UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN

Institut Supérieur de Philosophie

# THE NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY

# IN EDMUND HUSSERL AND BERNARD LONERGAN

by

William F. J. Ryan, S. J.

Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy

1971

UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN

Institut Supérieur de Philosophie

# THE NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY

# IN EDMUND HUSSERL AND BERNARD LONERGAN

by

William F. J. Ryan, S. J.

Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy

1971

To the memory of my father,

who knew and gave the unique solution : _solvitur ambulando_.

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The punctilio dictated by the code for crediting sources in a work like this is as simple as it is comprehensive : every source is to be acknowledged.  It would be unthinkable to pick and choose one's credits such that only a handful would appear in the notes and bibliography.  There are other sources, however, which are not intended by this code but which are for all that no less real and indispensable.  These are all the people who have helped to bring this work to completion, and I must acknowledge their support and friendship with gratitude.

I find it strange in a certain way that I cannot thank here by name these many persons and spell out my gratitude.  In ways too pervasive often to take note of, yet too numerous to pass over, they have extended their continuous help.  But another code prescribes that only a limited number of them may be mentioned.

There is, then, a group of persons, the list of whose names makes up a kind of special litany, to whom I wish to express my profound thanks :

to Professor Bernard Lonergan of Regis College, Toronto, and Harvard University, whose professional interest in questions included the kindness and readiness to answer many that I asked him ;

to Professor Herman Van Breda, O.F.M., Director of the Husserl Archives, Louvain, for making available the wealth of this center of research ;

to Professor Rudolf Boehm of the University of Ghent and formerly of the Husserl Archives, for putting his great knowledge of Husserl at my disposal and for his constant support to undertake this study ;

to Professor Frederick Crowe, S.J., of Regis College, Toronto, Director of the Centre for Lonergan Studies there, for

CONTENTS

PART III : CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

## CONCERNING CITATIONS OF HUSSERL'S WORKS

1. Where there exists an English translation of a work by
   Husserl, the English title will be used (e.g., Cartesian
   Meditations). Where there is only the German original, the
   German title will be given (e.g., Erfahrung und Urteil).

2. In the case where there is not a published English translation
   of a work of Husserl, the translations of texts are the
   present writer's ; the original German will be found in the
   notes.

3. If a published English translation is modified, this will
   be indicated in the notes ; the original German will likewise
   be given in the notes.

4. With regard to references to Husserl's works : if there
   exists a published English translation, the first page numbers
   given are those of the English translation : the page numbers
   given in brackets are those of the German edition. If
   there is no published English translation, then the numbers
   refer to the pages of the German edition.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

## I. HUSSERL'S WORKS

APS — Analysen zur passiven Synthesis.

CM — Cartesian Meditations.
Cartesianische Meditationen.

EP — Erste Philosophie (designated as EP, I, and EP, II).

EU — Erfahrung und Urteil.

FTL — Formal and Transcendental Logic.
Formale und transzendentale Logik.

FUG — "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-
historisches Problem" (page numbers according to the
edition of Die Krisis).

IdI — Ideas
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie, Erstes Buch.

IdII — Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie, Zweites Buch.

IdIII— Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie, Drittes Buch.

IP — The Idea of Phenomenology.
Die Idee der Phänomenologie.

LU — Logical Investigations (designated as LU, I, or LU, II).
Logische Untersuchungen (designated as LU, I ; LU, II/1 ;
or LU, II/2).

N — "Author's Preface to the English Edition" of Ideas (page
numbers according to the edition of Ideas).
"Nachwort" zu den Ideen I (page numbers according to the
edition of Ideen III).

PA — Philosophie der Arithmetik.

PSW — Philosophy as Rigorous Science (page numbers as found in
Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy).
Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft.

PV — The Paris Lectures.
Die Pariser Vorträge (page numbers according to the
edition of Cartesianische Meditationen).

K — Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phänomenologie.

KEM — "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" (page numbers
as found in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Pheno-
menology).
"Die Krisis der europäischen Menschentums und die Philo-
sophie" (page numbers according to the edition of
Die Krisis).

Z — The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.
Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.


## II. LONERGAN'S WORKS


BLR — "Bernard Lonergan Responds."

BTI — "Belief : Today's Issue."

C — Collection : Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (The follow-
ing works are listed according to their order in
Collection ; their pagination is that which is found
in Collection) :

FI — "The Form of Inference."

IT — "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought."

IPD — "Insight : Preface to a Discussion."

CSR — "Christ as Subject : A Reply."

ORE — "Openness and Religious Experience."

MH — "Metaphysics as Horizon."

CS — "Cognitional Structure."

EA — "Existenz and Aggionamento."

DM — "Dimensions of Meaning."

DD   - "The Dehellenization of Dogma."

DL   - "Dublin Lectures" (designated as DL, I-VI).

DP   - Doctrinal Pluralism.

E    - "Notes on Existentialism."

FS   - "Functional Specialties."

FC   - "The Future of Christianity."

GF   - Grace and Freedom.

In   - Insight.

NKG  - "Natural Knowledge of God."

OCR  - "Origins of Christian Realism."

R    - "Response."

S    - The Subject.

SS   - "Schematic Supplement."

TMF  - "Theology and Man's Future."

V    - Verbum : Word and Idea in Aquinas.


## III. OTHER WORKS


ABL  - The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan.

HOR  - "Horizon, Objectivity and Reality in the Physical Sciences."

QMO  - Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity.

# INTRODUCTION

## I.

What would be the reasons for a comparison of Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan ? One reason might be to establish the influence of Husserl upon Lonergan. Another might be to measure their discipleship against the teachings of a common master. However, there is no direct influence of Husserl upon Lonergan, say, in the manner of Brentano upon Husserl. Nor is there a common master whom both might acknowledge. And yet, Husserl and Lonergan are contemporaries who share a common problematic, primal to both of their philosophic enterprises : the structure of human knowing.[1]

Individual points of similarity and contrast between them can be checked off : Life-world and common sense ; Epoche and self-appropriation ; _Erlebnis_ and consciousness. But a more

---

1. For an article in which a comparison of Husserl and Lonergan is found, see Jean-Marie Laporte, S.J., "Husserl's Critique of Descartes," in _Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_, 23 (1962-1963), 335-352. There is a misinterpretation of Husserl's notion of intuition based partially on Lonergan's own incomplete account of the notion. On this crucial point of intuition in Husserl, see the Prenote to Part III of this work. For a more adequate comparison-confrontation of Husserl and Lonergan--though it is really a sketch--see Patrick Heelan's HOR, especially pp. 389-390, n. 24. However, see the reservations expressed in Chap. XIII, n. 4, of this present work.

general and more comprehensive notion can be chosen, and then
the individual points fall into perspective. In this work we
will take the problem of objectivity, a major theme in both
Husserl and Lonergan, as the heading under which to set out
their comparison-contrast.

Our goal in comparing and contrasting Husserl and Lonergan
is not to establish some sort of all-inclusive superiority of
the one over the other. Rather, our goal is to take one aspect
of the objectivity problematic and make it the recurrent theme
for the investigation so that an exchange between Husserl and
Lonergan can emerge and develop on the basis of this theme.
Other elements of their cognitional theory, such as the pairs
mentioned above (Life-world and common sense, etc.), will be
examined with this theme always in view.

Husserl's credentials as a philosopher are universally
known. It would be useful, however, to draw up an academic
résumé for Lonergan. His teaching career, and the type and
limited number of his writings up until around 1967 are such
that he would be known only to specialists in dogmatic theology,
although the publication of Insight in 1957 revealed his remark-
able ability in philosophical speculation.[2]

Lonergan, in answer to a question about his prior "allegiance
to neo-Thomism," has provided a sketch of his philosophical
development :

---

2. At the time of Insight's appearance, Andrew J. Reck ("Insight
   and the Eros of the Mind," in Review of Metaphysics, 12
   [1958] , 107) compared it to Hegel's The Phenomenology of
   Mind. And a reviewer (W.S.S.) in The Personalist 39 [1958] ,
   280) remarked : "I regard this work as among the finest
   philosophical efforts of our current century, and perhaps of
   a much longer period than that."

... it is true that I spent a great deal of time in the study of St. Thomas and that I know I owe a great deal to him. I just add, however, that my interest in Aquinas came late. As a student in the philosophy course at Heythrop College [Jesuit seminary near Oxford] in the twenties, I shared the common view that held the manuals in little esteem, though I read J.B.W. Joseph's Introduction to Logic with great care and went through the main parts of Newman's Grammar of Assent six times. In the early thirties I began to delight in Plato, especially the early dialogues, and then went on to the early writings of Augustine.... Finally, it was in the forties that I began to study Aquinas on cognitional theory and as soon as the Verbum articles were completed (Theological Studies, 1946-49), I began to write Insight.[3]

We can go on and fill out the sketch.[4]    Bernard Lonergan was born in Buckingham (Quebec), Canada on December 17, 1904. In 1930 he took the "General Degree" in the humanities at the University of London. In 1940 he completed his doctorate in theology at the Gregorian University with a dissertation on Aquinas' theory of grace. The main part of it was published in four articles in Theological Studies (1941-1942) under the title of "St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans " (re-edited in book form in 1971 as Grace and Freedom). Then came the Verbum articles (1946-1949 ; re-edited in book form in 1967). Then in 1957 he published Insight : A Study of Human Understanding. His

---

3. R, 257.

4. Two other sources for Lonergan's biography (and for good overviews of his enterprise) are : 1) Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., "The Exigent Mind ; Bernard Lonergan's Intellectualism," in Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., in Continuum, 2 (1964), 16-33. (This is the Lonergan Festschrift.) 2) F.E. Crowe, S.J., "introduction" to Collection : Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. F.E. Crowe, S.J. (New York : Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. vii-xxxv. The best overall interpretation of Lonergan is ABL.

His sixtieth birthday in 1964 was the occasion of a Festschrift
published in a special issue of Continuum. The republication
of fifteen papers and the first publication of a lecture
appeared in the book, Collection : Papers of Bernard Lonergan,
S.J. in 1967. Since then Lonergan has published articles
and lectures for different occasions at various academic centers
in the United States, such as the important The Subject, the
Aquinas Lecture for 1968 at Marquette University. In 1971
archives named the "Centre for Lonergan Studies" were opened
at Regis College, Toronto.

Lonergan's professorial career has been split between
his native Canada and Rome. From 1940-1953 he was professor of
dogmatic theology in the Jesuit theologates of Montreal (L'Imma-
culée Conception, 1940-1947) and Toronto (Regis College, 1947-
1953). Then from 1953-1965 he was professor of dogmatic theology
at the Gregorian University. Since 1965 he has returned to
Regis College (now a member of the newly formed Toronto School of
Theology) where he is research professor of dogmatic theology.
In 1970 the International Lonergan Congress was held at Tampa
where Lonergan met with about 70 "Lonergan Experts" and "Critical
Respondents" to discuss his thought.[5] In the same year the
Canadian government awarded him its highest honor, naming him a
Companian of the Order of Canada. And to bring his biography
up to date, he has been named the Stillman Guest Professor at
Harvard University for 1971-1972.

Lonergan is not a neo-Thomist in the sense that he is a
disciple of Gilson or Maritain.[6] Nor is he a student or a

5. See John Navone, S.J., "Ongoing Collaboration : The First
   International Lonergan Congress," in Gregorianum, 51 (1970),
   541-560 ; W.F.J. Ryan, S.J., "Le premier 'International
   Lonergan Congress,'" in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 68
   (1970), 260-262.

6. See, for example, the reviews of Insight by James Collins in
   Thought, 32 (1957), 445-446 and Cornelius Fay, in The New
   Scholasticism, 34 (1960), 461-487.

disciple of Maréchal, though his notion of unrestricted question-
ing bears a strong family resemblance to Maréchal's notion of
the dynamism of the human mind.[7]  But if one wished to identify
perhaps the single most important influence for his cognitional
theory, one would find that it was Newman and his An Essay in
Aid of a Grammar of Assent.[8]  And though Newman is never directly
quoted or mentioned in Lonergan's main work, Insight, his notion
of assent is frequently recalled by the manner in which Lonergan
discusses affirmation, and it once emerges clearly in a direct
reference to Newman's celebrated example about Great Britain's
being an island.[9]

The pairing of Newman and Lonergan contrasted with the
pairing of Descartes and Husserl could be used to throw light
on the overall strategies of Lonergan and Husserl.  Newman and
Lonergan start from assent ; Descartes and Husserl suspend assent.
Then one might ask how, or whether, Lonergan and Husserl ever

---

7. See Leslie Dewart, Appendix 2, "On Transcendental Thomism,"
   in The Foundations of Belief (London : Burns & Oates/Herder
   and Herder, 1969), pp. 449-522 ; and Otto Muck, S.J., The
   Transcendental Method, trans. William D. Seidensicker (New
   York : Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 255-284.  Both of these
   authors tend to overemphasize Lonergan's relationship to
   Maréchal.  Lonergan himself says that he learned much about
   Maréchal "by osmosis" through conversations with a former
   student of Maréchal (see Crowe's "Introduction" to Collection,
   p. xi).  See ABL, 28-29, n. 5 ; and Joseph Donceel, S.J.,
   "On Transcendental Thomism," in Continuum, 7 (1969), 164-168.

8. See C.S. Dessain, "Cardinal Newman and Bernard J.F. Lonergan,
   S.J.," a paper presented at "Ongoing Collaboration : The
   First International Lonergan Congress," 1970.  This paper will
   be published in one of the forthcoming volumes containing
   papers presented at the Congress.  Volume I has been published
   as Foundations of Theology, ed. Philip McShane, S.J. (Dublin :
   Gill and Macmillan, 1971).

9. In, 706.

rejoin each other.

At first blush it might appear that Lonergan's long years as a seminary professor of theology might have kept him shunted off to the side, apart from the major philosophical issues of his contemporaries. The scope of the 1970 Lonergan Congress, however, as manifested in the polymath nature of the topics examined and the diversity of the participants, testifies to Lonergan's importance.

Among the participants were Thomas Altizer, Elizabeth Anscombe, Carl Braaten, Emerich Coreth, Charles Davis, Leslie Dewart, Louis Dupré, Manfred Frings, Langdon Gilkey, George Lindbeck, John Macquarrie, J. Alfred Martin, Senator Eugene McCarthy, Michael Novak, Schubert Ogden, Heinrich Ott, Karl Rahner, William Richardson, and James M. Robinson.

A considerable number of papers were presented in which Lonergan was discussed in connexion with another philosopher.[10]

---

10. Some of these contributions are : Donald H. Johnson, "Rational Evolution of Apocalyptic Vision : A Critique of Lonergan from the Standpoint of Norman O. Brown" ; Robert O. Johann, "Lonergan and Dewey on Judgment" ; Matthew L. Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-Methodology" ; Frederick Lawrence, "Self-Knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan" ; M. Regnier, "Lonergan and Hegel" ; William Richardson, "Being for Lonergan : A Heideggerian View" ; William F.J. Ryan, "Intentionality in Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan : The Perspectives of Intuition-Constitution and Affirmation" ; Giovanni Sala, "The Apriori in Human Knowledge according to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight" ; Vincent Potter, "C. S. Peirce and Lonergan" ; David M. Rasmussen, "From Problematics to Hermeneutics : Ricoeur and Lonergan" ; Manfred S. Frings, "Insight, Λόγος, Love (Lonergan, Heidegger, Scheler)" ; Christopher Mooney, "Lonergan and Teilhard de Chardin : Common Concerns" ; Schubert M. Ogden, "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle" (Lonergan and Whitehead).

The number of these papers, as well as the stature of the philosophers involved in the comparison, lend further weight to the conviction that Lonergan is a philosopher whose thought can help to enlighten some of the perennial problems that vex all philosophers.

## II.

The thesis of this work might be stated in this manner : there is an ambiguity in Husserl's notion of objectivity arising from the unresolved conflict between sense perception (especially seeing) as the normative _act_ in knowing and his notion of categorial objectivity as the normative _object_. This conflict exists because Husserl does not have an explicitly recognized operator that promotes cognition from sensation to categorial activity, though he does have an implicit operator. As for Lonergan, his notion of objectivity rests upon the capital role of the explicitly recognized operator, questioning.

The theme of this work, then, is : objectivity and the operator-like element in intentionality. The term "operator" is Lonergan's which he borrows from mathematics. In using this term, we may seem to tip our hand. It may seem that we have taken a notion of Lonergan, foreign, or at least marginal, to Husserl's thinking and made it a norm by which Husserl is to be judged.

However, the use of a particular term is evidently of minor importance. On the other hand, the notion of operator, as we will undertake to show, is neither foreign, nor merely marginal, to Husserl's conception of objectivity. In Lonergan the notion is front center ; in Husserl it is present without being explicitly singled out. Above we posed the question, not just rhetorical, how and whether Husserl and Lonergan ever rejoin each other. The answer is that they do, and here is the meeting-ground.

## III.

With respect to the works of Husserl that we will make use
of : the works for the basis of the comparison-confrontation are
those after the transcendental turn in his phenomenology, that is
to say, the post-Ideas (1913) works.  In the main these are
Logical Investigations, Investigation VI (1921 version),
Erfahrung und Urteil, Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcen-
dental Logic, and Die Krisis (with "Philosophy and the Crisis
of European Man" and "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie
als intentionalisches Problem").  Erste Philosophie, Analysen zur
passiven Synthesis, and several manuscripts of the Krisis period
have also been consulted.  But the matter is not entirely simple.
For, very briefly, it can be said that Husserl adopts certain
views in Logical Investigations, The Idea of Phenomenology, and
Ideas I which he never abandons.  Consequently we have brought
in some of these views for the exposition of his thought.[11]

With respect to Lonergan : his historical works "Gratia
Operans" (Grace and Freedom) and Verbum have been used minimally.
"Gratia Operans," though consulted, is not directly cited.  Verbum
is cited as a direct source several times, but only insofar as it
represents Lonergan's thinking and not his interpretation of
Aquinas.  Nor have any of his abundant Latin theology notes
been cited directly, except once concerning the absolute objecti-
vity of the judgment.

For our study of Lonergan the main sources are Insight, "Cogni-
tional Structure," "Metaphysics as Horizon," and The Subject.
Insight is the basic text.  "Cognitional Structure" offers
precisions on objectivity and consciousness ; "Metaphysics as
Horizon" on horizon and the subjective pole of questioning ;

---

11. LU : the characteristics of the constituted ideal object ;
    IP : the basis for the distinction of immanence and transcen-
    dence ; IdI : intuition, the "Principle of Principles."

*The Subject* on the self-transcendence of the subject.  With its
785 pages, twenty chapters, and Epilogue, *Insight* is to
Lonergan's philosophical oeuvre, in a way, what *Die Krisis*,
together with *Erfahrung und Urteil*, *Formal and Transcendental
Logic*, and *Cartesian Meditations*, is to Husserl's.

This work is divided into three Parts.  Part I contains six
expository chapters on the essential elements of Husserl's notion
of objectivity : the Epoche and Ego ; intentionality ; Husserl's
vocabulary : the general notion of objectivity ; the types of
objectivity ; and intuition.  Part II contains six expository
chapters on Lonergan : the polymorphism of knowing and self-affir-
mation ; unrestricted questioning (intentionality) ; Lonergan's
vocabulary ; the principal notion of objectivity ; aspects of
objectivity ; and affirmation.

Then comes a brief prenote to Part III, entitled "Orientation
and Focus," which sounds the leitmotiv again : the operator,
implicit and explicit, and its relationship to objectivity.
Part III follows with its six chapters where Parts I and II are
paired off chapter by chapter.  The role of the operator is
constantly recalled.  The function of Part III is to serve as a
kind of Rosetta stone where points of similarity and contrast
between Husserl and Lonergan can be read off.

This work has been written with the conviction that there
exists a wide area of fundamental accord where Husserl and
Lonergan can meet for an exchange of ideas on the major problems
of their philosophies, and of philosophy itself.  Within that
area we have wished to mark off a meeting-ground.

The problem of objectivity has been chosen in this work to
be that meeting-ground.  It is such a key position that from it
many of the main features of the wide area can be surveyed.  If
there is a feeling that a bridge has to be built so that
Husserl and Lonergan, together with the people interested in
their thought, can come together within that meeting-ground (which
is itself within that wide area), one can hope that it is a
permanent bridge and not merely a drawbridge.

PART I

THE NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY IN EDMUND HUSSERL

"... the following must, as it were, be hammered in :
Cognition is primarily intuition."

(Heidegger : Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics)

CHAPTER  I

EPOCHE AND EGO

## I.  Cession : Epoche and the Natural Attitude

Traditionally philosophers bring the message first and primarily to themselves, and then to others, that all is not simple with human knowing.  From the programme of Socrates in quest of wisdom to the parody of Gilbert and Sullivan, "Things are seldom what they seem," or the television comedian's jest, "Why is there air ?" in high earnestness or high fun, the philosopher appears as the man who is asking obvious or impertinent questions.

Plato, and Aristotle after him, state that the beginning of philosophy and science is a basic puzzlement about things.[1] Martin Heidegger queries relentlessly, "Why is there something

---

1. Plato, Theaetetus, 155D ; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b11-22. But there is a counter-opinion in Greek philosophy to Plato and Aristotle.  Pythagoras (Plutarch, De recta rat., 13) prescribes the absence of wonderment as the quintessence of his philosophy ; the stoics judge as their highest goal never to lose their composure.  With the bidding, nihil admirari, Cicero (Tusc. Disp., III, 14 ; De Fin., V, 29) and Horace (Epp., I, 6) echo their agreement.  For this counter-opinion of repressing wonderment, see Bruno Snell, The Discovery of Mind : The Greek Origins of European Thought, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Torchbook (New York : Harper & Row, 1960 , p. 42 ; and n. 11, p. 42.

rather than nothing ?"[2]   And Edmund Husserl's Epoche is the
ever poised wondering of the "Detached Observer" directed
upon what we ordinarily take without questioning, or without
enough questioning.[3]

Husserl, though claiming that philosophy really only
begins with phenomenology, would still subscribe to the
traditional view that the philosopher's task is to interpellate
human knowing and its claims to validity.[4]   Phenomenology
takes up the goal of traditional philosophy : to understand
reality, to understand our knowing and what we know.  Husserl
has his own starting point and set of questions, but his aim
is to investigate the subject-object relation that constitutes
human knowing.  One of the main and enduring problems of philo-
sophy is Husserl's also.  That problem is the objectivity of
human knowing.

_____

2. Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics," trans. R.F.C. Hull
   and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being (collection of four
   essays of Heidegger), ed. Stefan Schimanski and Werner
   Brock, Gateway Edition, 4th ed. (Chicago : Henry Regnery,
   Co., 1965), pp. 325-361 ; An Introduction to Metaphysics,
   trans. Ralph Manheim, Anchor Books (Garden City :
   Doubleday and Co., 1961), chap. 1.

3. For the relation of wonder (Erstaunen, Verwunderung, Wunder),
   the riddle (Rätsel) of cognition, and the Epoche in Husserl,
   see IP, 10 [ 12] , 29 [ 36-37] , 57 [ 72] , 59 [ 74]  ; IdI, 242
   [ 204] ; KEM, 168-173 [ 328-332] ; K, 12, 80, 100, 153, 162,
   168, 172, 183-184.  See also Eugen Fink, "Die phänomenolo-
   gische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kri-
   tik," in Studien zur Phänomenologie : 1930-1939 (The Hague :
   Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) pp. 101-106 ; 110-111, 116 (this
   is the celebrated article formally endorsed by Husserl : see
   "Vorwort von Edmund Husserl," pp. vii-viii, in this Studien) ;
   and Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,"
   in the same Studien, pp. 179-201 ; M. Merleau-Ponty, Pheno-
   menology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, 3rd, ed.
   (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. xiii-xiv ; Aron
   Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl." in Studies in
   Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston : Northwestern
   University Press, 1966), pp. 404-406.

4. See, for examle, IP, Lecture 1 ; PSW, 71-79 [ 7-13]  ; CM,
   §§1, 2, 64 ; all of KEM ; K, §§ 1-7.

In the preface to the Logical Investigations, his first major philosophical work, Husserl says that he feels compelled to make "critical reflections of a general nature on the essence of logic, and on the relationship, in particular, between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity [Objektivität] of the content known."[5] For Husserl, right from the beginning of his career as a philosopher, the main question is to search out the foundations of knowledge. "This question," declares Husserl, "coincides in essence, in main if not entirely, at least for its principal part, with the cardinal question of epistemology, that of the objectivity [Objektivität] of knowledge."[6] And then in Ideas (§86) he adds that the central viewpoint of phenomenology is "the constitution of the objectivities of consciousness."

Phenomenology's study of objectivity means, according to Husserl's conception, a quest for the ultimate sources of the validity of human cognition. It is a search for a methodology to attain a philosophy which, as a rigorous science, is grounded on unassailable evident principles discovered by intuition, and thus would be a "pure and absolute knowledge."[7]

---

5. LU, I, 42 [I,vii] (preface of 1st ed. retained in the 5th ed.).

6. LU, I [I] 56 [8] . The problematic of objectivity is also related to a period of profound soul-searching on Husserl's part in 1906, just before the lectures "On the Idea of Phenomenology" (see Walter Biemel's Einleitung to the German edition, pp. vii-viii, that quotes from Husserl's diary). The objectivity problematic is a "cardinal question," not only in the Logical Investigations, but also throughout Husserl's whole career. See Rudolf Boehm, Vom Gesischtspunkt der Phänomenologie (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), the Vorwort. It is worth remarking that the elements of the title of this work are taken directly from IdI, § 86 ("Die funktionellen Probleme").

7. PSW, 72 [8]; see also FTL,[3-4],9 ; II. Abschnitt, 7. Kapitel ; CM, §§5-6 ; K, 14, 16, 191, 260, 273, 275. For the development in Husserl's notions of science and evidence, which coincide with the advance from static constitution to genetic constitution, see Chapters II, IV-VI of this work ; see also Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), Chapters IV and V.

This quest for the ultimate origins of our knowing leads
Husserl back finally to the transcendental subject who
constitutes and guarantees objectivity.

The quest is announced in the quasi slogan, "zu den
Sachen."[8] This is not an invitation to renew some sort
of empiricism. It is the policy-statement to establish
the primacy of intuition and evidence to which Husserl
gives very specific meanings. Evidence is the giving of
something itself (Selbstgebung) in its presence in and
through an intuition. Intuition allows the evident object
to be the way it is. When something is seen in its full
presence, there is no possibility of denying such a presence.
Husserl states the all-comprehensive validating primacy
of intuition by calling it the " 'principle of all prin-
ciples.' "[9]

Intuition can be directed in two directions : either
upon the transcendent object or reflexively back upon it-
self. Reflexive intuition is the basis for the reduction
by which the transcendental subject reveals to himself his
intentional intuition-performance as his essential
structure. The reduction further reveals that, although
intentionality involves an unavoidable believing in the
objective world that is concomitant with intuition, there
is the possibility of a positing that obscures intuition.
This positing "is not believing but rather something that
contaminates belief" and intuition.[10] Husserl's aim is to

---

8. LU, I, 252 [II/1, 6]  ; II, 663 [II/1, v] ; PSW, 96-97
   [27] ; IdI, 83 [43] .

9. **Id1,** 223 [185] . Note that Husserl equates νοεῖν and
   "Sehen überhaupt als originär gebendes Bewusstsein"
   (IdI, 44 [German ed.] ).

10. Paul **Ricoeur,**"An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in
    Husserl : An Analysis of his Phenomenology, trans.
    Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston :
    Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 18.

disclose intuition in its purety and free it from any distorting and obscuring influences.[11]

But Husserl's phenomenology is not simply an interesting outlook that a person might adopt in an eclectic fashion without much ado. The phenomenological attitude is a necessary rupture with what Husserl calls **the natural attitude (**natürliche Einstellung**)** and its unreflective straight-forward positing of the objective world. The possession of the transcendental Ego is achieved and subsequently sustained, only through the cession of this natural attitude.[12]

Before taking up Husserl's conception of the transcendental subject, then, it would be helpful to consider briefly this natural attitude. Such a brief overview will help to show the direction of his argument and clarify its significance, since his starting point is the demonstration of its shortcomings, and even more, of its prevention of solving the problem of knowing.

As a prefatory note, the basic preconception of the natural attitude, appearing as the attitude does in diverse forms, might be pointed out. This is the unquestioned acceptance of the self-sufficiency of the world without adequately inspecting its ultimate origin from the constituting - intuition of the transcendental Ego.

---

11. See Paul Ricoeur, in the same "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," p. 18 : "The intuitionism at the base of the Husserlian epistemology is not destroyed by transcendental phenomenology. On the contrary, Husserl never ceases to deepen his philosophy of perception in the broad sense of a philosophy of seeing. Therefore, the natural thesis is something mixed with an undoubted belief and, what is more, one which is intuitive at its root. Hence, Husserl has a principle in view which is involved in believing without being believing and which contaminates the seeing without being this seeing itself, since the seeing will emerge in its authentic form from the phenomenological reduction."

12. IdI, Second Section, First and Fourth Chapters ; CM, § 8 ; K, §§ 39, 52-55, 71-73.

## A. The Natural Attitude and the Positing of the World

There is, first of all, what might be called the everyday natural attitude of ordinary living that is carried on with a minimum of reflexion. The person in the natural attitude, says Husserl, is "conscious of a world, spread out endlessly in space, and developing and having developed endlessly in time." [13] According to his different modes of sensation, he sees or hears objects in a spatial order. They are in his environment, and he can focus his attention upon one of them or an aspect of one, and then turn it to another. But whether or not he pays them any attention, they are present.

He is likewise aware of a temporal succession of events and things within a temporal horizon stretching out endlessly to the past and the future. He can project his attention to the future, concentrate it on the present, or turn it back upon the past. But whether he takes note of time or not, it too is there, continuing in its ordered sequence.

But "this world is not simply there... as a world of things, but in the same immediacy it is there as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world."[14] Things are not only endowed with material properties, but also value-characters. They present themselves as "tables" and "books," "beautiful" and "ugly," "friends" and

---

13. "... einer Welt bewusst, endlos ausgebreitet im Raum, endlos werdend und geworden in der Zeit." IdI, 57 ; trans. adapted from Gibson, p. 101.

14. "... ist diese Welt... nicht da als eine blosse Sachen-welt, sondern in derselben Unmittelbarkeit als Wertewelt, Güterwelt, praktische Welt." IdI, 59 ; trans. adapted from Gibson, p. 103.

"enemies."[15]

This world that is accessible, on principle, actually or virtually to everyone's immediate experience Husserl names the Life-world (Lebenswelt). Every moment of his life a personis aware of himself as inserted in this world and occupies himself in one way or another with all his fellow existents there.[16]

The Life-world is the background and all-encompassing context against which and in which all mundane things appear, stay, and vanish. It is continually present as the universal framework in which its co-ordinates of space and time locate all of a person's actual and possible activity.[17] "The pregiven world is the horizon that, flowing yet constant, engages all our goals, all our aims, whether fleeting or enduring, just as an intentional consciousness-horizon is already there beforehand, implicitly 'embracing.' "[18]

Besides this everyday type of natural attitude, there are two other mentalities, scientific and more sophisticated, which Husserl would consider as still belonging to the natural attitude. He ranges these under the two headings of "objectivism" and "subjectivism" (in the terminology of Die Krisis).

---

15. IdI, 103 [59-60].

16. EU, § 10 ; K, §§9h, 38, 47. See also Aron Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, pp. 418-426. The term "Lebenswelt" is found as early as 1924 in the unpublished article "Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie," in EP, I, 232.

17. K, § 38.

18. "Die vorgegebene Welt ist der Horizont, der alle unsere Ziele, alle unsere Zwecke, flüchtige oder dauernde, strömend-standig befasst, wie eben ein intentionales Horizontbewusstsein im voraus implizite 'umfasst.' " K, 147 ; see further EU, § 7, The notion "world" is taken up again in Chapter II.

## 1. Objectivism

The names Galileo and geometry for Husserl give up their specific identity and become eponyms. Instead of signifying the individual man and the branch of mathematics, they indicate rather a mentality and the mathematization of nature. Husserl picks Galileo as the representative of a mathematical tradition because in him, according to Husserl's view, it has attained a high point of its development.[19]

Pure geometry has its own quest for certitude and ultimate knowledge which it locates in mathematical exactitude. It refines to a precise methodology the casual manner of measurement, such as long and short, that people employ every day. It determines and classifies the basic types of geometrical forms from the point to the most complex figures ; it introduces number theory, etc.

The quantified aspect of things obviously make them directly accessible to a mathematical consideration. But their sense qualities or their activities, in order to be subsumed into a system of such mathematical measurement, must be considered as spatio-temporal events ultimately dependent upon, and related to, the extension and shape of the bodies involved.[20] Once nature has been mathematized both directly and indirectly, then the relation of all the bodies therein can be considered as spatio-temporal processes subject to a universal causality.[21] "This universal idealized causality includes all individual contingent figures and qualities..."[22]

---

19. K, 58 ; FUG, 365.

20. K, 31-36.

21. K, 36-40.

22. "Diese universale idealisierte Kausalität umgreift alle faktischen Gestalten und Füllen..." K, 38.

Laws of functional dependence that cover all occurrences
are determined.  Formulated as mathematical equations,
these laws allow exact predictions and inductions that surpass
those of pre-theoretical ordinary experience.  Further, they
are presented as expressing nature as it really is.

Thus with the mathematization of nature, Galilean
physics is reached.  It has the hallmark of science par excel-
lence, for it concerns itself with "pure idealities," and
thus transcends the fluctuating uncertainties of individual
men and the world they experience.[23]  Its universality is
unimpeachable.

The ideal objectivity of its definitions,laws,and mathe-
mathical functions assures Galilean physics of a never-failing
exactitude and consistency.  And because it is exclusively
object-oriented, Galilean physics is the exemplar of objectivism.[24]

Descartes, according to Husserl, is the heir of the
Galilean tradition.  He accepts the Galilean conception of
mathematized nature as a closed and self-contained corporeal
world where all events can be precisely calculated.  His
methodological doubt, however, bearing in the opposite
direction from Galileo towards subjectivity, arrives at the
Ego cogito, the domain of consciousness.  This Descartes
identifies with the human soul.  But the Cartesian soul
turns out to be as closed and self-contained as the corporeal
world.  The Galilean nature and the Cartesian soul, in a
sense, exist parallel to each other.

Such a conception of the relation of nature and soul
to each other is, according to Husserl, the origin of the
so-called Cartesian dualism.  But if Descartes arrives at
a dualism, he has found the bearings to the domain of sub-
jectivity, so that other philosophers, taking their readings

---

23. K, 21.
24. K, 19-36.

from him, can direct themselves towards it.[25]

## 2. Subjectivism

In this new direction of the study of human knowing
opened by Descartes, two trends, in Husserl's mind, take their
departure. First, there is an "empiricist psychologism (of
sensualistic and naturalistic stamp)", and secondly, transcen-
dental subjectivism.[26]

Locke is a leading representative of this empiricist
psychologism. According to his conception, the soul is a sort
of inner space separated from the outer world. However, he
misses Descartes' problem : how what is outside the soul can
influence what is inside the soul. The germinal intentionality
of Descartes never develops in Locke.[27]

For Hume, also in the empiricist tradition, the way
into subjectivity is a dead end. There exist only sense data
that association organizes. Consequently, causality, identi-
ty, and mathematical concepts are nothing but a fiction con
constructed by the mind.[28]

Kant represents the second trend, the shift towards
transcendental subjectivity. For him the problem is to
discover how, given the origin of knowing in sense intuition,
a priori synthetic judgments are possible. Between the
phenomenal object in consciousness and the noumenon exists a
chasm. There is no possibility of attaining the noumenon. As
a consequence, there is no possibility of grasping the ultimate
presuppositions of objective knowing. For this reason,

---

25. K, §§ 10-21.
26. "... des empiristischen Psychologismus (sensualistisch-
    naturalistischer Prägung). ..." K, 86.
27. IdI, § 62 ; K, §§ 22-24.
28. K, §§ 23-27.

Husserl considers Kant's philosophy as <u>weltimmanent</u> in contra distinction to his own phenomenology that seeks to uncover the origin of the world in the constituting activity of the transcendental Ego.

In Husserl's opinion, contrary to the common interpretation, Kant does not take up Hume's real problem which is the crucial problem in human cognition : "... how is this <u>most radical sub-jectivism</u> understandable that subjectifies the world itself ? The riddle of the world in the deepest and last sense, the riddle of a world whose being is <u>being that is constituted out of a subjective</u> effectuation, and this with the evidence that another world cannot be at all imagined--this and nothing else is Hume's problem."[29] And Husserl would aver that it is also the problem of phenomenology.[30]

## B. <u>Epoche</u>

### 1. <u>Back to the Life-world</u>

The history of modern philosophy, according to Husserl's judgment, is a battle between objectivism and subjectivism that is as futile as it is endless. Since neither of them has uncovered the ultimate grounds of knowledge, they do not have a common area for discussion. Unaware of its unquestioned pre-mises, each continues to produce conclusions and applications that can only appear to the other as impertinent. Both of them, however, share one presupposition: both accept the self-sufficient validity of the Life-world as the ground of knowing. Because of this unquestioned presupposition, both of them in Husserl's estimation are naive and inadequate, for the positing

---

29. "... wie ist dieser <u>radikalste Subjektivismus</u>, der die Welt selbst subjektiviert, fassbar ? Das Welträtsel im tiefsten und letzten Sinne, das Rätsel einer Welt, deren <u>Sein aus subjektiver Leistung</u> ist, und das in der Evidenz, dass eine andere überhaupt nicht denkbar sein kann--das und nichts anderes ist <u>Humes Problem</u>." K, 99-100.

30. IdI, § 62 ; K, § 27.

that they make is not contested radically enough.[31]

Kant's transcendental subjectivity is evidently something very different from the subject in the empiricist tradition. In fact, Husserl's notion of subjectivity reached through the Epoche has certain fundamental Kantian characteristics : reality is relative to consciousness which is necessary and absolute.[32] However, Kant's search is for the validity of a possible objective consciousness. His transcendental subjectivity is ultimately an a priori form of the world, and as such, it is weltimmanent.

Kant by his notion of the noumenon sets up a world behind this world as an explanation. In Husserl's mind that is not an explanation but rather a transfer of the explanation. The positing of yet another world does not explain the positing of this one.

One must ask more than how a priori knowledge is possible. One must see its necessary relationship to the Life-world, and then in turn inquire about the Ursprung of this Life-world itself. The Life-world, instead of being a problem for Kant, is rather a presupposition. In seeking, then, in subjectivity, the origin of the Life-world, and as a consequence of any world based upon it (such as the world of Galilean objectivism), Husserl undertakes to solve Hume's radical problem : how this world is constituted "out of subjective effectuation and this with the evidence that another world cannot at all be imagined."

But Husserl's definitive response to Kant comes from his principle of principles : intuition. Husserl broadens the notion of intuition to include both sense and categorial activity, and thus it spans the whole range of cognition from experience (Erfahrung) through understanding (Verstand) and reason

---

31. Husserl does not use "naive" in a pejorative sense when speaking of the sciences ; according to him, they are naive insofar as they are ignorant of their phenomenological basis ; see, for example, PSW, 85 [18] ; FTL, 2 ; CM, 153 [179] ; K, 27.

32. See IdI, Section II, Chap. II ; see also Paul Ricoeur, "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in Husserl, p. 17.

(Vernunft).[33] In the same way, he broadens experience such that he has both sense and categorial experience.[34]

### a. Objectivism : Abstraction and Life-world

Objectivism, perhaps distracted by the success of its mathematical prowess, does not appraise the full meaning of the fact that its ideal logico-mathematized laws and formulation are based on an abstraction of the corporeal aspect of the Life-world. They are a dressing of ideal constructs (Ideenkleid), a theoretico-logical superstructure.[35] Idealization requires materials to be idealized, and a superstructure needs a foundation to rest upon. This foundation is the Life-world and the evidence of common experience.

The Life-world is the primary sphere of evidence since it offers the possibility of the self-presentation of corporeal objects. All theoretical truth, whether logical, mathematical, or scientific, has its final validation in the evidences which concern occurrences in the Life-world. The mental operations which produce the theories and the world of objective science

---

33. See LU,II, 662 [ II/2, iv] , the Foreword to the 2nd ed. (1921) ; LU, II, 671 [ II/2, 6] . "The old epistemological contrast between sensibility and understanding achieves a much-needed clarity through a distinction between straight-forward or sensuous, and founded or categorial intuition. The same is true of the contrast between thinking and seeing (intuiting), which confuses philosophical parlance by confounding the relations of significance to fulfilling intuition, on the one hand, with the relations of sensuous and categorial acts, on the other." See also Paul Ricoeur, "Kant and Husserl," in Husserl : An Analysis of his Phenomenology, pp. 189-190.

34. See FTL, § 11.

35. EU, 42-43 ; K, 51-52.

presuppose the operation of "those acts of consciousness through which the _Lebenswelt_ appears as ever present and pre-given," and thus "as existing independently of, and prior to all scientific activity."[36]

The means by which Husserl demonstrates the dependence of scientific theories upon the Life-world is to perform a suspension of acceptance - what he calls an "Epoche," or "reduction" with respect to Galilean objective science. The Epoche neither denies nor endorses the validity of science. The person in the attitude of the Epoche assumes a detached neutrality and suspends all his critical judgments concerning science, so that he withholds assent to its assertions. He further abstains from taking any critical position vis-à-vis the truth or falsify of these assertions. He considers them as accepted as valid, but does not proceed upon their accepted validity.[37]

Once this Epoche of objective science has been effected, the Life-world itself can be made a theme of direct investigation. Though a Life-world is relative to a certain culture, there is nevertheless an essential structure discernible in every Life-world and capable of becoming the theme of a special science that Husserl names an "ontology of the Life-world."[38]

Like Galilean science, this ontology of the Life-world has its own premises and methodology. Unlike Galilean science, it presents nature with space, time, and causality, not as mathematized, but as experienced.

The means to discover the essence of the Life-world is that of the eidetic reduction that uncovers the core structure of the Life-world. Through the reduction it becomes manifest that in the Life-world "there is... a fixed typology... to be taken and understood methodically as a pure Apriori."[39] To this fixed typology belong the spatio-temporality of events and their typicality

---

36. Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," in _Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology_, pp. 418-420.

37. K, §§ 35-36.

38. K, § 51.

of behavior. However, Husserl is not interested in just eastablishing an ontology of the Life-world for itself. His primary interest is in the Life-world's invariant structure considered in relation to consciousness.[40]

Later we shall see how there is likewise an eidetic structure of the Ego that predetermines its processes and activities in a systematic fashion. The point that Husserl wishes to make about the Life-world is that it, too, is systematic ; that it is man's immediate milieu and habitat, and that this milieu and habitat has a structure of Types. Once the essential characteristics of both the Ego and the Life-world have been drawn up, then it is clear that there is a parallelism between the structure of the Ego and that of the Life-world which is not just fortuitous. The parallelism is an intentional correlation.

With an ontology of the Life-world we have a whole essential structure together with all its diverse individual intentional processes at one presentation that as a transcendental clue solicits an investigation of subjective correlates.[41] In fact, states Husserl, this is "the task of an 'ontology of the Life-world.' "[42] After the transcendental reduction in union with the eidetic reduction of the Ego we have a coign of vantage from where we can see precisely what the clue was pointing towards : the correlation between the world and the intentionally operating Ego.

Then the realization can dawn that, besides the natural attitude which accepts the Life-world without a question, there is also a "consistent and reflective attitude which is directed upon the subjective modes in which the Life-world and its objects

---

40. IdI, §§ 47, 144 ; K, § 66.

41. K, §§ 50-51.

42. "Die Aufgabe einer 'Ontologie der Lebenswelt.' " K, § 51, the paragraph heading.

appears."[43] Instead of being totally engrossed in the objects that surround him, a person can turn his attention inward towards the subjective modes in which objects appear in consciousness. There he can discover for the first time "that the world, and how the world, as correlate of a unified synthesis of interrelated productions and operations derives its sense of existence and validity..."[44] His interest is not merely the world as pre-given. His theme is the structure of consciousness and its synthesis of intentional acts by which the world can and does appear at all as meaningful for him.

## b. Subjectivism : Intentionality and Life-world

Subjectivism, comprising on the one hand the psychologism of Locke and Hume, and on the other, the transcendental subjectivity of Kant, does not adequately explain knowledge either. Whereas objectivism attends outward to what it claims is "really real," subjectivism turns inward to subjective activity to find the grounds of cognition. Descartes, when he attains the ego cogito, is on the threshhold of discovering the domain of subjectivity, but his dualism blocks him from discovering the Transcendental Ego.[45]

43. "... die Idee einer konsequent reflexiven Einstellung auf das Wie der subjektiven Gegebenheitsweise der Lebenswelt und der lebensweltlichen Objekte." K, § 38, from the paragraph heading.

44. "... dass und wie Welt als Korrelat einer erforschbaren Universalität synthetisch verbundener Leistungen ihren Seinssinn und ihre Seinsgeltung... gewinnt." K, 148. For enlightening interpretations of the Epoche and the Lebenswelt, and their implications for social studies, see Alfred Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" (pp. 118-139) and "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences" (pp. 140-149), in Collected Papers I : The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson, 2nd unchanged ed. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) ; Alfred Schutz, "Some Structures of the Life-World," in Collected Papers III : Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 116-132 ; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Anchor Book (Garden City : Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967).

45. CM, 24-25 [64] ; K, §§ 63-65.

In spite of an acknowledgment of subjectivity, there are still Galilean presuppositions at work in Descartes. The conception of the physical world as a field of interrelated bodies mutually influencing one another serves as a model for the psychic world. Psychic events are imagined after the manner of causal occurrences such as those that obtain between physicial bodies. The soul is regarded as a self-contained sphere parallel to the corporeal world where psychic data occur that are conceived as different types of atoms or complexes of atoms. Such are, according to Husserl, the antecedents of modern psychology. Its representation of knowing is based, not upon the direct experience of psychic activity, but rather upon a dualistic conception of soul and nature, which in turn is based upon the theories of Galilean physics.

What is needed, according to the judgment of Husserl, is a genuine psychology that will correctly explain consciousness without any dualistic preconceptions. Just as a kind of Epoche was performed to reveal that Galilean physics is an abstraction that presupposes the Life-world, another should be performed to disclose the relation of psychology to the Life-world. Just as the Life-world is the departure point for mathematized physics, so is it also for psychology. It is here that the soul and its operations are experienced, and they are experienced precisely as embodied.[46]

The first thing we must do, asserts Husserl, applying the principle of evidence, and intuition, "is to take conscious life completely without any prejudice in the direct reflexive self-experiencing precisely as it presents itself there."[47] Should

---

46. K, § 69.

47. "... das erste ist, und zwar zunächst in der unmittelbaren reflexiven Selbsterfahrung, das Bewusstseinsleben ganz vorurteilos als das zu nehmen, als was es sich da als es selbst ganz unmittelbar gibt." K, 236 ; see also CM, §§ 16 and 20.

we do this, then we do not find in direct self-presentation there the sense data of empiricist psychology. Rather, what we do find are the cogito and cogitatum of the intentional performance, exemplified in such expressions as, "I see a tree that is green," or "I remember my school years," or "I am sorry that my friend is sick." All such acts are intentional performances and are to be characterized as acts of consciousness of something in the Life-world.[48]

Though it is only after the Epoche that the two dimensions of intentional performance in their essential structure can be seen, still a pre-Epoche direct inspection can furnish clues on this structure of intentional performance and the correlative Life-world. Such inspection reveals two components of intentionality : a subjective and an objective side. The subjective component is the diverse modes of self-presence of the knower intending the object ; the objective component is the variegated modifications of things intended, correlated with these diverse modes of the subject. The subjective component is the "act-of-being-conscious," while the objective component is "that-of-which" one is conscious. Husserl also underscores the difference of these two components by distinguishing the experiencing from the experienced, the meaning-act from the meant.[49]

Husserl uses the term "really inherent" (reell) for the subjective component, and "not really inherent" (irreell) for the objective.[50] The distinction of these two irreducible components, as Husserl makes clear from the time of the Logical Investigations, is the pons asinorum of cognitional theory.

---

48. K, § 69.

49. K, § 68. The question of intentionality is treated in detail in Chapter II.

50. The detailed discussion of reell and irreell, Immanenz and Transzendenz, is taken up in Chapter II.

Although even Hume, declares Husserl, cannot avoid speaking of "impressions and perceptions of things," empiricism's ineradicable defect is its blindness to the significance of intentionality and its two distinct components.[51] Since consciousness and its object are correlates, no discussion of consciousness can be adequate unless the intentional object is taken into full consideration.

In order to demarcate the domain of consciousness, an Epoche must be effected, according to Husserl, that he calls the "phenomenologico-psychological reduction." The objects of the Life-world appear in consciousness in their presentational manners and ontological modalities (Seins-modalitäten). They also present themselves in consciousness as endowed with values and as bearing affective charges. The phenomenologico-psychological reduction means that one refrains from endorsing, rejecting, or being involved in any person's beliefs, values, or points of view.[52] What one does precisely by this Epoche is to exercise a detached observation in order to consider intentional activity only insofar as it is intentional.[53]

### 2. "The Transcendental Shift"

Once the two investigations of objectivism and subjectivism have revealed the inadequacy of these two attitudes and their relation to the Life-world, it becomes manifest that the two investigations converge upon a common problem area. The investigation of objectivism begins by showing through an Epoche objectivism's abstraction of the corporeal aspect of the Life-world, advances to a direct examination

---

51. K, 245.

52. K, §§ 70-72.

53. See Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, p. 441.

of the essential structure of the Life-world, and arrives at
the possibility of studying the subjective modes of how the
Life-world and its objects appear in consciousness. For its
part, the investigation of subjectivism begins by describing
the authentic manner of the soul's presence in the Life-
world, advances to an exposition of intentionality in the
Life-world, and arrives through the phenomenologico-psycholo-
gical reduction at the point where the intentional object
is considered purely as such. This then is the common problem
area where these two investigations meet : the correlation
of the Life-world and subjectivity.[54]

Once the convergence of these two lines of inquiry is
seen, then the full amplitude of the natural attitude is

54. K, §§ 38, 66-69. The exposition of the Epoche in this
chapter is based upon Husserl's "way" (Weg) to the Epoche
found in the Krisis. Ideas I and the Cartesian Meditations
present other ways to the Epoche that Husserl eventually
abandoned for the one presented in the Krisis. See K,
§ 43 and EP, II, which is entirely given to the problem
of the Epoche. See also Rudolph Boehm, "Les ambiguïtés
des concepts husserliens d'"immanence' et 'transcendence,'
Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 84
(1959), pp. 481-526 : "Nous pouvons donc résumer ainsi,
en quelques mots, l'évolution de la pensée husserlienne... :
de fait, Husserl pense dans les Ideen, de 1913, 'La mé-
ditation phénoménologique fondamentale' sur le terrain
même de l'attitude naturelle ; du reste, il en est par-
faitement conscient. Vers 1923, il reconnaît de manière
explicite l'importance primordiale que revient à la pos-
sibilité de principe de fonder une phénoménologie 'transcen-
dentale' sur une réflexion qui prend pour point de départ
ce terrain naturel (réflexion de l'ordre d'une psycholo-
gie phénoménologique). Dans la Krisis seulement, vers
1936, Husserl reconnaît la nécessité absolue, pour une
philosophie phénoménologique, de partir du fait de la
'présence préalable' (à l'instauration de cette philo-
sophie et de toute philosophie, en général), du monde de
la vie naturelle." p. 517. In this article, Boehm,
aligning himself with Fink) criticizes Ricoeur's
interpretation of Husserl's Epoche in his commentary
on the Ideas (see pp. 504-517).

likewise seen. The natural attitude can be regarded as existing on two levels. There can be, first of all, the natural attitude of the ordinary person taking his everyday-world for granted. At this level the natural attitude is distinguished from objectivism and subjectivism as being less sophisticated. But at the second deeper level, there can be the comprehensive natural attitude which is identified with the mental outlook that, by reason of its manner of positing the existence of objective reality, overlooks the ultimate subjective grounds of positing. At this level the natural attitude includes all objectivism and all subjectivism.[55]

The comprehensive natural attitude thus consists in more than just the human condition of being embodied in the Life-world and of experiencing it as **pregiven**. A man obviously cannot help accepting and believing in the Life-world.[56] But the comprehensive natural attitude means that a person is so engrossed in the world that he does not realize that he is performing acts that posit and evaluate the world and the objects in it. He posits them without knowing that he is positing them. Being so completely intent upon what he is positing, he does not reflect that he is positing.[57]

Such operations in which a person is turned completely out towards the world and never sufficiently analyzes his subjective activity Husserl names "anonymous."[58] Why anonymous ? Because operations go on whose subjective origins are never identified. The comprehensive natural attitude,

---

55. IdI, §§ 27-32, 56-60 ; K, §§ 38-41, 52, 55, 71.

56. See EU, § 7 ; for the discussion of "belief" and the Urdoxa, see Chap. II.

57. See Paul Ricoeur, "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology, pp. 18-20.

58. See PV, 15 [15] , 36 [36] ; CM, 153 [179] ; K, 209.

then, anonymously positing and evaluating the world, is ranged over and against the attitude turned towards subjectivity and its effectuations.

Unless we advance another decisive step, these two attitudes stand in an inconclusive confrontation. In order to evaluate them adequately with reference to each other, it is necessary to pursue the ways laid down by the two investigations of objectivism and subjectivism to the point of convergence where we abandon entirely the comprehensive natural attitude. At the point of convergence, we perform what Husserl calls the transcendental Epoche, or reduction.[59]

The transcendental Epoche is the free option to investigate subjectivity as the ultimate validating ground of cognition.[60] It is the radical "self-examination" (Selbstbesinnung), the attempt at self-possession, by the Ego to uncover through reflexive intuition the structure of intuition and evidence,

---

59. A vocabulary note on Husserl's use of "reduction" and "Epoche" : in IP he speaks of "epistemological reduction" (IP, 33 [43] , 38 [48] ), "phenomenological reduction" (IP, 34-35 [44-45] ), "ἐποχή ," (IP, 34 [44] ), and "epistemological ἐποχή " (IP, 38 [48] ) ; in IdI : "phenomenological ἐποχή " (IdI, § 32) ; it is, further, a "bracketing," "suspension" of the natural attitude (IdI, §§ 31-32), "phenomenological reduction" (IdI, § 50) ; in FTL : "phenomenological reduction", (FTL, 269 [237] , 282 [249] ) ; in CM : Husserl keeps the Greek form, ἐποχή whereas the English translation gives the transliteration, "epoché" (CM, 20-21 [60-61] , etc.) ; then also in CM, "transcendental-phenomenological reduction" (CM, 21 [61] ), "phenomenological reduction" (CM,37 [75] ) ; in K Husserl drops the Greek form and uses "Epoché." See Rudolf Boehm, "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction," in International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (1965), 183-202.

60. For the Epoche as "free" (freie), see CM, 25 [64] . See also, Boehm, "Les ambiguïtés," pp. 504-507.

and their relationship to positing.[61]  But where does the
motivation come from to perform the Epoche in the first
place ?  As long as the comprehensive natural attitude
holds sway, it completely shuts out the possibility of
transcending itself.  The natural attitude is incapable all
on its own of inititiating a new outlook that is the very
reversal of itself.  Its functioning means precisely that
the Epoche is not functioning.  As Eugen Fink notes, it is
a paradox that we can be aware of the natural attitude only
when we have dropped it to assume the transcendental attitude
from where can judge the natural attitude for what it is.[62]

The motivation for the Epoche arises in the basic
wonder innate to the transcendental Ego.[63] This wonder which
pervades all intentional experiencing, even that which takes
place at the level of the natural attitude, is the
drive to know what reality is.  Nor is the drive so anonymous
that the transcendental Ego cannot turn his intuition
upon it, though it is another question whether he ever
actually will or not.  The intentional experiencing of the
Ego, then, with its correlative subject- and object-pole is
always open to the intuitive gaze of the Ego himself.[64]

61. See FTL, 273 [241-242] : "The whole of phenomenology is
    nothing more than / scientific self-examination on the
    part of transcendent subjectivity...."  See further
    FTL, § 103 ; CM, § 64 ; K, §§ 7 and 15, and p. 193 : see
    also Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and the Sense of History,"
    in Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology," pp. 155-
    156, and p. 156, n. 12 of the translators who say of
    "Selbstbesinnung" : "... we usually render it as
    'coming to self-awareness,' though the full sense meant
    might be translated at length as 'reflectively investigating
    the sense of one's own self.' "

62. Fink, "Die phänomenologische Philosophie," in Studien,
    pp. 110-114.

63. See the works cited in n. 3 above.

64. IdI, §§ 77-79 ; K, §§ 53-55 ; see also Hermann Assemissen,
    Strukturanalystische Probleme der Wahrnehmung in der
    Phänomenologie Husserls (Köln : Kölner Universitäts§Verlag,
    1957), pp. 19-20.

The touch of the transcendental Ego is unavoidably in all his intentional performance so that when it is question of intentional objects being transcendental clues, whether as individuals or as the whole essential structure of the Life-world, it means that the Ego is always capable by essence of becoming aware of his own operating. The transcendental Ego is the source, guide, and goal of the transcendental clue so that he cannot help but leave traces pointing to himself.

The relation between phenomenology and the transcendental reduction constitutes a framework in which the reduction must be viewed. Rudolf Boehm notes :

> ... even though Husserl himself is rarely deliberately explicit in this regard, he does call attention to the framework over and over again. This means that the method is to be considered as the method which it is, and not constantly from the point of view of the results of its application. The path which Husserl took in following this method led him to found anew a transcendental idealism. Still, he himself saw as specific in his phenomenological idealism, as that which distinguished it most radically from every other, the fact that it was grounded in that phenomenological method...[65]

The Epoche is the turn "zu den Sachen" to let them appear as "they themselves.' "[66] This turn means the reflexive intuiting of the transcendental Ego and his positing just as they are in themselves. This is the phenomenological method that discloses the primary evidence : the correlation

---

65. Rudolf Boehm, "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction," p. 185, See also Rudolf Boehm, "Husserl et l'idéalisme classique," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 57 (1959), 351-396 ; and his "Les sciences exactes et l'idéal husserlien d'un savoir rigoureux," in La phénoménologie et les sciences de la nature (Bruxelles : Archives de l'Institut International des Sciences Théoriques, 1965), pp. 104-118.

66. CM, 13 [54] .

of the transcendental Ego and what his intentional
intuiting constitutes.[67]

The objectivism reduction and the phenomenologico-
psychological reduction already indicate that the source of
absolutely primary evidence lies in the direction of subjectivity.
The objective of the transcendental reduction is to clear away
anything that blocks the possession of the primary evidence.
The comprehensive natural attitude is the main hindrance
that keeps us from attaining the transcendental Ego.  Con-
sequently, the transcendental reduction must put the natural
attitude entirely "out of play."  The reduction must be as
radical and as comprehensive as the natural attitude itself,
and "at one stroke" suspend all acceptance of its whole
system of existential claims.[68]

Performing the Epoche, we abstain from participating
in any position-taking with regard to the world and its
existence so that "the whole concrete surrounding life-world
is... from now on only a phenomenon of being instead of some-
thing that is."[69]  The suspension of world-positing  is all
inclusive : "all the processes of meaning objects, the judgings,
valuings, and decidings, the processes of setting ends and
willing  means...."[70]  Other people and our own psychologically
functioning Ego considered as intramundane existents are
consequently also subject to the Epoche.  Through the Epoche
the world is made a phenomenon, that is ,a reduced reality,

---

67. See PSW, 96-98 [27-28] ; FTL, 14-17 [12-17] ; §§ 97, 101,
    104 ; CM, § 6, and p. 16, n. 1 of the English translation ;
    see also IdI, §§ 77-79, and also Paul Ricoeur's remarks
    on the relation of intuition and reflexion on p. 252,
    n. 1 of his translation of IdI, Idées directrices pour
    une phénoménologie (Paris : Gallimard, 1950).

68. CM, 13 [54] .

69. CM, 19 [59].

70. CM, 20 [59] .

a nonaffirmed and nonevaluated correlative of consciousness, or simply, something intended purely as intended. Through the Epoche the full untrammelled liberty of intuition is established, free from any prejudicial position-taking.

The Epoche does not stop any of the accepting of positing of consciousness. Experiencing goes on as before. The world as experienced, judged, and willed continues to appear as always, but now, through the Epoche we recognize position-taking for what it is. Our human situation in the world involves an unavoidable believing in the world and a position-taking with regard to it. But the difficulty with position-taking is that it is usually so engrossing that it conceals the position-taking operations of subjectivity even from itself.

> This universal depriving of acceptance ... of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.), --or, as it is also called, this 'phenomenological epoche' and 'parenthesizing' of the Objective world--therefore does not leave us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it ; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them, the universe of 'phenomena' in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense. The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely : as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me.[71]

Once we initiate the Epoche, its momentum carries us into the realm where the transcendental Ego loses his anonymity and stands identified as the ultimate source of all conscious activity with its correlative objectivity.

---

71. CM, 20-21 [60].

The Epoche of objectivism and the phenomenologico-psychological reduction furnished the last clues to where the search should go, and having advanced to the total abstention of the transcendental Epoche, they coincide with it. Then the comprehensive parenthizing of the world through the Epoche enables the transcendental Ego to effect the cession of his anonymous living and start to win his self-possession.

## II. Possession : The Transcendental Ego

If the Epoche has revealed the transcendental Ego, there still remain some precisions to make with regard to the two other Egos that are involved, namely, the human, or psychophysical, Ego and the Ego as "Detached Observer." (unbeteiligter Zuschauer). The human ego is the person considered as existing and experiencing in the Life-world. The Ego as the Detached Observer, on the other hand, is the person viewed as performing the Epoche by which the world is reduced to a phenomenon and all psycho-physical Egos, including the person's own, are reduced to the transcendental Ego.[72]

In Husserl's words :

> By phenomenological epoché I reduce my natural human Ego and my psychic life--the realm of my psychological self-experience-- to my transcendental-phenomenological Ego, the realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience. The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me- this world, with all its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only

---

72. CM, §§ 8-11, 15 ; N, 13-16 ; Edmund Husserl, "Phänomenologie und Anthropologie," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2. (1941), 8. See also Fink, "Die phänomenologische Philosophie, in Studien, pp. 121-123 ; Roman Ingarden, Bemerkung, pp. 212-214 of German ed. of CM.

with transcendental-phenomenological epoché.[73]

By indicating the three Egos, Husserl is not introducing
three distinct substances that would keep an independence
though ranged in a hierarchy. They are really identified
in the transcendental Ego. The other two are aspects
explicable in reference to the transcendental Ego.[74] Perhaps
the best way to conceive the three would be as Marvin
Farber does who distinguishes them according to "the degree
of reflection" that is manifested in their activity.[75] If
there are "anonymous" world-immersed operations going on,
there is question of the mundane Ego. If a radical reflection
is being pursued, then the Detached Observer is surveying
the performing of the transcendental Ego and the relation
of the mundane Ego to the transcendental Ego.

It could be added further that the human Ego is the
transcendental Ego as non-Epoche-performing whereas the
Detached Observer is the transcendental Ego precisely as
Epoche-performing. Their identity is "the specific identity
of the three Egos of the phenomenclogical reduction."[76]
That means : the question of three Egos and their identity
arises only after the Epoche is operated.

