewal was likely to be superficial and ineffective.

Since Lonergan was a philosopher and a theologian, he naturally emphasized the renewal of Catholic philosophy and theology. It is in these fields that he made his greatest contributions.

For Lonergan, what does critical and enduring *aggiornamento* require? A genuine assimilation of what is new in modern science, scholarship, philosophy, and theology. The careful preservation of what is still valid in the older traditions. And the critical ability to distinguish the authentic from the inauthentic in our classical and modern legacies.

How are these requirements to be met? To understand modern science is to comprehend its methodical canons, its distinct heuristic structures, its firm insistence on empirically verified truth claims. To understand modern scholarship is to grasp its specialized methods of research, interpretation, critical history, and normative dialectic. To understand modern philosophy is to carry forward the historic shift to intentional subjectivity by exploiting its full range of epistemic and moral implications. Finally, to re-conceive modern theology is to articulate its methodological dependence on eight interrelated functional specialties that mediate an ancient religion to a diverse and constantly changing world. Each of these tasks is easy to proclaim but extraordinarily hard to execute.

You may have noticed the recurrent emphasis on method. For Lonergan, the deep way to understand modernity is through strategically grasping its methods of inquiry and conduct. These methods account for the dynamism of modern life by providing normative frameworks of collaborative creativity. In classical culture, where the results of science were thought to be permanently true, logic was the

basis of epistemic and ontological integration. But the results of modern science, scholarship, and practical activity are subject to continual revision and amendment. These distinctively modern practices locate invariance, not at the level of propositional outcomes, but at the level of method, a patterned set of intentional operations yielding progressive and cumulative results.

As the human mind develops, it creates new methods for understanding and transforming reality. To rise to the level of one's time is to master these methods and to honor their exigent norms and procedures. Lonergan's reconstruction of philosophy is based on the intentional analysis of these evolving specialized methods and of the generalized empirical method that, he believes, underlies them all.

His is a strikingly Catholic philosophy in the deepest sense of the term. It is open, dynamic, comprehensive, historically minded, pluralistic, integrative, and critical. Lonergan takes his stand on human beings as they are, concrete existential subjects with a mature commitment to self-knowledge.

All adult persons are invited to intellectual and moral conversion, to discover in themselves the *de facto* invariants of their conscious subjectivity. These invariant principles provide the critical ground for distinguishing human development from decline. To honor them faithfully, as persons and communities, is to achieve authenticity. To dishonor them is to lapse into alienation and sin. To justify such lapses is the purpose of ideology, the rationalizing project by which all individuals and institutions are tempted.

What are the foundational principles that constitute our deepest humanity?

1) The unrestricted desire to know (the *eros* of mind) and the unrestricted desire for good (the *eros* for all that is truly worthwhile)
   1a) These unrestricted desires make human inquiry and practice dynamic and open-ended; they explain the intrinsic restlessness of the human spirit.
2) Human consciousness is also subject to immanent norms that require us to be actively attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and open to grace in our personal and collective existence.
   2a) Lonergan articulates these normative exigences in the transcendental precepts, his intentional analogue to the natural law.
3) Because human existence throughout history is a tangled knot of greatness and wretchedness, we must also recognize the forms of bias, dramatic, egoistic, group, and general that compromise our fidelity to these fundamental principles.

3a) Bias obstructs human development and makes us vulnerable to alienation and decline.
3b) The justification of bias is the root of ideology, the most significant cultural barrier to repentance and reform.

As the foundational principles are universal and invariant, so is our vulnerability to bias and sin. This caution applies to every human being and to every historical community, including the church. It applies, as well, to the process of *aggiornamento*, for even renewal and reform can go awry.

Since divine grace perfects created nature and heals the violence of sin, Lonergan's principles are Catholic in another sense as well. They enable us to preserve whatever is genuine and good in both classical and modern history; they enable us to criticize whatever is compromised by bias, sin, and ideology. The gift of grace respects the integrity of humanistic achievement while enabling us to transcend its de facto limitations and weaknesses.

Lonergan's methodological renewal of philosophy and theology has explicit historical analogues. He attempted to do for the twentieth century what Thomas Aquinas achieved in the thirteenth. The analogy, of course, is one of proportion, for we no longer live in a medieval world. Aquinas rose to the cultural challenge of his time by integrating Aristotelian and Augustinian insights into a scripturally grounded theology. Lonergan met the challenge of modernity by articulating its intentional sources, methods and norms, by distinguishing its enduring achievements from its limitations, and by encouraging the creation of communities of inquiry actively committed to *aggiornamento* in-depth.

The Catholic Church should faithfully support such ecumenical communities wherever and whenever they arise.

Teaching and Learning at Vassar

Barbara, Sarah, and I moved to Poughkeepsie, New York, in the summer of 1968. I had accepted an offer to teach at Vassar, a path-breaking women's college which had just decided to become coeducational. Radical change was in the air, politically, culturally, and intellectually. American cities were burning, American soldiers were dying, American campuses were swept by fierce winds of dissent.

Vassar's decision to admit men was a sign of the times. Old institutional patterns were dissolving as a participatory ethos emerged in the academy, the church, and the nation at large. It was an exciting and troubling time, a time of unrest and upheaval.

Political and religious conservatives have severely criticized the late sixties for their excesses. And excesses there were. But the grievances that evoked them were real. Racial discrimination, deteriorating cities, an unwise and unjust war, serious environmental neglect, restricted opportunities for women, a compliant academy too closely tied to the government, a curial bureaucracy reluctant to implement the basic reforms of Vatican II. In my opinion, we sorely need a dispassionate and balanced appraisal of this turbulent and seminal period.

We have lived at Vassar for thirty-nine years; it has been our home. Originally nondenominational, Vassar is now effectively secular though there are appointed chaplains for the major religious groups on campus. There is a small number of Catholics on the faculty, but a larger contingent in the student body. Vassar has a strong and vibrant feminist tradition; it is passionately committed to the liberty and equality of women. Vassar is liberal in its politics and culture; its curriculum is diverse and flexible. You can study nearly everything except theology, though there is an active department of religion. Robert Bellah has identified four distinct cultural traditions in the United States: biblical, civic republican, utilitarian, and expressive individualist. Expressive individualism is the dominant tradition at Vassar today.

I have deep respect for my Vassar colleagues; I admire their integrity, their exceptional gifts, their wholehearted commitment to teaching and scholarship. I have immense affection for our students. They are intelligent, critical, and adventurous, open to new ideas, responsive to challenge. It has been an honor to teach and learn from them.

I have no doubt that my work at Vassar has been holy. That it has been a form of Christian service. For me, the classroom is holy ground and the hours of teaching holy hours. What can this mean, since Vassar is a secular institution and the integrity of the classroom precludes all forms of worship? By seeking knowledge together, by respecting truth, by refusing no questions and appraising all answers, by building a community of learning and obeying the normative precepts Lonergan outlined. I believe we are doing God's work. The great majority of our students don't see it that way, but I do. Our *eros* of mind is a gift from God; our *eros* for the good a clear sign of God's presence within us. When human beings respond to these desires with integrity and make them the center of their lives, they honor God and profoundly enrich human existence. All forms of service are holy: parenting, teaching, healing, creating, governing, feeding, cleaning, fighting for justice.

I've learned at Vassar many things I may not have learned as well if I had stayed at Notre Dame. To respect and admire colleagues with whom I profoundly disagree; to learn from students of every race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation; to recognize the blatant and subtle prejudices that deny women full equality; to realize that we can do God's will without acknowledging God's presence or God's help; to love this world with all its diversity, disorder, and strangeness; to perceive signs of grace wherever they appear.

Vassar has been an essential part of my Catholic education.

Charles Taylor

Next to Lonergan the most important contemporary influence on my thinking has been his fellow Canadian, Charles Taylor. Lonergan was a Jesuit who studied and taught in Catholic institutions. Taylor is a lay Catholic educated in Canada and England, who has taught at Oxford, McGill, and now at Northwestern. Lonergan was a philosophical theologian; Taylor is a remarkably capacious thinker whose principal audience consists of secular intellectuals. Although they lived and moved in different circles, their ways of thinking are fundamentally Catholic, open to the whole of reality in its full complexity.

Two central themes in Taylor's recent work, pluralism and unbelief, illuminate his Catholicity.

Taylor reminds me of John Dunne in his effort to understand rather than condemn views he does not share. This trait is apparent in all his works, especially *Sources of the Self*, the *Ethics of Authenticity*, *A Catholic Modernity?*, his recent lectures on William James. Taylor is acutely aware of modern pluralism: moral pluralism in *Sources*, the different forms of individualism in *Authenticity*, the multiple Catholic responses to *Modernity*, contrasting genealogies of modern unbelief. He thinks we oversimplify complex cultural traditions, dividing them into one-sided, polarizing contrasts. This bifurcation makes critical appraisal easier than it should be for neither the advocates of modern pluralism nor its critics really understand its complexity. Taylor's subtle genealogies reveal the multiple branchings that occur within a common tradition, like modern humanism, or the ideal of authenticity.

Not surprisingly, he believes there are multiple Catholic modernities as well. Catholics can embrace the moral insights and aspirations of their secular contemporaries without endorsing the restrictive ontologies of naturalism or historicism. The authentic goods acknowledged in modernity, like human rights,

the affirmation of ordinary life, universal benevolence, and the passionate struggle against suffering and injustice are fully consonant with the Christian gospel.

The critical task is to distinguish genuine from counterfeit forms of these modern goods and to determine the ontological commitments that are needed to motivate and justify their courageous pursuit.

Like Lonergan, Taylor believes that human beings have a natural orientation to the good. But our contemporaries tend to stifle or deny the deep implications of this moral thrust. Both scientific materialism and the hermeneutics of suspicion are openly skeptical of moral ontologies inconsistent with their prejudices. Culturally, we are constricted by an ethics of unbelief that treats doubt as more authentic than assent, and redemption as less credible than despair. Taylor does not condemn these powerful prejudices. While recognizing their spiritual grip, he seeks to understand their origins and the basis of their appeal. Paradoxically, these reductive treatments of morality are often grounded in unacknowledged moral aspirations. The result is a fascinating reversal of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals. Nietzsche claimed to find envy and resentment at the root of Christian ethics. Taylor reveals how the passion for justice and the commitment to freedom motivate theories that explicitly deny the force of these critical moral concerns The genealogical critics of morality are actually driven by moral passions themselves.

We humans are self-interpretive animals. Part of who we are is who we take ourselves to be. This hermeneutic principle applies to both personal and cultural self-interpretation. We seriously constrict our freedom to think and act by misunderstanding our past and oversimplifying our present and future. Taylor insists that the dominant interpretations of modernity are one-sided and incomplete. Particularly the stories we tell of modern unbelief.

According to the "mainline story," it was the rise and advance of science and critical thinking that weakened Christianity in the West. On this account the empirical and critical spirit of modernity is incompatible with the requirements of authentic faith. By contrast, Taylor argues that the principal obstacles to religious allegiance in modernity are moral and spiritual not epistemic. The modern scientific revolution was accompanied by a moral and cultural rejection of traditional hierarchies and Christian otherworldliness. The modern affirmation of ordinary life gave a new dignity to lay vocations. The insistence on individual rights, on freedom of inquiry and expression, religious liberty, and the primacy of conscience made traditional forms of social control appear repressive.

The church's entanglement in the *Ancien Regime* alienated the friends of democracy; its passive acceptance of the injustices of capitalism alienated the working class and its allies. In our time, the halfhearted acceptance of women's rights is a major barrier to the church's credibility and effectiveness.

The critical insights of Lonergan and Taylor are complementary. Lonergan emphasized the church's epistemic failure to understand the new forms of learning. Taylor emphasizes its belated commitment to modernity's moral aspirations. In both cases, the church concentrated on the excesses and aberrations of the new. It was also driven by legitimate fears of losing what was valid in the old. But a defensive, nay saying Christianity has limited attractive power for the young, the creative advocates of innovation and change, and all who suffer from the systemic injustices of the past.

Lonergan and Taylor show us another way. Without ceasing to be critical, they emphasize the affirmative: the insights and achievements of modernity, its support for human freedom and responsibility, the goodness of this life that coexists with our hope for life eternal.

A Catholic Christianity

"Genuine Christian humility excludes the resentment that belittles the learning one does not possess" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 361).

The renewal of Catholic Christianity should begin with a comprehensive and critical realism. We need to understand the decline of the church, especially in Europe, but also in the United States where many former and present Catholics feel deeply estranged. There are several reasons for this decline, not all attributable to the church's failures. But genuine renewal begins with repentance, with accepting responsibility for past errors and sins. In my judgment, defensive apologetics will not be helpful.

I want to focus on three influential criticisms of Christianity whose polemical force still carries weight. These criticisms come from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, whom Paul Ricoeur has called "the masters of suspicion." Ricoeur's thoughtful and balanced interpretation of Freud exemplifies the best way to address these critical assaults.

Marx rejected Christianity as "the opium of the people." He thought its emphasis on God demeaned human dignity; he thought its emphasis on heaven weakened opposition to injustice on earth.

Nietzsche claimed that the sources of Christian ethics were suspect; that the gospel of love was actually rooted in resentment and envy.

Freud believed that the religious mentality is infantile and regressive; that religious accounts of reality are unscientific, that religious ethics are unduly restrictive, and that religious hopes are illusory and vain.

All three of these thinkers assumed that a mature and healthy humanity would reject religion as an obstacle to development and growth. In my judgment, this belief is mistaken. It confuses aberrant forms of religion with the genuine article. But the aberrations are real, even if they are exaggerated by the masters of suspicion. The rhetorical force of their criticism resonates with everyone, believer and nonbeliever alike, who thinks that God is the enemy of man, that the church is complicit in systemic injustice, that it belittles achievements it does not understand, and that it fosters immature ways of thinking and feeling. When I say the church, I mean us. It is we who are vulnerable to these failings, who commit these sins, who dishonor God by the images of the divine we project and defend. We are called to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world. But is that what we are? Is that how our contemporaries experience our presence among them? The most powerful witness, for or against the gospel, are the lives that we actually lead.

What would a Catholic Christianity faithful to the message of the gospel and the mission of redeeming the world be like?

1) our thought and speech would be realistic and critical; we would be as truthful as we can in understanding ourselves, our past, and the complexity of the world that we serve.
2) genuinely repentant, we would not justify past failures, conceal present weaknesses, nor shrink from the challenge of conversion and change.
3) Our understanding of the church and the world would be deeply historical. The redemptive message of the gospel is constant, but it has to be proclaimed with fresh credibility to each culture and people in history.
4) An ecumenical church would treat everyone with dignity and respect. Without glossing over differences, its internal and external dialogues would seek mutual understanding and, where possible, consensus in judgment. It would be a continually learning and teaching church, conscious of its limits as well as its strengths.

5) The church should abandon all the baggage of patriarchy. Women and men are equally created in God's image, equally redeemed by Christ's sacrifice, equally inspired by the Spirit, and equally called to the service of God in the world. All the ministries of the church should be fully open to women.
6) The principles of collegial governance and meaningful lay participation proclaimed in Vatican II must be fully implemented. The unifying role of the pope is consistent with a far less centralized, bureaucratic, and secretive manner of conducting the church's affairs. The church's internal practice must become a model of freedom and justice if its prophetic ministry to the world is to be taken seriously.
7) If the church becomes a credible agent of redemption and reconciliation, if it reveals by its language and practice that it truly is the people of God, it will find, I believe, a troubled world hungry for its presence and ministry. For our world needs the insight, wisdom, and compassion of Christianity as much as any period in history. A humble and merciful church, a joyful and honest church, a genuinely Catholic Church, can be a light unto the nations by authentically searching for truth, overcoming evil with good, and by charitably resolving the painful divisions within its own ranks. The challenge of *aggiornamento* is ours.

Lonergan Workshop
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"AT THE STILL POINT" WHERE "THERE IS ONLY THE DANCE": *LOGOS*, LONERGAN, AND T. S. ELIOT'S *FOUR QUARTETS*

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I. INTRODUCTION: WHITHER THE "CENTER"?

AT FIRST GLANCE, the oft cited words of Lonergan that organize this year's Workshop, which disparage a naive "right" and aimless "left" but hold out hope for a "not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new," will strike many as political allusion, just as they might have sounded when first presented at Marquette University in May of 1965, very near the conclusion of the radical changes in Catholic life that were about to begin through the closing of Vatican II.[1] Yet these comments conclude an essay, "Dimensions of Meaning," whose main concern is not politics but rather the interpretation, development, and importance, in all human learning, of the category of "meaning." Against neo-Thomists such as Gilson and Coreth,[2] Lonergan rejects the claim "that what counts is the reality that is meant and not the mere meaning that refers to it," and instead affirms that "the functions of meaning are larger than the objection envisages."[3] Once naïve empiricists leave the infant's "world of immediate experience," words begin to "denote not only what is present but also what is absent... not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal," and thus words lead us to a "larger world mediated by meaning" in which meaning is not only

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[1]Bernard Lonergan. "Dimensions of Meaning," 1965. *Collection*. 2d ed. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 245. On the lecture date, see editors' note p. 308.

[2]See, for example, "Dimensions of Meaning,"), 188-204.

[3]"Dimensions of Meaning," 234.

descriptive but constitutive of reality, and indeed is "the real world" in "which we live our lives."[4] As the third in a series of three articles that prepared the way for "meaning" becoming one of the four foundational chapters in *Method in Theology*,[5] "Dimensions of Meaning" is clearly part of a much broader project, though its conclusion does become more directly controversial by stressing the need for Catholic theology to shift from a "classical" to a "modern culture."[6]

It is crucial to understand as to precisely what this shift does and does not entail. While "Dimensions of Meaning" does not make this point entirely clear, certainly other parts of the essay praise the scholarly contributions of modern science and historical method, as those familiar with the "general empirical" method of Lonergan's *Insight* would expect.[7] Yet the two paragraphs just before the essay's conclusion do make very clear that Lonergan does not simply praise modern scholarship, or argue that its insights can be uncritically adopted. On the contrary, Lonergan's tone here is the honest despair of a truly earnest scholar, one too well aware that there are "endless works of commentary, interpretation, exegesis, explanation," but "no expectation that this stream will dry up, that a final word will be spoken," for "new books pour forth annually by the thousands" and "our libraries need ever more space."[8] Sadly, however, "the vast modern effort to understand meaning in all its manifestations" has not led to general enlightenment, for it "has not been matched by a comparable effort in judging meaning." Whereas "the effort to understand" meaning has become "the common task of unnumbered scientists and scholars," "judging and deciding are left to the individual, and he finds his plight desperate," for "there is too much to be learnt before" one "could begin to judge." Nevertheless, Lonergan concludes this section of the essay with a claim familiar to all students of his fourfold epistemology: "Yet judge he must and decide he must if he is to exist, if he is to be a man."[9]

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[4]"Dimensions of Meaning," 233.

[5]The preceding two articles are "Time and Meaning," 1962. *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 94-121, and "The Analogy of Meaning," 1963. *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964.*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 183-213.

[6]"Dimensions of Meaning," 233.

[7]Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 5th ed. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

[8]"Dimensions of Meaning," 244.

[9]"Dimensions of Meaning," 244.

No immediate direction is given, however, as to what could make such judgments true, or good, or worthy of humanity, or faithful to God, and so Lonergan's conclusion to "Dimensions of Meaning" begins by acknowledging that this apparently "bleak picture" cries out for some theological response. He then makes the much less controversial – and far less frequently quoted – affirmation that "there has been no new revelation from on high to replace the revelation given through Christ Jesus," "no new Bible," and "no new church, to link us with him," and further attempts to clarify that any crisis in the Church – such as what may have necessitated Vatican II – is "a crisis not of faith but of culture," and the shift needed from "classical" to "modern" mediations of meaning is a shift in cultural expression rather than fundamental belief.[10] Perhaps what Lonergan here intends is a corrective balancing of contemporary theology that allows the insights of modern scholarship to be integrated with the lasting truths of Christian revelation. Still, the question of "judgment" persists, and it is not entirely answered by the metaphorical hope that "what will count," in the long run, is "a perhaps not numerous center,"[11] for what creates this "center," what can guide the judgments of those within it, helping them to know whether or not the cultural transition is really being made, whether or not they are discovering the "complete solutions" that both integrate new scholarly information and affirm existing theological truth?

The original Marquette audience already had, of course, the lengthy discussion in Lonergan's *Insight* of the foundations of the intellectual judgment of truth, which would allow them to recognize that "Dimensions of Meaning" was not a modernist or, worse yet, postmodernist manifesto of nihilist despair, but as a literary scholar today I am especially struck by the cultural parallels between Lonergan's concerns and the transition to literary modernism that occurs in the early twentieth-century. In the 1920s, Yeats's "The Second Coming" had followed Nietzche in seeing a post-Christian age in which "the center cannot hold,"[12] and T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland" had juxtaposed an almost forgotten past with an apparently aimless modern culture embued with sexual sterility and spiritual decay.[13] About a decade later, Eliot's "Choruses from 'The Rock'" saw in modern

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[10]"Dimensions of Meaning," 244.

[11]"Dimensions of Meaning," 245.

[12]W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming," in *The Norton Anthology of English_Literature: The Major Authors,* 8th ed. Gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 2402.

[13]T. S. Eliot, "The Wasteland." 1922. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962.* (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991).

culture "knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word,"[14] then asked further questions that are surely prophetic of Lonergan's philosophical quest:

> "Where is the Life we have lost in living?
> Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?"[15]

Yet Eliot's very ability to ask such questions – let alone to contemplate the answers plentifully supplied within the rest of 'The Rock," a 1934 church pageant play – reflects his own integration of new and old that had become possible through his conversion to the Anglican Church seven years earlier, in 1927. In short, in sum, Eliot came to recognize that, if information was to become knowledge and knowledge to be wisdom, he needed repentance – which is masterfully chronicled in "Ash Wednesday,"[16] the poem Eliot used to publicly announce his conversion – and above all else, he needed God.

Again, I see an important parallel to Lonergan, for seven years after "Dimensions of Meaning" he published *Method in Theology*,[17] a book in which the third, now fully developed chapter on "meaning" is followed by a fourth introductory chapter, on "religion." This chapter makes clear that, at not only the stage of "judgment" but every other stage in Lonergan's fourfold epistemology, God is foundational to perceiving, knowing, and judging the central intellectual, ethical, and religious realities that can provide a stable ecclesiastical center. "Man's transcendental subjectivity," or individual capacity to become aware of meaning that transcends one's self, "is mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth toward the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value"[18] – the ultimate aims of each stage of Lonergan's epistemology or "transcendental method." In other words, while often this stretch is a "reach" rather than an "attainment," still Lonergan insists that "within" the human "horizon" there exists "a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness" that "cannot be ignored."[19]

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[14]T. S. Eliot, "Choruses from 'The Rock,'" 1934. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 147.

[15]"Choruses from 'The Rock,'"147.

[16]T. S. Eliot, "Ash Wednesday," 1934. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 83-95.

[17]Bernard Lonergan. *Method in Theology*. 1972. (Minneapolis: Seabury, 1979), 241.

[18]*Method in Theology*, 103.

[19]*Method in Theology*, 103.

Yet precisely because God is not just one more object to be perceived, known, and judged, but is rather, as St. Paul puts it, the "all in all"(1 Corinthians 15:28) that allows our very being to exist, the common human consciousness of God – our psychological common grace – arises within "the *a priori* structured drive that promotes us from experiencing to the effort to understand, from understanding to the effort to judge truly, from judging to the effort to choose rightly," and precisely to "the measure that we advert to our own questioning and proceed to question it," there arises "the question of God," the question of whether or not "our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation" have been able to allow "our capacity for self-transcendence."[20] "That capacity," Lonergan very poetically concludes, "becomes an actuality when one falls in love," when "one's being becomes being-in-love" with both our fellow human beings and most importantly, with "the love of God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength" (Mark 12:30).[21]

To this point in chapter 4 of *Method*, Lonergan stresses that the fulfillment of our capacity for religious self-transcendence requires human effort, even if it is work enabled and ultimately completed by God, and it seems fair to see the "transcendental method" first outlined in *Insight* as a "way up" to God open to any human with ears to hear, eyes to see, and a heart willing to follow Christ's great commandments. Yet right after describing "being-in-love" with God in the language of that commandment, Lonergan turns to perhaps his most common, characteristic way of describing religious experience, which suddenly becomes "God's love flooding our heart through the Holy Spirit given to us" (Romans 5:5), followed immediately by one of the longest, clearest statements of theological conviction in *Method*, the Pauline promise that "There is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths – nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Romans 8:38). In the very ordering of his sentences, Lonergan thus illustrates a shift from a "way up" or philosophical anthropology to a "way down" of revealed theology, and immediately he further begins to emphasize that the fulfillment of the human capacity for self-transcendence "is not the product of our knowledge and choice"; "on the contrary," religious conversion

[20]*Method in Theology*, 103.
[21]*Method in Theology*, 105.

> dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and eyes of that love will transform our knowing.[22]

Although Lonergan again cites St. Paul to describe this as "a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Galatians 5: 22),"[23] mainly he is at pains to distinguish it from the other conscious states through which transcendental method has led the human person. For now, on this "fourth level of intentional consciousness," the human person is "brought to a fulfillment," through "conversion," and possesses "a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love."[24] Clearly alluding again to St. Paul's call for the Ephesians to know, "with all" the "saints," "the breadth, and length, and depth, and height" of "the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge" and allows us to "be filled with all the fullness of God" (Ephesians 3:18-19), Lonergan concludes his account of "the gift of God's love" by proclaiming it as the spiritual center, "the ground root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness...the peak of the soul, the *apex animae.*"[25]

Lonergan's use of metaphorical paradox here is highly poetic, placing "God's love" as both the foundation and summit of human consciousness and thus a unifing, central whole, but it is not *Method*'s final word on religion. Lonergan must yet respond to several other troubling questions: if transcendental subjectivity is the "a priori" drive of human consciousness, why do humans so frequently ignore it? More troubling yet, if the spiritual "*apex animae*" just described is strictly the "gift of God," why does God not give it more often? As beautiful and moving as Lonergan's account of "being-in-love" with God undoubtedly is, does it provide an accurate, even possible account of the human condition? Does it reflect a subjective Christian desire, or is it in some way an objective account of God's working in history? Is it something that can be experienced in our world, in time, or only in the next, in eternity? If such questions cannot be answered, is the possibility of a "stable center" simply a "logo-centric" fiction, as Derrida and the other Nietzchean deconstructionists

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[22]*Method in Theology*, 106.
[23]*Method in Theology*, 106.
[24]*Method in Theology*, 106.
[25]*Method in Theology*, 106-107.

claim? Because his theology springs from a center founded on both the old and the new, Lonergan can respond to such questions with a modern, critical philosophy, as *Insight* certainly demonstrates, but *Method*'s chapter on "religion" deepens and amplifies the possibility of this center through the detailed use of a highly complex and deeply traditional biblical concept that Lonergan thoroughly understands: the "word" or, in Hebrew "*dabar*," and, in Greek, "*logos*".

Careful to acknowledge the reality of general revelation, of common grace, Lonergan begins with a very general definition of "the word" as "any expression of religious meaning or of religious value," but he then proceeds to a much more specific discussion of the reality of an "inward," spiritual word and the necessity of an "outward word" as "constitutive" of human community.[26] Lonergan thus recalls both the "outer word" of the law given to Moses on the heights of Sinai and the inner word of Moses' closing discourse in Deuteronomy, when he promises the Jewish people that God's word is written on their hearts, and known in the depths of their being, and capable of moving them to ethical action. Assuring and challenging every Jewish believer, Moses promises them that "the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that *thou* mayest do it" (Deuteronomy 30:14). Yet *Method* has already noted the Greek Philosopher Heraclitus's notion of *logos* as "an intelligence...that steers through all things," which "to know... is wisdom,"[27] and so Lonergan clearly understands both the Jewish and Greek sources that help explain why the Apostle John makes the *logos*, or "Word," so central to the opening of his gospel. For John, the word is "with God" and "was God," the still center out of whose mutual love "all things were made," and from which comes "the life" that is "the light of men" (John 1:1-4). Yet the possibility of misunderstanding the *logos* in our fallen world is also all too likely, for "the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not" (John 1:5). Even once the Word "was made flesh" and became very clearly present in the person of Jesus Christ, the drama of salvation remained, for some "received him not," even though to "as many as received him, to them he gave the power to become the children of God" (John 1:12-14). The preexistent reality but also possible human rejection of the *logos* speaks directly to the troubling questions always posed about God, but for the most part *Method*'s chapter on religion shows Lonergan speaking from the viewpoint of one who has accepted "being-in-love" with God, and who knows religious conversion not simply as a historical fact or written biblical concept, but as "a mystery of love and awe" that,

[26]*Method in Theology*, 112-13.
[27]*Method in Theology*, 91.

like the relationship of husband and wife, cannot "be objectified."[28] Thus it is from both a personal and scholarly perspective that Lonergan summarizes his own ongoing conversion to the good news of John's "*logos*":

> Perhaps after years of sustained prayerfulness and self-denial, immersion in the world mediated by meaning will become less total and experience of the mystery become clear and distinct enough to awaken attention, wonder, inquiry... But then, as much as ever, one needs the word – the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those that share the gift of God's love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen."[29]

Apart from one's interior spiritual life, there remains the problem of how to speak publicly of this "personal" word in which "love speaks to love" in such a "powerful" way. Lonergan's *Method* lists "the religious leader, the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher" as being among those who "announce[s] in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us";[30] but, based on Lonergan's other comments on literature,[31] we should certainly add "poet" to this list, particularly T. S. Eliot, a poet whose understanding of "the word of God's love" is so congruent with Lonergan's. "Ash Wednesday," for example, uses both our sense of "still" as quiet and the older meaning of "still" as "always," or eternal, in order to affirm, with John's gospel:

> Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard,
> The Word without a word, the Word within
> The World and for the world;
> And the light shone in darkness and
> Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled
> About the center of the silent Word.[32]

Or, even more evocatively for my topic, consider Eliot's own quotations from Heraclitus, which serve as the epigraphs for *Four Quartets*. Given here only

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[28]Lonergan's own spiritual development has been clearly described by Gordon Rixon, S.J., in "Bernard Lonergan and Mysticism," *Theological Studies* 62 (2001): 479-97.

[29]*Method in Theology*, 113.

[30]*Method in Theology*, 113.

[31]See, for example, Lonergan's discussion of symbol in "Time and Meaning," or his inclusion of the "pages of literature" amongst the mediation of meaning in "Dimensions of Meaning," 233.

[32] T. S. Eliot, "Ash Wednesday." 1934. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 92.

in their Greek characters, the first translates as a warning, that "although the *logos* is common to all, most people live as though they have a wisdom of their own," while the second speaks of a movement which Lonerganians might find especially suggestive: "the Way up is the way down."[33] However, a serious study of *Four Quartets* does not offer a systematic method for spiritual enlightenment; rather, Eliot uses "signs and symbols"[34] that first tend to focus on the material suffering of time before teaching the reader – in the philosophically and theological sophisticated manner that makes the mature Eliot so complex – to trust in and be transformed by the eternal, transcendent love of God.

II. T.S. ELIOT'S *FOUR QUARTETS*: "WHERE THE FIRE AND THE ROSE ARE ONE"

Each of the four quartets – "Burnt Norton," "East Coker," "The Dry Salvages," and "Little Gidding" – portrays transcendence in a similar but distinct manner. Each is named after a particular location or setting – one linked fairly clearly to the four substances of, in their order here, earth, air, water, and fire – and each uses a free verse but still fairly regular pattern of five similar sections, employing a nameless narrator (who sometimes can be identified as Eliot and sometimes cannot) to present many concrete and allusive symbols, and often paradoxical concepts, that explore whether human suffering in time may yet be redeemed eternally. As its title suggests, *Four Quartets*' repetitive and contrapuntal pattern of symbol and idea is intended to create a poetic music "heard so deeply" that, in the poem's own words, "you are the music while the music lasts" ("The Dry Salvages," 199). The potential interpretations of this poem's truth, goodness, and above all else its beauty are infinite – and each reader is thus encouraged to themselves narrate the symbols against the story of his or her own life, and to navigate the complex interaction of symbol and idea in a way that deepens the experience of time but also opens him or her to the possibility of God's eternal love.

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[33]*Four Quartets* was first published by Faber and Faber in 1942, in Britain, and they continue to publish the poem in the United Kingdom. All quotations used here are cited with reference to the page numbers, since the poem's line's meter is irregular and are to the American Publisher's edition: T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets*. 1942. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962* (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 173-209.

[34]*Method in Theology*, 113.

Yet many readers cannot travel past the irresolvable paradoxes of "Burnt Norton's" famously difficult opening lines – which mingle "time present," "time past," and "time future," but then make the rather depressing claim that "If all time is eternally present / All time is unredeemable" (175). The "eternal present" is one of the poem's most important concepts, but first Eliot seems to want to prevent any use of an "abstraction" relevant only "in a world of speculation". Instead, we are invited "down the passage which we did not take," to a "rose garden," perhaps a garden like that in the British country home that gives this quartet its title, but "to what end," "to what purpose" we "do know not" (175). Still, Eliot is confident that his words "echo thus," in "your," the reader's, "mind," perhaps meaning that they awaken memories of beauty, growth, life in any garden, memories ultimately linked not just to our own lives but the human memory of Eden. A "bird," perhaps the hermit thrush whose water-drip signified the divine in "The Wasteland,"[35] perhaps the Holy Spirit, does call us "into our first world," where "they were, dignified, invisible," where "they were as our guests, accepted and accepting" – "they," of course, very likely being the God who, in English translations of Genesis 1:26, said, "Let us make man in our image." Turning then to a wisdom image from the East, "the lotus rose, quietly, quietly," and "the surface glittered out of heart of light," but eventually the bird seems to banish all from the garden, saying "Go, go, go," for "human kind / Cannot bear very much reality" (176).

Certainly we cannot consciously describe the primordial mystery of love and awe that Eliot intends in the initial garden, nor do most find clarification in the even denser symbols that open section two; why "garlic and sapphires in the mud / clot the bedded axle-tree" (176) is the kind of poetic question that requires Lonergan's "inverse insight," the admittance, for example, that even if the axle-tree is the cross, we cannot trace the entire allusion to the point of intellectual comprehension. Perhaps that is part of Eliot's point, a modern image as beyond human grasp as the medievals intended in the image that closes this opening section, with "the boarhound and the boar... reconciled among the stars" (177). Both modernist and medieval lines here serve as introductions to the crucial image that follows, the image which gives my essay its title and reappears so often elsewhere in the poem; for the place where suffering is "reconciled," according to the syntax of the poem, is "at the still point of the turning world" (177). Yet we are not told what this "still point" is, and there is no obvious biblical or literary

[35]T. S. Eliot, "The Wasteland." 1922. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 67.

allusion, even if readers are reminded of the "still word" of "Ash Wednesday," or even the still point of the lovers' compass in Donne's "A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning."[36] Here, Eliot's initial "point" seems at once geometric, aesthetic, and metaphysical: "at the still point, there the dance is... and except for the point, the still point, / There would be no dance, and there is only the dance" (177). Very prosaically, we note the need for any circle to have a fixed central point, but the poetry paradoxically demands that we also see this center as a source of aesthetically patterned, even joyful movement.

The "still point of the turning world" is the key to the apparently unredeemable paradoxes that open this quartet, as Eliot almost reveals by explicitly stating that "only through time is time conquered" (178). But in general, the middle part of the quartet "allows but a little consciousness," perhaps "a grace of sense," a dim awareness of "a white light still and moving" (177-79), that blazes again only in the always dense symbolism of the quartet's fourth section, where we encounter G. M. Hopkins' "kingfisher."[37] If we recall this Jesuit poet's emphasis on "inscape," in which a creature responds to its Creator by revealing its created form, the still point's link to *logos* becomes suddenly brilliant. For in "Burnt Norton," "after the kingfisher's wing / has answered light to light," and all "is silent," "the light is still / at the still point of the turning world" (180). Without stating it explicitly, Eliot is using the words of poets past and present to point to an unchanging Word, the still point of the *logos*, Who enlightens all of creation.

This brief fourth section of "Burnt Norton" thus illustrates the initially aesthetic point of the concluding section five, which begins by admitting that "words move, music moves / Only in time," and therefore can "only die," but by "the form, the pattern," somehow stretch the reader's reach toward the eternal, the infinite, for "a Chinese jar still / moves perpetually in its stillness" (180). Without Eliot's Western roots, readers here may not see any connection between his words and the eternal Word, but suddenly, as the poem does so often, the still sound of aesthetic beauty is shattered by the reality of suffering. As "The Word in the Desert," the suffering Christ "is most attacked by voices of temptation," and especially "the loud lament of the disconsolate chimera" (180). Eliot's faith

[36]John Donne, "A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning," in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Major Authors,* 8th ed. gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2006), 611.

[37]For the original poem, see G. M. Hopkins, S.J., "As Kingfishers Catch Fire," *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Major Authors,* 8th ed., gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 2161.

knows that the satanic lie is a "chimera," whereas the "Love" embodied in Christ "is itself unmoving," in response to Satan's temptations, and becomes "the cause and end of movement" by being "timeless" (181). Humanity, however, is "caught in the form of limitation / between un-being and being," and only in the "shaft of sunlight," or "the hidden laughter of children" playing in trees, are we fully "quick" (the old meaning of "alive") – "now," "here, now," where we should be, "always" the time, place, and way in which we can live eternally (181). Normally, "Burnt Norton" suggestively concludes, we can barely see or speak of this reality, but its haunting presence does render "ridiculous the waste sad time / stretching before and after" (181).

The very broad vision of "Burnt Norton" is next balanced within *Four Quartets* by "East Coker," whose title refers to the English town from which Eliot's sixteenth-century ancestors migrated to America, a movement his own life reversed. Thus there is a very personal, historical reason for the quartet's opening line, "In my beginning is my end," though within the quartet the older sense of "end" as "purpose" is again stretched far beyond the individual, toward the common, universal purpose and end of human life which is, as certainly as taxes, of course, death… isn't it? The final line of "East Coker" does allude to the poet's own death, but frames the entire poem with a reversal, "In my End is my Beginning," which reminds us again of the *logos* who is "the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last" (Revelations 1:11). In between Eliot's deeply personal words and broadly universal Word is the human journey in time, the sixteenth-century "daunsinge, signifying matrimonie," which portrays humans "joined in circles," "keeping the rhythm in their dancing / As in their living in the living seasons"; however, "feet rising and falling. / Eating and drinking," leads finally to a much terser fragment: "dung and death" (183). "The dancers are all gone under the hill" (185) concludes the quartet's section two, and does not this deeply painful fact contradict Eliot's preceding "serenity," the "wisdom" that had claimed "there is only the dance," thus "bequeathing" the reader "merely a receipt for deceit" ("East Coker," 184)?

Perhaps because of Eliot's own often painful life, his preconversion depression and postconversion failed marriage to the mentally ill Vivienne Haigh-Wood (an illness Wood perhaps acquired, of course, from attempting to read "The Wasteland"), it is within this most biographical of the *Four Quartets* that the poetry becomes truly "dark dark dark." In Eliot's acceptance of this darkness, however, comes the possibility of what Lonergan would recognize as authentic religious conversion, though one grounded not in Romans 5:5 but rather the *via*

negativa tradition of St. John of the Cross. "I said to my soul, be still," says Eliot's poetic narrator, "and let the dark come upon you / Which shall be the darkness of God" (186). Many readers find the *via negativa* a difficult path to comprehend let alone follow; however, in my experience some university students, just beginning to be aware that their own desires must be reshaped by God's will, can be deeply moved as the narrator continues the interior prayer:

> I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope
> For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without love,
> For love would be love of the wrong thing; there is yet faith
> But the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting.
> Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought:
> So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing. (186)

After so convincingly reminding readers of the inevitability of physical suffering and death, and casting them into a potentially dark depression, the divine "still point" centering Eliot's poetry here serves to reawaken the reader's hope that within the darkness, despite the pain, there exists a unity beyond life and death, a larger circle in which the dancer, God, is still dancing.

Though beautiful, the poetry here does tend toward the abstract and speculative, and perhaps that is why section four's symbols again become at once more allusive, almost allegorical, and yet also concrete, and existential. "Adam's curse," our fallen nature, means that we need "the wounded surgeon," Eliot's modernization of Christ as "the great physician," and as "in the enigma of the fever chart," we cannot get better without becoming more fully aware of our own disease (187-88). The imagery here contrasts physical and spiritual reality, and certainly many have wondered whether it is possible to believe in a spiritual dance after the physical dancers have perished; but Christ's suffering, his wounds, reverses the progress of the entire paradox, and that is why, in the conclusion of section four, his "dripping blood" becomes "our only drink," his "bloody flesh our only food" (188). Still, "caught between un-being and being," part of us, at least in this world of time, goes on think that we are, "really," "substantial flesh and blood," yet we also retain the spiritual sense, "in spite" of our material chains, "to call" that most painful "Friday good" (188). After this perspective on religious conversion, so moving to anyone even faintly familiar with the reality of Eucharistic worship, the quartet's fifth section concludes by confidently speaking again of Love as the "still point" which allows us to keep moving toward the center where the Word eternally speaks:

Love is most nearly itself
When here and now cease to matter.
Old men ought to be explorers
Here or there does not matter
We must be still and still moving
Into another intensity
For a further union, a deeper communion… (189-90)

The final lines of "East Coker" go on to suggest that whether in the history of Eliot's ancestors or the reality of his own inevitable death, this communion occurs across the "empty desolation of the sea," but this potentially dark imagery is saved, salvaged by the following quartet. Eliot's own epigraph tells us how "The Dry Salv-Ages," should be pronounced (191), which both clarifies and deepens this poem's again historical and profoundly theological meaning. For while the epigraph further explains that "les trois sauvages" is a small group of rocks just off the coast of Cape Ann, Massachusetts, near where Eliot's ancestors emigrated, we are not told whether these rocks signify the possibility of shipwreck or salvation from it, though the rest of the quartet seems to affirm, as usual with Eliot, that the answer is both. For whether speaking of the "river within us" or "the sea" that "is all about us" (191), most of the first part of the quartet wonders, again, "where is there an end of it, the soundless wailing" (193) that continues long after the storms and shipwrecks inevitable in every life, the "undeniable / Clamour of the bell of the last annunciation" announcing another fisherman's funeral (193)? Seafarers or landlocked, within time, how does it become possible to avoid repeating "the bone's prayer to Death its God," and to honestly speak the "barely prayable, prayer of the one Annunciation" (193-94), the one, essential response of Mary to God's call upon her life: "Be it unto me according to thy Word" (Luke 1:38).

Whereas the first two quartets seem to stress metaphysical and aesthetic elements of religious conversion, in "The Dry Salvages" we are much more clearly in the moral realm, and the question of divine relationship to the human will becomes of preeminent importance. Again, Eliot's initial account of suffering in time stresses, far more than I can repeat here, how difficult it is to judge and act rightly in response to the "moments of agony" that litter our lives, and by this point in the poem there is almost a stoic response to "the somber season / or the sudden fury," in which suffering "is what it always was" (195). Perhaps this jaded response to history explains why, uniquely within the *Quartets*, the entire section three here turns eastward to the Hindu Upanishads, which also were important to

the slim religious hope in Eliot's preconversion "Wasteland,"[38] and finds in them a very challenging teaching; on the "field of [spiritual] battle, Krishna tells Arjuna:

> "on whatever sphere of being
> The mind of a man may be intent
> At the time of death" – that is the one action
> (And the time of death is every moment)
> Which shall fructify in the lives of others... (197)

Christians hopeful of God's grace may reject this teaching, or hope against its ultimate veracity, but Eliot means to stress the reality of the freedom of the will, even when suffering leaves us barely able to pray. Both "grace" and "will" are part, further, of why section four next focuses on Mary, so important to Eliot in "Ash Wednesday," where she taught him the necessity, preached by Piccarda in Dante's *Paradiso*,[39] of finding "Our Peace in His will."[40] Here Eliot's narrator asks Mary "to repeat a prayer also on behalf" of fishermen now working and those who have lost loved ones at sea; the obvious allusion, of course, is hailing Mary to "pray for us now, and at the hour of our death," praying, essentially, that we will have the wisdom and humility to be able to repeat her prayer of the "one Annunciation," the prayer that allows her to be eternally united with the Lord, the fruit of her womb. Against the sea "yelp" and "howl" of the early parts of poem, Mary points us toward "the sound of the sea bell's / Perpetual angelus," calling us all to prayer and full acceptance of God's will (198).

So solemn and profound is the poetry here that Eliot opens section five by shifting tone, turning to a straightforwardly sarcastic, mocking account of attempts of the will to assert human rather than divine power. In astrology, the occult, and even Freudian or Jungian psychology, Eliot sees the "usual pastimes and drugs, and features of the press" by which "men's curiosity searches past and future / And clings to that dimension" (198). Is the human will even capable of doing otherwise? Based solely upon the writing of the mass media, one might be doubtful, except for the counter-evidence provided by those who have followed

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[38]See, in particular, section five, "What the Thunder Said," in T. S. Eliot, "The Wasteland." 1922. *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. (New York, San Diego, & London: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 66-69.

[39]Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*. 1321. Trans. C. H. Sisson. Ed. David H. Higgins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 362.

[40]T. S. Eliot, "Ash Wednesday," 95. Picarda's version of this crucial concept appears in Canto 3 of Paradiso in Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

Mary's obedience, the saints whose "vocation," Eliot states, is "to apprehend the point of intersection of the timeless / with time" (198). Yet in a paradox that again resonates with Lonergan's account of the interdependence of the "way up" and "way down" in chapter 4 of *Method*, this really is no "occupation," but rather a vocation in which there is

> something given
> And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
> Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender. (198)

"For most of us," Eliot continues, immediately disqualifying both himself and most readers from either understanding or being able to truly live the saint's vocation, "there is only the unattended moment," the brief "shaft of sunlight" which gives us "hints and guesses" of truth before we turn to the far more mundane tasks necessary to ongoing religious conversion: "prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action" (199). What is it, however, that makes either the initial glimpse or the continuing, even partially accurate response at all possible? Eliot answers this crucial question in lines that once again assert the centrality of the divine *Logos*, or Incarnate Word, for

> The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation.
> Here the impossible union
> Of spheres of existence is actual,
> Here the past and future
> Are conquered, and reconciled,
> Where action were otherwise movement
> Of that which is only moved
> And has in it no source of movement –
> Driven by daemonic, chthonic
> Powers. And right action is freedom
> From past and future also. (199)

Though highly poetic, Eliot's theological point here does seem entirely clear: only in the Incarnate person of the Word of God, the Alpha and Omega who is Jesus Christ, can past and future human sin and suffering be "conquered and reconciled," and only because of the saving power of Christ's cross, the "at-one-ment" between God and humanity, can the human will be sufficiently transformed so as to allow the "right action" that truly "is freedom." Without the "still point" of this cross, our movement is all too apt to become chaotic, destructive, even demonic. Again emphasizing the ongoing nature of religious conversion, "The Dry Salvages" concludes by reminding us that any "right action" achieved is

merely temporal, that ultimately we "are only undefeated / Because we have gone on trying," and that this effort must go on "not too far from the yew-tree" that signifies, in English churchyards, both death and the saving cross; yet against any form of Christianity which denies the importance of human response, for Eliot this effort does leave, we finally see, a "life of significant soil" (199).

Prayerful praise for the ongoing power of this life within the church is the primary end, or purpose, for "Little Gidding," whose title refers to the Anglican community of worship founded by the saintly Nicholas Ferrar in 1625. Returning to a place once graced by men such as the sixteenth-century poet George Herbert, Eliot comes here, in 1942, to "kneel where prayer has been valid," to join together with all the saints gathered in unity by the "pentecostal fire" of Acts 2; here, "now and in England," for the historical Eliot "the soul's sap quivers" because "the communication / Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the living" (200-201). Here, the extended reality of the Incarnation in Christ's body has become another historical example of "the intersection of the timeless moment," in "England and nowhere. Never and Always" (201). By this point, the paradoxes of time and eternity are familiar, but what gives the poem its potency is how unredeemable appears both past and present time. For in 1647 "Little Gidding" had been dissolved due to its role in harboring Charles I, who had come there "at night like a broken king" (201), and whose eventual arrest and execution was publicly justified by the faithful Puritan pen of John Milton. Milton is perhaps the one English poet even more theologically learned than Eliot himself, but he himself "died blind and quiet" ("Little Gidding," 206) after the Restoration of Charles II, and in defeat managed "merely" to compose *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained.* As a devout Anglican, how should Eliot look upon the English Civil War? As a poet, how should he regard the many preceding greats whose traditions his own modernist work had once hoped to modify? Of far more immediate importance, how can Eliot's will turn either to the prayer-filled life of "Little Gidding" or ecumenical Christian dialogue, either the united or divided Christian Church, while England is being bombarded by the Nazis in 1942?

The existential angst at the heart of this quartet is intensified, as it was in history, by Eliot's work as a "night watchman" during these bombings. Summing up human suffering in time, in the bombed dust all about him he knows "the death of air," "the death of earth," "the death of water and fire," which in a physical sense all results from "the dark dove with the flickering tongue," an apt description of the German planes (202-203). Eliot's avoidance of despair during this difficult time falls into three distinct stages. First, after another "interminable

night" on watch, Eliot walks through the street and, in a scene reminiscent of the *Purgatorio* of Dante (who for many years had been Eliot's chief poetic mentor), he meets "some dead master" with "a face still forming" (203). In fact, based on his "brown baked features" and comments, it is Dante, though other allusions here also suggest the recently deceased Yeats;[41] perhaps, as a poetic rather than literal purgatory, the spirit is called "a familiar compound ghost" because Eliot cannot objectively recognize past poets' influence whilst he is still alive (203). Whoever it is, the dead poet does not wish "to rehearse / my thoughts and theory which," he bitterly adds, "you have forgotten"; "last year's word's belong to last year's language," and the more important task, as my conclusion will make clear, is Eliot's personal repentance and humble acceptance of God's grace (204).

That way forward is then clarified through a comparison of "three conditions" of the soul, described by Eliot almost as though he is annotating a moral theology textbook. "Attachment" is often contrasted to "detachment," which in turn is understood to be "indifference" (205). In fact, the third condition here is a parody, "as death resembles life" (205), and even when one is attached to something, as Eliot was to the Anglican church of Little Gidding, a detached acceptance of God's will in time can allow one to be open to God's transforming grace. "History may be servitude, History may be freedom," depending on one's attitude, but with God's help both past love and apparently present hatred can be redeemed, can "become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern" (205). Eliot then quotes the medieval writer Julian of Norwich,[42] acknowledging the inevitability of sin but confidently proclaiming God's eternal triumph:

> Sin is Behovely, but
> All shall be well, and
> All manner of thing shall be well. (205-206)

In the case of the English Civil war, for example, and all those presently within the Christian church, those once divided must in the afterlife "accept the constitution of silence," and be "folded in a single party" by the grace of God

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[41]"And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail" ("Little Gidding," 204), for example, may allude to W. B. Yeats' "rough beast" in "The Second Coming," in *The Norton Anthology of English_Literature: The Major Authors*, 8th ed., gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2006), 2402.

[42]The text cited by Eliot here and later in "Little Gidding" is Julian of Norwich's *Revelations of Divine Love*, visions that she said occurred on May 13, 1373. See "Julian of Norwich" in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Major Authors*, 8th ed., gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 282-83.

(206). Then, "all shall be well and / all manner of thing shall be well," provided, as Eliot concludes section three, that like Julian we too experience "the purification of the motive / in the ground of our beseeching" (207). As Lonergan might say, if we can learn to ask God, and to accept from God, only "what truly is good" rather than what we wish were good, than all shall be well with our souls.[43]

Chapter 4 of Lonergan's *Method* also admits very honestly, however, that "God's thoughts and God's ways are very different from man's and by that difference God is terrifying."[44] "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God" (Hebrews 10:31). This, I think, is why Eliot begins section four of "Little Gidding" by speaking again of how "the dove descending breaks the air / with flame of incandescent terror" (207), a description sure to recall the German bombers but also, perhaps, the tongues of Pentecost. Very quickly we see, as Thomas Howard points out, that the reference has to be to the Holy Spirit who alone can "guide [us] into all truth" (John 16:13).[45] For these "tongues declare / the one discharge from sin and error," a remedy offered, we are again told, by "Love" (207). Yet this remedy is also a "torment," for our "only hope, or else despair," is "to be redeemed from fire by fire" (207). Here, indeed, is a more literal form of purgatory, one that recalls Dante's own redemption from lust through painful fire in Canto 27 of *Purgatorio*,[46] but there too it is "Love," God, who "devised the torment" because "the intolerable shirt of flame" ("Little Gidding," 207) removed a lust too embodied to be eradicated simply by the choice of Dante's intellectual will. As the "tongues of fire" at Pentecost transformed the first believers, Eliot implies, so eternally "we only live, only suspire / Consumed by either fire or fire" (207). In the words of Hebrews, echoed throughout medieval theology and the modern masterpiece that is Eliot's "Little Gidding," "our God is a consuming Fire" (12:29).

Yet no single image can express God's essential being, and though the freedom of the human will necessitates choice, the fifth and concluding section of "Little Gidding" (which also functions as a conclusion for the entire *Four Quartets*) is much more hopeful because our sense of "the end" often becomes, from God's perspective, "a beginning." Eliot especially applies this paradoxical hope to poetry, for "every phrase and every sentence" can become "an end and a

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[43]*Method in Theology*, 35.

[44]*Method in Theology*, 111.

[45]Thomas Howard. *Dove Descending: A Journey into T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets*. (San Francisco: Ignatius), 141-43.

[46]Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, 317.

beginning," "an easy commerce of the old and the new," a "complete consort dancing together," and from a poetic point of view even history can become transfigured, "a pattern of timeless moments" (207-208). But most of all Eliot's conclusion speaks to the individual reader, and again turns to Julian of Norwich further describing her experience of God – "the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling" – to serve as the introduction to a conclusion in which Eliot invites each reader to return to the heavenly kingdom. Some of the natural images here used to portray Eden or heaven have appeared before in the poem, but unbeknownst to many modern readers the famous concluding line refers quite specifically to the highest heavens of Dante's *Paradiso*, in which the fire of God's love has consumed all sin and transfigured human love into another pattern, the aesthetically perfect pattern of an undying rose, at whose center is the still fire of Love dancing an eternal dance.[47] You have probably heard the conclusion of *Four Quartets* at countless after-dinner banquets, but let me here, as Eliot would say, "say it again" – "shall I say it again?" ("East Coker," 187) – and, if you may, hear anew its transcendent truth:

With the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling

> We shall not cease from exploration
> And the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And know the place for the first time.
> Through the unknown, remembered gate
> When the last of earth left to discover
> Is that which was the beginning;
> At the source of the longest river
> The voice of the hidden waterfall
> And the children in the apple-tree
> Not known, because not looked for
> But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
> Between two waves of the sea.
> Quick now, here, now, always –
> A condition of complete simplicity
> (Costing not less than everything)
> And all shall be well and
> All manner of thing shall be well

[47]See Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, 481-99.

When the tongues of flame are in-folded
Into the crowned knot of fire
And the fire and the rose are one. ("Little Gidding,"
209)

III. CONCLUSION: WILL WE KNOW THE DANCER WHEN "THERE IS ONLY THE DANCE"?

It is worth hearing this poetry, and carefully contemplating the whole of *Four Quartets*, if only because, as Eliot suggests in "The Dry Salvages," great poetry can offer a "sudden illumination," beyond any "well-being, / Fruition, fulfilment, security or affection, / Or even a very good dinner" (194). Whereas once we may have "had the experience but missed the meaning," a spiritually open reading can "approach the meaning" in a way that "restores the experience / In a different form, beyond any meaning / We can assign to happiness (194). Though my own paper here offers only "hints and guesses" (199) toward this restorative, transfigured vision, certainly *Four Quartets* encourages and even requires what I have elsewhere termed "transcendental literary criticism";[48] in this critical approach, while avoiding any external imposition of ideology or theology upon the text, the literary art itself traces a rich and complex vision of truth, goodness, and beauty in which "words, after speech," as Eliot says in "Burnt Norton," "reach / into the silence" (180). Or, according to A. David Moody, in *Four Quartets* Eliot uses words "to make them mean what is beyond words; or, to put the same idea another way, to so transform the understanding of the world which is in its words that it will be perceived as the Divine Word in action."[49]

Yet "East Coker" also reminds us that after "the intolerable wrestle of "words and meaning," the "poetry does not matter" (184). Every attempt "to learn to use words" is "a different kind of failure" and no entirely "new" wisdom can be gained because everything important "has already been discovered / once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope / to emulate"; still, "there is no

[48]See Greg Maillet, "'A Poem Should not Mean but Be': Lonergan and Literary Aesthetics." *METHOD: A Journal of Lonergan Studies* 21 (2004): 57-91, and "'Fidelity to the Word': Lonerganian Conversion through Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale* and Dante's *Purgatorio*" *Religion and the Arts* 10, no. 2 (2006): 219-43.

[49]A. David Moody, "*Four Quartets*: Music, Word, Meaning, and Value" *The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 147.

or several times, by men whom one cannot hope / to emulate"; still, "there is no competition," but "only the fight to recover what has been lost / And found and lost again and again" (188-89). Even the very greatest poetry is always inadequate to express the life and light inherent in the eternal Word, and the gap between human desire and divine reality must very often mean, as Eliot summarizes in "East Coker," that "the only wisdom we can hope to acquire / is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless" (185).

For me, one of the most moving parts of the entire *Quartets* occurs when, to return to *Little Gidding*, Eliot meets the compound ghost of Dante and Yeats and the "past master" offers to "disclose the gifts reserved for age / To set a crown upon [Eliot's] lifetime's effort" (204). For those familiar with "Tradition and the Individual Talent,"[50] Eliot's early essay about how the modernist poet revalues and reshapes traditions by his own unique talent, the natural expectation here is at least some praise of the wisdom surely attained by this advanced stage in Eliot's career. Instead, the honest dead poets promise nothing other than "the cold friction of expiring sense," the "conscious impotence of rage / at human folly" (204), and finally what most of us will probably not allow ourselves to see in this life:

> the rending pain of re-enactment
> Of all that you have done, and been; the shame
> Of motives late revealed, and the awareness
> Of things ill done and done to others' harm
> Which once you took for exercise of virtue. (204)

In purgatory one's soul remains, Dante concludes, "unless restored by that refining fire," the fire of God's love, "where you must move in measure, like a dancer'" (204).

Now whether this scene is fictional inspiration or a potential material reality that, depending on our own pride, may be a grace necessary to our sanctification before entering heaven, Eliot will not let us forget that the longed for, celebrated final union with God "cost[s] not less than everything" ("Little Gidding," 209). Lonergan seems to support Eliot's portrayal of the potentially painful process of authentic religious conversion. For despite the optimism inherent in transcendental method, and no matter how successfully the method translates information into insights judged to be knowledge and transvalues knowledge into universal catholic wisdom, or how energetically we enact this wisdom as social or

[50]T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," *The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends*, 3rd ed. (Boston and New York: Bedford St. Martins, 2007), 537-41.

political action, Lonergan finally insists that at the ground and "*apex animae*" of our souls we require a communion with God that is not easy to attain, and without which we cannot become what we were made to be. In addition to the poetic account of being-in-love with God, chapter 4 of *Method* also offers a lengthy, more sobering sermon which reminds us that only "religious faith" can "liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons" and "enable men to resist the vast pressures of social decay," for "men are sinners," and we "must learn with humility that religious development is dialectical, that the task of repentance and conversion is lifelong."[51] However wise we attempt to become, Lonergan himself would concur, with Eliot, that often we need to hear not "of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, / Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, / Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God" ("East Coker," 185).

Faced with the reality of our own sin, any viable attempt to become part of a "not numerous center" must begin and end with spiritual humility and religious faith. In the course of our lives, especially our life in the church, we may at times feel part of "the center," and at other times feel excluded from it; at times the center may seem big enough, at other times too small. Whatever the circumstance, we must retain hope in the viewpoint of eternity, where the center which is the Kingdom of God may be much larger than we are able to perceive while here on earth. As is perfectly illustrated through both the historical life and poetic journey of Dante, Eliot's master, the key to this beatific vision is accepting, as Lonergan puts it, that "finally the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gift of God's love"; in the "privileged area" that is our eternal soul, "it also" has a more "specific meaning, the word of God himself."[52] In the words of that Word, the eternally stable center is the "drawing of [His] love" on the cross, as foreshadowed in Christ's great pastoral prayer for the church: "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us" (John 17:21). Finally, when we hear the voice of His calling, be still and know that God is God (Psalm 46:10), that Jesus is the Word and Wisdom of God who is author of our salvation (John 1:1; 1 Corinthians 1:30), and that when the Spirit of God speaks in love to our spirit and makes it cry out "Abba, Father," (Romans 5:5. 8:15), we also become one of the children in the apple tree, quick now, here now, laughing forever.

[51]*Method in Theology*, 117-18.
[52]*Method in Theology*, 119.

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"A PERHAPS NOT NUMEROUS CENTRE"

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WHAT I HAVE to say is, as the saying goes, "a bit much", and is bound to seem unduly negative to some. So I shall start with a sketch of what the church is for, in my view, and why it's worth belonging to her, whatever her faults as an empirical institution, as opposed to vehicle of transcendent meaning. (That curious distinction will turn out, if I am anywhere near right, to be important in the sequel.) So we begin with a potted dogmatics, and a potted apologetics. After those preliminaries, we start getting unpleasant. I am sorry about this, but it is a necessary condition of getting the job done, as I see it to be.

Christianity presupposes that there is a God who has created the world, and that the human race has fallen into sin. It consists in a remedy which God is supposed to have provided for sin, and which Christians are obliged both to proclaim and to attempt to implement. I believe that there are good arguments for the existence of God, but will not now go into them. I take it that the existence of moral badness, which in the Christian context is identified as sin and as due to sin, would be admitted by everyone; where people are divided on the question is whether they do or do not blame it exclusively on other people or on human institutions to which they do not happen to belong. Very approximately, how is Christianity supposed to work as a remedy for sin? Konrad Lorenz remarked that intra-specific aggression is built into human beings, and that in order to canalize it for better or for worse, you need four things; a cause, a community, an enemy, and a leader. In John Searle's *The Campus War*, which is about the student revolutions of the late nineteen-sixties, I read of the way in which the students seized on or manufactured causes, formed militant communities, and identified enemies (usually administrations who couldn't possibly meet their demands). Having previously read Lorenz, I thought at one stage, "Where are the leaders?" I turned the page, and there they were; at a certain stage in the revolution they popped up.

How would it be, I wondered, if, in order to deal with human sin – which evidently is compounded by, and indeed very largely consists in, misdirected human aggressivity – God had provided us with these four requisites – as cause, goodness and truth as such; as enemy, evil as such (as opposed to its human victims and dupes, and even perpetrators); a community which would cut our other community loyalties (to country, to family, to profession, and so on) down to size; and the one sort of human leader who could not possibly let us down, a human being who was divine? R.C. Zaehner remarked on the "hunger for an incarnate God", which expressed itself throughout the world religions, and made people divinize Muhammad and the Buddha in flat contradiction to what those faiths believed and wished.

Why not be a Protestant? Let us take the hermeneutic of suspicion first. Luther was one of the great preachers of Christendom, but he wasn't a systematic theologian. To try to get a systematic theology out of his position is rather like trying to lay a rug that won't quite fit. If you cut one bit off, you get a revised Catholicism; if another, antinomianism; if another, Calvinist double predestination. For the antinomians, Luther did not go far enough; since Christ's atonement is totally sufficient, Christians do not have to obey the moral law, let alone the State and its magistrates. According to the doctrine of double predestination, God ineluctably causes the sinner to sin, and accordingly to go to hell, just as he saves the few whom he sanctifies. To nearly everyone but Calvinists, this seems an abominable doctrine.