The Detached Observer is not the Ego whose operations
are to be inspected in phenomenology. All questions pertaining

---

73. CM, 26 [ 65]  . The Ego as Detached Observer Husserl also
    calls the "philosophizing" or "meditating" Ego : see,
    for example, CM, 20 [ 60]  , 24-25 [ 63-64]  , 35 [ 73] ; K, 178.

74. It is worth nothing that Husserl speaks of reducing "my
    natural human Ego" to the transcendental Ego.  CM 26
    [ 65]  ; see n. 73 above.

75. Marvin Farber, The Foundations of Phenomenology (New
    York : Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1962), pp. 553-554.

76. "... die eigentümliche Identität der drei Iche der phä-
    nomenologischen Reduktion.  Fink, "Die phänomenologische
    Philosophie," in Studien, p. 121.  See also FTL, § 95 ;
    PV, 15-16 [ 15-16]  ; CM, 35 [ 73]  , 69 [ 103]  .

to intentionality, constitution, intuition, and objectivity
pertain to the transcendental Ego, not the Detached Observer.
But it is the Epoche-performing Detached Observer that only
makes it possible in the first place that any question of
three Egos can arise at all.  And furthermore, it is the
Epoche-performing Detached Observer that makes it possible
to see how the three Egos are distinguished, what the transcen-
dental Ego is, and that the transcendental Ego is the ultimate
ground of cognition.

## A.   The Eidos Ego

With the Epoche we attain the transcendental Ego and
his operations.  But the question might now arise, What is
this transcendental Ego ?  The diverse moments of the Epoche
give the answer to this question.[77]  In a first moment of the
Epoche we have reduced all reality to an intentional correlate
that is to be considered purely as intended.  This is the
return to consciousness.  In a second moment there is the
identification of the living present, the constituting unit
of time consciousness.  This is the return to the absolute
present.  It is the cumulatively advancing consciousness-
point that constitutes both itself and the transcendent
object.

Then in a third moment the Epoche "is accompanied by
an 'eidetic' reduction which allows the evidence of a particular
fact only insofar as it is a structural moment of an essential
invariant."[78]  The eidetic reduction reveals the Eidos of

---

77. See Rudolf Boehm, "La phénoménologie de l'histoire," in
    Revue internationale de philosophie, 71-72 (1965), 67-68.

78. "... la réduction phénoménologique s'accompagne d'une
    réduction 'eidétique" qui n'admet l'évidence d'aucun fait
    singulier qu'à titre de moment structurel d'un invariant
    essentiel" : Rudolf Boehm, "La phénoménologie de l'his-
    toire," pp. 67-68.  For pertinents passages in Husserl,
    see : IdI, §§ 33-34 ; N, 11-12[141-142] ; FTL, §§ 98-99 ;

the Ego : that is, his invariant structure. Like the first
and second moments of the Epoche, it is a liberating event,
for it reveals to the Ego himself what makes him precisely
what he is without the distracting admixture of contingency.

The means to detach the Eidos Ego is the method of
free variation of one's own individual Ego, or, as Husserl
names it, the "monad." It is the same method that Husserl
employs to detach the essential notes of the Life-world. And
furthermore, it should be noted that the starting point is
one's own individual Ego taken with his typical operations
in the Life-world. We may begin with any intentional act.[79]

For example, we can take a perception, recognize it
as a Type, reach its eidetic structure, and from that the
Eidos Ego. We vary the perceptual object, yet in such a
way that it always remains as the perception of something,
no matter what. We shift from actual perceptions into the
realm of possible perceptions in order to detach the "pure"
essence of perception from all factualness. This is the pure
Eidos perception, pure of everything that restricts it to any
contingent perceiving whatsoever, "whose 'ideal' extension
is made up of all ideally possible perceptions...."[80]

Any intentional act, such as retention, recollection,
liking something, striving for it, can serve as the starting
point for the free variation to attain the invariant Eidos of
the act. The eidetic essences, though possessing their
individual identity, are related to one another in an eidetic
nexus inside an Eidos Ego and point to it as the unifying
source of all intentional performance.[81]

---

.../... CM, Second and Fourth Meditations ; K, §§ 50 and 55. See
also Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xiv :
"Every reduction, says Husserl, as well as being transcendental
is necessarily eidetic" ; Paul Ricoeur, "A Study of Husserl's
Cartesian Meditations, I-IV," in Husserl : An Analysis of
His Phenomenology, pp. 90-93 ; 106-114.

79. CM, §§ 33-34.

80. CM 70 [ 104] .

81. CM, 43 [ 80-81] .

Since Husserl's starting point is always the monad,
there is no danger that the Eidos Ego might turn out to be
a depersonalized center of consciousness. The eidetic
reduction steers clear of the Scylla of a casebook
description of the transcendental Ego and the Charybdis of
conceiving it as an abstract function.[82] These "eidetic
researches are nothing else but <u>uncoverings of the all-
embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such</u>, which
comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego
and this ego itself qua possibility."[83]

Here we can grasp the proportion between the Life-
world's a priori as transcendental clue and the monad as
starting point for the eidetic reduction of the Ego. A
preliminary understanding of the proportion--and relationship--
is already gained by the phenomenologico-psychological
reduction of subjectivism that discloses the meaning of
intentional performance. Then, after the eidetic reduction
of the Ego, the proportion is seen as pertaining to the
correltation of the whole objective world and the Ego. In
starting from the Life-world to perform the Epoche, just as
in starting from the monad to accomplish the eidetic
reduction, Husserl avoids a "sudden leap into the
transcendental Ego" that would pass over the complete and
integrated correlation that phenomenology seeks to display :
from the human Ego and the Life-world to the transcendental
Ego and the conscious constitution of all objectivity.[84]

The essential characteristic of the transcendental
Ego thus uncovered is intentionality, or a "synthetic
structure."[85] By this synthetic processes, the transcendental

---

82. See Ricoeur, "A Study of Husserl's <u>Cartesian Meditations</u>,
     I-IV," pp. 90-93 ; 106-114.
83. CM, 71 [105-106] .
84. K, 190.
85. CM, §§ 17-18.

Ego constitutes a unified object of which he is conscious.
Intentionality is "this universal fundamental property of
consciousness : to be conscious of something ; as a cogito,
to bear within itself its cogitatum."[86]  Husserl delineates
further the essential traits :

> ... the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically.
> Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing 'cogito,'
> synthetically comprising all particular conscious processes
> that ever become prominent, and having its all-embracing
> cogitatum, founded at different levels on the manifold
> particular cogitata.... The fundamental form of this
> universal synthesis, the form that makes all other
> syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing
> consciousness of internal time.[87]

There are two important features of this fundamental
form that should be noted : first, the identifying synthesis
of the object in the flow of presentations, and secondly,
the habitualities of the transcendental Ego.  These two
features can fit the two-sided inquiry of the subject-
object correlatives that may be made into consciousness.
The Cartesian precis, Ego-cogito-cogitatum, can serve as an
index-heading for this two-sided investigation.  Starting
with the cogitatum, we approach the Ego through his identifying
synthesis of objects.  Starting with the Ego-cogito, we
approach the Ego directly.[88]

First of all, let us consider the synthesis of identi-
fication.  The synthesizing activity of the Ego as the
second moment of the Epoche discloses, is essentially temporal,
for it attains an identity in a flux.  Perception illustrates
well the temporal nature of the synthetic operations of

---

86. CM, 33 [72] .
87. CM, 42-43 [80-81] .
88. CM, §§ 14-15 ; K, § 50.

the Ego.  Through its profiles (Abschattungen) the perceived
object offers itself continually to consciousness where it
is grasped as something one and identical in a manifold.
The Ego constitutes an identical sense (Sinn), and thus a
unified object, through the synthesis operated upon the
multiplicites of the object's appearing (Selbstgebung).  For
Husserl it is momentous that from synthesis there is a
unified sense and object.

But further, the whole of conscious life is an all-em-
bracing unified consciousness of time that comprises all
particular syntheses whether of empirical or ideal objects.
This means that the Ego is essentially the center of a
structural system of temporal syntheses.  As Husserl states :

> Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing 'cogito,'
> synthetically comprising all particular conscious
> processes that ever become prominent, and having its all-
> embracing cogitatum, founded at different levels on the
> manifold particular cogitata.  But this founding does
> not signify a building up in the temporal sequence of
> a genesis, since indeed any imaginable particular subjective
> process is only a prominence within a total consciousness
> always presuposed as unitary.  The all-embracing cogitatum
> of  reflection  is the all-embracing life itself, with
> its openly endless unity and wholeness.[89]

There is another temporal aspect of the intentionality
of consciousness : its horizon.[90]  Horizon refers first of

---

89. CM, 42-43 [ 80-81] .

90. See, for example, IdI, §§ 82-83 (Husserl states that the
    notion of horizon is not found in LU but appears for the
    first time in IdI : FTL, 199 [ 177] , n. 1) ; EU, §§ 8-9,
    12, 51b ; FTL, §§ 80, 105 ; PV,[ 18-20][ 18-20] , 33 [ 33] ,
    36 [ 36] ; CM, §§ 19 (see Husserl's "definition" of "horizon,"
    p. 45 [ 83] ), 20, 27, 30, 64 ; K, §§ 45-49 ; pp. 246, 267 ;
    FUG, 367, 369, 382 ; Ms. K III 6, 236-237 [ 144b-146b] ;
    308 [ 200a] ; 369 [ 235a] .  See also Alphonse De Waelhens,
    Phénoménologie et vérité, 2 ed. (Louvain : Editions
    Nauwelaerts, 1965), pp. 40-43, 50-52 ; De Waelhens, La
    philosophie et les expériences naturelles (The Hague :

all to the basic potentiality of <u>sense</u> perception by which
at any point in space and time it has a limitless number of
possibilities.  These possibilities can belong to either the
continuance of a single specific act (for example, seeing)
with its modifications or a series of diverse kinds of acts
of perceptions (for example, seeing then hearing).  These
possibilities, however, have a pre-established boundary
condition : the physically real world.  It is the spatio-
temporal "<u>unbestimmte Umgebung</u>," endlessly stretched out,
within which they must occur.

The open possibilities of perception as horizon with
time-space specifications can refer to either the objective
or the subjective side of perception.  Thus the horizon can
either refer to the limitless number of objects-to-be-
perceived within and against the physical world.  Or the horizon
can refer to the relation of an act of perception to other
acts of representation (presentation and presentification).[91]

---

.../...  Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), Chap. V ("Le monde") ;
Jacques Derrida, in his <u>Introduction</u> to <u>L'origine de la</u>
<u>géométrie</u>, the French translation of FUG, (Paris : Presses
Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 123 ; Aron Gurwitsch,
<u>The Field of Consciousness</u> (Pittsburgh : Duquesne University
Press, 1964), Parts IV ("Phenomenological Theory of
Perception") and V ("The Thematic Field") ; Gurwitsch,
"The Problem of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology," in
<u>Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology</u>, pp. 122-123 ;
H. Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept of 'Horizon'," in
<u>Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl</u>, ed. Marvin
Farber (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1941), pp.
106-123 ; Alfred Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's
Late Philosophy," in <u>Collected Papers</u> III, pp. 93-99.

91. Perception (presentation), for instance, has, as a
horizon of the past, awakable recollections.  Recollection
(presentification) has, as horizon, "the continuous
intervening intentionality of possible recollections
(to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the
actual Now of perception" (CM, 44-45  82  ).  See also
Paul Ricoeur, "A Study of Husserl's <u>Cartesian Meditations</u>,
I-IV," pp. 95-100.

Next, every cogito and cogitatum of the Ego--whether sense or categorial acts--has a horizon. This is the limitless number of possibilities belonging to the cogito and cogitatum at each moment in the flowing present of consciousness. Potentialities simply exist (perhaps never realized), or are foreshadowed in intentional acts as possible further determinings. The sense-to-be-augmented, and through such a sense, the object itself, stand to all possible interplay of cogito-cogitatum as horizon.

And finally consciousness itself has a horizon : its very intentionality. This horizon is "an all-embracing cogito... having its all-embracing cogitatum." It is the possibility of constituting an objective world. The objective world, correlated to consciousness, is not just the Life-world or the Galilean world (in Husserl's sense), but any world whatsoever. Then in this sense the world is the horizon of all horizons ; it is all that can be constituted.[92]

The second important feature of the universal form of time is "the Ego as substrate of habitualities." Husserl emphasizes that the Ego is not merely "an empty pole of identity."[93] Rather, with each act that emanates from him, the Ego acquires a new abiding property that Husserl names an "habituality." An act of decision can serve as an illustration. If I decide to do something, says Husserl, the fleeting act passes away, but henceforth I am of this conviction. "... I am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so decided...." As long as I accept the conviction, "I can 'return' to it repeatedly, and repeatedly find it as mine,

---

92. See also Emmanuel Levinas, "La ruine de la représentation," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda et J. Taminiaux (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 81 : "L"horizon impliqué dans l'intentionalité n'est donc pas le contexte encore vaguement pensé de l'objet, mais la situation du sujet."

93. CM 66 [100] .

habitually my own opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego who __is__ convinced, who, as the persisting Ego, is determined by this abiding habitus or state."[94]

Every intentional object of the Ego can become a habituality. Objects of acts of knowing or of deciding, instead of merely vanishing with the acts, can become the permanent possession of the Ego, ready for recall. The synthetic operation of the Ego is not, in relationship to the object it constitutes, an atomistic and ephemeral attention that is borne along with the flow of time but never grasps an enduring object. On the contrary, synthesis achieves and constitutes objective permanence.[95]

## B. The Other Ego

According to Husserl, when I wish to grasp the essence of the transcendental Ego, I must begin, not by a comparative study of other men, but by the variation of my own reduced intentional activities.[96] Such a method of reaching the transcendental Ego might appear as not only extremely dubious, insofar as its aim is nothing less than the general essence of all possible Egos, but even worse perhaps, as solipsistic, insofar as all reference to any other person is deliberately eliminated.[97] But on the contrary Husserl is likewise insistent that the objective world for me is the same objective world for everyone (für jedermann).[98]

In order to solve this paradox where sealed-off Egos nevertheless have the same objectivity, I must begin from my own transcendental Ego and inspect the levels of constitution effected by it. First of all, I must perform another Epoche

---

94. CM, 66 [100] .

95. CM, § 33.

96. IdI, § 157 ; N, 21-22 [152-154] ; FTL, §§ 95-96 ; CM,72 [106] .

97. CM, 89 [121] .

98. N, 21-22 [152-153] ; FTL, 13, 206, 209, 212 ; CM, 92-93 [124-125] ; 95 [127] .

<u>within</u> the transcendental experience already determined by the transcendental Epoche. This second Epoche, abstracting from all constituted aspects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity, delimits a nexus of intentionality "in which the ego constitutes <u>within himself</u> a peculiar ownness."[99] This ownness is a level that is exclusively mine. It is my primordial world.

At a second level, the other presents himself as a body (<u>Leib</u>) that can be paired off over against my body. By appresentation I recognize him as being a man like myself with his own transcendental Ego. He belongs to an objective world which, even though it transcends my own primordial world, is always there, given ina different fashion, but given just an uncontestably. It is always there as identical for everyone, myself included. Accordingly, declares Husserl, the intrinsically first other that exists for me is the other Ego. And finally, the other "experiences me forthwith as an Other for him, just as I experience him as <u>my</u> Other."[100]

The eidetic reduction discloses intentionality as the essential trait of the Ego Eidos which remains after the transcendental reduction, and which even the second Epoche that marks off the area of exclusive ownness does not eliminate. But rather, it reveals this area of ownness as a level in the Ego's basic structure of intentionality. To the "original sphere" belong sensations and sense objects, habitualities, etc., in a word, transcendent objects which nevertheless are completely independent of empathy (<u>Einfühlung</u>), my experience of others. But this area of exclusiveness is a sphere through which the vector of intentionality passes to constitute the other for me, and thus one same world for both of us and for everyone, since we have the same Eidos Ego.

---

99.  CM, 93[124] .
100.  CM, 130 [158] .

## III. <u>Summary</u>

The main point in this first chapter has been to orientate the question of objectivity in Husserl in relation to the Epoche, intuition, and evidence. The motivation for the Epoche has been found to arise in the wonder of the transcendental Ego. The Epoche, operating in different moments, is the attempt of the Ego to undertake reflective possession of himself as the constituting source of objective reality.

We have also set up some benchmarks that plot the subsequent course of our discussion of objectivity. The Ego's essential characteristic of intentionality clarifies the two dimensions of intentionality--immanence and transcendence-- studied in Chapter II. Then, in outlining the two essential features of the Ego's intentionality--the synthesis with its horizon and the Ego as substrate of his habitualities--we have already delineated essential traits of objectivity, and thus have already marked out important points to be inspected. These traits are : the identity and unity of the object effected by synthesis in a temporal manifold, and its permanent availability, like a habit, for recall. And finally, the study of the other Ego discloses a further trait of objectivity : accessibility for everyone.

CHAPTER   II


INTENTIONALITY


We have already seen how the eidetic reduction reveals
that the essential structure of the Ego is intentionality.[101]
In this chapter we will consider in greater detail some of the
salient features of intentionality.  As already made clear,
the intentionality that we are examining is not the natural
attitude's every-day "consciousness of something," nor that of
objectivism or subjectivism, for, as Emmanuel Levinas remarks,
it was not necessary to wait for Husserl to encounter problems
of intentionality for the first time.[102]  We are concerned ,
not with an anonymously functioning consciousness of objects,
but with the specifically phenomenological notion of inten-
tionality which presupposes that the Epoche (in all of its
moments) is operative.[103]

Intentionality for Husserl denotes a subject-pole and an
object-pole.  His notion of intentionality, however, excludes
any image from objectivism or subjectivism that represents an
inside and an outside that somehow must get together, whether
that be as two matching independent things or as noumenon and

_____

101.  IdI, §§ 84, 86 ; N 21 [ 153] ; K, 84.

102.  Emmanuel Levinas, "La ruine de la représentation," in
      Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, p. 75.

103.  IdI, § 87 ; K, 153, and all §§ 39-40.

phenomenon.[104]

There are two aspects to intentionality as presented in Husserl's intentionality analyses. One is clearly distinguished and directly studied ; the other is rather considered indirectly and with reference to the first. The first aspect is that of intentionality viewed as an individual act with its correlative object, the noesis with the noema, the <u>cogitatio</u> with the <u>cogitatum</u>. This aspect might also be called that of <u>Sinngebung</u>. The second is that of intentionality taken to signify the ultimate ground of the intentional acts as residing in the transcendental subject. The distinction, then, is that between individual acts and their grounding.

Husserl is more preoccupied with the first aspect than with the second, but after passing the watershed of <u>Ideas</u>, he is progressively more aware of its significance. Certain students of Husserl have noted his twofold conception of intentionality. Although Levinas has remarked that intentionality for Husserl "<u>is essentially the act of sense-giving</u> (<u>Sinngebung</u>),"[105] he balances this judgment by noting that "the presence of the subject to transcendent things is the very definition of consciousness,"and that the possibility itself of intentionality is rooted in "the situation of the subject."[106] Eugen Fink makes the

---

104. IdI, §§ 43, 48, 52, 80 ; EP, I, 361-364 ; EP, II, 469 ; PV, 32-33 32-33 ; CM, 86 [118-119] . See also Iso Kern, <u>Husserl und Kant</u> (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 119-134 ; Fink, "Die phänomenologische Philosophie," in <u>Studien</u>, pp. 79-95 ; Quentin Lauer, <u>Phenomenology : Its Genesis and Prospect</u>, Harper Torchbook (New York : Harper and Row, Inc., 1965), p. 24.

105. "<u>II</u> [le rapport de l'intentionalité] <u>est essentiellement l'acte de prêter un sens</u> (la Sinngebung)." <u>E. Levinas, En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger</u>, 2nd ed. (Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967), p. 22.

106. "... la présence du sujet auprès des choses transcendantes est la définition même de la conscience." and "... la situation du sujet." Levinas, "La ruine," in <u>Edmund Husserl</u>, pp. 78 and 81 respectively.

straightforward assertion that it is only with Husserl's
"intentional analysis that 'intentionality' is revealed at
all."[107]  And the basic problem of Husserl's phenomenology,
adds Fink, is "die Frage nach dem Sein der Intentionalität."[108]

After making the transcendental shift in his phenomenology,
Husserl takes greater cognizance of the two aspects of intention-
ality.  In Formal and Transcendental Logic he speaks of
intentionality as "functioning" (fungierende),"[109] and in
Die Krisis as "mitfungierende."[110]  Appearing in such contexts,
the word recalls the importance that Husserl assigns in the
Ideas to the notion of Funktion which embraces,he declares,
"the most important problems" of phenomenology, namely those
of the intentional "constitution of the objects of conscious-
ness."[111]  Husserl further notes :

> The viewpoint of Function is the central viewpoint of
> phenomenology,...  Instead of the single experiences being
> analysed and compared, described and classified, all treat-
> ment of detail is governed by the "teleological' view of
> its function in making 'synthetic unity' possible.[112]

Merleau-Ponty, taking function and teleology as his texts,
points out the two dimensions of intentionality in Husserl :

107. "Die intentionale Analyse bringt überhaupt erst 'Intentiona-
     lität' zum Vorschein."  E. Fink, "Das Problem der Phäno-
     menologie Edmund Husserls," in Studien zur Phänomenologie,
     p. 218.

108. Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie," p. 223.

109. FTL, 157 [140] .

110. K, 240.

111. "... die allergrösten Probleme...  Konstitution der Bewusst-
     seinsgegenständlichkeiten."  IdI, 251 [212] ; trans.
     adapted from Gibson.

112. IdI, 252 [213] .

It is a question of recognizing consciousness itself as
a project of the world, meant for a world which it neither
embraces nor possesses, but towards which it is perpetually
directed--and the world as this pre-objective individual
whose imperious unity decrees what knowledge shall take
as its goal.  This is why Husserl distinguishes between
intentionality of act, which is that of our judments and
of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a position...
and operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität),
or that which produces the natural and antepredicative
unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in our
desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more
clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the
text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise
language.[113]

In the Cartesian Meditations, what Husserl has to say of
the unity of conscious life, the horizon of intentional acts,
and the "actuality and potentiality of intentional life" under-
scores this twofold intentionality.  With regard to conscious
life, he says :

---

113. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. xvii-xviii.
    For this question of the two aspects of intentionality
    and the problematic of intentionality in Husserl, see
    Helmut Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept of 'Horizon,' "
    in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, pp.
    106-123 ; E. Fink, "L'analyse intentionnelle et le pro-
    blème de la pensée spéculative," trans. W. Biemel et
    J. Ladrière, in Problèmes actuels de la phénoménologie,
    ed. H.L. Van Breda, O.F.M. (Paris : Desclée de Brouwer,
    1952), pp. 53-87 ; Quentin Lauer, Phénoménologie de Husserl :
    Essai sur la genèse de l'intentionnalité, (Paris : Presses
    Universitaires de France, 1955) ; Walter Biemel, "Les Phases
    décisives dans le développement de la philosophie de Husserl,"
    Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris :
    Les Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 32-71 (Discussion, pp.
    63-71) ; A. De Waelhens, "L'idée phénoménologique d'inten-
    tionnalité," Husserl et la pensée moderne, ed. H.L. Van Breda
    et J. Taminaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp.
    115-129, and the three studies of De Waelhens, "Phénoméno-
    logie husserlienne et phénoménologie hégélienne," pp. 7-29,
    "Signification de la phénoménologie," pp. 75-103, "Science,
    phénoménologie, ontologie," pp. 105-121, in Existence et
    signification (Louvain : Editions E. Nauwelaerts, 1958).

> Conscious life is... an all-embracing 'cogito', synthetically
> comprising all particular conscious processes that ever
> become prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum,
> founded at different levels on the manifold particular
> cogitata.[114]

And then further on :

> Conscious life... is not just a whole made up of 'data'
> of consciousness and therefore 'analyzable' (in an extremely
> broad sense, divisible) merely into its selfsufficient and
> non-selfsufficient elements....[115]

Another designation of consciousness most clearly reveals
that Husserl recognizes the basic intentionality of conscious-
ness : he speaks of the "intentional life" of the Ego. This
means the same as the "conscious life" just mentioned.
"Actuality and Potentiality of Intentional Life" is a chapter
heading of the Cartesian Meditations.[116] The chapter examines
how the analysis of intentional life uncovers "the potentialities
'implicit' in actualities of consciousness."[117]

Noetic activity reveals a basic intending-beyond-itself,
yet essential to itself, that points up the fundamental
orientation of subjectivity :

> Intentional analysis is guided by the fundamental cognition
> that, as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the
> broadest sense) a meaning of its meant, but that, at any
> moment, this something meant is more-- something meant with
> something more--than what is meant at that moment 'explicitly'.
> In our example, each phase of perception was a mere side
> of 'the' object, as what was perceptually meant. This
> intending-beyond-itself, which is implicit in any conscious-
> ness, must be considered an essential moment of it.[118]

---

114. CM, 42-43 [80] .

115. CM, 46 [83] .

116. CM, § 19.

117. CM, 46 [83] .

118. CM, 46 [84] .

The description of intentionality in terms of actuality
and potentiality could serve to summarize Husserl's notion of
intentionality.  The actuality of intentional life pertains
to the individual and specific intentional acts of conscious-
ness.  For its part, the potentiality of intentional life
indicates, first of all, the possibilities open to every intention-
al **act, and** then behind the act, the Ego as the source of all
intentional operating.  The Ego grounds all intentionality in-
asmuch as it makes intentionality possible in the first place.

Furthermore, such expressions as "intentional life" and
"conscious life," recalling the eidetic structure of the Ego,
point out unmistakably the essential intentionality belonging
to the Ego's "inborn a priori."[119]  In brief, intentionality
is the essence of the Ego.[120]

There are two levels of the analysis of intentionality
in Husserl which he himself explicitly recognizes.  One ante-
dates the other.

> The phenomenology developed at first is merely 'static' ;
> its descriptions are analogous to those of natural history,
> which concern particular types and, at best, arrange them
> in their systematic order.  Questions of universal genesis
> and the genetic structure of the ego in his universality,
> so far as that structure is more than temporal formation,
> are still far away ; and, indeed, they belong to higher
> level.  But even when they are raised, it is with a
> restriction.  At first, even eidetic observation will
> consider an ego as such with the restriction that a
> constituted world already exists for him.  This, moreover,
> is a necessary level ; only by laying open the law-forms
> of the genesis pertaining to this level can one see the
> possibilities of a maximally universal eidetic phenomenology.[121]

---

119. PV, 28 [ 28]  .
120. See IdI, 242 [ 203]   , IdI, §§ 84, 86 ; CM, 33 [ 72]  ; K, 84.
121. CM, 76-77 [ 110]  .  See also Robert Sokolowski, The Formation
    of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (The Hague : Martinus
    Nijhoff,1964), pp. 181-189 ; 201-210.

The first analysis, then, is a "static," or structural, one, while the second which is subsequent and at a "higher level" is a genetic analysis.

The two aspects of intentionality just mentioned above are connected with these two levels of analysis. On the one hand, the preoccupation with intentional acts and structural analysis go together, and on the other, the awareness of the grounding intentionality of the Ego and genetic analysis.

With respect to the essential intentionality of the Ego and genetic analysis, a further very important point can be noted : the appearance and significance of the terms "teleology" (Teleologie), "stimulus" (Reiz), "affect" (affizieren), "tendency" (Tendenz), "questioning" (Fragen), and the two most important of all, "striving" (Streben) and "interest" (Interesse). These notions appear, first of all, in the context of categorial activity : the advance from the passive constitution of sensation to the active constitution of judgment, the relationship of empirical objectivity to categorial objectivity. Briefly, this context is the relationship of Erfahrung and Urteil.[122]

---

122. These notions are to be distinguished from Aufmerksam-keit (or also, Attention). In particular, the main points of contrast between Aufmerksamkeit and the important notion of Interesse should be indicated.
In LU : the context is empiricism, psychologism and its notion of association, and abstraction. Aufmerksamkeit is, according to empiricism, the attention to successive traits of an object by which one may be said to recognize a certain identity that constitutes the general, or ideal, object. On several occasions Husserl uses Interesse as a synonym of Aufmerksamkeit (LU, I [ II/1] , 363 [ 137] , 370 [ 146] , 381 [ 159-160 ]). Such usage is casual. Husserl rejects the empiricist understanding of Aufmerksamkeit because it does not distinguish between mental states and the object. Husserl, however, broadens the notion of Aufmerksamkeit by lining it up with consciousness and intentionality : "The range of the unitary notion of attention is therefore so wide that it doubtless embraces the whole field of intuitive
.../...

.../... and cogitative reference (Meinens), the field of
presentation (Vorstellens) in a well-defined but
sufficiently wide sense, which comprehends both
intuition and thought. Ultimately it extends as
far as the concept : Consciousness of something"
(LU, I [II/1] , 384 [164] ). (LU, Invest. II,
Chapter. III : "Abstraction and Attention" ; see also
Farber, The Foundations of Phenomenology, pp. 256-
266.)
In IP : Husserl asserts that Aufmerksamkeit cannot be
simply identified with "the notion of an undifferent-
iated and in itself no further describable 'seeing' "
(IP, 9 [12 ] , in the "Gedankengang") ; see also
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception,
Introd., No. 3, " 'Attention' and 'Judgment.' ")
In IdI : in § 35 Husserl is concerned with the noetic
side of attention, the "turning-to-the object"
(Zuwendung). Attention is : 1) the active (opposed
to potential) consciousness of an object towards
which the Ego is turned ; 2) the whole cogito.
(See Ricoeur. Idées, pp. 112-113, n.2 [Ricoeur's note] .
In § 92 the noematic side of attention is presented.
The variations in the attention of the Ego have
corresponding noematic variations. Attention affects
the object im Wie of its appearing in conscious-
ness, not in its Quid. (See Ricoeur, Idées, p. 320,
n. 1 [Ricoeur's note] .) Husserl holds that there is
an "essential connexion between attention and intention-
ality." Therefore "the question at issue concerns the
radical and first beginning of the theory of attention,
and... the further inquiry must be conducted within the
framework of intentionality, and indeed not at once as
an empirical, but first of all as an eidetic study"
(IdI, pp. 270-271 [232] , n. 1).
In APS : Husserl identifies Aufmerksamkeit and thema-
tisches Interesse (APS, 151).
In EU : in §§ 16-17 the context is Assoziation
(Husserl's notion, not that of psychologism). In § 18
Husserl defines Aufmerksamkeit : "Allgemein ist Auf-
merksamkeit ein zur Wesensstruktur eines spezifischen
Aktus des Ich (eines Ichaktes im prägnanten Wortsinne)
gehöriges Tendieren des Ich auf den intentionalen
Gegenstand hin, auf die immerfort im Wechsel der Gege-
benheitsweise 'erscheinende' Einheit, und zwar als ein
vollziehend-Tendieren" (EU, 85). Starting with § 47,
Husserl speaks of the specific function of Interesse
as effectuating the advance in cognition from sensation
to categorial activity.
The difference between Aufmerksamkeit on the one hand,
and Interesse and Tendenz, etc. on the other, then,

Then the notions of striving and interest are found in the wider context of the all-embracing intuition-intentionality structure of the Ego's knowing, and its relationship to evidence and truth. Intentionality is a structure comprising the functionally interrelated sense and categorial operations : categorial activity depends upon the Vorkonstitution of sensation. Intentionality comprises the advance and promotion in human cognition from sense to categorial activity, and the relationship of this advance and promotion ultimately to evidence (the Selbstgebung of the object) and truth.

It is striving and interest that effectuate the advance and promotion. And they do so, not inasmuch as they intervene as something extraneous to the intentionality of cognition, but rather inasmuch as they are the specific manifestations of intentionality in sense and categorial activity that bring about the movement toward evidence and truth. Intentionality exists on the level of sensing and on the level of judging. But it likewise exists in the striving and interest that promote cognition from the one level to the other.

---

.../... might be summed up in this manner : if Aufmerksamkeit is taken to mean the cogito, the actual (opposed to potential), conscious intentional activity of the Ego, then Interesse and the other related notions are the procedure within the cogito, the intentional activity, that brings about the advance of the cogito to the attainment of its object. In EU Interesse appears more frequently than the others in the context of the constitution of categorial objectivity, and thus tends to become the proper term to describe the movement in knowing from the level of passive genesis--where Assoziation is found--to the level of categorial activity. We will return to Interesse (and the other related notions) especially in Chaps. V and VI below.

The <u>perception-interest</u>, which directs receptive experience, is only the <u>preliminary stage of the cognition-interest properly speaking</u>. It is a driving intention to effectuate completely the givenness of the intuitively given object.[123]

Striving and interest are co-extensive with intentionality. They are what make intentionality more than a static consciousness of an isolated object. They are what make it a cumulative genesis that takes its ultimate meaning from the attainment of categorial evidence and truth. This cumulative genesis Alphonse De Waelhens describes as a "promotion" in cognition.[124]

Striving and interest are involved, then, with the two seemingly disparate elements that Husserl finds in intentionality, namely, intuition and constitution, and that he seeks to unite. How are intuition and constitution to be reconciled : intuition that denotes a basically passive looking and constitution that denotes an active performance which brings about something ? When Husserl calls intuition the "principle of principles," he is to be taken literally. It has a normative role in cognition which must be acknowledged in every congnitional activity. The constitution (both passive and active) of objects, then, must accord with the exigencies of intuition.

---

123. "Das <u>Interesse der Wahrnehmung</u>, von dem die rezeptive Erfahrung geleitet ist, ist erst die <u>Vorstufe des eigentlichen Erkenntnisinteresses</u> ; es ist ein tendenziöser Zug, den anschaulich gegebenen Gegenstand allseitig zur Gegebenheit zu bringen." EU, 232.

124. See <u>Phenoménologie et vérité</u>, p. 56 : "La conscience humaine est signifiante et elle est dialogue. Cela veut dire qu'elle promeut le don qu'elle reçoit à un sens que ce don ne possédait pas explicitement ni <u>pour lui-même</u>. La vérité, qui est toujours vérité d'un sens, est une promotion." See also p. 57 : "La connaissance est un mouvement de promotion, où la 'chose' apporte à l'esprit la facticité de ce qui est et où l'esprit confère à la chose son sens de vérité, l'élève à l'objectivité connaissable et connue." See further pp. 55-57 of this work.

In a striking phrase Husserl fuses intuition and constitution by describing the ideal act of knowledge as "originary-giving" (originär gebende), that is to say, as seeing and effectuating objectivity at one stroke.[125]

Paul Ricoeur, commenting upon this effort of Husserl to combine intuition and constitution, asserts that constitution "is so little a 'making' in the mundane sense that it is a 'seeing.' "[126] And according to Gaston Berger,

> One must learn to unite two concepts that we are in the habit of contrasting : phenomenology is a philosophy of creative intuition. Intellectual vision really creates its object, not a semblance, nor a copy, nor an image of the object, but the object itself.[127]

---

125. IdI, 83-84 [43-44] , 91-92 [51-52 ]. See Paul Ricoeur's comments : "Husserl uses a surprising expression to start us off in the right direction. He calls the intuition that can 'legitimzie' all signification envisaged by conscious-ness the 'originary giving intuition'(originär gebende Anschauung). That intuition can be giving... is at first glance an expression more enigmatic than clarifying. Nevertheless, I believe that Husserl would be understood if one could understand that the constitution of the world is not a formal legislation but the very giving of seeing by the transcendental subject." "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in Husserl : An Analysis of His Phe-nomenology, p. 19.

126. "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology," p. 27, n. 19. See also Ricoeur's remarks in "Husserl and the Sense of History," in this same work, p. 147 : "... the very seeing itself is discovered as a doing (opération), as a producing (oeuvre), once Husserl even says 'as a creating' IdI, § 122 . Husserl would be understood--and the one who thus under-stands him should be a phenomenologist--if the intentionality which culminates in seeing were recognized to be a creative vision" ; see also p. 174 of this article. For further remarks on intuition-constitution by Ricoeur in this same work, see "A Study of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, I-IV, pp. 102-103 and "Kant and Husserl," p. 189.

127. "Il faut apprendre à unir des concepts que nous sommes ha-bitués à opposer : la phénoménologie est une philosophie de l'intuition créatrice. La vision intellectuelle crée

.../...

In terms of originary-giving intuition, striving and interest are the effort of the Ego by which all his intentional activity always moves "to effectuate completely the givenness of the intuitively given object." As specific manifestations of intuition-intentionality, their function is to set going the constituting-seeing which effectuates the presence of the object by seeing it. Or, it might be said, they are a looking for the object that becomes a looking at it.

Thus for a very important preliminary and background note on intentionality. For headings for the following study of intentionality we will make use of the Cartesian triad Ego-cogito-cogitatum. Husserl himself notes on several occasions that it is a convenient blueprint for examining intentionality, for it neatly presents the two correlative elements of intentionality, the subjective and the objective, the Ego-cogito and the cogitatum.[128] Our first topic in this chapter is the two levels of analysis ; then the notion of world that will require a further examination of the notion of horizon ; and finally Husserl's conceptions of immanence and transcendence vis-à-vis the constitution-creation problem of objectivity and subjectivity.

### I. Ego-Cogito-Cogitatum

To facilitate his study of intentionality, Husserl introduces the terms "noesis" and "noema" in Ideas, a work rather at the first level of intentional analysis.[129] However, he does not lay them aside in his later works where his main orientation is towards the problems of genetic analysis.[130] To set

---

.../... réellement son objet, non pas le simulacre, la copie, l'image de l'objet, mais l'objet lui-même." Le cogito danss la philosophie de Husserl (Paris : Aubier, 1941), p. 100 ; see also pp. 97-100, 103, 107.

128. IdI, § 80 ; PV 13 [13] ; CM, §§ 14, 21 ; K, § 50.

129. IdI, Third Section, Third Chapter.

130. See, for example, CM, 36-37 [74-75] ; 46-51 [83-88]; FTL, 262 [231-232] .

up some guide posts, we could say that the Logical Investigations and Ideas are at the level of static analysis, while The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Erfahrung und Urteil, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Die Krisis are at that of genetic analysis.[131] Our interest is more with genetic analysis, and thus with the second group of works.

## A. Static Analysis

### 1. Ego Cogito - Noesis

In every intentional act, for example, a perception, or a judgment, there are according to Husserl two essentially distinct components, the noetic and the noematic, or the really inherent (reelle) and the non-really inherent (irreelle).[132] As a preliminary and provisional distinction, we could simplify the case by saying that the really inherent component is the subject's nonreflexive self-awareness accompanying all his intentional activity ; it is that which belongs to the subject's side of intentional processes, as indicated in such expressions as, "my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing or doing."[133] The non-really inherent component, on the other hand, is that which belongs to the objective side. It is what is experienced, objectivated, thought, valued, or done.

However handy such a distinction may be to call attention to the two sides of intentional activity, its limitations become patent as soon as one begins to probe into the make-up of an intentional experience. The natural attitude's pre-reduction notion of intentionality would have subject and object

---

131. For Ideas and the notion of inner time which is essential to genetic analysis, see IdI, § 81. See also Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 159-166.

132. LU, II [II/1] , 536-541 [347-353] , 542 [355] , 567 [385], 576, n.1 [397, n. 1] , 577, n.2 [399, n.1 ] (concerning "real" and "reell") ; IdI, §§ 88, 97, 128 ; CM, §§ 11,18. The rendering "really inherent" for "reell" is taken from Cairns's translation of Cartesian Meditations, p. 26.

133. CM, 26 [65] .

confronting each other somewhat as two separated entites.
But the reduction has precisely eliminated any such confrontational
theory of knowing by disengaging the intentional act from
any trappings of presumed transcendence. The intentional act
is isolated qua intentional act. The reduced act is considered
on its own merits purely as an intentional experience.

However, the problem of knowing is still not resolved,
but in a way aggravated. Granted that the Epoche brackets
out all position-taking so that the operation bracketed in
may lie open to the gaze of intuition in its giving of itself
(Selbstgebung), still this giving of itself reveals an
objective aspect as pertaining to the essence of intentional
acts even when they are reduced.[134] The question, then, of
immanence and transcendence reappears in a new shape, more
bedevilling than before.

How Husserl wrestled with the difficulty is attested by
the advance from the Logical Investigations to his tortuous
search in The Idea of Phenomenology and Ideas for an adequate
vocabulary to express what is found present in the giving of
itself in the act of knowing.[135] In the first edition of
Logical Investigations Husserl states :

> ... by a return to the adequately fulfilling intuition it
> will render clear and distinct the pure forms and laws of
> cognition. This clarification demands... a phenomenology
> whose only aim is a descriptive analysis of experiences
> according to their really inherent components.[136]

---

134. Rudolf Boehm renders Selbstgebung in French by the happy expression présence authentique, in "Les ambiguïtés," pp. 487, n. 1 and 486, n. 1.

135. See the two articles of Rudolf Boehm, "Les ambiguïtés des concepts husserliens d' 'immanence' et de 'transcendence' and "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction."

136. "... die reinen Erkenntnisformen und Gesetze will sie durch Rückgang auf die adäquat erfüllende Anschauung zur Klarheit und Deutlichkeit erheben. Diese Aufklärung erfordert... eine Phänomenologie, die es auf blosse descriptive Analyse der Erlebnisse nach ihrem reellen Bestanden... abgesehen hat." LU, I, 1. Aufl. (Halle : Max Niemeyer, 1900), p. 21.

Only the really inherent components are adequately present to intuition. The really inherent components, the really immanent elements of conscious activity are only the **subjective stream** of experiencing, or this experiencing itself when it becomes the object of an inner perception. Thus far the limits of immanence according to the conception of the Logical Investigations in the first edition.

In spite of the lack of a single comprehensive presentation of the meanings of immanence and transcendence in Husserl's The Idea of Phenomenology, a basic conception can be discerned in them "which in his later writings is constantly, almost always, tacitly presupposed, as though he had actually published The Idea of Phenomenology.[137] Rudolf Boehm proposes the following schema in "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction" (p. 193) :

Real Transcendence

| Ego (-pole) | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | |

| Real Immanence | Intentional Immanence | Pure Transcendence |

Pure Immanence

---

137. Boehm, "Basic Reflections," p. 193. Cf. EU, 16-17 : "Erkenntnis is eben wie Urteil, Geurteiltes als solches, kein reelles Moment des erkennenden Tuns, das in der Wiederholung Desselben nur ein immer wieder gleiches wäre, sondern ein in der Art 'Immanentes', dass es in der Wiederholung selbstgegeben ist als Identisches der Wiederholungen. Mit einem Worte, es ist nicht reell oder individuell Immanentes, sonder irreal Immanentes, Ueberzeitliches." See further CM, § 41.

With regard to this outline, Boehm notes :

> In this schema the essential is immediately visible :
> 'Pure' or 'phenomenological' immanence in no way excludes
> every kind of transcendence, i.e., not all real transcendence ;
> rather it includes intentional immanence, which is a
> real transcendence.[138]

In terms of noesis and noema, cogito and cogitatum : the
noesis and the cogito belong to the Real Immanence (really inhe-
rent component), the noema and the cogitatum to the Intentional
Immanence.  With the notions of noesis-noema, cogito-cogitatum,
and the distinctions of the underlying schema, Husserl has the
means to pose, and thus investigate, the phenomenological
question of subjectivity-objectivity.

Various noetic characters can be identified, such as
supposing, conjecturing, questioning, doubting.  Inasmuch
as Husserl reckons such characters as being modifications of the
fundamental position-taking intrinsic to consciousness which
he names the Proto-form (Urform) of belief, or the Urdoxa, all
noetic belief characters are related to it.  Parallel to these
noetic characters, there are the noematic modalities of
possible, probable, questionable, doubtful.  And inasmuch
as Husserl reckons these as modalities of the Real, or the
Certain, which he calls the Protoform  of all the modalities
of Being, all noematic modifications are related to it.[139]

---

138. Boehm, "Basic Reflections, p. 193.  For a modified present-
ation of this scheme, see Boehm, "Les ambiguïtés," p. 490.

139. See IdI, §§ 103-104, 139 ; EU, 24, 25 (cf. "Weltglauben"),
53 (cf. "Seinsglaublen," "Glaubensboden"), 60 (Urdoxa is
der Boden schlichten Glaubensbewusstseins"), 63 (cf.
"Glaubensgewissheit," "passive Gewissheit"), 67, 469 ;
CM, 35 [73] , 58 [93] , 62 [97] ; FTL, 302 [265-266] .  See
also Ricoeur, "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I, in
Husserl : An Analysis, pp. 18, 26-27 ; Ricoeur's comments
in his French translation of Husserl's Ideen, pp. 354, n. 1 ;
386, n. 1 [for p. 235 of the German edition] ; De Waelhens,
Phénoménologie et vérité, pp. 47-50 (concerning EU) ;
.../...

There is another level of noetic-noematic parallelism :
that which belongs to the different types of intentional acts,
such as perception, memory, imagination, judgment, aesthetic
and ethical judgments.  Thus one distinguishes the perceiving
and the perceived, etc.  Husserl's noetic-noematic investigations
of these acts and that of the two  protoforms is as vast as
it is meticulous, and there is the possibility that one can
become so involved in following the details of his analyses
that one loses sight of Husserl's guiding idea of the
correlation of noesis and noema.

There is the correlation of individual noetic characters
and noematic modalities, such as supposing-possible, and of
specific intentional acts, such as seeing-seen.  But more
fundamental, in the very primordial sphere of subject and
object, there is a basic correlation grounding the whole
possible range of particular noetic-noematic pairings of
intentional experience.  For the two  protoforms themselves are
correlative to each other.  Furthermore, inasmuch as the two
protoforms  are correlative, they have their habitat in the
sphere of Real Immanence and Intentional Immanence (see the
schema indicated above).  The Urdoxa belongs to the sphere
of Real Immanence, while the  Protoform of the Real to that
of Intentional Immanence.  Consequently, both of them find
themselves matched in the comprehensive sphere of Pure, or
Phenomenological, Immanence.  The whole question of objectivity,
then, is located in--or to use the expression of phenomenology--
is reduced to a carefully demarcated area of the realm of

---

.../... Suzanne Bachelard, La logique de Husserl (Paris :
        Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), pp. 213-219 ;
        Gaston Berger, "Husserl et Hume, " in Phénoménologie du
        temps et prospective (Paris : Presses Universitaires de
        France, 1964), p. 5 (compares the notion of "belief" in
        Hume with that of Urdoxa in Husserl) ; Emmanuel Levinas,
        Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl,
        2e édition conforme à la première (Paris : Librairie
        Philosophique  J. Vrin, 1963), p. 192.

subjectivity.

## 2. Cogitatum-Noema

To the noetic side of consciousness belong the multiplicity
and temporal succession of intentional acts which follow one
another, appearing, enduring, and disappearing in the stream of
time.  To the noematic side belongs the identity of the object
that is the unity-pole in the series of multiple noeses.[140]
For perception, Husserl offers the celebrated example of the
tree in the garden : there is the one and same tree seen in a
succession of various acts of seeing.[141]

If the noema is distinct from the noetic elements of the
act, it is no less distinct from the object.[142]  The noema is the
sense (Sinn) that consciousness constitutes by its intentional
experiencing.  As such, it is an identity--constituted
with its presentational modes and ontic modalities--available for
recall.  And it is through this noematic identity that the
same, identical object itself is available for recall and can
appear to consciousness.  To be even more precise, the noesis
constitutes the object through the noema.  In Husserl's words :

> Not only does every addition of new or modification of
> old noetic characters constitute new noematic characters,
> but therewith eo ipso new ontic Objects are constituted for
> consciousness.  To the noematic characters there correspond
> predicable characters inherent in the Object meant, and
> indeed they are present as real predicables, and not merely
> as noematically modified ones.[143]

---

140. See IdI, § 98 ; FTL, § 62 ; CM, §§ 17, 30-31.

141. IdI, §§ 97-99.

142. IdI, §§ 105, 129, 131.

143. "Jedes Hinzutreten neuer noetischer Charaktere, bzw. jede
     Modifikation alter, konstituiert nicht nur neue noematische
     Charaktere, sondern es konstituieren sich damit eo ipso für
     das Bewusstsein neue Seinsobjekte ; den noematischen Cha-
     rakteren entsprechen prädikable Charaktere an dem Sinnes-
     objekt, als wirkliche und nicht bloss noematisch modifizierte
     Prädikabilien."  IdI, 301  260  ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

The unity of the object is the "carrier" (Träger) of sense upon which the manifold noematic characteristics-for example, seen object, seen living object, etc.--converge.

> As the central noematic moment, there is set apart :
> the 'object of reference,' the 'Object,' the 'identical,'
> the 'determinable subject of its possible predicates'--
> the pure X in abstraction from all predicates--and it
> is set apart from these predicates, or more precisely,
> from the predicate-noemas.[144]

In brief, "every noema has a 'content,' namely its 'sense' and is related through it to 'its' object."[145]

To return to the schema presented earlier : it permits us to clarify the distinction between noema and object. The noesis, as already mentioned, belongs to the sphere of Real Immanence, while the noema to that of Intentional Immanence. As for the object, it would belong to the sphere of Real Transcendence which nevertheless is in contact with Pure Immanence through the intending of the noesis and the noema.

The intending of the noesis and the noema, and their relationship to the object is not analogous to the noumenon-phenomenon pairing. Husserl could not be more explicit in rejecting anything like a recrudescence of the noumenon-phenomenon dualism. There is no such thing for Husserl as an unknown

---

144. "Es scheidet sich als zentrales noematisches Moment aus : der 'Gegenstand,' das 'Objekt,' das 'Identische,' das 'bestimmbare Subjekt seiner möglichen Prädikate'-- das pure X in Abstraktion von allen Prädikaten--und es scheidet sich ab von diesen Prädikaten, oder genauer, von den Prädikatnoemen." IdI, 365-366 [321] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

145. "Jedes Noema hat einen 'Inhalt,' nämlich seinen 'Sinn' und bezieht sich durch ihn auf 'seinen' Gegenstand." IdI, 361 [316] ; trans. adapted from Gibson. See also Aron Gurwitsch, "The Intentionality of Consciousness" in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, pp. 124-140.

object, completely independent from and beyond consciousness. Objects exist for consciousness. There is no question of objectivity apart from consciousness, for an object is that which, though transcendent, is constituted by intuitive consciousness as transcendent to consciousness.[146]

### B. Genetic Analyse

There is a certain formalism in Husserl's earlier analysis of constitution. In his words :

> The phenomenology developed at first is merely 'static' ; its descriptions are analogous to those of natural history, which concern particular types and, at best, arrange them in their systematic order. Questions of universal genesis and the genetic structure of the ego in his universality, so far as that structure is more than temporal formation, are still far away ; and, indeed, they belong to a higher level.[147]

The analyses establish eidetically distinct intentional acts, such as presentation or presentification, and ontic modalities, such as real, problematic, etc. The material side of intentional acts, however, is neglected so that the elements which serve as the basis for distinguishing objects of the same kind of intentional act--for example, a seen man from a seen pine tree-- are passed over.There is, furthermore, a certain timelessness to the objects inasmuch as their meaning is unaffected by the subject who knows them or the era in which he might know them. Thus from the point of view of static analysis, the meaning of number, death, or mercy is one and the same whether it is a child or a graybeard who knows them, whether it is in ancient Assyria or twentieth century Seattle.

---

146. PV, 32-33 [32-33] ; CM, 83-85 [116-118] .
147. CM, 76, [110] .

It is Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness that a
allows him to go beyond the formalism of static description.
We have already touched upon the question of time-consciousness
in the previous chapter where, we saw, it must be designated
as "the fundamental form" of intentional constitution. Belong-
ing to this fundamental form are the two features of the
Ego : the all-embracing cogito of conscious life and its
horizons, and the Ego as substrate of his habitualities.
These features of the Ego, his horizons and habitualities, ex-
plain his personal, emotional, intellectual, and moral growth.
They are,consequently, essential for the genetic analysis
of the constitution of objects.

Husserl's study of time has two important contributions
to his notion of constitution. First, he discards the
formalism of the apprehension-content (Auffassungsinhalt)
and apprehension (Auffassung) schema that is the basis for the
static analysis of the Logical Investigations and Ideas.
This schema, conceived on the basis of a matter-form
dualism, presents an intentional element--intention, or
noesis--posed over and against a non-intentional element--sense
data, or hyle--which it informs, thus bestowing meaning, and
thus constituting an object of knowledge.

However, Husserl discovers that this schema ignores the
radical temporality of conscious acts, introduces two irreconcilable
elements, one temporal and conscious, the other non-temporal
and non-conscious, and thus gives the impression that there
are ready-made elements that appear in consciousness independent
of the consciously intending subject.[148]

---

148. This is an over-simplification. The problem of the matter-
form schema (Auffassungsinhalt-Auffassung) is treated
briefly again in Chapter V, in the section on Immanent
Objects, with references to Husserl's works. Though it
is a large and important question in Husserl, we can do
little more than state its significance for our purposes.
What is germane to our investigation is that at their very

As a means for pedagogical presentation of the elements found in intentional activity, the schema has its merits.[149] But, asserts Husserl, when one turns to the really inherent elements of intentional experiencing, the sphere of Pure Immanence, then the schema can give the erroneous impression that a sensation or an intention "with this real occurring [reellen Auftreten] ... is fully constituted as an object.... But even in the immanent 'internality' of the ego, there are no objects beforehand," that is no sensations or intentions.[150]

The second contribution of Husserl's time studies is the notion of the temporal developmental process of constituting objects. The question here is briefly this : if there is developmental constitution of objects through successive meaning increments and layers, how does it take place ?

Husserl takes a categorical object, a judgment, and traces its origin back through the sedimented layers of meaning. Husserl might admit that such objects are ready-given but would deny that they were ready-made. In his words :

> The essential peculiarity of such products is precisely that they are senses that bear within them, as a sense-implicate of their genesis, a sort of historicalness ; that in them, level by level, sense points back to original sense and to the corresponding noetic intentionality ; that therefore each sense-formation can be asked about its essentially necessary sense-history.[151]

---

.../... source, intentional acts are temporal inasmuch as consciousness is a flow of distinguishable time phases in which it is impossible that ready-made objects should simply appear without the constituting activity of consciousness that precisely makes objects one and identifiable.

149. FTL, 286 [252-253] ; see also Sokolowski, The Formation, p. 178.

150. FTL, 285 [251] and 286 [253] .

151. FTL, 208 [184] .

A judgment can be broken down into the series of previous constitutive judgments and sense experiences that have contributed their sense elements. The predicates of one judgment are from another judgment, and these in turn from another, and so on back to an original judgment that can be schematized in its barest elements of simple subject (S) and simple predicate (p). For example, one could start with the trignometric function sin 90° = 1, and trace it back through definitions of symbols, functions, triangles, etc. to an original judgment of some sort in the simple schema of Sp that has bearing upon the occasion of some measuring act in the Life-world.

The return to origins, however, has not come to its term.[152] The analysis to detach the fundamental judgment schema is concerned with active, or predicative, constitution. There still remains the prepredicative experience (Erfahrung) that precedes the activity of forming a judgment. Such experience is premeaningful, but not in the sense that it is an amorphous state of confused awareness. It is intentional, but in a teleological and anticipatory manner insofar as it is aimed at the subsequent constitution of a judgment. Husserl says that it is the primal instituting (Urstiftung) of the Life-world, that world which is always there for us.[153]

Every object, then, whether a categorial object, such as a trignometric function, or a physically real (real) object, such as a tree in the garden, is constituted either by active or passive genesis respectively.[154] The question of the universality of constitution is answered whether one begins

---

152. CM, § 38.
153. FTL, 164 [147] , 232-233 [206] ; see also Chap. V below.
154. CM, 51 [87- 88] ; 78 [112] , 80 [113] .

with the examination of categorial objects or physical
ones.[155]   As Husserl says :

> These problems, once they are seen in one sort of
> Objects, immediately become universal : Is not each and
> every Objectivity, with all the sense in which it is
> accepted by us, an Objectivity that is winning or has
> won, acceptance within ourselves--as an Objectivity having
> the sense that we ourselves acquired for it ?[156]

The notion of habituality can help to clarify here what
active and passive constitution achieve and establish.
Habitualities, as we saw in the previous chapter, effectuate
a "fixed and abiding possession" for the Ego.[157]   Husserl's
example was an act of decision which, once endorsed, enters
permanently as a partial aspect into the total make-up of
the concrete Ego and becomes designated as a conviction.
Furthermore habitualities have another characteristic
extremely relevant to Husserl's notion of objectivity : their
availability for recall.

What Husserl has to say of habitualities embracing
the effectuations of passive and active genesis joins what
he has to say concerning the monad.  What he affirms of
habitualities, says Sokolowski,

> ... refers to the same thing Husserl describes...
> when he says that categorical acts deposit a sense
> which remains in objects and has an effect on the way
> we subsequently encounter such objects.  The categorical
> act which constitutes the sense as a predicate is equivalent
> to the act which establishes our conviction, and the
> deposited sense is equivalent to the conviction itself.

---

155. Thus <u>Formal and Transcendental Logic</u> concentrates on
     categorial objects, whereas <u>Erfahrung und Urteil</u> begins
     with pre predicative experience.

156. FTL, 264 [233] .

157. CM, 60 [95-96] .

Considering such sense as convictions or habitualities is simply to consider their subjective orientation.[158]

The monad, then, is the Ego bearing the aggrandizement of his habitualities along with himself, continually enriching them, and through them advancing to the constitution of new meanings, and thus new objects.

## II. Constitution : Creation or Condition ?

In his analysis of genetic constitution, Husserl swings the focus of his interest from "ready-made" objects to the developing subject. Time has relatively little significance for the static analysis since objects are viewed as though endowed with a certain atemporal fixity through the almost impersonal workings of noeses and noemas. Sokolowski points out how the relation of objectivity and subjectivity is conceived in genetic analysis :

> Objectivity is... conceived as the solidifying of a part of our intentional life in a judgment. In the judgment there is constituted a sense that immediately breaks off from the perpetual flow of consciousness and becomes an ideal entity transcending the life and temporality from which it arose.[159]

The relationship of objects to subjectivity is specified as that of what is relative to what is absolute.[160] Objectivity gets its sense from subjectivity. This is what Husserl

---

158. Sokolowski, The Formation, p. 188 ; Sokolowski translates "Erfahrung" by "encounter."

159. Sokolowski, The Formation, p. 182.

160. Two meanings of "absolut" can be distinguished in Husserl : 1) apodictic and adequate ; 2) nondependent : see IdI, §§ 47-50 ; K, § 55. See also Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 121-139 ; Rudolf Boehm, "Das Absolute und die Realität," Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 72-105 (originally appeared as "Zum Begriff des Absoluten bei Husserl," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 13 [1959], 214-242). The "final absolute," however, is the lebendige Gegenwart : see IdI,236 [198] ; Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 160-162 ; Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 66-78.

has in mind when he claims that all objects and the world
itself through the Epoche become a phenomenon for the Ego.

There remains nonetheless a certain ambiguity in
qualifying subjectivity as absolute : is to call
subjectivity absolute to say that is creates objectivity, that
is fashions objectivity entirely from its own resources ?
The world is relative to the absolute Ego.  What does that
mean ?  Does it mean that constitution of objects is
creation of objects ?

## A. The World

As already seen, the Life-world is presupposed for
any scientifically elaborated world.  However, when Husserl
speaks of the world, he can mean more than just the Life-world.

The world--after the Epoche--for Husserl is not a
single object nor the sum of all the individual objects
in it, but rather the goal of the totality of constituted and
to-be-constituted senses.  Not only the  pregiven Life-world
is included, but all worlds, thus all cultural worlds.
The world is the developed and developing system of sense
constituted by the Ego.  But to speak of totality or system
is not to conceive of them as a static corpus of works
containing meanings achieved and stored up once and for all.[161]

The notion of horizon is again enlightening here.
Horizon first of all signifies for Husserl the possibility of

---

161. K, 146, 173 ; Ms. K III 6, 148 [95a] ; 230 [142a] ; 236-
    237 [144b-145b] ; 369 [235a] ; Ms. K III 10 (all) ; See
    Ludwig Landgrebe, "The World as Phenomenological Prob-
    lem," in  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
    1 (1940), pp. 51, 55 ; E. Fink, "Welt und Geschichte,"
    Husserl et la pensée moderne, ed. H.L. Van Breda et
    J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959),
    pp. 143-159 ; De Waelhens, La philosophie et les expé-
    riences naturelles, Chap. V.  "Le monde."

further perceptions that the Ego anticipates in the course
of an actual perception.  The world, however, can be called
the ultimate horizon, "the horizon of all horizons," if it
is considered as the totality of all possible intentional
experiencings and their meanings.  Then, similar to the
Life-world, it is there surrounding the Ego as accessible,
and as a horizon it continuously expands out from all the
sense that the Ego for his part actively fashions.

To bring out this characteristic of the world by which
it grows through the accompanying growth of its horizon of
sense in the subject, Husserl speaks of the world as an
idea in a Kantian sense.  As an idea, it bears a  resemblance
to the notion of a limit in calculus : it is always
approached, but never attained.[162]  In Husserl's words :

> Only an uncovering of the horizon of experience ultimately
> clarifies the 'actuality' and the 'transcendency' of the
> world, at the same time showing the world to be inseparable
> from transcendental subjectivity, which constitutes
> actuality of being and sense.  The reference to harmonious
> infinities of further possible experience, starting from
> each world-experience--where 'actually existing Object'
> can have sense only as a unity meant and meanable in the
> nexus of consciousness, a unity that would be given as
> itself in a perfect experiential evidence--manifestly
> signifies that an <u>actual</u> Object belonging to a world or,
> all the more so, <u>a world itself, is an infinite idea,</u>
> <u>related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiences--</u>
> <u>an idea that is the correlate of the idea of a perfect</u>
> <u>experiential evidence</u>, a complete synthesis of possible
> experiences.[163]

---

162. IdI, §§ 74, 83, 144, 149 ; K, 266 ; § 9a ; KEM ; FUG.
     See also the <u>Introduction</u> of Jacques Derrida to the
     French translation of FUG, <u>L'Origine de la géométrie</u>,
     pp. 130-171.

163. CM, 62 [97] ; see also CM, 54-55 [90-91] ; 107-108
     [138].

Perhaps it is here, in terms of the notion of idea, that the essential intentionality of the Ego can best be seen. The world is enriched continuously by the meanings that the Ego effectuates in the arts and sciences. The goal of subjectivity is to effectuate sense. Though the Ego is unceasingly engaged in achieving sense, concretely in the arts and sciences, his task is never done. Effectuating sense is the open-ended intentionality of the Ego. Its goal is an idea, always approached, never attained. "The Idea is the pole of a pure intention, empty of any determined object. It alone reveals the very being of the intention : intentionality itself."[164]

Now if the world can be conceived of as an idea, what of the transcendental Ego to whom it is correlative ? Husserl never tires of stressing the correlation by which every objectivity is parallel to, and dependent upon, a subjective effectuation. It seems possible, then, to affirm that the Ego, too, is an idea, from a certain point of view. For inasmuch as the Ego develops through his accumulating habitualities that correlatively aggrandize the sense of objects, he is increasing in knowledge, art, culture, goodness, etc. according to the norms of what it is to be human with the continual possibility of developing ever more.[165]

---

164. "L'Idée est le pôle d'une intention pure, vide de tout object déterminé. Elle seule révèle donc l'être de l'intention : l'intentionnalité elle-même." Derrida, L'Origine, Introd., p. 153.

165. The whole of intentionality, in Husserl's conception, is controlled by reason (Vernunft), is what he calls teleological. The role of reason is to subject all of intentional life to the exigencies of evidence so that the Ego with his accumulated habitualities and the objects attained through them may systematically take conscious possession of what his intentionality is aimed at in all of its functioning. The goal of intentionality which is approached only asymptotically is the conscious self-possession of the Ego by the Ego. In such an awareness

.../...