What of the hermeneutics of recovery? In his *Grundkurs*, Karl Rahner suggested that, in these ecumenical days, Catholics should think about what they have to learn from the "three 'onlys'" characteristic of classical Protestantism, only grace, only faith, only Scripture. The first reminds us that all our good, including whatever moral virtue we may have, is the gift of God; faith is the proper response to and acceptance of the gift of God (no Protestant interprets faith as mere intellectual assent); the Catholic, with all her attention to the history of doctrine, should remember that her faith is none other than that first expressed by the biblical writers, especially those of the New Testament. I add that I believe a distinction between priesthood and laity is necessary for the sacraments, especially the Eucharist; and that there must be authority to proclaim doctrine and denounce error – hence the necessity of Pope and bishops.

So much, briefly, for being a convinced Catholic, and I suppose a rather conservative one by today's standards. I thought that to say something about this was worthwhile, to put all the nasty things I shall have to add in perspective.

These are largely concerned with the uses and abuses of authority. Anne Wilson Schaef and Diane Fassell have written a book with the title, in itself rather unfortunate I think, *The Addictive Organization.* (I believe *The Dysfunctional Organization* would have been better.) There they make the remark that, the higher the ideals officially proclaimed and represented by an organization, the greater the discrepancy between these and what actually goes on there. This has proved perfectly true in my experience. I wish the Catholic Church were an exception to this principle, but if one looks at the facts, one can retain no doubt that she is not.

I start with a story, which is trivial in itself but, as it were, emblematic of what tends to go wrong in the church. Since Vatican II, parish councils have, as I understand, been mandatory in the church. What is not mandatory is that the parish priest should take any effective notice of them. A layman who was on such a council once noted a considerable amount supposed to have been spent on the vestry, and he queried what the money had been actually used for. Now there was an elderly female dragon present, who objected very strongly and vociferously to the priest being questioned about his use of money. But the layman, who persisted in his view that parish councils were for something other than show, would not be intimidated or otherwise put off, and persisted in his question. The priest thereupon blushed scarlet (he had red hair, so the effect was rather striking), and admitted that the money had really been employed on purchasing drapes for the rectory. Now I have no doubt that the rectory really needed drapes, or that the priest had a perfect right to buy them. But it seems to me that the money for this ought to have been accounted for as such, and that the layman was right to use his place on the parish council to press the point. The function of the dragon in the interaction is also instructive. Many laypersons find undue deference to priests congenial; and this encourages certain evils to accumulate and fester.

Lonergan told a joke about a common conception of the church before Vatican II. The Pope was the captain of the ship, its officers the bishops, the priests the crew, and the laity the cargo. English lay Catholics of the Victorian era were exhorted to "pay, pray, and obey"; if they belonged to the upper classes, they should "hunt, shoot, and entertain" as well. Now that some lay Catholics are educated, such attitudes would no longer be possible, even if they were desirable.

February's *Time* magazine forecasts another wave of scandals about priests, not this time about sexual malpractice, but about embezzlement. I hope they are wrong. But if they are right, it is yet another illustration of the evils attendant on

an unduly isolated way of life for priests, not subject to the criticism of any but their peers and superiors.

In 1981, I was appointed to the Religious Studies Department at the University of Calgary. One of my principal functions was to teach contemporary Catholic thought. I may surprise you by saying that I think that, had I said that something was Catholic thought which in his opinion was not Catholic thought, or even incompatible with it, the bishop would have been quite right to rebuke me. In fact, my predecessor was an ex-Jesuit of liberal tendency; and in the Education Department was another ex- Jesuit, who had fallen foul of the bishop for reasons which I could never understand, but was a renowned liturgiologist. I thought I had a wonderful opportunity before me, to teach contemporary Catholic thought to prospective teachers in Catholic schools and other interested parties in a fully ecumenical and therefore secular (not secularist) milieu. But the diocese had ceased to trust the University in this matter. Soon after I arrived, they insisted in setting up an independent College to instruct their teachers, which would be more under the bishop's control. In all the years I taught at Calgary, one prospective Catholic teacher slipped through the net and took instruction from me. But the instruction of such people was a large part of the *raison d'etre* for my appointment in the first place.

Could it be, as an eminent philosopher (and devout Anglican) suggested, that the bishop's advisers agreed with many members of the Philosophy Department at the university, that Catholic thought could not possibly survive in a free market of ideas?

The bishop, now dead, was a good man and a good priest (as I know at firsthand), though I think rather disastrous as a bishop. Largely, I think, to make up for what he thought, and rightly thought, was a slight to me, he appointed me to something called the Diocesan Catechetical Commission, where we discussed a number of curricular issues in the Catholic schools. Those were the days when sexual scandals in the church were first making a big public impact. One day, when neither the Bbshop not his right-hand man, a Basilian father, were present, something broke inside me – I had read yet another account of a priest abusing altar boys. I said that unless we discussed this matter, and the attitude we ought to take up toward it, then we were in effect doing nothing. (I was not yet aware of the claim that is now often made – that members of the laity who show inconvenient concern with what is really going on are set to turn wheels which turn wheels which turn nothing of any significance.) There was dead silence for about ten seconds; then the chairman, an elderly and rather sick layman, said it was well that

some people should have Dr. Meynell's concerns, and then rapidly moved to the next matter of business. I told the story to a very perceptive atheist woman, who immediately said, "I wonder what he has to hide?" About a year later, he died; and a couple of years after that, it was revealed that his brother, a priest, had been offering unwelcome sexual solicitations to twenty-one women over twenty years. I do not think the chairman was engaging in a full-fledged act of deception; I attribute rather a vague feeling of unease about his brother to him, which made him uncomfortable with the idea of too much scrutiny of these matters by laypeople.

Quite early on in the period when these sexual scandals were becoming notorious, I saw on television an interview between a layman and a priest. The priest said that the church should just put these cases behind her and forge ahead. The layman, apparently a decent man, and not in the least aggressive or arrogant, seemed a little bothered by this. Wasn't more careful self-examination by the church required than the priest was suggesting? "Are you accusing me of lying?" asked the priest haughtily. I think it was worse than that; the priest was so self-deceived that he was incapable of uttering a decent, clearheaded lie, but was rather afflicted by what Plato called the lie in the soul. Such is triumphalism with its trousers down. That priest was surely deeper in denial than the ox that fell into the river at Khartoum. To speak of the worst crisis in the church since the Reformation, as some have done, may be nearer the mark.

I wrote an article once for a Catholic journal, in which I said something about the intense yet barren sense of guilt which some Christians seem to instill in those over whom they have influence. A beloved cousin of mine, who happens to be an Anglican, sent me a card, which said, on the outside, "I feel so guilty about missing your birthday"; and on the inside, "But then I feel guilty about everything because I'm Catholic." The editor told me to omit this passage, which I did with some regret; I had already blamed some other denominations for instilling such a painful yet barren sense of guilt. (Of course the authentic and healthy sense of guilt that leads to betterment of life is quite a different matter). A little while after the article was published, I heard from a friend who knew the editor that the latter regarded me as thoroughly conceited and insolent – a sort of elderly young puppy, I suppose.

I thought about this a good deal; and could only conclude that it was due to my allusion to the claim, made by many people, that the Catholic Church often fosters an unhealthy sense of guilt. In these post-triumphalist days I thought that was a proper admission, especially as I had already said the same of some

Protestant denominations. The allegation is of course notorious. I could only conclude that I was faced with another case of denial: the editor knew in his heart that the allegation was true, but could not endure that it be aired in public. Catholicism seems so often to underwrite ideals the very opposite to those one would have thought she stood for. Since our hearts are hid, as St. Paul would say, with Christ in God, we should be able to face any claim against ourselves, however difficult, with an unbiased assessment of the evidence for it.

Some clergy, and higher clergy at that, are exemplary in this respect. Archbishop Rembert Weakland was troubled, as he well might be, by the statistic that there were more abortions in strongly Catholic districts of the United States than there were elsewhere. Rather than just fulminating from the pulpit about this, he decided to take the rather original step of calling together a meeting of Catholic women to tell him why they thought this might be. He came away from the meeting, he said, with his ears burning with shame at what they told him about the misery they underwent in trying to obey the official teaching of the church on birth-control. As one might have foretold, many Catholics wrote to Rome asking that the Archbishop be deposed for his outspoken views on these matters.

One often hears that the church is not a democracy, with the implication that it cannot and ought not to be so. As I have already said, I believe there is a necessary place for authority in the church, but that should not preempt the question whether it might not be better for the church, where the administration of the sacraments and the promulgation of doctrine is not directly concerned, to be more democratic than she is. But it is something of a vice among religious people, and perhaps particularly of Catholics, that some of them just love to be told what to think and do, on matters where it would be better if they were acting and thinking for themselves. The Victorian mathematician and Catholic convert W. G. Ward said that it would be fine with him if he got an infallible Papal Bull with his Times every morning; I don't think this attitude is a very healthy one, or particularly redolent of what St. Paul calls "the glorious liberty of the children of God," or for that matter of the more abundant life promised us by our Lord according to St. John. The following little story is about Anglicans, but the moral is at least as applicable to Catholics. A young squire came home to his English parish after the First World War, and presided over the parish council meeting, as was then customary for the squire. He did his utmost during the meeting to get the other members to express their own opinions and come to collective decisions, without notable success. Finally an old man rose to his feet and said, "Why can't Mr. Maxwell tell us what to do, same as what we're used with?"

In the late nineteen-sixties, as may be remembered, Fr. Charles Davies caused some anguish in the Roman Catholic Church in England by leaving his priesthood and the church. The Dominican, Herbert McCabe, wrote an editorial in New Blackfriars, saying that, while the church was quite plainly corrupt, one ought to stick with her all the same. For admitting the corruption of the church, he was dismissed from his editorship. A few days later, I went to my parish church, and told another layman who I knew slightly that I thought the McCabe affair a disgrace. He heartily agreed with me. "In my young day", he said regretfully, "he would have been silenced." I suddenly understood that he found the incident disgraceful for exactly the opposite reason that I did. I thought Fr. McCabe deserved high commendation for courageously proclaiming a truth which everybody knew; the other layman thought that he should have been punished more severely. I am very much afraid to say that I did not have the nerve to inform this gentleman of the differences between us; I merely broke off the conversation when I could without undue fuss.

There is a book by a woman who was the mistress of an Irish bishop for many years; the matter was finally brought to light at the insistence of their son, who, when he had reached the age of seventeen, refused to endure the humiliation of not being acknowledged by his father any more. She received a lot of abusive mail, much of which complained bitterly that she had made the issue public. Was she not paid enough, her correspondents asked, to keep quiet? Early in the story, she tells a tale from her youth. A Catholic mother and daughter were sitting in their kitchen, when the teenage son entered, white to the lips, and reported that a senior Catholic cleric in the diocese was in the garage having sexual relations with his secretary. His sister promptly fell into hysterics, and his mother slapped him in the face, and rebuked him for saying such things in front of his sister. The trouble, one gathers, was not so much with what went on, but with what was known or admitted to be going on.

I hear that, a couple of generations ago, the father of a Catholic family used to go through the papers with a pair of scissors cutting out any references to priests convicted of traffic offences and other petty or not so petty crimes, before the rest of the family saw them. About twenty-five years ago, I was watching television, when a young priest appeared and started talking about the problem of AIDS among priests. I admired his courage, but wondered why he was making such a fuss about what was obviously a minor problem, since the vast majority of priests were keeping their celibate vows. About fifteen years layer, the Catholic chaplain at my university – who was in many ways very good at his job – died of

AIDS. The subsequent policy in the diocese, as one lady who had liked him complained, was to treat him as though he had never existed. Like very many others, I was horrified by what was revealed about the Newfoundland archdiocese, where apparently, among other things, some priests had organized vice-rings for procuring boys. Once, when a mother complained to the archbishop of Newfoundland about the sexual abuse of her altar-boy son by a priest, the archbishop ordered her to mention in confession that she had lied about a priest: none of his priests would behave in such a way. Finally the truth of such allegations, and worse, was revealed in England by the Winter Commission, which was presided over by an Anglican.

Sometime in the ten-sixties, a decade also known for the Norman conquest of England, a Pope said, *a propos* of clerical celibacy, that so long as priests were in the arms of their wives, the church would be in the hands of the laity. As a reaction to the Reformation, which generally (and not always consistently) underplayed or even abolished the role of the priest, the Catholic tendency has been, so far as I can judge, to set the priestly caste too far apart from other people.

This, of course, is by no means all jam for the clergy themselves. An ex-Jesuit told me that the two years after his ordination were the loneliest of his life. He had been put on a pedestal by everyone, including his family. A few years ago I heard a sermon from a delightful Irish priest. When he was young, he said, he had been brought up to think that priests could do no wrong; it was only after he became one that he realized that they were very much like other people. But he should not have been subjected to such illusions in the first place. "Mummy, priests must be wonderful men." "Well, Virginia, there is no doubt that they have a very important and difficult job to do. But I think that, in their character and behavior, they're very much like the rest of us." Hans Drewermann among others, has exclaimed at the immense strains imposed on priests by their isolated way of life.

I knew a lecturer in social work who had formerly been a priest, and I confided in him how distressed I had been by the events in Newfoundland. I added that I was thankful that this must be the worst, that things could not be as bad elsewhere. He replied, "Whatever gave you that idea?" When the Soviets were in power in Russia, loyal folk would say that most of those departed to the Gulag no doubt deserved what they got; but the authorities did seem to have made a mistake about Grandfather. So one hopefully assumes – at least I did and still to some extent do – that the more shocking cases are the exception rather than the rule.

Thank God, I have known some holy priests who I am sure lead the celibate lives demanded of them. The worst of it is that the ill-repute and the suspicions consequent on the revelations of disgraceful behavior spread to them, too. I understand that Kim Campbell was brought up as a Catholic, and is now an Anglican. When someone asked her why, she said that there was certain streak of the diabolical in the Roman Catholic Church. Who can deny that?

What is the answer? The main one can be given in the single word – *glasnost*. I once told this to our United Church chaplain at Calgary, and he roared with laughter, remarking, "Well, you know what that did to communism." But I have faith that, as one theologian remarked, the church, being founded on divine principle, is always capable of reform. A subsidiary answer is that the way of life of priests shouldn't be so much different from that of the laity; the denial or at least drastic compromise of the special role of the priesthood by the Reformers has given rise to an unhealthy setting-apart.

I am determined to end on a more positive note. A priest known to most of you, and one of he really good men of my acquaintance, once said gently, as was his wont, that some authors did not seem to realize that the normal expression of the sexual instinct could be set aside for the kingdom of God. In his case, at least, I could believe it. The present bishop of Calgary took sides with the workers against management in the Safeway strike a few years ago. Someone angrily wrote to the press that this amounted to violation of the principle of separation of church and state. On the contrary! It appears to me one of the main functions of religious leaders, as it was of the prophets of old, to recall people to principles of humanity and common decency when these are being forgotten.

It is told of the great and good Dom Helder Camara, late archbishop of Recife, that a government-employed gunman came to assassinate him, basically because of his inconvenient proclivity to speak and act on behalf of the poor. Having reached the palace, the gunman knocked on the back door, and an insignificant-looking little man opened it for him and asked him his business. "Where's the archbishop?" "I am the archbishop." Surprise, and a moment's pause. "I am going to kill you." "I am prepared for death; do what you came to do." The gunman could not manage it; he looked at the archbishop, fumbled for a moment with his gun, and then sheepishly took his leave. That's the sort of prince of the church for me.

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GOING BEYOND IDEALISM: LONERGAN'S RELATION TO HEGEL

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It is not to be inferred that my attitude towards Hegel is merely negative.[1]

My present aim is to establish the need for an investigation into the relationship of Lonergan's Critical Realism to Hegel's Absolute Idealism and to outline generally the strategy to be employed in going beyond Absolute Idealism. Such an investigation is, for reasons I shall provide, especially important for the future of Lonergan Studies and, I think, long overdue.

1. NEGLECT OF LONERGAN'S RELATION TO HEGEL

No doubt there are many causes of the neglect of Lonergan's relation to Hegel. One might be the predictable complexity of the relationship. Hegel is a comprehensive thinker who operated at a level of reflexivity that included in its sweep the entire history of philosophy. As Lonergan himself remarked, "Hegel's range of vision is enormous; indeed, it is unrestricted in extent."[2] The prospect of working out the relationship of such a thinker to Lonergan, an equally synthetic and reflective thinker, is a daunting one. To complicate matters further, there is the obstacle imposed by what Hegel himself described as his "severe style" which makes no concessions to the reader.[3]

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[1]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 398.

[2]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 374.

[3]*Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, vol. II, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 616, for Hegel's account of the "severe style."

Moreover, there are strong affinities between Lonergan Studies and Voegelian Studies, and Voegelin's animus toward Hegel is obvious. Some, perhaps, will be predisposed by Voegelin's polemic to dismiss Hegel.[4] How could it be worthwhile to explore the relation of Lonergan to a "gnostic magician" who, Voegelin implies, suffers from that intelligent, higher stupidity identified by Robert Musil and stands at the center of the Satanistic movement of modernity?[5] Further, Voegelin's negative estimation is complemented and reinforced by persistent myths and legends about Hegel that make him unattractive to advocates for open, democratic societies, to Catholic believers in an absolutely transcendent God, and to theorists of indeterminately directed, open-ended history.[6]

Moreover, there are Lonergan's own criticisms of Hegel. While Lonergan does not accuse Hegel of sorcery or Satanism, his objections are pointed and penetrating. Hegel's dialectic, we are told, is "closed, conceptualist, necessitarian, and immanental."[7] His notion of being may be comprehensive in connotation, but

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[4]Voegelin's estimation of Hegel has been tested by Glenn Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Magee concludes that in Hegel's system love of wisdom is replaced with the lust for power and is the ultimate expression of the pursuit of mastery (8).

[5]See Glenn Hughes, "Lonergan and the Concept of Stupidity," A Paper Presented at the Meeting of the West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, April 12-14, 2007. Here is not the place to defend Hegel against what I regard as abusive treatment by Voegelin. I would just note here that Hegel was not unaware of the dangers of the misology of which Voegelin accuses him. See *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 19, where Hegel writes, "Unfortunately, however, the retreat of thought has led it, as Plato noticed even in his time, to a very uncalled-for hatred of reason (misology). . . ." But, this citation would not have calmed Voegelin; Hegel, in Voegelin's opinion, thinks far too much. "Hegel," he claims, "dismisses the tension between noetic analysis and the divine mystery of reality . . .." "Hegel abolishes the tension of the Metaxy, and transfigures consciousness into the divine Logos itself, by letting the noetic analysis penetrate the divine mystery under the title of 'dialectics'. We are at the center of the Satanistic movement." See his "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," *Eranos Yearbook*, vol. 46 (Insel Verlag, 1977), 369. Voegelin's principal statement on Hegel's Hermeticism is found in his "savagely polemic essay" (Magee's phrase), "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery," *Published Essays, 1966-1985*, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990).

[6]On these myths and legends and their unfounded, or at least controversial, nature, see *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, ed. Jon Stewart (Indianapolis: Northwestern University Press, 1996). Lonergan's understanding of Hegel's philosophy, as I hope to show in subsequent studies, may contribute to our understanding of the intractability of the standard controversies in Hegel studies over, for example, the rationality of the actual, the necessity of the stages of Spirit, the end of history, denial of the law of contradiction, the essence of the dialectic, and the more-than-individual individual.

[7]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 446. Voegelin's criticism of Hegel is "existential" and attributes to him a moral aberration. Lonergan's is philosophical and accuses him of a philosophical oversight and consequent incompleteness. Whereas Voegelin's strategy for

it is restricted in denotation; it leaves no room for a multiplicity of discrete facts. In his effort to put reason back on its throne, he failed to appropriate the quintessentially rational act judgment.

Further still, Lonerganians aspire to be realists, indeed to be Critical Realists; but Hegel was an idealist, an Absolute Idealist. Despite our understanding that Lonergan in *Insight* held steadily in his sights a form of idealism, *viz.*, Critical Idealism, some still may harbor reservations about engaging in the extended flirtation with idealism that a comparison and contrast with Hegel would require. For, at a level of consciousness that is never eliminated, we still "know," in a generic sense, by contact and confrontation, and so we may be dissuaded from wrestling with Hegel by a primitive fear of losing contact with the real that goes hand in hand – or, rather, paw in paw – with our ineradicable involvement in knowing by looking.

It may seem more profitable, then, to spend our time investigating Lonergan's relation to Aquinas or to Newman than to a thinker who, it appears, is just another example of the counterposition, however comprehensive his aspirations. Or, if we agree that studies of Lonergan's relationship to thinkers whose views he ultimately rejects serve to clarify his position by contrast – if we discern, as it were, the positivity of determinate negation – wouldn't our time be better spent on Lonergan's relation to Kant? For, it is Kant at whom Lonergan seem to take aim in *Insight*, not Hegel.

Hegel, then, is notoriously difficult, possibly dangerous, apparently counterpositional, an Absolute Idealist, and apparently not Lonergan's main target in *Insight*. For these reasons, and no doubt for others as well, Lonergan's relation to Hegel has been neglected. But, I think better reasons can be given in favor of undertaking the serious study of Lonergan's relation to Hegel. I shall propose three I regard as especially compelling.

The first pertains to the task of bringing Lonergan into the contemporary philosophical conversation. The second pertains to the nature of Lonergan's actual

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dealing with Hegel is polemical and distancing, Lonergan's is intellectual and sublative, as I hope to show in Sections 4 and 5 below. A question raised by the difference in approaches is that of the relationship between Hegel's, or any philosopher's, supposed cognitional theoretic errors and his supposed moral ones. Lonergan's approach, with its emphasis on the cognitional and its ideal of sublation, is itself markedly Hegelian, whereas Voegelin's approach is not. Lonergan's treatment of Marx is similarly philosophical rather than polemical. Should we deal with Hegel polemically or philosophically, in terms of moral implications of philosophical errors that he may neither have intended nor foreseen, or in terms of the philosophic errors and the reasons for them? On the different emphases of Lonergan and Voegelin, see my article, "Affinities of Lonergan and Voegelin," *Lonergan Workshop Journal*, vol. 12 (1994): 179-98.

debt to Hegel in his construction of the argument of *Insight*. Lonergan's debt to Hegel, I believe, is a heavy one, greater than his debts to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Maréchal, or Newman, comparable only to his debt to Aquinas. The effectiveness of Lonergan's refutation of Kant, I believe, is due in large measure to his appropriation of and reliance upon the insights of Hegel. The third pertains to the significance of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in the movement from naïve realism and Scholastic realism to Lonergan's realism beyond idealism. Hegel's Absolute Idealism, I shall suggest, is the idealism of the precise design required to serve as the halfway house through which we must pass if we are to complete successfully the journey to Critical Realism. It is the home away from home in which we need to spend a Hegelian "moment," as it were, if we are to recover from our totalizing addiction to immediacy, if we are to apprehend vividly the discomfiting flow of the immanent criterion at work, if we are to reflect adequately upon indeterminacy, determinacy, and determination, if we are to catch our rational breath and give articulate expression to the relevant further questions that will guide us on the ascent beyond idealism and enable us to take in the commanding view afforded by Critical Realism. But, if this is so, then we may well wonder how we are to come to terms with the dialectical complexities and persistent perplexities of Hegelianism in such a way as to actually surpass it. As G. R. G. Mure has written, "The whole Hegelian system is so closely woven that its virtues and faults seem intermingled and ubiquitous."[8]

Finally, then, I shall argue that Lonergan himself left us a clue we might follow through the twists and turns of the Hegelian labyrinth. I shall argue that the achievement of the Critical Realist standpoint Lonergan promotes requires much more than a brief flirtation with Hegel's Absolute Idealism. It requires, first, the development of a fairly intimate relationship with it and, secondly, the deliberate supersession, sublation, or transcendence of that relationship. I shall suggest, moreover, that this supersession is not to be achieved by means of the often abrupt and impersonal strategy of "reversing the counter-position," as that strategy is commonly understood, but by a more prolonged and sensitive strategy of a different sort. To "go beyond idealism" to Lonergan's Critical Realism requires that we *evert* Hegel's Absolute Idealism, that we *turn it inside out*.[9] I shall consider each of these points in turn.

[8]G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 294.

[9]I have previously invited attention to Lonergan's eversion of Hegel and provided a brief summary of his differences from Hegel in my article, "The Polymorphism of Human

2. HEGEL'S INFLUENCE AND THE HEGEL REVIVAL

A first reason, then, for exploring Lonergan's relation to Hegel pertains to the contemporary philosophical situation in which Lonergan's thought must gain a firm foothold if it is to survive and gain influence comparable to that exercised by Hegel himself. Hegel is *the* comprehensive Christian philosopher of modernity, whereas Lonergan may be described as *the* comprehensive Christian philosopher of postmodernity. Hegel's immediate influence upon such notables as Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and others is, of course, well-known, and contemporary French philosophy is fairly described as comprehensible only inasmuch as it is understood as a reaction to Hegelian speculation.[10] Contemporary analytic philosophy, in yet another expression of its slowly dawning recognition of its own historical imbeddedness, has extended its conceptual mining operations from Platonic, Aristotelian, and Thomist texts to the rich conceptual veins of the Hegelian *corpus* it reviled at its inception.[11] Hegel's influence is now recognized to be so far-reaching that a revival of Hegel studies is already well underway.[12] As Frederick Beiser has remarked:

Consciousness and the Prospects for a Lonerganian History of Philosophy," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 4, issue 140 (December 1995): 379-402.

[10]See Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic*, with an introduction by Jacques Derrida, trans. Lisabeth During (London: Routledge, 2005); Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert C. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Richard Schacht, *Hegel and After: Studies in Continental Philosophy Between Kant and Sartre* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

[11]See, for example, Tom Rockmore, *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2005) and his earlier book *On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996). See also, Peter Hylton, "Hegel and Analytic Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 445-85.

[12]Illustrating the rise in interest: Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); M. J. Inwood, *Hegel* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, 2002); Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006); Frederick Beiser, *Hegel* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Horst Althaus, *Hegel*, trans. Michael Tarsh (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); *Hegel, Volumes I & II*, ed. David Lamb (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1998); *The Hegel Reader*, ed. Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Michael Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); *Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature*, ed. Stephen Houlgate (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998); *The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, ed. Jon Stewart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998); *Miscellaneous Writings of G. W. F. Hegel*, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston, IL:

> Virtually every major philosophical movement of the twentieth century – existentialism, Marxism, pragmatism, phenomenology and analytic philosophy – grew out of reaction against Hegel. The concepts, arguments and problems of these movements will remain forever alien and arcane to us until we understand what they grew out of and what they reacted against.[13]

Lonergan studies must make themselves intelligible to the intellectual culture in which they hope to gain a hearing. If we hope to gain for Lonergan a voice in the contemporary philosophical conversation, we must show how it is that he comes to terms with Hegel and how he may be situated in relation to him.[14]

3. LONERGAN'S DEBT TO HEGEL

In the second place, even if Hegel had not risen to such philosophical prominence in the forty-odd years since Lonergan's death, Lonergan's own debt to Hegel would provide ample justification for a thorough-going investigation of his relationship to him. The sort of study I am proposing with regard to Lonergan's relation to Hegel has already been carried out, to some extent, with regard to his relation to Kant.

It has been recognized for some time that Lonergan's *Insight* is interpreted profitably as a deliberate and calculated response to Kant's Critical Idealism. Lonergan's pointed "Contrast with Kantian Analysis" in the pivotal chapter on self-affirmation is fairly compelling evidence that this is the case. With the appearance of William Mathews's *Lonergan's Quest,* the fact that Kantian Criticism is a major target in *Insight* may be regarded as indisputable.[15] But, it

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Northwestern University Press, 2002); Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). On Lonergan's relation to the analytic tradition, see Michael McCarthy, *The Crisis of Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) and Joseph Fitzpatrick, *Philosophical Encounters: Lonergan and the Analytic Tradition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

[13]Frederick C. Beiser, *Hegel* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2.

[14]The reader will find a brief but nevertheless excellent account of Hegel's position in G. R. G. Mure, *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[15]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 362-66; William Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of* Insight (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005);

should be noted that Lonergan is not content in the chapter on self-affirmation to contrast his position only with that of Kant. He provides a second pointed contrast with which this pivotal chapter concludes. The contrast with Kantian analysis, which runs eight paragraphs, is followed by a "Contrast with Relativist Analysis" which runs for twelve. Moreover, a close reading of this concluding contrast by anyone who has read Hegel reveals that the unnamed relativist with whom Lonergan is taking issue bears a remarkably close resemblance to Hegel.[16] Thus, while it is true that Lonergan's argument in *Insight* is to be interpreted profitably as a response to Kant's Critical Idealism, it is also true that it is just as much a pointed response to Hegelian Absolute Idealism.[17]

But, still more significant than Lonergan's response to Hegelian relativism is his reliance on Hegelian insights in framing his response to Kant. In his effort to get beyond Kant, Lonergan adopts a strategy that has its inspiration and origin in Hegel. Thus, while Lonergan's *Insight* is indeed a response to Kant, that response is informed heavily by, and partly dependent for its efficacy upon, Lonergan's appropriation of Hegel's Absolute Idealist critique of Kant.[18] Of course, Lonergan

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see also the exploitation of the clues provided in *Insight* by Giovanni Sala, *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

[16]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 366-71. The allusions to Hegel are manifest: "He [the relativist] regards the unconditioned as the ideal towards which human knowing tends . . .. [S]hort of this comprehensive coherence, there can be no sure footing. There is understanding, but it is partial; it is joined with incomprehension; it is open to revision when present comprehension yields to future understanding; and so intimately are all things related that knowledge of anything can be definitive only when everything is known" (366-67); again, ". . . [T]he relativist invents for himself a universe that consists merely of explanatory system because he conceives the unconditioned as the ideal of understanding, as the comprehensive coherence towards which understanding tends by asking what and why" (369); and, again, "For him (the relativist) nothing is simply wrong, for every statement involves some understanding and so some part of what he names truth" (371).

[17]See also, in this regard, Lonergan's prolonged critique of Hegel (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 46-48).

[18]Lonergan's attentiveness to Kant has troubled traditional Thomists – at St. Louis, Toronto, and Notre Dame – from the beginning. It is interesting to note, perhaps, that objections to Lonergan at Toronto in the 1970s – those of Mauer, Synan, and Owens – were reinforced by a suspicion that he is not only post-Kantian but, indeed, post-Hegelian. In a sense, the post-Hegelian character of Lonergan's thought has been recognized more fully outside the Lonergan circle than within it. The editors of Lonergan's Collected Works have observed in a footnote that "too limited a focus on *Insight* suggests that Kant was (Lonergan's) partner in dialogue, but the evidence keeps mounting that Kant is second to Hegel here . . .." See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6, *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 71-72. I would agree that Kant may be second to Hegel in influence – he certainly is second chronologically. Lonergan's early studies were of Newman, Plato, Augustine, and Hegel, Thomas, and then Kant, in that order, and

does not rely on Hegel alone to effect his refutation. His debts to Plato the methodologist, to Aristotle on knowing by identity, to Augustine on *veritas*, to Aquinas on insight into phantasm and the distinction between "*quid sit*" and "*an sit,*" to Maréchal on finality, and to Newman on the illative sense are well-known. But, Lonergan's reliance upon and uses of these thinkers differ significantly from his reliance upon and use of Hegel. On the concluding page of the chapter in *Insight* devoted to the most fundamental of transcendental notions, the notion of being, we find a footnote that is remarkable, not merely for its occurrence – because, as has often been remarked, footnotes are few and far between in *Insight* – but for its bearing upon our understanding of the very structure and organization of the entire work. The footnote in question qualifies Lonergan's criticism of Hegel's notion of being which, Lonergan claims, is comprehensive in connotation but restricted in denotation.

> It is not to be inferred that my attitude towards Hegel is merely negative. In fact, characteristic features in the very movement of his thought have their parallels in the present work. As his *Aufhebung* both rejects and retains, so also in their own fashion do our higher viewpoints. As he repeatedly proceeds from *an sich*, through *für sich*, to *an und für sich*, so our whole argument is a movement from the objects of mathematical, scientific, and commonsense understanding, through the acts of understanding themselves, to an understanding of understanding.[19]

Lonergan has famously remarked: "My study of Kant was an afterthought." But, I also disagree with the editors. My own view, to be developed, is that *Insight* also owes more to Hegel than to Kant.

[19]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 398. This statement suggests that Hegel's influence on Lonergan's seminal philosophical work is matched only by that of Aquinas. Moreover, the argument might be made that, as regards its "characteristic features," *Insight* owes more to Hegel than to Aquinas. What these "characteristic features" are, and to what extent they permeate *Insight*, are questions to be addressed in subsequent studies. The Editors' Note *n* on Lonergan's attitude to Hegel, appended to the footnote, while it provides additional evidence of Lonergan's "focal interest" in Hegel in the 1930s, also reflects the common underestimation of the extent of Hegel's influence on the argument of *Insight*. The editors are content to draw the reader's attention to contents of *Insight* that owe something to Hegel's inspiration, *viz.*, Lonergan's remarks on history. As regards the contents of *Insight*, similar references could easily be made to those that echo the inspiration of, say, Hume. But, the influence of Hume, unlike the influence of Hegel, on *Insight* does not pertain directly to the formal, dynamic structure of the work. It is Hegel's influence on the very structure and organization of *Insight* that is most remarkable. Whereas Aquinas may be credited with providing the tripartite structure of cognitional process by which *Insight* is, in a certain sense, formally organized, he did so only once the locus within which that tripartite structure was conceived had been transposed by the shift from substance to subject, from first principles to transcendental method, from human nature to human history, from logic to

Lonergan might have issued similar warnings to qualify his critical attitude toward Hume and Husserl, for example, and he would have been right to do so.[20] For Lonergan's project in *Insight* may be compared with Hume's strategy of assaulting the citadel in his *Treatise of Human Nature*;[21] and the first half of *Insight* is, in a qualified sense, a phenomenology that invites comparison with the earlier Husserl.[22] But, such warnings are not to be found. Lonergan does sound an alarm, however, with regard to inferences the reader may be inclined to make about his basic attitude toward Hegel; and the *caveat* is justified by his remarkable declaration that the "whole argument" of *Insight* is Hegelian in its structure. Yet, this great procedural debt to Hegel, while it has been noted, has not been seriously and thoroughly explored.[23]

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method, from Aristotelian science to modern science – in short, from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis. So, for example, Lonergan owes his understanding of the concept (the inner word), as the expression of what is understood, to his transposition of Aquinas, and this understanding is essential to the argument of *Insight*, but only after it has been extricated from Aquinas's faculty psychology. As I hope to show in subsequent studies, the tools for effecting this transposition were, to a great extent, provided to Lonergan by Hegel either directly or through intermediaries who themselves owed a debt to Hegel. See also Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 366 ff. where Lonergan recasts his standard account of the dynamic of history – progress-decline-redemption – in Hegelian terms as position, negation, and negation of the negation. Note that this terminology is genuinely Hegelian whereas the more familiar terminology of thesis-antithesis-synthesis that Lonergan also occasionally employs is described by Hegel himself as a "lifeless schema." See Gustav Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'," in *The Hegel Myths and Legends*, 302.

[20]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 440-41, on Husserl.

[21]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 24. See also, 552: ". . . I am impressed by Hume's argument that the central science is the empirical science of man . . .."

[22]Lonergan framed his presentation of the argument of *Insight* in his Address to the 1976 Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Toronto, in terms of Husserl. A serious comparison of Lonergan and Husserl has been carried out by William Ryan, SJ, in numerous articles. The relationship of Lonergan's position to that of Hume has been explored by Joseph Fitzpatrick in *Philosophical Encounters: Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 37 ff.

[23]The single serious study of Lonergan's relationship to Hegel is Jon Michael Nilson's *Hegel's* Phenomenology *and Lonergan's* Insight*: A Comparison of Two Ways to Christianity*, a doctoral dissertation written under the direction of John S. Dunne at the University of Notre Dame in 1975. Nilson has a good number of insights into the relationship, in particular, of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* to Lonergan's *Insight*, but he tends to conceive both philosophies as "systems" – which, I would argue, is true of neither in the ordinary meaning of "system." and his comparisons and contrasts remain for the most part descriptive and so underestimate the import of both the similarities and the differences between the two thinkers. Nilson's work will receive the attention it deserves in studies to follow. Additional evidence of Lonergan's interest in and study of Hegel in the early-to-mid 1930s, long before the composition of *Insight*, is provided in Patrick Brown's doctoral dissertation completed at Boston College.

Many years ago George Worgul gave to his investigation of the occurrence of Newman's ideas in Lonergan's works the title "The Ghost of Newman in the Lonergan *Corpus*."[24] The title, while it is both inspired and catchy, is a bit of an overstatement, for Worgul did not expose at the very structural core of Lonergan's mature thought a Newmanian framework. He showed, rather, that there are other ideas, besides the now familiar illative sense, that Lonergan borrows from Newman. But, I believe we can speak without exaggeration and, indeed, with a degree of precision, of "the *Geist* of Hegel in Lonergan's *corpus*." Just how apropos this title might be for a study of the relationship of Lonergan to Hegel remains to be shown. Still, while there is something catchy but clearly inappropriate about the title "Kant's Transcendental Ego in Lonergan's Corpus," or "Descartes' Cogito in Lonergan's Corpus," or "Hume's Bundle of Perceptions in Lonergan's Corpus," it seems to me that Hegel's *Geist*, in a sense to be determined by further study, does indeed infuse Lonergan's project in *Insight*.

If we wish to attain a more concrete apprehension of Lonergan's Critical Realism, we must take seriously the fact that *Insight* is heavily dependent upon Hegel, not only with regard to its content but also with regard to its dynamic structure. We have reason to believe, then, that Lonergan's relationship to Hegel is deeper and broader than his relationships to other philosophers, with the one exception, perhaps, of his relationship to Aquinas. Accordingly, a study of Lonergan's relationship to Hegel may serve the purpose not only of establishing for Lonergan a place in the contemporary conversation but also of deepening our understanding and appreciation of his Critical Realism. Let us consider a bit more closely now the relationship of Lonergan's debt to Hegel to the concrete appropriation of Critical Realism.

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[24]*The Modern Schoolman* 54 (1977): 317-32. Worgul pointed, for example, to Lonergan's employment of Newman's idea that the whole of knowledge is mutilated by the elimination of theology in the article "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World." See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, *Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), ch. 7. Worgul restricted his attention to explicit mentions of Newman.

4. IDEALISM AS THE HALFWAY HOUSE ON THE WAY TO CRITICAL REALISM

In his introduction to *Insight* Lonergan provides the now fairly well-known image of idealism as the halfway house between materialism and Critical Realism. He writes:

> For the appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness . . . is not an end in itself but rather a beginning. It is a necessary beginning, for unless one breaks the duality in one's knowing, one doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into the bog of a knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice knowing on the altar of an immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery – and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness – that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is idealism.[25]

In 1958, during the Discussion following the first lecture in the two-week series known as the Halifax Lectures, Lonergan was asked about this quotation, and he responded in this way: "It is not an easy point. As a matter of fact, it is a fundamental point. But it will become clearer in the course of the two weeks, and if it does we are achieving an awful lot. Roughly, however, is it *truth* that is decisive, and is it *simply* truth that is decisive?"[26]

A thorough exegesis of this quotation and the investigation of its relationship to Lonergan's mature position would plunge us headlong into the very project I am here merely proposing, so I shall limit myself to a few general observations. First, Lonergan identifies idealism as the halfway house or midpoint

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[25]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 22.

[26]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5, *Understanding and Being*, ed., Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 279. Emphases added.

on a journey from materialism to Critical Realism.[27] Secondly, one can get off to a rocky start on this journey and bring it to a premature conclusion. In an effort to escape materialism without falling into the clutches of idealism one may seek refuge in a pre-critical, incoherent, half animal and half human realism. Thirdly, while this incoherent realism lying between materialism and idealism is also described as a halfway house, it is so only in the static and minimal sense of a mere midpoint; it is, from the standpoint of the one inhabiting it, a permanent residence nestled uncomfortably, as it were, between the natural habitat of materialism to the West and the cultural hub of idealism to the East. Fourthly, from the standpoint of Critical Realism, idealism is a halfway house in the dynamic and richer sense, the halfway point on a longer journey, and it hovers, as it were, above both materialism and incoherent realism and just below Critical Realism. Accordingly, to take up permanent residence in incoherent realism is to adopt a compromise between two opposed positions, materialism and idealism, regarded as equally menacing and unacceptable; whereas, to embark on the journey toward Critical Realism is to eschew compromise and to opt for idealism over both materialism and incoherent realism. The relation between materialism and incoherent realism, on the one hand, and idealism, on the other, is not one of static or horizontal opposition but one of dynamic and hierarchical sublation. In the fifth place, the transition from incoherent realism to idealism may be accomplished with greater or less thoroughness. It may involve the wholesale rejection of the confrontationist myth, or it may be a function merely of the systematic exigence for greater analytical consistency and coherence. In the former case, it is a forward-looking transition, a real change of residence, a full-scale move into the halfway house. In the latter case, it is a half-hearted affair, a backward-looking move, not into the halfway house entirely beyond immediate realism but into a gated philosophical enclave, so to speak, still circumscribed by its philosophical boundaries.

[27]Lonergan borrows the image of idealism as the halfway house between realism and materialism directly from Maréchal. See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5, 276-77. However, as I shall attempt to show in what follows, we should not jump to the conclusion that, since Maréchal in his *Cahiers* was crafting a Thomist response to Kant, it is Kant's Critical Idealism that has the design and the furnishings required for an idealism that is to serve as the halfway house. The image also occurs in Leo W. Keeler's *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study* (Romae: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1934), 6, which Lonergan reviewed in the 1935 volume of *Gregorianum*. However, the image is not Keeler's but occurs in a quotation from A. E. Taylor's *Plato* and is used with reference to the Eleatic doctrine.

The move into the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism, then, is a move into idealism. But, there is more than one type of idealism. There is the Critical Idealism associated with Kant, and there is the Absolute Idealism associated with Hegel.[28] Does Lonergan have both of these idealisms in mind when he declares that idealism is the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism, or does he have just one of them in mind?

We may assume that the idealism in question is to be regarded as the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism precisely because it has rejected fundamental presuppositions that underpin the compromise of incoherent realism. Inasmuch as it has done so, it may be regarded as quasi-positional. If both types of idealism are simply counterpositional, how could one be regarded as the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism? Our question, then, may be rephrased: Are these two idealisms equally quasi-positional, or is one of these idealisms in some sense more positional than the other?

To put the question this way may seem problematic, for it would appear that any idealist philosophy is to be viewed as counterpositional from the standpoint of Critical Realism. On the other hand, by identifying idealism as the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism, Lonergan has introduced implicitly a distinction between positions and counterpositions in a specific and strict sense, on the one hand, and positions and counterpositions in a generic and loose sense, on the other. Positions and counterpositions in the strict sense are distinguished in *Insight*, and this distinction is the more familiar one. A philosophy is positional

> (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the 'already out there now'; (2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state, and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction.
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> On the other hand, it will be a basic counterposition if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions.[29]

But, in *Topics in Education* Lonergan distinguishes positions and counterpositions in a looser, generic sense:

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[28]Lonergan also speaks now and then of a naïve, solipsistic idealism that we can safely ignore, because in Lonergan's view the problem it raises is not a properly philosophical one. See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5, 107.

[29]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 413. Emphasis added.

> Fundamentally, positions are philosophic . . . views that are in harmony with the full implications of the three levels [of consciousness]. Counterpositions are views . . . that involve a blind spot, a limited horizon, where the limitation is either to the intellectual level or to the experiential level. The systematic formulation of the difference between positions and counterpositions is given in epistemological terms: if the real is what you know by understanding correctly, you have a position; if the real is *anything but that*, or if no real at all is acknowledged, you have a counterposition.[30]

Accordingly, just as one may distinguish knowing in the generic sense from knowing in the specific sense, so one may distinguish counterpositions in the generic sense from counterpositions in the specific sense. In the generic sense of knowing, any component in cognitional process is knowing. In the specific sense, human knowing is a dynamic structure of experiencing, understanding, and judging.[31] Similarly, in the generic sense a counterposition is any philosophical viewpoint that fails to acknowledge all of the components of normative cognitional process and their relations. In the specific sense a counterposition is any philosophical viewpoint that affirms one or more of the following propositions, implicitly or explicitly: that consciousness is self-knowledge; that knowing is looking; that objectivity is extroversion; that being is a subdivision of the "already out there now." Thus, naïve realism is counterpositional in the specific sense. Further, empiricism is counterpositional in the specific sense. But, it is possible to hold a philosophic view that does not affirm any of the propositions constitutive of the counterposition in the strict sense, but which nevertheless fails to identify, thematize, and appropriate some essential element in cognitional process. In other words, failure to identify, thematize, and appropriate some essential element in cognitional process does not entail affirmation of any of the propositions constitutive of the counterposition in the specific sense. Strictly speaking, such a view *is not* counterpositional; generically, it *is* counterpositional. It is more accurately described as quasi-positional, i.e., fundamentally in harmony with the position, despite its incompleteness.[32] Insofar as it has broken with the

[30]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, *Topics in Education*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 179.

[31]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, *Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 207.

[32]In Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Method* (1959), translation by M. G. Shields of *De Intellectu et Methodo* (first draft) (Lonergan Research Institute, 1990, unpublished), 19, Lonergan writes: "Now, all true understanding must be retained, whether in the orientation towards thing or towards the true. However, the statements made by their proponents have to be discerned:

basic counterposition, it is the product of an intellectual conversion, and it stands squarely and without compromise on the path of philosophical development leading to Critical Realism.

4.1 The Quasi-positionality of Absolute Idealism

Let us consider now the relative counterpositionality, as it were, of the two major forms of idealism in order to determine which is better equipped to serve as the halfway house between materialism and Critical Realism.

Kant's Critical Idealism – despite the "Copernican shift," the acknowledgement that we cannot know the real by means of our faculty of intuition, and the affirmation of the spontaneity of the faculty of Understanding – adheres to the counterpositional ideal of confrontationism in its retention of a notion of the unknowable *Ding-an-sich* behind a phenomenal veil. Kantian Critical Idealism, as Lonergan points out, is a half-hearted affair;[33] it is plagued by its affirmation that our only immediate apprehension of the really real would be through intuition. In Critical Idealism there is a residual empiricism.

Kantian Criticism, then, remains counterpositional in the strict sense. It advances beyond naïve realism and Scholastic realism inasmuch as it acknowledges that we have no immediate access to the really real; but the truth of

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some of these statements are consonant with systematic intelligence (these are positions), while some are not (and these are counterpositions)." For an extended discussion of positions and counterpostions, see my article, "Reversing the Counterposition: The *Argumentum ad Hominem* in Philosophic Dialogue," *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 6 (1986): 195-230. The tactic of "reversal" is not restricted to reversal of the strict counterposition but can be more broadly applied to supersede counterpositions in the generic sense. "Reversal is a methodical subversion of the hypostatization of the conceptual product of neglected and occluded intelligent and reasonable performance, an essentially coherent expression of the 'operator' that would evoke the renewal of operation in an over-integrated interlocutor" (206). The tactic of reversal brings to light not only the conflict between cognitive performance and the basic counterpositional claims about cognitive performance, but also the conflict between cognitive performance and imprecise or undifferentiated, but still basically positional, claims about cognitive performance, or the sort of conflict that results when the implications of significant differences in performance are only compactly acknowledged and insufficiently differentiated. To employ the tactic of reversal to resolve the latter type of conflict is not "reversing the counterposition" in the sense in which this phrase is commonly used, i.e., it is not reversing the counterposition in the strict sense. In short, reversal is also employed in "developing the position." It is possible to be positional but relatively undifferentiated. It is also possible to be counterpositional in the strict sense and highly differentiated. In this connection, see my article, "Authentication of Common Sense from Below Upwards: Mediating Self-correcting Folk Psychology," *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 15 (1999): 117-39.

[33] Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 438.

this acknowledgement is compromised by the retention of the confrontationist ideal. It advances, not by way of an intellectual conversion but, rather, by way of intellectual consistency and coherence to build a grand philosophical hypothesis and to draw the conclusion that the really real is forever inaccessible. Because it is not rooted in an intellectual conversion, in its advance it remains backward-looking; it pines for immediate confrontation with the really real. Inasmuch as it retains the ideal of confrontation and contact, inasmuch as it still imagines cognitive mediation to be the interposition of merely subjective conditions *between* the objectivity-seeking subject and the unintuitable *Gegenstand*, and despite its promising affirmation of the spontaneity of understanding, it remains counterpositional in the strict sense. It may be more coherent and consistent in its reasoning than naïve and Scholastic realism, and so have a stronger apprehension of the normative objectivity that pushed it beyond immediate realism, but it is no less counterpositional at its root. Critical Idealism does not abandon the cognitional myth, but rather accepts the inaccessibility of the real it continues to imagine to be "out there." There is abundant textual evidence that, in Lonergan's view, the ideal of confrontation and contact remains intact in Critical Idealism.[34]

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[34]As Lonergan notes with regard to Kant's Critical Idealism, ". . . empiricism begets critical idealism. It awakens Kant from his dogmatic slumbers by revealing to him that the one and only immediate apprehension we have of objects is by sensible intuition." *A Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 242. Again: "The idealist . . . correctly refutes the naïve-realist claim that the whole objectivity of human knowing is found in some component of human knowing, but mistakenly concludes that human knowing does not yield valid knowledge of reality. . .. (T)he strength of the idealist position is the sharpness with which it refutes the mistaken claims of naïve realists; its weakness is its inability to break completely with the confusions introduced by naïve realism" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 214-15). Again: "Why does the (critical) idealist assert that it is by *Anschauung* that our cognitional activities have their immediate relationship to objects? It is because their world is a picture world; the original relationship of cognitional activity to the picture is the look; and so it is in . . . *Anschauung* that the critical idealist places the immediate relation of cognitional activity to objects" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, 218). Again: ". . . (Kant) was unable to break cleanly from the basic conviction of animal extroversion that the 'real' is the 'already out there now.' . . . However convinced Kant was that 'taking a look' could not be valid human knowing, he devoted his energies to showing how it could seem to be knowing and in what restricted sense it could be regarded as valid" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 439). And again: ". . . Kant's philosophy is not built in a way that is compatible with the fact that the decisive element is truth. Because, for possible knowledge, the criterion in Kant always is the possibility of connecting it with an intuition. And that is why you get into these logical difficulties in Kant. But they are only symptomatic" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 447-48). It should be noted that Lonergan typically speaks of "idealism" without qualification, and one must determine from the context which idealism – Critical Idealism or Absolute Idealism – he is criticizing. Moreover, Lonergan commonly emphasizes the implicit anticipations of the position in Kant, rather than the counterpositional commitments. This emphasis tends to blur the fundamental

But Hegel, in contrast to Kant, "took the more forthright position that extroverted consciousness was but an elementary stage in the coming-to-be of mind...."[35] Lonergan writes,

> Five hundred years separate Hegel from Scotus . . .. [T]hat notable interval of time was devoted to working out in a variety of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look. The ultimate conclusion was that it did not and could not. If the reader does not himself accept that conclusion as definitive, certainly Hegel did . . ..[36]

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difference between Critical Idealism and Absolute Idealism by emphasizing their shared oversight of the role of judgment. A similar ambiguity afflicts his reference to "idealism," without qualification, as the halfway house in the quotation from the Introduction to *Insight*. However, in *Understanding and Method*, 109, Lonergan does actually distinguish between "Kantian criticism" and "idealism," Both fail to appropriate judgment, but only in "idealism" is truth decisive. Still, "... idealism conceives truth ontologically and so for it truth is arrived at by understanding; the notion of truth is not that which is elicited from an act of the judgment." The present section is an attempt to show that Critical Idealism is not equipped to serve as the halfway house, and this is shown best, I think, not by emphasizing the implicit positional elements in it, but by emphasizing its adherence to the confrontationist ideal. This adherence, I shall argue, precludes its being regarded as the true *midpoint* between materialism and Critical Realism.

[35]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 447-48.

[36]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 372. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* may be described as an account of Spirit's self-overcoming of this counterpositional presupposition. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 224: "Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation, is capable of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of mind." Lonergan remarks that Kant's critique (the KRV) "was not of the pure reason but of the human mind as conceived by Scotus . . .." See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 38-39. Philosophers after Kant may be sorted into two groups: those who believe Kant to have critiqued the human mind, and those who believe Kant to have critiqued an *historical conception* of the human mind or *a particular ideal of knowledge*. Hegel and Lonergan may be counted among those in the latter group.

Hegel abandons the ideal of immediate confrontation with the real,[37] recognizes the limitations of picture-thinking,[38] takes his stand on the dynamically unfolding desire to know as the immanent criterion of objectivity,[39] thematizes the

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[37]See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 27: "In Phenomenology, the soul, by the negation of its corporeity, raises itself to purely ideal self-identity, becomes *consciousness*, becomes 'I', is for itself over against its Other. But this first being-for-itself of mind is still conditioned by the Other from which it proceeds. The 'I' is still perfectly empty, a quite abstract subjectivity which posits the whole content of immediate mind outside of it and relates itself to it as to a world already in existence. Thus what was at first only our object, does indeed become an object for mind itself, but the 'I' does not as yet know that what confronts it is natural mind itself. Therefore, the 'I', in spite of its being-for-self, is at the same time still not for itself, for it is only in relation to an Other, to something given. (S)elf-consciousness overcomes the one-sidedness of its subjectivity, breaks away from its particularity, from its opposition to objectivity, and attains to the universality which embraces both sides and represents within itself the immanent unity of itself with consciousness."

[38]See, for example, Hegel's remarks on the distinction between sense, conception (picture-thinking), and thought in his "smaller" Logic. The distinction "is of capital importance for understanding the nature and kinds of knowledge . . .." See *The Logic of Hegel,* trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 36-38. Again, in *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, trans. A. V. Miller; ed. Michael George and Andrew Vincent (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 8-9: "In ordinary life, the expressions *to have an Idea* and *to Think* (*vorstellen* as distinct from *denken*) are used *interchangeably* and we thus dignify with the name of thought what is only the product of imagination. In 'Ideas' of this sort we have an object before us in its external and unessential existence. In thinking, on the contrary, we separate from the object its external, merely unessential side, and consider the object merely in its essence." Further, Hegel explains why people often find philosophy unintelligible: "Their difficulty lies partly in an incapacity . . . for abstract thinking, i.e., in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move about in them." They have "an impatient wish to have before them as a mental picture that which is in the mind as a thought or notion . . . a hankering after an image with which we are already familiar." See *The Logic of Hegel*, 7-8.

[39]In the Introduction to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel writes: "But the essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two moments, 'Notion' and 'object', 'being-for-another' and being-in-itself', both fall *within* that knowledge which we are investigating. Consequently, we do not need to import criteria, or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is *in and for itself.* But not only is a contribution by us superfluous, since Notion and object, the criterion and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself, but we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really *testing* them, so that, since what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is simply to look on. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are *for* the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for the same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something

normative supersession of the presupposition of a primordial subject-object dichotomy, refuses to totalize the experiential element in compound objectivity,[40] welcomes the unimpeded exercise of normative objectivity, introduces a corresponding ideal of knowledge as comprehensive coherence,[41] and looks forward to the achievement of the virtually unconditioned, although without real otherness, i.e., to a single virtually unconditioned identical with the universe – the self-mediating, self-determining *Begriff*.[42]

This is the Hegelian type of idealism, an Absolute Idealism, with its thoroughgoing transposition from substance to subject,[43] its realization that to identify a limit is to be beyond it,[44] its struggle to articulate the dynamism of a normative objectivity that recurrently overreaches its own premature certainty of consistent and coherent achievement, and its affirmation of this movement as a self-correcting process. Insofar as this idealism abandons the confrontationist ideal and affirms the identity of thought and being, it is positional in the strict

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is *for it* the *in-itself*; and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, *for it*, another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination rests." *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 53-54.

[40]Hegel writes, "*'Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu'* : there is nothing in thought which has not been in sense and experience. If speculative philosophy refused to admit this maxim, it can only have done so from a misunderstanding. It will, however, on the converse side no less assert: '*Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu*.'" See *The Logic of Hegel*, 15.

[41]The ideal of comprehensive coherence in Hegel corresponds to the ideal that is the good or end of the second level of cognitional operation in Lonergan: "Intelligence as such seeks a complete explanation of all phenomena: it aims at understanding every-thing. Hence it is constantly making distinctions in order to comprehend all these distinct realities in all their aspects. The end of intelligence is the whole complex of intelligible relations such that the universe may be understood in its unity." This good is the end of "systematic intelligence" which invites comparison with Hegel's notion of system: "In saying 'systematic' we do not mean to suggest some abstract system consisting of propositions from which everything can be deduced. 'Systematic' as we are using it is intended to connote an understanding of the whole concrete universe distinguished according to all its many aspects and the intelligible relations of each of its parts, hence an understanding of the entire universe as something that is one." *Understanding and Method*, 93-94. See Hegel's remark on "system" in note 66 below.

[42]See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 180-81: "However, the Knowing of truth does not itself, to begin with, have the form of truth; for at the stage of development now reached, it is still *abstract*, the formal identity of subjectivity and objectivity. Only when this identity has developed into an actual difference and has made itself into the identity of itself and its difference, therefore, only when mind or spirit steps forth as an immanently developed totality, not till then has that certainty *established* itself as truth."

[43]See *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 486-87.

[44]See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 24-25: "The very fact that we know a limitation is evidence that we are beyond it, evidence of our freedom from limitation." Also, 182: "Therefore, to talk of the limitations of Reason is worse than it would be to talk of wooden iron."

sense. Insofar as it is incapable of affirming real otherness, it is counterpositional in the generic sense. This idealism rejects the idea that the subject is known in some prior "existential" state,[45] abandons the cognitional myth, eschews objectivity as extroversion, rejects the notion of being as a subdivision of the "already out there now." But, insofar as it fails to appropriate judgment, it cannot affirm a multiplicity of discrete matters of fact.[46]

We may distinguish, then, between an idealism that is counterpositional in both the strict and loose senses, inasmuch as it retains the confrontationist ideal, continues to conceive objectivity as extroversion, and retains a notion of being as a subdivision of the "already out there now"; and, on the other hand, an idealism that is positional in the strict sense and counterpositional only in the loose sense, inasmuch as it deliberately rejects the cognitional myth, the conception of objectivity as extroversion, the notion of being as the "already out there now real," does not conflate consciousness and self-knowledge, and eschews picture-thinking, but still fails to appropriate judgment.

The former type of idealism, insofar as it fails to break cleanly with confrontationism, is a backward-looking idealism plagued by a sense of subjective entrapment. Moreover, it looks back, not through a window of the halfway house on the road to Critical Realism, but from an empiricist sub-world whose boundaries are still determined by the counterpositional presuppositions of immediate and incoherent realism. The latter type of idealism, though, is an authentically forward-looking idealism. If it happens to glance back, what it sees

[45]Hegel writes, "It is . . . a very great difference whether one *is* or *has* something and whether he *knows* that he is or has it; for example, ignorance or rudeness of the sentiments or of behaviour are limitations which one may have without knowing it. In so far as one reflects or knows of them he must know of their opposite. Reflection upon them is already a first step beyond them." *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, 12. Again: "But it is well to distinguish between only *being* thinkers, and *knowing* ourselves as thinkers. The former we always are in all circumstances; but the latter, on the contrary, is perfectly true only when we have risen to *pure* thinking." *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 224. Again, on p. 6: "only when we contemplate mind in this process of the self-actualization of its Notion, do we know it in its truth (for truth means precisely agreement of the Notion with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind is not yet true, has not yet made its Notion objective to it, has not yet transformed what confronts it in immediate guise, into something which it has posited, has not yet transformed its actuality into one which is adequate to its Notion. The entire development of mind is nothing else but the raising of itself to its truth . . .." Again, p. 182: "Mind in its immediacy has therefore not yet grasped its Notion, only *is* a rational Knowing, but does not yet *know* itself as such." In brief, this distinction is ubiquitous in Hegel, in his narration and promotion of the movement from the implicit to the explicit.

[46]In Hegel, as in Aristotle and Kant, judgment is treated as a synthesis of concepts: "Judgment is the presentation of an object as unfolded into the three moments of the Concept." See *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, 107.

is a world it has deliberately left behind, bounded by a false and persistent set of spontaneous presuppositions that have been intelligently rejected.

Kant's Critical Idealism is the former sort. Not only is it no closer to Critical Realism than are naïve and Scholastic Realism, but one might argue that, inasmuch as it has reduced being-as-described to mere phenomena, existentially it lies at a still greater distance from it. The incoherent realist at least *felt* like she was in touch with being; the move into counterpositional idealism now puts her altogether out of touch.

Only an idealism that abandons completely the cognitional myth can be regarded as the halfway house on the way to Critical Realism, and that idealism is Hegel's Absolute Idealism. As Coehlo has remarked, "It could be said . . . that Lonergan's method is not only post-Aristotelian and post-Kantian, but also explicitly and consciously post-Hegelian."[47] For Kant, sensible intuition remains decisive. For Hegel, it is truth that is decisive, although he conceives truth ontologically and so, for him, "truth is arrived at by understanding; the notion of truth is not that which is elicited from an act of judgment."[48] So it is that Lonergan describes Hegel's Absolute Idealism explicitly as a "transitional phase with its antithesis in contingent and irrational factors in nature and human affairs"[49] and discerns in his own doctrine of judgment the key to the supersession or sublation of the residual opposition between Absolute Idealism and an uncomprehended residue of contingent fact. But, to formulate and appropriate that doctrine of judgment presupposes "that we have escaped the clutches," as Lonergan puts it,

[47]Ivo Coehlo, *Hermeneutics and Method: The 'Universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 194.

[48]See *Understanding and Method*, 109-13, on philosophical oversight of the role of judgment. It should be noted that, despite his putative failure to appropriate judgment, Hegel does not lapse into what Lonergan has called "cognitional atomism," that is, the error of identifying knowing with one of the acts constitutive of the required set of acts. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 189: "A favourite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul, intelligence, or mind. Faculty, like power or force, is the fixed quality of any object of thought, conceived as reflected into self... Any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity, and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and faculties. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an external accident. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowledge). Yet this does not mean intelligence *inter alia* knows – besides which it also intuits, conceives, remembers, imagines, etc. To take up such a position is in the first instance part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured ...."

[49]Cited by Coehlo, 285 n. 23. The quotation is from LRI Library file 855, 'August 26, 1975: Prof. Vertin's Questions.'

not merely of naïve realism and empiricism and critical idealism, but also of *Absolute Idealism*.[50]

4.2 The Conditional Necessity of the Hegelian "Moment"

Entrance into and passage beyond the halfway house of Absolute Idealism are conditionally necessary. If Critical Realism is to be achieved, two general conditions, one negative and one positive, must be met.

First, the negative condition: If Critical Realism is to be achieved, knowing as looking, objectivity as extroversion, and being as a subdivision of the "already out there now" must be rejected. This is, as it were, the determinate negation that constitutes the leap into idealism.[51] This is not the blanket negation of access to the real, here conceived as a subdivision of the "already out there now," which evokes a fear of entrapment in the one-sidedness of mere subjectivity.[52] The very notion of "mere subjectivity" employed here, and its opposition to objectivity, are products of the cognitional myth, and that myth has been rejected.[53] Neither, on the other hand, is this rejection by itself the discovery and appropriation of the event of insight. Nor, again, is it the discovery and appropriation of the act of judgment. It is the admission that immediate confrontation – whether unsophisticated or intellectually sophisticated – is not to be had, not because we cannot penetrate the veil of appearances, but because being is not a subdivision of

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[50]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 178-79.