The culmination of intentionality is this all-embracing correlation of Ego and world where the sense of the world is constituted by the Ego. Beyond this sense, claims Husserl, no other is imaginable.[166] Constitution, intentionality, world, horizon, and idea are broad notions. So to come down to the question that can be lurking behind them : is constitution, then, creation ?

### B. Constitution as Condition

Constitution for Husserl is not creation. The best way to establish that it is not, is to cite the occasions where he denies their identification.

In his preface to the English translation of Ideas, Husserl states :

> Our phenomenological idealism does not deny the positive existence of the real world and of Nature--in the first place as though it held it to be an illusion. Its sole task and service is to clarify the meaning if this world, the precise sense in which everyone accepts it, and with undeniable right, as really existing. That it exists--given as the existing universe in an experience that is continuous, and held persistently together in universal consistency--that is absolutely indubitable.[167]

---

.../... of his activity, he would see in what manner he gives meaning to the world. See FTL, the Introduction, §§ 7, 8, 23, 24 ; CM, Second Meditation especially ; KEM ; FUG, and the Introduction to the French edition, by J. Derrida, pp. 130-171 ; see also André de Muralt, L'Idée de la phénoménologie : l'exemplarisme husserlien (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), pp. 335-366.

166. CM, § 41.

167. "... der phänomenologische Idealismus leugnet nicht die wirkliche Existenz der realen Welt (und zunächst der Natur), also ob er meinte, dass sie ein Schein wäre, dem das natürliche und das positivewissenschaftliche Denken, obschon unvermerkt, unterläge. Seine einzige Aufgabe und Leistung ist es, den Sinn dieser Welt, genau den Sinn, in welchem sie jedermann als wirklich seiend gilt und mit wirklichem Recht gilt, aufzuklären. Dass die Welt existiert, dass sie in der kontinuierlichen immerfort zu universaler Einstimmigkeit zusammengehenden Erfahrung als seiendes Universum gegeben ist, ist volkommen zweifellos." N, 21 [152-153] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

Thus Husserl avers that the "other person" is constituted for me, even though in a certain manner he is already there :

> ... the fact, 'I am,' prescribes <u>whether</u> other monads are others for me and <u>what</u> they are <u>for me</u>. I can only find them; I cannot <u>create</u> others that shall exist for me.[168]

Husserl details the comprehensive list of what the subject constitutes, but does not create or make :

> ... the subjective Apriori precedes the being of God and world, the being of everything, individually and collectively, for me, the thinking subject. Even God is for me what he is, in consequence of my own productivity of consciousness ; here too I must not look aside lest I commit a supposed blasphemy, rather I must see the problem. Here too, as in the case of the other ego, productivity of consciousness will hardly signify that I invent and make this highest transcendency.
> The like is true of the world and of all wordly causation.[169]

For further clarification we can examine how Husserl conceives the relationship of immanence and transcendence. The schema we have presented above helps to show the point of contact--and rupture--between the constituting activity and the constituted object in Intentional Immanence. Thus, Husserl's theme, oft repeated with variations, that "Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego," is to be balanced by the occasions where he denies a creative activity to constitution.[170]

---

168. CM, 141 [ 168] .

169. FTL, 251  222  ; see also FTL, § 63, where "offers" (<u>darbietet</u>) is equivalent to "production" (<u>Erzeugung</u>). See Suzanne Bachelard, <u>La logique de Husserl</u>, pp. 188 ; 238-239.

170. CM, 83-84 [ 117] .

There is a radical distinction between the two.  Husserl
bluntly asserts that "Between consciousness and reality yawns
a veritable abyss of sense."[171]

Husserl is asserting that immanence is never transcen-
dence, that subjectivity is not objectivity, and that not even
the transcendental reduction (if anyone ever imagined that
it did) reduces the one to the other.  When Husserl affirms
that subjectivity is absolute and that objectivity is relative,
absolute cannot mean creative cause, nor can relative mean
created effect.

The distinction between absolute and relative might be
clarified by distinguishing between the production of the
Sinn of an object and the effectuation of its Seinssinn by
the Ego.  As Husserl puts it :

> Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something
> that (as I must recognize when I systematically explicate
> my own conscious life, as a life of acceptance [Geltungs-
> leben] ) has received its whole being-sense for me from
> from effective intentionality ; not a shadow of that
> sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality.[172]

The being-sense (Seinssinn) is dependent upon subjectivity in
order to emerge.  "Consciousness is the necessary condition
for the emergence of meaning and objects, but it does not
create them."[173]

Subjectivity can be called the condition of possibility
for objectivity, as long as there are no overtones of its

---

171. "Zwischen Bewusstsein une Realität gähnt ein wahrer
     Abgrund des Sinnes."  IdI, 153 [117] ; adapted from
     Gibson.  See IdI, §§ 47-50 ; see also Sokolowski,
     The Formation, pp. 126-131 ; Boehm, "Les ambiguïtés,"
     pp. 504-517 ; and "Das Absolute und die Realität," pp.
     88-105.

172. FTL, 234 [207] ; see also FTL, 164 [147] ; § 103.

173. Sokolowski, The Formation, p. 139.

being a "sufficient ground" or "efficient cause."[174]
Several rather simple examples might be adduced to clarify
how subjectivity is the condition for the revealment of the
sense of objects :

> Consciousness is a fundament for the world in the
> sense that the world cannot become 'real' (verum) unless
> there is consciousness.... subjectivity is a fundament
> for the world as real in the same way that the keel of
> a boat is a necessary condition for the boat itself.
> Without the keel, no boat can be formed ; and yet, the
> keel itself is not the boat, nor can it alone 'cause' the
> boat. It is simply a condition that is necessary for
> the coming-to-be of the vessel.[175]

Other examples could be : the glass tubing and neon light ;
an elaborately shaped trellis and the trained rose-vines ;
recording tape and the music recorded upon it.

It should also be noted that the facticity involved
in static as well as genetic constitution is most  consonant
with Husserl's explicit denials that constitution is creation.
Static analysis may differentiate intentional acts, but the
differentiation of acts does not explain the diversity of
objects. It is formalistic. Genetic analysis may go a long
way to elucidate the diverse objects, but it ultimately runs
up against the  pregiven world of passive constitution and
the  pregiven living present of consciousness which is the
well-spring of conscious life. It too has a certain formalism.
Whether one's analysis are static or genetic, one
ultimately meets up with a certain givenness, or facticity,
that is not the work of consciousness.

The entirety of objects and their senses from their
origin to complete emergence is not, and cannot be, accounted

---

174. Boehm, "Das Absolute," p. 99.
175. Sokolowski, The Formation, p. 137.

for solely by subjectivity.  Subjectivity just on its own
cannot give a complete and independent account of why it has
this specific intentional act of perception and why it sees
this tree in the garden.[176]

For subjectivity to be the absolute sufficient originator
of sense and objects would be more than to effectuate
their Seinssinn ; it would be simply to produce their Sein
also.  It would be to create them.  To effectuate Seinssinn
is not the same as to effectuate Sein.  "From the standpoint
of cognition," says Husserl, "for us men our own being is prior
to the being of the world, but not for that reason is it prior
from the standpoint of reality."[177]

### Summary

This chapter has three major topics.  First, an overview
of Husserl's notion of intentionality with its two aspects :
the individual intentional acts, and then the ultimate ground,
the condition of possibility, of these acts.  The second
major topic comprises the two kinds of analysis, static and
genetic.  The notions of noesis and noema are introduced in
static analysis (but not confined to it).

The pale of immanence and of transcendence is indicated
by a schema in which they can be distinguished from each
other, as well as reell from irreell, and noema from object,
while at the same time their point of contact is plotted out.
Genetic analysis, attempting to rectify the formalism of
static analysis, introduces the conception of the development
of the Ego, and the consequent parallel development of the

---

176. Concerning facticity see Sokolowski, The Formation, pp.
     136-139, 158-166, 191-194.

177. "Das ist... auch wahr, dass der Erkenntnis nach für uns
     Menschen unser eigenes Sein dem Sein der Welt vorangeht,
     aber darum nicht der Wirklichkeit des Seins nach."  K,
     266.  See also Levinas, Théorie de l'intuition dans la
     phénoménologie de Husserl, pp. 138-139.

meanings and objects he constitutes. The notions of world
and horizon are expanded : the world is the limit-idea, the
horizon of all horizons of all possible intentional effectuation.

And then the question : is constitution creation or
condition ? The third part, then, shows that according to
Husserl's notion, constitution is not a creation of sense and
objectivity, but rather a condition for their emergence. Genetic
analysis, just as static analysis, runs up against a certain
facticity in the Ego's constituting. Subjectivity does not
produce the Sein of objects, but as the keel is a condition
with respect to the finished boat, subjectivity is the condition
for the disclosing of the Seinssinn of objectivity.

CHAPTER III


HUSSERL'S VOCABULARY


The intentional object, says Husserl, can serve as
a clue to reach back to an understanding of its relationship
with subjectivity.[178] It would seem that Husserl's vocabulary
pertaining to objects could serve likewise in its own
fashion as a clue to disclose his notion of objectivity. The
language of a person whether operating in the natural
attitude or engaged in science can function as a clue to
reveal his conceptions in these areas.
The person in the natural attitude finds his vocabulary more
or less ready-made. The phenomenologist, however, like the
scientist, and unlike the person in the natural attitude, will
have to tool his own vocabulary to a certain extent in order
to express his own proper conceptions for a problematic
like objectivity.

However, neither the vocabulary of the natural
attitude nor that of science is adequate for Husserl, inas-
much as the notions themselves that either vocabulary expresses
concerning subjectivity and objectivity are radically
inadequate before the effectuation of the Epoche. Words
such as "thing," "body," and "object" are very frequently

---

178. See for example, CM, § 21 ; K, § 50.

used interchangeably to indicate the same referent.[179]
They are not clearly distinguished because the notions
which they disclose are not clearly distinguished either.
The notions of the natural attitude and of science, so
different in many respects, share a common ground with
respect to objectivity. For them an object is essentially
a perceptible spatio-temporal entity.[180]

Husserl's vocabulary for objectivity contains four
principal terms : Gegenständlichkeit, Gegenstand, Objekti-
vität, and Objekt. On some occasions he will use the related
expressions Gebilde and Einheit, too. The expressions
Immanenz, Transzendenz, and Welt are manifestly important
in a vocabulary study of Husserl, but their chief meanings
have already been mentioned.

For expressing objectivity-object, the German terms
outnumber the English counterparts four to two. To translate
the two German pairs (Gegenständlichkeit-Gegenstand and
Objektivität-Objekt), without resorting to neologisms or
circumlocutions, English has "objectivity" and "object."
Dorion Cairns, however, in his translations of the Cartesian
Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic, distinguishes
between the two German pairs by spelling "object" with a
small letter when it translates Gegenständlichkeit and Gegen-
stand, but with a capital letter when it translates Objekti-
vität and Objekt.[181] The distinction of spelling is also
observed with regard to related words, such as gegenständlich

---

179. See, for example : "... the thoughts of men are every
     one a representation or appearance, of some quality,
     or other accident of a body without us, which is
     commonly called an object." Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
     abridged and edited by John Plamenatz, 3rd. impression,
     The Fontana Library (London : William Collins Sons
     and Co., Ltd., 1967), p. 61.

180. IdI, §§ 27, 57-60 ; K, 141, 146 ; §§ 36-37.

(objective) and _objektiv_ (Objective), etc.[182] We will
adopt Cairns's practice.

There are three prenotes. First, our chief interest
is in what Husserl means by _Objektivität_ and its cognates,
in phrases like "the Objectivity of human cognition," "Objectively
valid knowledge." Secondly, although we can designate
_Objektivität_ as the focal point of our study, it should not
be inferred then that its meaning is univocal and exclusive,
and that there are not occasions when _Gegenständlichkeit_ or
_Gegenstand_ are employed where we might have expected _Objek-_
_tivität_ or _Objekt_. Thirdly, all four terms express the
general notion of something being correlative in a certain
manner to intentionality, e.g. seen objects, imagined objects,
hallucinated objects, or the objectivity of cognition, etc.[183]

### I. The Four Usual Terms
### A. Gegenständlichkeit

There are four uses of _Gegenständlichkeit_ we can survey.
First use : in the _Logical Investigations_, while discussing

---

182. In order to distinguish _Gegenständlichkeit_ and _Objek-_
_tivität_, some of the French translators of Husserl
use the neologism "objectivité" for _Gegenständlichkeit_ :
see Edmund Husserl, _Logique formelle et transcendentale_,
2e ed., (1st ed., 1957), trans. Suzanne Bachelard
(Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), p. 18,
n. 3 ; Edmund Husserl, _Recherches logiques_, II/1, trans.
Hubert Elie, Lothar Kelkek, et René Schérer (Paris :
Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 46  38  , n. 1;
p. 275, in "Remarques sur la traduction de quelques ter-
mes" ; Derrida's translation of FUG, _L'origine de la_
_géométrie_, p. 180 [368] . However, Edmund Husserl, _Expé-_
_rience et jugement_, trans. D. Souche (Paris : Presses
Universitaires de France, 1970), p. 484 of the "Index,"
gives _objectivité_.

183. For another schema for Husserl's vocabulary on
objectivity, see De Muralt, _L'idée de la phénoménologie_,
pp. 120-121.

an expression's intentional referent, Husserl introduces
the term Gegenständlichkeit and explicitly distinguishes
one of its meanings from Gegenstand. He gives the reason
why he will employ it rather than Gegenstand on certain
occasions :

> I often make use of the vaguer expression 'objectivity'
> since we are here never limited to objects in the narrower
> sense, but also have to do with affair-complexes, properties
> and non-independent forms etc, whether real or categorial.[184]

Since Husserl widens the notion of what he means by
an object, he introduces a new terminology.  In the narrow
understanding of what an object is, only physical bodies,
trees, houses, vegetables would qualify.  But in Husserl's
understanding of objectivity, a state of affaires, like "the
principle of the parallelogram of forces" has as much
objective status as "the city of Paris."[185]

This broader conception of objectivity is already
present in one of Husserl's earliest writings, the Philosophie
der Arithmetik of 1891.  In a brief historical review of the
development of certain themes in his writings, Husserl
describes the "objectivities" he had in mind in the
Philosophie der Arithmetik :

> It was therefore, in my later terminology, a phenome-
> nologico-constitutional investigation ; and at the same
> time it was the first investigation that sought to make
> 'categorial objectivities'of the first level and of higher

---

184. "Ich wähle öfters den unbestimmteren Ausdruck Gegen-
     ständlichkeit, weil es sich überall nicht bloss Gegen-
     stände im engeren Sinn, sondern auch um Sachverhalte,
     Merkmale, um unselbständige reale oder kategoriale
     Formen u. dgl. handelt."  LU, I [II/1] , 28 [38 ], n. 1 ;
     trans. adapted from Findlay.

185. LU, I [II/1] , 330 [101] .

levels (sets and cardinal numbers of a higher
ordinal level) understandable on the basis of the
'constituting' intentional activities...[186]

The first use, then.  Categorial objects, as well
as all objects, belong to the supreme formal region of
Gegenständlichkeit-überhaupt (not a genus) which includes all
objectivities found in judgment considered from the point
of view of Husserl's Formal Ontology.  "The formal region of
objectivity-in-general is divided into ultimate substrates
and syntactical objectivities"[187]-- for example, the final
individual term, "the table," or the syntactical objectivity,
"This red table is wider."  Our interest is not specifically
in Husserl's Formal Ontology.  Nevertheless it should be
noted that the "formal universality" of the objectivity-in-
general is a "transcendental clue" pointing to the essential
intentionality of the Ego obviously more important than all
the piecemeal "transcendental clues" of individual objects.[188]

Second use.  Husserl also calls such categorial
objectivities "objectivities of the understanding" (Ver-
standesgegenständlichkeiten) to indicate their active
constitution source in contrast to that of physically real
objects.[189]  Ideal (ideale) and non-physically real (irreale)
objctivities are other expressions for this type of objec-
tivity which is to be distinguished from individual physically
real (reale), or empirical, objects.[190]

---

186. FTL, 87 [ 76]  .  The detailed investigation of categorial
     objects is taken up in Chaps. IV-VI below.

187. "... teilt sich die formale Region Gegenständlichkeit-
     überhaupt in letzte Substrate und syntaktische Gegen-
     ständlichkeiten."  IdI, 70 [ 30]  : trans. adapted from
     Gibson.  See also IdI, 337 [ 295]  ; Beilagen §§ IV-V,
     pp. 386-389 ( German ed.)  ; IdI, § 13 (not a genus).

188. CM, § 21.

189. EU, 392 ; §§ 64-65 ; CM, §§ 38-39.

190. EU, §§ 64-65 ; FTL, 60 [ 53]  , 158 [ 141]  , 258 [ 228]; § 62 ;
     K, 23-24 ; FUG, 368.

Husserl speaks of a further type of ideal objectivity, a "general objectivity" (<u>Allgemeingegenständlichkeit</u>). Thus, the term <u>Verstandesgegenständlichkeit</u> is used to designate the constitution-origin of an objectivity in active genesis, <u>irreal</u> and <u>ideal</u> to distinguish a certain class of objectivities from <u>reale</u> objects that are spatio-temporal, and <u>Allgemeingegenständlichkeit</u> to indicate a type of <u>irreale</u> (<u>or ideale</u>) objectivities that are Regions (genera) and species, e.g. the Region color and the species red, or yellow, or blue.[191]

Third use : Husserl does not confine his use of <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u> to just <u>irreale</u>, or <u>ideale</u>, objectivities. Occasionally he will employ it with <u>reale</u> while contrasting <u>reale Gegenständlichkeiten</u> with <u>ideale</u>.[192] In this case <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u> serves more to indicate a common characteristic that both <u>reale</u> and <u>ideale</u> entities share and possess, just as one might say that they possess validity and correlativity to subjectivity. Both of them possess objective status.

Fourth use : in <u>The Idea of Phenomenology</u>, and other works, there are places concerning the general intentional structure of consciousness where, instead of using the term Objektivität--which would be expected--he uses <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u>. For example :

> It is only in cognition that the essence of objectivity can be studied at all, with respect to all its basic forms;; only in cognition is it truly given, is it evidently 'seen'...
> We need the insight that the truly significant problem is that of the <u>ultimate bearing of cognition</u>, including the problem of <u>objectivity in general</u>, which is only what

---

191. EU, §§ 86-93.
192. EU, 304-306 ; the heading of § 65 ; FTL, 158 [141] , 247 [218] .

it is in correlation with possible cognition.[193]

But in this same work, there are likewise occasions where
Husserl employs Objektivität which is his usual term for
Objectivity when there is question of the transcendent dimension
of cognition.  In a context hardly different from the above
where he uses Gegenständlichkeit, Husserl says :

> I must never fancy that by relying on transcendent
> presuppositions and scientific inferences I can arrive where
> I want to go in the critique of cognition--namely, to asses
> the possibility of a transcendent Objectivity of cognition....
> And, evidently, that goes not just for the problem of
> transcendent Objectivity but also for the elucidation of
> every possibility.[194]

The important point ever to keep in mind with respect to
Husserl's usage of Gegenständlichkeit is that he introduces it,
as he himself avows, to expand the meaning of objectivity
beyond the narrow limits of the empiricist conception.  Thus
are categorial objectivities, numbers, mathematical functions,
geometrical figures and universal concepts as really objective
as cabbages and kings.

### B. Gegenstand

Perhaps the easiest way to begin the survey of the meanings
of Gegenstand is to compare them with those of Gegenständ-
lichkeit.  After having introduced Gegenständlichkeit in the
Logical Investigations as distinct from Gegenstand, Husserl
later in the same work sometimes uses Gegenstand and speaks of

---

193. IP, 59-60 [ 74-75] .  See also IP, 11-12 [ 14] , 15 [ 19], 18
     [ 23] , 20 [ 25] ,  43[ 55] ; PSW, 90[ 22] ; APS, Beilage VII, pp.
     364-365 (both Gegenständlichkeit and Objectivität are used).

194. IP, 31 [ 38-39] ; trans. adapted from Alston and
     Nakhnikian ("Objectivity" for "objectivity").

"categorial objects," or objects of a "higher order."[195]

In the <u>Ideas</u> and <u>Cartesian Meditations</u>, for example, he uses <u>Gegenstand</u> just as he might have used <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u> :

> If <u>object</u> and <u>empirical object</u>, <u>reality</u> and <u>empirical reality</u> mean one and the same thing, then no doubt the conception of idea as objects and as realities is an inverted 'Platonic hypostatization.' But if, as has been done in the <u>Logical Studies</u>, the two are sharply separated, if object is defined as anything whatsoever, e.g., a subject of a true (categorical, affirmative) statement, what offence then can remain, unless it be such as springs from obscure prejudices?... In this sense, indeed, the tone-quality <u>c</u>, which is a numerically unique member in the tone-scale, or the digit <u>2</u> in the series of numbers, or the Circle in the ideal world of geometrical constructions, or any proposition in the 'world' of propositions--in brief, the ideal in all its diversity <u>is</u> an 'object.'[196]

And just in the case of <u>Gegenständlichkeit</u>, Husserl employs <u>Gegenstand</u> together with <u>überhaupt</u> to signify the supreme universal form of his formal ontology.[197] Further, besides

---

195. See, for example, LU, I [II/1], 330 [101]; II [II/2], 787 [145], 788 [147], 795 [156], 797 [158], 812 [177], 822 [189], 824 [191]; see also the important note, FTL, 248 [219], n.1.

196. "Besagt <u>Gegenstand</u> und <u>Reales</u>, <u>Wirklichkeit</u> und <u>reale Wirklichkeit</u> ein und dasselbe, dann ist die Auffassung von Ideen als Gegenstanden und Wirklichkeiten allerdings verkehrte 'Platonische Hypostatierung.' Wird aber, wie es in den 'Logische Untersuchungen' geschehen ist, beides scharf getrennt, wird Gegenstand definiert als irgend etwas, also z.B. als Subjekt einer wahren (kategorischen, affirmativen) Aussage, welcher Anstoß kann dann übrig bleiben--es sei denn solcher, der aus dunklen Vorurteilen herstammt?... Und in diesem Sinne <u>ist</u> eben die Tonqualität c, die in der Tonreihe <u>ein</u> numerisch einziges Glied ist, oder <u>ist</u> die Zahl 2 in der Anzahlenreihe, die Figur Kreis in der Idealwalt geometrischer Gebilde, ein beliebiger Satz in der 'Welt' mathematischen Sätze-- kurzum vielerlei Ideales ein 'Gegenstand.' "" IdI, 88-89 [48-49]; trans. adapted from Gibson. See also IdI, Beilage XXVII, pp. 414-417 (German ed.). See also CM, 59 [95] where Husserl lists other objects : "numbers, states of affaires, laws, theories."

197. IdI, 66-68 [26-28], 72 [32]; FTL, 77 [68-69]; CM, 50-51 [87-88].

using <u>Gegenstand</u> in combination with <u>real</u>, he does not hesitate
to use it together with <u>ideal</u> and <u>irreal</u>.[198]  So much for the
very brief point by point comparison with the usage of
<u>Gegenständlichkeit</u>.

Gegenstand is likewise used to refer to the correlate of
consciousness in general , or of an individual intentional act
of representation (<u>Vorstellung</u>), whether this be presentation
(<u>Gegenwärtigung</u>) or presentification (<u>Vergegenwärtigung</u>).
As something of a definition of <u>Gegenstand</u> that is broad enough
to take in the complete correlate or the individual correlate,
one might consider Husserl's remarks on two occasions.  In
<u>Erfahrung</u> <u>und</u> <u>Urteil</u> he points out the essential traits of the
object  and thus gives a kind of working definition :

It is precisely this identity as correlate of an
identification to be carried out in an open, unlimited, and
free repetition that constitutes the <u>exact</u> <u>meaning</u> <u>of</u>
<u>object</u>.[199]

Then in <u>Cartesian</u> <u>Meditations</u> he adds the further element of
"horizon intentionalities" :

The object is, so to speak, <u>a</u> <u>pole</u> <u>of</u> <u>identity</u>, always
meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized ;
in every moment of consciousness it is an index, pointing
to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according
to its sense....[200]

Paul Ricoeur, distinguishing <u>Gegenstand</u> and <u>Objekt</u> in

198. LU, I 226 [ I] , [ 229] ; IdI, 82 [ 42] ; FTL, 155 [ 139] , 163
     [ 146] , 167 [ 149] ; § 58 (paragraph heading) ; CM, 52 [ 89] ;
     FUG, 368-371 ; for "<u>allgemeine Gegenstände</u>," see LU,
     III, § 52.

199. "Eben diese Identität als Korrelat einer in offen endloser
     und freier Wiederholung zu vollziehenden Identifizierung
     macht den <u>prägnanten Begriff des Gegenstandes</u> aus."
     EU, 64.

200. CM, 45-46 [ 83] ; see also CM, 65 [ 100] .

his commentary on the _Ideas_, remarks :

> _Gegenstand_ is the object of perception or representation just as it is given with its qualities.  _Objekt_ is often taken in a phenomenological sense...  it indicates the correlate of consciousness as wider than the object of representation and includes the object of feeling and willing....[201]

There are situations in the _Ideas_ where _Gegenstand_ and _Objekt_ confront each other and the difference is noticeable :

> The intentional Object, that which is valued, enjoyed, beloved, hoped as such, the action as action, rather becomes an object only when it is grasped in a specific '_objectivating_' conversion of thought.[202]

Ricoeur draws some further precisions in his commentary :

> The _Gegenstand_ is what is intended by perception and its related acts, therefore by attention in the strict sense (erfassen, auf-etwas-achten) ; the _Objekt_ is what is intended by consciousness in all its forms (thing and value), therefore by consciousness in the wide sense.  But every act can be changed in such a manner that the _Gegenstand_ of perception which bears the pleasant, the worth-while, etc. comes to the foreground.[203]

---

201. "Gegenstand est l'objet de perception ou de représentation, tel qu'il se donne, avec ses qualités.  Objekt est pris souvent en un sens phénoménologique... il désigne le cor-rélat de conscience plus large que l'objet de représenta-tion et inclut l'objet du sentir et du vouloir...."  Edmund Husserl, _Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie_, p.119, translator's n.3.

202. "Das intentionale Objekt, das Werte, Erfreuliche, Geliebte, Erhoffte als solches, die Handlung wird vielmehr erst in einer eigenen 'vergegenständlichen' Wendung zum erfaßten Gegenstand."  IdI, 122 [82] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

203. "Le _Gegenstand_ est le vis-à-vis de la perception et des actes apparentés, donc de l'attention au sens strict (erfassen, auf-etwas-achten) ; l'Objekt est le vis-à-vis de la conscience sous toutes ses formes (chose .../...

However, it can be immediately shown that there are
instances in the Ideas where Gegenstand means the correlate of
consciousness taken in the broad sense, for example, the heading
of Chapter One of the Fourth Section, or the title of
§ 135.[204] And it can be furthermore shown that Objekt for its
part, in Ideas and elsewhere, can signify the correlate of
perception and related acts.[205] Nevertheless, the distinction
that Ricoeur draws is valid in general for the Ideas.

There are the related terms gegenständlich (objective)
and vergegenständlichen (objectify). Gegenständlich is used
either as an adjective or as a substantive. In such instances
Husserl employs the terms in a manner consonant with his usage
of Gegenstand just mentioned.[206]

Vergegenständlichen means to "make into an object," or
to "objectify," as when Husserl speaks of the "objectifying
conversion" of consciousness by which it constitutes the
object.[207] Since the expression is found in the context of

---

.../... et Valeur), donc de l'actualité au sens large. Mais
tout acte peut être transformé de telle manière que le
Gegenstand de la perception qui porte l'agréable, le vala-
ble, etc., passe au premier plan." Ricoeur, Idées, p.119,
translator's note n.1.

204. IdI, 148 [ 112] , 402 [ 356] ; N, 26 [ 159]  .  See also Fink,
"Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in
Studien zur Phänomenologie, p.211.  "Husserl fordert eine
Erweiterung des Begriffes des Seienden, die mit der Weite
des Begriffs 'Gegenstand', verstanden als Korrelat eines
sinnvoll identifizierenden Meinens, übereinstimmt."

205. See IdI, 127 [ 88] , 263 [ 224] , 364 [ 318] ; EU, 315 ; CM,
61 [ 96]  ; K, 97, 107.

206. A sampling of cases of Gegenständlich as an adjective :
LU, 1 [ 1] , Proleg., § 67 (the first Task of Pure Logic
and "Gegenständlichen Kategorien") ; IdI, 122 [ 83] ,
227 [ 189] , 226 [ 227] ; § 119 ; EU, 36, 378-379, 437-438 ;
FTL, 169 [ 151] ; and of Gegenständlich as a noun : IdI,
118 [ 78] , 227 [ 189] , 362-364 [ 317-319] ; EU, 290.

207. "...vergegenständlichen Wendung." IdI, 122 [ 82] ; trans.
adapted from Gibson.  See also IdI, 337 [ 295] ; EU, 64-
65 (noun) ; 75 (verb) ; 303 (past participle).

intentionality together with such other expressions as _Akt_, _Leistung_, _Richtung_, and _Wendung_ it should be noted, then, that active, rather than passive, constitution is under discussion.

### C. _Objektivität_

_Gegenständlichkeit_ and _Gegenstand_ form a pair that can be contrasted with each other ; the same is true with _Objektivität_ and _Objekt_. The more important contrasts and comparisons, however, are to be made between the two sets of pairs. We have already remarked on certain distinctions between the use of _Gegenstand_ and _Objekt_. As already mentioned, our chief interest is in the meaning of _Objektivität_ inasmuch as this indicates the transcendent dimension of human cognition. There are three uses of _Objektivität_ that will occupy our attention.

First of all, _Objektivität_ means the intentional correlative of consciousness ; it is that which is transcendent to consciousness. It is the pole correlative to the subjective pole when one is considering "the relationship... between the subjectivity of knowing and the Objectivity of the content known."[208] And, as Husserl makes clear on several occasions of his career, the Objectivity of knowledge is pivotal in phenomenology. As he puts it in The Idea of Phenomenology :

> I must never fancy that by relying on transcendent presuppositions and scientific inferences I can arrive where I want to go in the critique of cognition--namely, to assess the possibility of a transcendent Objectivity of cognition. And that goes not just for the beginning but for the whole course of the critique of cognition, so long as there still remains the problem of how cognition is possible. And, evidently, that goes not just for the problem of transcendent Objectivity but also for the elucidation

208. LU, 1 [I], 42 [vii]; trans. adapted from Findlay ("Objectivity" for "objectivity").

of every possibility.[209]

Husserl's phenomenology claims "to be transcendental philosophy and, as such, to have the ability to solve the problems that concern the possibility of Objective knowledge."[210] In short , Objectivity in this sense, is "the cardinal question of epistemology."[211]

The second use : Objektivität can refer to the ideality of knowledge. It then indicates the status of knowledge by which, as a permanent acquisition actively constituted in and by consciousness, it has validity at all times and for all men. As such,

> ... this is precisely the goal of the activity of knowing.... Only the grasping in the form of universality makes possible that disengagement from the here and now of the situation of empirical experience which belongs to to the essence of the Objectivity of thought.[212]

The theoretical formations (Gebilde) of science, mathematics, and logic possess this ideal Objectivity.[213] As will be seen later, this is Objectivity par excellence for Husserl, and

---

209. IP, 31 [38-39]: trans. adapted from Alston and Nakhnikian ("Objectivity" for "objectivity"). See also LU, I [II/1], 253-254 [8]; IP, 16-17 [20-21], 20 [25], 38 [48]; IdI, 95-96 [56]; N, 18-19 [150]; EP, I, Beilage XX, pp. 381-395 ; APS, Beilage VII, pp. 364-365 ; EU, 384 ; FTL, 34-35 [30-31], 263-264 [233-234]; K, 149, § 53 ; FUG, 369, 385.

210. CM, 148 [174].

211. LU, I [I], 56 [8].

212. "... das ist ja das Ziel der Erkenntnistätigkeit.... Erst das Erfassen in der Form der Allgemeinheit ermöglicht diejenige Loslösung vom Jetzt und Hier der Erfahrungssituation, die in dem Begriff der Objektivität des Denkens beschlossen liegt." EU, 384. See also De Muralt, L'idée de la phénoménologie, pp. 120-121.

213. LU, I [II/1], 254 [8]; 330 [101]; EU, 384, FTL, 20-21 [18-19], 26-27 [23], §§ 8-9, § 11c, § 26b-c, 263 [233]; K, 30 ; FUG, 368-371, 385.

coincides with the first usage above.

The third use. The plural form Objektivitäten is not common in Husserl, certainly not as common as Gegenständlichkeiten. As in the case of Gegenständlichkeit compared with Gegenstand, Objektivität is more abstract than Objekt, even though Husserl will speak of "individuelle Objektivitäten."[214] Thus Objektivitäten can manifest diverse aspects of what Objektivität usually means, namely, ideal transcendence (meanings one and two from above) : categorial Objectivities (LU, II [ II/2] , 787-788 [ 146] , 794 [ 154] ), Objectivities transcendent to inner time (Z, § 33), founded Objectivities of a higher order (Ad. I,84 [German edition] ), spiritual Objectivities (communities) (CM, 132 [ 160] ), all transcendent Objectivities (CM, 99 [ 130] ).

### D. Objekt

There are three uses of Objekt we will consider. First, Objekt as the transcendent correlate of consciousness. Objekt employed in this way signifies something that has the characteristic of Objektivität, namely, transcendence to consciousness. "Objects of cognition (Erkenntnisobjekte) claim to possess" transcendence.[215] The Objekt, then, is what is opposed to immanence, to what is really inherent to subjective cognitional process ; it is the point upon which focuses the intentionality of consciousness.

> The Epoche, inasmuch as it gives us the attitude on the Subject-Object-correlation belonging together with the world and therewith the attitude towards the transcendental Subject-Object-correlation, brings us to the point where we recognize with complete realization that the world which exists for us, in every mode and manner of its being, is our world and derives its ontic sense totally from our intentional life in an eidetic structure of formations

---

214. Z, 111 [ 84] .
215. IdI, 97 [ 56] .

that are a priori demonstrable....[216]

The distinction made by Ricoeur--mentioned above--between Gegenstand and Objekt in the Ideas underscores this usage. There are "the modes of Ego-comportment" which

> ... make it understandable how, in itself and by virtue of its current intentional structure, consciousness makes possible and necessary the fact that such an 'existing' and 'thus determined' Object is intended in it, occurs in it as such a sense.[217]

Objekt is the correlate of subject. It is the pole correlative to the intentional activity of the subjective pole.

The second use of Objekt : ideale Objecte. Again, Objekt is related to Objektivität. Here it is employed to signify that which has the status of ideality by belonging to an "ideal world."[218] Examples of ideal Objects are theoretical-formations, categorial entities, geometrical forms, and numbers.[219] Other ideal Objects of a different sort, yet likewise distinct from empirical objects, or simple things, are "cultural Objects," such as "books, tools, works of any kind...."[220]

Third use : we have already seen (in the section on Gegenstand) that Objekt can be used as the correlate of

---

216. "Die Epoché, indem sie uns die Einstellung über der mit zur Welt gehörigen Subjekt-Objekt-Korrelation, gab und damit die Einstellung auf die transzendentale Subjekt-Objekt-Korrelation, führt uns ja dahin, selbstbesinnlich zu erkennen :dass die Welt, die für uns ist, nach Sosein und Sein unsere Welt ist, ganz, und gar aus unserem intentionalen Leben ihren Seinssinn schöpft, in einer aufweisbaren apriorischen Typik von Leistungen...." K,184.

217. CM, 47 [85]; see also EU, 81 ; § 19 ; FTL, 201 [178], 292 [257]; PV 21 [21-22]; CM, 62 [97], 95-96 [127].

218. FTL, 260-261 [230].

219. FTL, 44-45 [39-40], 82 [72], 260-261 [230].

220. CM, 92 [124]; see also FTL, 288 [254].

perception and related acts.  Using Objekt, Husserl gives a very
neat definition of something that possesses Objectivity,
specifically, a perceived Object :

> The Object is a unity of consciousness which in repeated
> acts (therefore, in temporal succession) can appear as the
> same ; it is that which is identical with regard to intention,
> which is identifiable in no matter how many acts of
> consciousness, that is, perceptible or re-perceptible in
> as many perception as you like.  I can satisfy myself 'at
> any time' of the identical 'it is.'[221]

There are two important terms related to Objektivität
and Objekt that should be briefly examined here : Objektiv and
Objektivieren.  Objektiv is used as an adjective and as a
substantive.  As an adjective it indicates what is real insofar
as this is transcendent to the immanent elements of
subjectivity.  Objektiv is the correlate of subjective.  Husserl
can thus speak of a critique der objektiven Erkenntnis (K,
78), or of an " 'Objective' object" (CM, 53 [90]), or-- in a
striking phrase-- of "non-Objective ('merely subjective')
objects." (CM, 64 [99]).[222]  Objektiv is further used with such
terms as Wahrheit, Welt, and Geltung to contrast them with the
subjective elements involved.[223]

When a substantive, Objektives is employed like Objekt.
As pointing up the transcendental correlate of consciousness,
it is defined in this manner :

---

221. Z,145 [109] .

222. For "Objective knowledge," see also IdI, 285 [245]
     ("objektive gültiger Erkenntnis") ; N, 18 [150] ; FTL,
     243 [215] ; CM, 148 [174] ; K, 78.

223. Wahreit : FTL, 195 [173] , 200-201 [178] , 224 [198] , 274[242] .
     Welt : N, 22 [153] , 26 [158] ; FTL, 201 [178] , 233 [206] ,
     236 [209] , 240-241 [212-213] ; CM, 52-53 [89] , 63 [98] , 84
     [117] , 89 [121] , 92-93 [124-125] , 105-108 [135-138] .
     Geltung : IP, 37 [47] (Giltigkeit);PSW, 102 [32] , 123-127
     [50-53] ; IdI, 285 [245] ; FTL, 280 [247] ; CM, 5 [47] , 83
     [116] ; K, 102.

> Something Objective [Objektives] is nothing other than
> the synthetic unity of actual and potential intentionality,
> a unity belonging to the proper essence of transcendental
> subjectivity.[224]

However, Objektives is not so concrete as Objekt, and
stresses more the characteristic of having Objectivity, as is
brought out in the English translation, "the Objective."[225]
In this it is analogous to expressions like "the perceived",
"the intended," or "the true."

Objektivieren is the analogue of vergegenständlichen. It
can mean to intentionally effectuate an Object which is
transcendent to consciousness,[226] or an ideal Object,[227] or a
differentiated level of self-constitution by subjectivity.[228]
And logic, once grounded by phenomenology upon transcendental
logic, crowns all self-Objectifying, for it is "the science in
which pure theoretical reason accomplishes a complete
investigation of its own sense and perfectly Objectivates
itself in a system of principles."[229]

## II. Related Terms

Besides the two sets of terms pertaining to objectivity
that we have just surveyed, there are several other related
expressions that Husserl makes use of. Welt, Immanenz and
Transzendenz, and reell and irreell (intentional) we have
already briefly examined. There remain Gebilde and Einheit.

Gebilde (formation) is a term which Husserl frequently
employs when discussing different types of ideal objects in

---

224. FTL, 274 [242]; see also FTL, 256 [226-227].

225. See, for example, FTL, 166 [148]; CM, 95-96 [126-127],
99 [130].

226. IdII, § 7; FTL, 34 [30], 210 [187], 256-257 [227],
262-263 [232]; CM, 133-134 [161].

227. CM, 127 [155-156].

228. CM, 115 [144], 129 [158], 131 [159]; K, 116.

229. FTL, 30-31 [27].

the context of active constitution. It underlines the active element of their constitution : they are formed, produced. From their origin in the working of consciousness, they come to "their ideal Objectivity."[230] These formations can be "ideal" (FTL, 258 [228]), or "objective" (FTL, 256 [226]), or "pure" (K,47), or categorial (Id1, 70 [30]), or cultural, such as the "state, law, morality, the church,"[231] or geometrical (FUG, 371).[232]

The expression "Einheit" (unity) is often used by Husserl to signify immanent "objects." We shall consider it in some detail in Chapter V in the section given to immanent "objects."

### Summary

Husserl puts at his disposition the two pairs of terms Gegenständlichkeit-Gegenstand and Objektivität-Objekt. Each term has, more or less, its specific use. Gegenständlichkeit is explicitly introduced to be contrasted with Gegenstand which is tainted by the prejudices of psychologism and empiricism. But Gegenstand itself is often enough used to speak of ideale Gegenstände. As for Objektivität, it is the expression Husserl makes use of to describe the transcendent dimension belonging to intentionality. And Objekt indicates that which has Objektivität.

The valid conclusion with respect to Husserl's vocabulary is that it is not rigid, but neither is it for all that purely random. The terminology we have briefly outlined furnishes the principal usage of the four usual terms in Husserl. We could make this general conclusion : Husserl has certain meanings in mind when he employs these terms which can be

---

230. FUG,[369].

231. "...Staat, Recht, Sitte, Kirche..." IdI, 422 [375];
     trans. adapted from Gibson.

232. For further examples of Gebilde, see IdI, 89 [49]; EU,
     446-448, 458 ; FTL, § 100 ; CM, 127 [155] ; K, 70 ; FUG,
     368-371, 384-385.

understood in their context without too much difficulty if
one already has a general notion of the diversity of his
vocabulary.

There are, then, two important points that should always
be kept in mind with regard to Husserl's vocabulary. First,
the notion of object is not to be confined to merely empirical
things. The introduction of Gegenständlichkeit witnesses to
this concern of Husserl's to broaden the notion of object.
Secondly, objektiv as an adjective is uniformly employed in
conjunction with Erkenntnis, Welt,Wahrheit, and Geltung to
signify transcendent to subjectivity. It is a good reference
point to look for when one is reading Husserl with an eye for
his notion of objectivity.

CHAPTER IV


THE GENERAL NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY


        The diversity of Husserl's vocabulary for objects
should have already made us chary of a question like, What is
objectivity in Husserl ?  and perhaps even more of the one,
What is the general notion of objectivity in Husserl ?  Yet
it is this second question that we will undertake to answer
in this chapter in pointing out what objectivity involves as
a specifically phenomenological notion.

        A first distinction is to be made.  While surveying
Husserl's vocabulary, we met with the notion <u>Gegenstand</u>
(<u>Gegenständlichkeit</u>) <u>überhaupt</u>, the object-in-general.  This
is the supreme formal notion of his formal ontology, the pure,
empty form of objectivity-in-general, which "prescribes to the
material ontologies a <u>formal constitution common to all of</u>
<u>them</u>."[233]  Husserl, we saw, furthermore makes a division of
object-in-general into ultimate substrates and syntactic
derivatives.[234]

        Everything-- substrates and syntactic derivatives,
whether they signify categorial objects or objects belonging
in the different regions of material objectivity-- when
considered from a formal point of view, is embraced by the

_____

233. IdI, 67 [ 27] .
234. IdI, 70 [ 30] .

notion objectivity-in-general. The formal notion of objectivity, however, is not the only one which Husserl considers. The work Formal and Transcendental Logic represents Husserl's attempt to ground formal logic upon transcendental logic through the phenomenological investigation of its basis in transcendental subjectivity. Discussions about the object-in-general pertain to the first task that Husserl assigns to a pure logic in his Logical Investigations. [235]

In the Ideas the study of logic and formal ontology is pre-Epoche. [236] Furthermore, these two disciplines are explicitly subjected to the Epoche. [237] Continuing to use the structure of Ideas for reference points, we could say that the object-in-general belongs to the First Section while the notion of objectivity that interests us belongs rather to the Fourth Section of this work, "Reason and Reality" ("Vernunft und Wirklichkeit"). [238]

The question we are asking is, What does it mean in Husserl for consciousness to have a valid transcendent correlate? What is the transcendent correlate ? What is transcendence ? The question regards the very nature of the intentionality of consciousness, and not what constitutes formal structures or the different types of objects, such as "seen" object, "loved" object, and so forth. It is aimed at the objectivity of human cognition. In terms of Husserl's vocabulary, the question is about Objectivität and Objektiv as found in such expressions as the "Objectivity of knowledge," "Objective validity," and "Objective cognition".

---

235. LU, I [ I], Prolegom., § 67.

236. Logic and formal ontology appear in the First Section ; the Second Section ("The Transcendental Phenomenological Outlook") introduces the Epoche.

237. IdI, § 59.

238. The title of Chapter I of the Fourth Section is, "Noematic Meaning and Relation to the Object."

## I. Urgegenstand

But is there a priviledged object that one can take as normative according to Husserl ?  If so, where is it, that is to say, on what level of intentionality is it found, empirical or categorial ?  These are the cardinal questions for this chapter.  As preparatory to answering them, we will  consider the two types (strange as it sounds) of Urgegenstände ; then we are in a better position to consider the object as being a unity-identity whole.

### A.  The Empirical (Reale) Object

Husserl assigns the empirical object an important place in cognition.  It is point zero from which knowledge begins. Through sense experience the individual empirical object is encountered against the back-drop of the world.  Experience is the subject's immediate presence to the physically real world. The empirical object is the ultimate substrate upon which knowledge builds and then expands up through the constitution of categorial objectivities.[239]

Empirical object can have two meanings according to Husserl when taken as the absolute substrate of knowing :

> I. Universal nature, the universe of bodies in which Universal nature displays herself, is absolute substrate in a special manner....
> 2. The individual objects of external sense perception, of the perception of physical bodies, are the absolute substrates in the sense of what can be directly perceived in an originary   manner.[240]

---

239. See IdI, §§ 10, 15 ; EU, §§ 6-46 ; FTL, §§ 64, 82-86 ; CM, §§ 38-39 ; K,70.

240.    "1. Absolutes Substr-t in einem ausgezeichneten Sinn ist die Allnatur, das Universum der Körper, in denen sie sich auslegt....
       2. Absolute Substrate in dem Sinne des ursprünglich schlicht Erfahrbaren sind die individuellen Gegenstände der äuBeren sinnlichen Wahrnehmung, der Körpererfahrung." EU, 159.  See also EU, § 14.

Husserl explicitly calls this concrete individual the "proto-object" (Urgegenstand) ; the "thing" (Ding), which is the concrete individual, is, he avers, the "proto-objectivity" (Urgegenständlichkeit).[241] The prefix "proto-" (Ur-) does not refer to a temporal priority, but rather denotes a structural priority that the empirical object has inasmuch as it is the starting point of human cognition.[242] It is the ubiquitous first point of contact between the knower and the immediacy of the surrounding physical real world that serves as a basis for the human knowing structure that culminates in the constitution of categorial objects.

Husserl does not admit that universal nature and the individual objects possess any element of objectivity, as empiricism would have it, by the mere fact of "being there," physically opposable to the knower. There are no such things as ready-made objects of any kind, least of all any physical thing, imagined to be an object essentially inasmuch as it is spatially outside of the knower. All objectivity is constituted, whether it be that of universal nature or individual bodies. For these to emerge in consciousness as endowed with objectivity, subjective constitution must intervene as the condition. Once constituted as possessing objectivity, that is to say, constituted precisely as universal nature or individual objects, they are the understructure upon which categorial objectivity is founded.

---

241. IdI, 66 [26], 76 [36]; IdI, Beilage XXVII, p.416 (German ed.) ; IdII, § 8.

242. Cf. Alfred Schutz's remarks on originär in "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Volume II," in Collected Papers III, p. 19, footnote : " 'Originarily' (and related forms such as 'originary' and 'originariness') is an adaptation from Husserl's German (originär) and should not be understood as meaning 'originally,' since the term is used in a structural and not a temporal sense." Originär is not found in the first ed. of LU ; it appears in the Second ed. : I [I] 195 [190], See Farber, the Foundation, p. 133- n.18.

## B. Language

The individual empirical thing is identified as the proto-object. Could there possibly be then another level of proto-objectivity ? From another point of view, it is language which has this privileged character. If the empirical object must be presupposed by categorial objectivity and language as their basis, it is nonetheless constituted as an empirical object insofar as it is subsumed by categorial objectivity and language. That is to say, insofar as the empirical thing is promoted to the level where it is identified and named by language it is an object. Merely by its being there, open to any perception, an empirical thing is not an antecedently existing object, completely ready for knowing.

Alphonse de Waelhens, speaking in reference to Husserl's distinction between cultural objects and practical objects, points out well the comprehensive nature of language :

> If it is true, in a certain way, that the practical objects (the chair, the table, the hammer) depend upon a layer of experience prior to that where cultural objects appear (the painting, law, 'la Cour des Comptes'), it is essential to note that all practical objects have a fundamental relationship to culture, that all cultural objects are founded upon practical things. But above all, the existence, even at its lower level, of an experience properly human is inseparable from language. Language, however is a cultural object. There is at least, therefore, a cultural object which embraces every experience whatever it might be.[243]

---

243. "S'il est vrai, d'une certaine manière, que l'objet d'usage (la chaise, la table, le marteau) relève d'une couche d'expérience antérieure à celle où apparaissent les objets culturels (le tableau, le droit, la Cour des Comptes), il est essentiel de remarquer que tous les objets d'usage ont un rapport fondamental à la culture, que tous les objets culturels se fondent sur des choses d'usage. Par dessus tout, l'existence, même à son niveau inférieur, d'une expérience proprement humaine est inséparable du langage. Or celui-ci est un objet culturel. Il y a donc, au moins, un objet culturel qui englobe toute expérience quelle qu'elle soit." La philosophie et les expériences naturelles, p.86, n.3.

Language for Husserl is the locus where the acquisitions
of human culture in general are preserved in order to be at
the disposal of everyone.[244]   What the habitualities are for
the individual person, in an analogous way the objects available
through language are for the community.  A person's habitualities
are at his beck and call, for example, his knowledge of chemistry
or his love of his wife, and so forth.  No matter what he
may be doing, he always has the possibility to summon up and
activate his habitualities at any given moment in the whole
span of his conscious life.

Husserl describes language as the embodiment
(Verleiblichung, Sprachleib) of a spiritually constituted
result, or product (Leistung).[245]   Once embodied in language,

---

244. Jean Hyppolite asks in the context of the Epoche if there
     is, according to Husserl, "... un champ transcendantal
     sans sujet... dans lequel les conditions de la subjectivité
     apparaîtraient, et où le sujet serait constitué à partir
     du champ transcendantal...." (Discussion" after the paper
     of H.L. Van Breda, "La réduction phénoménologique," in
     Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont [ Paris : Les Editions de
     Minuit, 1959] , p.333.)  Van Breda replies : "Pour Husserl,
     cette solution est impensable" (in the same "Discussion,"
     p.333).  Jacques Derrida, however, transposes the question
     to the context of written language with the unique
     accessibility of ideal objects thourgh its Verleiblichung
     to many transcendental subjects.  Language is not a
     Platonic world--or champ-- of disembodied forms.  "Il est
     certain que l'écriture, en tant que lieu des objectivités
     idéales absolument permanentes, donc de l'objectivité
     absolue, constitue un tel champ  transcendantal, et que
     c'est à partir de lui ou de sa possibilité que la subjec-
     tivité transcendantale peut pleinement s'annoncer et
     s'apparaître." (Derrida, in his "Introduction" to his
     French trans. of FUG, L'origine, p.85).

245. FTL, §2 ; K, 23 ; FUG, 369.  We might note here that the
     contrast between language as presented in LU, and in K
     and FUG is neither an opposition nor a rejection by the
     later works.  As a generalization, we might say that LU
     accepts and analyzes language with its ideal objectivity
     as something already constituted, whereas K and FUG study
     written language in its relationship to the Ursprung and
     accessibility of ideal objectivity.  It is written down
     language as viewed in K and FUG that we are inspecting
     here.  For the contrast between LU, and K and FUG, see
     Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 71-73.

the product, such as algebra or poetry or biology, becomes
an acquisition (Erwerb), or possession (Besitz), available
to everyone at any time. Language enables the objects
constituted by an individual subjectivity (the monad in Husserl's
sense) to become the possession of all.

Permanence is an essential trait of what is objective.
Consequently, when Husserl speaks of language, he has in mind
the written language. Mathematics or biology or phenomenology
assume the enduring status of objectivity when they are written
down. For their permanence is not affected by the vicissitudes
or misfortunes that befall the individual person.[246]

Husserl envisages communities of researchers dedicated
to furthering specific areas of human culture. Such communities
could be multiplied indefinitely. Ideally it would be the
whole human community that would dedicate itself to the
advancement of human learning conceived in Husserl's manner.
Every member would have access to the store of culture ;
every new member would be initiated by teaching him first of
all to speak and to read and to write. At every moment the
human community would be advancing like the prow of a ship,
leaving behind an ever spreading wake of permanent cultural
accomplishments.[247]

Why, then, can language be called the proto-objectivity ?
Universal nature and the things found in it are the proto-
objectivity inasmuch as they are prior to the active constitution
of subjectivity, namely, the judgment. They are already
there (Vorhanden). They belong to the level of prepredicative
experience. But with the advent of the judgment (predication),
which is the result of the active unifying and identifying
constitution, language comes into existence.

Constitution, then, can serve as the touchstone to determine

246. FUG, 367-368 ; 371.
247. FTL, 32 [28-29] ; FUG, 367-369.

proto-objectivity : from the point of view of passive constitution,
universal nature and the bodies found in it are the proto-
objectivity. This is the proto-objectivity which predicative
knowledge itself presupposes as its basis. But from the point
of view of active constitution, written language is the
proto-objectivity. With it a person is put in contact with
the permanent achievment of human culture that he can learn
(if he wishes), and having learned, further.

Even though from the point of view of passive constitution
the empirical object may be the proto-object, Husserl asserts
that one can only correctly speak of object when referring
to categorial objects. When one is speaking of empirical and
categorial objects,

> It should be recalled... that one is speaking of an
> Objekt, or a Gegenstand in different ways. For... in the
> area of originary passivity one really cannot yet in the
> proper sense speak of objects....[248]

And the reason why only the categorial object is properly
speaking the object is that it is a perduring unity-identity,
actively constituted in the judgment.

> It is precisely this identity as correlate of an
> identification to be carried out in an open, unlimited, and
> free repetition that constitutes the exact meaning of
> object.[249]

---

248. "Es ist... daran zu erinnern,dass hier die Rede von einem
Objekt, einem Gegenstand, eine uneigentliche ist. Denn...
kann man im Bereich der ursprünglichen Passivität im
eigentlichen Sinne noch gar nicht von Gegenständen
sprechen...." EU, 81, n.1 ; see further EU, 64-65 which
are referred to in this note. See also FTL, 79 [69]
and 146 [130] where the same assertion is made : objecti-
vity is found only in the judgment.

249. "Eben diese Identität als Korrelat einer in offen endloser
und freier Wiederholung zu vollziehenden Identifizierung
macht den prägnanten Begriff des Gegenstandes aus." EU,
64.

And this brings us to the next point.

## II. The Unity-Identity Pole

After considering the two proto-objectivities, we can now try to answer the question we posed above : Is there a privileged object that one can take as the norm for objectivity in Husserl ? Since the object properly speaking really exists only on the level of active constitution, that is to say, in the predicative judgment, then it is here that one will find the privileged object. The privileged object is the categorial object constituted in the judgment. Two of the essential traits of objectivity have been disclosed which pertain to the judgment : the judgment is the foundation of written language, and consequently of the accessibility and the permanence of objects. With universal accessibility and permanence, then, two essential characteristics are disclosed ; there are two others that will be indicated.

When Husserl declares that the "precise concept of the object" is determined by the unity-identity which is constituted in the judgment, he is pointing out a third trait of objectivity that is really the basis of the accessibility and the permanence of the object. Inasmuch as the object is a unity-identity, it is the _same_ permanent acquisition. And inasmuch as it is a unity-identity, it is the _same_ acquisition, always accessible to a limitless multitude of people.

The object might be designated as "X."[250] If so, then

---

250. In IdI, § 131 and EU, 358 and 364, Husserl describes the object as an "X" to be determined through the series of possible noemas. The object as "X" recalls Kant's use in the Critique of Pure Reason (trans. N.K. Smith  London : Macmillan   Co., Ltd., 1964 ) ; something besides the subject A and the predicate B which explains their unity (A8 ; A9, B13-A10, B14) ; the object as something in general = X (A104-A106) ; the transcendental object, the noumenon (A250-252) ; and even the subject : "the thing which thinks," "the transcendental subject of the thoughts" (A364, B404). Needless to say, in all of this Husserl is unKantian. The point of similarity between Kant and Husserl is to be found in their notion of a series of possible determinations for something that can be disignated as "X."

then it could be conveived after the manner of the unknown of
an equation to be determined by subsequent operations.  It
is the bearer of determinations, like the subject of a sentence,
or again, like the "X" of an equation whose properties are
being enumerated or progressively explicated.  The object is
what is intended through the manifold noetic characters and
noematic modalities occuring in the judgment.  For it is in
this way an object is said to be constituted.

What does this mean specifically with regard to the
judgment, though ?  First of all, we should point out that we
are examining Husserl's notion of judgment (Urteil), not that
of posited meaning (Satz).[251]  Husserl distinguishes them in
this manner ;

> We have then single, membered posited meanings (as with
> perceptions and other positing intuitions) and many membered
> synthetic posited meanings, such as predicative doxic
> posited meanings (judgments), posited meanings in the form
> of suppositions with predicatively articulated material,
> and so forth.  Single and many-membered alike are further the
> posited meanings expressing pleasure, wish, command, and so
> forth.  The concept of posited meaning is certainly extended
> thereby in an exceptional way that may alienate sympathy,
> yet it remains within the limits of an important unity of
> essence.  We must constantly bear in mind that for us the
> concepts sense and posited meaning contain nothing of the
> nature of expression and conceptual meaning, but on the other
> hand include all explicit sense meanings and all propositional
> meanings.[252]

---

251. See IdI, § 133.  We have adopted Gibson's translation,
     "posited meaning," for Satz, rather than Sokolowski's,
     "assertion" (The Formation, "Glossary," p.230).

252. "Wir haben dann eingliedrige Sätze (wie bei den
     Wahrnehmungen und sonstigen thetischen Anschauungen) und
     mehrgliedrige, synthetische Sätze, wie prädikative doxische
     Sätze (Urteile), Vermutungssätze mit prädikativ gegliederter
     Materie usw. Eingliedrig wie mehrgliedrig sind ferner
     Gefallenssätze, Wunschsätze, Befehlssätze usw.  Der Begriff
     des Satzes ist damit freilich ausserordentlich  und vielleicht
     befremdlich erweitert, aber doch im Rahmen einer
     wichtigen Wesenseiheit.  Beständig ist ja im Auge zu
     behalten,dass die Begriffe Sinn und Satz für uns.../...

A variety of judgments (comprising a variety of posited meanings), as easily as a single judgment, can be made about the same "X". It could be judged as light colored, of medium size, noisy, intelligent, and kind-- in sum, my best friend. Or again, it could be judged as the ratio of the opposite side from an angle $\underline{a}$ of a right triangle to the adjacent side, the limit of a secant of a circle sharing the same vertex with the secant, the slope of a curve, and $\frac{dy}{dx}$ -- in a word, the tangent.

Through all of these judgments (or the single judgment), the "X," though it is the unifying-identify pole, receives a continuously growing number of senses. As the noematic moments expand, the knowledge of the object, though the object always remains as the enduring point of reference, is enriched. As the noematic moments accumulate and are organized, the object in a sense is put together. In Husserl's notion of genetic constitution, as we saw, there is no such thing as ready made objects. Rather subjectivity is continually at work amplifying the objects themselves it knows insofar as it amplifies the number and the types of noemas. The subject and his objects grow together. The subject puts the object together. Thus, a friend or the tangent would be the same objects for a youth and the older Edmung Husserl, for a friend is a friend and a tangent is a tangent. And yet they would be different, for the subjects would be different.

---

.../... nichts von Ausdruck und begrifflicher Bedeutung enthalten, andererseits aber alle ausdrücklichen Sätze, bzw. Satz-bedeutungen unter sich befassen." IdI, 369 [324]: trans. adapted from Gibson. Our discussion here, then, concerns the "mental" side of judgment, or the pre-expressed side. Ricoeur's commentary on IdI, § 133 is enlightening : "Dans les Ideen, Husserl décide d'appeler proposition [Satz] l'ensemble sens + caractère thétique, c'est-à-dire le Quid perçu, imaginé, etc. + le mode de croyance (certitude, doute, conjecture, etc.), réservant le terme de proposition expressive [Ausdruck] pour les énoncés de la couche expressive...." Ricoeur's French trans. of the Ideen, p.445, n.1 (Ricoeur's note).

In Husserl's notion of genetic constitution,

> ... once a judgment is performed on a given object,
> the object thereafter carries a sense that is the result of
> the judgment.  If, in an original judgment and on the basis
> of encounter,I judge that S is p,from then on S will appear
> to me as carrying the sense p. 'At the same time there is
> engendered the categorial resultant S p : that is, p
> emerges as a "deposit" in the sense of S, as now determined
> in this way.' S p can then becomes the subject of a further
> predication, S p is q in which the new predicate is a
> development or determination of the first one.  The predicate
> q depends on the predicate p.  If p had not been predicated
> earlier, q could not have been predicated now.  The process
> can be continued indefinitely, and the result is an object
> with a multiple layer of senses, S,p q r t... each of which
> presupposes those which have gone before.[253]

The multiple layer belongs to the noematic sense, while
the unity-identity is the object itself upon which the noemas
converge.  Through these noemas subjectivity attains the object
which it itself is constituting.  The difference, says Fink, is

> ... of the noema as object in the 'how' of its modes of
> presence and of the object as what is noematically identical
> in the noemas in their continual changes.[254]

---

253. Sokolowski, The Formation, p.170.  See FTL, 313  275 .

254. "... von Noema als Gegenstand im Wie der Gegebenheitsweisen
und Gegenstand als noematisch Identischen der immerfort
wechselnden Noemen." "Die phänomenologische Philosophie
Edmund Husserls in der Gegenwärtigen Kritik," in Studien,
p.132.  See IdI, § 130 ;see also Ricoeur's comments to
this § 130 in his trans., p.440 , n.1 (Ricoeur's note) :
"La référence à l'objet est donc cet aspect du 'Quid'
du noème qui est le plus opposé à l'aspect du 'Quomodo'
(en tant que perçu, que souvenu, que regardé attentivement,
etc.).  Ce texte confirme Fink qui réduit la différence du
sens et de l'objet à celle du 'noème comme objet dans le
comment (im Wie) de ses modes de donnée et de l'objet
comme  moment noématiquement identique des noèmes dans leurs
changements incessants'....  On arrive alors à ceci :
quand on a éliminé le Quomodo de tout correlat de pensée,
il reste le Quid ou sens ; à son tour, ce sens est con-
sidéré comme faisceau de prédicats et sens de quelque
chose.  Le 'de' désigne la visée objective de tout prédi-
cat renvoyant à un 'quelque chose' qu'il détermine."

The senses determining the object develop like a crystal that advances through its structured course of growth and at last solidifies.

> Objectivity is... conceived as the solidifying of a part of our intentional life in a judgment. In the judgment there is constituted a sense that immediately breaks off from the perpetual flow of consciousness and becomes an ideal entity transcending the life and temporality from which it arose.[255]

But this is not to deny for a moment the importance of sense experience and its object. "In respect of its being, reality has precedence to every irreality whatsoever, since all irrealities relate back essentially to an actual or possible reality."[256] Empirical reality which is on the level of passive constitution is the proto-objectivity, the starting point in human cognition.