[51]Lonergan writes: "It is an extremely difficult matter, a matter of making the subject *leap*, to move him from the first level, the level of sensism, materialism, and so on, to the second, to bring him up to the level of the idealist. And it is another leap to bring him from the idealist position to the realist position." See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 18, *Phenomenology and Logic*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 110.

[52]See the discussion of this fear and it roots by Richard M. Liddy, *Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan's* Insight (Lanhan: UPA, 2007), 205-206.

[53]In his Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 48, Hegel writes, "Instead of troubling ourselves with such useless ideas and locutions about cognition as 'an instrument for getting hold of the Absolute', or as 'a medium through which we view the truth' (relationships which surely, in the end, are what all these ideas of a cognition cut off from the Absolute, and an Absolute separated from cognition, amount to) . . . we could reject them out of hand as adventitious and arbitrary, and the words associated with them like 'absolute', 'cognition', 'objective' and 'subjective', and countless others whose meaning is assumed to be generally familiar, and could even be regarded as so much deception. For to give the impression that their meaning is generally well known, or that their Notion is comprehended, looks more like an attempt to avoid the main problem, which is precisely to provide this Notion. We could, with better justification, simply spare ourselves the trouble of paying any attention whatever to such ideas and locutions; for they are intended to ward off Science itself, and constitute merely an empty appearance of knowing, which vanishes immediately as soon as Science comes on the scene."

the "already out there now." Again, it is the realization that our knowledge of being is had, at a minimum, by intelligent mediation and constitution. But, this is only the negative condition, and it is insufficient.

In addition, there is the positive condition. If Critical Realism is to be achieved, the occurrence of insight and the grasp of the virtually unconditioned and judgment must be discovered and fully appropriated. Insight must be discovered and fully appropriated if we are to rescue being-as-described from demotion to mere appearance. Judgment must be discovered and appropriated if we are to overcome the reduction of a threefold objectivity to experiential and normative objectivity and rescue being-as-explained from identification with the Absolute Idea.

The Hegelian "moment," then, is the transition from incoherent to Critical Realism. It is initiated by the rejection of the myth that knowing is like looking. It entails a loss of the real only to the degree that the real is believed to be known by immediate confrontation or contact; more precisely, it entails a loss, not of reality, but of a specific conception of reality. The Hegelian "moment" is consolidated in the concrete apprehension of the inadequacy of the ideal of comprehensive coherence and of the ontological notion of truth, in the experience of a building pressure to break the identity of thinking subject and thought object without reverting to the strict counterposition, in the emergence of the problem of real distinction, real otherness, which, in its turn, invites appropriation up the road of the grasp of the virtually unconditioned and points to a recovery of the real as not only intelligently grasped but also as reasonably affirmed in a multiplicity of true judgments. It is the gradual discovery, in Lonergan's Hegelian words, that Hegel's logic-in-motion is a "transitional phase with its antithesis in contingent and irrational factors in nature and in human affairs."[54] Again, more precisely, the Hegelian "moment" evokes, not the recovery of the so-called reality lost with the abandonment of the counterposition, but the discovery of the need for a more adequate conception of the real. In general, as Lonergan, remarks, "it is by studying different philosophic systems, comparing them, and seeing the different consequences of the different systems that one arrives at the wisdom of one's own that entitles one to prefer one notion of being to another. That preferring one notion of being to another is a strategically very important judgment . . .."[55] In particular, it is by entering the halfway house of Hegel's Absolute Idealism that

[54]Quoted by Coehlo, *The Universal Viewpoint in Bernard Lonergan: Hermeneutics and Method*, 193.

[55]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 156-57.

one meets the negative condition and discovers the positive condition to be fulfilled if one is to reach and inhabit the standpoint of Critical Realism.[56]

Subsequent to the fulfillment of the negative condition and prior to the fulfillment of the positive condition, one abides in the halfway house of Hegelian Absolute Idealism. Again, this abiding in the halfway house of idealism is not properly-speaking an experience of lost access to the real, for the ideal of confrontation and contact has been abandoned; but, neither is it the discovery yet of a more adequate conception of the real. It is, rather, akin to total immersion in the abstractly isolated intelligibility of being. It is not characterized by fear of isolation from the real and growing skepticism.[57] Nor is this abiding in the idealist halfway house the experience of being trapped in one's own mind. One can believe oneself to be trapped in one's own mind only if one still believes oneself to have lost access to the real, and if one still believes that, then one has not rejected the confrontationist ideal, and one has ventured no farther than a Critical Idealism on the outer edge of the empiricist enclave. But, the confrontationist ideal has been abandoned, and with it the presupposition of a primordial subject-object separation, a primordial problem of the bridge, and the possibility of being trapped on one side of that primordial opposition. In the halfway house one discovers the dynamic unity of the subject-object relation, the primordial identity of knowing and being, and the problem is not one of escaping the isolation of oneself as subject from objects "out there," but one of establishing the real distinction between oneself and other beings. In wrestling with this problem, one begins to move beyond idealism toward Critical Realism.

I have argued, first, that the idealism of the halfway house is a particular type of idealism, *viz.*, Hegelian Absolute Idealism. Secondly, I have argued that the passage through the halfway house of idealism on the way to Critical Realism is conditionally necessary. If one is to attain the standpoint of Critical Realism, one must dwell in Hegelian Absolute Idealism and then move beyond it. Thirdly, the relationships of Critical Realism to Absolute Idealism, and of Absolute Idealism to incoherent realism, are to be understood in a way that is both Hegelian and Lonerganian, *viz.*, as *Aufhebungen*, as sublations, as relations of lower to higher viewpoints and, in that qualified sense rejections of what preceded, while

[56] " . . . (C)ritical realism (is) the attempt to get beyond the empiricism of Hume, the critical idealism of Kant, and absolute idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the subsequent varieties of subjectivism." *A Second Collection*, 239.

[57] Note that Hegel, as Lonergan recognizes, has departed from the Cartesian tradition of universal doubt. See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 446.

nevertheless, and again in a qualified sense, as retentions of what preceded.[58] As the pre-philosophic standpoint thematized in incoherent realism is not simply eradicated but is preserved as superseded by Absolute Idealism, so the properly philosophic standpoint thematized in Absolute Idealism is sublated by the standpoint of Critical Realism.

Finally, I would emphasize that this *Aufhebung* is not merely intellectual but also existential. If it is to be more than a notional apprehension, in Newman's sense, of the way in which the doctrine of judgment resolves the problems emergent in Absolute Idealism – if it is to be more than the invocation of "grasp of the virtually unconditioned and judgment" as something like a *Deus ex machina* to guarantee a real distinction between, say, God and human beings – it will require the idealistic reorganization of oneself in one's living, the disintegration of that idealistic self-organization, and a critically realistic reorganization of one's living.[59] The Hegelian "moment" on the journey to Critical Realism is a concrete abiding in the halfway house of Absolute Idealism, and the transcendence of Absolute Idealism is a concrete sublation of it.

5. THE EVERSION OF HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

In the movement beyond Absolute Idealism, existential supersession follows upon intellectual supersession.[60] But, as I have argued, Hegel's philosophical position is

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[58]One of the English renderings of *aufheben* is "to reverse (a decree or judgment)." While Lonergan's conception of reversal differs in important ways from Hegel's *Aufhebung*, I think this superficial resemblance is yet another indication of Lonergan's intimate relation to Hegel.

[59]"However, men in their living can be organized more on the level of experience, or more on the level of intelligence, or more on the level of rational reflection; and so there arise three basic classes of philosophy. The tendency to organize on the experiential level is manifest in the materialist, the empiricist, the sensist, the positivist, the pragmatist, the modernist.... On the second level, there are the philosophies of the Platonist, idealist, relativist, essentialist varieties. On the third level, there are the realists, where what is meant by the real is what is known when one truly affirms, 'It is.' . . . Now these philosophic differences will radiate through the whole of life." (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, 178-79)

[60]One might object that *de facto* Absolute Idealism is already superseded existentially just inasmuch as concrete judgments of fact are made and a multiplicity of really distinct objects, among which is the subject, is affirmed. As Lonergan writes, "It is a viewpoint that is transcended automatically by anyone that, in any instance, grasps the virtually unconditioned and affirms it" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 398). But, this experience of knowing, while it is existential in the broad sense, is not knowledge of that experience, and so is not existential in the fuller sense of conduct following upon intelligent grasp and rational affirmation. To think it is, is to conflate consciousness and self-knowledge and involve oneself in the strict counterposition. See *A*

not to be overcome by the standard strategy of "reversing the counterposition," as that strategy is commonly understood. For, Hegel's philosophical position is not, strictly speaking, counterpositional. It is quasi-positional or "transitional." It stands at the midpoint between materialism and Critical Realism. As such, it is more complex, more subtle, more sophisticated, and more challenging than the positions of, say, Scotus or Hume or Kant. While these positions share with that of Hegel an oversight of judgment, their adherence to the confrontationist ideal makes them vulnerable to fairly brusque reversal. But, Hegel is not so easily overcome. Assuming we have found our way into the halfway house that is the Hegelian System, we may well wonder, deprived as we are of the dialectical technique upon which we typically rely, how we are to find our way beyond Hegel's System. Surely, it cannot be the relatively pedestrian strategy of pushing Hegel toward greater logical consistency and coherence. For, Hegel purports to have sublated this strategy of what he terms "philosophies of the Understanding" and to have exceeded the reach of its critical grasp in his formulation of the speculative propositions of his System. Lonergan, however, has offered us a clue.

Among the deliberately crafted responses Lonergan provided in what is now known as "Questionnaire on Philosophy," we find the following statement:

> Marx was right in feeling that the Hegelian dialectic needed to be adjusted, but he was content to turn it upside down. *What it needed, I should say, was to be turned inside out.* Instead of endeavoring to insert movement within logic, the relatively static operations of logic had to be inserted within the larger ever-ongoing context of methodical operations.[61]

The suggestion here is that the movement beyond the halfway house of idealism is to be accomplished by everting Hegel's Absolute Idealism, by turning it inside out. Further, we may infer from this statement that Lonergan himself came to terms with Hegel in just this way. Accordingly, it appears that if we are to complete the journey from incoherent realism to Critical Realism, not only must we employ the strategy of reversing the strict counterposition in order to establish ourselves in the halfway house of idealism, but we must also employ the strategy of everting the quasi-positional or transitional standpoint of Absolute Idealism in

Second Collection, 242: "I too hold for the primacy of conscience, for the primacy of the questions that lead to deliberation, evaluation, decision. But such sound judgments, in turn, presuppose we have escaped the clutches of naïve realism, empiricism, critical and absolute idealism."

[61]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 17, 36. Emphasis added. What Marx actually said, in *Kapital*, was that Hegel's idealism left his dialectic standing on its head, and that it must be turned right side up again if we are to discover the rational kernel in the mystical shell.

order to go beyond it. In this final section, I shall explore briefly the heuristic anticipations of the strategy of eversion and sketch, in very broad outline, what the eversion of Absolute Idealism might involve.

In the statement quoted, Lonergan supplies not only an image but also a formulation of an insight that stands at the center of a cluster of insights to be evoked by the image. Let us dwell first on the dynamic image of everting something we turn inside out with some frequency, for example, a sock. To assist us in keeping track of the changes that occur in the process of eversion, let the sock be unusual in that it is red on the visible outside and green on the unseen inside. Let us now turn this odd sock inside out and notice that two changes have occurred. One change is from end-to-end; the toe is now where the cuff was, and the cuff is now where the toe was. A second change is at once from inside-to-outside and from outside-to-inside; the body of the sock is now green on the visible outside and red on the unseen inside. Further, let us observe that the two changes, in the image, are inseparable from one another. We cannot turn our sock inside out without the toe exchanging positions with the cuff. Finally, let us note that the image suffers from a major deficiency; for, the dynamic aspect of the image is limited to the activity of everting. But, to evert Hegel's dialectic is to evert something that is, not a static formal structure, but a structured dynamic flow of contents.

Now, instead of imagining a sock, let us imagine Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and consider briefly what might be involved in its eversion. Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a narrative of the movement from the most abstract standpoint of sense-certainty to the most concrete standpoint of absolute knowing. If we reverse the positions of the starting-point and the end-point we have a movement from the most concrete standpoint of absolute knowing to the most abstract standpoint of sense-certainty. But, besides this change from end to end, there is the change from inside to outside and from outside to inside. Thus, we have a movement that begins, not from the most concrete standpoint of absolute knowing, but from the eversion of the absolute standpoint; and this movement now terminates, not in the most abstract standpoint of sense-certainty, but in the eversion of abstract sense-certainty. We have, then, two basic questions: What becomes of the standpoint of absolute knowing when it is moved from one end of the process to the other and then turned inside out? What happens to sense-certainty when it is moved from one end of the process to the other and then turned inside out?

But, the change from inside to outside and from outside to inside is undergone by the entire dynamic body of the *Phenomenology*. Accordingly, it would seem that the entire dialectical dynamism of Spirit undergoes eversion. Does the eversion of the body of the *Phenomenology* undergo both moments of eversion? Do the intermediate stages in the unfolding of Spirit also change position when the ends exchange places, as suggested by the image? Or, is the eversion of the body of the *Phenomenology* only a change from inside to outside and from outside to inside? Do the dialectical relations of supersession of one stage by another between the everted absolute standpoint and everted sense-certainty remain basically the same? With the exchange of positions of the beginning and the end, is there also a change in direction of the flow of Spirit? Or, if one prefers to put this question in less linear and more Hegelian terms, is the direction of rotation of the circle of infinite thought reversed?[62] That is to say, is the movement now one from a starting-point in the everted absolute standpoint through spirit, to reason, to self-consciousness, to objectifying consciousness, terminating in everted sense-certainty? Or, does the movement remain fundamentally a movement from implicit to explicit with the direction of the flow and the sequence of intermediate stages remaining basically the same? We may recall that Lonergan declares that the argument of *Insight* proceeds in Hegelian fashion from *an sich*, through *für sich*, to *an und für sich*. For Lonergan, it appears, the direction of the flow is to be retained while attention shifts from the dynamism's conceptual obverse to its methodical reverse. While we should not expect Lonergan to merely unpack slavishly the image of eversion, for like Hegel he knows the limits of picture-thinking, we may ask, Why does he ignore its implications in this regard? And, what are the consequences of this shift of emphasis from the conceptual obverse to the methodical reverse for the dynamic unfolding of Spirit?

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[62]See *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. Wallace, 24-25: "Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles." But, as G. R. G. Mure remarks, "So far as geometrical expression is applicable at all, the whole series ad each triad within it, as Hegel himself suggests, is better symbolized by a circle than by a straight line. If it were worth while refining the symbol further, we might imagine the dialectic as a series of spirals bent back on itself in a circle, but Hegel warns us that quantitative determinations matter less, go less and less deep, in proportion to the spiritual significance of that which they characterize." *The Philosophy of Hegel*, 37.

It appears there is some illumination to be gained by thinking of eversion as consisting of two moments – the end-to-end moment and the inside-to-outside and outside-to-inside moment. But, we are not committed to the spatial rearrangements implicit in the dynamic image of eversion. After all, in our ordinary understanding of eversion, we don't usually consider the change from end to end but focus our attention on the change from inside to outside and from outside to inside. Accordingly, let us suppose that sense-certainty and absolute knowing retain their respective positions as starting-point and end-point. What, then, becomes of sense-certainty if it remains in its position as the starting-point but is turned inside out? What becomes of absolute knowing if it retains its position as the end-point but is turned inside out? What is the methodical reverse of the standpoint of sense-certainty as starting-point? What is the methodical reverse of the standpoint of absolute knowing as end-point?

Now, let us imagine Hegel's *Logic* and consider briefly the prospect of its eversion. Hegel's *Logic* is a movement from the proto-category of undifferentiated, indeterminate being, through the categorial differentiations of essence, to the notion and the fully differentiated unity of the Absolute Idea. If we reverse the positions of the end-point and the starting-point, we have a movement from the Absolute Idea, through essence, to undifferentiated, indeterminate being. But, we have, secondly, a change from inside to outside and from outside to inside. What, then, happens to the Absolute Idea when it is moved from one end to the other and turned inside out? What does undifferentiated, indeterminate being become when it is moved from one end to the other and turned inside out? What transformation does the intermediate stage of essence undergo in its relations to the everted Absolute Idea and everted indeterminate being? What are we doing when we are turning Hegel's logic-in-motion inside out? In Lonergan's view, what we are doing is inserting the relatively static operations of logic within the larger, ever-ongoing context of method. But, again, undifferentiated, indeterminate being and the Absolute Idea need not exchange positions. What becomes of the proto-category of undifferentiated, indeterminate being as starting-point when it is turned inside out? What becomes of the Absolute Idea as end-point when it is turned inside out? What is the methodical reverse of the proto-category of indeterminate being as starting-point? What is the methodical reverse of the Absolute Idea as end-point?[63]

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[63] Hegel's Absolute Idea is "the identity of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Each of these by itself is still one-sided, possessing the Idea itself only as a sought-for beyond and an unattained goal; each, therefore, is a *synthesis of endeavor*, and has, but equally has *not*, the Idea in it; each

Obviously, this is just the barest heuristic beginning of the eversion of Hegel's Absolute Idealism. The questions evoked by Lonergan's clue have still to be answered, and answering them will require a thorough study of the relation of Lonergan to Hegel. The eversion of Absolute Idealism requires the implementation of a complex and subtle strategy of intellectual supersession. While Absolute Idealism, in virtue of its apparent deficiencies, can be toppled outward into the factualness of Marx or toppled inward into the factualness of Kierkegaard, such overturnings are not what is meant by eversion.[64] What is to be everted here is not a static system, nor even a series of discrete states, but an interconnected sequence of stages in the growth of a single organism-like *Begriff*. To think one's way carelessly into such a self-enclosed dynamic process is to risk intellectual dismemberment, at a minimum; at the dialectical limit, it may be to risk the loss of one's finite subjectivity in divine self-inflation, at one pole, *and* the loss of one's participation in divinity, at the other. To think one's way out effectively one must apply to Hegel himself the Hegelian principle that philosophical thought is self-critical[65] and show how strict adherence to this principle invites, neither the outright dismissal of his System nor its toppling, but its eversion.[66]

Lonergan writes, "The only thing [Hegel's] System has to fear is that it itself should be no more than some incomplete viewpoint and, in fact, that is what it is."[67] To make good on this claim it is not enough to declare that logic cannot be put in motion, or that the principle of motion is not spiritual but material. Neither

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passes from one thought to the other without bringing the two together, and so remains fixed in their contradiction." In the chapter on the Absolute Idea with which Hegel's *Logic* concludes, Hegel turns to a discussion of *method*: "From this course the method has emerged as *the self-knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete existence that is the Notion itself." See *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1969), 824, 826.

[64]On the toppling of Hegelianism into left- and right-wing factualness, see Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 398.

[65]G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, 296.

[66]See *The Logic of Hegel*, 24: "The term *system* is often misunderstood. It does not denote a philosophy, the principle of which is narrow and to be distinguished from others. On the contrary, a genuine philosophy makes it a principle to include every particular principle." Lonergan writes: ". . . Hegelian dialectic seems the initial essay in philosophic writing that envisaged the totality of possible positions" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 572). Also: ". . . (T)he anticipation of a constant system . . . grounds classical method; the anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of systems grounds genetic method . . ." (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 509).

[67]Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 397.

of these strategies meets the requirements of genuine supersession. It must be shown, rather, that Hegel's logic-in-motion, his injection of dynamism into the Concept [*Begriff*], his ontological notion of truth, his dialectical transitions which leave no uncomprehended residue, the unstable equilibrium of his speculative proposition expressing the comprehensive position as the identity of identity and non-identity, and so on, are precisely the mixed results one might expect from the philosophy of the halfway house between materialism and Critical Realism, from a philosophy that is neither positional nor counterpositional in the strict senses, but quasi-positional or transitional.[68] More generally, it must be shown that Lonergan's Critical Realism adds to Hegel's Absolute Idealism "a new principle, sets a new goal, a new task, a new criterion, liberates what is sublated from its

[68]In Hegel's logic-in-motion, for example, Lonergan discerns such a mixed result: "True, the same concept is always conceived in the same way, and there is no movement in concepts considered logically. Nevertheless, if they are considered in a concrete way as they exist in the human mind, they undergo continual modification because concepts do not exist independently of the intending and the understanding of a concrete human being.... Hence, with a greater or lesser advance in understanding, concepts undergo greater or lesser development and change. To recognize this fact is to recognize the fundamental point in the solution of the problem of historicity" (*Understanding and Method*, 54). Again, Hegel's logic in its entirety, in virtue of the identity of thought and being, is a transitional *metaphysics* which, Lonergan claims, is *connotatively comprehensive* but *denotatively restricted*. The intending of the *Logic* is a hybrid of transcendental notion and determinate category. Lonergan writes, ". . . (T)he most fundamental difference in modes of intending lies between the categorical and the transcendental. Categories are determinations. They have a limited denotation. They vary with cultural variations. . . . In contrast, the transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change. . . . They are comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole or totality of which our answers reveal only part" *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972, 11). In Lonergan's terms, then, Hegel's intending is transcendental inasmuch as it is comprehensive in connotation, inasmuch as Hegel finds the whole, the totality, in every part; but it is categorial inasmuch as there is only the single virtually unconditioned which is the Absolute. Thus, Hegel's philosophy provides evidence for both the "epochal" and the "absolutist" interpretations of his eschatology. Is Hegel's philosophy *its* time comprehended in thought, or is it *time* comprehended in thought? See Daniel Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Grand Synthesis: A Study of Being, Thought, and History* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), esp. ch. 7. Hegel's *Logic* with its hybrid ideal invites comparison with Lonergan's conception of metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being that is governed by a strictly transcendental intending. Lonergan writes, "The significance of metaphysics lies not in the future but in the present. It is a matter of indifference to metaphysics whether or not there will be some future date in which complete explanation will in fact be reached. But it is a matter of supreme importance to metaphysics that here and now one reject all obscurantism and so accept in all its implications the effort for complete explanation. Again, the value of an anticipatory outline of a hypothetical complete explanation is not to be measured by the extent to which the future explanation is anticipated. For the metaphysical issue is not the present order of future knowledge but the order immanent in the dynamics of all knowledge whether past, present, or future" (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3, 508).

limitation and directs it to higher ends, *yet in no way stunts it, interferes with it, robs it of its integrity.*"[69] If we are to achieve and to inhabit the standpoint of Critical Realism, not only must we reject incoherent realism, but we must enter into and *go beyond* Hegel's Absolute Idealism.[70]

[69]See Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 358-59, on sublation. Emphasis added.

[70]In *Caring About Meaning*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1982), 108, Lonergan remarked that, while Husserl's "account of knowledge was never purely constructive," his is. "It is all construction. Saying it is all construction enlarges the notion that human knowledge is discourse. When I say 'critical realism is not a half-way house between materialism and idealism but idealism is the half-way house between materialism and critical realism,' it is the same thing again."

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.SHANKARA AND AQUINAS: A CASE STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS

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PhilosophyWorks

INTRODUCTION

THERE IS A remarkable convergence between the ethical theories of Shankara and Aquinas, the founders of the mainline theo-philosophies of their respective traditions: Shankara of Advaita Vedanta, the principal school of interpretation of Hinduism; Aquinas of Thomism, the principal theological and philosophical school of Western Christianity. Both Shankara and Aquinas regarded morality (*dharma, virtus*) as the path to perfection, but not perfection itself, much less the cause of perfection. Human perfection consisted, according to both of them, in the bliss (*ananda, beatitude*) of an intuitive union (*anubhava, visio*) of the self (*Atman, mens*) with the Absolute (*Brahman, Deus*). And for both of them the immediate cause of this perfection was salvation (*moksha, salvatio*), at once a liberation of the individual from the bondage of sin (*karma, peccatum*) and an elevation from a strictly human mode of life (*samsara, natura seu vita humana*) to union with the godhead (*Isvara* or *saguna Brahman, deitas*) and indeed with Being Itself (*nirguna Brahman, Ipsum Esse Subsistens*). Therefore, although both of them considered morality to be a necessary condition and a natural consequence of human perfection, they still regarded it as insufficient for, subordinate to, and dependent upon the transcendent perfection of immediate union with the Absolute through salvation.

Admittedly, this comparison emphasizes, if it does not exaggerate, the convergence between the respective ethics of Shankara and Aquinas. The differences between them, not just in their ethics, but, more fundamentally, in their epistemology and metaphysics as well, are indeed considerable, and ultimately incommensurable. But the fact remains that they both subordinated

morality to salvation in the belief that human perfection is not to be found in strictly mundane pursuits and accomplishments, but in a union with Ultimate Reality exceeding all human powers and practicable aspirations. This concurrence, then, offers a possible key to a comparative ethics of Hindu and Christian traditions, as well as a gauge of the contrast between traditional and modern forms of ethics, East and West.

The focus of my comparison between Shankara and Aquinas will, therefore, be the pivotal role each played in the development of his ethical tradition. It will not be a conceivable parallelism between the contents of their theories, such as has been claimed for Shankara and Meister Eckhart (Otto; Eliade 3). Nor will it be the putative commonality in the transformative intent of their philosophies, such as has been ascribed to Shankara and Fichte (Taber). Much less will I attempt to trace a formal correspondence in the architectonic of their theories, such as has more recently been recommended for a comparative philosophical hermeneutics, whether just of Western or also of world philosophies (Dilworth). These are all, no doubt, worthy endeavors. But what I am focusing upon is the comparable historical import of Shankara and Aquinas for their respective traditions, leaving the questions of any substantive, or intentional, or formal analogies to be answered with the context of this historical framework.

In medieval India, Shankara responded to the challenge of Buddhism to Brahmanism by making Advaita Vedanta into the most powerful and the most popular of the *darshanas* (schools of interpretation) of Hinduism. This was a position it retained under Moghul rule and the British raj, until in the twentieth century it became, through the leadership of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekenanda, a wellspring for a renaissance of traditional Indian culture and the eruption of Indian nationalism. Advaita Vedanta became as well one of the sources for the founding of the academic disciplines of the history of religions and comparative ethics (Crawford 86; Deutsch 3; Hindery 177-20; Radhakrishnan 2:445-50, 656-58; Taber 5).

Similarly, in medieval Europe, as Christendom was disturbed from within by the forces of an emergent nationalism and threatened from without by the forces of a resurgent Islam, St. Thomas Aquinas forged Biblical revelation, Patristic thought, and classical Greek philosophy into the authoritative synthesis later known as Thomism. This body of thought survived the Reformation sundering of Christendom and the Enlightenment critique of religion, to remain not just the official theology of the Roman Catholic Church, but a common ground for Protestant and Catholic theologians. In diverse schools of

interpretation, Thomism has also proved to be a permanent resource for the perennial renewal of Western philosophy (Gilson vii-viii,, 3-25, 357-78; MacIntyre 1988: 164-208, 401-403; 1990: 58-169, 216-36; Porter 13-33, 171-79).

It is this historical analogy between Shankara and Aquinas that recommends them as natural candidates for a comparative analysis of Advaita Vedanta and Thomism, of Eastern and Western theo-philosophical traditions, and of traditional and modern ethics. In this comparison I want, first, to outline some of the parallels between the lives of Shankara and Aquinas, the matrices within which their thought crystallized, before I attempt to compare their respective theo-philosophies. In analyzing their theo-philosophies, I will compare, in turn, their epistemologies, their metaphysics, and their ethics because for both of them their epistemologies grounded their metaphysics, and their metaphysics their ethics. I will conclude by suggesting some of the implications of their common subordination of morality to salvation for contemporary issues in comparative ethics.

THE LIFEWORLDS OF SHANKARA AND AQUINAS

The historical analogy between Shankara and Aquinas arises from a similarity of function within their respective cultures, from a symmetry between their lives, and from a comparability of literary output. Within their respective cultures, Shankara and Aquinas sought a synthesis between tradition and innovation. Yet the outcomes of their efforts were diametrically opposed: while Shankara succeeded in assimilating enough of Buddhism into traditional Hindu thought to inoculate Indian culture from the threat of Buddhism to the caste system, Aquinas provided Christendom with a theory for meeting the challenge of Aristotelianism from within and of Islam from without. So Shankara thwarted the intent of Buddhism to reform Indian society, whereas Aquinas enhanced the ability of Christianity to reform Western society.

A Brahmin, Shankara vied with sages of other schools (*darshanas*) in defending the traditional religion of India from the criticism and the alternative posed by the heterodox salvation (*bhakti*) movement of Buddhism. Partly through the success of his endeavors, Hinduism succeeded in disarming the threat of Buddhism to the caste system, thereby preventing Buddhism from becoming a religion independent of and perhaps superior to the state. Yet in Advaita Vedanta, Shankara succeeded in assimilating Buddhism to Brahminism by transforming, at

the same time, the elite moral code of Brahminism into the civil religion of Hinduism, thereby uniting all of the castes of Indian society into a single civilization, if not quite into an indivisible nation (Crawford xiv-xv; Taber 6-13, 139-43; Radhakrishnan 2: 470-75).

Aquinas was, by contrast, the champion of Christianity, the salvation movement that, by becoming the civil religion of the Roman Empire, had succeeded, in the West, in subordinating state to church within the theocracy of Christendom. Though a son of Landulf of Aquino, a loyal vassal of the Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II, Aquinas himself took no part in the contention between papacy and empire, even while he was master of the Dominican theological institute attached to the papal court (Weisheipl 4-35, 160-63). His genius was to assimilate the classical ideology of the state – Greek, particularly Aristotelian, philosophy, together with its Muslim interpretations – into a critical reconstruction of Christian doctrine (Chenu 28-34). In the process, he was able, particularly in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, to provide a rebuttal to the newly attractive Muslim philosophical systems of Avicenna and Averroes. What is more, Aquinas also revitalized Aristotelianism, becoming the principal intermediary for the transmission of this tradition to the modern era (MacIntyre 1990: 105-26).

Despite proceeding from different standpoints, therefore, and aiming at contrary goals, Shankara and Aquinas both produced an authoritative synthesis of classical ideology and contemporary religiosity for their respective traditions. Shankara assimilated Buddhism to Brahminism to establish in Advaita Vedanta the principal orthodox school of Hinduism. Aquinas adapted Aristotelianism to the interpretation of Christian doctrine to found the standard theo-philosophy of Christendom and, arguably, of Western civilization. Their respective syntheses, however, had diametrically opposed outcomes: Advaita Vedanta effectively crushed Buddhism within the embrace of Hindu tradition, while Thomism helped to solidify the ideological hegemony of Christianity in European society.

The analogy of historical function between Shankara and Aquinas was complemented by a symmetry between them in their lives. Both Shankara and Aquinas practiced from youth the detachment they preached as adults – one as a sage, the other as a friar. Shankara (686-720 [?]) was a prodigy who skipped from student (*brachmacarya*) to sage (*sannyasa*), bypassing the stages (*ashramas*) of householder (*garhasthya*) and ascetic (*vanaprasthya*) (Crawford 63), even though it meant that for a time he forsook his widowed mother. He led a celibate life, becoming a prolific author and the founder of four monasteries (*matts*). He is

reputed to have flouted traditional strictures by admitting outcastes (*sudras*) into these monasteries and, within the monasteries, abolishing caste distinctions. After spreading his teaching over much of India, Shankara died suddenly at the age of thirty-two (Radhakrishnan 2:227-50).