Nonetheless, the object constituted in predicative judgments are the goal of sense experiencing.

> ... a full-grown sense or meaning can be present only after a judgment is made. A fixed sense which has the consistency and solidity to reappear in different acts as the same ideal entity appears for the first time in judgments. We might say that 'concepts' arise only in judgments. Before the categorical act of judging takes place, there are only the fluid anticipations of meaning or sense, but such anticipations are not the same as fixed senses there are only the 'lived' pre-conceptual or pre-categorical foreshadowing of the type of object we call a sense, and it can be understood only teleologically, that is, in function of the terminal sense they anticipate. There is no crystallized meaning in pre-predicative encounter.[257]

Although Husserl distinguishes two different kinds of

255. Sokolowski, The Formation, p.182.

256. FTL, 168-169 [150-151]; see also FTL, 164 [147].

257. Sokolowski, The Formation, p.172.

objectivity, sense objects and categorial objects, he integrates
them into a unified notion of objectivity.  He does not leave
them cut off from one another like two independent entities.
Sense objects adumbrate categorial objects.  By and in the very
act of arising, of appearing, they are already set on the way
towards categorial objectivity in the cycle of intentionality
whose period is marked by the constitution of categorial
objects.  Husserl does not hesitate to say that in every object,
even a physical one, "there is implied a certain ideality."
For, he adds :

> It is the universal ideality of all intentional unities
> over against the multiplicities constituting them.
> In it consists the 'transcendence' belonging to all species
> of objectivities over against the consciousness of
> them....258

Whether we take an empirical or an ideal object, there
is ideality involved precisely inasmuch as the object is
a unity vis-à-vis the "manifold 'psychic' processes."259
Unity is essential to objectivity, for without it there is just
a stream of psychic states.  But unity belongs par excellence
to ideal objects.  Consequently, all objects, even empirical
objects, insofar as they are a unity-identity detachable from
the flow of experiencings really inherent to the subject's
intentional activity possess a "certain ideality."

The unity-identity, furthermore, is the very basis
(darin besteht) of transcendence.  We have here the core of
Husserl's notion of objectivity.  Transcendence has nothing
at all to do with a confrontation between an "in here" and an
"out there."  The conception of the transcendence of both the
empirical object and the categorial object as residing in

---

258. FTL, 165 [148].
259. FTL, 165 [148].

their unity-identity is the total repudiation of any empiricism,
residual or avowed, which imagines transcendence on the basis
of two things spatially separated.

Transcendence means a pole of unified and identified notes
correlative to a manifold of intentional acts. Transcendence
means a permanent unity which a limitless number of intentional
acts can reactivate. There is no meeting of two self-sufficient
entities. If there is any opposition implied between
transcendence and subjectivity, it is only the correlativity
between the unity and a manifold.

We are in a position now to determine Husserl's general
notion of objectivity by marking out the essential notes of
objectivity. First, then, the object is a unity-identity
pole with respect to both noetic characters and noematic
modalities. Genetic constitution explains the expansion
of noematic senses and thus the correlative cumulative determi-
nation of the intended object which Husserl designates as "X"
to show that its constitution in subjectivity means the
possibility of an endless determining process. Nonetheless,
once the judgment is made, the object is crystallized, thus
marking a definite, identifiable stage in the process.

Secondly, the judgment, originating in sense experience,
must be incarnated in writing to escape the contingency of
the monad who has produced the judgment (more precisely, the
judgments, since Husserl has whole written works in mind).
Once written down, human works achieve a permanence.

Thirdly, by its permanence, the object becomes an
acquisition accessible to everyone at any time. Its validity
is supra-temporal and omni-temporal.

The fourth note, though not considered in this chapter,
we will mention by anticipation : the validity of an object
is determined by the fulfilling of an intuition, whether sense
or categorial.[260] Intuition, involving as it does evidence

---

260. See Chap. VI below.

and truth, adds a new dimension to objectivity, namely reality (Wirklichkeit).

These four traits of the object which the general notion comprises unequivocally disclose what objectivity is for Husserl : it is ideal objectivity. In the following chapter we shall treat in greater detail the types of objectivity, especially ideal objectivity. Then in the last chapter of this Part I we will take up the notions of intuition (Anschauung), evidence (Evidenz), and truth (Wahrheit) which are essential to explain the validity (Geltung) of an object. And finally, we have answered the question we posed at the beginning of this chapter : Is there a privileged object that one can take as the norm for objectivity in Husserl ? The answer is, Yes. When one has determined the general notion of objectivity with its four components, then one perceives what the privileged object is in Husserl. It is the ideal object.

### Summary

One question dominates this chapter : Is there a privileged object that is the norm for objectivity in Husserl ? First, two types of proto-objectivity are distinguished on the basis of passive and active constitutions : empirical reality and language. Then the object is seen as the unity-identity pole with relation to the manifold noeses and noemas. The distinction between the object and the noematic sense, indicated in Chapter II, is further explicitated by an examination of the judgment and written language. Four essential characteristics of objectivity are then enumerated. They disclose that the privileged object for Husserl is the ideal object.

CHAPTER V


TYPES OF OBJECTIVITY


The variety in Husserl's vocabulary is already a clue
that he conceives of different types of objectivity.  In this
chapter we shall examine the two basic kinds of objectivity
which are different to such an extent that really the expression
"objectivity" can be misleading.  The two kinds are immanent
objectivity and transcendent objectivity.  Our principal
interest is in transcendent objectivity, and more particularly
in ideal objectivity because of its cardinal importance in
Husserl's phenomenology.

### I.  Immanent "Objects"

If (transcendent) ideal objects are taken as the norm
for Husserl's notion of objectivity then the essential difference
between immanent and transcendent objects must be clarified at
the very beginning.  The difference lies in their relation to
the intentional act.  The essential difference is this :
immanent "objects" are really inherent (reell) moments of the
act, transcendent objects are not really inherent (irreell).

Husserl has several terms for what we can group under
the one title of immanent objects : he speaks of Inhalt, Einheit,
Objekt, and Gegenstand.[261]

---

261. Inhalt : LU, Invest V ; Z, §§ 40-41, 76.
      Einheit : Z, 84, 89, n. 1 ; 107, 119, § 43, FTL, 285 [252] .
      Objekt : Z, §§ 8-11, 36-37 ; IdI, 134 [96] .
      Gegenstand : EU, 304 ; FTL, 166 [148] , 285 [251-252] , 288
      [254] .

Perhaps the term "unit" (Einheit) could be the most accurate of these expressions since Gegenstand and Objekt, as already seen, are shared with transcendent objectivity. In German, as in English, "object" usually denotes what is transcendent to consciousness. "Unity," however, is more neutral. It denotes an essential characteristic of intentional activity whether on the immanent side with its flow of noeses, or on the transcendent side with its manifold of noemas. Every intentional act manifests the unity of its immanent side inasmuch as it is a specific kind of act related to its particular object, such as the act of hearing is specifically hearing something, and judging is judging something.[262]

In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl distinguishes two sorts of immanent objects, sensations and intentions (Akte). First, the sensations :

> These immanent contents are experiencings in the usual sense : the sense data (even if unnoticed), for example, a red, a blue, and the like ; further, appearances (the appearance of a house, of the environment, etc.), whether or not we pay attention to them and their single 'objects'.[263]

There are two levels of sensation indicated here, sense data and appearances. Their distinction is based upon the degree of their complexity. The sense data are simple units correlative to a partial intention in a complete act of perception. For example, the red datum and the blue datum Husserl mentions are simple units. The house-appearance is a

---

262. See, for example, CM 53 [89] , 80 [113] .

263. "Diese immanenten Inhalte sind die Erlebnisse im gewöhnlichen Sinn : die Empfindungsdaten (seien es auch unbeachte), etwa ein Rot, ein Blau und dgl. ; ferner Erscheinungen (Haus-Erscheinung, Umgebungserscheinung usw.), ob auf sie und ihre Gegenstände' geachtet wird oder nicht...." Z, 110 [83-84] ; trans. adapted from Churchill. Cf. IdI, § 36.

complex datum comprising many simple units.[264]

Then with regard to intentions (<u>Akte</u>), Husserl continues :

> In addition, there are the 'acts' of asserting, wishing, willing, and so on, and the reproductive modifications (fantasies  memories) pertaining to them.[205]

Although it is perfectly legitimate, admits Husserl, to distinguish sense data and noeses (intentions), in the <u>Formal and Transcendental Logic</u> he avers that the distinction must not be effected in such a way that sense data would appear as "ready-made objects" confronting intentions.  To be precise, the noesis is the immanent object and includes sense data.  The "intentional experiencings" are not just another set of data to be matched off with the sense data so that when the two of them come together then there is a sensation.  Such a conception of sensation is a type of psychologism.  Intentionality cannot be viewed as something extrinsic being added to the sense data to somehow inform it.[266]

---

264. See Sokolowski, <u>The Formation</u>, pp. 80-81.

265. Z, 110 [ 84] .

266. See FTL, 286-287 [ 252-254] .  The terminology of LU for
     sense data and intentions is <u>Inhalt</u> and <u>Auffassung</u> (see
     LU, 5th Invest., §§ 2, 14, 15 ; 6th Invest., § 26).  IdI
     uses "hyle" and "noesis."  Very early Husserl repudiated
     any dualism that might be involved between two supposedly
     equal but complementary elements (see the extremely
     important footnote, Z, 25, n. 1 [ 7, n. 1] ).  Later, in
     a note concerning the meaning of the term "noesis" in IdI,
     Husserl asserts : "Zur Noesis gehören also die hyletischen
     Momente, soferne solche Funktionen der Intentionalität,
     Sinngebung erfahren, einen konkreten noematischen Sinn
     konstituieren helfen.  Das muss aber früher mit entspre-
     chender Feierlichkeit gesagt werden.  Ich bin selbst ins
     Schwanken gekommen, da ja früher noetische und hyletische
     Momente unterschieden wurden" (IdI, 478, Germ. ed.).  This
     remark is from ca 1928 (see IdI, 461 [ Germ. ed.] ).  See
     also CM, 38 [ 76-77] .  This whole question of the origin
     and breakdown of the <u>Auffassungsinhalt-Auffassung</u> dualism
     is treated in detail by Rudolf Boehm, "Deux points de vue :
     
     .../...

In the "immanent 'internality' of the ego"[267] there is
only the steady flowing forth of intentional moments which
comprise the sense data and the intentional experiencing.
These intentional moments are inherent elements of the Ego's
activity in the sense that they are phases of the cumulatively
advancing self-presence of the Ego as he not only constitutes
but conserves transcendent objectivity. The self-presence
concomitant with the Ego's intentional acts, however, is matched
by another presence : the presence in these acts of the
transcendent object.

The transcendent object for its part is not an inhering
moment or element of the Ego's self-presence in intending, but
rather it is that which is constituted to be the unified focal
point, and this focal point matches whatever level or levels
(sense or categorial) of this intending that are involved.
The transcendent object might be described as a counter-
presence.. But its presence is possible only by the
simultaneous and correlative self-present intending of the
Ego. Immanent objects, as moments of the Ego's self-presence,
constitute the transcendend object by allowing it to appear, so
to speak, in and with this self-presence. This self-presence
is the condition of possibility for the appearing of the
transcendent object. This appearing and presence of the
transcendent object mean that it is not anterior to the intention-
al act of the self-present Ego. Immanent objects are advancing
cycles of the Ego's consciousness, of his Now, whose period is

---

.../... Husserl et Nietzsche," in Archivio di Filosofia, 1962,
    fasc. 3, pp. 173-175 ; Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 177-
    183. We have already seen something about the relationship
    of intentionality and immanent time in Chapter II above
    where genetic constitution was discussed. We will not go
    further into the question of immanent objects and their
    constitution since our main interest is transcendent ideal
    objects, and more precisely, categorial objects.

the constitution of a transcendent object.

When speaking of immanent objects, then, one should bear in mind Husserl's precaution and not conceive of them as things or another set of data. Immanent objects can be called "objects" inasmuch as they possess one of the essential characteristics of transcendent objects : a certain unity-identity in the flow of subjective processes. And for this reason perhaps the term Einheit would be less misleading.

## II. Transcendent Objects

In terms of the Immanence-Transcendence schema of Rudolf Boehm given above (Chapter II), we have very briefly examined immanent "objects" (units) which belong to the sphere of Real Immanence ; now we will turn our attention to real and ideal objects, which belong to the sphere of Intentional Immanence.

### A. Physically Real (Reale) Objects

According to Husserl if one takes the intentional object in general, and considers its possible particularizations, then one has

> ... objectivities that are real (in a broad sense) and categorial objectivities.... The latter point back to an origin from 'operations,' from a step-by-step generative-constructive activity of the ego : the former, to an origin as effects of a merely passive (in any case, not an <actively> generative synthesis.... We have the material-ontological particularizations, starting from the concept of the real concrete individual, which is differentiated into its real region-- for example : (mere) spatial thing, animate being, and so forth-- and entails corresponding particularizations of the relevant formal-logical modifications (real property, real plurality, real relational complex, and the rest).268

267. FTL, 286 [253].
268. CM, 51[ 37-88] . See the "Bermerkung" of Roman Ingarden on the difficulties he finds with Husserl's distinction of Aktivität and Passivität. The problem of their distinction yet interrelationship, comes up in Chap. VI below, and then throughout Part III.

What, then, are the characteristics of a reale Gegen-
ständlichkeit ? It is a material thing intrinsically determined
by space and time. Inasmuch as it is plotted according to the
two co-ordinates of space and time, it has its identity in
the world of bodies.[269] The physically real object is one's
point of contact with the Lebenswelt. Though the Lebenswelt is
not merely the sum total of all the individual bodies that can
be counted up, it could be said that as a background it is
mediated through the knowledge of the individual physically
real objects. The individual empirical object, as we have seen,
is what Husserl names the Urgegenstand.[270]

Husserl does not consider physically real objects as
belonging to an omnium gatherum of diverse things, which
nonetheless possess the common trait of being directly given
in a simple act of perception, in much the same way that a
rain drop on the nose and a clap of thunder are perceived with
the same immediacy. Physically real objects are not of the
same simple uniformity. There are levels of complexity to them.

> The 'ready-made' object that confronts us in life as an
> existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all the
> 'spiritual' or 'cultural' characteristics that make it
> knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table, an esthetic
> creation,) is given, with the originality of the 'it
> itself,' in the synthesis of a passive experience. As such
> thing, it is given beforehand to 'spiritual' activities
> which begin with active grasping.271

But, adds Husserl,

> With good reason it is said that in infancy we had to
> learn to see physical things, and that such modes of

---

269. See, for example, EU, § 65.
270. See especially EU, 159.
271. CM, 78 [112].

consciousness of them had to precede all others genetically. In 'early infancy,' then, the field of perception that gives beforehand does not as yet contain anything that, in a mere look, might be explicated as a physical thing.[272]

There is a difference between the drop of rain and a drop of perfume upon one's nose, just as there is a difference between the clap of thunder and a song of Schubert. A certain amount of culture or education is required to distinguish an elegant perfume and a Schubert Lied from the other uncomplicated sense objects. For one has "to learn to see physical things," and we might add, especially certain kinds of cultural objects. We shall return to the question of cultural objects in the next section that is on Ideal Objects. Before doing so, however, we should examine some further aspects of what Husserl calls the "passive generative synthesis" that constitutes physically real objects.

Physically real objects, as we have seen, are formed by the prepredicative constitution of experience (Erfahrung) which is contrasted by Husserl with predicative, or categorial, activity (Urteil). "Experience is the primal instituting founding of the being-for-us of objects as having their objective sense."[273] In pure experience, "we achieve the presence of objects before any sense is deposited in them by judgment. It is the region of consciousness which we have 'presence' but not yet any fully crystallized, conceptual 'sense.'"[274]

Within the field of experience itself, sense perception is the Urmodus. The two are not co-extensive, even though Husserl considers perception as the primal experience."[275] For

272. CM, 79 [112] .

273. FTL, 164 [147] .

274. Sokolowski, The Formation, 175.

275. "Urerfahrung..." IdI, 127 [88] ; trans. adapted from Gibson. See also EU, 54 ; FTL, 141 [158] , 164 [147] .

experience further includes memory and imagination insofar
as they are referable to sense perception.[276]   Husserl emphasizes
its privileged position in human cognition : it is the
"primitive mode of the giving of something-itself"[277] ; and
it is the primal mode of intuition."[278]

Though we are anticipating later discussions, it is
important to point out the noteworthy situation that arises from
the central position that Husserl assigns sense perception and
its object.   There are two remarks : first of all, inasmuch
as sense perception is the primordial mode of the object's self-
giving, it is the model for all other types of knowing.   They
are understandable in the light of their analogy with sense
perception.

It is the intuition that "sees" its object in the
complete immediacy of the object's presence.   Husserl speaks
of "transcendent perception" and "immanent perception" where
the operative word is obviously "perception", even though the
activities in question might make one rather think that the
notions of transcendence and immanence are diverse enough not
to be grouped together under the uniform heading of
"perception."[279]   He speaks furthermore of sense intuition
and categorial intuition.   Again, the operative word is
"intuition."   And again, one might have rather thought of the
diversity of sensation and categorial objectivity.

Second remark : while emphasizing the cardinal role of
perception (and intuition), and consequently of its object
(the physically real object), Husserl nevertheless at the same
time affirms that it is the ideal object which is the model of
objectivity.   No one has ever been blunter than he in

---

276. EU, 84.

277. FTL, 158 [141] .

278. "Wahrnehmung ist der Urmodus der Anschauung...." K, 170 ;
see also Z, §§ 16-17.

279. See Z, § 44, Appendices, XI and XII ; IdI, §§ 38, 42, 44.

asserting the distinction between ideal and physically real objects. Yet, on the one hand while Husserl makes perception the <u>Urmodus</u> of intuition, and thus of the self-giving of objects, on the other he proposes, not the object of perception, but the ideal object as the norm of objectivity according to which even physically really objects are to be judged to determine their objectivity. So while categorial activity is brought over to be measured against sense perception, the physically real object is moved in the opposite direction to be assimilated to the ideal object. We shall return to the topic of the two kinds of intuition again in the next chapter, and likewise in Part III.

As we saw in the previous chapter, as soon as one has enumerated the essential characteristics of the object, one has actually sketched the salient features of the ideal object. From prepredicative experience up to the judgment, every object can be characterized as an object insofar as it is a unity vis-à-vis a manifold of intentional acts.

> ... a certain <u>ideality</u> lies in the sense of every experienceable object, including every physical object, over against the manifold 'psychic' processes <u>separated</u> from each other by individuation in immanent time--the processes of an experiencing life, then too of potential experiencing life, and finally of potential and actual becoming-conscious of all sorts, including the non-experiencing sorts. It is the <u>universal ideality of all intentional unities</u> over against the <u>multiplicities</u> constituting them.280

As a consequence, one can state that "the ideal object is the absolute model of the object in general."281

---

280. FTL, 165 [148] .

281. "L'objet idéal est le modèle absolu de l'objet en général." Derrida, "Introduction" to <u>L'origine</u>, p. 57.

## B. Ideal Objects

In order to clarify Huss,rl's conception of ideal objectivity in its diverse vocabulary and its distinct levels and degrees, we can offer the following schema that will also serve as the outline of this section :

Ideal Object : ideal formation (ideales Gebilde) that divides
      into categorial and non categorial objects.


1. Various Terms :
 a. Nonphysically Real (Irreal*; may be used for all ideal
   objects) : in contradistinction to physically real
   (real) objects.
   1'.Categorial (Kategorial) : the species of ideal object
     which is constituted as a founded object in the judg-
     ment, as either the affair-complex (Sachverhalt) or
     one of the elements of the affair-complex.
     a'.Objectivity of the Understanding (Verstandesgegen-
      ständlichkeit) : another term for the categorial
      object, indicating its origin in active constitution.

2. The Categorial Object :
 a. Properties.
 b. Degrees : depending upon the relationship of the
   categorial object's Seinssinn to Realität.
   1'. Bound (Gebunden).
   2'. Free (Frei).
 c. Levels of Completeness (can be either Bound or Free) :
   1'. Language (Sprache ; Bound) :
     a'. Word, phrase, sentence.
   2'. Sense (Sinn ; Bound or Free).
   3'. The Categorial Object itself (Bound or Free) :
     a'. Affair-Complex (Sachverhalt) :
      1". Essence (Wesen) :
       a". Type (Typus) ; Bound
       b". Eidos (also called reine Allgemein-
        gegenständlichkeit) : Free.


### 1. Various Terms

First of all, then, we can take some terms that Husserl uses in connection with the ideal object. The ideal object is nonphysical (irreal) because it is neither temporally nor spatially conditioned in its essence. The ideal object, which may also be termed an ideales Gebilde, or an ideality, divides

into categorial and noncategorial objects.  The categorial
object is either the affair-complex, or one of the elements of
the affair-complex, constituted in the judgment.  Further, the
categorial object is called an objectivity of the understanding
inasmuch as it originates in the activity of the understanding
in contradistinction to sensation.  This is Husserl's version
of the classical distinction between understanding and sense.
He joins the objectivity of the understanding and the categorial
object in this way :

> We call such objects... with reference to their origin
> syntactic or categorial objects, or also, objectivities of
> the understanding because they have arisen from the
> effectuations of the understanding which judges.[282]

## 2. Categorial Object

The categorial object is a species of the ideal object.[283]
The categorial object is constituted in the judgment.  When
considered as the unity-identity that is posited as a complete
unit, it is termed the affair-complex (Sachverhalt).  In this
sense, then, the Type and consequently the Eidos, though
categorial objects, are not in themselves affair-complexes.
This point is discussed below.  The judgment is taken here to
be the doxic, or predicative, positing of an affair-complex,
such as, "The roof is red," and "Acceleration is the second
derivative of distance with respect to time."

---

282. "Wir nennen solche Gegenstände... mit Rücksicht auf ihren
Ursprung syntaksiche oder kategoriale, oder auch, weil
sie aus Leistungen des urteilenden Verstandes entsprun-
gen sind Verstandesgegenständlichkeiten. EU, 285.  Husserl
also speaks of Vernunfterzeugnisse (CM, 78 [ 111] ).

283. EU, § 65 ; FTL, §§ 2, 8.  Husserl recognizes the "products"
(Gebilde) of music, painting, sculpture, and architecture
as ideal noncategorial objects.  He introduces them--as
seen below--to exemplify the characteristics of all ideality:
unity-identity, reproduceability, accessibility, für jeder-
mann.  His main interest, nevertheless, is the categorial
object and its specific properties.

The import of the categorial object is evident in light
of Husserl's assertion concerning the objectivity of sense
experience and the judgment : only in the judgment does
objectivity properly speaking exist.  Husserl is unambiguous
about the comprehensiveness of categorial objectivity :

> As cognitive-judging subjects, we have... no objectivi-
> ties other than categorially formed ones-- nor does it make
> any sense for us, in that capacity, to want something dif-
> ferent.  Truly existing Nature, truly existing sociality
> or culture and the like--these have absolutely no sense
> other than that of being certain categorial objectivi-
> ties....[284]

The notion of categorial objectivity, then, is the heading
under which we examine Husserl's conception of objectivity.

---

284.  FTL, 146 [130] . Questions, wishes, commands, and promises,
with their "objectivity," are not discussed here.  Husserl
distinguishes them from the predicative judgment, or
doxic judgment, which can be formalized as "S is p."
"Categorial objectivity" is "doxic" objectivity (FTL, 313
[275] ; see also APS, Beilage VII, 364-365)  In LU Husserl
speaks of the judgment as an "objectifying act" that is the
"primary bearer" of the material element of meaning (Sinn
in the vocabulary of IdI).  Joys, wishes, volitions, though
nonobjectifying, are founded on "objectifying acts" (See
LU, Invest. V, §§ 41-43).  In IdI Husserl declares "all
acts in general--even the acts of feeling and will--are
Objectifying acts which 'constitute' objects originarily"
("... alle Akte überhaupt--auch die Gemüts- und Willensakte--
'objektivierende' sind, Gegenstande ursprünglich 'konsti-
tuierend'...." (IdI, 332 [290] ; trans. adapted from
Gibson).  All conscious (intentional) acts, then, both
doxic (perception, judging) and nondoxic (wishing, willing,
promising) are positing (thetisch).  Nonetheless, the doxic
act keeps its pre-eminence inasmuch as there is a doxic
modality in every positing (see IdI, 332 [290] ; see also
Ricoeur's commentary here in his French trans., Idées, p.
400, n. 1).  Furthermore, nondoxic positing can only be
expressed by being objectified in a doxic positing.
"Express" (Ausdrücken) here does not mean the verbal
expression nor the sense (Sinn) which is properly speaking
the noema of a wish, etc., and not a judgment.  It is rather
the "significance" (Bedeutung), or "conception" (das
Begriffliche) (see IdI, §§ 115-127 ; see also Mohanty,
Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, pp. 94-97).

## a. Properties

ın enumerating the essential traits of objectivity, we have already anticipated those of the categorial object (as an ideal object). These properties are common to all categorial objects, of whatever degree (bound or free) or level (language, sense, and the categorial object itself).

First of all, the ideal object is independent of any of the spatio-temporal co-ordinates that determine the physically real object. From the time of his controversy with psychologism, Husserl never waters down his claims for the ideal object's independence from the individual psychological processes in which it is constituted. These claims are applicable to the categorial object :

> ... every consciousness in a unitary sense (as a constituted immanent unity) is at the same time necessarily also unity of consciousness of the objective to which it 'refers.' But not every consciousness is itself time consciousness, i.e., consciousness of something temporal, something constituting intentional time. Thus, a judicative consciousness of a mathematical state of affairs is an impression, but the mathematical state of affairs which in its unity 'is there' undivided is nothing temporal ; the act of jugment is not an act of presentation (or of presentification). Accordingly, one can say of a thing, an event, or a temporal being that it is represented in phantasy, that it appears according to the mode of phantasy, memory, expectation, or that it appears retentionally : and, likewise, one can say that the thing appears as actually present, that it is perceived. But one cannot say that a mathematical state of affairs appears as present or as presentified. The act of judgment can be of long or short duration, has its extensity in subjective time, and can be actually present or presentified. What is judged, however, is not long or short, enduring or less enduring.[285]

Husserl explains the nontemporal and nonspatial character

---

285. Z, 124-125 [ 96-97] .

of categorial objects by offering the example of a judgment
of "a mathematical state of affairs" :

> If we have a judgment (for example, 2 X 2 = 4), what is
> meant as such is a nontemporal idea.  The same thing can
> be meant in countless acts of judgment in an absolutely
> identical sense, and this same thing can be true and false.
> Let us take this idea as the 'principle' and consider the
> 'judgment' as the correlate of this principle.  Therefore,
> should one not say, 'the act of judgment, the consciousness
> in which precisely the 2 X 2 = 4 is meant' ?  No.  Let us
> consider : instead of directing my glance of attention toward
> what is meant as such, I direct it toward the judging, to
> the process in which it comes to be given to me that 2 X 2 =
> 4.  A process goes on.  I begin with the forming of the
> subject-thought 2 X 2 and bring this formation to an end.
> This serves as the fundamental affirmation for then affirming.
> "is equal to 4."  Therefore, we have a spontaneous act of
> forming which begins, goes forward, and ends.  What I
> form there, however, is not the logical principle which is
> meant therewith.  What is 'formed' is not the meant ;
> rather, what is formed in spontaneity is first of all the
> 2 X 2 and on this, the 2 X 2 = 4.  As soon as this formation
> is complete, it is already over as a process, and immediately
> sinks back into the past.[286]

The categorial object has, then, the characteristic of
Zeitlosigkeit, of being "everywhere and nowhere," ("...
'überall und nirgende'...").[287]  It has a "trans-temporality"
that "means an omni-temporality" ("...Überzeitlichkeit besagt
Allzeitlichkeit.").[288]  Through all particular intentional
acts in which "their 'making an appearance' " occurs, the
categorial objects are "numerically, identically, the same."[289]

---

286. Z, 182 [ 130-131]; see also Z, § 45 ; FTL, §§ 56-58.
287. EU, 313.
288. EU, 313.
289. FTL, 154 [ 138] .

It is this identity of theirs that <u>makes them objective</u>.[290]

The second property : because of their identity, categorial objects are an acquisition (<u>Erwerb</u>), or possession (<u>Besitz</u>), that is accessible to everyone (<u>für jedermann</u>).[291] We have already drawn attention to the similarity between the habitualities for the individual and the ideal object for the community. The ideal object has an enduring permanence that enables it to be summoned up any time and any place. Trigonometry, for example, can either be the limited skill of an individual mathematician or the whole recorded body of trigonometric knowledge.

In affirming ideal objects, characterized by their freedom from space and time, and by their unchangeability, Husserl never proposes that they are some sort of "Platonic hypostases" subsisting in a world of their own.[292] In the light of what we have seen of Husserl's specification of the ideal object, we can see how idle it would be to pose the question, Where are ideal objects ? Such a question is meaningless even if they were Platonic forms, since <u>such</u> immaterial forms are precisely <u>not</u> somewhere at all. In any case, to pose the question would manifest a residual empiricism that conceives all objectivity univocally after the norm of physically real objects.

By anticipating the discussion on induction, however, we can say that there is according to Husserl an intuition of ideal objects that is as validating for them as perception is for a physically real body. One "sees" categorial objects as much as one sees the tree in the garden. The ideal object is a ready acquisition <u>für jedermann</u> provided that everyone performs the requisite validating intuition. As far as

---

290. FTL, §§ 58, 62.
291. EU, 64-65 ; FTL, 32 [28-29]; FUG, 367-368, 371.
292. LU, I [II/1], 330 [101]; EU, 397, 411.

objectivity is concerned, "the seven regular solids are...
seven objects precisely as the seven sages are : the principle
of the parallelogram of forces is as much a single object as
the city of Paris."[293]   We shall return to the different types
of validating intuition in the next chapter.

A further important point : ideal objectivity and cultural
objectivity coincide for Husserl.
The cultural object is an ideal object, for it is a
"product of the spirit" that "is 'embodied' in the physically
real world but through the embodying is not rendered physically
individual."[294]   Taken in its broadest sense, cultural
objectivity includes not only the humblest artifacts, such
as tools, but also the most refined products of the human
spirit, such as music, sculpture, mathematics, and logic.

But cultural objectivity is even more embracing.   As
we saw De Waelhens remark in the previous chapter, there
exists a cultural object that can take in all objectivity :
language.   Even trees, cats, and dogs, anything whatsoever,
once they are known and named, are introduced into the ambit
of cultural objectivity and thus of ideal objectivity.   They
have become identifiable and thus communicable.

In brief, what "cultural object" means is "constituted
object".   It means that there is objectivity only insofar as
there is a constituting subjectivity.

### b. Degrees

The degrees of ideal objectivity (the bound or the free
idealities) are determined by the relation of the "ontic
sense" (Seinssinn) of the ideal object to "physical reality"

---

293. LU, I [ II/1] , 330 [ 101] .

294. "... das geistige Gebilde als solches bestimmt, ist zwar
in der realen Welt 'verkörpert,' aber durch die Verkörperung
nicht individuiert." EU, 320.

(Realität).[295] "Bound idealities," say Husserl, "are bound to
the earth, to Mars, or to specific territories." They "bring
physical reality with them in their ontic sense and thus
belong to the physically real world."[296]

As examples of bound idealities, one might take "tools
(the hammer, pliers)" or "architecture."[297] Their ideality
is seen not simply in their unity-identity but even more
precisely in this unity-identity inasmuch as it is recognizable
in their reproduction, whether actual or possible. It is as
though the bound ideal object is dependent upon a multitude
of reproductions to show that it is really identical no matter
how often it is reproduced ; as though there had to be many
so that the identity-unity could stand out all through the
various copies. There is a multitude of the same kind of
hammer and pliers actually existing ; and this multitude can
be increased ad infinitum.

The work of architecture might be unique, like the
Chrysler Building. This structure could, however, be copied
a limitless number of times. As an example of architecture
actually reproduced, one could take the identical house that
is constructed again and again in a housing project.[298] Other
examples of bound idealities offered by Husserl are Goethe's
Faust, Raphael's "Madonna", Beethoven's "Kreutzer Sonata,"

---

295. EU, 295. In CM, 92 [124] Cairns translates Seinssinn by
"existence-sense."

296. "Gebundene Idealitäten sind erdgebunden, marsgebunden,
an besondere Territorien gebunden etc. ... die in
ihrem Seinssinn Realität mit sich führen und damit der
realen Welt zugehören." EU, 321. EU speaks of "bound"
and "free" idealities. The free ideality is the Eidos
(see EU, 321, § 87 ; cf. IdI, §§ 2-9).

297. "... Werkzeuge (Hammer, Zangen)... Architekturen...."
FUG, 368.

298. See FUG, 368 ; CM, 92 [124].

and a symphony.[299]    Again, these are unique, but "in principle repeatable."[300]

And again, the constitution of a state is a bound categorial ideality, for it belongs to a certain people in a certain place.  It "has an ideality insofar as it is a categorial objectivity, an expression of the state's will... which is repeatable and reactivatable at different times, and re-understandable and identifiable by different people."[301]

There exists a gradation in bound idealities, from the degree of the lowliest hammer up to the highest degree of the exquisite Kreutzer Sonata.  All bound idealities, diverse as they may be, are similar in this fashion : they "bring physical reality with them in their ontic sense and thus belong to the physically real  world."  By its _Seinssinn_, an object like a hammer exists in order to be multiplied for many times and places. Architecture organizes space.  Painting works with color and music with successive sounds.  Bound idealities need a physical presence in order that their spiritual presence can appear.  Their material presence is the locus of the manifestation of a permanently valid, meaningful reality, that of an ideal object.

With regard to free idealities, Husserl says :

> If we speak of truths, true affair-complexes in the sense of theoretical science and in such a way that the validity of the 'once and for always' and of the 'for everyone' belongs to its essence as the Telos of judgmental

---

299. Goethe's _Faust_ and Raphael's "Madonna," EU, 320 ; Beethoven's "Kreutzer Sonata," FTL, 21 [18] ; a symphony, FTL, 164 [147].

300. "... _prinzipiell_ doch wiederholbar...." EU, 320.

301. "Die Staatsverfassung hat eine Idealität, sofern sie eine kategoriale Gegenständlichkeit ist, ein Ausdruck des Staatswillens... der zu verschiedenen Zeiten wiederholbar, reaktierbar, von verschiedenen Personen nachverstehbar und identifizierbar ist." EU, 320.

determinations, then these are free idealities. They are not bound to any location, that is to say, their location is in the universe and in every possible universe. They are omnipresent and omnitemporal as far as their possibility of reactivation is concerned.[302]

Unrestricted validity is the hallmark of the free ideality.[303] Such validity is the achievement of the eidetic reduction that has suspended all positing. The free ideality is the Eidos, the pure essence, without any residue of the empirical conditions of the Type and without any trace of positing. In this way is it different from the object of the "Sciences of Fact."[304] The free ideality is found in what Husserl designates as the formal and material eidetic sciences which are concerned with not only the Eidos but also eidetic relations and procedures.[305]

We can first of all identify the formal eidetic sciences and summarize briefly their characteristics. They comprise formal logic and formal ontology (of which formal mathematics is a species).[306] Formality means freedom from every specifying (and thus limiting) material content. The free ideality of formal logic lies in its purely formal structure that regulates the noncontradiction and consistency of human knowing. The free ideality of formal ontology belongs to it inasmuch as it is the science of the object-in-general with

---

302. "Wenn wir von Wahrheiten, wahren Sachverhalten im Sinne theoretischer Wissenschaft sprechen und davon,dass zu ihrem Sinn das Gelten 'ein für allemal' und 'für jedermann' gehört als das Telos urteilender Feststellung, so sind dies freie Idealitäten. Sie sind an kein Territorium gebunden, bezw. haben ihr Territorium in Weltall und in jedem möglichen Weltall. Sie sind allräumlich und allzeitlich, was ihre mögliche Reaktivierung betrifft." EU, 321.

303. EU, § 65 ; see also IdI, §§ 2-9 ; FTL, § 98 ; CM, §§ 34, 64.

304. IdI, §§ 6-8.

305. IdI, §§ 7-8 ; EU, § 65 ; CM, § 21.

306. IdI, § 8 ; FTL, §§ 23-27.

its formal categories of unity, multiplicity, and relation. The free ideality of mathematics presupposes these formal categories. It is found, for example, in "arithmetic, pure analysis," and "theory of multiplicities" [307] Cases of a mathematical multiplicity are the natural numbers and the "Euclidean multiplicity" with their axioms and theorems.[308]

The object-in-general is the pure eidetic possibility that as such takes in any imaginable, possible object whatsoever, any intended correlate of consciousness, insofar as it is considered purely as correlative to the Eidos Ego. It is the transcendent dimension of intentionality viewed purely as formal with only, and all, the formal implications.[309]

As for the material eidetic sciences, they treat the Eide that are the supreme genera.[310] Such a genus is called a "Region."[311] Examples of these Eide, or Regions, are Physical Nature in general and Thing.[312] Further examples are given below. Though these Eide have a material content to be of such and such a nature, they are nonetheless, just as the formal Eide, free idealities.

These free idealities of the formal and material eidetic sciences, then, like every ideal object, are valid "once and for always" and "for everyone." However, they are different from bound idealities, for their validity derives from validity itself, that is to say, from the eidetic intentional structures and procedures of the transcendental Ego himself, and not from the particularities of "any location," that is, the particularities of any kind of positing.

---

307. "... die Arithmetik, reine Analysis, Mannifaltigkeits-
      lehre...." IdI, 64 [23]; trans. adapted from Gibson.

308. FTL, §§ 29, 53.

309. IdI, §§ 8-10 ; FTL, §§ 24, 27, 42.

310. IdI, §§ 8-9 ; CM, § 21.

311. IdI, § 9.

312. See IdI, § 9 ; see also IdII and IdIII.

### c. Levels.

There are what may be called three different levels of idealities in categorial objectivity. The first level is language. Suppose one asks, "How many times and places do a single word, or the Pythagorean theorem, or the commutative law of addition, or all of mathematics exist?"[313] Just once, Husserl avers. Neither the oral repetition, nor the written tradition, nor the translation modify their essential uniqueness at all.

> The sense-perceptible expressions have spatio-temporal individuation in the world as every corporeal event, or everything embodied as such in bodies. However, the spiritual form itself, which is called ideal objectivity, is not so embodied. Nevertheless, these forms do exist in a certain manner in the world but only because of these two-levelled repetitions, and finally because of being embodied in a sense-perceptible way.[314]

Take for example the word "Löwen,", suggests Husserl. How many times and places does it exist ? Just once. Through all oral repetitions and written traditions, there is the one word "Löwen" that all German-speakers use when they mean a certain type of large African feline.[315] The same is true of any other word that one might choose, such as "rot", and so forth.[316] Furthermore, there is the same kind of immutable identity in the statements expressing a Sachverhalt, such as the commutative law of addition, or the definition of an

---

313. See FUG, 368.

314. "Die sinnlichen Äußerungen haben in der Welt raumzeitliche Individuation wie alle körperlichen Vorgände bzw. alles in Körpera Verkörperte als solches ; nicht aber die geistige Gestalt selbst, die da 'ideale Gegenständlichkeit' heisst. Indes in gewisser Weise in der Welt objektiv seiend sind sie doch, aber nur vermöge dieser doppelschichtigen Wiederholungen, und letzlich vermöge der sinnlichen verkörpernden." FUG, 368. See also FTL, §§ 1-3, 57b.

315. FUG, 368.

316. See EU, 314-315.

ellipse in terms of a locus of points.

Husserl distinguishes the particular, transitory
linguistic occurrence of a word or a statement, and that word
or statement taken as an expression.  The linguistic event,
the particular case of use, with its sensible manifestation
in spoken sound or visual symbol is unique and unrepeatable.
The word or statement, however, as an expression is identical
in each of its occurrences.  When taken as something actually
spoken or written, then the word or phrase occurs just once.
When taken as an expression, then the word or phrase is identical
and is repeatable in a limitless number of occurrences.  And
if they are identical and repeatable in this manner, then they
possess an ideality.  Thus the ideality belongs to a linguistic
expression even in its purely linguistic aspect.[317]

---

317. J.N. Mohanty denies this first level of ideality
distinguished by Husserl.  Mohanty argues : 1) There can
be no identity between the word or phrase spoken and the
word or phrase written ; thus Löwen spoken and Löwen written
are not the same linguistic expression.  2)  The identity
Husserl  ascribes to the linguistic expression (first
level of ideality identified by Husserl) is that of the
meaning (second level); in other words, the ideality
belongs to the meaning element, and not to the heard-
seen expression (Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, pp.
60-63).  Without going further into the problem, on
Husserl's behalf one might counter Mohanty's arguments in
this manner : 1) Husserl holds that the level of the
ideality of the linguistic event in its sensible
manifestation is not independent from the ideality of the
meaning of the expression but subordinate to it.  It is
a level of ideality, integrated with the other levels.
2)  Granted that a person understands the meaning of a
word or phrase, still he also recognizes their visual
and acoustic identity, and to recognize the empirical
pattern of a word or phrase in seeing or hearing it
is not the same as understanding meaning.  3)  Though the
word or phrase as written cannot be said to be the same
as the word or phrase as spoken, still one could hold
that there is an identity between spoken words or phrases
considered as spoken, and words or phrases considered as
written.  If one takes written words and phrases as an
area by itself, and spoken words and phrases as an area
by itself, then within each area an identity can be found,
that is, written form with written form, spoken ..../...

Any language can possess an equivalent word for a
"Löwen," as well as an equivalent statement for the Grundsatz
of the commutative law of addition, and in this language
the word and statement as expressions keep their identity
through every oral or written repetition. The plurality of
languages, however, shows that their words or statements are
bound to a particular era and place. The ideality of a
particular language, then, is an ideality bound to specific
places at a specific period of time. It does not have a
universal unrestricted ideality, independent of all circumstances.
But the very fact of the plurality of languages, taken together
with their mutual translatability, indicates something else
besides mere variety.[318]

And thus the second level of ideality, that of what is
meant : the unity of sense, or the noematic sense. This
ideality consists in the identity of the noematic sense that
is always at the disposition of the individual, and thus of
the community. The noematic sense can be present any time and
any place, for (as we have already seen) inasmuch as it is

---

.../... with spoken, and thus identity can be claimed. But
something in the one area could not be said to be simply
identical to someting in the other area. Thus, for example,
the written form of Löwen cannot be equated with the spoken
form of Löwen. The writing down of, and the written
form of, Löwen is not the same as its pronunciation.
Nevertheless, the recognizing of the equivalence of the
written form and the spoken form, though distinct from
recognizing them in their separate areas, is not reducible
to the understanding of the meaning of the word or phrase.
The recognition of the identity of the written form with
the spoken form is a new act of recognition. The point
to always return to is that Husserl distinguishes
functionally interlinking levels of ideality, not separate
strata. See further Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of
Perception, p.XV ; and his "Sur la phénoménologie du
langage," in Eloge de la philosophie, Collection Idées
(Paris : Gallimard, 1960), pp. 83-111 ; H.J. Pos, "Phéno-
ménologie et linguistique," in Revue internationale de la
philosophie, 1 (1938-1939), 354-365 ; De Muralt, L'idée de
la phénoménologie, pp. 124-125.

318. See FUG, 368, n. 1 ; see also Derrida, "Introduction" to
L'origine, pp. 58-62 ; Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of
Meaning, p. 105.

irreal vis-à-vis the individual intentional acts, it is free
from their limiting conditions. Each occasion upon which one
says "Löwen", or pronounces the commutative law of addition,
or  utters something like Husserl's example, "2 + 2 = 4"
(given above), or the equivalent in any other language, the
sense of the word or the statement is identical. And just
as word and statement can be reiterated without end, so can
their respective senses be called up anew, for these senses
are the condition of possibility for the diversity of words
and the statement.[319]

Beyond, but functionally interlinked with, the ideality
of the two levels of language and the noematic sense, there
is the third level : the ideality of categorial objectivity
intended through them. The affair-complex of the judgment
can be concerned with either a physically real object, like
the Löwen, or an ideal one, like the parallelogram of forces.
Nevertheless, the affair-complex taken as the categorial object
constituted in the judgment is an ideal object. An individual
Löwen does not cease to be an individual physical object and
acknowledged as such in the judgment. But the objectivity
of the affair-complex of the judgment is ideal inasmuch as
it is a unity-identity always accessible for reproduction in
a limitless number of judgments. This is the meaning of
Husserl's assertions that "a certain ideality lies in the sense
of every experienceable object, including every physical
object"[320]  as a unity over against the multiplicities
constituting it ; that objectivity exists only in the judgment ;
that this objectivity is ideal.

The categorial object is primarily the Sachverhalt, the
affair-complex, constituted in the judgment. This can be
something as uncomplicated as that of the judgment : "The tile

---

319. Concerning sense and noema, see Chap. II above.
320. FTL, 165 [ 145] .

is red,"[321] or as complex as the definition : "Acceleration
is the second derivative of distance with respect to time,"
or a whole book on calculus.  Every categorial object, however,
in relation to the physically real object, is an object of
an essentially different nature, without being for all that
totally alien to the physically real object.  The categorial
object is, in fact, founded upon the sense object (though
different from the way in which a remembered object is related
to a sense object).[322]

With the judgment

> ... a new kind of objectivity is constituted, namely
> the affair-complex, 'S is p' ; it is generated in creative
> spontaneity.[323]

The notion of the affair-complex is extremely
comprehensive in Husserl.  It can mean an affair-complex in
the Lebenswelt, a mathematical one (the example, 2 + 2 = 4
cited earlier), a sociological one, a political one, and so
forth.  At the base of all of them, however, lies the most
rudimentary structure which Husserl formalizes in "S is
p."[324]

In this form, either "tile," for example, or "acceleration"
could be symbolized by "S."  Further and more complex judgments
can expand from this cell-judgment, like "S p is q," "S is

---

321. The example is Husserl's : see LU, II [II/1], Invest. VI,
     § 12.

322. In Chap. VI below the relation of the categorial
     (founded) object to the sense (simple) object is discussed
     in the context of their constitution.

323. "... ist vorkonstituiert eine neue Art von Gegenständlichkeit
     der Sachverhalt 'S ist p' ; er ist erzeugt in
     schöpferischer Spontaneität." EU, 284.

324. EU, §§ 58-62 ; FTL, Appendix II, § 1.  See also Sokolowski,
     The Formation, p.170.

greater than p," "A or B is p," collections, sets, and so forth.

But the essential point for Husserl is always this :
the affair-complex, no matter what it is, whether a particular
contingent affair-complex like the red tile, or a universally
valid one like the second derivative, is an ideal object.
Once constituted in the judgment, the affair-complex is a
unity-identity with an ideality above the first two levels of
language and sense.  It is detachable from the individual
situation (no matter how necessary this may be to make the
particular affair-complex to be exactly what it is, that is to
say, particular), from the psychological processes of the subject,
the co-ordinates of place and time.

In the terms of levels, the ideality of the judgment about
red tile is a bound ideality and that of the second
derivative considered as a function is, a free ideality.  To
underscore Husserl's view once again : if a unity-identity,
then ideality.  It may not be true, or it may cease to be
true, but that is another question.

So,

A judgment that was once true can cease to be true, as
the proposition, 'The car is the fastest means of
transportation,' loses its validity in the age of the airplane.
Nonetheless, it can always be formed again as this one,
identical object in distinct evidence by any number of
individuals, and as something meant has its supra-temporal,
non physical identity.[325]

---

325. "Ein Urteil, das einmal wahr gewesen ist, kann aufhören
wahr zu sein, wie etwa der Satz 'das Auto ist das schnell-
ste Verkehrsmittel' im Zeitalter der Flugzeuge seine
Gültigkeit verliert.  Gleichwohl kann er als dieser eine,
identische von beliebigen Individuen allzeit in der
Evidenz der Deutlichkeit wieder gebildet werden und
hat als Vermeintheit seine überzeitliche, irreale
Identität."  EU, 313-314.  See also Z, 124-125 [96-97]
and 182 [130-131]  (cited in nn. 285 and 286 of this
Chapter).

Every affair-complex is minted in the particular judgment of
an individual person, but then gains possible or actual
currency in its communication with others, and in a sense
never goes out of circulation.

The affair-complex, besides being an ideal object itself
in the manner just explained, is the seedbed where germinate
the ideal objects which Husserl calls the "Type" and the "Eidos."
For as we have seen, with respect to experience and judgment,
objectivity only appears in the judgment. Some of "the modes
of objectivity" are listed by Husserl :

> "... as a matter of essential necessity, determinations
> (properties and relative determinations), predicatively
> formed affair-complexes, combinations, relationships,
> wholes and parts, sets, cardinal numbers, and all the other
> modes of objectivity, in concreto and explicated originaliter,
> have being for us-- as truly existent or possibly existent
> modes-- only as making their appearance in judgments."[326]

Type and Eidos embrace all of the modes of objectivity
that appear in the judgment insofar as these modes are general
essences. General essences are obviously involved in the
universal judgments like, "Red is a color," and "Acceleration
is an example of the second derivative." Here red and color
in the first statement, and acceleration and derivative in the
second, are general essences. Such essences are further
involved even in particular judgments, like "This tile is
red." Here red and tile are likewise general essences.

We can consider the Type first. The Type is the general
descriptive essense which the Ideas name a "morphological
essence."[327] Husserl contrasts the Type with the Eidos, the

---

326. FTL, 79 [ 69] .
327. IdI, § 74.

general exact essence.[328]  Correlative to the Type, there are
descriptive concepts in which common properties, prevailing
traits, and recurring patterns of operating are grasped.  Yet,
there is a certain vagueness and approximation in these concepts
inasmuch as their basis is direct sense intuition.  Though
general, these concepts reveal the variety and variation of
empirical objects by a certain imprecision.  The Type can
be said to be contingent on two counts : its constitution starts
from the individual data contingently encountered in particular
experiences ; this constitution then proceeds on the basis
of comparison with similarities that are likewise contingently
encountered.  The constitution of the Type, then, in both its
start and process is contingent.

---

328. This basic distinction of two kinds of ideal objects
     is maintained throughout Husserl's works.  See LU, I
     [II/1] , Invest. I, § 18 ; IdI, § 74.  Then come the works
     where the idealization of the Life-world is regarded as
     an Ideenkleid that must be ultimately seen in relation
     to prepredicative experience by means of a "genetische
     Fragestellung" (EU, 38).  See, for example, EU, § 10 ;
     FTL, § 96 c ; K, §§ 9, 36 ; the "Abhandlung," "Realitäts-
     wissenschaft und Idealisierung, Die Mathematisierung
     der Natur," in K, pp. 279-293 ; Beilage II (to K, § 9a),
     in K, pp. 357-364 ; and all of FUG (which is Beilage III
     to K, § 9a).  See also Derrida, "Introduction" to L'origine,
     pp. 144-147 ; Levinas, Théorie de l'intuition dans la phé-
     noménologie de Husserl, pp. 169-174.  However, see
     Alfred Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philoso-
     phy," in Collected Papers III, pp. 92-115.  Schutz has
     serious reservations about an absolute distinction of two
     orders between the Type and the Eidos, and on the basis
     of his investigations of EU, CM, and K, poses the question
     whether "there is indeed merely a difference of degree
     between type and eidos" (p. 115).  We will go further into
     this problem of the relation between Type and Eidos in
     Chapter VI below and Part III.  For further observations
     on the Type and the Eidos, see Schutz, "Some Structures
     of the Life-World," in the same Collected Papers III,
     pp. 116-132.

The examples of the Type offered by Husserl help to
clarify its properties.  Certain botanical objects can be
described by the concepts "crenate, lenticular, umbellate."[329]
One then has some general descriptive concepts for recognizing
and classifying leaves.  Certain animals can be identified
by reason of a set of characteristics and a pattern of
operations as a "dog, or a viper, or a swallow, or a spar-
row."[320]  With respect to physical bodies, one can describe
them as round and straight, flat and smooth, swift and
slow.[331]  One then has the rough but useful tool of an
incipient mathematics.  In sum, the Type stakes out a domain
of familiarity marked by recognizable traits and patterns of
acting.

The Type exists, however, in different stages of
perfection that are measured by the exactness of the identity
achieved.  As for these stages, ultimately they are measured
and determined by the functioning of Streben and Interesse.[332]
We will consider two stages that Husserl distinguishes : the
Empirical Type and the General Type.[333]  Both stages can cut a
across all the illustrations cited above.

The Empirical Type is constituted in Association.[334]
It detaches itself in one's field of experience (Erfahrung) by

---

329. "... gekerbt, linseförmig, doldenförmig u. dgl...." IdI,
     208 [170] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

330. "... als Hund, als Natter, als Schwalbe, als Spatz..."
     EU, 399.

331. See K, § 9a ; FUG, 383-384.

332. See Chap. VI below where the interconnection of Streben
     and Interesse, and the constitution of the Type and the
     Eidos is taken up.

333. See EU, §§ 80-85.  See also Schutz, "Type and Eidos in
     Husserl's Late Philosophy," in Collected Papers III,
     pp. 92-115.

334. See EU, §§ 83-83 ; APS, 3.  Abschnitt, "Assoziation" ;
     FTL, Append. II, § 2b.For Husserl's notion of Association,
     see  n.373 in Chap. VI below.

arousing (<u>affizieren</u>) one's notice of certain properties similar
to those found elsewhere in this field. This similarity is
passively taken in, noticed but not fully identified in a
thematic, universal judgment. The Empirical Type is an accumu-
lation of characteristics of familiarity. It is the concrete
individual taken by itself ; attention is directed upon it alone
and not upon it as a recognized particularization of a general
essence. And yet, the Epirical Type is perceived with the
dormant recognition of similar, and therefore, general, traits
shared with other concrete individuals. The typicality is
known in a latent way, and yet it can be summoned forth.

A leaf, a dog or a viper, a round or straight thing can
attract attention so that one places them through Association
as being of a similar typicality.[335] In general one dog is like
any other. But as long as it is only the particular dog that
is recognized without the similarity with other dogs being
judged, then only the Empirical Type is present. When the
similarity is made thematic, the General Type is attained.

The General Type is the similarity between individuals
recognized and judged as such. The General Type represents an
advance upon the Empirical Type inasmuch as the basis for the
similarity of the individuals is disclosed, that is to say,
the identity of the general essence is seen thoughout a multiplicity
of individuals. A certain exactness is achieved. To return
to Husserl's example of the dog. The relation of the individual
to the universal has become thematic in the judgment : "This
is <u>one</u> dog among others." An object is grasped of being of
such and such a Type, possessing specific traits and a pattern
of acting common to others.

As such, the General Type offers a scope of anticipation
that the domain of its typicality can be enlarged.[336] Further

---

335. EU, § 83a.
336. EU, §§ 83-84.

objects of the same Type are expected to be met, and when
met, offer new precisions to the conception of the Type.  The
grasp of an identity enables one to recognize it again as an
identity.  It is an Erwerb one carries with him to match with
other occurrences of the same Type.

The General Type is the basis for determining an
Ontology of the Life-world.[337]  The typicality of the Life-
world, as we have seen, once formulated in an Ontology of the
Life-world, is a transcendental clue pointing to subjectivity
and the Eidos-world.

"The essence (Eidos) is an object of a new kind."  It is
"a pure essence."[338]  Husserl makes it clear that the Eidos is
not a concept, in the sense that, if one knew the meaning of
a word or phrase, he would comprehend the Eidos.  Perhaps by
first of all noting that "its correlate is an intuitive and
apodictic consciousness of something universal,"[339] we can see

337. See Chap. I above.

338. "Das Wesen (Eidos) ist ein neuartiger Gegenstand.... ein
     reines Wesen."  IdI, 55 [14] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.
     See also EU, § 87.  It might be noted here that Husserl's
     examination of ideal objectivity is concerned more with
     the "producer" of the ideal object than with its "consumer."
     (See Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, pp. 5-7
     and Chapter II, "Expression and Its Function.")  The analyses
     of EU, FTL, CM, K, and FUG aim more at explaining the active
     constitution that produces the ideal object (for example,
     Galileo and geometry) than at explaining the cognitional
     act of the consumer who appropriates it for himself.  The
     properties, however, of the ideal object, its accessibility
     and für jedermann, evidently evidently presuppose consumers.
     Two types of ideation may, then, be identified : there is
     the productive ideation that is a creative intuition-
     constitution, and there is the reproductive intuition, or
     Wesensschau.  (See Ricoeur's translation, Idéen, p. 235,
     n. 1 ; Derrida, "Introduction" to L'origine, p. 147).

339. CM, 71 [105] ; see also FTL, § 98.

better why Husserl does not want to limit the Eidos to a concept, or the content of a concept.

The Eidos is a correlate of an "intuitional consciousness" of a pure essence that retains its identity throughout an unlimited number of possibilities. A concept, however, implies precision and fixity, whereas the Eidos is the identity under-stood that is the basis for forming the multitude of concepts that express it. One Eidos (that which is understood in intuition) can be the source of many concepts (expressions of what is understood).

The Eidos is a

> ... universal, one that is pure, 'unconditioned'--that is
> to say : according to its own intuitional sense, a universal
> not conditioned by any fact.  It is <u>prior to all 'concepts'</u>,
> in the sense of verbal significations ; indeed, as pure
> concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos.[340]

Husserl calls the Eidos an Apriori in order to bring out its regulatory function with respect to all possible manifesta-tions in individuals. It is the invariant structure that restricts and determines all variant exemplifications in the sense of making them to be what they are. It is "the essence common"[341] to all of them. The variant exemplifications are possible through the co-ordinates of space and time. The invariance, however, is "the indissolubly identical"[342] that persists throughout all the variant exemplifications.[343]

Although there is "an open horizon of endlessly manifold free possibilities"[344] of variants, this horizon is predetermined

---

340. CM, 71 [ 105]  .  See also Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," in <u>Collected Papers III</u>, p. 110.

341. FTL, 248 [ 219]  .

342. FTL, 248 [ 219]  .

343. See EU, § 87.

344. FTL, 248 [ 219]  .

by the Eidos to be such and such a horizon, in keeping with
the specific nature of the Eidos involved. Within such a horizon,
the possibilities of manifold variations are entirely plotted
out in advance, specified, and determined by the Eidos, not
in the sense that a particular case could be predicted as to
its contingent occurence, or to all its contingent circum-
stances, but that it can occur only as an exemplification of a
specific Eidos. This is the sense, and the only sense in
which Husserl would "recognize philosophically" an Apriori.[345]

Because of some of Husserl's preferred examples of
Eide, such as the Eide of Sound, Color, or Red, one might
tend to consider his preoccupation with the Eidos as a jejeune
exercise with rather obvious and predictable results. But one
might recall Husserl's conceptions of formal and material
eidetic sciences. Then one could call to mind Ideas I, II,
and III. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Cartesian Meditations,
Erfahrung und Urteil, and Die Krisis, where he spells out in
elaborate detail the traits of a multitude of eidetic
structures, for example, perception, experience, the judgment
and the transcendental Ego himself. Or simply, there is the
general orientation to have always with regard to Husserl :
Husserl's whole phenomenology is eidetic ; it is concerned with
Eide.

The capital significance of the Eidos can be judged,
then. For in the noematic domain (we could say), there are
the Eide of the material and formal ontologies to whose
structures the Types point as transcendental clues. And in the
noetic domain, there is the Eidos Ego, the constituting
source of the whole range of eidetic reality. As the pure
essence, the invariant, the Eidos is the ground and gage of
phenomenology.

When speaking of ideal objects, Husserl always

345. FTL, 248 [219] , n. 1 (Husserl's note).

characterizes them as being an <u>Erwerb</u> (or <u>Besitz</u>) <u>für jeder-</u>
<u>mann</u>. These two notions point up essential aspects of his
conception of ideal objectivity. The ideal object has some
of the properties of a Kantian idea : it is the correlative of
a limitless manifold of intentional acts of, one could say,
a limitless manifold of subjects. Thus it must be written
down in order to preserve its identity. For it is an <u>Erwerb</u>
insofar as it is protected against the threat of its
disappearance from the community of subjects. As soon as it is
recorded, it is saved for, and accessible to, everyone at any
time and place whatsoever, and not just here and now at the
moment of its creative production.

    But its accessibility is not activated by the mere random
reproduction in someone's <u>Wesenschau</u>. The ideal object anticipates
not only its retrieval by the original producer himself, but
also its reproduction by others in order that through its
renewed and maintained presence it may become both continually
better known and also the point of departure for further know-
ledge. Such, for example, would be Galileo's contribution as
Husserl conceives it.

> Because of our interest in these ideal forms and our
> logical rigor in the treatment of them to determine them,
> and on the basis of those already determined to construct
> new ones, are we 'Geometricians.' [346]

    But why is the ideal object accessible to others at all ?
Why is it there <u>für jedermann</u> ? Maybe one should ask, Just who
is this <u>jedermann</u> ? The ideal object is accessible for every-
one inasmuch as the <u>same</u> Eidos Ego with the <u>same</u> eidetic
intentional structure is found in every person. And one can
say that the ideal object is identically the same because it is
not limited to one lone and unique monad. The eidetic

---

346. "Für diese idealen Gestalten interessiert und konsequent
damit beschäftigt, sie zu bestimmen und aus den schon
bestimmten neue zu konstruieren,sind wir 'Geometer.'". K, 23.

reduction of the individual subject and the subsequent
determination of The Other Ego reveal a transcendental Ego
that is the same in essence in every monad.  Consequently,
when an ideal object is constituted by an Ego, it can be
appropriated by any other Ego because this latter has the same
eidetic intentional structure and is capable of performing
the same intentional activity as the former.  There is the
possibility of an _Erwerb_ of ideal objects precisely because
of the community of subjects whose intentional performance is
grounded in the unity of the transcendental Ego.[347]

The transcendental shift effected by the Epoche
transposes the question of ideal objectivity from a search for
a kind of pre-existent object outside, and independent,
of the subject to a discovery of its origins in intending
subjectivity.  The ideal object is not "ideal" and "object"
in the sense that it is always there to be somehow approached,
found, and then intuited in an external manner.  Rather there
exists ideal objectivity insofar as there exists the same
Eidos Ego grounding a community of subjects.  The _sameness_ and
the _unity_ of the ideal object exist because of the _sameness_
and the _unity_ of the transcendental Ego.  Ideal objectivity is
constituted _by_ the transcendental Ego _for_ the transcendental
Ego to have forever.

---

347. We will not go into the question of intersubjective
     constitution which is a vast problematic in its own right,
     Some justification for our approach can be proffered by
     citing the example of Sokolowski's work, _The Formation_
     _of Husserl's Conception of Constitution_ which, though
     treating the whole problematic of objectivity and
     constitution, does not broach the question of inter-
     subjective constitution at all.  See p. 2 of the
     Introduction : "Our study will not be concerned... with
     the problem of intersubjective constitution.  We limit it
     to examination of the constitution Husserl attributes
     to individual subjectivity which, in his thought, is the
     more basic form of constitution."

## Summary

This chapter examines the two kinds of objectivity, immanent and transcendent. Immanent objects, inherent to the intentional act, are the noetic side of the act. The transcendent object, for its part, is not inherent to the act. Its distinction from the immanent object can be described in terms of presence : it is a presence introduced to the self-presence of the intending Ego. The transcendent object can be either a physically real object or an ideal one. The ideal object is the categorial object. Husserl's notion of the categorial object is the aspect of objectivity with which we are concerned. Although the physically real object is given in its own proper prepredicative experience, nevertheless it is the unity-identity of the physically real object that constitutes its objectivity. For, properly speaking, objectivity exists only in the judgment. Categorial objects are found in two degrees : as bound or free idealities. Furthermore, three levels of categorial objectivity can be distinguished if one starts from language : 1) the words and phrases of the language ; 2) their meaning ; 3) the object meant.

CHAPTER VI


ANSCHAUUNG, "THE PRINCIPLE OF PRINCIPLES"


The Epoche enables the transcendental subject to take
reflective possession of himself.  In this reflective self-
possession, intentionality is disclosed as the essential
trait of the transcendental subject by which there is always
present a transcendent dimension, that is, objectivity.  The
transcendental subject's intentional life is determined by a
subjective pole as well as an objective one which, though it
is constituted by the subject, is constituted precisely to
be correlative to the subjective pole.

Epoche, the  transcendental subject, objectivity
constituted by the subject :these have been our themes up to
this point.  Next arise the questions of what is a real object
and its validating ground.  And the determination of these two
questions then raises the essentially related questions concerning
evidence and truth.

The main topic of this chapter, then, is Husserl's notion
of intuition, for it is intuition according to him that is the
validating ground for the reality of objectivity.  Once his
idea of intuition is clarified, then those of evidence and truth
can be likewise.  Though some remarks must be made about
intuition and sense objects, the main concern of this chapter
is categorial objectivity and its validating intuition.  The
interesting situation, already adverted to earlier, that exists
where sense perception is the model of human cognitional

activity, while the ideal object is the norm for objectivity, will be discussed again. We are attempting, then, to show what legitimizes objectivity according to Husserl, especially categorial objectivity, and established it as real objectivity. In a word, the question posed in this chapter is, What makes an object an object for Husserl?

## I. Intuition

Husserl's slogan "zu den Sachen," announcing the programme of his phenomenology, is a declaration, made possible by the Epoche, of the primacy of intuition and its evidence. The facts, "die Sachen," are that which is given, precisely that and nothing more. They must be allowed to speak for themselves, or to shift the metaphor to Husserl's preferred manner of speaking, they must be seen as they are. When it is question, then, of determining the status (real or not real) of an object of an intentional act, then it is intuition that must be appealed to. For intuition is the "principle of all principles."

Every type of intentional activity, presentation or presentification or thinking, involves a relationship to an objective correlative : seeing, hearing, and feeling, or imagining and remembering, or thinking, all have their object. Phenomenological constitution can be considered as

> ...up to now, constitution of any intentional object whatever. It has embraced the full breadth of the topic, cogito-cogitatum. We shall now proceed to differentiate this breadth structurally, and to prepare for a more pregnant concept of constitution. It has not mattered up to now, whether the objects in question were truly existent or non-existent, or whether they were possible or impossible.[348]

There is, then, more involved in intentionality than the object simply as a correlate, a cogitatum of a cogito.

---

348. CM, 56 [91].

Something is involved over and above whether an object is presented, or presentified, or thought. One can ask if the object is <u>real</u> or not. And as soon as one asks this question, then, according to Husserl, one moves to the level of reality and the verification of the validity of an object. One then reaches a "more pregnant concept of constitution."[349]

Intuition, evidence, and verification mutually involve one another : to the extent that something is evident, it is intuited, and if it is intuited, it can be verified as real. "Verification" thus "refers ultimately to making evident and having as evident."[350]

These three--intuition, evidence, and verification--determine the fundamental structure of intentional life. Insofar as they are operative, intentional activity which attains real objectivity can exist.

> In the broadest sense, evidence denotes a universal primal phenomenon of intentional life, namely--as contrasted with other consciousness-of, which is capable a priori of being 'empty', expectant, indirect, non-presentive--the quite pre-eminent mode of consciousness that consists in the self-appearance, the self-complex (or state of affairs), a universality, a value or other objectivity, in the final mode : 'itself there,' 'immediately intuited,' 'given originaliter.' For the Ego that signifies : not aiming confusedly at something, with an empty expectant intention, but being with it itself, viewing, seeing, having insight into, it itself.[351]

Intentionality, then, can be either empty or intuitively fulfilled. The touchstone is whether the object appears in its self-giving.

If it does, then one achieves the "mode of consciousness

---

349. See LU, Invest. V and VI ; IdI, Part, IV ; CM, Third Med. ; FTL, § 46.

350. CM, 54 [92].

351. CM, 57 [92-93]; cf. FTL, 157-158 [141].

that consists in the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting,
the self-giving" of the object. If the object appears, giving
itself, and thus is known, the intentional act is intuitive ;
if not, then the act is empty.

The notions _Reiz_ and _Affektion_, and _Streben_ and _Interesse_,
already identified in the context of intentionality in
Chapter II, are important factors for intuition and reappear
in this  Chapter.  Their precise point of entry into intuition-
constitution can be localized in the advance from prepredicative
to predicative activity.  Their working is necessary for the
production of the categorial object.  They are, to be exact,
different components of the one intentional act of intuition-
constitution through which the categorial object is finally
produced.  As a consequence, they are likewise intrinsic
to the evidence and truth which are involved in the production
of the categorial object.

## A. Sense Intuition

In keeping with Husserl's distinction of physically
real objects and ideal (categorial) objects, we will examine
the two kinds of intuition that validate these objects, namely
sense intuition and categorial intuition. The first to be taken
up is sense intuition.

Acts of presentation and presentification are intuitive
inasmuch as they put the object itself before consciousness,
each in its specific manner.  Husserl calls perception originary
presentation since the object appears now to consciousness.[352]
It is present.  The presence of the perceived object possesses
its specific time status.  Together with its manner of appearing
to consciousness, the time status of the perceived object is
the reason for its pre-eminence for Husserl.  There is no
question of summoning it up to make it present so that it could

---

352. See LU, Invest. VI, § 45 ; Z, 63-64 [41]; IdI, 127 [88];
    FTL, 158 [141]; K, 107.

be intuited. The perceived object is present (<u>gegenwärtig</u>) in the two-fold meaning where "presence" means "being there," and "being there at the actual moment right now."[353] Although there might be a temporal succession to the act of intuition in which it is modified and shifts to a certain degree, as long as one object is being intuited, then the act can be considered "as one single act which keeps going on."[354]

The objects of memory and imagination do not offer themselves in a self-appearing. They are not present. Rather these objects are called up from the past or from an atemporal status in such a way that they can be said to be presentified. Since perception, however, possesses the plenitude of intuition, Husserl calls it the "<u>Urmodus der Selbstgebung</u>,"[355] and sets it up as normative for human cognitional activity.

One can speak of an empty intention with respect to perception when the object is not intuited in any of many possible intuitions that would be adequate. Such, for example, is the situation where someone could be describing a specific German house with red tiles to one who has never seen it ; or the situation where one is merely thinking about such a house without perceiving it in any manner. Tiles, red, and house are already familiar things, but they are not intuited as pertaining to a specified house, and will not be until one sees the house.[356]

There is not just one unique intuitive act which must take place in order for the intention to be fulfilled. For

353. Concerning the twofold meaning of "present" (to which a third, "<u>Ursprünglichkeit</u>," is added), cf. Ricoeur's commentary in his translation <u>Idées</u>, p.254, n.2.

354. "... comme un seul acte qui traîne...." Levinas, <u>Théorie de l'intuition</u>, p.121.

355. FTL, 158 [141].

356. See Levinas, <u>Théorie de l'intuition</u>, pp. 112-113.

fulfilling every intention, a vast number of intuitions are possible and adequate. Thus in the example of the red-tiled house, one has the possibility of looking at it in a countless number of ways, for example, from in front, from the side, while walking, while standing, and so forth. Any one of these perceptions can present the red-tiled house intuitively. Husserl speaks of the sense object's being given "in a straightforward (schlichter) manner."[357] Perception does not require any other type of intentional act as a base. The whole object appears in perception at one stroke as soon as the perception of it takes place.

It is true that the object is perceived in a sequence of profiles (Abschattungen) where the object, as it were, sketches its identity.[358] However, each element in the series of perceptions, occurring as it does at one stroke, offers the whole object. Further, the unity of these successive acts of perception, each directed upon the object, is not a new intentional act or synthesis founded upon the simple acts of perception, and thus constituting a new complex act. The acts of perception have a certain uniformity inasmuch as one cannot insolate distinct elements and thus identify levels of structure, as in a judgment. "The multiplicity of the acts of perception is like one single act which keeps going on."[359] In this way, is perception a "straightforward", a simple, direct, and nonfounded act.

Alfred Schutz points out that vision is Husserl's "paradigm" for perception.[360] Although Husserl uses the term

---

357. LU, II [II/2], 787 [145].

358. IdI, §§ 41 and 44. See Sokolowski, The Formation, pp.61 (concerning LU) and 123-124 (IdI).

359. "La multiplicité des actes de la perception, est comme un seul acte qui traîne...." Levinas, Théorie de l'intuition, p.121.

360. Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," in Collected Papers III, p.104. See LU, Invest. VI, §§ 45 and 46 ; IP, 23-24 [30-31]; PSW, 146-147 [71-72 ]; IdI, §§, 3,4,24 ; CM, 24 [63-64]; FTL, § 59 ; K, 107, 204.

"intuition" (<u>Anschauug</u>) for sense as well as categorial intuition,
it always keeps its original meaning of "seeing" that recalls
visual perception.  It is not idle, then, to note that Husserl
resorts to expressions related to "seeing" when he is describing
<u>all</u> acts of sensation where the object appears in its authentic
presence.  It serves well his conception of the object's
appearing to consciousness in its full identity, in its
<u>Leibhaftigkeit</u>, and its being known as if by a direct vision.
Intuition means that one sees what is there before his gaze.
One does not see what is not there.  One does not distort the
seen object by looking at it.  Further, not only does intuition
give the seen object unaltered in its identity, it likewise
gives itself.

It discloses itself as a  nondistorting gaze that takes the
object just as it is, whether a seen, heard, or felt object
If the perceived object is there fully present, then consciousness
can open its unobstructed gaze upon it, and consciousness is
considered to intuit the perceived object, whether this object
is something heard or felt.

## B. <u>Categorial intuition</u>

According to the schema of the ideal object offered in
the previous chapter, the categorial object comprises the
affair-complex as well as the ideal essences, the Type and the
Eidos, whose ultimate origins lie in the affair-complex.  Our
examination of Husserl's notion of categorial intuition, then,
will coincide with these three aspects of categorial objectivity :
the affair-complex, and then, the Type and the Eidos.  But
first of all, some preliminary remarks on categorial objectivity
in general, and the affair-complex in particular.

Just as there is an intuition that validates empirical
objectivity, there is another, avers Husserl, that performs a

corresponding function for ideal objects.[361]

If the fulfilling intuition for sense objects is relatively simple and uncomplicated, those for categorial objects can run the whole gamut of imaginable complexity, from the one that accompagnies the judgment, "This roof is red" to the complexity of the manifold intuitions necessary to understand a book on calculus.

The essential difference between sense objects and categorial objects lies respectively in the simplicity or complexity of the intuitive acts that constitute them. The intuition that constitutes the sense object is a simple act of perception, whereas the intuition for the categorial object presupposes, and is ultimately based upon, perceptions. Hence sense objects are simple objects, and categorial objects are complex, or founded, objects.

## 1. The Affair-complex

Before examining the affair-complex as founded, we will consider its presence (Selbstgebung). And we will consider this as, first of all, indicating its time status. The physically real object and the ideal object each have there own specific "now". The now of the ideal object consists in its being a permanent unity-identity, always accessible to everyone. It is constituted and kept in existence, not \y the individual acts of memory or successive perceptions of a particular individual, but by the intuitions of a person acting on the atemporal level of ideal objectivity.

---

361. See LU, Invest, VI, §§ 45-46 ; see also Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, pp. 448-463 ; René Schérer, La phénoménologie des "Recherches logiques" de Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 317-322. See further FTL, § 58.

This level could be designated as the level of activity specifically pertaining to the Eidos Ego (transcendental Ego). For inasmuch as he possesses the Eidos Ego, each individual Ego, as we have seen, is always able to communicate with the others through ideal objectivity. Ideal objectivity, by reason of its omnitemporal and omnipresent existence, is a permanently abiding transcendental field which the Ego either expands by his creative intuition or to which he gains access by reproductive intuitions. In this way can it be said that the "now" of the ideal object means that the ideal object is always abidingly present for the transcendental Ego, ready for his intuition.

The other aspect of the ideal object's presence is its giving of itself (Selbstgebung) in originary intuition. The affair-complex is actively constituted when one intends the specific identity of an object, or identifies different aspects of it. Identification is not performed by simple sense intuitions since they cannot be directed upon the identity in and for itself. Identification is a synthesis of different elements which, inasmuch as it is a synthesis, cannot be given in one or many sense intuitions.[362]

What is constituted is an affair-complex, and it is constituted in a judgment. The affair-complex is given in a categorial intuition which ultimately is founded upon sense intuition. In the categorial intuition, different elements are not merely assembled and presented in an undifferentiated series, but are intuited as united. There is no way that one could perceive in any sensation a state of affairs, even one so simple as, "The tiles of the house are red." True, one perceives through sense intuition, and perhaps in succession, one after the other, shape, red,and size, but one does not

362. See LU, Invest. VI, § 47 (Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, pp. 457-459) ; Z, Appendix XIII ; EU, § 13.

perceive the identity and unity of these elements as such.
One does not put everything together : that is to say, precisely
that the tiles of the house are red.

Examining Husserl's formalization of the judgment,
"S is p," one can more easily understand what he means by
saying categorial intuition is based upon sense intuition.
S is established by the sense intuition, as well as p : the
tiles are seen, as well as the redness.  But between the seeing
of S and p, the tiles and the red, and the seeing that S is
p, is a gap that is bridged by categorial intuition.  However,
if there were no sense intuitions to furnish the empirical
elements, the categorial intuition could not occur.  What
sense intuition sees are shapes or colors, the tiles and the
red.  What categorial intuition sees is the unity-identity of
the affair-complex ; that the different elements belong together ;
that tiles and red go together.

There are other categorial elements and judgments of
greater complexity to which belong their specifically fulfilling
categorial intuitions.[363]  There are the categorial intuitions
which must accompany the conjunction (S and P) ; the disjunction
(S or P) ; the relation of whole and part (S has p ; S is p) ;
relative clauses (S, which is p, is q) ; and so on, up through
all dependent and independent clauses, paragraphs, chapters,
books of literature, mathematics, and science, and ultimately
the whole literary production of a nation and humanity.  So
again, one may see empirically the individual things joined
by "and" or disjoined by "on" as well as the things that are
t-e matter of judgments, but one does not see empirically
the categorial forms nor the categorial objects.

What, then, does one see in categorial intuition ?
Or to put the question another way, what precisely does
categorial intuition bring to sense intuition ?  "The categorial

_____

363. See LU, Invest. VI, §§ 43-52 ; EU, §§ 50c, 61-63 ; CM,
     77 [111].

form is not a really inherent predicate of the thing, nor a result of reflection upon consciousness. It is an <u>ideal</u> structure of the object."[364] It does not add anything in the sense of intrinsically modifying the empirical object.[365] Were categorial intuition to add anything to the content of the sense object, it would transform the sense object into something else, in the way that tasting food adds a new content to food that is merely seen.

The categorial intuition sees both the categorial form and the categorial object constituted through such forms, though the intuition is directly upon the object and not specifically upon its formal elements qua formal elements. The unity-identity of the categorial object is determined by any of the manifold forms : conjunction, concession, etc., and especially the "is" form. Their function is to make possible the judgment as a unity that is detachable from its individuating conditions. This function they can perform inasmuch as they are independent of the material element of any individual categorial object, or the particular categorial intuition that sees the object. Because the categorial form makes it possible for the categorial object of the judgment to exist as an ideal object, it is then "an ideal structure of the object."

In the <u>Logical Investigations</u>, Husserl places the difference between the empty intending and the fulfilled intuition of the categorial object in what he calls a categorial "representative content" (<u>Repräsentation</u>).[366] However, in the

---

364. "La forme catégoriale n'est pas un prédicat réel de la chose, ni le résultat de la réflexion sur la conscience. C'est une structure <u>idéale</u> de l'objet." Levinas, <u>Théorie de l'intuition</u>, p.118.

365. See LU, II [II/2], Invest. VI, § 43 ; EU, § 50c ; FTL, § 79.

366. LU, II [II/2], Invest. VI, 56. See also Schérer, <u>La phénoménologie des "Recherches logiques" de Husserl</u>, pp. 322-325 ; Sokolowski, <u>The Formation</u>, pp. 70-71.

Vorwort to the second edition, he explicitly rejects this
concept of representation-content (even though he does not
supress the chapters in the second and subsequent editions
where he treats the notion). The notion of the categorial
representation-content is modeled on that of the sense
representation-content that is found in a sense intuition
together with its matter and quality.

Further, the notion is based upon the matter-form schema
(Auffassungsinhalt-Auffassung) that Husserl drops when he
initiates his studies in genetic constitution. According to
the conception of representation-content, there must be some
kind of sense data for the categorial form, just as there is
sense data for the sense intuition. In a judgment like, "The
tile is red," there are two elements, one categorial, the
other, empirical. There is a categorial form "S is p." And
there are the empirical elements, "tile" and "red" to which
the categorial forms belong. It is easy enough to point to the
sense data for the tile and the red. But sense data, or sense
content, for the categorial form would be something different.
For if the sense content were not different, one would perceive
sense and categorial objects in the same way.

Husserl's solution is to place the representation-content
in the "psychic bond" that one experiences when one performs
a categorial act, such as "the psychic bond that is experienced
in actual identification, collecting, etc."[367] "Actual"
means "authentic, intuitive,"[368] in the intuitive act. One
has a special kind of psychological experience when one
has a categorial intuition.[369]

---

367. "... das psychische Band, das im aktuellen Identifizieren
     oder Kolligieren u. dgl. erlebt ist...." LU, II [ II/2] ,
     809 [ 173] ; trans. adapted from Findlay.

368. LU, II [ II/2] , 809 [ 173] .

369. See Sokolowski, The Formation, p.70, where he discusses
     Repräsentation.

Husserl's abandoning of the representation-content, as Sokolowski points out, can be attributed to his abandoning of the matter-form schema for intentional activity. And this abandoning of the schema can in its turn be viewed as a purification of his notion of intentionality and objectivity. For the schema is tinctured with the dualism of psychologism, as he himself avers : there are, as almost independent entitites, the "sensuous Data and intentional mental processes."[370]

The rejection of the matter-form schema can be further considered as in keeping with Husserl's opinion that categorial intuition adds to the empirical object no new content that would intrinsically modify it. The empirical properties of an object and its ideal structure are of two essentially different orders. And if they are, then there should be no reason, it seems, why a representation-content, existing on the level of a psychological experiencing, should be an essential component of the categorial intuition. The categorial intuition, arising from the impulse of Interesse, consists in seeing the ideal structure of the categorial object with its essence and eidetic properties. This seeing intuits something that is not even present (in the two meanings of present) to sense intuition.

The fulfilling categorial intuition, then, takes place when the categorial object in its ideal structure is made present. This presence is not dependent upon a representation-content. Consequently, the distinction between empty and fulfilling intuition is to be placed in the nature of categorial intending itself. That is to say, in whether the intending, manifested in a specific interest, comes to its term in the intuition of a categorial object with its specifically non-empirical structure. Such is the Selbstgebung of the categorial object.

_____

370. FTL, 286 [ 254 ].

The judgment is a crystallized meaning so constituted that it can stand by itself available to everyone to be appropriated through his own intuition. Besides this ideality of the affair-complex of the judgment taken as a unity in itself, however, there are other ideal categorial objects that are constitutive elements of this unity. These elements are the categorial objects designated by the S, p, q, in the formalized expression of the judgment, that is to say, they can be general objects.

The judgment is the habitat of the categorial objectivity in the sense that both the judgment itself and its elements, general objects, are categorial objects. But general objects are intuited, first of all, _in_ a judgment of which they are a constituted element.[371] Distinct particular general objects are not constituted by themselves. One does not go around conceiving "tile," "red," "triangle," "function," and even "me," and "you," piecemeal apart from judgments. The judgment performs its identifying activity by unifying general objects that are not pre-existant to this activity but rather exist for the first time through the judgment.[372] After their occurrence in the judgment, however, one can isolate them and consider them in and for themselves.

We come, then, to the other kinds of categorial intuition to which correspond the general objects, the Type and the Eidos. Once one has intuited the affair-complex as a unity-whole, he can turn his attention to the general objects and examine them for themselves.

---

371. See EU, 240 ; and the III. Abschnitt.
372. See Schutz, "Type and Eidos," pp. 101-104.

## 2. Intuition of the Type and of the Eidos

### a. The Type

The empirical Type is constituted in the prepredicative level through Association.[373] It is an anticipation and

---

373. Some remarks should be made about Assoziation so that its relationship with Reiz, Affektion, Tendenz, Zuwendung, Streben, and Interesse might be clarified.

In LU : when Husserl speaks of Assoziation, he refers to the empiricist notion which he is combating (LU, Invest. II, § 15). Nevertheless, according to what he asserts later in EU (p.78), the notion of Anzeige in LU, Invest. I, § 2, forms already the Keim of genetic phenomenology. For the Anzeige motivates the belief (Überzeugung) in the existence of something else. In this way it contains elements of Husserl's later notion of Assoziation.

In APS : Association is discussed in the framework of the Epoche (APS, 117-119). It is characterized thus : "Das Gegenwärtige erinnert an das Vergangene" (APS, 118). There are two kinds of Association : 1) Reproduktion, and 2) the höhere Stufe, Erwartung and Apperzeption (APS, 119). Paarbildung is a moment of Association effectuated by Tendenz, affektive Kraft, and Zuwendung (APS, § 28). Husserl describes Affektion : "Wir verstehen darunter den bewusst seinsmässigen Reiz, den eigentümlichen Zug, den ein bewusster Gegenstand auf das Ich übt--es ist ein Zug, der sich entspannt in der Zuwendung des Ich und von da sich fortsetzt im Streben nach selbstgebender, das gegenständliche Selbst immer mehr enthüllender Anschauung-- also nach Kenntnisnahme, nach näherer Betrachtung des Gegenstandes" (APS, 148-149). Affektion pertains to the Grundformen der Vergegenständlichung (APS, 162). It is eine grundwesentliche Form (APS, 162). It is a Lebendigkeit that is not something sachlich (APS 167). Affektion belongs,then, to the formal structure of Association and constitution, and not to any material element, or content, involved. Because of Affektion, fulfilling intuition takes place : "Nur vermöge der affektiven Kraft ist überhaupt die Verbindung of the elements appearing in the strömenden lebendigen Gegenwärtssphäre zustande gekommen, und solange Anschauung statthat, ist eo ipso affektive Kraft da" (APS, 175).

In EU : any hint of an empiricist conception of Association is excluded : "Assoziation kommt hier ausschliesslich in Frage als der rein immanente Zusammenhang des 'etwas erinnert an etwas,' 'eines weist auf das andere hin' " (EU, 78 ; cf. the characterization of Assoziation above in APS, 118). Association .../...

predilineation of the General Type which is constituted in
its distinct unity-identity on the predicative level.  Those
two Types are related to each other as process and term, as
adumbration and completion.

The General Type, inasmuch as it is a categorial object,

---

.../... is on the level of passive constitution.  Consequently,
to speak of "objects" here is not exact since, properly
speaking, only the categorial object is an object (EU,
81, n.1).  Nonetheless, the final goal of Association
can be designated as ideal objectivity, the Type and
the Eidos, inasmuch as they are preconstituted
(vorkonstiuiert) in it (EU, § 81).
In FTL : "original givenness" always has an
" 'apperceptional' after-effect" by which anything
present in a similar new situation will be perceived
in a similar manner (FTL, 317 [ 279] ; see further FTL,
App. II, § 3).
In CM : "the meditating ego" examines the "eidetic
laws" of passive genesis (CM, 79 [ 113] ).  Passive genesis
"lies prior to all activity and, in part, takes in all
activity itself" (CM, 79 [ 113] ; cf. CM,11 [ 52] where Husserl
says : "Predicative includes pre-predicative evidence").
"Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which
we designate as 'association,' in contrast to passive
synthesis of 'identification' " (CM, 112 [ 142] ; cf.
APS 132).
In summary, then : Husserl does not clearly distinguish
Reiz, Tendenz, Affektion, Zuwendung, and Interesse from
one another, but often uses them interchangeably.  He
does, however, tend to use Zuwendung and Interesse to
describe the active initiative of the Ego in constituting
categorial objectivity.  In EU, §§ 55 and 57, he speaks
of Interesse in the context of the constitution of
attribution and identity judgments.  In EU, § 81, he
explains the role of Interesse (contrasting it in this
section with Affektion which underscores the passivity
of the Ego vis-à-vis the stimulating object) in the consti-
tution of the ideal object as a unity-identity being
detached through the sequence of individual judgments.
To distinguish Assoziation, then, from Reiz, Tendenz,
Affektion, Zuwendung, and Interesse, two points can be
made : 1) these five notions, when used interchangeably,
designate an essential element in the intentional process
through which Association is achieved.  There is the con-
trast between an element of the process and the term of
the process.  These five belong to the process, whereas
Association is the term, the attainment .../...

is intuited because of the impulse of the Ego's thematizing
interest. Association, for its part, expands one's fields
of familiarity by increasing the number and kind of objects
to be identified by categorial activity. The materials and
conditions are being assembled for intuiting a general Type.
The advance, however, from the level of passively taking in
similar characteristics to the level of articulating them
in the categorial intuition is accomplished by a specifying
interest. This interest is an intention to make thematic
the identity or some particular aspect of the empirical
Type, and it promotes one's knowing from Association to the
categorial intuition of the General Type.

 To add further precision in clarifying the intentional
performance by which the Empirical and General Type are
constituted, this observation might be made : the notions
stimulus (<u>Reiz</u>) and affecting (<u>Affektion</u>) appear in conjunction
with Association, while the notions of striving (<u>Streben</u>)
and interest (<u>Interesse</u>) are found in connexion with the
production of the General Type. The patterns of appearance
of these notions are almost exclusively confined to the one or
the other Type respectively. In passive constitution there
is a stimulus and affecting by which intentionality is oriented
towards a categorial production. Striving and interest, however,
are really more comprehensive and can englobe the whole of
intentional performance, predicative as well as prepredicative.
Yet, they primarily define categorial activity.

---

.../... of a certain level of objectivity. Further, they are
 the specific element in this level of intentional
 performance by which Association is aimed at and attained.
 2) When <u>Interesse</u> appears in the context of the constitu-
 tion of categorial objects, then it signifies intentional
 activity on a higher level than that of Association.
 (See also Mohanty, <u>Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning</u>,
 pp. 141-142 ; Schutz, "Type and Eidos, in Husserl's
 Late Philosophy," in <u>Collected Papers III</u>, pp. 93-99 ;
 Sokolowski, <u>The Formation</u>, pp. 173-177).

Different things might be casually judged to be a "dog or a viper, or a swallow, or a sparrow."[374] This judging takes place in two steps. First, one might judge, "This bird is a swallow," that is, S is p. S and p are specifically intuited as well as are any other members, such as q, r, etc., that might appear in a more complex judgment. Subsequently one intuits other affair-complexes where there are birds that are swallows. One's interest turns upon S', S", S''' which draw attention since they reveal the same moment p as noticeable and noteworthy. There are, then, two series of judgments to be distinguished :

> ... the first one in which the individual moment is predicated to each substratum : S' is p', S" is p", S''' is p''' ; and a second series in which everywhere the same p (without prime) is predicated to each substratum as the universal unity of the species constituted passively in the congruence of likeness of p', p", p'''. Then we arrive at judgments such as S' is p, S" is p, etc., whereby p is no longer a predicative individual kernel, but a general one.[375]

As long as one intuits S' is p' and S" is p" one intuits two affair-complexes where there are two individual objects with their two individual moments. But as soon as one advances to the judgments, S' is p, and S" is p he intuits the same unity-identity of the universal, or the general, that appears in the individual objects. The intuiting of the universal in this way Alfred Schutz has termed "the supression of the prime," that is to say, those of p.[376]

---

374. "... als Hund, als Natter, als Schwalbe, als Spatz...." EU, 399.

375. Schutz, "Type and Eidos," p. 103. This passage of Schutz is a précis of, and commentatry on, EU, 389-390.

376. Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation," in Collected Papers I, p. 21 ; see also Schutz, "Type and Eidos," p. 114.

The universal can then be detached from the judgment and intuited by itself without any individuating conditions. Examples are the Types (or morphological essences) mentioned in the last chapter, such as crenate, lenticualar, umbelliform, straight, square, triangle, or those mentioned earlier in this chapter, such as dog, viper, swallow. These are the genera, species, and properties that are intuited in various degrees of precision in the Life-world.

The second step is what Husserl calls the "presumptive idea of a universal."[377] Upon experiencing something and making a judgment about it, one intuits the object as possessing a certain typicality, and as open to the further specification of its properties. Every object is intuited in a horizon of anticipated, or presumed, properties that one expects to meet with on further occasions. When one knows a swallow or a dog, then integral to one's subsequent intuitions is the presumption that swallows and dogs will look and behave in a typical way, unless something contradicts this expectation.

Or again, perhaps the best example of all because of its importance and detailed treatment is the Type, ego-cogito-cogitatum. By reason of its typicality, it is a transcendental clue from which the reduction can be initiated. As seen in Chapters I and V, Husserl's main interest in the Type in his later works is to study it, not so much in itself, but more in its relation to the structures of active constitution in the Transcendental Ego.

Briefly, the supression of the prime leads to the presumptive idea. The fulfilling intuition of the Types takes in these two stages, one of which is preparative of the other. In terms of presence and self-giving, the union of

---

377. "... eine _präsumptive Idee_... _eines Allgemeinen_.... EU, 401 ; see also all of EU, § 83a where this remark occurs.

prime elimination and the presumptive idea, it could be
said, is what effectuates the presence and self-giving of
the Type.

At the interior of the advance from Association to
this intuition of the General Type is the promoting force,
interest. Whether one is speaking of passive and active
constitutions, or sense and categorial intuitions, one
should bear in mind the roles of interest. It is itself
neither a constitution nor an intuition. Rather it effects
the passage of cognition (whether designated as constitution
or intuition) from the level of empirical receptivity to
that of categorial activity.

### b. The Eidos

The movement from the level of the Type to that of
the Eidos is accomplished by the Detached Observer. For it
is a movement from an activity of the Life-world of the
Natural Attitude to an activity proper to the realm of the
Transcendental Ego. One could also say it is accomplished by
special Interesse of, and proper to, the Detached Observer.[378]

---

378. The relationship that Husserl sets up between the Epoche
and Interesse in K is worthy of note. Interesse is not
just a specific attending to a certain objective situation
in such a manner that the Empirical and General Types are
constituted. It can also designate both the natürliche
Einstellung and the whole transcendental shift towards
the Selbstbesinnung of the Epoche. Interesse can thus
be equated with intentionality. But it is a more precise
notion inasmuch as it explains Association and active
constitution in the production of the Empirical and
General Types. Further, it is a more evocative notion,
for it suggests the whole orientation of the Ego
towards the cogntional enterprise in its entire scope,
both the natürliche Einstellung and the Epoche.
    The following remarks of Husserl are enlightening :
    "In all dem aber waltet--und das macht
Wissenschaftlichkeit, Beschreibung, phänomenologisch-
transzendentale Wahreit möglich-- eine feste Typik, die,
wie schon gesagt, eine methodische als reines Apriori
zu umgreifende Wesenstypik ist. Hier ist ..../...

The method used to accomplish this movement to the eidetic
intuition (or <u>Wesenserschauung</u>, or <u>Ideenschau</u>) is the eidetic
variation.

---

...../... es merkwürdig und philosophisch sehr wichtig, dass
dies auch den ersten unserer Titel, die durch alle
Relativitäten hindurch doch als Einheit konstituierte
Lebenswelt, das Universum lebensweltlicher Objekte,
betrifft.  Sie hätte eigentlich ohne alles transzendentale
Interesse, also in der 'natürlichen Einstellung'... zum
Thema einer eigenen Wissenschaft-- einer Ontologie der
Lebenswelt rein als Erfahrungswelt... werden können." (K,
176).
      "Die Welt des Lebens, die alle praktische Gebilde
(sogar die der objektiven Wissenschaften als Kulturtatsachen,
bei Enthaltung von der Teilnahme an ihren Interessen)
ohne weiteres in sich aufnimmt, ist freilich in stetem
Wandel der Relativitäten auf Subjektivitat bezogen." (K,
176).
      "Von der Möglichkeit und Bedeutung einer solchen
lebensweltlichen Ontologie auf dem natürlichen Boden,
also ausserhalb des transzendentalen Interessenhorizontes,
haber wir schon gesprochen...." (K, 176).
      "... praktische Interesse.... Wechsel der Interessen...."
(K, 22).
      "Nie hat diese Korrelation  von Welt und subjektiven
Gegebenheitsweisen  ein eigenes philosophisches Interesse
erregt, so dass sie zum Thema einer eigenen Wissenschaft-
lichkeit geworden wäre." (K, 168).
      We can take a brief overview of the different, but
complementary, aspects of the Eidos presented in the
different works of Husserl.  EU is concerned with the
constitution of the Eidos : thus Association and the
Empirical Type, the General Type, and scopes of anticipa-
tion are prominent in the study (EU, III. Abschnitt).
FTL, which offers a brief companion-explanation of the
same material as EU, goes into the recognition of similar
objects based upon the build-up of anterior intentional
acts (FTL, Appendix II).  CM takes the Type, ego-cogito-
cogitatum, and then more specifically, the cogitationes,
as a transcendental clue to penetrate into the material
and formal eidetic structures of intentionality (CM, §§
21, 25, 34).  Then K offers further precisions to EU.
There is an advance through the gradations of typicality
which is governed by the diverse focusings of <u>Interesse</u>.
There is an Ontology of the Life-world that is to serve
as a transcendental clue to point one's way into the
domain of the transcendental <u>Interesse</u> (K, §§ 9, 48,
51 ; FUG).  ...../...

The eidetic variation, as briefly seen in Chapter I, is essentially a performance of the imagination that through a cumulative and converging series of notes presentified by the imagination aims at disengaging the identical universal structure of an object.[379] "_Imagination_ in general is the neutrality-modification applied to the 'positing' Presentification."[380] Because of this nonpositing trait, imagination can be of service in the phenomenological attitude where positing and nonpositing, once reflectivly grasped for what they are, can be manipulated.

The imagination, besides being nonpositing, operates free from time limitation. It has the liberty to range through unlimited possibilities with no commitment to posit any of them, or to locate any of them in time. This liberty

---

.../... See also Schutz, "Type and Eidos" ; Jean Patocka, "La doctrine de l'intuition eidétique et ses critiques récentes," in _Revue internationale de philosophie_, 71-72 (1965), 17-33 ; K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, "Husserls Lehre von der Idealität der Bedeutung als metaphysische Problem," in _Husserl et la pensée moderne_, pp. 230-241.

379. See IdI, §§ 4, 70 ; EU, § 87 ; CM, §§ 23, 34 ; K, § 9 ; FUG, 383-384. The imagination has a plurality of functions (an ambiguous status?) in Husserl : on the one hand, inasmuch as its act is presentification, which is distinguished from the presentation of the act of perception, it is a founded activity ; on the other hand, through its free variation, it helps to effect the liberation of the ideal object from its empirical facticity. See Maria Manuela Saraiva, _L'imagination selon Husserl_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 231-232, n. 62 ; Derrida, "Introduction" to _L'origine_, p. 133, n. 1.

380. "... ist das _Phantasieren_ überhaupt die _Neutralitäts-modifikation der 'setzenden' Vergegenwärtigung_ ..." IdI, 309 [268] ; trans. adapted from Gibson.

and atemporality make it possible for the imagination to be
appropriated to produce very specific images through which
a certain identical structure is constituted.

One takes as a point of departure for the eidetic
variation a General Type which serves as an example of the
universal and a prototype for the ensuing modifications.  The
eidetic variation can be considered as an intuitive activity
analogous to the suppression of primes that constitutes the
General Type.  One comes to know the General Type through
generalization and a consequent expanding familiarity.  These
Types are "scopes of anticipation of experience delineated
by actual experiences."[381]  The intuition of the General Type
is both a familiarity with, and an anticipation of, similar
individual empirical objects.  The Eidos, however, is a
specific universality intuited after a reflectively controlled
process which begins from the Type and converges upon a
precisely determined essence.

It presupposes the object of the Life-world as pregiven.
The eidetic variation, however, in determining the structure
of the ideal object prescribes the rules for experiencing
all the similar individual empirical objects.

All of the variations that are set out bear similarities
to the same prototype.  Throughout the variations a unity-
identity stands forth as the pole of congruence upon which
they converge.  The differences, inasmuch as they are non-
converging, drop out as irrelevant.  The abiding unity-
identity, invariant throughout the variation, "prescribes their
limits" to these arbitrary variations.  "It appears as that
reality without which an object of this kind cannot be
thought, that is, without which it cannot be intuitively

---

381. Schutz, "Type and Eidos," p.108.

imagined as such."[382]   It is upon this manifold of images,
then, produced systematically in reflexion that the intuition
of the Eidos is founded.

For an example of an Eidos, we might take one that
Husserl adduces in Erfahrung und Urteil : the Eidos of sound.[383]
The free variation of sound can run through a vast array of
possible particulars differing form one another in pitch,
intensity, or timbre.  Throughout, the invariant identity of
essence can be intuited, while the particular differences can
be neglected.  The arbitrary variations, as multifarious and
diverse as they may be, are nonetheless so regulated by the
unity-identity of the same specific Eidos that they can never
diverge from this regularity unity and constitute another Eidos,
as though, for example, the same variation could produce both
the Eidos of color and of sound.[384]

---

382. "... ihre Grenzen vorschreibt.  Es stellt sich heraus als
     das, ohne was ein Gegenstand dieser Art nicht gedacht werden
     kann, d.h. ohne was er nicht anschaulich als ein solcher
     phantasiert werden kann." EU, 411.

383. EU, § 87 a.

384. EU, 420.  An illustration of a method closely related to
     the eidetic which might be cited is that of Peter Berger,
     who is a student of Husserl and Schutz.  After presenting
     six "various images" that people have about what constitutes
     the essence of a sociologist, Berger notes that they include
     "certain elements that would have to go into" his "concep-
     tion."  He then puts them together.  "In doing so," says
     Berger, "we shall construct what sociologists themselves
     call an 'ideal type.'  This means that what we delineate
     will not be found in reality in its pure form.  Instead,
     one will find approximations to it and deviations from
     it, in varying degrees" (Invitation to Sociology : A
     Humanistic Perspective, Anchor Books [Garden City, N.Y. :
     Doubleday   Company, Inc., 1963] , p.16).

But the best example of the eidetic intuition in Husserl, as we mentioned in Chapter V, is his investigation of the Eidos Ego which takes as its point of departure the General Type ego-cogito-cogitatum. The generalization of the Type contrasts with the essential necessity of the Eidos. In the Cartesian Meditations and Die Krisis, the ego-cogito-cogitatum is used as a transcendental clue to undertake the inspection of the eidetic structure of the transcendental subject and his object. Starting from the cogito or cogitatum, that is to say, from a a general familiarity with the nature of intentional activity and objectivity, one initiates the eidetic intuition to uncover the essential modes of consciousness or the essential formal- and material-ontological specifications of the object. The essential structure of both the noetic and the noematic sides of intentionality are fixed by the eidetic intuition working through the free variation.

If the intuition of the Type is anticipatory of precisions to be achieved by further experience of the empirical individuals, the eidetic intuition is prescriptive of the ensuing experience of all of them.[385]

> The variation being meant as an evident one, accordly as presenting in pure intuition the possibilities themselves as possibilities, its correlate is an intuitive and apodictic consciousness of something universal. The eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, 'unconditioned'-- that is to say : according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned by any fact.[386]

Further, the eidetic intuition cannot be reduced to just the understanding accompanying words or phrases. It is the intuition of the formal and material ontological structure

385. CM, 47 [84-85] ; 50-51 [87-88] ; 70-77 [104-106]; K, § 50.
386. CM, 71 [105].

of an essence.  It can likewise embrace the interrelations of
different formal and material elements in the same essence
where these occur, such as the Eidos of a triangle (comprising
the Eide plane and polygon), or the Eidos of hearing (comprising
the Eide perception and representation), or the Eidos of a
mastodon (comprising mammal and vertebrate).[387]  The intuition
of the Eidos is the source of all the essential knowledge of
an object.  The Eidos "is prior to all 'concepts', in the sense
of verbal significations ; indeed, as pure concepts, these
must be made to fit the eidos."[388]

In a sense, the eidetic intuition is no more objective
than any other intuition.  Both an intuition of the empirical
Type performed in the Natural Attitude and an eidetic intuition
of the phenomenological attitude are intentional operations
because they have a transcendental correlative.  Though the
former is performed by the anonymously functioning transcendent-
al Ego, it is no less intentional qua intentional than the
latter.  One hears music no better nor smells flowers more
distinctly for having effected an eidetic study of sounds or
plants.

And yet, the .eidetic intuition does surpass the intentional
acts of the Natural Attitudes on two counts : 1) it is a
reflective attitude of the Ego opened by the Epoche in which
the Ego is aware of the essential noetic and noematic structure
of his intentional performance ; 2) it uncovers a pure universal
essence free from all empirical ties.  Consequently, it
discloses itself as the intuition where objectivity is pre-
eminently seen for what it is.  For the Eidos is seen as pre-
eminently possessing objectivity : it is the ultimate unity-
identity and the permanent ground of intuitive grasping.  In
brief, it is objectivity recognized as such.

---

387. See Patocka,   "La doctrine de l'intuition," in Revue
     Internationale de philosophie, 71-72 (1965), 32.
388. CM, 71 [ 105] .

## II. Evidence

Objective reality is attained in fulfilling intuition and more precisely, in the fulfilling categorial intuition. This intuition is the criterion of objective reality.  .
Fulfilling intuition, however, is always correlative to evidence which Husserl describes as the "giving of something-itself" (Selbstgebung).  In a general sense, accepting that intuition and evidence are conjugates, one can say that intuition pertains more to the subjective side of intentionality, whereas evidence looks to the objective side.[389]

Inasmuch as evidence is what Husserl calls an intentional performance, it is the criterion of objective reality.  There is an activity on the part of the Ego by which the giving of itself by the object occurs.  The object is evident and can be intuited insofar as it is made to be evident, insofar as it is made to appear by subjectivity.  Beyond evidence there is nothing to which one might appeal for the ultimate validation of human knowing.  For evidence itself there is no criterion. It is simply the criterion.

We might take as our starting point something of a definition that Husserl gives of evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic : "Evidence... designates that performance on the part of intentionality which consists in the giving of something-itself [die intentionale Leistung der Selbstgebung] ."[390]  First of all, evidence is not defined by some sort of "feelings of evidence."[391]  The essentials of the

---

389. See FTL, 170 [ 152] .  For discussions of evidence in Husserl, see De Waelhens, Phénoménologie et vérité, Chaps. I-IV ; Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," § 4 ("Die Selbstgebung des Seienden") and § 5 ("Das Problem der Evidenz"), in Studien zur Phänomenologie, pp. 199-218.

390. FTL, 157-158 [ 141]; see also EU, 11 ; CM, 15 [ 56] .

391. FTL, 157 [ 140] .

evidence problematic are indicated rather as : intentional
performance and the giving of something-itself.  With respect
to these two elements, this is to be borne in mind from the
beginning : to set up intuition and evidence as correlatives,
or-- in terms of the quasi definition just given -- intentional
performance and the giving of something-itself, is to present
again in another context the constitution-intuition relation
(and the question of a possible priority) found in Husserl's
notion of intentionality.  The definition is broad enough to
take in the whole problem-set of evidence: adequate and
apodictic evidence ; the evidence for immanent and transcendent
objects ; prepredicative and predicative ; and then the evidence
for empirical and ideal objects.  Our interest is specifically
in prepredicative and predicative evidence.[392]

Coinciding with Husserl's shift from static to geneti-
constitution, is a shift in his attitude towards evidence as
adequate or apodictic.  The adequate evidence of immanent
objects we will take up by itself.  In <u>Ideas I</u> the evidence
of the principles of phenomenology must be adequate and apodictic,
with adequate evidence as the sought after norm which measures
apodictic evidence.[393]  Adequate evidence would be the total
and comprehensive grasping with certainty through a perfectly
fulfilled intuition of an object in its existence and essential
structure.  The evidence of immanent objects is such a case.

---

392. In choosing a "definition" of evidence from FTL, we reveal
     that our concern is with the notion of evidence appearing
     in Husserl's later works, those in which genetic
     constitution has an essential role : EU, FTL, CM, and K.
     To speak of a certain conception of evidence as found in
     these works is not to say that they present identical
     notions of evidence.  For example, the question of evidence
     and the initiating of the Epoche are very different in CM
     and K.  But with respect to PSW and IdI they present a
     distinct conception bearing common elements.

393. IdI, §§ 136-138 ; Beilagen XXVI-XXVII (only in German ed.).

But such evidence, Husserl decided, is not available for everything. Apodictic evidence, for its part, though not total and comprehensive is "a grasping in the mode 'it itself,' with full certainty of its being, a certainty that accordingly excludes every doubt."[394] In Formal Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Die Krisis (though apodicticity has an added meaning here), apodictic evidence is presented as sufficient for phenomenology and transcendent objects, whereas adequate evidence is viewed as an ideal goal which would be the culmination of human knowing.[395]

Apodictic evidence has an "absolute indubitability" that excludes "in advance every doubt" about the object giving itself in intuition.[396] It is the absolute indubitability that a scientist requires of the principles which are already evident in and by themselves, and which he undertakes to ground further back through a series of acts at a deeper level. Apodictic evidence is commensurate with the necessary fulfilling intuition, which is to say, it is commensurate with such intuitions insofar as they are a structured intentional performance that brings about the itself-giving of the principles-- which is precisely their grounding--or the itself-giving of an object.

Husserl's shift to genetic constitution brings with it a broadened conception of intentionality as well as of evidence. Intentionality means not just individual acts and their analyzable structures, but also the Ego as intending in

---

394. CM, 15 [56].

395. FTL, § 59 ; CM, § 6 ; K, §§ 7, 73. In K the context of Apodiktizität is enlarged : it concerns the necessity of the radical Selbstbesinnung in order to undertake the whole phenomenological enterprise.

396. CM, 15-16 [55-56].

his very essence, and as a developing subject with his sedimented habitualities. Evidence means not just what is an adequate giving of something-itself, but also the possibility of expanding evidence-making intuitions that reside in the very essence of the Ego.

Husserl explicitly couples intentionality and evidence :

> The concept of any intentionality whatever--any life-process of consciousness-of something or other--and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving of something-itself, are essentially correlative.[397]

Husserl, pointing up the essential intentionality structure of the Ego, speaks of the Ego's "life-process of consciousness" and "conscious life."[398] As correlative to intentionality, evidence is then involved in the intentional living of the subject which, though always aiming at the unity-identity of objectivity, is an ongoing vital process of directed development. Acquired evidences accumulate and become an "abiding possession" (bleibenede Habe)[399] which matches the unity-identity of the object, for through it the Ego can both recall his evidence-acquisitions and pivot upon them to set up new ones.

Not surprisingly, then, Husserl explicitly couples objects and evidence, too. "Category of objectivity and category of evidence," he says, "are perfect correlates."[400] As a consequence, "every fundamental species of objectivities" has corresponding to it a fundamental species of evidence. He ties

---

397. FTL, 160 [143] .

398. FTL, 160 [143] ; see also CM, 57-58 [92-93] .

399. CM, 60 [95] . Cf. Husserl's use of Erwerb and Besitz in connexion with ideal objectivity.

400. FTL, 161 [144] ; see also CM, § 29.

in the evidence of objects with the genetic constitution of
objects as he notes that corresponding to each fundamental
species of objects there is likewise "a fundamental species of
intentionally indicated evidential style in the possible
enhancement of the perfection of the having of an objectivity
itself."[401]

As already seen, the fundamental category-distinction
of objects is into immanent and transcendent object.  According
to the schema of Rudolf Boehm presented in Chapter II, the
immanent objects belong to the area of Real Immanence within
Pure Immanence.  Immanent objects, in contrast to transcendent
objects, are given with a certain degree of adequacy, though
Husserl qualifies this adequacy in respect to an ideal norm.[402]
Just as immanent and transcendent objects are distinguished
on the basis of the fulfilling intuition involved, they could
be distinguished just as well by the kind of evidence with
which they give themselves.

The evidence of immanent objects is unique on two
counts.  First, different from the empirical objects, the
immanent object is nonspatial, and thus it does not offer
itself through and in a series of profiles (Abschattungen).
Secondly, different from the transcendent objects (both
empirical and ideal), both the immanent object and the reflexive
act that is directed upon it belong to the same identical
stream of consciousness.  It is in this stream of the "living
present" (lebendige Gegenwart) where evidence is made possible
in the first place.  It is the same stream in which the giving
of the immanent object-itself takes place, and then in turn
through this object, the transcendent object is constituted.[403]

---

401. FTL, 161 [144] .

402. IdI, Beilage XXIX, p. 419 (only in German ed.).

403. See LU, Invest. V, § 4 ; IdI, §§ 41-46 ; Z, 109-110 [83]
     (There are temporal Abschattungsmanifatigkeiten which are
     time phases. Z, 119 [91] ) ; 159 [117] .  See also
     Sokolowski, The Formation, pp. 74-101 (concerning Z) and
     pp. 123-126 (concerning IdI).

The essence of evidence defined as the giving of something-itself appears more clearly in immanent objects than in transcendent objects, inasmuch as Husserl views evidence as an intentional activity, or performance, on the part of the subject. In the sense that immanent objectivity can be viewed as that which brings about the intentional event called the _giving_ of the object, immanent objectivity exists for transcendent objectivity. To be more specific, the immanent objects, sensing and intending (or simply, noeses), exist to make it possible for transcendent objects to become evident so that they can be intuitionable. The correlation of objectivity and evidence can thus be viewed in the correlation of immanent and transcendent objectivity at the interior of the evidence-making performance.

With regard to transcendent objects, we have already spoken of the _Selbstgebung_ and the presence of the empirical and categorial objects in connection with their respective fulfilling intuitions to which _Selbstgebung_ and presence are inseparably bound. Further, having discussed sense and categorial intuition and having touched on passive and active constitution, we have at the same time uncovered some of the aspects of the two kinds of evidence that Husserl distinguishes for transcendent objects, namely prepredicative and predicative evidence. Since these two kinds of evidence are intimately related to the notion of truth, we will treat them with it in the next section.

## A. Truth

Husserl sets up evidence and truth as correlatives.[404] Evidence, however, is the criterion of truth. It is the

---

404. See FTL, § 46 ; CM, 12 [52] ; 60 [95] . For the whole question of truth in Husserl, see De Waelhens, _Phénoménologie et vérité_, Chaps. I-IV.

criterion insofar as one has fulfilling intuition, and one
has fulfilling intuition in turn insofar as there is the
Selbstgebung of the object.[405]  Since the Selbstgebung of
transcendent objects can be taken in its complete range from
prepredicative through predicative evidence, there exists a
correlative range of truths, prepredicative through predicative.
In speaking of "prepredicative truth", Husserl thus widens the
notion of truth beyond the confines of the judgment.[406]  Even
though the judgment is normative for intentional performance and
objectivity, it does not pre-empt truth.  In general, truth be
belongs to all positing fulfilling intuition.  Thus, sensation
and memory have their own truth, proper to them.

Husserl wishes to loosen truth from a conception that
would tie it down to just the agreement between subject and
predicate.  Such an agreement without further ado is not his
notion of the judgment and of truth.  "Truth is not essentially
in the judgment, but in intuitive intentionality."[407]  Once, then,
Husserl couples truth and evidence, as he couples intuition
and objectivity, truth encompasses both prepredicative and
predicative intentional performance.

True knowledge is knowledge of reality.  When one per-
ceives with a fulfilling intuition, one perceives what is real,
whether it is a seen, heard, etc., object.  So--to recall an
example already used--when one sees the red tiles of a roof, one
brings a specific intending to its term in a fulfilling intuition :
one has true knowledge of the red tiles.  Seeing with a
fulfilling intuition gives what is real in a particular case,

---

405. See Levinas, Théorie de l'intuition, p. 114.

406. The term "non-predicative [nichtprädikative] evidence"
first appears in FTL, 209 [186] .

407. "... la vérité ne se trouve pas essentiellement dans le
jugement, mais dans l'intentionalité intuitive...." Levinas,
Théorie de l'intuition, p. 191 ; see further, pp. 133-134.
See also De Waelhens, Phénoménologie et vérité, pp. 21-25 ;
Chap. IV.

namely, the red tiles. In brief, the reality of red tiles is verified and substantiated by effectuating the necessary sense intuition, namely seeing.

In spite of the independently established status of the truth of perception or of memory, this truth is not self-contained. Achieving truth in the judgment is the "goal" (hinzielt)and culmination point of intentional performance.[408] The achieving of this truth stands to prepredicative truth as categorial objectivity stands to empirical objectivity. Cognition is a functional unity comprising both prepredicative evidence and truth, and predicative evidence and truth. But the keystone is predicative evidence and truth, just as categorial objectivity is the keystone with respect to empirical objectivity. In this sense, then, "Predicative includes prepredicative evidence."[409]

We can get something of a definition of truth by taking "the double sense of truth and evidence" that Husserl points out. The double sense designates either the subjective side or the objective side. First of all, on the subjective side,

> ... truth signifies a correct critically verified judg-ment--verified by means of an adequation to the correspond-ing categorial objectivities 'themselves', as given in the evidential having of them themselves : given originalter, that is, in the generating activity exercised on the basis of the experienced substrates 'themselves'.[410]

In connection, then, with this concept of truth, one sees "evidence" has a first sense "the original having of a true or actual being itself." There is a "consciousness of correctness" with respect to the judgment.[411]

---

408. EU, 340-341 ; see also EU, §§ 50, 71.

409. CM, 11 [ 52] .

410. FTL, 127 [ 113] .

411. FTL, 128 [ 114] ; see also FTL, 160 [ 143] .

Secondly, on the objective side, truth means actuality (Wirklichkeit).  "The true is now the actually existent or the truly existent, as the correlate of the evidence that gives the actuality itself."[412]  This second concept of truth is "at bottom the intrinsically first."[413]  Husserl then tells what actuality comprehends :

> ... actual properties, actual relationships, actual wholes and parts, actual sets and connected complexes (for example, solar systems), and so forth.[414]

And in relation to this second notion of truth,

> ... evidence signifies the property belonging to the judgment--as a supposed categorial/objectivity (an 'opinion' or 'meaning')--when it fits, in original actuality  Aktualität  , a corresponding actuality  Wirklicheit  .[415]

We have already had occasion to point out how Husserl speaks of Tendenz, Interesse, and Streben in connection with the intuition and constitution of empirical and categorial objects, and that such notions have a bearing on the functional unity of cognition.  Husserl sets truth in this context by speaking of an "Erkenntnisstreben" and by describing the judgment as a "Streben nach Wahrheit."[416]  As also noted before, Tendenz, Interesse, Streben act as the motivating force that advances cognition from sensation (prepredicative knowing) to judgment

---

412. FTL, 127 [113] .

413. FTL, 128 [114] .

414. FTL, 128 [114] .

415. FTL, 128 [113-114] .  Cf. LU, Invest. VI, § 39 where Husserl distinguishes four meanings of truth, two of which--as Ricoeur remarks (Idées, p. 483, n. 1  for p. 300 of German text )--pertain to the judgment while the other two pertain to Wirklichkeit.

416. EU, 340-341 ; see also EU, 351 ; FTL, 167 [149-150] ; CM, 57-58 [93] .

(predicative, or categorial, knowing). What should be remarked
here with respect to evidence and truth is that they are not
identified with this motivating force. The evidence and truth
of the judgment are the goals and fulfillment of this force.
The judgment is a "Befriedegung" of a specific (thematic)
Interesse.[417]
And why is the true judgment a Befriedegung of the cognitional
movement ? Because--in terms of the definition of truth cited
at the head of this section--in the correct (true) judgment one
reaches in a categorial fulfilling intuition what is real
(Wirklichkeit).[418]

It is important here to relate the true judgment with
what Husserl says about categorial intuition's adding no "real
moments" (like a quality, part, moment, etc.) to the object.[419]
The true judgment brings no new content to the affair-complex.
The affair-complex offers itself in evidence only as either
being or not being such and such. Consequently, the judgment in
order to be true must assert that the affair-complex is or
is not in such and such a way.[420] It is only in the true
judgment's

---

417. EU, 252-253. But for "Befridegung" in connexion with
     Association, see APS, § 20.

418. See EU, § 69.

419. See LU, Invest. VI, §§ 43-44 ; EU, §§ 73-75 ; FTL, § 79.
     See also Levinas, Théorie de l'intuition, pp. 116-117 ;
     The Foundation of Phenomenology, pp. 452-453 ; Schérer,
     La phénoménologie des 'Recherches logiques' de Husserl,
     pp. 317-322.

420. See LU, II [II/2], 839 [206] : 'The unity of coincidence
     is, in the case of the intuitive judgment, a true unity of
     knowledge (if not a unity of relational cognition) : we
     know, however, that, in the unity of knowledge, it is not
     the fulfilling act (here the authentic synthesis of
     judgment) that we know, but the fact which is its objective
     correlate. In intuiting things we carry out a judging
     synthesis, an intuitive thus it is or thus it is not."
     See also EU, § 73 ; FTL, § 79.

    ... 'is' that occurs the positing of the 'being' 'once and for always' and therewith a sense-formation of a new kind with respect to the substrate-object. It is that towards which the Objectifying consciousness in its different steps is ultimately striving, and thus objectivization in the full sense reaches its goal in this copulative 'is'-posi positing...[421]

The striving of cognition (<u>Erkenntnisstreben</u>) towards truth comes to its term in the judgment. The judgment is a decision (<u>Entscheidung</u>) where, in the light of the evidence achieved, one comes down for or against the actuality of an affair-complex.[422]  One decides **yes** or **no** with respect to the objective reality of an affair-complex.[423]  The tendency towards truth can be viewed as a controlling being exercised by evidence : intentional performance always occurs within evidence, always going from prepredicative evidence towards the acquiring of predicative evidence. To judge correctly, then, is to reach, as if with the concreteness of a determinate and clear-cut decision, that which really is. It is to reach what is objective. In a word, it is to arrive at objective truth.

---

421. "... 'ist' vollzieht sich eigentlich erst die Setzung des 'seiend' 'ein für alle Mal' und damit eine Sinnbildung neuer Art am Substratgegenstand. Sie ist das, worauf das objektivierende Bewusstsein in seinen verschiedenen Stufen letztlich hinausstrebt, und so erreicht die Vergegenständlichung im prägnanten Sinn in dieser kopulativen 'Ist'-Setzung... ihr Ziel." EU, 254-255.

422. See EU, 348 : "<u>Urteilen im prägnanten Sinn</u> ist sich so oder so entscheiden, und ist somit Entscheidung für oder Entscheidung gegen, <u>Anerkennung</u> oder <u>Ablehnung</u>, <u>Verwerfung</u>."

423. See EU, 348 : "Im spezifischen urteilende Stellungnehmen entspringt noetisch das 'ja' und 'nein,' dessen noematisches Korrelat das am gegenständlichen Sinne auftretende 'gültig' und 'ungültig' ist...."

### III.  Validating Intuition

Evidence and intuition have the last word in determining objective reality.  The intentional performance through which objective reality takes    all its validity (Geltung) and sense is the conjunction of the subject's constituion and intuition. Constitution and intuition fuse in a "creative intuition." Evidence is inseparably bound with this creative intuition, such that what is objectively real is what one sees with fulfilling intuition (whether sense or categorial) in its Selbstgebung.  Intuition is an intentional looking-performance that in and through its very working brings along with itself the evidence by which objects appear and thus are objects.

In the sense that evidence means that the object is present for its proper fulfilling intuition, it can be said that evidence is normative in cognition.  Alphons De Waelhens points out,however, that Husserl's notion of apodictic evidence involves the notion of "the necessity of the object."  Husserl speaks of "apodictic evidence," signigying that when something is evident one must know it with necessity.  That is to say : if the object is evident, it is unthinkable that one could deny its reality.  According to De Waelhens to conceive evidence in this manner is to shift one's attention from evidence taken as the presence and the Selbstgebung of the object to evidence considered as the logical necessity involved in one's thinking. "The evidence called apodictic does not bear upon the relation of the presence of the object to consciousness but upon the intrinsic necessity for its object to be posited or thought by this consciousness."[424]

---

424. "... l'évidence dite apodictique ne porte pas sur la relation de présence de l'objet à la conscience mais sur la nécessité intrinsèque pour cet objet d'être posé ou pensé par cette conscience."  De Waelhens, Phénoménologie et vérité, p. 30.

One might say that when evidence is considered as predicative and in connexion with the problem of eliminating error (a predominate theme in Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations), then evidence unavoidably will be considered as apodictic and as bearing upon "the intrinsic necessity" for an "object to be posited" by consciousness. Thus, though apodictic evidence is not the whole of Husserl's idea of evidence and is counterbalanced by his notion of prepredicative evidence, it is nonetheless integral to that idea. To oversimplify to make the point : logical necessity, the "inconceivability" of the nonbeing of the object, takes precedence over the consideration of its presence and Selbstgebung.

One might, however make another point. Insofar as Husserl's notion of evidence is bound up inseparably and essentially with intuition, it involves the notion of necessary positing. For what is evident, is what appears in the giving of itself in order to be intuited. One sees what is evident insofar as it is there to be seen in its giving of itself. The intuiting matches the evidence ; the giving of the object itself is the intuiting of the object. Thus, what is evident, is seen necessarily. If the object is evident, it is inconceiveable that the object should not be seen. Consequently, for Husserl to join the necessity of positing with evidence is not to add something extraneous to evidence. [425]

When knowing is considered as intuition, embracing both sense and categorial activity in their entirety, then the ful-filled intuition where the object is seen in its originary presence is the norm and goal of knowing. In keeping with such

425. One might perhaps set the necessity-evidence couple in the context of Husserl's thoroughgoing intuitional philosophy : then, to separate necessity and evidence would be to risk opening up again the chasm between Erfahrung and Denken that his theory of sense and categorial intuition (with their prepredicative and predicative evidences respectively) are designed to close up.

a conception, the presence of the object and the necessity of positing cannot be contrasted as though the necessity of positing were an intrusion of logical thinking which was essentially different from intuition. Necessary positing is fulfilled intuition.

One might, however, raise a further point in order to qualify the relationship between necessary positing and evidence. One might align the notion of necessary positing with that of **Interesse** and Streben. Then, just as Interesse and Streben, neither is necessary positing to be made equivalent to the giving of the object itself in its evidence. Nonetheless, all of them might be set up in the following relationships : Interesse and Streben initiate and constitute the knowing process ; evidence as the giving of the object itself is the term ; and the necessary positing is the process (more precisely, an individual, limited part of the process taken as complete, for example, a judgment) come to its term in the achieving of evidence through intuition. Though Husserl himself never puts all of these elements together in this way, it seems legitimate to so align them. One sees then, anew, from a different angle, the pre-eminence of intuition (and evidence) in Husserl. But one captures a glimpse again, from this different angle, of the problem of reconciling intuition (and evidence) and constitution in the context of Interesse and Streben.