Similarly, Aquinas (1225-1274) was a brilliant student who, rejecting his family's efforts to install him as abbot of the powerful Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino, joined the recently founded mendicant Order of Preachers, whose mission was to evangelize the ex-urban poor. He studied and taught at universities in Naples, Paris, Cologne, in addition to heading theological institutes at the papal courts of Viterbo Orvieto and at the Dominican studium in Rome. Felled in an accident near Fossanova on his way to the Council of Lyons, he died at the age (most probably) of forty-nine (Weisheipl 324; Chenu 34-43; Torrell I). As with Shankara, Aquinas's detachment from the mundane concerns of family, commerce, and politics for the sake of religious and spiritual pursuits was to be reflected in his subordination of morality to salvation in his ethical theory.

No wonder, then, that the character of the literary output from these lives of deciation is the third correlation between Shankara and Aquinas. The bulk of the work of both of them was commentaries on sacred texts and classical writings, but they both also formulated original philosophies, and they both had the rare capacity to translate the spiritual import of their theories into hymnody for popular devotions. Shankara wrote commentaries on the principal *Upanishads* (*Chandogya, Brhadaranyaka, Taittiriya, Aitereya, Svetasvatara, Kena, Katha, Isa, Prasna, Mundaka,* and *Mandukya*), on the *Bhagavadgita*, and on the *Vedanta* (or *Brahma*) *Sutra* (Radhakrishnan 2:45051; Deutsch and Van Buitenen 123-24, 313-16). Aquinas, for his part, began his teaching career with a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and continued throughout his life to write commentaries, mostly on books of the Bible, particularly from the New Testament, and on the newly translated works of Aristotle (Chenu 66-83, 173-84; Eschmann 384-85, 393-407; Torrell 1:39-45, 54-74, 198-201, 222-46). These commentaries served in both cases to nourish the development of independent theo-philosophical theories.

Shankara provided summary statements of his theory in *Upadesasahasri* (Deutsch and Van Buitenen 124-50), *Atmabodha* (Nikhilananda), and *Vivekacudamani* (Chatterji). But Aquinas engaged in a more elaborate and systematic development of his theory. Beginning with voluminous sets of disputed questions (the most important, *De Veritate*), he produced a ream of polemical writings, monographs, and letters. All the while he was engaged in producing the

three theological syntheses of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the *Compendium Theologiae*, and the *Summa Theologiae* for which he is most famous (Chenu 241-96; Eschmann 385-93, 407-23; Torrell 1:75-223).

The religious inspiration implicit in Shankara's and Aquinas's theoretical writings found overt expression in the hymns and prayers that both Shankara and Aquinas composed for the rituals and feasts of their respective traditions. Thereby they communicated to the common faithful of their religions a profound appreciation of their fundamental beliefs that would otherwise have remained the esoteric property of a clerical elite (Nikhilananda 177ff.; Eschmann 424-28). For both men, therefore, the development of their theo-philosophies originated from a critical appreciation of traditional sources and fostered their contributions to sacred rites.

A COMPARISON OF THEO-PHILOSOPHIES

The affinities between the lives of Shankara and Aquinas – in their historical function, their career path, and their literary production – help to explain some of the parallels between their theo-philosophies, with their respective epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical components. The overriding affinity between the two thinkers is, of course, that both of them conceived of their philosophies within the context of their religious beliefs. In both cases, the intent was to interpret and defend the intelligibility of the truths they accepted on faith. Yet it is important to recognize that, despite this commonality of intent, there are significant differences in the philosophies they developed to interpret their religious beliefs. The correspondence between them is least of all in their epistemologies and less in their metaphysics than in their ethics. In contemporary terms, Shankara is generally regarded an absolute idealist and a spiritual monist (Radhakrishnan 2:521-26), whereas Aquinas is ordinarily depicted as a critical realist and dualist (Lonergan 1967: vii-xv, 47-66, 215-20; Murnion 88-118). Yet the dichotomy between their epistemological positions is echoed, but is also qualified, in the differences between their metaphysical positions. And by the time they have each finessed their ethical positions, they have, in effect, almost circled back, to face each other in a common subordination of morality to salvation. Hence, the convergence between the conclusions of their ethical theories is

remarkable given the prior contrast between their metaphysical theories and the fundamental divergence in their epistemologies.

Epistemology

Shankara contended that because of the ambiguity, if not the downright deceptiveness, of sensory impressions, it was necessary to withdraw from waking consciousness to deep sleep in order to attain genuine knowledge. *Maya* (apparition) and *avidya* (ignorance), he believed, were two aspects of the same illusion of having a genuine sensory knowledge of material reality. *Maya*, the apparition of an independent existence of the material world apart from Brahman, was actually a kind of super-imposition of illusion upon reality, much like the momentary resemblance of a coiled rope might have to a snake. Correspondingly the supposition that the physical world could have an independent existence apart from Brahman was a consequence of *avidya*, the ignorance endemic to ordinary waking consciousness (Deutsch 5-26; Reyna 51-69). Consequently, Shankara believed that in order to attain genuine knowledge (*jnana*), we had to make a withdrawal (*badha*) from waking consciousness (*jagartha sthana*) to dreaming (*svayna sthana*), and thence to deep sleep (*susupti*), so that we could become aware of ourselves as being in reality souls (*jivas*) rather than bodies. Then, he urged, we had to take the ultimate step to a transcendent consciousness (*turiya*), in which we could experience the lack of any real distinction between our individual selves, each "me" with its own name and autobiography, and Atman, the absolute Self that is the "I" of human nature as such. In this state, Shankara said, we could experience the bliss (*ananda*) of the indistinguishability between ourselves as Atman and Brahman itself, while at the same time recognizing the deceptiveness of *maya* and the fallibility of *avidya*.

While Aquinas agreed, in effect, with Shankara that self-knowledge reveals human existence to be a participation in divine perfection, the account he gave of self-knowledge was diametrically opposed to Shankara's. We become rationally conscious, he said, precisely in the effort to understand the natures of things presented to us in sensory imagery (1.12.12; 1.32.1; 1.79.4; 1.87.1; 1.88.1-2; 1.111.2.3) and rationally self-conscious in the act of taking responsibility for our own actions toward these things (1-2.*proem.*; 1-2.1.1).[1] At one and the same time,

[1]For brevity's sake, I am confining the citations from Aquinas to the *Summa Theologiae*. I will refer to part, question, article, and section of article in Arabic numerals punctuated by periods, with multiple citations separated by semicolons. The last citation in the first parenthesis, for example, is to *Summa Theologiae* Part I, question 111, article 2, response to the third objection.

he said, we know *what* we are understanding or doing and are conscious *that* we are thus understanding or acting (1.14.2.1; 1.87.1; 1.93.7.4). This self-consciousness can be converted into self-knowledge in two ways. It can become self-understanding if we take Aristotle's route of analyzing the nature of the soul from its potencies, its potencies from its activities, and its activities from their objects (1.77.3; see 1.75-89). But we can also verify this self-understanding as self-knowledge if we follow Augustine's lead in recognizing the criterion for our self-knowledge is the participation of our own intellects in the light of the divine ideas in the mind of God (1.84.5).

This conjunction of categorical and transcendental self-knowledge, according to Aquinas, occurs in both the speculative and the practical intellects. From the recognition that the objects of the speculative intellect are the natures of things as they are revealed in empirical data, we realize that the activity of understanding entails making the data intelligible before we can grasp what they mean, and thus that we must have an agent as well as a possible intellect (1.54.4-5; 1.79.3). Likewise, the recognition that only the acts for which we take responsibility are truly human (1-2.1.1-3; see 1-2.6-21) leads us to realize that deliberation is necessary for freedom (1-2.1.2.1; 1-2.1.4.3;1-2.9.3; 1-2.13.6; 1-2.17.6.1), and thus that the will must be subordinated to practical intellect at the apex of the soul (1.19.10; 1.19.12.3; 1.22.4.5; 1.83.1; 1.96.2-3; 1.103.5.2; 1.115.4).

Thus, despite the dichotomy between Aquinas's critical realism and Shankara's absolute idealism, Aquinas postulated, like Shankara, the possibility of an assimilation of the individual soul to the Absolute – in its activity, however, rather than in its being. Through the dual development of categorical and transcendental self-knowledge, Aquinas argued, the soul can come at once to know itself as rationally self-conscious and to recognize the immediacy of its relationship to God. For the soul could not become self-conscious in each act, nor could it undertake or evaluate its self-understanding, he said, unless it were present to itself with the transparency of a spiritual subject (1.14.2.1; 1.87.1). And this self-presence, he added, enables us to realize that saying, in Aristotelian terms, we understand everything by the light of our own agent intellects is equivalent to saying, in Augustinian terms, that we understand everything in light of the divine ideas in God's mind ((1.84.5). We can tell the truth about everything, the soul as well as its objects, because the mind can assess its understanding of the natures of things by the internal light enabling it to gauge them in terms of their ideas in the mind of God (1.16.5; 1.87.1). Likewise, we are able to decide what is

the right thing to do because the mind follows, in its capacity to act responsibly, a kind of natural law that shares in the eternal law identical with the mind of God (1-2.93.1-2).

Metaphysics

The divergence between the absolute idealism of Shankara and the critical realism of Aquinas in their epistemologies is reflected, although somewhat mitigated, in the differences between their respective metaphyics: between the non-dualism of Shankara and the dualism of Aquinas. The non-dualism of Shankara's metaphysics was indeed consonant with the absolute idealism of his epistemology. He denied any genuine distinction between appearance and reality, between the finite and the infinite, and between subject and object (Deutsch 13-14). From the *Upanishads* Shankara adopted the basic metaphysical principle that Brahman is the reality behind the apparition of the world of physical nature. While Brahman was in itself beyond definition, he said, it can be described within the bounds of language as the infinite intelligence of being-consciousness-bliss (*saccidananda*) (Crawford 36; Deutsch 9, 27). The world, he said, only appears to be distinct from Brahman, much like the space within a bottle appears to be distinct from the rest of space, or a reflection of the sky in a pool from the sky itself. Yet Shankara did not think the material world was altogether an illusion, for it was far too obvious and irresistible to us, he thought, for it to be completely unreal in itself (Deutsch 15-26, 28). Still, it could not be, he contended, ultimately real, except, that is, as a limitation or reflection of Brahman (Deutsch 31-32). Likewise, the independent existence or ultimate reality of oneself as a concrete individual was, he argued, strictly phenomenal, the consequence, again, of the same combination of *maya* with *avidya* that led us to believe in the independent existence of the world about us. By becoming conscious of oneself as Atman, though, one could recognize the phenomenality both of one's own bodily existence and of the existence of the material world.

Thus Shankara believed that in the bliss of union between oneself as Atman and the world as Brahman one could attain at once authentic knowledge and authentic being. Then one could comprehend what is meant in the *Chandogya Upanishad* by the enigmatic declaration about the relation between Brahman and oneself: "That art Thou." At first, Shankara conceded, we may be content merely with the worship (*bhakti*) of Brahman in the guise of the godhood of Isavara (*saguna Brahman*). But ultimately, he urged, we can be satisfied with nothing less than the intuitive knowledge (*jnana*) of Brahman simply as reality or being as

such (*nirguna Brahman*) (Deutsch 12-14, 18-19). For Shankara, therefore, "*Saguna* Brahman is the 'content' of a loving experience of unity [with Brahman]; *nirguna* Brahman is the 'content' of an intuitive experience of identity [with Brahman]" (Deutsch 14). Only in the latter state, Shankara insisted, could one assert, in the words of the *Katha Upanishad*, "I am Brahman" (Crawford 38).

To the spiritual non-dualism of Shankara's metaphysics, the dualist metaphysics of Aquinas's metaphysics must appear at first to be at antipodes. In fact, Aquinas's belief in the reality of the distinctions between appearance and reality, between finite and infinite, and between subject and object does make his metaphysics more akin to Ramanuja's Visistadvaita (Adualistic) Vedanta (Sharma 335-71; Raju 188-96), or even to Madhva's Dvaita (Dualistic) Vedanta (Sharma 372-75; Raju 197-98). For Aquinas regarded the world as a separate and distinct entity from God: something created by God at (or with) the beginning of time (1.8; 1.44-46; 1.65-74; 1.90-102). Not only did he think this act implied at the moment of creation an infinite distinction between God in his absolute independence and the world in its utter dependence, he also thought the infinity of the distinction was permanently manifest in the contrast between the identity of essence and existence in the pure act of God's being and the distinction between essence and the mere fact of existence in the being of the world as a whole and of every entity within it (1.3.3-4; 1.4; 1.7; see Gilson 1956: 84-95). What is more, Aquinas regarded each creature, whether human or simply natural, as a separate and distinct entity, with an existence of its own (1.47; 1.50.3-4; 1.66). And though he argued that the human capacity for rational knowledge showed that the human soul was subsistent, and therefore immortal, he still thought the human body was an integral component of each person, destined to be united with the soul at the end of time (1.75-76; 1-2.4.5-6; see Marty 134-77). At that point, the distinction of each human being in its finite essence from the subsistent being of God, even in the immediacy of the beatific vision, would be reinforced by the individuation concomitant upon the reunification of the soul with the body (1.12; 1.26.3; 1-2.3.8: 1-2.5; see Peter 5-71).

In Aquinas's dualist metaphysics "God" meant not so much a name as a category: a pointer to the source of the evidently providential order of the universe, not the proper designation for the essence of the creator in himself (1.13.7-10). Although Aquinas thought that the nature of the world indicated in a number of ways the rationality of believing *that* there was a being to whom the category of God referred (1.2.3), he did not think it was humanly possible to have any positive understanding of *what* that being was, only a negative knowledge of

what the being was *not* (1.3.*intro.*). Yet he also argued that it was nonetheless possible to gather from the perfections of created nature some inkling, albeit remote and obscure, of what the creator of such perfections had to be *like*, and thus for it to be appropriate for us to call him, and him alone, "God" (1.13; see Burrell).

In addition, Sacred Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition taught, Aquinas asserted, that this being had revealed oneself through Moses and the prophets to the people of Israel and through Jesus Christ to the rest of humankind as well (2-2.171-74; 3.1; 3.8; 3.26; 3.42.1; 3.58-59). Consequently, the closest we could come in human terms to the proper name for God was, Aquinas argued, the One-Who-Is (*Qui est*) or, better yet, the Tetragrammaton (*Yahweh* = I-Am) because this name had the dual distinction of being what God had called himself in response to Moses' query about his name and of signifying the pure being of God's incommunicable and singular substance (1.13.11). The same divine self-revelation also authorizes to believe, Aquinas added, that the divine nature is shared equally by three persons – Father, Son, and Spirit – who are related to one another in the godhead somewhat as memory, intellect, and will are in the human mind (1.27-43). Hence, although Aquinas conceded that God's intimate nature transcended the scope of natural human knowledge, he believed that God had nevertheless revealed himself in signs and symbols to those blessed with faith, and he argued that both the nature of God and the persons of the godhead would be manifest to the just in the beatific vision (1.12.5-10; 26.3).

Aquinas's dualist metaphysics, therefore, was basically opposed to Shankara's non-dualist metaphysics. Yet Aquinas approached Shankara's worldview in depicting the existence of the world as a participation in the glory of God and the perfection of everything in the world as a likeness of God's own goodness (1.4.3; 1.6.4; 1.8; 1.45.7; 1.65.2; see Fabro 187-337; Geiger 311-456; Krenn 257-316). Moreover, Aquinas contended that as a result of creation, God was in every created being through his essence, his presence, and his power (1.8.3; see 1.6.4; 44.1-4). Being, life, and intelligence were, consequently, ascending degrees of participation in the fullness of being proper only to God (1.93.2; see Fabro 220-27). In fact, the intelligence of human beings, as well as of pure spirits, approximated the divine nature closely enough, he argued, for them to be called not just a trace, but an image of God's goodness (1.59.1.*sed contra*; 1.93.2; see Marty 22-65). In human beings, this resemblance to God was to be found, he said, in the mind – not in reason, the capacity to assimilate information from sensory experience; nor in intellect, the ability for an immediate grasp of

self-evident first principles (1.59.1) – but in mind, the fundamental power to know God as the meaning of being, articulate that knowledge, and thus love God as such (1.93.6).

To be the image and likeness of God in the strict sense, though, Aquinas thought, was proper only to Jesus Christ, the Son of God (1.35.2; 1.93.5.4). Yet through Christ's mediation, every human being, he argued, could share in the privilege: potentially, because of the mind's natural aptitude to know and love God; formally, through the grace of actually knowing and loving God in this life; and completely, in the glory of the beatific vision (1.93.4; 1-1.109.3; 3.1.26). Hence, though Christ was the paradigmatic image and likeness of God, because he was equal to the Father and the Spirit in the transcendence of their one divine nature, every human being, Aquinas claimed, was nevertheless created *to* this image and likeness because of the potentiality of human nature for union with God through knowledge and love (1.93.1.1).

The distance between Shankara's adualism and Aquinas's dualism narrows, therefore, in light of the entire picture of their respective metaphysical theories. Shankara did deny any real difference between Brahman and the world, between each person and Atman, and between Atman and Brahman. But he also denied that either the world or any person within it was entirely unreal. The world and each person can be considered actually to exist, he asserted, even if in the case of the world its existence was a derivation or reflection of Brahman, and in the case of each person its existence was a derivation or reflection of Atman. And the identity Shankara contended each person as Atman could attain with nirguna Brahman would be inconceivable without at least some intelligible distinction between Atman and Brahman.

Just as Shankara propounded a nuanced adualism, Aquinas qualified the dualism of the infinite distinction between God and the world to admit a scale of identification between the Creator and creation. Yes, Aquinas did emphasize the infinity of the difference between the pure act of God's subsistent being and the created existence of the world as a whole and of each entity within it. Still, he also depicted the perfection of the world, particularly that of spiritual beings, as a participation in God's own perfection. For spiritual beings, this perfection consisted in knowing and loving God: imperfectly in this life, at least naturally and possibly also supernaturally; and possibly in the life to come, supernaturally and perfectly (1.12.1, 5-13). In the beatific vision, Aquinas argued, human beings, created to God's image and likeness and elevated first by grace and then by glory, would share in the infinite self-knowledge and self-love by which God had created

and redeemed the world (1.3.1 ad 2; 12.1 ad 3; 90.2sc; 93.1, 4-9; 1-2.100.2). The perfection of this union with God, Aquinas added, had already been achieved in the unique case of Jesus Christ, the image and likeness of God as the divine Word and the redeemer of the world in his humanity (1.35.1-2; 88.3 ad 3; 3.7-8; 23.4; 25.1-3; 26).

Thus Shankara and Aquinas agreed in postulating for human beings the possibility of an ultimate union with Being itself. But what Shankara thought could be attained as an intramundane identification in substance, Aquinas believed could be attained only in a supramundane identification in knowledge and love – with the exception of Jesus Christ, who was, as the Word of God, identical in his divine nature with the Father and the Spirit and, as human, had enjoyed the beatific vision in this life and, at death, had ascended to union with God in heaven (3.9-10; 53; 58). Despite the irreconcilable differences, therefore, between Shankara and Aquinas, in the starting-points of their metaphysics, there is significant convergence in the final import of their theories.

Ethics

In their ethical theories, the convergence of basic intent is even closer, although there remain notable differences of content and emphasis. Shankara disparaged conventional morality (*dharma*) for its implication in the remorseless cycle of *karma-samsara* (Deutsch; Crawford). *Dharma* was indeed necessary, he admitted, for keeping pleasure (*kama*) and success (*artha*) subordinated to the attainment of human perfection. But just as Shankara regarded the world as an apparition (*maya*), he considered morality a consequence of ignorance (*avidya*). Only salvation (*moksha*) was capable, he argued, of freeing human beings from the mutually reinforcing cycle of apparition and ignorance to become their true selves in Atman, and thereby become capable of achieving the bliss of union with Brahman. A saint (*jivanmukti*) – one who had attained such a union – could, in principle, do whatever he wanted, Shankara argued, since he would share in the transcendence of Brahman to any consideration of good and evil (*Brhadranyaka Upanishad*; Crawford 36-37, 47, 118-20).

Yet for everyone who was not a sage, Shankara maintained, the conventional morality of caste (*varnadharma*) and stage of life (*ashramadharma*) was obligatory (Crawford 113-15). And the only relief from *dharma* that Shankara recognized even for a saint was that the practice of *dharma* (*dharmayoga*) would become spontaneous and gratuitous, instead of onerous and redemptive. What is more, for anyone to undertake the practice of genuine knowledge (*jnanayoga*),

which Shankara considered to be the sole means to achieve salvation, one had first to acquire the virtues of truthfulness (*satya*) and righteousness (*dharma*), in addition to compassion, charity, self-control, and non-violence (*Manduka* and *Katha Upanishads*; Crawford 39-40). *Jnana yoga* itself, as Shankara interpreted it, included undergoing four disciplines in three stages (Crawford 62 ff.). The four disciplines were discrimination (*viveka*); indifference (*vairagya*); the attainment of tranquility, self-control, dispassion, endurance, intentness, and faith; and a dedication to freedom and wisdom (*mumuksutra*). The three stages in the acquisition of these disciplines were, first, hearing (*sravana*), that is, study of the Vedanta; then, thinking (*Manama*), that is, indoctrination in Advaita Vedanta by a guru; and, only then, meditation (*nididhyasana*), that is, identification with Brahman (Deutsch). Hence, though Shankara thought human perfection could be attained only in a salvific union of oneself as Atman with Brahman, for which neither ritual punctilio nor moral scrupulosity could ever be a sufficient condition, he nevertheless thought a virtuous life was both a necessary condition for and a natural consequence of salvation (Crawford 47-49, 71).

Much the same view of human perfection – in different terms, to be sure – was true of Aquinas. Just as he thought human fulfillment was to be achieved in union with God in the beatific vision, so did he think the power to achieve this end was a gift of God. This gift was necessary, he thought not just to reform within human nature the image and likeness of God corrupted by sin, but to elevate human nature beyond its finitude to a communication with the divine nature (1-2.109-14; see Lonergan 1971). No human effort was sufficient, he argued, to merit this gift of God (1-2.109.3-8). In this conception of salvation as a grace of both justification and elevation, Aquinas took his stand within the Augustinian, as opposed to the Pelagian, tradition of Christian ethics.

Yet Aquinas also explained salvation as the capstone to a life of virtue and the inspiration for the practice of virtue. His analysis in the *Summa Theologiae* of the grace of salvation comes right in the middle of the Second Part, the section of the *Summa* in which he explicates the conditions for the free and autonomous human return to God corresponding to his analysis in the First Part of the free and glorious self-communication of God in the missions of the Trinity and the creation of the world. This examination of the act of conversion comes only after Aquinas has studied (in Section One of the Second Part) the final end of humanity, the general conditions for a moral act and for the development of virtue, and the import of the natural law. And it precedes his exposition (in the Section Two of Part Two) of the particular conditions for each of the virtues, theological and

cardinal, in all of their ramifications, both as they apply equally to everyone as a human being and as they affect differentially the protean diversity of human missions, vocations, statuses, offices, and occupations. These two sections of Part Two take up more than half of the entire *Summa*. To develop the subtle and nuanced theory of virtue expounded in these two sections, Aquinas drew upon, not just Sacred Scripture and Christian tradition, but also upon the wealth of insight into human nature he had discovered in Aristotle's *Eudemean Ethics* and *Nichomachean Ethics* (Porter 100-117), as well as the guidelines for everyday life and particular practices of which he was cognizant from canon law and church practice. The upshot is that in Aquinas's theory of the human good the ultimate end (the beatific vision) and the necessary means (divine grace) are indeed supernatural, but a virtuous life is a natural concomitant – a necessary but insufficient condition for salvation, and a normal and natural consequence of salvation (Marty 199-277).

Thus both Shankara and Aquinas subordinated morality to salvation as the criterion of the human good. Shankara subordinated *dharma* to *moksha*, a combination of liberation (*mukti*) and intuition (*anubhava*) that enabled an identification of the true self (*jiva*) with Atman and thereby the possibility of a share in the blissful union of Atman with Brahman. Aquinas subordinated *virtus* to *gratia* in salvation, a combination of justification and elevation that enabled an anticipation – through faith, hope, and love – of union with God in the beatific vision. Yet they both also regarded morality (*dharma/virtus*) as a necessary but insufficient condition for salvation (*moksha/salvation*) and a normal and natural consequence of salvation. Although they both thought a saint could, in principle, do whatever one wanted, they also expected a saint, in practice, to do whatever everyone else ought to do. Despite differences of symbolic system and conceptual framework, therefore, the pragmatic implications of Shankara's and Aquinas's ethical theories were remarkably similar.

PERTINENCE TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ETHICS

What pertinence does the subordination of morality to salvation common to Shakara's and Aquinas's ethical theories have to contemporary ethical discussions, particularly in the field of comparative ethics? In the first place, it elucidates some of the reasons for the mounting dissatisfaction in Western ethics with either Kantianism or utilitarianism. The categorical imperative lacks any

universal or absolute exigency without any foundation other than individual good will. And enlightened self-interest is too weak a norm for societies where might makes right (MacIntyre 1981: 35-48, 60-75). Admittedly, it may be impossible in modern – or postmodern – culture to invoke the appeal both Shankara and Aquinas could make to an implicit faith in a transcendent foundation for morality. Yet if morality has no foundation beyond the quotidian and the mundane, it may also be impossible to forge a common or a binding ethic for all classes and cultures (Murdoch). Although the light of a transcendent foundation for morality, manifest to Shankara and Aquinas, was eclipsed in the Enlightenment, it may once again be dimly espied, if only in the recognition of its absence.

Secondly, the common development of Shankara's and Aquinas's ethics as an articulation of the practical implications of their metaphysics (anchored in their epistemologies) invalidates the now hoary fact-value distinction. If the depiction of the lifeworld in a metaphysics is inherently value-laden, it already has implications for the formulation of ethical prescriptions (Porter 43-48). Conversely, if ethical prescriptions entail a conception of human perfection, they presuppose the formulation of a philosophical anthropology (Porter 69-99). Shankara and Aquinas knew there could not be one – metaphysics or ethics – without the other. Metaphysics cannot be reduced, therefore, to a philosophy of logic, nor can ethics be confined to a rhetoric of imperatives.

Thirdly, the convergence in intent, despite the differences of content, between the ethics of Shankara and Aquinas suggests that diverse ethical traditions may be correlative without being precisely commensurate. Just as a Westerner in India can recognize the color of saffron without having to categorize it as either yellow or orange, so can it also be possible for ethicists from different cultures to appreciate the distinctive features of one another's ethical traditions without having to reduce them to their own native categories. Analogies between cultures, despite linguistic and symbolic differences, may, therefore, argue for comparative ethics to moot the choice of either a blanket universalism or an indeterminable relativism, and elect instead a multiculturalism, sensitive to both similarities and differences in ethical codes.

In sum, this comparison of Shankara's and Aquinas's respective ethical theories may provide a clue to the solution of the contemporary dilemma that conventional morality cannot be (in a strong sense) both absolute and universal or at least (in a weak sense) both well-founded and commonly acceptable. That is, conventional morality appears, on the one hand, to be able to have an absolute or at least a well-founded basis in a religious faith only at the cost of remaining

particular and partisan in its appeal. On the other hand, it appears to be capable of universal or at least common acceptability only at the loss of any precise application to particular moral problems. To this dilemma there is a common response from the viewpoints of both Shankara and Aquinas.

They both subordinated the demands of morality – whether it was to be conceived of as individual virtue, social consensus, natural law, or religious duty – to the quest for salvation: unification with being as such. For Shankara, this unification was conceived of, in terms familiar to him from the Unpanishads, as the union of Atman (the true self) with Brahman (ultimate reality): provisionally, in the worship of Brahman in the divine form of Isvara (*saguna Brahman*); optimally, in a blissful identity with Brahman in *saccidananda* (*nirguna Brahman*). For Aquinas, the symbology of the union between humanity and God was derived from the Biblical narrative of the divine presence in human history, climaxing in the life of the God-man Jesus Christ; but he analyzed the union to be desired in terms of the sublation within humanity of natural virtue to the grace of salvation and the glory of the beatific vision, in which humanity might be united with God – Father, Son, and Spirit – in the unity of *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*. Both of them, therefore, thought that the motive of morality was an unconditional exigency within each human being for union with Being itself – a foundation for morality that, however differently it might be conceived in each culture, was not just well-founded and commonly acceptable, but absolute and universal.

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ROBERT DORAN AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY: REFLECTIONS FROM NAIROBI, KENYA

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IN MANY RESPECTS, the thought of Robert Doran, like that of his mentor Bernard Lonergan, is difficult to understand and to employ. However, Doran's thought centers on a theology of history that he has developed using the thought of Lonergan as a starting point. When one becomes familiar with Doran's work, one can recognize that he provides tools for a normative engagement with history that are eminently practical. In this article I turn to recount how I attempted to apply the heuristic structure offered by Doran to the teaching of pastoral theology at the Hekima College, the Jesuit School of Theology in Nairobi, Kenya. I offer this account for two reasons. The first is that perhaps other teachers of pastoral theology could benefit from it. The second is that I accept the claims of Lonergan and Doran that their thought can ground a reorientation of the whole of theology. I would like to think that by my demonstrating how useful their ideas are for the eminently practical task of guiding church praxis, this can contribute to an increased interest in his thought by theologians working in areas other than pastoral theology.

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SECTION 1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Understanding the thought of Robert Doran, as that of Bernard Lonergan, takes time and hard work. Thinking at a foundational level is not easy. It involves a radical process of self-examination about the way one thinks and acts. Then, when one has really encountered the thought of both Lonergan and Doran, one is never the same again. One functions in a different way both in the drama of making one's own life choices and in one's intellectual efforts to engage with the world. Consequently, even though the primary purpose of this article is to offer an outline of a course in pastoral theology, this course relies so directly on the thought of Robert Doran that I feel it necessary to outline some of my basic presuppositions that emerge from his work.[2]

HISTORY AND THE SCALE OF VALUES

The relationship of the thought of Robert Doran to that of his mentor, Bernard Lonergan, is a close one. Lonergan developed heuristic categories to understand the structure of history in terms of progress, decline, and redemption. He used the analogy of vector analysis in physics to speak of these three approximations of the movement of history. Doran's theology of history is essentially one that takes up these three "vectors" of history and offers a deeper – and ultimately more usable – version of them for those involved in and committed to the praxis of social transformation.[3]

With Lonergan, Doran explains progress as the product in history of authentic decision-making. Doran points out that in the fourth level of consciousness the decision-making process involves first an affective response to value, then a judgment of value, then a prudential decision about how to act upon this value. With Lonergan, Doran speaks of a scale or hierarchy of values: vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious. However, unlike Lonergan, he further

[2]I have written in more technical detail on the thought of Robert Doran, and its relationship with that of Bernard Lonergan, in: "Unfinished Business in *Insight*: The Dialectics of History in Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran," to be published by the Lonergan Institute, Boston College, in proceedings of The Fourth International Lonergan Workshop, held at Mainz, Germany, January 2007.

[3]I mostly use Robert M. Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

explains that we relate to social, cultural, and personal values in a dialectical manner. The key reference point for the manner in which we relate to values is the dialectic between psyche and spirit that we experience at the level of personal values. Analogous dialectics are discerned by us at the cultural and social levels of value. At the level of culture we feel an attraction to both an anthropological version of culture and a cosmological culture. At the level of social values we respond to both the dictates of practical intelligence and of intersubjectivity.

Decline is a consistent deviation from this pattern. One way or another, it represents a situation where the integrity of the scale of values is not respected. This can occur at any one level of values when one pole of the dialectic of contraries is emphasized at the expense of the others, or, commonly, when lower values on the hierarchy are emphasized at the expense of higher values. Finally, redemption is the expression of God's intervention in history to solve the problem of evil. The vector of redemption in history heals individual minds from bias and, through them, heals cultures and social structures from decline. A discussion of the scale of values makes it clear how questions of individual authenticity and social and cultural progress interact. So it is that Doran can assert:

> The scale of values is the key to the structure of society.[4]

INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE, AND PROGRESS

I find it most helpful the manner in which Doran stresses the sharp distinction between social values and cultural values, or put another way, between the infrastructure of concrete social structures (e.g., economic and political) and the cultural superstructure of the ideas and values and the symbols that express them.