If these two points concerning the relationship of evidence and the necessary positing are a correct interpretation, then one has a further confirmation of the comprehensiveness of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology. His policy statement from the Ideas is unambiguous : intuition is the principle of all principles. There is no other Rechtsquelle of validating knowledge to which one might appeal.[426] So that when

---

426. IdI, 84 [ 44 ] ; 92 [ 52] .

Husserl makes the comprehensive assertion that all Sinn and Sein have their validating source in the Ego, he means precisely that originary giving intuition is this source.

Finally, intuition is self-validating. In order to legitimate intuition, one must perform another intuition which discloses the structure of intuition. One must make the eidetic reduction of intuition. To do so is not to go outside of the realm of intuition, but to go further into it. The reflexion one initiates to disclose the structure of intuition is itself an intuition, fully presupposing the necessity of the Selbstgebung of that which is intuitive : in the present case, intuition itself.[427]

Here, then, lies the ultimate ground for the validation of the Epoche. By intuition the Ego constitutes his objective world. By reflexion upon his intuition, which is itself another intuition, the Ego sees that he is the constituting source of objective reality. Werner Heisenberg might assert that the observer in a physical experiment in his very act of observing modifies what he is observing. Husserl, however, would aver that, entirely unlike such a case, intuition distorts in no manner whatsoever.

The precept "Zu den Sachen" is the assertion that intuition encomposses human knowledge in its entirety, both the objectifying intuition that constitutes transcendent objectivity, as well as the reflective inspection through the eidetic reduction and the Epoche. "Seeing legitimates itself alone in its performance."[128] Seeing lets one see that "that's the

---

427. "Only in eidetic intuition can the essence of eidetic intuition become clarified." [FTL] 249 220 ; see also FTL, 159 [142] .

428. "Sehen legitimiert sich allein in seiner Leistung, das Seiende an ihm selbst auszuweisen." Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in Studien zur Phänomenologie, p. 206.

Husserl makes the comprehensive assertion that all Sinn and Sein have their validating source in the Ego, he means precisely that originary giving intuition is this source.

Finally, intuition is self-validating. In order to legitimate intuition, one must perform another intuition which discloses the structure of intuition. One must make the eidetic reduction of intuition. To do so is not to go outside of the realm of intuition, but to go further into it. The reflexion one initiates to disclose the structure of intuition is itself an intuition, fully presupposing the necessity of the Selbstgebung of that which is intuitive : in the present case, intuition itself.[427]

Here, then, lies the ultimate ground for the validation of the Epoche. By intuition the Ego constitutes his objective world. By reflexion upon his intuition, which is itself another intuition, the Ego sees that he is the constituting source of objective reality. Werner Heisenberg might assert that the observer in a physical experiment in his very act of observing modifies what he is observing. Husserl, however, would aver that, entirely unlike such a case, intuition distorts in no manner whatsoever.

The precept "Zu den Sachen" is the assertion that intuition encomposses human knowledge in its entirety, both the objectifying intuition that constitutes transcendent objectivity, as well as the reflective inspection through the eidetic reduction and the Epoche. "Seeing legitimates itself alone in its performance."[128] Seeing lets one see that "that's the

---

427. "Only in eidetic intuition can the essence of eidetic intuition become clarified." [FTL] 249 220 ; see also FTL, 159 [142] .

428. "Sehen legitimiert sich allein in seiner Leistung, das Seiende an ihm selbst auszuweisen." Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in Studien zur Phänomenologie, p. 206.

way things are."

Intuition is ultimate for Husserl, such that human knowing takes place exclusively in and through intuition. If one does not have fulfilling intuition right away or has only a partial intuition, all that he can do is work for a more exact and more perfect intuition. But that,too, will be an intuition. There may be absence of knowing or levels of knowing, but all of it is measured by intuition. The lack itself of knowing is defined by Husserl precisely in terms of intuition : namely, there is empty intending that aims at fulfilling intuition.

With respect to transcendent objects, then, one could say there is no distortion in intuition because intuition means that the object is there, appearing in its presence. Intuition is the unique and very locus of the possibility where an object presents itself and thus is an object. Correlative in this way to evidence, intuition is, as Fink asserts, the "final criterion," of what is really objective.[429]

---

429. "Es ist bezeichnend für den intentional-analytischen Stil des Husserlschen Dekens, dass das Problem der Evidenz aus allen Streitfragen nach einem 'Kriterium' herausgehoben und in ein Forschungsproblem verwandelt wird. Statt über das Recht des Sehens argumentativ zu spekulieren und leere gegensprechende Denkmöglichkeiten anzusetzen, ist das Sehen zu betätigen, ist ursprüngliche Evidenz herzustellen und gerade so zu entscheiden, dass es seinerseits das letzte 'Kriterium' aller blossen Denkmöglichkeiten ist. Sehen legitimiert sich allein in seiner Leistung, das Seiende an ihm selbst auszuweisen. Hinter das Sehen kann man nicht zurück, sofern es das letzlich urmodale, allen anderen, abgewandelten Bewusstseinsweisen sinngebende Dabeisein der menschlichen Erkenntnis beim Seienden ist." Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in Studien zur Phänomenologie, p. 206.
It might be pointed out that Husserl ties together Interesse and Dabeisein : "Mit Beziehung darauf  the distinction between Thema and Gegenstand  kann man einen weiteren Begriff von Interesse, bzw. von Akten des Interesses bilden. Unter solchen sind dann nicht nur diejenigen verstanden, in denen ich einem Gegestande thematisch, etwa wahrnehmend und dann eingehend betrachtend zugewendet bin, sondern überhaupt jeder Akt der, sei es vorübergehenden oder dauernden Ichzuwendung, des Dabeiseins (inter-esse) des Ich." EU, pp. 92-93.

## Summary

The aim of the present chapter is to determine what makes an object an object for Husserl, that is to say, what is the validating ground for objectivity. This is fulfilling, or originary-giving, intuition. There are three sections in this Chapter. First, intuition is distinguished as either sense or categorial, and is correlative with the respective object it constitutes. Intuition as constitution raises again the question of its relationship with constitution and the possible priority of one over the other. Sense intuition is simple whereas categorial intuition is complex, inasmuch as it is founded upon sense intuition. The categorial intuition that sees the affair-complex is prior to the intuition of the two ideal objects, the Type and the Eidos.

Secondly, evidence is the criterion of human knowing. But since intuition is inseperably bound with evidence, with the giving of the object itself (Selbstgebung), either intuition or evidence can be named the ultimate criterion of knowing. To say that evidence is the locus of objectivity is to say that something is an object insofar as, and to the extent that, it is evident and thus seen. To be an object is to be intuited in Selbstgebung.

Truth for Husserl is correlative to evidence and intuition. It is not just predicative ; it is likewise pre-predicative. However, since Husserl speaks of a movement (Erkenntnisstreben) towards truth that culminates in the judgment, there emerges again the question of the relationship of Interesse and Streben to intuition (and evidence).

Thirdly, validating intuition is discussed. Intuition is the ultimate ground of validation such that there is no question of going beyond intuition. What is seen is what is evident. This is what is objective reality. Furthermore, seeing legitimates itself. Finally, insofar as it legitimates

itself, intuition renders possible the Epoche which discloses
to the Ego himself that he and his intentional performance
are the validating ground of objective reality.

# PART II

## THE NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY IN BERNARD LONERGAN

"It is not the answer that enlightens, but the question."

(Eugène Ionesco, Découvertes)

# CHAPTER VII

## THE POLYMORPHISM OF KNOWING AND SELF-AFFIRMATION

### II. THE POLYMORPHISM OF KNOWING

For Bernard Lonergan the story of Archimedes rushing
naked from the baths of Syracuse and crying "I've got it !"
is a dramatic instance of what discovery is. Discovery puts a
term to preliminary questioning and inquiring, and brings the
satisfying release of understanding. More often it is much
less dramatic, and everyone has some experience of it. Essential
to all discovery, though, from the most sensational to the
most commonplace, from Archimedes to all of us, is the desire
to know.[1]

But where do the desire to know, or what we might also
call interest and curiosity, come from ? They come from the
drive that constitutes the primordial "Why ?" They arise from
the pure question that unceasingly issues forth in individual
queries and quests. Prior to any answer to these queries

---

1. In, 3-5. See also ABL, 70 ; Garret Barden and Philip
   McShane, Towards Self-Meaning, Logos Books (Dublin : Gill
   and Macmillan, 1969), Chap. II.

and quests, prior to any act of understanding or expression of
knowledge, like Archimedes' cry, "I've got it!" the pure question
is already operative. From the time of Plato and Aristotle,
philosophers have spoken of man's wonder and puzzlement. Very
little is needed for it to emerge. Hardly more than to be a
man. "When an animal has nothing to do, it goes to sleep.
When a man has nothing to do, he may ask questions."[2] Its names
are diverse. Its existence is an experienced fact.[3]

Questioning, according to Lonergan, reveals the range
of human knowledge and its objectivity. "An object is what
is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering
questions."[4] The epistemological theorem assembles these
elements of knowledge, the questioning and the object, and
states that "knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality
or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective."[5]

The epistemological theorem coincides with an understand-
ing of what questioning is. But understanding questioning is a
vast programme, for it entails a certain understanding of the
human subject and his knowing. Even a superficial inspection of
knowing shows that it is not of undifferentiated uniformity.
It has different aspects and levels. In Lonergan's terminology,
human knowing is polymorphic.[6] And there's the rub.

---

2. In, 10.

3. In, 9-10.

4. NGK, 59 ; et DP, 14.

5. CS, 227-228. As IPD, CS offers clarification on certain
   points found in In. A large portion of CS is dedicated to
   making precisions on the notion of objectivity.

6. See, for example, In, xvii, 319-328, 385-387, 426-427, 682,
   692 ; CSR, 173-192 ; CS, 222-224 ; S, 19-22. See also
   Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., "The Origin and Scope of Bernard
   Lonergan's Insight," in Sciences ecclésiastiques 9 (1957),
   265-266 ; ABL, 123-132.

The difficulty of the theorem lies in this polymorphism. "Human knowing involves many distinct and irreducible activities : seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging."[7] These irreducible activities fall upon three distinct levels : experience, understanding (insight), and judgment (affirmation).

In Lonergan's view, human knowing is a structure, or a whole, where the activities occurring on these three levels are functionally related so that no one of them," alone and by itself, may be named human knowing."[8] If no one of them, alone and by itself, is knowing, then no one of them alone and by itself is objective. Objectivity resides rather in the conjunction of all three. And the mischief begins when a person attempts to isolate objectivity in one of them.[9]

In order to consider Lonergan's thought on the polymorphism of human knowing, it would be profitable to begin first with a brief sketch of two of the "counter-positions" with which he himself frequently contrasts his own "position" in order to underscore its major traits.[10] Though such a method is a via negativa, it does serve to mark off clearly what does and does not belong to his opinion.

### A. Counter-positions

### 1. Naive Realism

Naive realism in Lonergan's vocabulary means the philosophical attitude according to which knowledge is conceived after the analogy of seeing. According to this attitude,

----

7. CS, 222.
8. CS, 222.
9. CS. 227-231.
10. In, 128-139, 339-347.

knowing an object is like taking a look at it. An object is
what is "already out there now real." To know our hand, we
merely have to look at it. And in a similar fashion, our mind
knows objects by a kind of looking at them.[11]

The basis for fancying knowledge after the "analogy
of ocular vision" is that knowledge is conceived in the image
of animal extroversion. In such extroversion the confrontational
aspects of living, such as sensation and conation, that are
directed toward external conditions, opportunities, and objects,
are most obvious. Objects are presented through sensation
and responded to in direct emotive reactions.[12]

Undeniably naive realism's theory of objectivity is
appealing. It is as decisive as it is straightforward :
an object of knowledge is either out there or it isn't. If
it is, we can view it, and thus have knowledge of it. If it
isn't, there is no question of seeing it, and thus there will
be no knowledge of it. Subject and object face off for a
direct confrontation that is the basis for asserting and
understanding their correlation.

Naive realism would be the attitude that a person tends
to adopt when he begins to philosophize about objectivity. If
it is a way of philosophical thinking easy to take up, it is
not so easy to lay aside. Lonergan thumbnail sketches some
historical examples :

> St. Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years
> to make the discovery that the name, real, might have a
> different connotation from the name, body. Or, to bring the
> point nearer home, one might say that it has taken modern
> science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects
> of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving

11. In, 412-416 ; CS, 224, 232-236.
12. V, 20 ; In, 182-184.

through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time.[13]

It is simply unwarranted, Lonergan would assert, to assume that the analogy of ocular vision is some sort of a norm by which to explain other cognitional activities. They may turn out to be something very different. In fact, says Lonergan, "intellect no more glances than sight smells."[14]

### 2. Kant's Critical Idealism

Lonergan is in accord with the Wendung to subjectivity (or, as he would also call it, the "world of interiority") that Kant's Copernican revolution effectuates.[15] He avows a similarity between his "self-affirmation of the knower" and

13. In, xx-xxi ; see further DP, 14 and 36-37 ; BLR, 233-234. See also Philip McShane, "The Strategy of Biology," in the Festschrift, Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, in Continuum 2 (1964), 78 : "This description of biological investigation runs counter to a currently popular view which in fact stresses, not the sequence of insights involved, but the corresponding images. This view gives the impression that if we had better equipment, small enough eyes, or big enough amoebae, we would be able to have a good look at the structure of the chromosones and the sequence of amino-acids ; indeed, even to read off the genetic code in some mysterious way. Modern physics should help in driving out such illusions : no more than the atom is the gene a complex of small balls. While the error may suffer exposure on the micro-level, it has its origin, so to speak, on the macro-level. Thus, when studying the heart, the anatomist 'studies it chiefly as a visual object and owing to our preference for visual experience and our persistent naive realism it is extremely easy to fall into the error of thinking of the visual heart as the very concrete heart itself'" (This citation by McShane is from J.H. Woodger, Biological Principles (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p. 328).

14. V, 170.

15. See In, xxi-xxii. It is worth noting that Lonergan names his own philosophy "critical realism" (CS, 235)236 ; see also OCR ; ABL, 3, 8-9, 91-103, 189, n. 15, 203, 247, 256, n. 38). In speaks of "intelligent and reasonable realism" (In, xxviii).

Kant's transcendental reduction.[16]   But if Lonergan acknowledges
similarities between the two, he nonetheless claims that self-
affirmation is the touchstone  to distinguish Kant's and his
notions of objectivity.[17]

The specific point where Lonergan takes issue with Kant's
notion of objectivity is Kant's conception of the relationship
between intuition (<u>Anschauung</u>) and objectivity.  Lonergan notes
how the <u>Transcendental Aesthetic</u> begins with a correlation
of the two :

> In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of know-
> ledge may relate to objects, <u>intuition</u> is that through which
> it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought
> as a means is directed.  But intuition takes place only in so
> far as the object is given to us.[18]

Now obviously intuition is not the whole of Kant's teaching
on objectivity.  But according to Lonergan, a realization of
their relationship is essential for an understanding of what
Kant means by objectivity.  In Lonergan's words :

> Of the pivotal importance of empirical <u>Anschauung</u> is his
> system, Kant was fully aware.  It was his refutation of Pure
> Reason, for concepts and, along with them, principles can
> refer to objects and so can possess objective validity only

---

16. In, 339.

17. In, 341-342.  See also Giovanni Sala, "The Apriori in Human
    Knowledge According to Kant's <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> and
    Lonergan's <u>Insight</u>," esp. §§ 1-3, a paper submitted at
    "Ongoing Collaboration : The First International Lonergan
    Congress," 31 March-3 April 1970, St. Leo (Tampa), Fla.;
    H.J. Paton, <u>Kant's Metaphysic of Experience</u>, 4th ed. (London :
    George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1965), I, pp. 93-106.

18. Immanuel Kant, <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>, trans. Norman Kemp
    Smith (London : Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 65 (A 19,
    B 13) ; the reference to this in Lonergan is MH, 208.  For
    further discussion of Kant by Lonergan, see, for example, In,
    154, 339-342 ; S, 13-18 ; NKG, 58-60.

through Anschauung. Of themselves, no matter how a priori
they may be, they are the mere play of imagination and
understanding....[19]

    Kant's conception of intuition, seen in its relation-
ship to his thinking on the noumenon and the phenomenon,
synthetic judgments, categories, reason, understanding, etc, evident-
ly is likewise very important, for, once assumed, it works as
a premise. In a dense summary, Lonergan points out their
relationship to Anschauung :

> For Kant, the judgment that seven and five are twelve
> is synthetic and a priori. Still it is only a posteriori, by
> an empirical Anschauung, that Kant knows five books in one
> pile on his desk, seven in another, and so necessarily twelve
> in all. Moreover, this function of Anschauung is universal.
> Anschauung is the one means by which are cognitional
> operations are related immediately to objects (K.R.V., A 19,
> B 33). Judgment is only a mediate knowledge of objects, a
> representation of a representation (K.R.V., A 68, B 93).
> Reason is never related right up to objects but only to
> understanding and, through understanding, to the empirical use
> of reason itself (K.R.V., A 643, B 671).[20]

    However, Lonergan's main objection to Kant's notion
of objectivity can be confined to what Lonergan would consider
the root problem of Kant's epistemology : the analogy of
seeing. For "Kant's door to his world of appearances is
Anschauung."[21]

### B.  Position : Critical Realism

    These sketches of two positions counter to Lonergan's
pinpoint fundamentally different orientations of thinking.
Although naive realism and critical idealism are antipodal to

19. MH, 208.

20. MH, 208 ; K.V.R. is Lonergan's abbreviation for Kritik der
reinen Vernunft.

21. MH, 208.

each other, yet in Lonergan's view they share the misconception about the analogy of seeing. They have overlooked the fact that human knowing is polymorphic.

Human knowing, according to Lonergan, is at once a whole and a structure.[22] A whole can be "some conventional quantity or arbitrary collection whose parts are determined by an equally conventional or arbitrary division."[23] Such a whole, for example, would be a gallon of milk.

But a whole can likewise be a highly organized structure or product of nature or art, such as human knowing or a string quartet. Then the relations of the parts are not conventional, but functional. "Each part is what it is in virtue of its functional relations to other parts ; there is no part that is not determined by the exigences of other parts ; and the whole possesses a certain inevitability in its unity, so that the removal of any part would destroy the whole, and the addition of any further part would be ludicrous."[24]

Again, parts can be things, like sticks and stones. Or they can be activities, such as are found in a dance, a chorus, or a string quartet. "Such a whole is dynamic materially. But dynamism may not be restricted to the parts. The whole itself may be self-assembling, self-constituting ; then it is formally dynamic."[25]

Human knowing involves many activities, and, according to Lonergan, they are distinct and irreducible. Seeing and imagining are not inquiring and understanding, nor are inquiring and understanding, for their part, weighing the evidence and judging. These distinct activities, as already mentioned, may be conveniently grouped under the headings of experience, understanding (insight), and judgment.[26]

---

22. In, 271-278 ; CS, 222-227.

23. CS, 222.

24. CS, 222.

25. CS, 222.

26. In, 271-316.

Lonergan explicitly states the guideline for discussing these activities : "No one of these activities, alone and by itself, may be named human knowing."[27]  Experience is the level of sense data.  It is the level of presentation where what is being sensed can be that which is tasted, or heard, or seen. "An act of ocular vision may be perfect as ocular vision ; yet if it occurs without any accompanying glimmer of understanding, it is mere gaping...."[28]  The biological processes occurring when one merely sees, tastes, or touches are not human knowing.  None of them is terminal.  They are components in the functional structure of knowing.[29]

We have sensations in order to understand.  Without the presentations of sense, there would be nothing to understand. Without something like a cart-wheel, for example, to start from, there would not be the possibility of understanding what a circle was and of defining it as the locus of a certain type of points.[30]  Without Tycho Brahe's observations, Johannes Kepler would not have been able to reach the understanding of the planetary orbits and the formulation of his three laws.

But again, the combination of sensation and understanding does not constitute human knowing.  Suppositions, concepts, definitions issue from the formulations of understanding (insight). These are answers to the question, "What is it ?/"Is it clear ?" But human knowing requires more.  Every answer to a question for understanding raises a further question for reflection and judgment.  There is a further motivating goal for conceiving and defining, thinking and considering and supposing, forming hypotheses and theories and systems.  That goal appears when one puts to these activities the question, "Is it so ?"  We conceive in

27. CS, 227.

28. CS, 222.

29. In, 3-9 ; 271-316 ; CS, 222-227.

30. In, 7.

order to judge.[31]

The two questions, "What is it ?" and "Is it so ?"--the
demands for understanding and then for verification--can be
designated as two phases in the process of knowing.  If
considered as two phases of the one questioning process that puts
cognition through a cycle--experience, understanding, judgment--
then they can be taken as performing a role analogous to the
operator in mathematics.  They "operate" in conjunction with
each other to bring about the advance from one level of
cognition to another.  The first question operates upon experience
to bring the knowing process to getting the point to something,
to catching on, to understanding an intelligible pattern, to
having an insight.  The second question operates upon the
achieved understanding to bring the knowing process to reach
a verified judgment.[32]

Thus judgment, though the keystone to the three-levelled
structure of knowing, is not knowing to the exclusion of
experience and understanding.  For to pass judgment one what
one does not understand is not a case of human knowing but of
human arrogance.  And to pass judgment independently of
experience is to set fact aside.[33]
As there are questions for understanding, there are questions
for the reflection that precedes judgment.  As those questions
lead to definitions, these lead to judgment.  Reflection applies
canons of relevancy, weights and sorts the evidence.  It asks,
"Is it so ?"  Then it grasps "the sufficiency of the evidence
for a prospective judgment."[34]

---

31. In, 273.  See also Crowe, "The Origin and Scope of Bernard
    Lonergan's Insight," 266.

32. For the discussion of intentionality and the two-phase
    question-operator, see Chap. VIII below.

33. CS, 223.

34. In, 279.

But what does it mean to "grasp evidence as sufficient"?
A general preliminary answer can be advanced : "To grasp evidence
as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to grasp the
prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned."[35]  And the
virtually unconditioned ?  In Lonergan's words :

> Accordingly, a virtually unconditioned involves three
> elements, namely :
> (1) a conditioned,
> (2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions,
>     and
> (3) the fulfilment of the conditions.
> Hence, a prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned
> if
> (1) it is the conditioned,
> (2) its conditions are known, and
> (3) the conditions are fulfilled.
> By the mere fact that a question for reflection has
> been put, the prospective judgment is a conditioned ; it stands
> in need of evidence sufficient for reasonable pronouncement.
> The function of reflective understanding is to meet the
> question for reflection by transforming the prospective
> judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status
> of a virtually unconditioned ; and reflective understanding
> effects this transformation by grasping the conditions of
> the conditioned and their fulfilment .[36]

Lonergan gives an example of the virtually unconditioned
and its three elements[37] : suppose a man returns from work to
his home and finds the windows smashed, smoke in the air, and
water on the floor.  Further, suppose he makes the extremely
restrained judgment, "Something has happened."  The point is not
whether he is right, but how he reached such an affirmation.

The three elements of his affirmation may be
portioned out this way :

The conditioned will be his affirmation that something
has happened.

---

35. In, 280.
36. In, 280.
37. In, 281-282.

The fulfilling conditions will be two sets of data :
the remembered data of his house as he left it in the morning ;
and the present data of his house as he finds it in the evening.
The fulfilling conditions are found on the level of experience,
of presentations.  They are not judgments, as is the minor
premise of syllogisms.  Nor do they involve questions for
understanding, and thus insights and concepts.  They lie
simply on the level of experience, past and present ; on the
level of the occurrence of acts of seeing and smelling.

The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling
conditions is a structure immanent and operative within
cognitional process.  It is not a judgment.  It is not an
act of understanding or its dependent formulated set of
concepts, such as a definition.  It is simply a way of doing
things ; it is a procedure within the cognitional field.  To
be precise, it is the procedure of the two-phase operator that
moves the knowing process to the grasping of the virtually
unconditioned.

Such in barest outline is what Lonergan means by
saying that judgment is the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.
We have already noted how he calls human knowing a materially
and formally dynamic structure.  We are now in a better
position to understand what he means by a formally dynamic
structure.

Human knowing is formally dynamic because it is
self-assembling.  One element summons forth the next until the
whole act of knowing is completed.  And this occurs, not with
the blindness of natural process, like digestion, but conscious-
ly.  Experience arouses inquiry, the first phase of the question-
operator.  Inquiry leads from experience to insight, then
from insight to the concepts which combine in single objects
both what has been grasped by insight and what in experience or
imagination is relevant to this insight.  In turn, insights and
concepts arouse reflective understanding, the second phase of

the question-operator. Reflective understanding marshals
and weighs evidence either to judge, or else to pause, and so
to renew inquiry.[38]

To speak of the formally dynamic structure of human
knowing is another manner of speaking of the polymorphism of
human knowing. In Lonergan's view it is necessary to recognize
the fact of polymorphism in order to guard the unity of human
knowing that comprises interrelated and interlocking elements.
The alternative to recognizing polymorphism is the grouping
together of a set of activities according to an imagined
similarity.

But, avers Lonergan, the parts of a structure are related
to one another, not by similarity, but by function. As in a
car, the engine is not like the tires and the muffler is not
like the gears, so too in human knowing--conceived as a dynamic
structure--there is no reason to expect several cognitional
activities to resemble one another. Consequently, one should
not scrutinize ocular vision and then assume that other
cognitional activities will be a similar sort of thing. Rather,
each cognitional activity must be examined in and for itself,
and, no less, in its functional relations to other knowing
activities.[39]

For Lonergan the judgment and its relationship with
experience and understanding is the passkey to comprehending
objectivity. The judgment is as pivotal for Lonergan's notion
of objectivity as _Anschauung_ is for Kant or extroversion for
the naive realist. It is involved in the "self-affirmation
of the knower" ; it is involved in the "principal notion of
objectivity" ; it is involved in the notion of "absolute
objectivity." Consequently, though his conception of the judg-
ment is examined several times and from several different

38. CS, 223.
39. CS, 224 ; see also R, 255-256.

points of view later on, we have given right at the beginning
an outline, brief as that may be, of what he considers to be
the essential elements required for a judgment.

## II. Self-affirmation

The schematic outline of the judgment and its parts,
even though illustrated by a concrete example, is a theoretical
presentation. The question "What is a judgment ?" has been
partially answered by identifying constitutive parts and
formulating their interrelationships. After theory now should
come practice. And so, "the next question is whether correct
judgments occur, and the answer to it is the act of making
one."[40]

And what will this judgment be ? The one that
Lonergan proposes is the self-affirmation of the knower which
is a "privileged judgment."[41] This is a privileged judgment
for two reasons. First of all, it is the judgment that a person,
actually engaged analyzing in cognitional process, is best
prepared to make.

In making the judgment of self-affirmation, one enters
the "world of interiority," Lonergan's counterpart to Kant's
Copernican revolution.[42] This world is distinguished from the

---

40. In, 319.

41. In, 342 ; see also In, 334-335. See ABL, 17-18, 91-103.

42. The terms, "world of interiority" and "world of
    exteriority," are post-Insight, but express notions in
    accord with the crucial "self-affirmation" of In. See
    EA, DM, "Lectures on Method in Theology. (Lectures given
    at Regis College, Toronto, Summers 1962 and 1969. The notes
    of the present writer taken during the lectures are the source.)
    The lectures of 1969 were based on the chapter, "Meaning,"
    of Lonergan's forthcoming book, Method in Theology.) See
    also ABL, "Introduction." It might be noted that Tracy's
    presentation of Lonergan is an application of Lonergan's own
    basic "categories" to Lonergan's own works. Thus Tracy
    structures his study upon the notions of world (of common
    sense and theory, of interiority and exteriority) and horizon.

"world of exteriority." The basis for the distinction of
these worlds lies in the dual mode of awareness-presence of
the subject and the object : the immediate presence of the
subject to himself in his three levels of knowing and the mediate
presence of his intended objects through those three levels.[43]
Without uncovering the world of interiority through self-
affirmation, one cannot understand the world of exteriority.
Or again, unless the subject affirms himself as a knower
operating through a three-levelled structure he cannot affirm
objectivity, either, with an adequate grasp of what it is.

Secondly, the judgment of self-affirmation is
involved in any judgment of fact, in any judgment that happens
to assert what is so. A judgment presupposes grounds for
assertion. These grounds involve the subject consciously
engaged in his cognitional processes where he is aware of himself
as experiencing, understanding, and judging. And these grounds
finally are the possibility for the subject to know objects,
and to know himself in relation to them.

Lonergan explains his terminology, "the self-affirmation
of the knower" :

> By the 'self' is meant a concrete and intelligible
> unity-identity-whole. By 'self-affirmation' is meant that
> the self both affirms and is affirmed. By 'self-affirmation
> of the knower' is meant that the self as affirmed is
> characterized by such occurences as sensing, perceiving,
> imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating,
> reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming.[44]

Here Lonergan explains the judgment of fact, one of the
cardinal points of his theory of knowledge. The self-affirmation
to be made is such a judgment. There is no question of the
necessary existence or knowing of the knower. The knower

---

43. CS, 235-236.
44. In, 319.

is an individual, concrete person. "It is not that I exist necessarily, but merely that in fact I do. It is not that I am of necessity a knower, but merely that in fact I am."[45]

We have already seen that the judgment rests upon the grasp of the unconditioned. Since self-affirmation is a judgment, it, too, rests upon such a grasp. For its part, as we have seen, the unconditioned is the combination of

(1) a conditioned,
(2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and
(3) the fulfilment of the conditions.

For the judgment of self-affirmation :

The relevant conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The link between the conditioned and its conditions may be cast in the proposition, I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. The fulfilment of the conditions is given in consciousness.
The conditioned offers no difficulty. It is merely the expression of what is to be affirmed. Similary, the link offers no difficulty ; the link itself is a statement of meaning ; and the conditions which it lists have become familiar in the course of this investigation. The problematic element, then, lies in the fulfilment of the conditions....[46]

Necessary for clarifying this judgment of self-affirmation, Lonergan asserts, is an examination of what is meant by consciousness and by the fulfilment of the pertinent conditions.[47] Consequently, in the two following sections we will turn our attention to them.

---

45. In, 319.
46. In, 319-320.
47. In, 320.

## A. Consciousness

### 1. The Notion of Consciousness

First of all, by rejecting what he calls the analogy
of "taking a look," Lonergan tells what is not meant by
consciousness. "Consciousness is not to be thought of as
some sort of inward look. People are apt to think of knowing
by imagining a man taking a look at something and, further,
they are apt to think of consciousness by imagining them-
selves looking into themselves."[48]

Then he tells what he means by consciousness : "...
by consciousness we shall mean that there is an awareness
immanent in cognitional acts."[49] And to be more specific :
"Consciousness... is experience of knowing, experience,
that is, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging."[50]
The cognitional acts thus are those already enumerated on the
three levels of experience, understanding, and judging.

In these processes, remarks Lonergan, there are an
act and a correlative content. For instance, hearing and
sound, understanding and idea, etc. In distinguishing acts and
contents, Lonergan likewise contrasts conscious acts with un-
conscious processes.

Consciousness means that cognitional process is not
just a procession of contents, but likewise a succession of
acts. It means that these acts are of a totally different
order than such acts as digestion. Digestion is unconscious ;

---

48. In, 320 ; see also CS, 224. For another detailed analysis
    of consciousness, see "Christ as Subject : A Reply" in
    Collection, pp. 164-197 ; this is an article written by
    Lonergan to refute an attack on his Latin class notes,
    De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (Romae :
    Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956 1958, 1961 ),
    (Ad usum auditorum). Perhaps here is the place to point
    out that some of Lonergan's most important thinking is
    found in his Latin class notes, some of which are almost
    inaccessible.

49. In, 320.

50. CS, 225.

indigestion is conscious. Seeing and hearing are not merely
responses to the stimuli of color and sound. They are a response
accompanied by an awareness of color and sound.[51]

To explain further what consciousness is, Lonergan
also contrasts it with introspection. The cachet of consciousness
is that it is the awareness immanent in knowing, and not some
sort of parallel activity going on along with it. Upon this
immanency swings the distinction between consciousness and
introspection, as well as that between conscious and unconscious
acts.

> By the conscious act is not meant a deliberate act ;
> we are conscious of acts without debating whether we will
> perform them. By the conscious act is not meant an act
> to which one attends ; consciousness can be heightened by
> shifting attention from the content to the act ; but
> consciousness is not constituted by that shift of attention,
> for it is a quality immanent in acts of certain kinds, and
> without it the acts would be unconscious as is the growth
> of one's beard. By the conscious act is not meant that the
> act is somehow isolated for inspection, nor that one grasps
> its function in cognitional process, nor that one can assign
> it a name, nor that one can distinguish it from other acts,
> nor that one is certain of its occurrence.[52]

---

51. In, 320-321.

52. In, 321. When a person formally studies consciousness,
    then, says Lonergan, the conscious act is isolated for
    introspection. Lonergan also speaks of the difference
    between consciousness and self-knowledge: "Where knowing
    is a structure, knowing knowing must be a reduplication
    of the structure. Thus, if knowing is just looking, then
    knowing knowing will be looking at looking. But if
    knowing is a conjunction of experience, understanding, and
    judging, then knowing knowing has to be a conjunction of
    (1) experiencing experience, understanding, and judging,
    (2) understanding one's experience of experience, understanding,
    and judging, and (3) judging one's understanding of
    experience, understanding, and judging to be correct.
      "On the latter view there follows at once a distinction
    between consciousness and self-knowledge. Self-knowledge
    is the reduplicated structure : it is experience,
    understanding, and judging. Consciousness, on the other
    hand, is not knowing knowing but merely experience .../...

The meaning of consciousness can be further elucidated by identifying the different types of presence. Once self-presence in general is explained then its three-levelled manifestation in human knowing can be more clearly pointed out.

> There is material presence, in which no knowing is involved, and such is the presence of the statue in the courtyard. There is intentional presence, in which knowing is involved, and it is of two quite ˙distinct kinds. There is the presence of the object to the subject, of the spectacle to the spectator ; there is also the presence of the subject to himself, and this is not the presence of another object dividing his attention, of another spectacle distracting the spectator ; it is presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to ; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending. As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become present to themselves ; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them ; and they are present to themselves by the same watching that, as it were, at its other pole makes the parade present to them.[53]

## 2. The Three Levels of Consciousness

Since consciousness is the self presence immanent in cognitional acts, it is found on the three levels of human knowing : experience, understanding, and judgment. There is an empirical consciousness, or awareness, characteristic of acts of sensing ; there is an experiencing of experience. The meaning of empirical consciousness, quite easy to grasp, is illustrated by the acts of seeing, hearing, touching, etc.

---

.../... of knowing, experience, that is, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging". (CS, 224-225).
    See also CSR, n.33, where Lonergan cites as corroboratory Georges Van Riet, "Idéalisme et christianisme : A propos de la 'Philosophie de la Religion' de M. Henry Duméry," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 56 (1958), 403-404.

53. CS, 226 ; see also EA, 248-249.

> If seeing is awareness of nothing but colour and hearing
> is an awareness of nothing but sound, why are both named
> 'awareness' ?  Is it because there is some similarity
> between colour and sound ?  Or is it that colour and sound
> are disparate, yet with respect to both there are acts that
> are similar ?  In the latter case, what is the similarity ?
> Is it that both acts are occurrences as metabolism is an
> occurrence ?  Or is it that both acts are conscious ?[54]

Lonergan's point is that both are conscious, and conscious
empirically.

At the second and third levels are intelligent and
rational consciousness respectively.  Lonergan clarifies their
meanings by relating intelligence and intelligibility, and
reasonableness and groundedness to the production of a human
artefact.  One might take, for instance, a Boeing 707.  In
such a work there is discernible an intelligible design ;
in the case of the 707, it is the solution discovered by
intelligence for the problem of how to transport people at
relatively high speeds.  In the artefact there is the
groundedness that consists in its existence being accounted
for by a sequence of labor, operations,and production; thus
there is the set of operations judged as worthwhile  for some
sufficient reason by which the 707 issued from the designer's
heads, passed across the drawing boards and through the assembly
line, and took off.[55]

Besides being involved in the construction of human
artefacts, intelligence and reasonableness are also involved,
but in another fashion, in the activity of knowing something.
Intelligence searches for intelligible patterns in presentations
and representations ; it grasps such patterns in its insights ;
it exploits such a grasp in its formulations and in further
operations equally guided by insights.  On the other hand,
reasonableness is reflection insofar as it seeks groundedness
(or verification) for objects of thought ; it finds groundedness

---

54. In, 321.

55. In, 322-323.

in its reflective grasp of the unconditioned ; and it exploits
groundedness when it affirms objects because they are grounded.[56]

Consciousness then can be known, but in a manner
different from that in which an object is known.  It will not
be uncovered by a direct introspection in something of the
way in which one could, say, "point to Calcutta on a map."[57]
If one, says Lonergan,

> ... tries to find himself as subject, to reach back
> and, as it were, uncover his subjectivity, he cannot
> succeed.  Any such effort is introspecting, attending to
> the subject ; and what is found is, not the subject as
> subject, but only the subject as object ; it is the subject
> as subject that does the finding.  To heighten one's presence
> to oneself, one does not introspect ; one raises the level of
> one's activity.  If one sleeps and dreams, one is present
> to oneself as the frightened dreamer.  If one wakes, one
> becomes present to oneself, not as moved but as moving, not
> as felt but as feeling, not as seen but as seeing.  If one
> is puzzled and wonders and inquires, the empirical subject
> becomes an intellectual subject as well.  If one reflects
> and considers the evidence, the empirical and intellectual
> subject becomes a rational subject, an incarnate
> reasonableness.[58]

### B.  Self-affirmation

### 1.  The Unity of Consciousness

The manifold of cognitional activity displays unity
on the side of both the contents and the acts.  The contents
cumulate, not into an omniumgatherum of unrelated and random
atoms of knowing, but into unities.  "What is perceived is what
is inquired about ; what is inquired about is what is
understood ; what is understood is what is formulated ; what is
formulated is what is reflected on ; what is reflected on is
what is grasped as unconditioned ; what is grasped as unconditioned

---

56. In, 323.
57. In, 323.
58. CS, 226-227.

is what is affirmed."[59]

What holds for the unities on the side of the object, holds for the unities on the side of the subject. Conscious acts are not haphazard occurrences, but rather there is present a blue printing finality by which the many acts coalesce into a single knowing. Among one's sensing, understanding, and judging there is a similarity involved, for all of these acts are conscious. But in one's sensing, understanding, and judging there is over and above the similarity an identity involved, for there is a unifying source for these diverse acts.

> Moreover, this identity extends all along the line. Not only is the percept inquired about, understood, formulated, reflected on, grasped as unconditioned, and affirmed, but also there is an identity involved in perceiving, inquiring, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming. Indeed, consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between conscious acts occuring within the field and unconscious acts occuring outside it.[60]

We might ask next what is the status of this unity of consciousness. Is it postulated ? Is it given ? It is given, asserts Lonergan. And the questions that naturally arise when consciousness is being discussed already anticipate their answers.

How can many contents of knowledge on diverse levels cumulate into a single integral known ? How can images arise f from sensations ? How can inquiry be about percepts ? The questions can go on checking off the different components all up the three levels of knowing to the judgment.

---

59. In, 325.
60. In, 325.

The response to these cumulating questions is, first of all, that all of them are concerned with a person's own cognitional activities, and in the case at issue, the activities of the one asking the questions. For he always speaks of "my experience," "my inquiry," "my affirmation," or "these questions of mine." But there is another way of elucidating this central point that consciousness is a unity in diversity.

## 2.  Self-affirmation

There exists the possibility of verifying the unity of consciousness by showing how a judgment of self-affirmation is an instance of grasping the virtually unconditioned. Where there is question of verification, there is also question of "experiential fulfilment." And where there is question of experiential fulfilment, there is also question of experience, understanding, and judgment. And finally, where there is question of judgment, there is also question of conditions, of the conditioned, and of the virtually unconditioned.[61]

However, by an experiential fulfilment one does not mean the conditioned, nor the link between the conditioned and its conditions, nor the conditions as understood and formulated, nor finally as affirmed. "One does mean that the conditions, which are formulated, also are to be found in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process. Just as inquiry brings about the advance from the perceived and not understood to the perceived and understood, so there is a reverse shift by which one moves from the perceived and understood to the merely perceived. It is this reverse shift that is commonly meant by verification."[62]

For example, says Lonergan, one could start from the formula PV = 64 and obtain a set of values for either P or V by considering now one, now the other as the independent variable. So that at the time when P = 2, V = 32, etc. Then "by setting

_____

61. In, 326-327.
62. In, 326.

up suitable apparatus and securing appropriate conditions
defined by the theory, I can advance from theoretical inference
to an experimental check."[63]

A person may then express the results of the experiment
in propositions such as the statement that, when P=2, V=32.
Although we could say that the whole aim of the experiment
is to arrive at these statements expressing the results (here,
that PV=64 when P=2 and V=32), nevertheless the statements them-
selves are not what is given. They are judgments. What then
is given ?[64] Merely the visual experiences of seeing a needle
in a certain position.

Such a procedure is verification. Verification is an
appropriate pattern of acts of checking. Such acts are reversals,
returnings, from formulations of the perceived to the correspond-
ing but more rudimentary cognitional contents of the acts of
perceiving or sensing. In the formulation there are elements
coming from insight and conceiving. But by reason of the
checking, it can be said that the formulation is not pure
theory or supposition or postulate or inference, but that its
empirical component is given.[65]

---

63. In, 327.

64. In, 327. "The statements represent judgments of fact ; the
    judgments rest on grasping the unconditioned ; the grasp rests
    on formulations and visual experiences. The experiment gives
    neither statements nor judgments nor reflective understanding
    nor formulations but only visual experiences. The experiment
    gives not visual experiences as described but visual
    experiences on the level of merely seeing. That P is 2 when
    the needle on a dial stands at a certain place, is a
    judgment. That V is 32 when certain dimensions of an object
    coincide with certain dimentsions of a measuring rod is
    another judgment. All that is seen is the needle in a
    position on the dial or the dimensions of an object standing
    in coincidence with numbered units on a rod. Nor is it
    this description that is seen, but only what is so
    described." In, 327.

65. In, 327.

The example here is obviously unimportant, and could
be supplemented by innumerable others.  Its significance,
based upon the polymorphism of cognition, however, is important.
And what is said in this instance applies, mutatis mutandis,
to the example of the man finding his house burned, or to that
of the judgment of self-affirmation, or to any judgment
whatsoever.

Lonergan then proceeds to show how one verifies that
consciousness is given.

> Now just as there is reversal to what is given sensibly,
> so there is reversal to what is given consciously.  Just
> as the former reversal is away from the understood as under-
> stood, the formulated as formulated, the affirmed as
> affirmed, and to the merely sensed, so also the latter
> reversal is from the understood, formulated, affirmed as such,
> to the merely given.  Hence, in the self-affirmation of the
> knower, the conditioned is the statement, I am a knower.
> The link between the conditioned and its conditions is cast
> in the proposition, I am a knower if I am a unity performing
> certain kinds of acts.  The conditions as formulated are the
> unity-identity-whole to be grasped in data as individual and
> the kinds of acts to be grasped in data as similar.  But
> the fulfilment of the conditions in consciousness is to be
> had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary
> state of the formulated where there is no formulation but
> merely experience.[66]

The "experience" here is consciousness.

Thus far some preliminary clarifications, according to
Lonergan.  Now we are ready to tackle the main point,  Am I a
knower ?  The question is posed for a  Yes  or  No  answer ;
thus it is on the level of critical reflection and judgment,
and to be specific, the judgment of self-affirmation : "I am
a knower."

The conditions for the affirmation have already been
indicated as : "If I am a unity performing certain kinds of acts."

---

66. In, 327-328.

But first of all, then, what do I mean by "I" ?  The answer is difficult to formulate.  "I" has a rudimentary meaning from consciousness.  It envisages neither the multiplicity nor the diversity of contents and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them.  But if "I" has some such rudimentary meaning from consciousness, then consciousness supplies the fulfilment of one element in the conditions for the affirmation that I am a knower.[67]

The other conditions involved pertain to "certain kinds of acts," that is to say, cognitional acts.  One can identify some of the other conditions by posing some self-oriented questions.  Does consciousness supply the fulfilment for the other conditions.  Do I see, or am I blind ?  Do I hear, or am I deaf ?  Do I try to understand ?  Do I actually understand sometimes, catch on, get the point, have an insight ?  Do I conceive, think, consider, suppose, define, and formulate ?  I do reflect, for I am asking if I am a knower.  Do I grasp the unconditioned, if not in other instances, then at least in this one ?  This is absolutely pivotal.[68]

The link between conditioned and conditions then is grasped.

> If I grasped the unconditioned, would I not be under the rational compulsion of affirming that I am a knower and so, either affirm it, or else find some loop-hole, some weakness, some incoherence, in this account of the genesis of self-affirmation ?  As each has to ask these questions of himself, so too he has to answer them for himself.  But the fact of the asking and the possibility of the answering are themselves the sufficient reason for the affirmative answer.[69]

The affirmative answer, "Yes, I am a knower," is the only coherent response,

---

67. In, 328.

68. In, 328.

69. In, 328.

> ... for if I am a knower, I can know that fact. But the
> answer, No, is incoherent, for if I am not a knower, how
> could the question be raised an answered by me ? No less,
> the hedging answer, I do not know is incoherent. For if I
> know that I do not know, then I am a knower ; and if I do
> not know that I do not know, then I should not answer.[70]

The judgment of self-affirmation manifests certain
inevitabilities involved in human knowing. Not that other
judgments cannot do the same, but self-affirmation is
immediately implicated with these inevitabilities of knowing.
That is why self-affirmation is a "privileged judgment."

These inevitabilities are defined by the three levels
of knowing. Their existence is not a matter of choice ; on the
other hand, their use is subject to a certain amount of
control. They are the endowment of man, and they make him
what he is.

> I cannot escape sensations, percepts, images. All three
> keep occurring during my waking hours, and the images often
> continue during my sleep. No doubt, I can exercise a selective
> control over what I sense, perceive, imagine. But the choice
> I cannot make effective is to sense nothing, perceive nothing,
> imagine nothing. Not only are the contents of these acts
> imposed upon me, but also consciousness in some degree is
> inseparable from the acts. Nor is that consciousness merely
> an aggregate of isolated atoms ; it is unity.[71]

Not only are the activities on the level of experience
inescapable, but so also are the intra-level operations of
the activities understanding and judgment, and the interlinking
relationship of all three levels.

---

70. In, 329.
71. In, 330.

If I cannot escape presentations and representations, neither can I be content with them. Spontaneously I fall victim to the wonder that Aristotle name the beginning of all science and philosophy. I try to understand. I enter, without questioning, the dynamic state that is revealed in questions for intelligence.... I can question everything else, but to question questioning is self-destructive.[72]

And then the culminating act, the judgment.

As I cannot be content with the cinematographic flow of presentations and representations, so I cannot be content with inquiry, understanding, and formulation... If, above all, I want to understand, still I want to understand the facts. Inevitably, the achievement of understanding, however, stupendous, only gives rise to the further question, Is it so ? Inevitably, the progress of understanding is interrupted by the check of judgment.[73]

The judgment of self-affirmation thus described with respect to the inevitabilities of the three levels and their interlinking is, according to Lonergan, "self-affirmation as immanent law."[74] Self-affirmation is immanent law, since it must issue forth inevitably, though consciously, whenever the question is put, "Am I a knower ?" Designated as immanent law, self-affirmation points up the invariant three-levelled structure of human knowing that is operative in both the privileged judgment of self-affirmation, and any other judgment of fact.

The judgment of self-affirmation could be just as well named primary as privileged. It is primary because it is the starting point for discussing not just subjectivity, but also objectivity. Lonergan emphasizes that the question of objectivity cannot be correctly posed, much less answered, until the prior question of self-affirmation is tackled.[75] The polymorphic

---

72. In, 330.

73. In, 330.

74. In, 329-330.

75. In, xxii-xxiv.

subject must be revealed to himself and affirmed by himself.[76]
The question of objectivity is suspended, then, in a not
unHusserlian manner until the prior conditions for discussing
objectivity are laid clear.  Such is the self-affirmation of
the polymorphic subject.

Self-affirmation is not demonstrated.  Rather, one pragma-
tically engages himself in the knowing process.[77]  One then
discerns natural inevitabilities and spontaneities that constitute
the possibility of knowing.  There is no deeper foundation than
this pragmatic engagement.  Even to seek it entails a vicious
circle.  For if one seeks such a foundation, one employs
one's cognitional process, and the foundations to be reached
will be no more secure than the inquiry used to reach it.
Lonergan concludes that the ultimate basis of human knowing is
not necessity but contingent fact.  And the fact is established,
not prior to one's engagement in knowing, but simultaneous with
it.

Two important points must now be made.  First, Lonergan's
distinction-- discussed again in Chapter XI-- of description
and explanation, and in consequence, the distinction of the
worlds of common sense and theory.[78]  Description deals with
things as related to us.  It is concrete and particular.
Explanation deals with things as related to one another.  It
is abstract and general.  Thus, a longshoreman might describe

---

76. In Insight Lonergan likewise names self-affirmation "self-
    appropriation" (In, throughout the Introduction and the
    Epilogue, p.748).  In the wider context of human living and
    human values, self-affirmation is presupposed by "rational
    self-consciousness" (S, 21), "Besinnung" (EA, 240) and the
    "authenticity of the subject" (EA 246).  See also the
    notion of self-transcendence in Chap. VIII below.

77. In, 332.

78. In 332-335.  See also ABL, 9-21 ; Chap. II ; 218.  See
    Chap. XI below.

a load as heavy, while the physicist would speak of inertia.
Singers might invoke the "Age of Aquarius," while an
astronomer would remark that Aquarius is a purely arbitrary
portion of the heavens whose designation is based upon the
position of certain stars relative to an observer on earth.
Graham Greene and François Mauriac detail the inner workings
of the human mind. But one could also study the knowing
subject as polymorphic, and as explicitly affirmed as polymorphic.

In Part I of Insight, Lonergan cites different instances
of knowing and then invites one to engage oneself pragmatically
in the act of knowing. He discusses natural inevitabilities
and spontaneities in knowing which he wishes one to take note
of. These inevitabilities and spontaneities are the polymorphic
structure of knowing, the functional interrelationship of its
elements, and the two-phase question-operator. They are found
in both descriptive and explanatory knowing.

However, Lonergan's preferred examples of knowing are
from physics, mathematics, and biology.[79] His preference would
seem to rest on the opinion that one can better pinpoint the
structure of knowing in an examination of such disciplines.
Inasmuch as they are explanatory, their cognitional procedures--
which comprise their data, inquiry, hypotheses, theorems, and
systems--are more clearly revealed than in the case of
descriptive knowing.[80]

The familiarity with explanatory disciplines enables one
to enter the "world of theory" and contrast it with the "world

---

79. See In, Chapters II, "Heuristic Structures of Empirical
    Method" ; III, "The Canons of Empirical Method" ; IV,
    "The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical
    Investigations" ; V, "Space and Time" ; VIII, § 5, "Things
    and Emergent Probability," and § 6, "Species as
    Explanatory" ; X, § 8, "Mathematical Judgments."

80. See Ernan McMullin "Insight and the Meno," in Continuum
    2 (1964), 69-73.

of common sense" and its descriptions.[81]  Such familiarity
can be the occasion for one to expand his notions of
objectivity.[82]  One can know, for example, the objects of sub-
atomic physics and the time of the Theory of Special Relativity,
and know that they contrast with the objects of his daily
routines and the time of his plane's arrival.  But even more,
Lonergan would seem to hold that one's entry into the world of
theory facilitates his entry into the world of interiority.
The world of theory, in expanding one's fields and specialities
of knowledge, can simultaneously heighten one's awareness of
himself as the subject engaged in pushing inquiries, formulating
hypotheses, working out theorems, and establishing systems.

As for his account of cognition itself, Lonergan would
claim that it is explanatory.[83]  For it defines the relations
obtaining between the different components of the knowing act :
the polymorphic structure and the two-phase operator-question
are identified.  It is an explanatory account of the invariant
structure of knowing.  But here the explanatory account is
different from other explanatory accounts, for example, those
of physics or sociology.  The data here is consciousness and
the access to this data is through consciousness itself.  Self-
affirmation is made from and through consciousness, and therewith,
the basic elements of the explanatory account are attained,
i.e., the polymorphic structure and the two-phase operator.
The self-affirmation that Lonergan prescribes, then, is the
attainment by the one performing the self-affirmation of an
explanatory account of his own knowing.

---

81. For the manner in which one may relate these two worlds to
    each other, see Chap. XI below.

82. In, xx-xxi.  See also QMO, "Introduction" ; Philip McShane,
    "Insight and the Strategy of Biology," in Continuum 2
    (1964), 74-88 ; Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics and
    Emergence (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1970), pp. 13,
    251-254.

83. In, 332-339 ; see also ABL, 141-144.

A final related point is to be made. Lonergan holds that
the explanatory account of knowing is not open to revision.
It might seem strange that Lonergan should assert the impossibi-
lity of revision while at the same time he asserts that there
is no absolute necessity either of the existence of the knower
or of his knowing. Both the existence of the knower and his
knowing are merely facts. They happen to be so. But it also
happens, as already seen, that a certain number and type of
conditions are fulfilled upon which the knower's existence and
his knowing are dependent. Thus they are virtually unconditioned.
And so the knower, grasping this virtually unconditioned, affirms
that he both is and knows.

Lonergan's argument is basically this : to what data
would one appeal to deny data ; to what insights to deny
insights ; to what judgments to deny judgments ? In his words :

> The impossibility of such revision appears from the very
> notion of revision. A revision appeals to data. It contends
> that previous theory does not satisfactorily account for
> all the data. It claims to have reached complementary
> insights that lead to more accurate statements. It shows
> that these new statements are either unconditioned or more
> closely approximate to the unconditioned than previous
> statements. Now, if in fact revision is as described, then
> it presupposes that cognitional process falls on the three
> levels of presentation, intelligence, and reflection ; it
> presupposes that insights are cumulative and complementary ;
> it presupposes that they head towards a limit described by
> the adjective, satisfactory ; it presupposes a reflective
> grasp of the unconditioned or of what approximates to the
> unconditioned. Clearly revision cannot revise its own
> presuppositions. A reviser cannot appeal to data to deny
> data, to his new insights to deny insights, to his reflective
> grasp to deny reflective grasp.[84]

## Summary

The pure question, the primordial "Why?" is the inescapable
endowment that makes man what he is. It is the desire to know
from which particular questions incessantly issue forth. The

---

84. In, 335-336.

questions can be explicitated in two general questions, distinct
but not mutually exclusive.  Rather one arises from the other ;
they are two phases of the one questioning.  These two general
questions are : "What is it?" and "Is it so?"

By thematizing questions Lonergan identifies three levels
in the structure of human knowing which, as a consequence, he
terms "polymorphic·"There is the level of the given, sense
experience.  Then there is insight and understanding matched
with the question "What is it?"  Last of all, there is reflection
and judgment matched with the question "Is it so?"  Not in the
exclusive activity of one of these elements, but in the con-
junction of all three resides the objectivity of human knowing.
Essentially objectivity is what is intended in questioning and
becomes known by answering this questioning.

The understanding of the polymorphism of human knowing
requires an understanding of the notions of consciousness and
self-affirmation.  By consciousness Lonergan means the awareness
immanent in cognitional activity, a self-presence, differentiated
on three levels.  This self-presence he explicitly distinguishes,
on the one hand, from the idea of an interior look, and on the
other, from introspection.  Though affirmation is a judgment
of fact, still it is a privileged judgment, and that for two
reasons.  First, it enables the subject to enter the world of
interiority ; it enables him to attack  the problem of
subjectivity and objectivity.  Secondly, because one must affirm
the three levels of knowing by the very fact that one makes
an inquiry about them inasmuch as this inquiry has to involve
them, self-affirmation discloses the invariant structure of
knowing, and thus its irrevisability.

CHAPTER VIII


INTENTIONALITY :

THE NOTION OF BEING AND UNRESTRICTED QUESTIONING


The examination of the dynamic structure of knowing has revealed how it can be defined in its three levels in terms of the two-phase operator-question, What is it?/Is it so ?  The two phases belong to the one questioning that is the dynamic orientation of knowing.  This questioning is thematized by, but does not consist solely in, this two-phase operator-question.  Self-affirmation is the crucial strategic move by which one graspes firsthand, so to speak, the two-phase operator in action ; in intelligent inquiry (phase one) and in reflective understanding (phase two).

Through self-affirmation one could say that the primordial wonder behind knowing has been thematized as questioning.  The next step is to take up the correlate of questioning.  The invariant knowing structure of the subject has been affirmed ; now the objectivity correlative to that subject can be investigated.  Thus Lonergan takes up what he calls the "notion of being." [85]

The notion of being is the same as the unrestricted questionning of the subject, or the pure desire to know, the "overarching intention of being," and the basic horizon.  The notion of being is spelled out by Lonergan in terms of unrestricted questioning  and the pure desire.  This notion of being is the ultimate underpinning of the objectivity of knowing.

---

85. In, Chap. XII ; see also S, 12.

There are three sections to this chapter : first, two
definitions that explicitate the two dimensions of the notion
of being : the one of the pure desire, the other, of being ;
secondly, the unrestrictedness of the notion of being, and then
intentionality, questioning as a two-phase operator, and horizon ;
thirdly, the self-transcendence of the knower.


## I. Two Definitions

Lonergan begins his study of the notion of being with
two definitions that are to serve as guideliness for the study :

> Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to
> know.
> By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation
> manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection. [86]

The desire cannot be equated with any one component of
knowing. [87] Thus it is evidently not the verbal expression of
questions, nor is it the conceptual formulation of questions,
nor an insight, nor any reflective grasp, nor a judgment. It
is the prior, enveloping drive that carries cognitional process
from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding
to judgment, from judgment on to the complete context of correct
judgments that is named knowledge. The desire to know is the
inquiry and critical power of man.

The desire is named "pure" because it differs radically
from every other sort of desire. It is not to be known by the
analogy of other desires, such as conation of instinct, but

---

86. If these definitions should appear as abrupt, or perhaps
    as airy postulates, it should be recalled that Lonergan has
    spent the previous ten chapters (347 pp.) in preparatory
    investigations leading up to them.

87. In, 348 ; see also R, 258-259.

rather "by giving free rein to intelligent and rational consciousness."[88] The pure desire unfolds with intelligent and rational consciousness as a man inquires to understand and as he critically ponders the evidence before affirming.

The pure desire may seem more like "purely indeterminate" or "purely without objective." Is it another way of saying that the human mind is somehow empty to start with ? If the mind is purely indeterminate, purely without objective, and purely empty, how can it have some orientation towards some objective ? Perhaps it is possible to speak of the mind as being empty, but then one should distinguish between the way there is nothing in a box and the way there is nothing in a stomach.[89] When there is nothing in a box, the box does not feel empty. When there is nothing in a stomach, the stomach does feel empty. Human intelligence, the capacity to know, is more like a stomach than like a box. Although it has no answers, and so is "empty," it can still ask questions.

Lonergan further distinguishes characteristics of the pure desire to know :

> The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing rather than the act. Still, the desire is not itself a knowing, and so its range is not the same as the range of knowing. Initially in each individual, the pure desire is a dynamic orientation to a totally unknown. As knowledge develops, the objective becomes less and less unknown, more and more known. At any time the objective includes both all that is known and all that remains unknown, for it is the goal of the immanent dynamism of cognitional process, and that dynamism both underlies actual attainment and heads beyond it with even further questions.[90]

---

88. In, 348.

89. MH, 215.

90. In, 349 ; R, 258-259 ; S,24  NKG, 59-60 ; William Richardson (in "Being for Lonergan : A Heideggerian View," a paper presented at the International Lonergan Congress 1970) seriously misunderstands Lonergan's notion of being by failing to note that the notion of being is not a .../...

But still what is this objective ?  Is it limited or
unlimited ?  The answers to these questions, and any other
questions have but a single source.  "They cannot be had without
the functioning of the pure desire.  They cannot be had from
the pure desire alone.  They are to be had inasmuch as the pure
desire initiates and sustains cognitional process."[91]

The cognitional process initiated is inquiry asking
"What?" and reflective understanding asking "Is it so?"  To
reach an answer, the desiring is not enough.  It is the ground,
the possibility for the emergence of the two operator-questions
which determine the levels of understanding and reflective
understanding terminating in judgment.

> ...answers come only from inquiring and reflecting.
> Now our definition was that being is the objective of
> the pure desire to know.  Being, then, is
> (1) all that is known, and
> (2) all that remains to be known.
> Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only
> in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality
> of true judgments.  What, one may ask, is that totality ?
> It is the complete set of answers to the complete set of
> questions.  What the answers are, remains to be seen.  What
> the questions are, awaits their emergence.  Meaningless or
> incoherent or illegitimate questions may be possible, but
> how they are to be defined, is a further question.  The
> affirmation in hand is that there exists a pure desire to
> know, an inquiring and critical spirit, that follows questions
> up with further questions, that heads for some objective
> which has been named being.[92]

---

.../... knowing, not even the knowing of "beings in their totality
   (Seiende im Ganzen)" (p.9), but rather intending as the
   capacity to know.  Intending is not the same as knowing
   as is made clear in the present citation and may be seen
   in the other works alluded to in this note.

91. In, 349.
92. In, 350.

Lonergan notes that the definition he proposes of being
is one of the second order :

> Other definitions determine what is meant.  But this
> definition is more remote for it assigns, not what is meant
> by being, but how that meaning is to be determined.[93]

It means that if one knows, then he knows being ; that if one
wishes to know, then he wishes to know being.  It means that
being is the objective of the pure desire.  Inasmuch as this
desire is determined, the meaning of being is likewise deter-
mined.

This definition of being, then, although of the second
order, is not simply indeterminate.  For neither the desire
to know nor knowing itself are indeterminate.  The determinate-
ness  of knowing consists in the true judgment that is a grasp
of the virtually unconditioned.  And the determinateness of
the desire to know, for its part resides in the two-phase
questioning that leads to the true judgment.  Then,

> Inasmuch as the desire to know ever goes beyond actual
> knowledge, we could say that being is what is to be known
> by the totality of true judgments.  Hence, being has at least
> one characteristic : it is all-inclusive.[94]

## II. An Unrestricted Notion

That being is all-inclusive, avers Lonergan, may be shown
by answering several particular objections, and then by
proceeding to show that all the particular objections are
adequately met once the all-inclusiveness of being is seen.
Thus one might object that our ignorance is great, or that there
is much that is futile for us to learn.  The response : we know

---

93. In, 350.
94. In, 350.

these facts by raising questions that we do not answer, or by
distinguishing the question we hope to answer from those we
are not ready to tackle. And being is defined not only by
the answers we give or hope to give, but also by the questions
we ask or those whose answers we must postpone.[95]

But with respect to these particular objections, and
others that one might raise, instead of going after them one
by one, it would be better to revert to the basic theorem :
every doubt that the pure desire is unrestricted serves only
to prove that it is unrestricted.[96] If one asks whether a
certain X might lie beyond its range, the fact that one asks
such a question proves that X lies within its range. Or else,
if the question is meaningless, incoherent, illusory, illegitimate,
then X turns out to be the "nothing happens," The "nothing"
that results when a procedure is not working correctly. But
the correct working of the procedure or its aberration in such
questions is determined solely by one norm : the working of
cognitional procedure, the working of the knowing process
itself.