Doran acknowledges that academia is indebted to Karl Marx for first speaking of this distinction between infrastructure and superstructure. However, Marx, according to most interpreters, had a deterministic understanding of this relationship. He asserted that the infrastructure of economic systems determine the superstructure of the ideas and values that legitimate them. Consequently, the only way for history to progress is by a logic of class warfare and the use of force to change economic systems. In fact, Marx understood there to be something automatic about the historical process whereby one economic system is overthrown by the next. Marx's notion of praxis was that individuals should associate

[4] Doran, *Dialectics*, 95.

associate themselves with this more or less automatic-anyway process of class conflict and revolution.

Doran's understanding of the relationship of cultural superstructure to economic and political infrastructure differs from that of Marx. He stresses the power of culture to alter economic and political systems. A first way of explaining this is by recognizing that underlying Marx's approach is a latent view that knowing involves "taking a good look." By this measure, the power of violent revolution must always be superior to the power of ideas (remember Stalin's quip: "How many divisions has the Pope?"). By contrast, Doran relies on a theory of knowing that stresses a structure of human self-transcendence that passes through four stages: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. Lonergan had already stressed at the beginning of his intellectual career that this model of knowing was foundational to his theory of history. He asserted that this explains how there is a solidarity in knowing because people in one place and era are exposed to more or less the same experiences. Consequently, the process of moving through insight to judgment and decision should engage with current, shared, challenges and produce a process of social change that is for the good of all. This is the idealized vector of progress posited by Lonergan. It proceeds first through technological discovery, then through economic and political change made necessary by such discoveries, and then through a change in the cultural superstructure that is needed to accommodate these changes at the level of infrastructure while still protecting the interests of the common good.

DECLINE AND REDEMPTION

Perhaps the reader of these comments is asking: "But is this not still an argument that is close to Karl Marx?" It is true that this idealized notion of progress does stress "development from below" where changing infrastructure (though driven by technological change not revolution) has a primary influence on culture. Perhaps we need to move to Lonergan and Doran's notions of decline and redemption in history in order to really appreciate the difference from Marx. Doran stresses, with Lonergan, that the notion of progress relies on political decision-making being always driven by authentic minds. Of course, the reality of history is more that decisions are driven by group bias and general bias. One example of group bias is close to what Marx denounced as class oppression. Another example is the sexism that men as a group can hold with respect to women. General bias is a cultural rejection of the authentic use of intelligence. This latter bias is a highly successful form because it forestalls the chance of its own reversal. The result then

own reversal. The result then is the progressive embodiment in social structures of a series of stupid and evil decisions. The "reality" of society at which anyone can "take a good look," seems to disprove the claims of individuals criticising the situation in the name of an authentic model of knowing and an authentic scale of values for decision-making.

So it is that in a world not constituted by automatic progress, a vector of redemption is needed in history. This is a supernatural event that intervenes in – without contradicting – certain laws of nature. Above all, we witness the anomaly of individuals who are far from being virtuous suddenly having their "hearts flooded with the love of God." In terms of the scale of values, these individuals, who do not habitually submit vital to social values, social to cultural values, and cultural to personal values, suddenly have a light switched on, so to speak, at the level of religious values. What follows, then, is what Lonergan and Doran call "development from above." After an initial experience of religious conversion, a moral conversion follows. One's new horizon reveals with distressing clarity what the true scale of values are and how far one has been from an authentic response to them. The individual determines to respond to this gratuitous gift of eternal and unconditional love by living a life of habitual authentic response to the scale of values.

While religious conversion is first and foremost an experience of the individual, it is also intimately related to social institutions. The normal way in which one is assisted toward this experience of encounter with a loving God is by being a member of a religious tradition. Similarly, once one has felt personally transformed by this encounter one will have an urge to communicate it to others. A normal way of doing this will be to invite others to an explicit joining of the religion of which one is now an enthusiastic member. However, certainly within the Christian tradition, this enthusiasm can also be expressed by trying to contribute to the common good of one's society – a society that includes those who do not share one's religion – by influencing the culture and social structures of that society. So it is that religion as a social institution begins to mediate redemption in history.

A THIRD STAGE OF MEANING

Of course, Lonergan and Doran assert that the dialectical interaction of progress, decline, and redemption in history has been going on for a long time. However, they insist that a new stage in history has arrived where it is necessary to be more critically aware of just what constitutes the structure of history. A reason

reason for this need is that society has become highly complex. One can easily make the wrong decisions in the directing of progress and then the negative effects, more than ever before, become cumulative and widespread.

Of course, the kind of critical awareness Lonergan and Doran speak about is based on acts of self-appropriation of the self-transcending structure of our own consciousness – because it is by analogy with this that the structure of history is discerned. They assert that modern philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel represent a beginning of just this kind of self-appropriation that is needed so as to better direct history. However, as Doran expresses it, ultimately, the turn to the subject initiated by Descartes must be completed with intellectual and psychic conversion.

Intellectual conversion is not easy to perform but it is in a certain sense straightforward; it involves affirming for oneself that the structure of one's knowing and doing dictates a certain pattern of use of four levels of consciousness if one wishes to be authentic. The central contribution of Robert Doran to the corpus of Lonergan's thought is to add the insight that if we are really to "know what we are doing when we are being authentic" we need to add psychic conversion to intellectual conversion. Psychic conversion helps us negotiate the affective dimension of responding to the scale of values in a self-transcending way. It involves understanding the manner in which symbols express and influence our affective state. This understanding can help us make sure that redemptive symbols influence our own lives and can help us strive to assist the process whereby they increasingly influence the societies in which we live.

PRAXIS

So it is that the labor of working on our own conversions: religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic, becomes central to the effort of any idealistic individual to be an instrument of positive change in history. A key statement of Doran's theology is:

> A transcendental analysis of the religiously, morally, and intellectually converted subject, coupled with the psychological self-understanding rendered possible by psychic conversion, grounds a reorientation of the scientific understanding of community, society, and culture.[5]

This transcendental approach has implications for how we understand the term praxis. I would like to propose the following summary of Doran's notion of

[5]Doran, 636, see also 648-50.

praxis. It has three interrelated meanings and "moments." The first meaning of praxis is that of working on one's own religious and moral conversion. Related to this can follow – although it is not necessary for salvation as are the first two – an analysis and appropriation of one's transcendental functioning in intellectual and psychic conversion. From there one proceeds to a "praxis of meaning" where one begins to engage, one way or another, in transforming the cultural superstructure some community. Finally, one wishes to be an instrument for assisting the creating of a structure of social institutions where there is a just distribution of vital goods to members of society. I call this "socially transformative praxis."[6]

Becoming clear on the meaning of praxis is so important that I would like to offer a personal reflection here. My own tendencies toward bias have had the characteristics, if I may say so, of an idealistic, earnest, and impatient young person. From a fairly young age I felt a sincere concern for those excluded by society, above all the poor, and felt a desire to be an instrument for social change that would benefit them. I hear you ask: "What could be wrong with that?" Well, the problem is that I remained more or less firmly rooted within the cognitive myth that knowing is "taking a good look." The result was that I expected the problem to lie only with what I could more or less "see." My interest lay with blaming certain economic structures and seeking to change them – fast! Inevitably, I tended toward a Marxist understanding of the praxis that would be needed for this. The catch call: "To the barricades!" functions of something of a symbol of my state of mind. The fact that I did not proceed to violent action is less a credit to my intelligence that a testimony to the lack of coherence in my value system and the absence of deeper reflection upon the ideas and attitudes that I held.

Let me add that, until today, the temptation of general bias – that is to trust the real is what I can see or touch – clings close to me on the question of how I understand praxis. Do I really believe that the tortuous process of (asymptotically) attaining and maintaining my own conversions is one of the most important tasks I can perform in the cause of being an agent of change in history? Do I really believe that amongst the most historically important acts I could perform is to influence, one way or another, the cultural superstructure of the ideas and values held in the common sense of certain communities?

[6]Doran conducts a lengthy discussion of the meaning of the term "praxis" in Part 2 of *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, "The Dialectic of Community."

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Clearly, there is something theological going on when we commit ourselves to a praxis that we understand to be collaborating with God's redemption of history. However, there is more to be clarified here. In *Method in Theology* Lonergan offers a definition of the function of theology:

> A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix.[7]

We can recognize in this definition there will be a place of importance for Lonergan for the redemptive praxis that we have been outlining. We have already outlined how the significance of religion within a society is to mediate redemptive ideas, values and symbols to its culture and so to have a transformative effect on its social structures. Still, there is much work to be done in retrieving and reflecting upon a religious tradition before we come to this point. Lonergan proposes that theology needs to proceed in a collaborative exercise of eight functional specialties. These specialties are divided into two phases. The first retrieves a religious tradition, the second mediates, or communicates, it to a cultural matrix. Lonergan derives the four functional specialties of each phase of theology by analogy with the four levels of consciousness. In each specialty, one of the levels of consciousness is especially prominent.

The eighth functional specialty is called "communications" and has most to do with the kind of praxis we have been discussing. This, so to speak, is where "the rubber hits the road." Lonergan also calls this functional specialty "practical theology."[8] It is in practical theology where the fruit of the previous functional specialties is born. This is where one hopes to be actually having an influence on the culture and social structures in which one lives. Before elaborating on this point, I want to stress one other dimension of the specialty of communications. The effort at mediating a religious faith to a cultural matrix involves a two-way process of communication. It can raise questions that are beyond the ability of the practical theologian to answer. Consequent on this, it is one of the tasks of

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[7]Bernard Lonergan, Introduction to *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972).

[8]He refers his readers to the work of Karl Rahner on practical theology for examples of practical theology in action. Lonergan reminds us that in *Method in Theology* he is merely identifying the methodological role practical theology plays within the overall project of theology. See *Method in Theology*, ch. 14, "Communications."

"communications" to establish a process of "feedback" to the other functional specialties. For example, theologians in Africa do well to be aware of the phenomenon of HIV/AIDS on their continent and of the kind of questions this raises. Such questions can effect even the questions African biblical scholars ask of the Bible. The practical theologian first communicates such general questions to other functional specialties. He or she then can look forward to insights from such reflection to "work their way through the system" of the other functional specialties and offer fresh directions for church praxis.[9] I will reflect some more on this feedback function of practical theology in Section 3 of this paper.

I return now to what takes up more of the energy of the practical theologian: the praxis of cultural and social transformation.

TWO SUBDISCIPLINES OF PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

I next want to make a tentative proposal. I want to introduce some distinctions within the task of practical theology. I have not found such distinctions made in the thought of Lonergan or Doran. I propose that we should acknowledge that within practical theology there are two subdisciplines: "public theology" and "pastoral theology." I want to define public theology as that exercise of the functional specialty of communications where one is mostly trying to influence social, cultural, and, perhaps, personal values in the society at large. In this context, the theologian is working primarily with individuals and communities with whom he or she does not presume to share explicit convictions. Next, public theology can be performed at a more or less academic level. At the academic level, one engages with practitioners of the human and social sciences. One desires to work in collaboration with them so that their own sciences may be helped to better acknowledge the authentic scale of values.

At another, more local, level one hopes that a key practitioner is intellectually and psychically converted but one does not expect this of the individuals and communities he or she works with. The task here is to transform the commonsense world of these communities to one that is more respectful of the authentic scale of values. Pastoral theology is that exercise of the functional specialty of communications that reflects about – and trains individuals to be – "shepherds" of a

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[9]I knew a missionary who was fond of declaring: "It is against African culture to describe a son as equal to the father. So, we must abandon our Christian doctrine of the Trinity!" This view is not an example of Lonergan's notion of the way in which praxis is a foundation for theory! Feedback of questions arising from pastoral experience is not the same thing as immediately "seeing" answers to these questions..

"shepherds" of a community of religiously committed individuals within a particular religious tradition.[10]

Public Theology

The above quotation from Robert Doran speaks of the importance of: "A reorientation of the scientific understanding of community, society, and culture." The task referred to here is explicitly the "scientific" task where a theologian interacts with human and social scientists in a process of reorienting these sciences to acknowledge the authentic scale of values. I explain this as one instance of public theology. In this process, the "own most" contribution of the theologian is to assist the social scientists make explicit questions of their own conversion: religious, moral, intellectual, and psychic.[11] This kind of praxis is the one most referred to in the works of both Lonergan and Doran. It is the kind of praxis they attempt themselves and is of paramount importance. Lonergan spent many years of his life working on public theology. He devoted the last years of his life to trying to work out the consequences of intellectual conversion for the discipline of economics.[12] He was convinced that at least one important cause of the suffering of the poor was the ignorance, and not the malice, of intellectual elites. We can note that had Lonergan succeeded in this aim the impact of his work could have been truly global.

[10]My proposal should be distinguished from the discussion of David Tracy of "the three publics of theology" in *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroads, 1989). Tracy asserts that the three publics which theology has to address in an age of pluralism are those of: society, academia, and church. These distinctions are related to his method of correlation. Doran offers a criticism of these distinctions and of the method on which it is grounded as one that inappropriately fragments theology. Doran stresses that theology is "one process" that assists the redemptive praxis of the religion in history. We can note that practical theology as I explain it thus figures more centrally in Doran's method of theology than in Tracy's.

[11]The expression "ownmost contribution" concerning the role of theology in this collaboration is taken from Robert Doran, *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations* (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2006), ch. 3. In fact, I consider the article by the philosopher Patrick Byrne in this collection to be an impressive example of public theology addressing the issue of stem-cell research. His contention is that much debate on the ethics of stem-cell research is distorted by assumptions that knowing (what is a human person) is a matter of taking a good look. So, his hope is to introduce an approach that is the fruit of intellectual conversion.

[12]Lonergan produced a document on economics published in The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 10, as *Circulation Analysis*. Some argue that this work is of abiding relevance and awaits discovery and development by like-minded individuals with a first-rate competence in economics.

Another theological praxis of importance occurs at a more local level. It works not at trying to bring people to a state of intellectual and psychic conversion and by trying to influence an academic discipline. Rather, it is an effort whereby a self-appropriated individual, trained in theology, tries to influence the common sense held by specific communities to accord with the authentic scale of values. This task can be an exercise either in public theology or in what I want to call pastoral theology. An example of this kind of microscopic work of public theology is mentioned in another article in this collection of presentations to the 34th Lonergan Workshop. It is the work in conflict mediation of the San Egidio community. This explicitly Catholic movement of lay people won international attention by mediating peace agreements between warring factions in Mozambique, Sudan, and elsewhere. As one can read in that article, they are clearly functioning from a position of religious and moral conversion and, increasingly, also moving to intellectual conversion. By this means the leaders of the San Eggidio community believe that they can more reliably train (themselves) and their younger members in mediation skills. Of course when they are conducting mediation, they do not presuppose that they are working with communities who share the specific religious convictions of the San Egidio community. Much less do they expect intellectual and psychic conversion. However, they are clear that intellectual conversion can be a key attribute of a mediator.

Pastoral Theology

Another variety of practical theology where agents of a restored scale of values act in a commonsense world is pastoral theology. As I mentioned above, this is the dimension of theology that assists pastors and pastoral agents in leading the faith communities for which they have responsibility. In the Catholic tradition, of which I am part, this kind of theology is best suited for training seminarians who will be ordained and assigned as pastors in parishes as well as future pastoral team members who will work with this priest. This team may comprise men and women, religious, and lay people. Pastoral theology can also be employed for training pastoral agents, such as chaplains, in a wide variety of Christian institutions other than the parish. Again, as mentioned above, here one hopes that the pastoral agents are intellectually and psychically converted. However, one is clear that the pastoral agent does not expect those he or she works with to be converted in this manner. On the other hand, a pastoral agent does hope for and expect to collaborate with God's work of causing religious and moral conversion in the individuals in the

in the individuals in the community with which he or she works.

I have spent nine years teaching pastoral theology at Hekima College, the Jesuit School of Theology. The system at the college for teaching this subject was impressive. Students in the first year of a three-year degree had a three credit course with me called "Introduction to Pastoral Theology." At the end of this, they were sent on a six-week pastoral placement often in their country of origin. The students were almost entirely religious and students for the priesthood. They came from many of the countries of Africa. About half were Jesuits. The pastoral placements were in Catholic institutions, usually parishes but also a variety of other works. These other works tended to be in areas of social development. They could range from rural health care programs, to AIDS hospices, to economic development work. When the students returned, they participated in a further three-credit course. In this course they offered class presentations of an analysis of the institution in which they were placed. They were evaluated, after class discussions, in terms of their application of a methodology for reflection on pastoral praxis to which I had introduced them in the previous semester.

SECTION 2
A COURSE IN PASTORAL THEOLOGY

The method I tried to teach at Hekima College was a variation on the methodology of what is known as the pastoral circle.[13] This pastoral circle has origins in the methodology of "see, judge, act" of the young Catholic Workers movement in Belgium in the nineteenth century.[14] The basic approach of this methodology is to emphasize the importance of theologizing from a context of pastoral experience, hopefully with the poor – a group, alas, easy to find in Africa. In a process that passes through reflection on context, and reflection on Christian values, one seeks to make comments on the effectiveness of a particular Christian ministry and to offer suggestions for further steps in the development of that ministry. As I

[13]I have offered outlines of this methodology in a number of publications, including "A Theology of Mission for Parish Work," *Africa Yetu: A Review of the Society of Jesus in Africa*, (December 2003): 27-41.

[14]It also has been influenced by the notion of the "hermeneutical circle" of Jan Louis Segundo, a liberation theologian from Latin America who wrote mostly in the 1970s and 1980s. See Jan Luis Segundo, *The Liberation of Theology*, trans. John Drury (New York: Maryknoll Press, 1976). However, see also the critique of Segundo in Doran, *Dialectics*.

ministry. As I mentioned, I tried to deepen this methodology by using a heuristic structure of the theology of history developed by Robert Doran. The method has four steps. Broadly speaking these steps follow the logic of the method of "see," "judge" and "act."[15] After teaching my semester course on an introduction to pastoral theology I hand out a two-page bullet-point summary of the method. Students are expected to take this hand out with them on their pastoral fieldwork and to start reflecting about the paper they will write analyzing the institution when they return for the next academic year of theology studies. In what follows I reproduce what I offer in this hand out and comment on it.

This kind of analysis is demanding for students. They found that pastoral theology is not less intellectually demanding than other courses in theology! However, in the second semester, our system of having class presentations from different individual class members followed by a class discussion helped a good deal. I noticed an improved quality of class discussion about use of the methodology as the semester proceeded. I took careful notes during the class and wrote somewhat a lengthy memorandum to the presenting student afterwards evaluating his or her performance. Students knew that I kept a copy of my memorandum and measured the final draft of their papers against it!

STEP 1: ("SEE")

STEP 1: INSERTION AND DESCRIPTION: ("SEE")
Be involved in the Catholic ministry to which you have been sent. Employ the technique of "participant observation." Include as part of this introductory overview the history of the institution you are studying. Try to identify key stages, turning points and persons in the past. You can also speculate about trends for the future. What will this institution be like in ten years time? Ask the question: "What is happening here?" Gather the data, stories, descriptions of what is going on in this situation. Seek to understand how the institution

[15]I employ this terminology with due caution about the cognitive myth that can be implicit in it. "Seeing" can seem to imply "taking a good look." "Judging" can seem to imply that we expect concepts representing reality to "pop up" without us needing to expend the labor of waiting for insight and reflecting rationally about whether to affirm or reject our insight. Of course, action that might result from such an approach would be ill-considered.

institution works. Offering an overall description of the institution is your main task in Step 1.

In presenting this step to the class, I stress Lonergan's distinction between description and explanation. Lonergan used to describe how a child who is a passenger in a car might call out about how "we are going faster!" An older person with a scientific background might note: "We are accelerating!" This second statement is explanatory and could be measured accurately by breaking it into specific measurements of distance covered, initial and terminal velocity, and time taken. I stress that Step 1 of the pastoral circle remains at a descriptive level.

A practical point to note here is that our students are usually undertaking what is only a six-week fieldwork placement in an institution they have not usually visited before. Also, the students themselves have had limited pastoral experience. Much of their time and energy will be spent simply developing a basic, descriptive, understanding of what is happening around them, how the institution works, and what life is like for the people served by the institution.

STEP 2: "JUDGE"

STEP 2: ("JUDGE")

2A: ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF THE SITUATION:

Here you switch from description to explanation. In Step 2A turn to <u>analyze, not the institution, but the situation in which members of the institution minister</u>.

1. Pay attention to **concrete social structures**. What are the structures of technology, economics, and politics here? Remember that you will often need to identify how the local situation is reflecting national or international patterns of social organization. What are the intersubjective bonds here of family, gender relations, clan, ethnic group, social class, etc.?

2. Continuing to study the situation in which your institution functions ask the following question: "What are the key **ideas, values, and symbols** that influence people in this situation?" These values can include religious values.

3. Next move to evaluate the situation in terms of our categories of **progress, decline, and redemption**. It is often best to speak first of decline and then of progress/redemption together.

All these dimensions 1, 2, 3, need to be touched upon as you analyze the situation in which your institution ministers. However, you can employ a certain flexibility with regard to applying these categories. Step 2 should not read like a "check list" of questions and answers about the situation. You will need to take a particular emphasis in your analysis that is relevant to the institution you are studying.

Readers will notice here a straightforward application of Doran's theology of history. One can note that there is considerable complexity required in this analysis. Students are asked to discern decline and progress/redemption both at the level of infrastructure and of superstructure. Furthermore, within each level of value they are asked to be sensitive to the dialectic of contraries between the pole of transcendence (anthropological culture or practical intelligence) and the pole of limitation (cosmological culture or intersubjectivity). I found that, by and large, students made good progress in developing the skills required for this.

Concrete Social Structures

Recognizing and naming the social structures at work in a situation was demanding. In recognizing aspects of structure related to practical intelligence, those who have previously studied social science are at an advantage here. What is required here is a mind that begins to recognize social structures at work. Students are also encouraged to recognize structural forces at work that move from the local, to the national, and even the global. For example, a shortage of medicines in a local government hospital can be related to the need for the government to use its foreign exchange to repay its high international debt. New patterns of economic growth evident in an area – as well as deeper marginalization of some poor groups – can be related to the liberalization of national economies. This, in turn, has often been

turn, has often been required by foreign donors. It is important to note these factors. This having been said, the general direction of the pastoral circle is to generate proposals for action in fields where a Catholic institution can hope to have some influence.

Recognizing how intersubjective forces interact with the dictates of practical intelligence was something new for the students and even those with a background in social science had rarely come across such an idea. However, many fertile insights arose from asking this question about the dialectic of contraries in the social infrastructure. I will discuss some of these under the heading of prudence under Step 3 and of future directions for African theology in Section 3 of this paper.

Ideas, Values, Symbols

In some respects, developing an ability to differentiate superstructure from infrastructure was the key skill to be developed in this course. A key litmus test of emerging intellectual conversion in students seemed to be an ability of students to habitually make this differentiation. Of course, it is important that individuals have an ability to read situations in terms of the entirety of the scale of values. However, the first casualty of a drift to thinking knowing is "taking a good look" seems to be a blurring of the distinction of social values and cultural values.[16]

As I have mentioned, in the schooling process of classroom discussions, I did feel I recognized progress being made on this matter. For example, I noticed that before studying pastoral theology many students already had a particular familiarity with ministering to youth. This need not be surprising. They were, of course, closer to this generation themselves and tended often to have ongoing ministerial commitments to youth groups. Even here however, many students found they had much to learn from the methodology based on the scale of values. Our students were keenly aware that young people of Africa face desperate problems on the level of vital values and social values. Young people have problems attaining the educational qualifications to which they aspire and have problems finding a job

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[16]The point of reference here is distinguishing the third and fourth levels of consciousness in our own process of self-transcendence. Lonergan states that there is a parallel, or an isomorphism, between the levels of consciousness and the levels of value. Vital values have a point of reference in the acts of experience and insight. Social values have a point of reference in the act of judgment which affirms that it is through social cooperation that the repeated and consistent provision of vital values is best achieved. Finally, culture has a point of reference in the affirmation of value we make in the fourth level of consciousness as a step toward making a decision. Culture helps us to decide to participate in social structures.

problems finding a job even if they do. It then becomes difficult to marry and set up a family, and so forth. With time, my pastoral theology students grew in clarity about how young people also have problems at the level of culture. Sometimes, improved attitudes of acceptance of life's realities, as well as cultivating attitudes of self-discipline and industriousness, can open new pathways for young people. They can be helped to grasp that they do not automatically have to drift into a culture of pleasure-seeking and, as often follows, addiction. Our students also recognized that, in the end of the day, the Church has a particular competence in helping individuals and groups reflect about the ideas and values that guide their lives and decide to make changes. This question of Church engagement with cultural transformation brings me ahead of myself. I will touch on this issue further in my discussion of prophetic ministry in 2C below.

A further point on this example of youth ministry relates to psychic conversion. Psychic conversion helps one be particularly attentive to the symbols that dominate a culture. Part of the "culture therapy" offered to young people can be that of recognizing the unhelpful symbols that govern their thinking and to move to symbols that are more liberating.[17] Students often found that the natural giftedness in drama of the young people they worked with could be employed both to caricature the false symbols of our culture and to advocate alternatives.

Progress, Decline, Redemption

On the issue of discerning the three vectors of history, I felt that, here again, the effects of the almost all-pervasive cognitive myth were evident. In this case, it led to difficulty in making distinctions. At this stage, it always seemed easier to identify decline than to make the further distinctions of recognizing progress and redemption at work. On the question of the difference of progress from redemption, I proposed to students that they not worry too much about it. Rather, they can "dwell on the positives" together. However, I did speak a little about "the law of the cross" as characterizing redemption. What characterizes redemption is that it involves itself with reversing decline. Instead of adopting violent means, its

[17]I wrote an article on related matters: "That All May Have Life in Abundance: Theological Foundations for Youth Ministry," in *Youth Ministry, A Life-Giving Ministry*, Tangaza Occasional Papers, No. 18, ed. Elena Rastello FMA and Gianni Rolandi SDB (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 2006).

preference is for a process – folly in the eyes of the world – of returning good for evil.[18]

By this stage, a lot is being asked of the student. One can note at this stage that the analysis is getting complex. When one considers the need to speak of the three vectors, with respect to both infrastructure and superstructure, one recognizes that the permutations of the different points one could analyze are many. Here, I stressed the need for a flexible use of the method. By and large, I found that students could rise to this. For example, a student working with a rural health program would tend to analyze the general aspects of decline and progress/redemption in the area with reference to aspects of these general vectors of history that had relevance for a discussion of health.

2B GENERATIVE THEMES

STEP 2B: GENERATIVE THEMES
Generative themes continue to analyze the situation in which your institution functions. Generative themes look to the deeper "causes of causes." They also seek to exercise a certain simplifying function whereby the pastoral agent gains insight (to be employed in Step 3) into the key areas where redemptive praxis may be needed. In trying to perceive generative themes you now can ask the question: "What are the two or three key issues that are on the 'hinge' between decline and redemption?" These issues should include both key obstacles to progress/redemption and at least one key sign of hope.

[18]Lonergan writes about returning good for evil in this manner in ch. 20 of *Insight*: "Now, the will can contribute to the solution of the problem of the social surd inasmuch as it adopts a dialectical attitude that parallels the dialectical method of intellect. The dialectical method of intellect consists in grasping that the social surd neither is intelligible nor is to be treated as intelligible. The corresponding dialectical attitude of will is to return good for evil. For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe to love all men with a self-sacrificing love" (*Insight*, 721-22).

As I mentioned above, the analysis expected in Step 2A was complex. There needs to be a process at work in the pastoral circle of discerning just a few key insights about a situation. Only in this manner will one ever be able to proceed in one's analysis to make proposals for action. Asking students to identify generative themes is an effort to respond to this need. Indeed, the term "generative theme" helps us recognize that we are seeking insights that can help to generate action.[19] Students are invited to search for a limited number of issues that are "causes of causes." Thus, for example we can speak of "poverty" as one cause of a situation. However, we can proceed to identify "unemployment" as a cause of this cause etc.

One specific example of a student using the generative themes to good effect was as follows. One generative theme in a village in Tanzania was that there was no adequate road from the area to a nearby city. The area was fertile and capable of high agricultural production. However, because of the lack of marketing outlets farmers merely produced food for their own consumption. Even in analyzing the faith-life of the people of the area it was recognized that this was an obstacle to all aspects of human flourishing. The insight from this sub-step survived, as it were, all the way through to Step 3 of the student's fieldwork paper. His proposals for action in the parish centered on trying to address the issue of road transport.

STEP 2C
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT MINISTRY TO THIS SITUATION

STEP 2C: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT MINISTRY TO THIS SITUATION

[19]The terminology of generative themes is borrowed from Paulo Freire in the work that was considered foundational for the theologies of liberation of Latin America: *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 2000). There is much of value in this work. Freire's critique of a "banking notion of education" can be understood of a critique of one kind of behavior that results from thinking that knowing involves "taking a good look." The way he advocates praxis for social change and comments on how this helps the poor overcome alienation has much to recommend it. However, Freire is strongly influenced by a Marxist notion of history necessarily being driven by a dynamic of class conflict. He lacks a notion of redemption in history as Doran explains it. In the end of the day, his method runs the danger of replacing one kind of alienation with another one.

In Steps 2A and 2B we analyzed the causes of the situation in which our ministry functions. This analysis already included a dimension of theology because we are confident that redemption is already at work in social situations where we are called to minister. In Step 2C we enter more deeply into a reflection on the redemption present in the situation. We focus on the question of how the institution in which we are placed is already contributing to the redemption of this situation. I suggest that this section first concerns itself with "Christological Reflection" and then with "Ecclesiological Reflection."

2Ci: Christological Reflection

Because you have already done a course on this, I ask you to base this section on the synoptic Gospels. You can choose a theme or image of Jesus that best speaks to redemption already present, or especially needed in this situation. You should therefore consider your generative themes carefully and then choose one or two Christological themes that best speaks to them.

2Cii Ecclesiological Reflection

This is the heart of your pastoral fieldwork paper. Unlike earlier questions within Step 2, this stage is explicitly focused on how the institution in which you are placed is functioning within its environment. Ask the following questions:

a. How effective is this ministry in mediating the experience of religious conversion (priestly ministry)?
b. How effective is this ministry in introducing redemptive meanings, values and symbols to its situation (prophetic ministry)?
c. How effective is this ministry in offering examples of well-run concrete social structures. Also, and importantly, is the parish working for social justice in any way that has a direct impact on social structures (kingly ministry)?
d. A key question to ask after this analysis is whether there is some kind of appropriate balance between the three dimensions of ministry. This question can often reveal valuable insights. Often enough, what is otherwise a busy and impressive institution, is clearly neglecting the challenge of balancing these different dimensions.

e. In a similar vein of, respectfully, asking questions about inadequacies in this ministry: "However unwittingly, is this ministry in some way contributing to decline in this situation?"
f. A related question to e. requires that you return to your list of generative themes. As you reflect on these themes and upon the Christian ministry that you have now analyzed, ask the question: "Is there any issue of major significance in an area that the church is neglecting – or possibly actually making worse?

Analyzing ministry is a demanding part of the pastoral circle. One can note here the significance of what I said above about generative themes. Identifying these few factors helps one proceed in a manageable manner to a further analysis that can produce decisions for action.

CHRISTOLOGICAL REFLECTION

The main part of this analysis of ministry is ecclesiological reflection. However, I include Christological reflection first to remind us that, in the end of the day, the praxis of Jesus Christ is always the point of reference for the praxis of Christians. I found that setting the question about a theme from the Gospels in this manner encouraged a kind of artistic creativity on the part of students. It helps bring alive the ecclesiological question: "Is this Christian institution prolonging the mission of Christ as best it can in this concrete situation?"