The knowing process is heading through inquiry and reflec-
tion to the judgment. The judgment is the grasp of the
virtually unconditioned where reflection has set the dichotomy,
Is is, or is it not ? At the root of the knowing process is
the pure desire to reach that immense unrestricted domain which
is designated by that dichotomy. This is the domain of what
is, of reality, or simply, of being.[97]

---

95. In, 351.

96. In, 352.

97. "In brief, the pure desire to know, whose objective is being,
   is the source not only of answers but also of their criteria,
   and not only of questions but also of the grounds on which
   they are screened. For it is intelligent inquiry and
   reasonable reflection that just as much yield the right
   questions as the right answers." In, 352.

Up to this point, our major preoccupation has been the implications of the all-inclusiveness of being. We should now examine what Lonergan means by the notion of being as a notion. Though he distinguishes the notion of being from particular conceptions and judgments, he still shows how they presuppose it. The notion of being is at once prior to each individual instance of knowing and goes beyond it.

The notion of being should be "placed in the pure desire to know."[98] As such, the notion of being is an orientation, as we have seen, in something of the manner that an empty stomach has some orientation, whereas an empty box does not. In order to explain how the notion of being is an orientation, Lonergan enumerates several levels of orientation with which he contrast the notion of being.

> A foetal eye is orientated towards seeing ; but a foetal eye does not see and it has no notion of seeing ; a notion arises only in so far as understanding discerns future function in present structure. Hunger is orientated towards food and eating ; it is a desire ; it lies within empirical consciousness ; but a notion arises only in so far as the orientation of hunger is understood. Purposive human action is orientated towards some end or product ; cognitional elements provide the rule and guide of such action ; but the cognitional elements are prior to the action ; they are constituted, not by the action itself, but by the planning that precedes it.[99]

None of these instances exactly parallels the relationship between the notion of being and cognitional process. The specific characteristics of co itional process is an orientation and a desire that are intelligently and rationally conscious.

For the desire to know is not unconscious, as is the foetal eye, nor empirically conscious, as is hunger, nor

98. In, 353 ; see also IPD, 157.
99. In, 354.

a consequence of intellectual knowledge, as are deliberation
and choice. The desire to know is conscious intelligently
and rationally ; it is inquiring intelligence and reflecting
reasonableness. Simply as desire, it is orientation without,
as yet, involving any cognitional content or notion. Still,
intelligence, as obverse, looks for the intelligible,
as reverse. Reasonableness, as observe, looks for the
grounded, as reverse. More fundamentally, the looking
for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is an obverse
that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted
objective named being. Were that heading unconscious,
there would be an orientation towards being, but there
would be no desire to know being and no notion of being.
Were that heading empirically conscious, there would be an
orientation toward being and a felt desire to know being,
but there would be no notion of being. In fact, the heading
is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an
orientation towards being, not only a pure desire to know
being, but also a notion of being.[100]

As an orientation, as the desire to know, how does the
notion of being precede and go beyond the particular instances
of knowing, or to be specific, the acts of understanding and
judging ? First of all, as a general response, there is the
direct approach of saying that one knows there are many things
that he does not know. Before starting to learn some of these
things, one already has an inkling, a clue, or a general idea
of what he wants to know. But even after one has learned
something, his knowledge can remain incomplete, and the
knowledge acquired can become a fillip to begin the process
anew. Thus one could conclude that the notion of being
extends beyond the known, what is known right now.[101]

Secondly, a response which takes into account objects
of thought on the level of understanding. There are objects
of thought that run from centaurs to horses, from the theory
of phlogiston to that of rapid oxidation. "In one sense,
they are all equivalent, for as long as one is merely thinking,

---

100. In, 355.

101. In, 353 ; see also In, 1-10, 33-69 ; IPD, 155-157 ; CS,
     227-231.

merely considering, merely supposing, one deals merely with the
conditioned and it makes no difference whether or not its
conditions are fulfilled."[102]  In one sense merely thinking
prescinds from existing and not existing, for it is not
thinking but judging that determines whether something exists
or not.  But

> In another sense, thinking does not prescind from existing
> and not existing, for thinking is purposive ; we think to
> get our concepts straight ; we wish to get our concepts
> straight that we may be able to judge ; so far from
> prescinding from existing and not existing, thinking is
> for the purpose of determining whether or not what is thought
> does exist.[103]

Thirdly, with respect to judgment.  It is in judgment that
we know whether something is or is not, for it is there that we
affirm or deny.  And yet, though being is known only in judging,
the notion of being is prior to judging.[104]  For prior to any

102. In, 353.

103. In, 354.

104. In, 353.  Lonergan defines the notion of being and
distinguishes it from other related cognitional matters
pertaining to being : "Je distinguerais maintenant :
(1) notion, (2) concept implicite, (3) connaissance, (4)
idée et (5) théorie de l'être.  La notion de l'être est
désir intellectuel, la première source de l'admiration,
l'origine de toutes les questions.  Le concept implicite
est n'importe quel concept se référant à une affirmation
prospective : ens dicitur ab esse, et tout concept se ré-
férant à une affirmation prospective se réfère à l'esse.
La connaissance d'un être se produit dans un jugement vrai,
et la connaissance de l'être se produit dans la totalité
des jugements vrais.  L'idée de l'être est l'essence di-
vine comme species intelligibilis ; c'est ce par quoi Dieu
comprend le tout de tout.  Finalement les théories de
l'être sont celles qui rendent compte, bien ou mal, de
ce qui précède".  (La Notion de Verbe dans les écrits de
saint Thomas d'Aquin [Paris : Beauchesne, 1966 ], p.44,
n.196 ; this footnote is not found in the English edition
of Verbum).

judgment, there is reflection and reflection is formulated
in the second phase of the operator-question, Is it ?
That question presupposes some notion of being, and is
prior to each instance of knowing beings. Not only, then,
does the notion of being extend beyond the known but it is
also prior to the final component of knowing when being is
actually known.

The going before and going beyond of the notion of
being affords another viewpoint from which to examine the
polymorphism of human knowing. We have seen how the
structure of knowing is functionally interlinked from
experience through understanding to judging. It is the
notion of being that grounds the structure, informs its
operating, and when the process reaches judgment, sets
the structure in motion again, or better, keeps it always
in motion. There it is that the notion of being "underpins
all cognitional content."[105]

The notion of being explains why we are not content
with a streaming of sensations, why we seek to understand
what is presented in sense data, and why we reflect and
ponder in order to judge.

> "... the notion of being penetrates all cognitional
> contents. It is the supreme heuristic notion. Prior
> to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known
> through that content. As each content emerges, the
> 'to-be-known through the content' passes without residue
> into the 'known through that content.' Some blank
> in universal anticipation is filled in, not merely
> to end that element of anticipation, but also to make
> the filler a part of the anticipated. Hence, prior to
> all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the
> totality to be known through all answers. But, once
> all answers are reached, the notion of being becomes
> the notion of the totality known through all answers.[106]

---

105. In, 356.
106. In, 356.

The notion of being, then, is all-pervasive. It underpins all cognitional content ; it penetrates them all. And finally it "constitutes all contents as cognitional."[107] As Lonergan says :

> Experience is a kaleidoscopic flow. Objects of thought are as various as the inventiveness of human intelligence. But the contribution of judgment to our knowing is ever a mere 'Yes' of 'No', a mere 'is' or 'is not.' Experience is for inquiring into being. Intelligence is for thinking out being. But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is never mere being, just as judgment is never a mere 'Yes' apart from any question that 'Yes' answers.[108]

## A. Intentionality, Questioning as Operator, Horizon.

In conjunction with the notion of being, Lonergan speaks of intentionality, questioning as operator, and horizon. We have chosen to group these three together here for two reasons : first, in order to have the prior discussion of the notion of being as clarificatory background ; secondly, to analyze their properties by which they are related to one another. We see how intentionality and questioning are tied together by Lonergan. Next we use this occasion to study questioning as the two-phase operator of knowing, although we have already introduced this term earlier. Horizon can then be determined in terms of its two poles, questioning and what is questioned. Finally, the examination of intentionality, questioning, and horizon clarifies the transition to the topic of the self-transcendence of the knower, and thus to the topic of objectivity proper.

We may begin with intentionality. The intention of being and the notion of being are the same.[109] Lonergan describes it in the same way as the notion of being :

---

107. CS, 228.

108. In, 357.

109. In, 355.

All marshaling and weighing of evidence, all judging
and doubting, are efforts to say of what is that it is and of
what is not that it is  not.  Accordingly, the dynamic
structure of human knowing intends being.  That intention is
unrestricted, for there is nothing that we cannot at least
question.  The same intention is comprehensive, for questioning
probes every aspect of everything ; its ultimate goal is the
universe in all its concreteness.[110]

Questioning, then, and intentionality describe the
originating drive of human knowing.  To questioning there is
referred answering, and to intentionality particular intendings.
The questioning is not any individual question, nor is the
intentionality any individual intention.  They are the grounds
for questions and intentions.

In describing intentionality, Lonergan matches up intentio
intendens, pensée pensante, and intentio intenta, pensée pensée.
In this matching, correlatives are identified and emphasized.
As a consequence, Lonergan's assertion that "the intrinsic
objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intentionality"
announces a very comprehensive, yet precise, situation : the
basic intentionality of knowing is prior to any particular
instance of intendens and intentum.

Next, to turn to questioning as operator.  Taking a
concept from mathematics, Lonergan names questioning the "operator"
of the knowing process.[112]  There is, strictly speaking, only
one questioning, just as there is only one notion of being, one
pure desire, and one intentionality.  This is the essential
questioning that is the permanent grounding and the originating

---

110. CS, 228.

111. In, XXV-XXVI ; 371 ; CS, 228.

112. The notion of questioning as operator is Lonergan's.
     (See In, 465-469 ; also the Index of In under the entry,
     "Operator."  See also Philip McShane, "Insight and the
     Strategy of Biology," in Continuum, 2 [1964], 86-88.)  The
     notion of operator is from mathematics where it is a
     prescription for the unique transformation of one .../...

power, setting in motion the whole knowing process. The questioning, however, takes place in two moments that are specified by the two questions, What is it ? and Is it so ? These two moments are the two phases of questioning working as an operator.[113] What proceeds immediately from these two questions, namely understanding (insight) and judgment, looks back to the primordial intending as answers to questions.

The basis for the functional relationship of the different activities is this property inherent to the knowing process that has been designated as a two-phase operator. The two questions, always inseparable, operate upon the knowing process to bring it to its term, the judgment. It should be noted that the two-phase operator, though an element of the knowing process just as much as sensation, understanding, and judgment, is not an element of either sensation, or understanding, or judgment. The two-phase operator-question is not simply extraneous to them. Rather, with respect to them, it is a supervening event that is intrinsic to the knowing process as a whole of which they are elements and that advances the process.

The first phase of the operator-question focuses upon the data of sensation to reach an understanding of something, an insight. People can perform more or less the same looking, hearing, and feeling without understanding the same thing at all.

---

.../... mathematical object into another. Such as, given the mathematical object "x," one can transform this object into three times itself by applying the mathematical operator "3X" (i.e., multiplication by 3), and so one gets a mathematical object, y=3x. Other examples of operators in mathematics are the derivative, the integral, and matrices. Formal logic also makes use of operators, such as quantifiers and abstractors. For another example of the operator, the "totemic operator," see Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), pp. 59-60.

113. The expression "two-phase operator-question" is the present writer's, although its use would seem to be in accord with Lonergan's notion of questioning.

To take Lonergan's example of Archimedes.[114]  Many people in
Syracuse had looked at, heard, and felt water overflowing a
bathtub without understanding why it did so.  Their multiple and
varied experiences with water did not automatically assure them
of grasping the principle of the displacement of fluids.

Archimedes was preoccupied with his problem to such a
degree that his experience of overflowing water was different.
And it was different precisely inasmuch as it was subject to a
supervening event extraneous to the sensation of water, and yet
for all that, capable of making that sensation specifically
relevant to his problem.  The supervening event was his
questioning, "Why does this water spill over?"

The second phase of the operator tests understanding by
asking, Is it so ?  It is the impulse by which one evaluates his
insights to see if they can stand up under critical scrutiny.
If they do, then one reaches an affirmation, just as Archimedes
did when he judged that his understanding of hydrostatics was
correct.  The second phase brings the knowing process to term.

These points, then, should be kept in mind concerning
questioning as an operator.  The two phases promote the process
of knowing from one level to another.  They do not change one
level into another.  Thus sensation never becomes understanding,
nor does understanding ever become judgment.  The two phases
are not intrinsic to any one of the components of knowing that
constitutes these levels such that they would be an intrinsic
element of sensing, or understanding, or judging.  They are
intrinsic, however, to the knowing process as a whole.  The
two-phase operator constitutes knowing as a process occurring in
three stages and advancing to a term.

There are further aspects of the operator notion that
will come up.  In Chapter XI normative objectivity will be seen
in relation to the operator, And in Chapter XII the elements
of the judgment are connected with the operator.

---

114. In, 3-6, 279, 324.

Next, to take up the notion of horizon. The person
engaged in the performance of questioning can be conceived
of as a pole to which is correlative another pole. The two
of them constitute a horizon. "A Horizon is a maximum field
of vision from a determinate standpoint. In a generalized
sense, a horizon is specified by two poles, one objective and
the other subjective, with each pole conditioning the other."[115]
Thus the objective pole is taken as correlative to a specifying
activity or set of operations of the subject. Similarly, the
subjective pole is considered in its relation to the objective
pole. The objective pole can also be called the subject's
"world."

The objective pole, or world, is the field which the
subject can operate, or "handle" in the way in which an expert
is said to be able to "handle" his area of expertise.[116] He
has in his possession a set of operations by which he can reach
a certain field, or world. The worlds of common sense and theory
are based upon the specialization possibilities of the subject :
the possibility of familiarity with what is concrete and immediate,
or the possibility for generalization. The worlds of exteriority
and interiority are based upon the differentiation of
consciousness : the mediate awareness of objects other than
one's self (or one's self known reflexively), or the immediate
awareness of one's self.

Thus there are horizons and horizons. There are the
horizons of the worlds of the scientists and the variegated
horizons of common sense. There are the horizons which appear
when one recognizes exteriority and interiority, such as the

---

115. See also E ; ABL, 7-21. It should be noted that, although
"horizon" is not an explicitly operative notion or
expression in In (first ed., 1957), it is an important notion
in the summer lectures, E (1957).

116. MH, 213-214 ; EA, 243-246 ; S, 1-2.

237.

horizons of Pure Reason or empiricism. But is there a basic
horizon ? Basic in the sense that it is normative ?

As before, so here, the central issue is the polymorphism
of human knowing and the privileged judgment of self-affirmation.
For the subject to recognize his own polymorphic knowing is for
him to take account of the occurrence there of questioning.
Once he takes account of questioning, he comprehends how it is
unlimited, is prior to, and goes beyond any particular
question. Then the judgment of self-affirmation caps the
inventory of polymorphic knowing : the subject's questioning
if he is a knower; his self-affirmation that he is one ; this
self-affirmation as immanent law.

The horizon, then, that Lonergan is concerned with is
that of the questioning subject and his correlative objective
pole. As questioning is one and unrestricted, so also is being.
As the subjective pole is one and unrestricted, so also is the
objective pole.

It follows that such a horizon is total and basic.
"It is total, for beyond being there is nothing. It is basic,
for a total horizon is basic ; it cannot be transcended, gone
beyond, and so it cannot be revised."[117]

This examination of the horizon of human cognition with
its correlative poles can also be viewed as an inquiry into
the a priori conditions of questioning. Thus, the subjective
pole, questioning, is the conditioned, and the objective pole,
being, is the condition. But since being is unrestricted, and
thus questioning also, questioning cannot be limited to just
one level of knowing. Questioning may be thematized, but that is
not to limit it. To thematize questioning is to identify its
two phases.[118]

---

117. MH, 215.
118. MH, 213-219.

Questioning and objectivity must always be viewed together. Lonergan puts them in perspective :

> As answers stand to questions, so cognitional activities stand to the intention of being.  But an answer is to a question, because it and the question have the same object. So it is that the intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human knowing passes from the side of the subject to the side of the object, that the intentio intendens of being becomes the intentio intenta of this or that being.  So the question, What's this ?, promotes the datum of sense to a 'this' that has a 'what-ness' and 'is.'  The promotion settles no issues, but it does raise issues.  It is neither knowledge nor ignorance of essence and existence, but it is the intention of both.  What the essence is and whether that essence exists are, not answers, but questions.  Still the questions have been raised and the very fact of raising them settles what the answers will have to be about.  The intentio intendens of the subject summons forth and unites cognitional activities to objectivity itself in an intentio intenta that unites and is determined by the partial objects of the partial activities.  As the intentio intendens of the dynamic structure, so the corresponding intentio intenta of the structured cognitional activities is intrisically related to being and reality.[119]

At this point, then, we can tie together the specific characteristics of the themes we have been considering : intentionality, questioning, and horizon.  We are interested in them for their relationship with objectivity.  Thus, there is an ultimate and total horizon of human knowing specified by a subjective pole, questioning, and an objective pole, reality. "The intrinsic objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intentionality."[120]  And so, "objectivity is what is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering questions."[121]

### III. The Self-transcendence of the Knower

The discussion of objectivity, as already seen in Chapter I, immediately raises the issue of how to conceive objectivity

---

119. CS, 229.

120. CS, 228.

121. CS, 232 ; NKG, 58.

inasmuch as it involves a certain self-transcendence of the knower. If knowing is conceived as similar to taking a look, objectivity will consequently consist in something to which the knower can extrovert. Spatial metaphors will dominate. The object will be what is out there now and real, and the knower can look at it.[122]

According to this conception, the difficulty of the knower transcending his own cognitional states is easily solved by the immediacy of sensation. The knower is here. The object is there. The knower takes a look at the object. If there is no object there, then, he does not see what is not there.[123]

Lonergan, however, denies that it is from the senses that cognitional activities derive their immediate relationship to real objects.[124] The relationship is immediate in the intention, the notion, of being. It is mediate in the data of sense inasmuch as the intention through the two-phase operator makes use of data to promote the knowing process towards the judgment. It is likewise mediate in the understanding and the judgment because these activities stand to the originating intention in its two-phase operator manifestation as answers stand to questions.

Objectivity and self-transcendence are a pseudo-problem of the "extra mental," of getting outside the mind. For as soon as a question is asked, being is intended ; and since being includes everything, everything is already within the minds's intention, within the notion of being. Intentionality taken as the capacity to question means that subjectivity is already "outside" of itself right from the beginning. On this intentionality authentic self-transcendence has its ultimate

---

122. NKG, 58.
123. CS, 232 ; S, 14,17-18.
124. CS, 235-236.

grounds.[125]

The distinction between the immediate and mediate
relationships of knowing is based on the polymorphic structure
of knowing.  There is the _intentio intendens_ that is questioning,
or the notion of being.  And there is the _intentio intenta_ that
pertains to the three levelled knowing structure, to each level
of which belongs a specific element of objectivity.

125. MH, 217 ; concerning cognitional self-transcendence, see
     also TMF, 457-458 ; FC, 6.  In a passage in the _Verbum_,
     Lonergan omits all mention of the spatial metaphor of an
     "inside," "outside," or "extra" mental by describing self-
     transcendence in terms of an innate scheme of knowing, an
     inborn scheme of man's intelligence, that functions in
     all the progress of learning and knowing : "... in all this
     progress we are but discriminating, differentiating,
     categorizing the details of a scheme that somehow we possessed
     from the start.  To say that X is real is just to assign
     it a place in that scheme ; to deny the reality of any Y
     is to deny it a place in the universal scheme.
         But how do we grasp the scheme itself ?  At its root it
     is just the principle of excluded middle : X either is or
     else is not.  And in its details the scheme is just the
     actuation of our capacity to conceive any essence and
     rationally affirm its existence and its relations.  Since
     within that scheme both we ourselves and all our acts of
     conceiving and of judging are no more that particular and
     not too important items, the critical problem... is not a
     problem of moving from within outwards, of moving from a
     subject to an object outside the subject.  It is a problem
     of moving from above downwards, of moving from an infinite
     potentiality commensurate with the universe towards a
     rational apprehension that seizes the difference of subject
     and object in essentially the same way that it seizes any
     other real distinction.  Thus realism is immediate, not
     because it is naive and unreasoned and blindly affirmed,
     but because we know the real before we know such a dif-
     ference within the real as the difference between subject
     and object.  Again, the critical problem has the
     appearance of insolubility only because the true concept of
     the real is hidden or obscured, and in its place there
     comes the false substitute that by the real we mean only
     another essence, or else that by the real we mean the
     object of modern existentialist experience--the mere
     givenness of inner or outer actuality, which truly is no
     more than the condition for the rational transition from
     the affirmation of possible to the affirmation of actual
     contingent being" (V, 87-88).

The <u>intentio intendens</u> is not knowing but merely intending
it is objectivity in potency.  But the <u>intentio intenta</u>
resides not in mere intending but in structured activities of
knowing : it is objectivity in act.  Moreover, objectivity
in act, because it resides not in a single operation but in
a structured manifold of operations, is not some single
property of human knowing but a compound of quite different
properties.[126]

Just as there are three levels of knowing, there are
three corresponding distinct elements of objectivity.[127]  Just
as  no one level alone and by itself is human knowing, no one
element alone and by itself constitutes the objectivity of
knowing.

There is, then an experiential component that resides in
the givenness of relevant data.  There is the normative
component that resides in the exigencies of understanding and
reflective understanding guiding the cognitional process from
data to judgment.  These exigencies, in a word, are the two-
phase operator-question.  Then finally there is an absolute
component that is reached when reflective understanding
combines the normative and the experiential elements into a
virtually unconditioned.[128]  Lonergan's main correlations
are here pointed out : normative objectivity and phase one of
the operator ; absolute objectivity and phase two.

Unrestricted questioning with its two phases define the
range of the objectivity of knowing.

The objectivity of human knowing, then, rests upon an
unrestricted intention and unconditioned result.  Because
the intention is unrestricted, it is not restricted to the
immanent content of knowing, to <u>Bewusstseinsinhalte</u> ; at least,
we can ask whether there is anything beyond that, and the

---

126. CS, 229.

127. CS, 230.

128. CS, 230.

mere fact that the question can be asked reveals that the
intention, which the question manifests, is not limited by
any principle of immanence.  But answers are to questions
so that if questions are transcendent, so also must be the
meaning of corresponding answers.  If I am asked whether mice
and men really exist, I am not answering the question when
I talk about images of mice and men, concepts of mice and
men, or the words, mice and men ; I answer the question only
if I affirm or deny the real existence of mice and men.
Further, true answers express an unconditioned.  Mice and
men are contingent and so their existence has its conditions.
My knowing mice and men is contingent and so my knowing of
their existence has its conditions.  But the conditions of
the conditioned may be fulfilled and then the conditioned
is virtually an unconditioned ; it has the properties of an
unconditioned, not absolutely, but de facto.[129]

The grasp of the virtually unconditioned is the precise
point at which subjectivity transcends itself and reaches objective
reality.  For the unconditioned inasmuch as it is unconditioned
cannot be restricted, qualified, or limited.[130]  And so one
must distinguish sharply between what is and, on the other
hand, what appears, or seems to be, or is imagined, or what is
just thought or might be possibly or probably affirmed.  In
these latter cases, the object is still tied down by relativity
to the subject.  But in the case of the judgment, cognitional
self-transcendence has come to its term.  To judge that something
is means that its reality does not depend upon the subject's
knowing activity.  One has gone beyond what is relative to him
"to something entirely different, to what is so."[131]  Essential
to the whole structure of human knowing, then, is the
intention of being.  By it is knowing the formally dynamic
structure that moves in two phases from the all-pervasive
luminousness of being to the successive focal points of the
individual apprehendings of the virtually unconditioned.[132]

---

129. CS, 230.

130. In, 377-380 ; CS, 230.

131. S, 3.

132. EA, 249.

The "overarching intention of being" goes ahead of, along with, and beyond the particular judgments to advance anew to other judgments.[133]

> The possibility of human knowing, then, is an unrestricted intention that intends the transcendent, and a process of self-transcendence that reaches it. The unrestricted intention directs the process to being ; the attainment of the unconditioned reveals that at some point being has been reached.[134]

These three, then, go hand in hand : the attainment of the unconditioned, the attainment of objective reality, self-transcendence.

In this chapter, then, we have seen that with the three-levelled structure of knowing there are specified three different elements of objectivity. These three elements will be identified as experiential, normative, and absolute objectivity. The distinction of these three elements and their mutual interlinking are the basis for the following four chapters where a detailed examination of them will be undertaken.

## Summary

We have begun with Lonergan's defintiion of the notion of being, and then proceeded to examine its traits. It is the primordial unrestricted questioning that is thematized and specified by, but does not consist in,the questions "What is it?" and "Is it so?" To thematize questioning in these two questions is to recognize questioning with its two-phase operator. Besides the "notion of being," Lonergan also employs the terms, "intentionality," and "horizon." When speaking of intentionality, he has the possibility of contrasting _intentio intendens_ with _intentio intenta_. The notion of horizon involves two correlative poles that determine a horizon, one of which is

---

133. CS, 231.
134. CS, 231.

the subjective pole, questioning, and the other is the objective
pole, being.  It follows, then, in Lonergan's view, that the
self-transcendence of the knower resides in his capacity
to question by which he is already "outside" his own immanent
cognitional activity.

CHAPTER IX


LONERGAN'S VOCABULARY

     This chapter is concerned with Lonergan's vocabulary on
objectivity and some related notions.  However, two matters
previously examined are necessary background : first, the
rejection of extroversion as the basis of objectivity ;
secondly, the three levels of knowing which ground the three
aspects of objectivity.  Self-transcendence is likewise a topic
closely related to objectivity, but it has been examined in
some detail in the previous chapter and will come up again in
the following chapter, so that the vocabulary pertaining to it
can be considered as adequately presented already.  There are,
then, three topics in this chapter : the notions of body and
objectivity, and  another vocabulary on objectivity inspired by
Lonergan's conceptions.

## I. Body

     According to Lonergan's usage, "body" indicates the
objective of extroversion.  It is an "already out there now
real" which is as accessible to animals as it is to men.
Persons implicitly thinking that objectivity has something to
do with the "already out there now real" are really thinking
of bodies when they speak of objects.  Lonergan's discussion
of "body" is in a way an attempt to rehabilitate the notion of
body by specifying some of its characteristics.
     Lonergan does not deny that a body is an object.  He
denies that the cognitional basis for determining a body is the

same as that for determining objectivity. In Lonergan's view a body is an object, but an object is not necessarily a body.

As a _mise en scène_ for his discussion of the meaning of "body," Lonergan starts with an example :

> ... Let us consider a kitten. It is awake and its stream of consciousness flows in the biological pattern. Such consciousness is a higher technique for attaining biological ends. It may be described as orientated toward such ends and as anticipating means to the ends. Moreover, the ends lie in external situations, and so the anticipation is extroverted. The kitten's consciousness is directed outward towards possible opportunities to satisfy appetites. This extroversion is spatial : as it is by the spatial manoeuvres of moving its head and limbs that the kitten deals with means to its end, so the means also must be spatial, for otherwise spatial means would be inept and useless. The extroversion is also temporal : present data are distinct from the memories that enrich them ; they are no less distinct from the imagined course of future action to which they lead. Finally, the extroversion is concerned with the 'real' : a realistic painting of a saucer of milk might attract the kitten's attention, make it investigate, sniff, perhaps try to lap ; but it could not lead to lapping and, still less, to feeling replete ; for the kitten, painted milk is not real.[135]

On the experiential level of human knowing taken just as experience, there is a type of extroversion. In relation to this extroversion, the essential traits of a "body" can be drawn. A "body" can be characterized

> ...as an 'already out there now real'. 'Already' refers to the orientation and dynamic anticipation of biological consciousness ; such consciousness does not create but finds its environment ; it finds it as already constituted, already offering opportunities, already issuing challenges. 'Out' refers to the extroversion of a consciousness that is aware, not of its own ground, but of objects distinct from itself. 'There' and 'now' indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted consciousness. 'Real', finally, is a sub-division within the field of the 'already out there now' :

---

135. In, 251 ; see also CS, 231-234 ; S, 8-18.

part of that is mere appearance but part is real ; and its
reality consists in its relevance to biological success or
failure, pleasure or pain.[136]

In sum, by a "body" is meant primarily a focal point of
the anticipation and attention of biological extroversion.[137]
It is an "already out there now real" where these terms have
their meaning fixed solely by elements within sense experience,
and so without the intervention of the two-phase operator in
its form of inquiry and reflective understanding.  "Body" is
thus defined apart from the use of any elements from insight or
judgment.

---

136. In, 251 ; see also : "... the terms, 'body,' 'already,'
     'out,' 'there,' 'now,' 'real,' stand for concepts uttered
     by an intelligence that is grasping, not intelligent
     procedure, but merely a biological and non-intelligent
     response to stimulus.  In other words, the point to preceding
     paragraphs is not to suggest that a kitten can understand
     and describe its spontaneity but, on the contrary, to
     indicate through human concepts the elements in a non-
     conceptual 'knowing.'
         "... our interest in kittens is rather limited.  For the
     point we wish to make is that not a few mean by 'thing'
     or 'body,' not simply an intelligible unity grasped in data
     as individual, but also an 'already out there now real'
     which is as accessible to human animals as to kittens "
     (In, 251-252).

137. In, 254 ; see also CS, 231-234.  The notion of "body" can
     be clarified by contrasting it briefly with the notion of
     thing.  As a broad generalization, one could say that for
     Lonergan "body" stands to sense experience as thing stands
     to understanding and judgment.  A thing is a unity, identity,
     grasped in data.  Further, there are the things for common
     sense determined by description and the thing for theory
     determined by explanation.  To both are ascribed extension
     in space, permanence in time, and subjection to change.  An
     example of a descriptive thing might be a dog, while an
     example of an explanatory thing might be the elements in
     the periodic table, or an electron.  See In, Chap. VIII,
     "Things,"  See also ABL, 120-123 ; QMO, 6,82 ; McShane,
     Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, pp. 107-108.

The discriminant for "body," object, and real is the three-levelled knowing structure. "Body" can be determined by the sense pattern of knowing. Object and reality, however, await the advent of the two-phase operator and then the ensuing understanding and judgment. For "the real is the verified ; it is what is to be known by the knowing constituted by experience and inquiry, insight and hypothesis, reflection and verification."[138] It is what is known only by the integrated working of the three levels. But "our present point is that, besides knowing in that rather complex sense, there is also 'knowing' in the elementary sense in which kittens know the 'reality' of milk."[139]

## II. Objectivity

Before taking up the principal notion of objectivity and its three partial aspects, we should have claarly in mind the relationship of intentionality and objectivity according to Lonergan's view, and his definition of objectivity that is based upon this relationship. Intentionality and objectivity are correlative. The intrinsic objectivity of knowing resides in its intentionality. Most concisely, then, "Objects are what are intended in questioning and what become better known as our answers to questions become fuller and more accurate."[140]

---

138. In, 254.

139. In, 252.

140. NKG, 59. See also Lonergan's shcematic presentation of what he believes to be the two mutually exclusive conceptions of objectivity : "On the one hand, there is the etymological meaning of the word, which was systematized by Kant, and remains in various subsequent philosophies that have not broken loose from Kant's basic influence. On the other hand, there is the meaning implicit in all discourse : an object is what is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering questions.
    "The Greek word for object, to antikeimenon, means what lies opposite. The Latin, obiectum, whence are derived our word, object, The French, objet, the Italian, oggetto, means what is put or set or lies before or opposite. The German, Gegenstand, means what stands opposite . In .../...

In treating objectivity Lonergan starts with the
principal notion, and then (in this order) takes up absolute,
normative, and experiential objectivity.  The procedure is the
inverse of his discussion of the levels of cognitional activity.
There the schema is : experience, understanding (insight),
and (reflective insight and) judgment.  The examination of the
structure of knowing reveals that questioning in its two phases
terminates in judgment.  Judgment is the culmination of
cognitional structure.  It is, then, pivotal to objectivity :
in it reside absolute objectivity, and through absolute objec-
tivity, the principal notion.  Thus the reason for beginning
with the principal notion and absolute objectivity.

A note : though the levels of the knowing structure are
matched with aspects of objectivity, still it should be pointed
out that Lonergan does not identify the two, He notes :

> ... the cognitional analysis in terms of structure does
> not say anything about objectivity.  Structure is the
> internally closed set of relations between functional parts.
> Objectivity asks about the relation between the structure
> and what is known.[141]

There is a parallel between the structure of objectivity
and that of knowing : the three elements of the one pair off
with the three elements of the other.  An over-view sets the
elements off :

> Principally the notion of objectivity is contained
> within a patterned context of judgments which serve as implicit
> definitions of the terms, object, subject.  But besides this
> principal and complex  notion, there also are partial aspects

.../... all cases, then, 'object' connotes something sensible,
   localized, locally related presumably to a spectator or
   sensitive subject" (NKG, 58).  Cf. DP, 14.
141. DL, III, 21.

or components emergent within cognitional process. Thus, there is an experiential aspect of objectivity proper to sense and empirical consciousness. There is a normative aspect that is contained in the contrast between the detached and unrestricted desire to know and, on the other hand, merely subjective desires and fears. Finally, there is an absolute aspect that is contained in single judgments considered by themselves inasmuch as each rests on a grasp of the un- conditioned and is posited without reservation.[142]

A final prenote, this one concerning the word "objective" : "objective" can be used, says Lonergan, "simply as an intensive."[143] Thus, when one says that "knowledge is objective" one means "that really and truly it is knowledge." However, when one appeals "to specific criteria with regard to particular statements then" one appeals "to different kinds of objectivity." These different kinds of objectivity are, of course, experiential, normative, and absolute objectivity.

## A. The Principal Notion of Objectivity

The principal, or complete, notion of objectivity, according to Lonergan, is such because it does not reside in a single isolated judgment, but rather in a network of judgments ultimately based upon three distinct judgments. In his words :

> Principally, the notion of objectivity is contained in a patterned context of judgments. For one may define as object any A, B, C, D,... where, in turn, A, B, C, D,... are defined by the correctness of the set of judgments :
> A is ; B is ; C is ; D is ; ..........
> A is neither B nor C nor D nor........
> B is neither C nor D nor.............
> C is neither D nor...................
> Again, one may define a subject as any object, say A, where it is true that A affirms himself as a knower...

---

142. In, 375 ; see also, CS, 230-231.
143. DL, III, 22-23.

The bare essentials of this notion of objectivity are reached if we add to the judgments already discussed, viz., I am a knower, This is a typewriter, the further judgment that I am not this typewriter. An indefinite number of further objects may be added by making the additional appropriate positive and negative judgments. Finally, in so far as one can intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers besides oneself, one can add to the list the objects that also are subjects.[144]

It can be seen that what Lonergan means by the principal notion of objectivity is intimately related to what he says of the notion of being and true judgments. The notion of being initiates and sustains the individual questionings. One true judgment does not quench the intending. For, in Lonergan's words,

> Being... is
> (1) all that is known, and
> (2) all that remains to be known.
> Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only
> in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality
> of true judgments.[145]

What Lonergan means by the "patterned context of judgments" is not the same as what he means by individual true judgments being increments in the "totality of true judgments." There are two different viewpoints : in the first case, he is concerned with the principal notion of objectivity ; in the second, with the notion of being. When he is speaking of the principal notion of objectivity, then he is engaged in showing how distinct objects are determined through three different types of true judgments : namely, self-affirmation, the judgment about something else (distinct from the subject), and the negative judgment which denies that the subject is the other thing. On the other hand, when Lonergan is speaking of the notion of being and the totality of true judgments, then he is concerned with them inasmuch as

---

144. In, 375-376.
145. In, 350.

they are an augmentation of knowledge.

A few words should be said on Lonergan's usage of the term "notion." We have already seen in the previous chapter what he means by the "notion of being." In the phrase, the "principal notion of objectivity," "notion" signifies the general sense or meaning of something. This is substantiated by the fact that Lonergan employs the phrase "objectivity in its principal sense," where it is evident that he is using "sense" as synonymous with "notion."[146] The "principal notion of objectivity" means, then, the "principal sense," or "meaning" of objectivity.

We might add further that whereas he speaks of the principal "notion" of objectivity, Lonergan refers to absolute, normative, and experiential objectivity as "partial aspects," "components," or "elements."[147] "Notion" seems, then, to mean a certain completeness of comprehension ; "aspect," "component", or "element," however, mean constitutive parts. Lonergan likewise calls these partial aspects of objectivity "properties," or "ingredients."[148] It is only from the combination of the three partial aspects that the complete sense of objectivity arises. The partial aspects must be identified for their essential traits, and then recognized as partial precisely with respect to the principal notion.

## B. Absolute Objectivity

The first of the partial aspects of objectivity in Lonergan's order of consideration is absolute objectivity. "The ground of absolute objectivity is the virtually unconditioned that is grasped by reflective understanding and posited in judgment."[149] Absolute objectivity, then, is that component of objectivity "that is reached when reflective understanding combines the normative

---

146. See In, 376-377.
147. In, 375, 377-381, 383 ; CS, 230.
148. S, 13-14.
149. In, 377 ; see also IPD, 160-161.

and the experiential elements into a virtually unconditioned,
i.e., a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled."[150]

Lonergan also names absolute objectivity "terminal
objectivity."[151]  It might also be designated as the "crowning
component" of objectivity by reason of its relationship to the
judgment.[152]  Absolute objectivity "comes to the fore when we
judge, when we distinguish sharply between what we feel, what
we imagine, what we think, what seems to be so and, on the other
hand, what is so."[153]  A brief reminder : phase two of the
operator is here.

"Absolute" is said in contradistinction to "relative."  The
unconditioned is set  off against the subject who grasps it :

> Because the content of the judgment is an absolute, it
> is withdrawn from relativity to the subject who utters it,
> the place in which he utters it, the time at which he utters
> it.  Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon was a contingent event
> occuring at a particular place and time.  But a true affir-
> mation of that event is an eternal, immutable, definitive
> validity.  For if it is true that he did cross, then no
> one whatever at any place or time can truly deny that he did.[154]

Another point that Lonergan raises with regard to absolute
objectivity is what he names its "publicity."

> Hence, it is in virtue of absolute objectivity that our
> knowing acquires what has been named its publicity.  For
> the same reason that the unconditioned is withdrawn from
> relativity to its source, it also is accessible not only to the
> knower that utters it but also to any other knower.[155]

---

150. CS, 230.

151. S, 14.

152. IPD, 162.

153. S, 14.

154. In, 378.  See, however, Lonergan's nuanced exposition of
     the relation of the developing subject and the absolutness
     of objective truth, S, 2-5 ; we shall return to this point
     in Chapter XII.

155. In, 378.

We shall return to this characteristic of absolute objectivity further on in the third section of this chapter when examining another vocabulary closely related to Lonergan's.

## C. Normative Objectivity

The next partial aspect of objectivity presupposes "the proper march of cognitional process. The ground of normative objectivity lies in the unfolding of the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know."[156] "The normative component" of objectivity "resides in the exigences of intelligence and rationality guiding the process of knowing from data to judging."[157]

"Normative" means "regulative," "prescribing the standard," "specifically constitutive," or "specifically determining." Lonergan employs the term to indicate what is specifically constitutive and determining in cognition : that is to say, the appearance of the two-phase operator.

Lonergan also speaks of "necessities" in connection with normative objectivity inasmuch as it has to do with rules of logical consistency and logical method.[158]

The objectivity of cognition rests upon the notion of being, the intention of being. But it is only at this level, and not at the preceding level of experiential objectivity that for the first time the notion of being, the intention of being, is _formally_ present to the knowing process. For it makes its appearance in the first phase of the operator. Therefore this objectivity is called normative by Lonergan.

The intervention of inquiry, phase one, in advancing the knowing process towards understanding, correlatively brings about a new level of objectivity : normative objectivity.

---

156. In, 380.
157. CS, 230.
158. DL, III, 21.

Similarly, reflective understanding, phase two, in advancing the knowing process towards judgment, correlatively brings about a new level of objectivity : absolute objectivity.

Lonergan does not use any synonyms for "normative" when speaking of objectivity. He does, however, use the term again when discussing the structure of knowing as grounded in the notion of being : "The detached and disinterested desire to know and its unfolding in inquiry and reflection not only constitute a notion of being but also impose a normative structure upon man's cognitional acts."[159]  Such usage is most logical, given the oft cited parallel between knowing structure and objectivity structure.

## D. Experiential Objectivity

The third component of objectivity is the experiential. It "resides in the givenness of relevant data."[160]

> It is the given as given.  It is the field of materials about which one inquires, in which one finds the fulfilment of conditions for the unconditioned, to which cognitional process repeatedly returns to generate the series of inquiries and reflections that yield the contextual manifold of judgments.[161]

A key in Lonergan's discussion of experiential objectivity is "given." He explains its usage :

> We are employing the name 'given' in an extremely broad sense.  It includes not only the veridical deliverances of outer sense but also images, dreams, illusions, hallucinations, personal equations, subjective bias, and so forth.  No doubt, a more restricted use of the term would be desirable, if we were speaking from the limited viewpoint of natural science.

159. In, 395.
160. CS, 230.
161. In, 381.

But we are working at a general theory of objectivity and
so we have to acknowledge as given not only the materials
into which natural science inquires but also the materials
into which the psychologist or methodologist or cultural
historian inquires.[162]

### III. A Related Vocabulary

Although this chapter is specifically concerned with
Lonergan's usage of terms with respect to objectivity, it would
be very profitable to compare the vocabulary of Patrick Heelan
who acknowledges that it is based upon Lonergan's.[163]  In
comparing the vocabularies, we should keep two points in mind :
(1) Heelan is treating of the problem of objectivity in the
physical sciences ; (2) he is also engaged in contrasting his
notion of objectivity with that of Edmund Husserl.

Heelan presents counterparts to two of Lonergan's
components of objectivity, namely, the experiential and the
absolute, and though Heelan does not explicitly name it, he
also acknowledges the equivalent of Lonergan's principal
notion of objectivity.  Heelan distinguishes "three different
(but not mutually exclusive) types of objectivity," which are
"empirical objectivity," "public objectivity," and "strict
objectivity."[164]  As will become clear, Heelan's "public
objectivity" is not Lonergan's normative objectivity, nor is it
exactly what Lonergan means by the publicity of knowledge.

---

162. In, 382.

163. See QMO, 3-22, 81-111, and the Glossary, pp. 185-191 ( see
    p. 185, n.1, for acknowledgment of the usage of  Lonergan's
    vocabulary) ; HOR, 381-389 ; and "Epistemological Realism
    in Contemporary Physics," Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth
    Annual Convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association
    (Shrub Oak ; N.Y. : Loyola Seminary, 1967), 25-33.  It is
    the article HOR that we will mostly use to discuss Heelan's
    vocabulary ; this article is substantially the same as
    Part II of the article "Epistemological Realism in
    Contemporary Physics."

164. HOR, 382.

First of all, then, empirical objectivity which has some
of the traits of experiential objectivity :

> Empirical objectivity is that founded upon the relation
> of intended spatial exteriority between an object given in
> perception and the point of perspective from which the knowing
> subject surveys the spatial field... The noetic attitude
> of extroversion is that which manifests (or constitutes
> as known) the exteriority of the empirical object to the
> perceiving subject.[165]

Heelan further distinguishes three kinds of empirical
objects. The first of these is the full empirical object. "A
full empirical object," says Heelan,"is something directly
perceived occupying its own space and possessing a certain (spatial)
unity and permanence in time ; for such an object, I reserve
the name body."[166] An example would be a desk. Heelan adds
that the full empirical object likewise possesses what he calls
"strict objectivity."

Secondly, there is "public objectivity" :

> Public objectivity is the property of being an object for
> the members of a certain community. Public objects are then
> objects recognized in a certain community, and so they
> possess intersubjective value. About them public communica-
> tion can take place between the members of the community.
> The contrary of public objectivity is the privacy (a kind
> of subjectivity) which pertains to those aspects of an
> individual subject's activity which cannot be shared with
> a general public, either because they cannot be linguistically
> expressed or because they do not constitute public and
> empirically establishable states of affairs in the community's
> common World.[167]

---

165. HOR, 382. Heelan uses the term "empirical objectivity"
    to express what Lonergan means by "experiential objectivity"
    (HOR, 382, n.12).

166. HOR, 383.

167. HOR, 383.

Among the various kinds of public objects, Heelan mentions
the two principal types :

> (i) <u>intentional</u> (or <u>ideal</u>) objects, as for example, the
> content of a formal definition, a mathematical object like
> a point or a line or a conceptual model, (ii) states of
> affairs (ontic realities) in the community's common World.[168]

We have already mentioned that Heelan's public objectivity
is not the same as Lonergan's publicity of knowledge which is
based upon absolute objectivity.  The distinction between the
two is clarified when we see that Heelan means by strict objec-
tivity.

> We need a kind of objectivity which is capable of
> distinguishing mere appearance from reality, and mathematical
> entities from real entities.  Common to all these classes
> is the fact that they are not merely objects of noetic
> consideration, supposition, inquiry or other merely preliminary
> acts of knowing, but they are all terminal objects of some
> form of inquiry, i.e. they are terms of <u>assertion</u> of different
> kinds.  The property of being the terminal object of an
> assertion, I call <u>strict objectivity</u>.[169]

This strict objectivity is the same as Lonergan's absolute
objectivity.[170]  Heelan goes on to assert that, although strict
objectivity promotes empirical and public objectivity to the
status of being terminal objects (i.e., objects of assertions),
it is not to be simply identified with empirical or public
objectivity :

> ... while strict objectivity confers on empirical and
> public objects that special quality in virtue of which they

---

168. HOR, 383.  Heelan employs the expression "real" to mean
     "physically real" (HOR, 381, n.8).

169. HOR, 384.

170. HOR, 384, n.1.

become in addition terminal objects of the complete cognitive act (i.e., objects of assertion), strict objectivity is not restricted to what is empirically objectifiable or publicly objectifiable. For example, of an electron it can be said 'It is,' and thus it possesses strict objectivity even though the electron may not be occupying a definite place in space at that particular moment. Similarly, if there are private objects like self-awareness of which I can say, for example, "My self-awareness is," then these possess strict objectivity, even though they possess neither empirical nor public objectivity.[171]

Once the level of strict objectivity is attained, then a basic set of assertions can be made from which can arise the equivalent of Lonergan's principal notion of objectivity. The subject affirms that there are objects, and then asserts "the entitative distinction between subject and object" by forming "an additional (generally implicit assertion that the subject is not the object."[172]

We can briefly summarize the differences between Lonergan and Heelan. To be precise, there is no question of a disagreement, but rather there is a difference of viewpoint that determines the vocabularies. Lonergan speaks of the aspects of objectivity from which the principal notion of objectivity emerges. Heelan, on the other hand, speaks of empirical and public objects. In his terminology empirical and public objects are also strict objects ; however, strict objects are not necessarily empirical or public objects. Finally, what Lonergan calls the principal notion of objectivity finds its conterpart in what Heelan names "the most general form of the assertion of strict objectivity," inasmuch as he explicitly declares that this general form contains the three essential judgments of Lonergan's principal notion.[173]

---

171. HOR, 384-385.

172. HOR, 385.

173. HOR, 385-386 ; see also HOR, 385, n.20, where Heelan refers to In, 375-377.

## Summary

This chapter has been concerned with Lonergan's vocabulary on objectivity. As a preliminary consideration, we briefly studied his notion of body. The second topic was objectivity : according to Lonergan's usage there is a principal, or complete, notion of objectivity, and three partial aspects. Insight is the basic source where one can check his vocabulary ; the same vocabulary is repeated in "Cognitional Structure" and The Subject, but with understandable variations because of audience and context.

As a third topic, we have presented the vocabulary of Professor Patrick Heelan on objectivity. Though avowedly based upon Lonergan's notions and vocabulary, it is adapted to the specific goals of the physical sciences.

The following two chapters are again given over to the topic of objectivity. Here the question has been mainly to identify and enumerate word usage ;there it will be to examine the principal notion of objectivity and its partial aspects in their specific properties and relationships to one another and to other problems of Lonergan's philosophy that are implicated.

CHAPTER X

THE PRINCIPAL NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY

Right at the beginning, in order to dispel any confusion, we should note that what Lonergan has to say about objectivity belongs to a philosophical and theoretical elucidation of objectivity, and not to the objectivity that is involved in the spontaneous functioning of human knowing. While granting that "commonly people will know objects and subjects," he denies that it follows "that people will commonly be able to give a lucid account of their knowledge of objects and subjects."[174] Thus, in Lonergan's opinion, objectivity is found in every true assertion, such as, "I am a knower," "This is a typewriter," and so on. Its significance, however, is systematically explained only in a theoretical study that distinguishes a principal notion of objectivity and its three partial aspects.

## I. Essentials of the Notion

We have already seen in the previous chapter how the principal notion of objectivity is found in a patterned context of judgments. To repeat Lonergan's schema :

> ... one may define as object any $\underline{A}$, $\underline{B}$, $\underline{C}$, $\underline{D}$, ... where, in turn, $\underline{A}$, $\underline{B}$, $\underline{C}$, $\underline{D}$,... are defined by the correctness of the set of judgments :
> $\underline{A}$ is ; $\underline{B}$ is ; $\underline{C}$ is ; $\underline{D}$ is ; ...................
> $\underline{A}$ is neither $\underline{B}$ nor $\underline{C}$ nor $\underline{D}$ nor................
> $\underline{B}$ is neither $\underline{C}$ nor $\underline{D}$ nor ........................
> $\underline{C}$ is neither $\underline{D}$ nor ............................[175]

---

174. In, 376 ; see also the Introduction of F.E. Crowe, C, xxxii-xxxiii.

175. In, 375.

Essential to this patterned context of judgments are three judgments that may be designated as (A) "I am a knower" ; (B) an affirmation about something besides the knower, such as, "This is a typewriter" ; and the subsequent negation of the identity of the knower and the object of the other affirmation, (A is not B) "I am not this typewriter."

We have already examined the "privileged" judgment of self-affirmation, and the judgment that asserts something else but does not relate it explicitly to the knower. But over and above these two, a third type of judgment, negation, is required which relates the judgment of self-affirmation to another affirmation, and denies their identity. This is the core of judgments that in its barest essentials constitutes the complete notion of objectivity according to Lonergan. Once the core is established,

> An indefinite number of further objects may be added by making the additional appropriate positive and negative judgments. Finally, in so far as one can intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers besides oneself, one can add to the list the objects that are also subjects.[176]

There is no discussion by Lonergan in this theoretical account about the order in which these judgments might occur. The presentation of the matter in Insight is dictated by motives of clarity of exposition : first, the subject is established, then a non-subject, and finally the explicit negation of the identity of the two is made. However, Lonergan indirectly indicates what the order is in the spontaneous performance of the cognitional acts : before one knows his own immanent activities, one knows something else first. Why ? Because, says Lonergan, "One only has to make a single judgment of

175. In, 375.
176. In, 376.

fact, no matter what its content, to involve oneself in a
necessary self-affirmation."[177]  If that is so, then an explicit
act of self-affirmation does not have to be the first judgment
of all.  If the judgment of self-affirmation is named a "privi-
leged" judgment, it is not because it is the first, but, as
already explained, because it is a paradigm of the judgment
and it is immediately accessible to the scrutiny of the knower
upon any occurrence of his knowing.

Here we might draw attention to the views of Lonergan
and Heelan on a point concerning the principal notion of objec-
tivity.  Lonergan's exposition of the principal notion is a
theoretical account ; so is Heelan's.  Lonergan avers that the
principal notion is "implicit within a suitable pattern of
judgments."[178]  And so does Heelan.[179]

Their use of the word "implicit" is worth analyzing.
Both Lonergan and Heelan are offering explicit theoretical
accounts of the emergence of the principal notion in a context
of judgments.  Both of them, however, would agree that the three
core judgments are present implicitly (i.e. the conditions are
fulfilled so that the judgments can be  made) as soon as one
begins to exercise one's cognitional acts, and to differentiate
between oneself and one's immanent activity, and all other
objects that are known as non-subject.  What they mean is this :
there is an intrinsic objectivity in the intentionality of
human knowing such that, if one knows an object, one knows
simultaneously that it is not simply a fabrication of one's
immanent states.  This implicit distinction, then, of subject and
object is the basis for the explicit schema of the theoretical
account which enumerates the three essential judgments required
for the principal notion of objectivity.

---

177. In, 342.
178. In, 384.
179. HOR, 385-386.

## II.  Properties of the Principal Notion

Essential to the principal notion of objectivity is a
set of judgments.  Then, declares Lonergan,

> ... there follows an immediate corollary ; the principal
> notion of objectivity, as defined, is not contained in any
> single judgment and, still less, in any experiential or
> normative factor that occurs in cognitional process prior to
> judgment.[180]

There are two general indications of properties of the principal
notion presented here : first, the principal notion is not
contained in an individual judgment, thus the function of the
negative judgment ; secondly, the experiential and normative
elements are preliminaries to the absoluteness of the judgment.

Concerning the experiential factor, we can recall some
points already mentioned.  First of all, Lonergan's account of
the principal motion is the renewed rejection of naive realism.
Instead of a type of extroversion that would identify objects
by taking a look at them, and then sorting them out, he
introduces as constitutive of the chief notion the negative
judgment.  The identity of two objects is not denied on the
basis of looking.  The identity is denied inasmuch as differences
of data are grasped.

If the judgment were described in terms of synthesis
posited or not posited, then there cannot be any question either
of seeing or looking at the terms and their synthesis.  Positing
is not looking.  As will be seen in Chapter XII, positing
pertains to judgment, to reflective understanding and the grasp
of an unconditioned.

Negation is on the same level as the two judgments of
self-affirmation and the affirmation of something that is non-
subject.  As these two judgments, it is decisive.  It cuts off

180. In, 376.

inquiry into data, mere thinking and supposing. But over and above cutting off the process of inquiry into some specific data, it closes the circle upon a certain area of human knowledge that is absolute (as based upon judgment) and differentiated (as based upon a negative judgment) : A is ; B is ; A is not B.[181]

Certainly the identity of an object and its distinction from others is founded upon the distinction of data presented and grasped. Lonergan agrees that data are perceived as well as their differences, but he adds that differences are not known by experience alone, and that it is through the intervention of reflective understanding and then judgment that differences are grasped and affirmed, and thus known as differences.[182]

Experience and insight do not have their own built-in regulator. Up to the interposition of the judgment, the presentation of the senses and images can proceed uninterrupted ; the hypotheses and bright ideas can come and go in an unending stream. Thus it is that Lonergan denies to them the constitution of the chief notion of objectivity by saying that it is "not contained... in any experiential or normative factor that occurs."[183] We shall return to this matter in the following chapters.

III. The Principal Notion and the Notion of Being

The general background : objectivity is what is intended

---

181. See Heelan's remarks on the negative judgment : "The contrary of strict objectivity is not to be looked for in negative statements ('That is not'), for this too is an assertion, but it is to be sought for in the various preliminary acts of inquiry, consideration and supposition, etc., which precede the act of assertion and are ordered to an assertion as to their term and goal. Thus, an object lacks strict objectivity when it is merely the object of inquiry, consideration, supposition, or other preliminary knowing act, but not yet an object of an assertion" (HOR, 386).

182. H, 217-218.

183. In, 376.

in questioning and becomes known through answering : objects
are determined through the two-phase operator question that
terminates in judgments.  Promoting all questioning, since
it is the pure question, is the notion of being.  Now the specific
point that Lonergan makes : "... the principal notion of
objectivity is closely related to the notion of being."[184]

Lonergan presents their relation in capsule form :

> Being is what is to be known through the totality of
> correct judgments.  Objectivity in its principal sense is
> what is known through any set of judgments satisfying a
> determinate pattern.  In brief, there is objectivity if
> there are distinct beings, some of which both know
> themselves and know others as others.  Moreover,the notion
> of being explains why objectivity in its principal sense is to
> be reached only through a pattern of judgments.  For the
> notion of being becomes determinate only in so far as judg-
> ments are made ; prior to judgment, one can think of being
> but one cannot know it ; and any single judgment is but a
> minute increment in the process towards knowing it.[185]

We have already examined what constitutes the determinate
patterns : upon the basis of the triad of judgments, the "notion
of being becomes determinate."  The single judgment by itself is
but a minute increment, and though it is a grasp of the unconditioned,
it does not establish the principal notion of objectivity all by
itself.

Conceivably, a series of single judgments could continue
uninterruptedly, like an unimpeded flow of sense presentations and
the expansion and succession of hypotheses, without the principal
notion arising.  But what detaches the judgments from the series
and sets them up as constitutive of the principal notion is the
conjoined operation of the three determinant judgments.  Lonergan
pursues the question :

---

184. In, 376.
185. In, 376-377.

Again, being is divided from within ; apart from being there is nothing ; it follows that there cannot be a subject that stands outside being and looks at it ; the subject has to be before he can look ; and, once he is, then he is not outside being but either the whole of it or some part. If he is the whole of it, then he is the sole object. If he is only a part, then he has to begin by knowing a multiplicity of parts ($\underline{A}$ is ; $\underline{B}$ is ; $\underline{A}$ is not $\underline{B}$) and add that one part knows others (I' am $\underline{A}$).[186]

It might seem that nothing is achieved by these precisions other than a certain amount of overrefinement and underrelevance. However, there are several points of importance at issue. First of all, Lonergan is disallowing any type of monism : a single subject occupied with its own cognitional activity ; consequently, an immanentism where the cognitional activity arises and ends intentionally and ontologically within itself. Secondly, one falls into such a monism when "one overlooks the overarching intention of being" that comes to focus in the judgment of fact.[187]

So, once again, Lonergan underlies the importance of the judgment of fact. The notion of being is certainly the direct topic of consideration, yet it is possible to recognize the existence of the notion of being, "the overarching intention of being," and still neglect the three judgments of fact that constitute the principal notion of objectivity. For it is important to have in mind that, in Lonergan's view, self-affirmation, subsequent affirmations and negations are simply judgments of fact.

The elimination of monism and self-transcendence : these are two sides of the same coin, the negative and the positive. The next topic, then, is the self-transcendence of the knower.

---

186. In, 377.

187. CS, 231. We will take up Lonergan's notion of fact in Chap. XII.

## IV.  The Principal Notion and Self-transcendence

The point that specifically interests us here is the self-transcendence of the _knower_, for Lonergan likewise conceives of two other successive stages in the achievement of self-transcendence, namely, the moral and the religious. Analogous to the manner in which judgment goes beyond the cognitional activity of the subject to assert that which is, the moral and the religious self-transcendence go beyond the intellectual knowledge that terminates in judgment. These three "are quite distinct but not at all disparate. They are three distinct phases in the unfolding of the human spirit, of that eros for self-transcendence that goes beyond itself intentionally in knowledge, effectively in morality, totally in religion."[188]

In Chapter VII we have already broached the matter of the self-transcendence of the knower. There the issue was intentionality (the notion of being) and the relationship to self-transcendence. Here the issue is the principal notion of being that rests upon the three core judgments and the self-transcendence of the knower.

The principal notion of objectivity and self-transcendence are intimately connected. Lonergan remarks :

> ... the principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. How does the knower get beyond himself to a known ? The question is, we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to know himself and asks how he can know anything else. Our answer involves two elements. On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or

---

188. NKG, 65 ; see also In, Chap. XVIII, XX, and the Epilogue ; S, 19-33 ; TMF, 457-460 ; FC, 6-8 ; DP, 33-39. Then there is Grace and Freedom (the series of articles originally entitled "St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans") which, it might be remarked as a historical sidelight, is Lonergan's first important publication (his doctoral dissertation) and is concerned with the question of religious self-transcendence, considered by Lonergan to be the highest level of self-transcendence.

think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I am. Further, we contend that other judgments are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in a heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject.[189]

We might say that the ultimate ground,or principle of self-transcendence lies in the notion of being by which the mind spontaneously heads for reality, and that the proximate ground resides in the principal notion's context of judgments.

We might pause on this text, "heading for being" : the notion of being and the individual judgment are like the sun and one of its concentrated beams focused, to a point. The notion of being is the vast originating power of all knowing that is constantly being particularized down into a judgment which affirms or denies that something is. When the pattern of the three judgments occurs, as we have seen, then the principal notion of objectivity arises implicitly or explicitly, depending upon the level of reflective awareness. In the same manner, self-transcendence takes place : implicitly, when one sooner or later forms the equivalent of the judgments, "I am a knower," "That is," and "I am not that" ; explicitly, when one with full reflexion identifies these judgments as three distinct judgments constituting a pattern.

The heading for being intrinsic to human knowing initiates the cognitional process in its movement through experience and understanding and brings it to termination in judgment. Experience and understanding ground partial aspects of objectivity, and thus, of self-transcendence. The heading for being only reaches determinate being in the judgment. There absolute objectivity is found, and thus the judgment can be designated as the locus

---

189. In, 377.

of the absolute self-transcendence of the knower.

In the context of objectivity and self-transcendence, Lonergan signalizes what he thinks are the implications of intuiting when it is taken as the model for cognition to determine the objectively real.[190]  In his opinion it effectively eliminates objectivity and self-transcendence in such a way that immanence is the outcome.

According to the intuitionist position, the subject is immediately related to objects by a confrontational looking. The intention of being, the notion of being, however, is something obscure.  For what is intended in questioning is not seen, intuited, or perceived.  It is undetermined and as yet unknown.  It is what one does not yet know but seeks to know.

Lonergan would hold that to explain the level of sense data this intuitionist position is partially adequate, inasmuch as ocular vision involves extroversion and data.[191]  It is only partially adequate because it does not recognize the three functionally interrelated levels of knowing.  One sees, for instance, many bodies fall.  But what about the derivative dy/dy that mathematically explains the free fall of objects ?  To see the mathematical symbols is not to "see" the derivative.  One does not see the derivative ; one understands it.  Then how does one get from seeing to understanding ?  By the first phase of the operator.

---

190. See In, 414 ; 634-635 ; S,"The Immanentist Subject," 13-18 ; ABL, 64-66.

191. Though Lonergan asserts that "visual images are incapable of representing or suggesting the normative exigences of intelligence and reasonableness" (S, 16), he nevertheless asserts "the heuristic function of imagination" (In, 298). We will touch upon this heuristic function of imagination and visual images in Chapter XII below.

> ... what is grasped in understanding, is not some further
> datum added on to the data of sense... on the contrary,
> it is quite unlike all data ; it consists in an intelligible
> unity or pattern that is, not perceived, but understood ;
> and it is understood, not as necessarily relevant to the data,
> but only as possibly relevant.  Now the grasp of something
> that is possibly relevant is nothing like seeing, intuiting,
> perceiving, which regard only what is actually there.[192]

What follows, then, for the intuitionist position ?  That
understanding must be immanent and subjective ?  Lonergan asserts
that it indeed does follow.

Then, what holds for understanding, holds no less for
judgment.  The judgment proceeds from the second phase of
the operator, reflective understanding.  But how can one see it ?
How can one see the synthesis posited by the judgment ?  How
can one intuit conditions qua conditions ?  How can one look at
the fulfilment of conditions ?  Visual images cannot explain the
role of understanding and judgment as the specific effectuation
of the promoting activity of inquiry (phase one) and reflective
understanding (phase two).