Readers will note that that I had to take notice of how much theology the first year students I teach have and have not already done. I found that focusing on the course the students had done in the synoptic Gospels could be successful. I asked them to display "exegetical elegance" in their answering of this subsection. By this I meant that when they take up a Gospel theme as related to their generative themes it should be a theme that is particularly found in that Gospel. I also encouraged them to choose something of a classic text from the Gospel that illustrates this favored theme of the evangelist. Examples include: hope in suffering in Mark, option for the poor in Luke, the balance of innovation with respect for tradition in Matthew.

ECCLESIOLOGICAL REFLECTION

I consider the moment of ecclesiological reflection to be of paramount importance in the pastoral circle. I spend considerable time introducing this point with students. Readers who are familiar with models of so-called social analysis for reflection on ministry may be surprised by this subsection. Such readers may feel

feel surprised by how theological I have become in a section that still purports to be only analyzing the current situation. Such surprise is warranted. It is a sign of how new is the theology of history of Lonergan and Doran. I have not found any other method of pastoral reflection that compares to Lonergan's and Doran's assertion that redemption is one of the vectors of history.[20] Doran is quite explicit that the use of social science is always necessary but never sufficient to understand historical reality. One always needs a theologian in collaboration with social scientists to recognize and handle the fact of God's grace at work in history.

Priest, Prophet, King

Next, the reader may notice that I played a "neat trick" with one tradition of speaking of the mission of the Church in terms of "priest," "prophet" and "king."[21] I relate these to the process of development from above as explained by Lonergan and Doran with respect to the scale of values. Actually, I simply borrowed this idea from a theologian, Neil Ormerod, who follows the methodology of Robert Doran.[22]

Following Ormerod, I speak of priestly ministry as setting up the conditions of possibility for religious conversion and moral conversion. Of course, we expect the functioning of the ordained minister in a place such as a parish to be central to this. This is a moment to ask whether the parishioners really feel that the Sunday Eucharist is the summit and source of their lives. An obvious related question is: "How good is the preaching in this parish?" This having been said priestly ministry as meant here is by no means limited to the work of the priest. When certain parish leaders have been trained to guide others in their prayer-life this is priestly ministry. This having been said, the priest has a special responsibility of oversight in the process of helping the parish grow in holiness. I find Pope John Paul II's encyclical *On the Eve of the New Millennium* especially helpful on this point. His description of "planning for holiness" captures well what is the best understanding of priestly

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[20]I compare a Doran-based method with some other methods in two articles published elsewhere: 1. "Adding Theological Reflection to Social Analysis: Lonergan and the Pastoral Circle," *African Christian Studies, Theological Journal of the Catholic University of East Africa*, (September 2000). 2. "Theological Reflection and the Slums of Nairobi," in *The Slums: A Challenge to Evangelisation*, ed. F. Pierli and Y. Abeledo, Tangaza Occasional Papers, No. 14 (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 2002), 77-98, 142-51.

[21]For example, these terms are central to ch. 2, "The Church as People of God," of *Lumen gentium* in Vatican II.

[22]Neil Ormerod proposes use of the terms "priest," "prophet," and "king" as a basis for a theology of mission in *Theological Studies* 61(2000): 432-46.

understanding of priestly ministry. The Pope's description of helping a prayer life both to begin and to mature in fact covers the ministry of assisting both religious and moral conversion. A further question not to forget to ask is whether anyone in the institution has considered ecumenism as part of the spiritual responsibilities of the institution.

I understand prophetic ministry to include efforts to restore cultural values to their appropriate place in the scale of values observed both by individuals and community. Ministry to cultural values can include touching on issues of how men and women, children and parents relate to each other (or even should relate to each other) in the family. It can also address issues of a culture of violence in war-torn areas, or of ethnocentrism in urban parishes where the parish is comprised of many different ethnic groups.

Kingly ministry is ministry to social values. Analyzing kingly ministry begins with asking how social institutions are run by the parish itself. Is the parish priest a model of financial rectitude? If the parish runs a school or a health centre, does it model practices that are attractive enough for other institutions in the private and state sector to desire to copy? A final, and by no means least important, aspect of kingly ministry is activism for social justice. In this respect, secular skills of community development for economic advancement are important to have represented on a pastoral team.[23] In much of Africa, the bishops have opted for Small Christian communities to be their foundational strategy of evangelization. It is not uncommon for fifty or so of these neighborhood groups to exist in a parish. As well as praying together, these groups can spearhead significant community-based economic development in their area. This can also provide opportunities for ecumenical and interreligious collaboration. Examples can include setting up savings cooperatives or campaigning against corruption in local government. A

[23]There is an extensive literature on community development in social science literature. I recommend a Google search under "participatory rural development" for those wishing to explore further. The methodology of participatory rural development is tried and tested in developing countries and is favored by the European Union in deciding what agencies to support with foreign aid money. I do not find it has the drawbacks of a latent Marxism that I noted in the thought of Paulo Freire. This method is attentive not only to social values but also to cultural values and so is relevant to prophetic ministry as well as kingly ministry. Of course, what such a social scientific approach cannot handle adequately is the manner in which religion might be brought to bear in helping the kind of selflessness that will make the participatory rural development method work optimally in practice.

local government. A more dangerous endeavor can be working against local criminal organizations that control the sale of drugs and of illegally brewed strong alcohol.

Alternate Models of Ecclesiological Reflection

At this stage, I would like to note a practical point. Not all students found it easy to enter into the methodology of analyzing Christian institutions in terms of priestly, prophetic, and kingly ministry. I believe that the issue here was one of an absence of intellectual and psychic conversion. To enter into a real appropriation of our self-transcending structure and then to read situations in terms of the scale of values operating in them is not easy. A lack of intellectual conversion in students became particularly evident when they were being asked to use this model of ecclesiological reflection. If students have not already been exposed to the thought of Lonergan – and my students differed from each other in this respect – it was a lot to ask of them to enter this method so quickly. Another reason for allowing flexibility in the kind of ecclesiological reflection I was calling for was that I could not entirely claim that tradition of Church teaching to be on my side as I try to promote my favored model. After all, I was bending the traditional categories of priest, prophet, and king, to fit into an approach for which they were not previously intended. My approach "cut and pasted" them, so to speak, onto a methodology based on the scale of values.

So it was that I found it prudent to offer a second model of ecclesiological reflection to the students. I offered an option to all students to replace the model of priest, prophet and king with an alternative one that is popular in parallel methods of theological reflection. This method evaluates ministries in terms of four categories derived from the praxis of the Church as represented in the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament. These categories are: *diakonia* (service) *koinonia* (community) *liturgia* (liturgy) and *martyria* (witness). I myself find these so called "four marks of the Church" to be somewhat arbitrarily selected. Intellectual and psychic conversion gives one the habit of expecting that categories we use in theology will have some anchor in the structure of human consciousness. I noticed, for example, that some methods of theological reflection replace *martyria* with *kerygma* (preaching) and some add a fifth category relating to catechesis. I find that these categories relate more to externals of Church practice and neglect the more formational realities of the growth that individuals and communities pass through

and communities pass through in terms of the scale of values (actually, they can be related to the priest, prophet, and king model as a kind of further step of application).

I believe I witnessed positive results from allowing these two options of ecclesiological reflection. Students who chose the alternative ecclesiological model lost a certain coherence because I still asked them to perform the earlier analysis of progress, decline, and redemption according to the Doran categories. However, a tension was relieved of students feeling over pressurized by an "ideological lecturer." At the same time, a majority of students continued to choose the priest, prophet, and king model. Furthermore, I would make sure to promote debates in the class about which approach seemed better. I felt that this approach was optimal for easing as many students as possible into the world of intellectual and psychic conversion.

Hermeneutic of Suspicion

The last three subquestions in ecclesiological reflection (d, e, f) are the way in which I introduce the insights of theologies that speak of "a hermeneutic of suspicion" into the process of the pastoral circle.[24] I have found that the question of balance between the three dimensions of ministry is often a moment of a key insight for students. Much as there is impressive work being done in a Christian ministry, when one asks the right questions one can recognize major oversights. Insights into such oversights revolve around what is best understood as a lack of respect for the integrity of the scale of values. Applying this analysis to parishes, one can at times recognize that the pastoral leadership is so caught up with issues of an explicitly religious nature that the outgoing concern beyond the parish – that is characteristic of kingly ministry – is neglected. However, it is surprising in how many parishes there is an opposite problem. Often enough an overworked priest is so concerned with administrative issues of running schools, hospitals, and development programs that priestly and prophetic ministry become neglected.

[24]Employment of the hermeneutic of suspicion is a central characteristic of theologies of liberation of Latin America. Doran acknowledges that theologians of liberation have made a permanent contribution to church thinking on issues of a preferential option for the poor and of giving a certain place to the hermeneutic of suspicion in theology. He then conducts a particular analysis of the thought of Jan Louis Segundo. Doran employs the thought of Paul Ricoeur in insisting that a hermeneutic of suspicion must be balanced with a hermeneutic of recovery. He criticizes Segundo for failing to do this convincingly. Doran proposes that a hermeneutic of recovery can best be served by employing the theology of history as he has outlined it (Doran, *Dialectics*).

Many of the examples I have been giving in my reflections on the pastoral circle come from parishes. However, a number of students go for pastoral fieldwork not to parishes but to other Catholic institutions. The question of balance of ministry can be adapted most helpfully to these situations. First of all, one has to make a prudential decision about what constitutes balanced ministry. A good number of our pastoral placements were in Catholic institutions whose ministry is primarily kingly. These included Catholic schools (where a majority of students are non-Catholic), the Jesuit Refugee Service working in refugee camps etc. Clearly, in such institutions one expects the kingly dimension of ministry to take pride of place. However, this having been said, asking questions about some appropriate level of prophetic and priestly ministry can be revealing.

Asking cultural questions in a secondary school can include noting that the school has been progressively moving to charging high fees in the last decade. Is this what was intended by the religious congregation that founded the school, or was it forced upon them by financial circumstances? Is the school leadership at least trying to organize funds for offering scholarships to students of poor students? Are efforts being made to form the privileged student body in a social conscience? Asking questions about priestly ministry in, say a refugee camp, can raise questions about whether the spiritual needs of refugees are being met. One can be surprised at how highly even the poorest of refugees rate this need. Of course, we can recall that religious conversion can occur outside the boundaries of the Catholic Church. Consequently, questions of assisting Protestant and Muslim chaplains to have access to refugee camps can be highly relevant here.

STEP 3: PASTORAL PLANNING ("ACT")

STEP 3: ("ACT")
The guiding question for this step is: "What might yet be in this situation?" The last three subquestions within ecclesiological reflection play a key role in stimulating your reflection in Step 4. If you have noticed a clear imbalance in ministries, this can offer you obvious priorities for proposals for new actions. Similarly, if you have noticed aspects of the ministry where more harm is being done than good this leads to some further, obvious, suggestions.

> Note that this stage of our reflection paper requires different intellectual skills from Step 1 and Step 2. Identifying the causes (Step 2) involved what we might call an analytical intelligence. In Step 3 our task is much more practical. We need to demonstrate good judgment concerning what changes might be desirable in an institution as it responds to its situation. At the same time, we need to demonstrate a kind of shrewd judgment concerning what changes might actually be possible in a situation. St. Thomas Aquinas called this the virtue of prudence.

The fruits of the pastoral circle are tasted in the proposals for action that they produce. When introducing this step to students I speak of the "virtue of prudence" as outlined by St. Thomas Aquinas. A key point for Aquinas is that the God's created universe is intelligible to human beings. Indeed it is our God-given vocation to use our intelligence to guide our actions in a creative engagement with our environment. This engagement needs to be creative if we understand the true nature of knowing. If we are conceptualists we will believe that it is enough to "know precepts" and just apply them. If, on the other hand we grasp that knowing and doing always involves both the attending of data and adding the contribution of the human mind we understand why the virtue of prudence is so important. In the end of the day, the individual tends to have to evaluate particular situations and proposed courses of action "according to their merits" (i.e., according to the scale of values). It is hard to predict what situations students will find themselves in. Of great importance then, is to learn the virtue of making good decisions. One needs both to exercise one's intelligence well to understand situations and then to have a practical wisdom about what might actually be possible to improve situations.

In assessing students, I was struck by the fact that there is not a direct and simple correlation between intelligence and prudence. I often gave students of average academic performance higher marks than they were used to receiving from their other courses. Alas, the opposite also occurred where academically gifted students got lower marks than they expected. In a culture that highly esteems educational attainment, this was the occasion for no small amount of hurt feelings and protests. In reflecting on this experience, I was struck by what I perceived to be a connection between psychic conversion and the virtue of prudence. Let me explain this first by speaking of the absence of prudence.

When I think of students who seemed to combine considerable intelligence with a difficulty in demonstrating practical wisdom, I believe that I often recognized that a lack of affective maturity in the student was a contributing cause. I believe I was witnessing examples of what Doran refers to, using terminology from Carl Jung, as certain affective "complexes" interfering with the authentic self-transcendence of the student in question. As a pastor, prudence often requires a sense for where the obstacles lie in implementing a decision in a community. This can have a lot to do with recognizing the pole of limitation in a dialectic of contraries. This in turn, is related to how well one understands one's own limitations. Understanding the various ways in which one's own psyche resists the self-transcending dictates of spirit is a valuable foundation for this.

An Example of Prudent Leadership

Let me offer an example of prudent leadership in a parish from a location where one student was assigned on pastoral fieldwork. In an urban parish with a rapidly growing population, it became clear to a priest and his pastoral team that there was need for a major increase of the number of small Christian communities. However, when the team began to propose this to members of the small Christian communities, they met remarkable resistance. Instead of forcing a decision on parish members, the team decided to embark on an extensive and lengthy campaign of catechesis about how "every individual parishioner is my brother and sister in Christ." By this means, they won over a large majority of members of small Christian communities before announcing the decision to multiply communities. In a final step, the bishop of the diocese was invited to the parish for a major Sunday liturgy. At this liturgy, the new small Christian communities were inaugurated and blessed. This liturgy was full of symbolism where each "parent" small Christian community "gave birth to a child." The last of resistance in the parish seemed to fall away at this stage. In fact, the members of the small Christian communities then performed most of the detailed work in implementing the decision.

Let me now apply the analysis of the scale of values to this story. First, the practical wisdom of the priest and pastoral team lay in respecting the dialectic of contraries between practical intelligence and intersubjectivity at the level of the dialectic of community. They took time to "massage" the intersubjective bonds of parishioners before implementing the decision that was practically necessary in the parish. Similarly, understanding the manner in which anthropological culture and cosmological culture exist in tension with each other, they took care to cater to both

to both as they sought to alter the culture of the parish. They not only explained the good, Gospel-based, reasons for the decision, but they also employed symbols to reinforce it. Of course, in the Catholic Church, the symbol *par excellence* is the ritual of the Eucharist. In this African context, it was clear that the culture of the people still has much of the cosmological in it. Consequently, parishioners had a high respect for the "chief" who was the bishop and for what would happen at a liturgy at which he was presiding. Similarly, by evoking during the liturgy symbols of physical generativity – so highly valued in cosmological culture – the parish accessed deep cultural energies in favor of what was in fact an act of spiritual generation, that of increasing the number of small Christian communities.

CONCLUSION

As I read other literature relevant to my course I am struck by how innovative and how valuable can be the adopting of an approach to the pastoral circle based on Lonergan and Doran.[25] I am persuaded that the point at issue, in the end of the day, is that of the intellectual and psychic conversion of the theologian. I stress these two conversions because, while religious and moral conversion are essential, one wishes these for everyone. What is distinctive of the intellectual task of theology is having a control of the meanings of what is going on in religious and moral conversion and how these conversions interrelate to the more natural "development from below" of human authenticity and of progress/redemption in history. The crucial challenge in theology is to know what one is doing when one is doing it with regard to one's own self-transcendence.

Of course, conversion, like charity, begins at home. I was struck by how important it was that I be intellectually and psychically converted if I am to teach the pastoral circle method to students.[26] This was especially so in the second

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[25]The literature on practical theology is diverse and overlaps with a number of other kinds of theology. These include theologies of liberation, contextual theologies, social-ethical theology, social and pastoral theology, etc. In order to navigate these readings I found Matthew Lamb most helpful. In *Solidarity With Victims: Towards a Theology of Social Transformation* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), Lamb offers five models of how the theory/praxis relationship functions in theology today: 1. the primacy of theory, 2. the primacy of praxis, 3. the primacy of "faith/love", 4. a critical theoretic correlation. 5. "critical-praxis correlation." He explains that model 5 is that of Lonergan and argues for its superiority over the other models. I have found it remarkable how many other authors, especially in practical theology, quote these five models with respect but without understanding what he means in model 5.

[26]It is with fear and trembling that anyone can claim to possess any of the conversions. Perhaps it

semester of the two-semester course when students were presenting pastoral fieldwork reports. The alertness I hope I have to my own intellectual and volitional functioning helped me be alert to what was going on in my students. In some respects, it was not so important what conclusions the students arrived at in their fieldwork reports. What was important was that they became schooled in the careful use of their critical and normative capacities by using this method.

If I think of the first semester of this course, I think of how being psychically converted was important. As I pointed out in the example above from parish life, psychic conversion can help one recognize resistance in a group to the good ideas that they need to accept. When I started to teach this course I adopted a lecture style for most of the time. However, with time I learnt to recognize and be patient with resistance in class members to the ideas I was proposing. I opted for a strategy of offering less content and more persuasion. I have already offered one example of this above in my account of how I offered a second model of ecclesiological reflection to students who preferred this option. Similarly, I learnt to appreciate the value of adult education methods for teaching theology. These methods invite the participation of students in learning as much as is possible. I became convinced that this was the most effective way of ensuring that they accept the insights that I hoped they would.[27]

SECTION 3
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR AFRICAN THEOLOGY

Before finishing my account of pastoral theology in this article, I want to recall my

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it is better to claim that one is at least approaching them asymptotically and that progress is always unstable – i.e., it can be reversed. Nevertheless, it is a false humility to deny that one has made progress in these matters or to refuse to try to help others from this basis.

[27]Thomas Groome has written much on the importance of adult education methods in theological education. See *Christian Religious Education: Sharing Our Story and Vision* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999). Groome stresses that pastoral agents who have been formed, intellectually and otherwise, in a manner that stresses participatory method can be expected to employ participatory methods of community building when in ministry. I find these points to be will taken in Groome. This having been said, Groome uses the term praxis in terms of this kind of participatory educational process. This is a rather narrow application of the term and in my opinion runs the risk giving the term praxis a narrow focus limited to efforts to build community within Christian institutions. It needs to make sure it is not neglecting the praxis that begins with self-appropriation and passes through an analysis of progress, decline and society – and not least on the level of culture – on the way to being socially transformative.

my comments in Section 1 about how both pastoral theology and public theology perform a feedback function to the other (seven) more specialized functional specialties in theology. Over the course of nine years I directed about three hundred pastoral fieldwork experiences of students at Hekima College, Nairobi. For six of these years I was also pastor of a poor urban parish in the same city. So it was that I was experiencing praxis directly in my parish and hearing much about praxis in a variety of countries and kinds of ministries through my students. These experiences of praxis have given me some thoughts about questions that need to be addressed by the entire project of theology as it is done in Africa. I briefly outline these thoughts in this final section of this paper. I do this mostly just to indicate the yet wider significance of a theological method based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran. I do this, as is my option in this paper, in a manner that relies on a reporting of personal experience.

Modernization and African Theology

In previous sections, I have stressed the importance of differentiating culture from social structures. I believe that this brings us to the heart of historical consciousness and a new understanding for theology. In my opinion, an enormous task lies ahead for African theologians. There is need to help transpose traditional African cultural values into a new modern context. The manner in which African primal cultures were confronted with the technically sophisticated society and culture of the imperial countries of Europe is the central historical event of Africa in the last one hundred and fifty years. The manner in which this confrontation has occurred has produced profound disarray in Africa. The intellectually converted observer will be alert to the role that cultural confusion has played in this process and not only oppression at the level of social structures. Similarly, the intellectually and psychically converted individual will recognize that there needs to be the construction of a new cultural superstructure in Africa that is truly something new.

I now offer an example of how I gained insight during my teaching of pastoral theology into these wider challenges for Africa theology.

Culture and Family Life

A social structure that is always foundational to culture is the family. While family life itself is a social structure, reflecting about how it and how it should be lived is a matter of culture. I have become convinced that family life in Africa is in crisis and that this in turn is part of a larger crisis of culture in the continent. During

During our pastoral theology course we used to invite another Jesuit staff member at our college who teaches moral theology. This theologian, Fr. Aqualine Tarimo SJ, is from Tanzania and has written on family life. One of his proposals is that the African model of extended family needs to evolve and begin to resemble more the nuclear family of countries of the industrialized North.[28]

Tarimo argues that the extended family was in part developed because of its functionality in a subsistence agricultural society. In African societies that are modern, and increasingly urban, African models of family need to evolve. Studying the economic aspects of this, Tarimo asserts that retaining the old model of family especially inhibits middle class Africans from saving money and investing in ways that lead to economic growth. Instead, middle class income is immediately spent on poor relatives. At a more moral level, Tarimo speaks of a phenomenon of "parasitism" that can develop when poorer relatives take advantage of the sense of obligation of more well-off relatives. Finally, Tarimo insists that, in fact, radical change is occurring anyway in the manner in which African live out family life. However, these changes are often occurring accidentally without moral choice directing them. Results can be that there are more broken family relationships, single mothers etc. than might be. Tarimo concludes that African intellectuals, and not least theologians, must lead the way in altering the ideas and values that constitute the common sense of their culture.

As one can imagine, Tarimo's argument is a provocative one. In class discussions, Tarimo's proposal was inevitably a highly controversial and provoked charged discussion. Most, but not all, students disagreed with Tarimo. A point to note is that however much some might disagree with Tarimo's suggestion, most agreed that the African family is in crisis. They agreed that this is an issue of culture and needs to be addressed as an aspect of prophetic ministry. My own opinion on the particulars of the debate is that, while acknowledging that I am a foreigner, I tend to agree with Tarimo.

I suspect that resistance to Tarimo's suggestion stems from a lack of intellectual and psychic conversion. Many African's consider the traditional model of family to be an absolute of African identity. At the same time, fewer and fewer Africans are actually living it. What results is that they live by a myth that nothing has changed in family life and then privately feel shame that they can do so little to support their rural cousins, or that they cannot raise the money to pay a dowry, or that they cannot offer the education they would wish to their own children, and so

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[28]Aquiline Tarimo SJ, in *Applied Ethics and Africa's Social Reconstruction* (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2003).

children, and so forth. A related point here is that in cosmological culture the reproduction of life and a notion of "life-force" is usually the central value. Criticizing the African family can seem to challenge the center of some individual's life. What is needed here is a balancing of a cosmological notion of culture with an anthropological notion. In a more balanced state of dialectic, one could feel more at ease with evolution occurring in one's cultural ideas and values.

So it is that I agree with the argument of Tarimo concerning the task of intellectuals in general and theologians in general. In the realm of theology, I would stress that this task requires the attention not just of practical theologians but perhaps all of the functional specialties of theology as they are performed in Africa. I note that Tarimo has arrived at this position from a perspective of moral theology. A related point here is that Christianity seeks to evangelize culture and this has always involved having an impact on moral norms. In Africa, as in the early Church as it departed from Jewish customs, Christianity has challenged the practice of polygamy.

Theologies of Reconstruction

A final point, here, is that a good deal of what Tarimo proposes is already happening both in broader African intellectual life and within theology. The intellectual currents of "African Renaissance" characterize the broader phenomenon and a related "Theology of Reconstruction" characterizes a theological take-up of related themes. Example of such theology include, J.N.K. Mugambi's *From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Christian Theology after the Cold War*. Within this book, Mugambi actually makes mention of the need for deeper foundational thinking in African theology and makes mention of the thought of Bernard Lonergan as possibly providing this.[29] This, of course, is my own hope for African theology and, in fact for theology elsewhere also. Thus, with Robert Doran, I would want to stress what needs "reconstructing" in Africa – and in fact in all cultures – is the integrity of the scale of values. I find in the following quotation much that could guide the future of theologies of reconstruction in Africa.

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[29]J.N.K. Mugambi *From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Christian Theology after the Cold War* (Nairobi: East African Education Publishers, 1998). An internet search using key words "African Renaissance" and "Theology of Reconstruction" will provide a wealth of further references.

> There are relations of mutual conditioning. Thus while people cannot devote their energies to creating and maintaining a social order if they are starving, conversely the effective and equitable distribution of vital goods to the whole community is a function of the integrity of the social order. Again, while culture rises on the base of social institutions, the integrity of the institutions is a function of the integrity of the meanings and values that inform them. Again, personal integrity emerges in the context of cultural traditions, but cultural integrity is impossible without persons of integrity to promote it. Again, too, the religious development of the person perfects natural endowment, but even that natural endowment is incapable of sustained development without grace.[30]

CONCLUSION

In this article I have tried to demonstrate the practicality of basing pastoral theology on the theology of history of Robert Doran. I started with a rapid run-through of this theology. I next proceed to outline and discuss in some detail how I use the categories provided by Doran in teaching a course where students are invited to reflect on an experience of pastoral ministry. Along the way, I offer distinctions between practical theology, public theology, and pastoral theology. I also try to indicate how this theology of history can open up a prospect of deepening efforts already underway to develop an African theology. Of course, I have been proposing a methodology that is in fact transcultural. What I have discussed with respect to theology in Africa is equally applicable to theology everywhere.

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[30]Doran, 98-99.

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THE ADOLESCENT AND THE USE OF THE PHILOSOPHER LONERGAN'S QUESTIONS

Phyllis Wallbank
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THE REALLY TROUBLESOME adolescent is, we are told, a product of Western society; it does not occur in the same lasting way in the East. I think that the similarities and differences are shown in that wonderful passage in St. Luke's Gospel about the newly adolescent boy Jesus. I hope to show how Lonergan's questioning alertness can be a great help at this stage of development. I shall also show the difference in that environment that hinders the adaptation to society in the West.

St. Luke's Gospel presents Jesus being brought up as a faithful Jewish boy raised in the traditions of Israel. Here is the passage with parts I want to draw particular attention to because they are so humanly adolescent, shown in upper case letters (Jerusalem Bible translation).

> Each year his parents went to Jerusalem for the feast of the Passover, and when he was 12 YEARS OLD, they went up according to festival custom.

Passover was the most important feast of the year for the Jews, when they gathered together in Jerusalem. The normal population of the city would be about 40,000, but at the Passover, with the influx of all the pilgrims, it was about 150,000. It would be easy to disappear in the crowds. People from Nazareth traveled all together in a large party, walking all the way to Jerusalem. The journey from Nazareth to Jerusalem would be over 60 miles, and they would walk together along the trade route.

> After they had completed its days, as they were returning, the boy Jesus remained behind in Jerusalem, but his parents DID NOT KNOW IT.

Here we have the sudden change of behavior of the adolescent, when the thought young child suddenly changes and doesn't think of the parents' worry, but only of his own strong urges to be with his "mates" and satisfy his own urges without emotional pressure, and begins to find his own uniqueness and who he really is."

> Thinking he was in the caravan, they journeyed for a day and looked for him among their relatives and acquaintances, but not finding him they returned to Jerusalem to look for him. AFTER THREE DAYS they found him in the Temple.

He would not have been allowed to be in the Temple all that time, and this is the time when the adolescent sees out the company of his mates. Then when the elders were in the Temple being asked questions, this is when the remarkable understanding of Jesus was apparent.

> Sitting in the midst of his teachers, he was LISTENING to them and ASKING THEM QUESTIONS. And all who heard him were astonished at his understanding and his answers."

He knew the Scriptures so well. He will have been taken to the synagogue regularly by St. Joseph, as it was the fathers who had to take the boys to learn the Scriptures. Today, we mostly leave the teaching of the Scriptures to the mother, while the father helps the boy's interest in sporting activities. There is therefore a lack now of a "control of error" or the pricking of the father's own conscience, that would occur when teaching his boy the way to love God and to serve him.

We now know that the mother cannot fully ever take the place of the father because there are big differences in the brain structure and brain function between men and women. Did you know that by the sixth week in the embryo the male brain is already different from the female?

The adolescent boy Jesus was already asking questions. This is the time that adolescents have to ask questions and find out for themselves what they really believe and who they really are in their own uniqueness.

In our first few years of life we absorb completely, like a sponge, our environment so that by the time we are three we already have the characteristics of a little African or American or Indian or the nationality of our environment, and the characteristics of the adults caring for us. We take in these traditions, these beliefs, and this behavior. The frontal lobes of the brain at this time have more cells than at any other time. The language is absorbed as a whole whereas in later years languages have to be learned by conscious effort and by another part of the main brain.

Gray matter is the name given to masses of brain cells because they appear gray in MRI scans. White matter is the name given to the masses of axons owing to their white sheath. The gray matter begins thinning and dying ff by about five years. However, we retain in our memory much of what he have learned during this time. The teenage brain's frontal lobes, where higher judgment, planning, and reasoning are dealt with, do not mature completely until the age of twenty. This is why teenagers under estimate their vulnerability when risk-taking. Our teenagers' brains are in a state of change and that directs their change in behavior until the brain is mature.

This is the time for Lonergan because during the early absorbent mind period, the child will have taken in things that go against his understanding now and also some traditions may run counter to life today. He needs now to be shown how to be attentive to certain aspects that he may suspect are based on superstition or that are no longer relevant. He should pick one such action and be ATTENTIVE to it. He should use his intelligence and trace the history of this action. He should use his INTELLIGENCE to judge its importance and relevance to his life today. He must be REASONABLE in his judgment, and if action is called for he should act RESPONSIBLY.

I read recently this story:

> There was a newly married young woman and she was going to bake a ham. She cut off either end and then put it in the oven. Her husband said, "Why do you have to cut off the end?" She replied, "I don't know but my mother always did." The next time she was at her mother's she asked her why she cut off both ends. She replied that she did this because her mother always did this. So when she

> went to see granny, she asked her. The grandmother replied, "I cut the ends off because my pot wasn't big enough!"

There is a very serious side to finding out their own uniqueness because as they find it truly and who they are Lonergan adds a fifth characteristic "to be in love" and this is because in the affirmation of our uniqueness we touch God who made us. We are so unique that our DNA is already unique at the time of conception. In this way they are led to God and feel affirmed.

To go back to the Gospel account:

> When his parents saw him they were ASTONISHED, and his mother said to him, "SON why have you this TO US? Your father and I have been looking for you with GREAT ANXIETY."

The teen brain is so different that when pictures are placed in front of them that show fear or anxiety, the teenager cannot recognize the emotions, which they could recognize at an earlier age and will be able to again later. Like so many mothers of suddenly thoughtless adolescents, Mary was angry at his behavior that had not taken their anxiety into account.

And he said to them:

> "Why were you looking for me? Did you not know that I MUST BE IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE?" But THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND what he said to them.

Now comes the main difference between East and West:

> He went down WITH THEM and came to Nazareth.

In the East, most young adolescents have to work and so stay at this age within society. Here in the West we separate our teenagers and shut them away from society, in a building with their own age group for many years, keeping them for hours each day away from other age groups. In the evening we separate them again, often with hours of homework so that there is little time for hobbies or mixing with other ages. So they adapt to each other at the

stage when nature made them able to adapt to society and to become part of it. Our poor children can only adapt to each other as teenagers and satisfy the natural urge to adapt by making gangs with rules and regulations. It is because of the Industrial Revolution when the factory owners shut up their parents for so many hours that they gave the buildings to shut up the children. We have continued generally to do this in the West.

So as was the custom, the adolescent Jesus returned with them and took his place in their home.

AND WAS OBEDIENT UNTO THEM; and his mother kept all these things IN HER HEART.

Women tend to link emotion with their thoughts. They think over many things. When a man is told when under an MRI scan to think of something very said, one small area on its own lights up, but when a woman is asked to do this, a great amount of her brain lights up and is interconnected.

Now Our Lord had begun to realize his own identity and waited for his time.

AND JESUS ADVANCED IN WISDOM AND AGE AND FOUND FAVOR WITH GOD.

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