And so, if adequate images for understanding and judgment
are not to be found, then there is the tendency to deny that they
attain objective reality and to consider them as immanentist
workings of the mind.  Such is Lonergan's thumbnail sketch of
the interrelationship of the intuitionist conception, object-
ivity, and self-transcendence.[193]

---

192. S, 15.

193. "The foregoing account, however, though it provides the
    key to doctrines of immanence, provides no more than a key.
    It is a general model based on knowledge of the subject.
    It differs from actual doctrines of immanence, inasmuch
    as the latter are the work of truncated subjects that have
    only a partial apprehension of their own reality.  But
    it requires, I think, no great discernment to find a
    parallel between the foregoing account and, to take but a
    single example, the Kantian argument for immanence.  In
    this argument the effective distinction is between immediate
    and mediate relations of cognitional activities to objects.
    .../...

## Summary

There are four sections to this chapter. The first is concerned with the essentials of the principal notion of objectivity. We have examined the order of occurrence of the three core judgments, and also their implicit presence prior to identification. Secondly, we have taken up the properties of the principal notion and the function of the negative judgment. Thirdly, we have examined the principal notion vis-à-vis the notion of being. The notion of being, the heading for being intrinsic to human knowing, effectively eliminates monism because the heading for being grounds the self-transcendence of the knower that appears with the pattern of the three constitutive judgments. Finally, we have considered the relationship of the intuitionist position and immanence. And again, these also are rejected for the same fundamental reasons that monism is eliminated. In a word, the principal notion of objectivity rests upon the enunciation of the three judgments, which in turn rests upon the notion of being.

---

.../... Judgment is only a mediate knowledge of objects, a representation of a representation. Reason is never related right up to objects but only to understanding and, through understanding, to the empirical use of reason itself. Since our only cognitional activity immediately related to objects is intuition, it follows that the value of our judgments and our reasoning can be no more than the value of our intuitions. But our only intuitions are sensitive ; sensitive intuitions reveal not being but phenomena ; and so our judgments and reasoning are confined to a merely phenomenal world. Such, substantially, seems to be the Kantian argument. It is a quite valid argument if one means by 'object' what one can settle by picture-thinking. 'Object' is what one looks at ; looking is sensitive intuition ; it alone is immediately related to objects ; understanding and reason can be related to objects only mediately, only through sensitive intuition" (S, 16-18).

## Summary

There are four sections to this chapter. The first is concerned with the essentials of the principal notion of objectivity. We have examined the order of occurrence of the three core judgments, and also their implicit presence prior to identification. Secondly, we have taken up the properties of the principal notion and the function of the negative judgment. Thirdly, we have examined the principal notion vis-à-vis the notion of being. The notion of being, the heading for being intrinsic to human knowing, effectively eliminates monism because the heading for being grounds the self-transcendence of the knower that appears with the pattern of the three constitutive judgments. Finally, we have considered the relationship of the intuitionist position and immanence. And again, these also are rejected for the same fundamental reasons that monism is eliminated. In a word, the principal notion of objectivity rests upon the enunciation of the three judgments, which in turn rests upon the notion of being.

---

.../... Judgment is only a mediate knowledge of objects, a representation of a representation. Reason is never related right up to objects but only to understanding and, through understanding, to the empirical use of reason itself. Since our only cognitional activity immediately related to objects is intuition, it follows that the value of our judgments and our reasoning can be no more than the value of our intuitions. But our only intuitions are sensitive ; sensitive intuitions reveal not being but phenomena ; and so our judgments and reasoning are confined to a merely phenomenal world. Such, substantially, seems to be the Kantian argument. It is a quite valid argument if one means by 'object' what one can settle by picture-thinking. 'Object' is what one looks at ; looking is sensitive intuition ; it alone is immediately related to objects ; understanding and reason can be related to objects only mediately, only through sensitive intuition" (S, 16-18).

CHAPTER XI


THE PARTIAL ASPECTS OF OBJECTIVITY


First the principal notion of objectivity ; then the
partial aspects : absolute, normative, and experiential objectivity.
This is Lonergan's procedure.  Its advantage is that it puts
things in perspective, the whole before the parts.  Consequently,
once Lonergan has finished with the principal notion, he
turns to the three partial aspects.

His order is to begin with, not what might be thought to
be the most immediate aspect, but what, though less accessible,
is the crowning component of the partial aspects of object-
ivity : absolute objectivity.  Ans so the order is, first, absolute
objectivity, then normative, and lastly experiential.

### I.  Absolute Objectivity

Absolute objectivity, as already seen in Chapter IX, is
also termed "strict objectivity" by Heelan.  "The ground of
absolute objectivity is the virtually unconditioned that is
grasped by reflective understanding and posited in judgment."[194]
The ground of absolute objectivity is phase two of the operator-
question come to term.  Heelan, when discussing strict object-
ivity, likewise aligns it with judgment, or "assertion."[195]

---

194. In, 377 ; as mentioned before, Lonergan also calls absolute
    objectivity "terminal" objectivity (S, 14).
195. HOR, 384.

Although a more detailed analysis of the judgment and virtually unconditioned is the topic of the following chapter, nevertheless we have already assembled enough of the essential points concerning the judgment to examine the topic of absolute object-ivity. In this section of this chapter, we are interested in the absoluteness of the judgment ; in the following chapter, the structure of the judgment.

The virtually unconditioned stands inside of the inter-locked field of conditioning and conditioned ; it has conditions. And "it itself is among the conditions of other instances of the conditioned ; still its conditions are fulfilled ; it is de facto absolute."[196]

"Absolute" is said in contradistinction to "relative." Relativity is involved in the subject who formulates the judg-ment, in his personality, his abilities, his prejudices, and in the place and time in which he judges. The content of the judgment, however, is a different matter. According to Lonergan, that which is judged is an absolute, for

> ... it is withdrawn from relativity to the subject that utters it, the place in which he utters it, the time at which he utters it. Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon was a contingent event occuring at a particular place and time. But a true affirmation of that event is an eternal, immutable, definitive validity. For if it is true that he did cross, then no one whatever at any place or time can truly deny that he did.

---

196. In, 378.

197. In, 378 ; see also : "Essentially, then, because the content of judgment is unconditioned, it is independent of the judging subject. Essentially, again, rational consciousness is what issues in a product that is independent of itself. Such is the meaning of absolute objectivity...." (In, 549). See further S, 2-3. But this is not the whole story ; as already noted in Chapter IX (n. 154), we shall take up Lonergan's conception of the relationship between the developing subject and the absolute object-ivity of truth in Chapter XII.

"Absolute" when employed by Lonergan in connexion with objectivity does not have the same significance as it does when employed together with necessity. The properties of objectivity and necessity are not the same, nor in consequence, are those of absolute objectivity and absolute necessity.[198]

Absolute necessity is contrasted with hypothetical necessity. Absolute necessity : God knows. An instance of hypothetical necessity : the old illustration, Socrates, while he is sitting, is by necessity sitting, however not by absolute but by conditioned necessity.

Judgments, however, that God knows and that Socrates is sitting both possess absolute objectivity (if they are correct judgments), even though God's knowing is an absolute necessity, whereas Socrates's sitting, like Caesar's crossing the Rubicon, is a contingent event. The absoluteness of the objectivity pertains to the content of the judgment, the reality of God's knowing and Socrates's sitting, not to the nature of the subjects involved. As true affirmations they both have "eternal, immutable, definitive validity." Only God exists absolutely, but the true affirmations about God and Socrates both possess absolute objectivity.

Lonergan draws a consequence of absolute objectivity :

198. In, 661-662 ; see also GF, 106. Viktor E. Frankl has some observations very germane to this discussion of absolute objectivity : "... the only really transitory aspects of life are the potentialities ; but the moment they are actualized, they are rendered realities ; they are saved and delivered into the past, wherein they are rescued and preserved from transitoriness. For, in the past, nothing is irrecoverably lost but everything irrevocably stored" (Man's Search for Meaning : An Introduction to Logotherapy, trans. [ of Part One] Ilse Lasch, 7th printing [ New York : Washington Square Press, Inc., 1965] , pp. 190-191).

> ... it is in virtue of absolute objectivity that
> our knowing acquires what has been named its publicity.
> For the same reason that the unconditioned is withdrawn
> from relativity to its source, it also is accessible not
> only to the knower that utters it but also to any other
> knower.[199]

In Chapter IX we have seen the relationship of what Heelan calls
"public objectivity" to absolute, or strict objectivity. Public
objectivity is not the same as the publicity of knowledge ; but
it is precisely in virtue of its absolute objectivity that
public objectivity acquires publicity. As we have noted,
public objectivity is always absolute objectivity, but the
converse is not true.

The distinction brings out well the meaning of the publicity
of knowledge by fixing clearly its relationship with the judg-
ment, and thus absolute objectivity. Moreover, naive realism
is once again turned aside. Naive realism would locate the
publicity of knowledge in one of the partial aspects of object-
ivity, namely, the experiential. An object would be
accessible insofar as one could somehow extrovert to it. In
Lonergan's view, however, the accessibility of a known object
is grounded upon its absolute objectivity that, in its turn, is
grounded upon true judgment. Absolute objectivity pertains to
what is. It is thus comprehensive enough to include affirmations
about God, Socrates, and Caesar, and the existence of an
electron and one's awareness.[200]

Lonergan then discusses absolute objectivity and the
formulation of certain logical principles :

---

199. In, 378.

200. CS, 238-239 (my self-awareness) ; see also Heelan, HOR,
     384-386 (my self-awareness and the particle) ; QMO, 101-
     111 (the existence of a particle).

Again, it is the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned
that is formulated in the logical principles of identity and
contradiction. The principle of identity is the immutable
and definitive validity of the true. The principle of
contradiction is the exclusiveness of that validity. It
is, and what is opposed to it, is not.[201]

Lonergan relates these principles to the larger context of
questioning and answering, the notion of being. "Besides the
native procedures of the mind in asking and answering questions,
there is the objectification of these procedures in such
principles as identity, contradiction, sufficient reason and,
more fully, in logic and methods."[202] The notion of being,
the originating power to ask questions is, as already
frequently mentioned, the ground of absolute objectivity inas-
much as it is the ground of all objectivity.

In another manner, as we shall see in the following
section on normative objectivity, "the objectification of these
procedures" also pertains to the normative element of cognition,
for this element has to do with the proper procedure of
cognitional process. The objectification, then, inasmuch as it
is a judgment, possesses absolute objectivity ; inasmuch as the
matter about which the judgment is made concerns the normative
elements of knowing, such objectification likewise pertains
to normative objectivity. Objectification, then, means the
formulation (as a judgment possessing absolute objectivity)
concerning the native procedures of human knowing withdrawn from
the relativity of the subject who makes it, and the time and
place of expressing it.

Lonergan next distinguishes absolute objectivity and the
invariance of universal judgments :

It is important not to confuse the absolute objectivity
of any correct judgment with the invariance proper to the
expression of universal judgments. Both universal and

---

201. In, 378.

particular judgments, if correct, are absolutely objective. But the former are expressed invariantly because the expression is independent of variations in spatio-temporal reference frames, while the latter are expressed relatively because their expression does not enjoy such independence. However, the variation of the expression presupposes and reveals the absolute objectivity of what is expressed. Because 'I am here now' has absolute objectivity, there is an identical truth to be repeated only by employing the different words, 'He was there then.'[203]

What is essential to absolute objectivity is the grasp of the unconditioned that <u>something is so</u>. The spatio-temporal reference frames do not affect the absoluteness of what is, but rather identify something as involving an empirical aspect by which it is locatable somewhere at some time. The co-ordinates of space and time indicate that together with absolute objectivity experiential objectivity is also present.

Further precisions can be made with respect to time and the absoluteness of being :

'Is' signifies two things. Primarily and always, it signifies being and truth, and as such it does not differ from either 'was' or 'will be.' But it also connotes a correlation between the time of the thing and the time of the one judging, and in this significance, it differs from 'was' and 'will be.'[204]

"To be" does not mean "to be at some time," any more than it means "to be at some place." Lonergan remarks :

Interpretations of being or of absolute objectivity in terms of space and time are mere intrusions of imagination. Absolute objectivity is simply a property of the unconditioned ; and the unconditioned, as such, says nothing about space or

---

202. NKG, 62.

203. In, 379.

204. SS, 3-4 ; see also In, 379.

time.[205]

In sum, the absoluteness of that which is is not intrinsically
determined by the spatio-temporal reference frames : to be is
to be unconditioned or absolute.

And so, once upon a time, one could have said, "Caesar is
crossing the Rubicon." Now one must say, "Caesar crossed the
Rubicon." And what was cited above, may be repeated here :
"... a true affirmation of that event is an eternal, immutable,
definitive validity. For if it is true that he did cross,
then no one whatever at any place or time can truly deny that
he did."[206]

## II. Normative Objectivity

The second partial aspect of objectivity is the normative.
Lonergan sketches some of its traits :

> It is objectivity as opposed to the subjectivity of
> wishful thinking, of rash or excessively cautious judgments,
> of allowing joy or sadness, hope or fear, love or detestation,
> to interfere with the proper march of cognitional process.[207]

"The proper march of cognitional process" : this is the
key phrase to explain normative cognition and objectivity. It
means that the process originates in the heading for being innate
to the human mind. As we have often seen, Lonergan conceives
of human knowing as a structure grounded in the notion of being.
If the absolute objectivity that resides in the true judgment is

---

205. In, 379. On the relativity of "now," cf. L.D. Landau and
     G.B. Rumer, What is Relativity ? trans. N. Kemmer (Greenwich
         Conn. : Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1966), p. 37.

206. In, 378.

207. In, 380.

the crowning moment of the partial aspects of objectivity, still it is the heading for being that is the originating drive towards the judgment. And normative objectivity pertains to this heading for being inasmuch as it is the correlative of phase one of the operator-question.

"Normative" means, as already indicated in Chapter IX ("Lonergan's Vocabulary"), "regulative," "specifically constitutive," "specifically determining," "Normative objectivity," then, signifies that, even though what is under consideration is to be named a partial aspect, still it pertains to the necessary and consistent process of human cognition, to "the proper march of cognitional process." Cognition is a process subject to norms ; so is the corresponding objectivity. "Normative objectivity governs the process from experiencing to the judgment." What, then, is the criterion in objectivity? It is the exigence that furnishes "the link that binds conditions with conditioned."[208]

But to press the point, what is this link ? It is "the proper march of cognitional process." And what is that? It is inquiry and reflective understanding, the two-phase operator, functioning to bring the knowing cycle to affirmation and, therewith, to absolute objectivity.[209]

Lonergan identifies the ground of normative objectivity, and then details some of its properties :

> The ground of normative objectivity lies in the unfolding of the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know. Because it is unrestricted, it opposes the obscurantism that hides truth or blocks access to it in whole or in part. Because it is detached, it is opposed to the inhibitions of cognitional process that arise from other human desires and drives. Because it is disinterested, it is opposed to the well-meaning but disastrous reinforcement that other

---

208. CS, 231.

209. For more on the link between conditions and conditioned, see Chap. XII below.

desires lend cognitional process only to twist its orientation
into the narrow confines of their limited range.[210]

In sum, this obscurantism, these inhibitions, and these
reinforcements produce counter-conditions in the knowing subject
that would trammel the proper march of cognitional process and
make sure that it never reaches an unconditioned. Hence,
to be objective in the normative sense is to give free rein to
the pure desire in its desiring to understand and in its
desiring to arrive at the unconditioned ; it is to unbar
"its questions for intelligence" and "for reflection."[211]
Cognition is a process subject to norms ; therefore so is
its corresponding objectivity. Thus it can be said that
"normative objectivity governs the process from experiencing
to the judgment."[212]

"Intelligent" and "reasonable" are the essential
qualifications to designate the proper march of cognitional
process. The process arises in the exigences of intelligent
questioning, and advances and ends under the control of reason.
"For the pure desire not only desires ; it desires intelligently
and reasonably ; it desires to understand because it is
intelligent and it desires to grasp the unconditioned because
it desires to be reasonable."[213]

Lonergan then turns to the question of logic and method,
and the series of impediments that can hobble the free operating
of "the inner exigence of the pure desire to know" which is
their ground. The validity of all logic and methods rests
upon the normative exigencies of the pure desire.[214] Logic and
methods are intelligent and rational, for their grounds are not
belief nor propaganda, but the inner exigence of the pure

---

210. In, 380.
211. In, 380.
212. DL, IV, 23.
213. In, 380.
214. In, 380-381 ; See also FI, 2,15.

desire, the intention of being. They are to be accepted insofar as they succeed in formulating that exigence ; they are to be revised insofar as they fail short.

We have already seen that Lonergan speaks of the principle of identity and contradiction as "objectifications of the native procedures of the mind in asking and answering questions."[215] Lonergan would also align with such formulations : Russell's postulate : "No valid proposition regards all classes."[216] It is in the context of normative objectivity that Lonergan locates their ultimate ground :

> Thus, the logical principles of identity and contradiction result from the unconditioned and the compulsion it exercises upon our reasonableness. The principle of excluded middle possesses ultimate but not immediate validity ; it possesses ultimate validity because, if a judgment occurs, it must be either an affirmation or a denial ; it does not possess immediate validity, for with respect to each proposition, rational consciousness is presented with three alternatives of affirmation, of negation, and of seeking a better under-standing and so a more adequate formulation of the issue.[217]

## A.  Objects of Description and Explanation

This sub-section is rather like a scholium. Lonergan does not treat descriptive and explanatory objects in connexion with the partial aspects of objectivity, but prior to them. The distinction obviates a pseudo-problem about objectivity, about what might be thought to be more "objective" than something else. The problem of descriptive and explanatory objects, however, can be taken up in conjunction with absolute and normative objectivity, inasmuch as these contain the formal elements of cognition with respect to experiential objectivity. Moreover, in the context of normative objectivity and the radical

215. NKG, 62.
216. DL, III and IV, 21-22.
217. In, 381.

dependence of cognition upon the pure desire, Lonergan speaks
of "the pure desire's movement towards understanding, towards
an understanding that regards not only things as related to us
by our senses but also things as related functionally among
themselves."[218]

Lonergan continually recalls that "all objectivity rests
upon the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know."[219]
Consequently, while in no way rejecting the importance of
experiential objectivity, we are in better position to keep in
view that heading for being which is constitutive of objectivity.
The disadvantage of treating descriptive and explanatory
objects in conjunction with experiential objectivity is that
one might seem to be giving ground to the tendency to conceive
objectivity exclusively in empirical terms, and thus reduce it
to the imaginable category of the already-out-there-now-real
of naive realism.

Lonergan pairs the descriptive objects with common sense
knowledge and the explanatory objects with theoretical
knowledge. Common sense is concerned with things as related
to us, our needs and abilities, our fears and desires and
interests. Theory is concerned with things as related among
themselves. The two attitudes cannot in principle conflict,
since, if they speak of the same thing, they do so from
radically different viewpoints.[220] The two are not totally
independent, for they deal with the same things : "description
supplies, as it were, the tweezers by which we hold things
while explanations are being discovered or verified, applied or
revised."[221]

---

218. In, 381 ; see also Heelan, QMO, 159-161.
219. In, 383.
220. In, 293 ; see also ABL, 16.
221. In, 291.

Lonergan points out aspects of the domain of description:

> There exists then a determinate field or domain of
> ordinary description.  Its defining or formal viewpoint is
> the thing as related to us, as it enters into the concerns
> of man.  Its object is what is to be known by concrete
> judgments of fact, by judgments on the correctness of
> insights into concrete situations, by concrete analogies and
> generalizations, and by the collaboration of common sense.
> It is as much an object of knowledge as any other, for it
> is reached by beginning from the level of presentations,
> by advancing through inquiry, insights, and formulation,
> by culminating in the critical inquiry of reflective under-
> standing, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the rationally
> compelled pronouncement of judgment.[222]

On the other hand, there is likewise the domain of

theory.  Its viewpoint is the thing as related to other things.

Its object is what is to be known by general judgments, by

judgments on the correctness of insights into the genus and

state of its objects, by the collaboration of scientific

research.  And it is as much an object of knowledge as the object

of common sense, for it too possesses the three elements

of objectivity.

Lonergan exemplifies the distinction of the two domains :

(One might make the distinction more graphic by

Kepler as representing explanation and Brahe description.)

> The significance of this distinction appears in logic
> as the separation of two universes of discourse.  To put
> the matter concretely, let us take illustrative propositions
> and consider the three cases of
>     (1) ignoring the distinction of the domains,
>     (2) denying the distinction of the domains, and
>     (3) accepting the distinction of the domains.
> First, if one ignores the distinction of the domains, then
> one has the problem of choosing between the propositions :

---

222. In, 292.

The planets move in approximately elliptical orbits with the sun at their focus.

The earth is at rest, and the sun rises and sets. Secondly, if one denies the distinction of the domains, one is committed to the more rigorous choice between the propositions :

From every viewpoint, the planets move in elliptical orbits with the sun at their focus.

From every viewpoint, the earth is at rest and the sun rises and sets.

Thirdly, if one affirms the distinction of the domains, then one will reject all four of the preceding propositions to assert both of the following :

From the viewpoint of explanation, the planets move in approximately elliptical orbits with the sun at their focus.

From the viewpoint of ordinary description, the earth is at rest and the sun rises and sets.[223]

The point of this scholium on Lonergan's distinction between objects of description and explanation is this : each is as much an object of knowledge as the other, for each of them is "reached by beginning from the level of presentation, by advancing through inquiry, insights, and formulation, by culminating in the critical inquiry of reflective understanding, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the rationally compelled pronouncement of judgment."[224]  Each possesses the three partial aspects of objectivity. And so "this is a typewriter," "Once bitten, twice shy,"

$$"\frac{x^2}{a^2} + \frac{y^2}{b^2} = 1,"$$

"The derivative of $x^2$ is 2x," "An electron impact is registered,"  "Questioning occurs," are all examples of judgments involving objectivity.  None is more objective than the other.

---

223. In, 294-295 ; see also In, 296.  See also DP, 20-21. Cf. the live "integration possibilities" in the case of interiority-exteriority : elimination, synthesis, oscillation, transposition, and mediation of the one by the other (ABL, 17-19).

224. In, 292.

Finally, before taking up experiential objectivity, the narrow conception of naive realism with regard to objectivity is once again dismissed. To the question, "What is an object?" naive realism would spontaneously respond, "A desk," "A typewriter," "Trees," and so forth. But to the questions, "Do the central equation for the ellipse, the derivative of a function, the impact of an electron, and questioning possess objectivity?" naive realism would hesitate. The success of its extroversion in accounting for such objects ranges from partial in the case of the desk to zero in the case of the derivative. Extroversion can never assay the normative and absolute aspects of objectivity, the functioning of the pure desire and the grasp of the unconditioned that they involve. And without them objectivity cannot exist according to Lonergan, for "all objectivity rests upon the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know."[225]

### III. Experiential Objectivity

With the chief characteristics of absolute and normative objectivity in mind, we turn to the last partial aspect.

> The third partial aspect of objectivity is the experiential. It is the given as given. It is the field of materials about which one inquires, in which one finds fulfillment of conditions for the unconditioned, to which cognitional process repeatedly returns to generate the series of inquiries and reflections that yield the contextual manifold of judgments.[226]

Though the experiential aspect, just as the absolute and the normative, is constitutive of objectivity, the last two share a common ground which the experiential element does not. The crux is the relationship of the three to questioning.

---

225. In, 383.
226. In, 381.

Absolute and normative objectivity are based upon the trio
phases of questioning ; experiential objectivity is its data,
is subservient to them.  Experiential objectivity is the given.
The given is unquestionable and indubitable.[227]  What
is constituted by answering questions, i.e., insights and
judgments, can be modified by other questions.  But the given
is constituted apart from questioning ; it remains the same
no matter what the upshot of questioning might be.  It is
unquestionable in the sense that it lies outside the cognitional
levels (and thus their objectivity) constituted by questioning
add answering.  In the same way, the given is indubitable;
What can be doubted is the answer to a question for reflection.
That is either a yes or no answer.  But the given is not the
answer to any question.  It is prior to questioning and
independent of any answer.

Lonergan enumerates further traits :

Again, the given is residual and, of itself.  It is
possible to select elements in the given and to indicate
them clearly and precisely.  But the selection and indication
are the work of insight and formulation, and the given
is the residue that remains when one subtracts from the
indicated
    (1) the instrumental act of meaning by which one indicates,
    (2) the concepts expressed by that instrumental act,
    (3) the insights on which the concepts rest.
Hence, since the given is just the residue, since it can
be selected and indicated only through intellectual activi-
ties, of itself it is diffuse ; the field of the given
contains differences, but in so far as they simply lie
in the field, the differences are unassigned.[228]

---

227.  In, 381-382.

228.  In, 382.  Lonergan defines the instrumental act of
      meaning in this way : "The formal act of meaning is an act
      of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing,
      formulating.  The full act of meaning is an act of judging.
      The instrumental act of meaning is the implementation of
      a formal or of a full act by the use of words or symbols
      in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance"
      (In, 357).

To the given belongs a certain uniformity precisely inasmuch as it is given. Suppose someone says, "My hand is white. Look !" Then suppose someone else says, "My paper is white. Look !" What are they doing? They are simply presenting data. One does not agree in any way at all with them. They are asking one to use one's eyes. The color of the hand and the color of the paper are instances of experiential objectivity. The hand is obviously white, but the hand is not the same color as the paper. But these persons are not putting forth any argumentation. They are just drawing attention.[229]

The instrument of final arbitration in the case of the white paper and the white hand is the eye. One puts the hand next to the paper and simply says, "Take a look." The shades of white are obviously different. But to begin a discussion in terms of chromatic and achromatic colors, brilliance and shade, would be to move, from the area of experiential objectivity, from the given qua given,

Thus, asserts Lonergan,

> ... the field of the given is equally valid in all its parts but differently significant in different parts.
> It is equally valid in all its parts in the sense that there is no screening prior to inquiry. Screening is the fruit of inquiry. It takes place once inquiry has begun.
> It is differently significant in different parts in the sense that some parts are significant for some departments of knowledge and other parts for other departments. The physicist has to disregard what he merely imagines, merely dreams, merely derives from his personal equations. The psychologist has to explain imagination, dreaming, and personal equation. Hence, once inquiry begins, the first step is the screening that selects the relevant field of the given.[230]

If one were to see a crack in the wall and a ten foot spider coming out of it, he would be having an hallucination.

---

229. DL, III, 21.
230. In, 382.

People do have such hallucinations. The datum, the enormous spider, is perfectly valid, not, however, for biology, but for abnormal psychology. The abnormal psychologist has to explain it, not the biologist. It is given.[231]

As another illustration, one might take Kepler before Brahe's accumulated data on planetary motions. True, in one sense this data is already the fruit of a screening process : Brahe made records about the motion of planets and not something else. In this sense both Kepler and Brahe have the same data. In relation to what Kepler was searching for, it was data, something given, for his investigations.

Or again, in early 1968 newspapers in the United States reported that the American espionage system had gathered such a volume of information that the central agency was swamped and had falled at least six months behind in assessing the value of the communications.

In these cases, there is the data, the given, either the mass of astronomical observations, or the bulging files of information.[232] The process of screening begins in the first case when Brahe and Kepler make observations of the planets and not, say, of clouds. In the other, it begins when the intelligence center assigns materials to military, linguistic, psychological, and scientific experts for examination and classification. And since the techniques of classification are here so highly refined, the screening can be carried out to the most minute detail.

It becomes clear that Lonergan is

... employing the name 'given' in an extremely broad sense.

---

231. DL, III, 22.

232. Granted that some screening has already taken place :
in the case of Brahe-Kepler, only certain astronomical
information was adduced ; in the case of the espionage,
only information judged relevant (or possibly relevant)
by individual agents was forwarded. There can be said
to be, then, levels of data.

It includes not only the veridical deliverances of outer
sense but also images, dreams, illusions, hallucinations,
personal equations, subjective bias, and so forth.  No
doubt, a more restricted use of the term would be desirable,
if we were speaking from the limited viewpoint of natural
science.  But we  are working at a general theory of
objectivity and so we have acknowledged as given not only
the materials into which natural science inquires but also
the materials into which the psychologist or methodologist
or cultural historian inquires.[233]

And, we might add, the materials into which Kepler and the
espionage system inquire.

Furthermore, Lonergan's analysis itself of human
cognition is avowedly an example of a screening process working
upon data.  For, according to Lonergan, "data include data of
sense and data of consciousness."[234]  Both such data pertain
to experiential objectivity since Lonergan does not restrict
the name "experiential" to what may be called external sense
data.  He employs the term likewise with internal data, after
carefully explaining the meaning of "external" and "internal."[235]
Such internal data Lonergan thus calls the "data of conscious-
ness" :

... the data of consciousness consist of acts of seeing,
hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, perceiving, imagining,
inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging,
and so forth.  As data, such acts are experienced ; but
as experienced, they are not described, distinguished,
compared, related, defined, for all such activities are the
work of inquiry, insight, and formulation.[236]

Experience, understanding (insight), and judgment occur

---

233. In, 382.  See also FS, the first functional specialty,
      "Research" ; McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence,
      Chapters II and III.

234. In, 274.

235. CS, 224-227.

236. In, 274.

in people. These activities are neither demonstrated nor postulated. They are given. They are data. Thus may they serve as the materials for an inquiry into the structure of human knowing, such as that which Lonergan undertakes. Their givenness is the experiential objectivity of human cognitional structure. This is the experiential objectivity or materials for an investigation of the epistemologist.

Lonergan explains why he grants the notion of the given such a broad extension :

> Our account of the given is extrinsic. It involves no description of the stream of sensitive consciousness. It involves no theory of that stream. It discusses neither the contribution of the empirically conscious subject nor the contribution of other 'outside' agents. It simply notes that reflection and judgment presuppose understanding, that inquiry and understanding presupposed materials for inquiry and something to be understood. Such presupposed materials will be unquestionable and indubitable, for they are not constituted by answering questions. They will be residual and diffuse, for they are what is left over once the fruits of inquiry and reflection are subtracted from cognitional contents.
> Now such unquestionable and indubitable, residual and diffuse materials for inquiry and reflection must be regarded as equally valid in all their parts. Were they all invalid, there could be neither inquiry nor reflection, and so no reasonable pronouncement that they are invalid. Were some valid and others invalid, there would have to be a reasonably affirmed principle of selection ; but such a principle can be grasped and reasonably affirmed only after the inquiry has begun. Prior to inquiry there can be no intelligent discrimination and no reasonable rejection.[237]

That is one reason why the given is defined extrinsically. There is yet another. It is validated by the radical endowment of man which Lonergan never tires of citing in his discussion o of cognition :

> Why is the given to be defined extrinsically ? Because all objectivity rests upon the unrestricted, detached,

---

237. In, 383.

disinterested desire to know. It is that desire that sets up the canons of normative objectivity. It is that desire that gives rise to the absolute objectivity implicit in judgment. It is that desire that yields the constellation of judgments that implicitly define the principal notion of distinct objects in the universe of being, some of which know others. Experiential objectivity has to rest on the same basis, and so the given is defined, not by appealing to sensitive process, but by the pure desire regarding the flow of empirical consciousness as the materials for its operation.[238]

## Summary

In this chapter we have considered the three partial aspects of objectivity according to Lonergan's mind. We have followed his order of treating them : absolute, normative, experiential. This ordering reveals the crowning element of objectivity, absolute objectivity, which is seen in its relationship with the heading for being in human knowing. We have also seen how normative objectivity is aligned with the heading for being ; experiential objectivity is likewise aligned with reference to this heading for being, and well as defined by it. To answer the perhaps lurking question, " "What are some objects ?" we have briefly noted Lonergan's distinction of objects of descriptive and explanatory knowledge. The main point of this chapter, however, can be summed up in a phrase of Lonergan's that has the ring of a slogan : "... all objectivity rests upon the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know."[239]

---

238. In, 383.
239. In, 383.

CHAPTER XII


AFFIRMATION : THE GRASP OF THE UNCONDITIONED


"The ground of absolute objectivity is the virtually unconditioned that is grasped by reflective understanding and posited in judgment."[240]   Though Lonergan calls absolute objectivity a partial aspect of objectivity, still it is the pivotal one.  In the previous chapter in the section on absolute objectivity, while touching upon the essentials of the judgment, we remarked that the topic there was the absoluteness of the judgment.  Here the general topic of the chapter is the reflective understanding leading to judgment inasmuch as reflective understanding is the grasp of the unconditioned.

### I.  Reflective Understanding and the Unconditioned

There are two determinations of the judgment according to Lonergan.  The first is "reached by relating it to propositions."[241] Then, as Lonergan himself does in an admittedly summary manner, one may distinguish proposition from utterance and sentence.

He proceeds to point out the two attitudes one can entertain regarding propositions :

> ... with regard to propositions there are two distinct mental attitudes ; one may merely consider them ; or, one may agree or disagree with them.  Thus, what I write, I affirm ;

---

240. In, 377.
241. In, 271.

> but what you are reading, you may neither affirm nor deny
> but merely consider.
> A proposition, then, may be simply an object of thought,
> the content of an act of conceiving, defining, thinking,
> supposing, considering.
> But a proposition, also, may be the content of an act of
> judging ; and then it is the content of an affirming or
> denying, an agreeing or disagreeing, an assenting or
> dissenting.[242]

The second determination of the notion of judgment is
reached by relating it to the questions for reflection that
are met by answering Yes or No.  Assenting and dissenting
are again obviously involved in answering these questions.
Furthermore, the grasping of sufficient evidence grounds
the assenting or dissenting, the Yes or the No.  It is
essential to both determinations.  This second determination is
our topic.

At the beginning of his investigation of reflective
understanding in Insight, Lonergan brings back the example of
Archimedes.  Archimedes was marshalling and weighing evidence
while searching for a solution.  When he had grasped the
sufficiency of the evidence he had accumulated, he rejoiced
before his fellow citizens of Syracuse by crying, "I've
got it !" Like Archimedes, says Lonergan, "What we know is
that to pronounce judgment without that reflective grasp is
merely to guess ; again, what we know is that, once that
grasp has occurred, then to refuse to judge is just silly."[243]

Besides Archimedes, we have already cited two other
of Lonergan's illustrations, that of the man who judges before
his charred home that something has happened and that of the
judgment of self-affirmation.  The notions of evidence, the
grasp of sufficient evidence, and the virtually unconditioned

---

242. In, 271.
243. In, 279.

were briefly introduced and examined in the analysis of those
judgments. In this chapter they are specific topics.

> Accordingly, the present section will be an effort to
> determine what precisely is meant by the sufficiency of the
> evidence for a prospective judgment. There is presupposed
> a question for reflection, 'Is it so ?' There follows a
> judgment, 'It is so.' Between the two there is a
> marshalling and weighing of evidence. But what are the
> scales on which evidence is weighed ? What weight must
> evidence have, if one is to pronounce a 'Yes' or a 'No' ?[244]

Lonergan, though immediately admitting that judgments can
become very complex, nevertheless asserts that there is a
general form of reflective insight from which they issue.[245]
The examples of the returning workman's judgment and that of
self-affirmation, each of varying complexity, manifest a same
general form that can be analyzed. Thus, when one grasps the
sufficiency of evidence, then one can make a judgment that
stands to the grapsing of evidence as a virtually unconditioned.
The general form, then, means this : the grasping of evidence
grounds the judgment as the virtually unconditioned. As
Lonergan puts it : "To grasp evidence as sufficient for a
prospective judgment is to grasp the prospective judgment as
virtually unconditioned."[246]
First of all, the formally and the virtually unconditioned are
to be distinguished : "The formally unconditioned has no conditions
whatsoever."[247] "... it stands outside the interlocked field
of conditioning and conditioned ; it is intrinsically absolute."[248]

---

244. In, 279.

245. See, for example, the heading, "The General Form of Inference,"
     In, 280.

246. In, 280.

247. In, 280.

248. In, 378.

This is God.[249]

The virtually unconditioned we have already considered in Chapters VII and IX insofar as it is relevant to the topics of self-affirmation and absolute objectivity. It is worthwhile to cite the important passages again.

The formally unconditioned stands outside the interlocked field of conditioning and conditioned. Contrariwise with the virtually unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned stands within that field. It has conditions, and it itself is among the conditions of other instances of the conditioned. Yet its conditions happen to be fulfilled, and thus it is a de facto absolute.[250] The three elements of the virtually unconditioned may be recalled :

    1) a conditioned,
    2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and
    3) the fulfilment of the conditions.[251]

We should note that Lonergan does not identify the judgment and the virtually unconditioned. Mount Rainier is in the State of Washington ; a certain number of conditions, physicial and geological, had to be fulfilled so that it is there. But Mount Rainier is not a judgment. One can make a judgment about it. Then such a judgment is an instance of the virtually unconditioned.[252]

Among many other things, such a distinction brings to mind a basic tenet of Lonergan : the judgment is not mechanically produced like the things of nature, or items in a factory,

---

249. See In, 669-677 ; IPD, 161 ; DL, III, 19.

250. In, 378 ; see also In, 280.

251. In, 280.

252. Although God himself is "formally unconditioned," the judgment which one makes that God exists is a virtually unconditioned. That means, if certain conditions are fulfilled, one can judge, "God exists." These conditions, according to Lonergan, pertain to what is real and what is intelligible. See In, 669-677, esp. 672, see further NKG.

but rather it issues forth from reflective understanding
where reasonable process is operating.[253] The field of fulfilling
conditions for a judgment is quite unlike that for anything
else.

Lonergan explains how the judgment is virtually
unconditioned :

> Hence, a prospective judgment will be virtually uncon-
> ditioned if
> (1) it is the conditioned,
> (2) its conditions are known, and
> (3) the conditions are fulfilled.
> By the mere fact that a question for reflection has been
> put, the prospective judgment is a conditioned ; it stands
> in need of evidence sufficient for a reasonable
> pronouncement.  The function of reflective understanding is
> to meet the question for reflection by transforming the
> prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to
> the status of a virtually unconditioned ; and reflective
> understanding effects this transformation by grasping the
> conditions of the conditioned and their fulfilment.[254]

In Lonergan's mind, "such is the general scheme."[255]
He then goes on to illustrate it from of deductive inference of
the syllogism.  Lonergan remarks that the syllogism can serve
two very different purposes :

> When we understand, we no longer are reasoning, or learning;
> we have reached the term and apprehend the many as one ;
> but the stock examples of syllogism represent acts of under-
> standing, matters that may have puzzled us long ago, but
> now are taken for granted.  It follows that such syllogisms
> do not illustrate learning or reasoning for current
> consciousness.  But take a syllogism in a field in which
> your grasp is not too ready ; define the terms ; demonstrate
> the premises ; and you will find that this reasoning is

---

253. V,34 ; 199-201.
254. In, 280.
255. In, 280.

bringing an understanding to birth and that, with under-
standing achieved, you no longer reason but apprehend the
many in a synthetic unity.[256]

For an example, Lonergan takes the case of the ratio of
the diagonal to the side of the square.  The ratio is root two.
The reasoning process demonstrates that root two is a surd.
The reasoning can be expressed in this manner :

If   $2 \neq m/n$, then $2 \neq m^2/n^2$.
But  $2 \neq m/n$.
Therefore $2 \neq m^2/n^2$.[257]

Now substituting letters such that A and B each stand
for one or more propositions, one can represent the deductive
form in this way :

If A, then B.
But A.
Therefore B.[258]

Lonergan locates the conclusion, major premise, and minor
premise with respect to the three elements of the virtually
unconditioned :

Now the conclusion is a conditioned, for an argument is
needed to support it.  The major premise links this
conditioned to its conditions, for it affirms, If A, then B.
The minor premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions,
for it affirms the antecedent, A.  The function, then, of
the form of deductive inference is to exhibit a conclusion
as virtually unconditioned.  Reflective insight grasps the
pattern, and by rational compulsion follows the judgment.[259]

---

256. V,54.

257. See In, 21 ; V,54.  The syllogism presented here is not
     exactly Lonergan's; his syllogism involves the indirect proof.

258. In, 280.

259. In, 281.

But deductive inference cannot be the fundamental instance of judgment since it has certain other judgments as presuppositions. In the demonstration that root two is a surd, a certain acquaintance with prime numbers is presupposed, for example, that if $m$ is prime to $n$, them $m^2$ is prime to $n^2$. And in the case of the general schema, there can be other judgments $C$, $D$, $E$,... that are presupposed for $A$ and $B$, and then $F$, $G$, $H$,... that are presupposed in their turn. As Lonergan argues :

> ... deductive inference cannot be the basic case of judgment, for it presupposes other judgments to be true. For that reason we have said that the form of deductive inference is merely a clear illustration of what is meant by grasping a prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned. For more general than the form of deductive inference is the form of reflective insight itself. If there is to be deduction, the link between the conditioned and its conditions must be a judgment, and the fulfilment of the conditions must be a further judgment. But judgments are the final products of cognitional process. Before the link between conditioned and conditions appears in the act of judgment, it existed in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process itself. Before the fulfilment of conditions appears in another act of judgment, it too was present in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process.[260]

To this more general form we now turn our attention.

## II. The Form of Reflective Insight

There is a matter that should be cleared at the beginning of this section. When Lonergan speaks of deductive inference, he means not only syllogistic reasoning, but also propositions that are essentially inferential. The general schema (If $A$, then $B$ ; but $A$ ; therefore $B$) that we have cited above might give the impression that only instances in the general form of deductive inference were cases of inference. Lonergan would say however, that propositions which are causal (with "because"),

---

260. In, 281.

or concessive (with "although"), or purposive (with "so that") are likewise inferences. Whereas the others are cases of formal inference, he would name these cases informal inference, and yet would assert that they too can be represented in the form of the hypothetical argument. But more general than both formal and informal inference is the form of reflective insight that terminates in the judgment as virtually uncodntioned.[261]

Reflective insight is "a way of doing things, a procedure within the cognitional field."[262] The procedure has already been aligned with the three levels of cognitional structure. In the case of deductive inference, it is not difficult to relate the three levels with the three elements ; conditions, link, and virtually unconditioned. And in the case of the judgment it is again possible to relate the three levels with those three elements.

The fulfilling conditions are found in the data of experience. Between the conditions and the virtually unconditioned is a process directed by the two-phase operator. Insofar as it directs this process it is the link between the conditions and the conditioned.[263]

In Chapter I we have already cited as a paradigm of the judgment Lonergan's example of the workman returning from work

---

261. FI, 1-9. Lonergan proposes the hypothetical argument as the form of all inference. With regard to reduction, he says : "Thus our conclusion has to do with the nature of the human mind. We have not sought the reduction of one inferential type to another because we thought one more valid or more obviously than the other. On the contrary we assumed all to be valid, and our concern with reduction has been a concern with the one law or form of all inference" (FI,15). FI dwells almost exclusively on the general form of inference, whereas In dwells rather on reflective insight. Lonergan is cognizant of the difference between the form and the reflective activity : see FI, 15.

262. In, 282.

263. DL, III, 20.

to his burnt home.  The man makes the "extremely restrained judgment of fact, "Something happened."

The fulfilling conditions are two sets of data : the remembered data of the morning and the present data of the evening.  They are the given from which one can understand an identity, known as "home," and a change to it, and then judge, "Something's happened."  Data from which one can make judgments can be personal and relative to a certain degree.  Thus, if someone had never seen a wooden frame house in his life, then the chances are that he would not be able to recognize the data of a burnt frame house, and subsequently make a pertinent judgment. And further, many people saw and felt the same water as Archimedes, or looked at the same planets as Kepler without any scientific result because they  were not personally involved in some way with the data.

Or again, to return to the example of root two as an irrational number.  Part of the proof (indirect) is to show that, if $m$ were prime to $n$, then $m^2$ would be prime to $n^2$, which can involve demonstrating that if $m^2$ is even, $m$ must be also.[264] This, in its turn, is proved by drawing up a comprehensive list showing that the last digit of every square which is even has a root whose last digit is likewise even.  Someone not occupied with the problem who came upon only the list of final digits most probably would not have the slightest inkling as to what they signified.

The point, then, is that judgments do not occur from data in the automatic way in which bottles are filled and  capped by a bottling machine.  Data by themselves are not relevant. Something must intervene to make them so.  Lonergan dwells further on the example of the workman to elucidate how the judgment will occur :

---

264.  See "Indirect Proof," The Universal Encyclopedia of
      Mathematics (New York : The New American Library, 1965),
      pp. 251-252.

... the weary worker not only experiences present data and recalls different data but by direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same set of things which he calls his home. The direct insight, however, fulfils a double function. Not merely are two fields of individual referred to one identical set of things but a second level of cognitional process is added to a first. The two together contain a specific structure of that process, which we may name the notion of knowing change. Just as knowing a thing consists in grasping an intelligible unity-identity-whole in individual data, so knowing change consists in grasping the same identity or identities at different times in different individual data. If the same thing exhibits different individual data at different times, it has changed. If there occurs a change, something has happened. But these are statements. If they are affirmed, they are judgments. But prior to being either statements or judgments, they exist as unanalysed structures or procedures immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is such a structure that links the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions in the concrete judgment of fact.[265]

Perhaps it is possible now to present very concisely some of the basic notions we have been considering, such as, condition, fulfilment of conditions, link, procedure in the cognitional field, sufficient evidence, and reflective insight (or understanding) itself. First of all, then, what are the conditions that Lonergan is speaking of ? A condition, very generally, is a requisite, or provision, such that if it occurs something else follows. In the case of the judgment, it means a field of antecedents required for the issuing of the judgment.[266] Some conditions are so essential that without them the judgment cannot occur. Such is the condition that one be conscious and know the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. The obviousness of such a condition in no way lessens its importance. This conditions exists habitually fulfilled in one's mind, but nonetheless is a real condition-- remote as it might be considered--for making any judgment whatsoever.

---

265. In, 282.
266. See In, 283, IPD., 161-162.

To use the example of the judgment about the burnt house as a paradigm for analyzing conditions and the unconditioned may seem like flogging a dead horse. The judgment is much too simple. However, this judgment appears too simple only because there is a large number of conditions that exist in a habitually fulfilled manner in one's mind, constantly employed without a repreated, explicit examination. Smoke, charred wood, and the difference between before and after have become part of one's habitual knowledge. They became part of one's habitual knowledge through a process in which other conditions of various kinds were fulfilled. That process is laborious and complex. If one might aver that the fact of the burnt house, or any other such simple fact, is settled by taking a look, Lonergan would riposte that taking a look is itself a condition, perhaps the last in a series that presupposes that laborious and complex process. But once the conditions do exist as habitually fulfilled, one makes judgments without adverting to the process.[267]

In the instance of root two as a surd, the conditions to be fulfilled can be more easily sorted out. Some of these conditions are a knowledge of equations in general, of equations with square roots, and the nature of prime numbers. For a mathematician they can be almost habitually fulfilled conditions. For the nonmathematician they can be either laboriously employed or just remain as a totally unfamiliar bloc of knowledge, and in that case, then, precisely as nonconditions.

But how does one pass from the fulfilment of conditions to the unconditioned? There is a link supplied by the cognitional procedure. And what is this procedure? It is the three levelled dynamic structure of human knowing where the two-phase inquiry initiates the passage from data to judgment.

---

267. See In 283 ; 342-347 ; IPD, 160-161. See also Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," in Foundations of Theology, p.32, n.37.

Data are screened, sorted, and classified. But why?
Because inquiry is specific ; because only through it are data
made relevant ; because someone wants to understand something.
A person could be interested in incineration in order to formulate
or understand the laws of thermodynamics. Or a person, like
the worker, could be interested in incineration because by it
he knows a specific change in state, namely, in that of his
home.

But something more than understanding can be the issue.
A judgment can be the issue. To put it in another way, the
second stage of screening can following the first, the second
phase of questioning can succeed upon the first. Then judgment,
not merely understanding, is the aim.

Kepler knew well the difference between the two. Because
he knew the difference, he worked like a man possessed. Before
settling upon the elliptical shape for the planetary orbits,

> ... with colossal expenditure of energy he tried one
> hypothesis after another, and threw them away, until he
> reached a point where he had a vague knowledge of the shape
> required, decided that for purposes of calculation an
> ellipse might give him at any rate approximate results,
> and then found that an ellipse was right....[268]

What were these hypotheses that Kepler threw away? They were
the series of insights preceding the affirmation of an
elliptical orbit.

Just as it was questioning that brought on the insights
which grasped patterns in data, it is questioning again
that impels reflective understanding to assay the insights. Some
are not relevant ; some are merely bright ideas ; some are correct.

---

268. Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science : 1300-
     1800, 5th rev. ed. (London : G. Bell and Sons, Ltd.,
     1968), p.64 ; see also Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers :
     A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe,
     reprinted (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), pp.
     227-411.

How do we distinguish them?

Insights not only arise in answer to questions but also are followed by further questions. Moreover, such further questions are of two kinds. They may stick to the initial issue or they may go on to raise distinct issues. So the worker might ask what started the fire or where his wife is. So Kepler might have asked where the planets came from. Finally, the transition to distinct issues may result from very different reasons. It may be because different interests supervene to draw attention elsewhere. Or it may also be because the initial issue is exhausted, because there are no further questions to be asked about it.

Lonergan then correlates questions with what he terms vulnerable and invulnerable insights :

> Let us now distinguish between vulnerable and invulnerable insights. Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or less extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue. But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial approach and explanation....
> When an insight meets the issue squarely, when it hits the bull's eye, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. But when the issue is not met squarely, there are further questions that would reveal the unsatisfactoriness of the insight and would evoke the further insights that pur a new light on the matter.[270]

---

269. In, 283.
270. In, 284.

The link, then, between conditions and conditioned is
grasped by reflective understanding. Through such acts one
comprehends what conditions are, which ones are to the point,
and when a sufficient number are fulfilled. To have sufficient
evidence means to grasp that the conditioned is linked with the
conditions. The question "Is it so?" is operative from start to
finish in reflective understanding. The scales weighing the
evidence are the "procedure within the cognitional field," the
three levelled structure of human cognition at work under
the impulse of the question-operator. And then, when the
evidence is apprehended, the scales are tipped to pronounce
either a Yes or a No.

### III. The Judgment of Fact

We have already considered some elements and instances
of the judgment of fact. Some of the instances : Archimedes'
principle, the self-affirmation of the knower, the worker's
judgment, and Kepler's Laws. In discussing Lonergan's notion of
the judgment of fact, we will introduce another example that
may aid to point up the essential either-or, yes-no quality of
the judgment that is not so manifest in his other models.

We might begin by asking with Lonergan,

> But what is fact? What is that clear, precise, definitive,
> irrevocable dominant something that we name fact?
>
> ... fact is concrete as is sense consciousness. Again,
> fact is intelligible : if it is independent of all doubtful
> theory, it is not independent of the modest insight and
> formulation necessary to give it its precision and its
> accuracy. Finally, fact is virtually unconditioned : it
> might not have been ; it might have been other than it is ;
> but as things stand, it possesses conditional necessity,
> and nothing can possibly alter it now. Fact, then, combines
> the concreteness of experience, the determinateness of accurate
> intelligence, and the absoluteness of rational judgment. It
> is the natural objective of human cognitional process. It
> is the anticipated unity to which sensation, perception,
> imagination, inquiry, insight, formulation, reflection,
> grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment make their several,
> complementary contributions. When Newton knew that the water

in his bucket was rotating, he knew a fact, though he thought that he knew absolute space. When quantum mechanics and relativity posit the unimaginable in a four-dimensional manifold, they bring to light the not too surprising fact that scientific intelligence and verifying judgment go beyond the realms     of imagination to the realm of fact.[271]

Fact is opposed to necessity. We have already seen in Chapter XI that Lonergan points out the distinction between absolute and conditioned necessity.[272] His interest is with the conditioned necessity inasmuch as a judgment of fact is related to it. His interest in analytic propositions is secondary.[273] Modern science, he claims, is occupied not with eternally necessary principles, but with hypotheses that can be verified.[274] And furthermore, he avers, metaphysics itself is just factual.[275]

But to return to a key statement quoted above : "It (fact) is the natural objective of human cognitional process." In a way, this statement encapsulates Lonergan's cognitional theory. Experience, understanding, and judgment are included ; conditions and unconditioned are involved.

The judgment of fact, however, has another aspect which Lonergan stresses : it is also a limited commitment. As an illustration, we might take a question to which a Yes or No answer could be given : Is it a fact that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer? The response, "Maybe," does not suffice, as evidenced by the assertions and counter-assertions of medical agencies and the tobacco industry. Each side is most interested

---

271. In, 331. Fact is the same as existence and occurrence for Lonergan. "To cover both terms Insight uses the names, fact, factual" (IPD, 162, n.21).

272. See also In, 781.

273. In, 304-309.

274. See In, 35,78 ; all of IT ; DD, 343 ; BTI, 8-9 ; NKG, 60-61.

275. In, 393, 441.

to make its Yes or No stand. And perhaps even some smokers are
interested in what the fact is.

How, then, does one get to a Yes or No answer? First
of all, there is required the field of fulfilling conditions to
make a judgment. One would have to begin by gathering the sta-
tistics on the number of comparatively heavy smokers who die
from lung cancer. Further data gathering might suggest that
the effect of smoking be checked in controlled laboratory
experiments with animals having a physiology similar to man's.
The lung tissue itself of smokers could be periodically examined.
Thus zoologists and biochemists would be amassing data.

Next one could weigh the evidence. One might query
whether the statistics were accurate ; whether enough cases
were available for examination ; whether results from experimental
animals were indubitable ; whether the medical examinations of
smokers were incontrovertible. Perhaps then the evidence would
be sufficient, and one would make the judgment, "Yes, cigarette
smoking does cause cancer."

Innumberable questions to be answered by factual
judgments can be posed : "Is the principle of hydrostatics
correct?" "Am I a knower?" ; "Has something happened to my
home?" ; "Do the planets describe elliptical orbits?" ;"Does
cigarette smoking cause cancer?" But essential to each and
every factual judgment is the fulfilling of conditions, whether
that judgment belongs to the domain of explanation or descriptive
knowledge.

The judgment of fact focuses on one point : is something
so, or is it not so ? What is so happens to be so. It happens
to have its conditions fulfilled. It could have been otherwise,
but it is not, and thus it is the way it is, but not absolutely
necessarily.

When the conditions fall into place and one apprehends
the link of these conditions with a prospective judgment,
Lonergan says that there is a kind of compulsion to judge, a

rational compulsion.[276] The judgment can come after any amount of preliminary weighing of evidence, from the simple assertion of the worker up to the exhaustively researched one about planetary orbits or cigarette smoking. In every instance, however, the judgment is limited to a certain area that is specifically being inquired into. Because of this restricted area for inquiry, Lonergan speaks of the judgment as a limited commitment. And it is limited precisely by the apprehending of fulfilling conditions and their link with an affirmation that can be made with regard to a very particular matter.

Lonergan would undoubtedly respond to the teasing question, "How many whiskers make a beard?" by saying that, even though one were unable to designate the exact number of required whiskers (supposing that the knowledge of such a number were a relevant condition in the first place), one could still affirm or deny that someone was sporting a beard. Under certain circumstances the evidence or lack thereof would be strong enough to compel one to make a yes or no judgment. To that limited judgment one would commit himself.

---

276. In, 329-332. Two eminent historians have some very germane remarks on facts and judgment. Carl Becker, Everyman His Own Historian, reprint of 2nd ed. of 1935, Quadrangle Paperbacks (Chicago : Quadrangle Books, 1966) : "To establish the facts is always in order, and is indeed the first duty of the historian ; but to suppose that the facts, once established in all their fullness, will 'speak for themselves' is an illusion (p.249). "Left to themselves, the facts do not speak ; left to themselves they do not exist, not really, since for all practical purposes there is no fact until someone affirms it" (p.251). And Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History, Fontana Books (Glasgow : William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1957) : "The general fact emerges that in a great deal of historical work mere scepticism carries one nowhere and everything depends in the last resort on the very delicate balancing of the mind as it makes what we call an 'act of judgment'" (p.20).

## IV. Truth

### A. True Judgments

The probing question ("Is it so?") of reflective understanding, the judgment, and absolute objectivity have been shown to be matched with one another by Lonergan. There is a further topic to be added : truth. The consideration of truth after the other three topics of this chapter is not a matter of casual unimportance. In Lonergan's schema, truth is obviously important, but the question is rather of where one should begin in examining human cognition. He does not start with truth. One, he says,

> ... must envisage the human mind under some precise aspect ; and the relevant aspect, I submit, is neither truth nor certitude nor deduction nor necessity nor universality nor conception nor inquiry nor intuition nor experience nor a priori synthesis nor apperceptive unity nor description nor phenomenology nor induction nor, indeed, any mere combination of these. The relevant aspect is understanding.[277]

Lonergan believes that it is crucial to answer this question before all others when one is examining human cognition : What is happening when I know ? To answer this question is to put understanding (and the two-phase operator) first and line up all the other aspects, such as certitude, necessity, truth, and so forth, in perspective with it. Thus the order of Insight, as avowed by Lonergan, and consequently this Part II.

To return to the true judgment : how does one know that this judgment is true? Lonergan distinguishes what he names ontological causes and the cognitional reason for knowing that a judgment is true. It is this cognitional reason that occupies our attention. The cognitional reason is the grasp of the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned.[278]

---

277. IT, 149.
278. IPD, 160-161.

How, then, does one know that a particular factual judgment is true, asks Lonergan :

> Here one is asking, not for an ontological cause, but for a cognitional reason. The only possible answer is that, prior to judgment, there occurs a grasp of the unconditioned. For only the unconditioned can ground the objectivity of truth, its absolute character, its independence of the viewpoints, attitudes, orientation of the judging subject.[279]

The matter of truth and its cognitional reasons for Lonergan, then, reverts to the prior consideration of reflective understanding. But just as he denies that the factual judgment mechanically issues forth, so there is no hint anywhere that he would assert that truth appears automatically once the fulfilling conditions are present. When he speaks of a rational compulsion to judge in a certain way, then he means that one is in possession of his rational procedure and consciously directing it.

It should be further noted that the true judgment under discussion is a factual judgment (whether explanatory or descriptive knowledge), just as the judgment of the previous discussion was factual and not inferential. However, what is said of true factual judgments obviously applies a fortiori to inferences.

True judgment can be considered in contrast with the level of understanding, of insights and hypotheses. There is no rule of cloture inherent to this level. A limitless number of ideas can ceaselessly arise. One can speculate endlessly on a topic. In the case of cigarette smoking and lung cancer, one could turn to a vast study of the structure of the human lung, and then proceed to consider the possibility of the human lung operating under water, and so on. Or in the case of Kepler,

---

279. IPD, 160.

one can recall the immense number of hypotheses through which
he toiled.

From the point of view of one who wants to know the fact,
what really is, what is true, such research and discussing
is hopelessly straying off on a tangent.  The one who wants to
know what is true feels the drive of an exigent and compelling
questioning.  He weighs evidence in order to make a specific
judgment.  He marshals his research and discussion so that he
can come to the position where he will be able to issue his
judgment, limited as it may be, in its commitment, of Yes or No.

What interests us, then, is not Lonergan's studies of
ontological truth or hermeneutics, but rather his treatment of
truth in the context of objectivity.[280]  Although there is the
question of criteria to deal with, the context is already
familiar.  Concerning the proximate criterion of truth :

> The proximate criterion of truth is reflective grasp
> of the virtually unconditioned.  Because it proceeds by
> rational necessity from such a grasp, the act of judgment is
> an actuation of rational consciousness, and the content of
> judgment has the stamp of the absolute.
> Essentially, then, because the content of judgment is
> unconditioned, it is independent of the judging subject.
> Essentially, again, rational consciousness is what issues in
> a product that is independent of itself.  Such is the meaning
> of absolute objectivity, and from it there follows a public
> or common terrain through which different subject can and
> do communicate and agree.[281]

And the remote criterion :

> Concretely, however, while reflective understanding
> grasps the virtually unconditioned, it itself is conditioned
> by the occurrence of other cognitional acts ; and while the
> content of the judgment is grasped as unconditioned, still
> that content either demands or rests on the contents of
> experiences, insights, and other judgments for its full

---

280. In, 549-594.
281. In, 549.

clarification. This concrete inevitability of a context of other acts and a context of other contents is what necessitates the addition of a remote to a proximate criterion of truth.

The remote criterion is the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know. In negative terms this proper unfolding is the absence of interference from other desires that inhibit or reinforce and in either case distort the guidance given by the pure desire.[282]

We have boxed the compass : from truth back through objectivity, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the three-levelled structure of knowing to the two-phase question-operator. Truth and objectivity are correlated. The truth of the judgment rests upon the absolute objectivity of the judgment. Truth is, then, "a public or common terrain through which different subjects can and do communicate and agree." But then truth and objectivity must be aligned with the three-tiered structure of knowing. Finally, what constitutes the functionally inter-linking structure, is the two-phase questioning. It underpins the whole cognitional enterprise.[283]

## 1. Truth and the Subject

For Lonergan, as has been frequently seen, the true judgment goes beyond any relativity involved in the subject who issues it to attain the realm of absolute objectivity, the realm of what is. The realm of what is is no longer liable to the circumstances of time and place, nor the personal disposition or indisposition of the subject making the judgment. But is this simply the whole story? What about the relation of the objecti-vity of truth and the subjectivity of individual men and women?

---

282. In, 550.

283. To advance from an examination of truth to an examination of the nature and structure of the real is, for Lonergan, to advance from cognitional theory and epistemology to metaphysics. See In, xxii (where Lonergan points out the difference between Parts I and II of In as based upon this advance) ; IPD, 152-155 ; S, 32-33 ; TMF, 453-454 ; PT, 34.

In Lonergan's opinion, the criterion by which one arrives at the truth is a virtually unconditioned.[284] An unconditioned has no conditions.  A subject may be needed to arrive at truth but, once truth is attained, one is beyond the subject and one has reached a realm that is nonspatial, atemporal, impersonal, and, in a word, absolute.

Then Lonergan shifts abruptly :

> Such is the objectivity of truth.  But do not be fascinated by it.  Intentionally it is independent of the subject, but ontologically it resides only in the subject....  Intentionally it goes completely beyond the subject, yet it does so only because ontologically the subject is capable of an intentional self-transcendence, of going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so.  Moreover, before the subject can attain the self-transcendence of truth, there is the slow and laborious process of conception, gestation, parturition.  But teaching and learning, investigating, coming to understand, marshalling and weighing the evidence, these are not independent of the subject, of times and places, of psychological, social, historical conditions.  The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm.[285]

Lonergan's insistence upon absolute objectivity goes hand in hand with his order of examining cognition : one starts with oneself and seeks to understand what happens when one understands.[286]  Objectivity and truth enter the problematic once one uncovers the three-levelled structure of his knowing.  They are the goal of human cognition towards which the native intentionality of the mind impels and promotes cognitional activity.  To recall once again,

---

284. In, 549-552 ; S,2-3.

285. S,3 ; see further TP, 26.

286. V, 45-46 ; In, Preface, Introduction, and Epilogue ; IPD, 154-155.

> ... the many operations are linked together both on
> the side of the subject and on the side of the object.  On
> the side of the subject there is the one mind putting the
> many questions in pursuit of a single goal.  On the side of
> the object there is the gradual cumulation and conjoining of
> partial elements into a single whole.[287]

Inasmuch as human knowing results from the co-ordinated ope-
ration of sensation, understanding, and judgment, there is no
such thing as an impersonal programmed manoeuvre that
automatically produces judgments in possession of objective
truth.[288]

Insight--the  word that Lonergan significantly takes for
the title of his major work--precedes judgment.  Insights can
proliferate like weeds in a field or flourish like the flowers
in a well-tended garden.  They are the abrupt curiosity that
stirs one, the bright ideas that flash into one's head, the hunches
that one assays.  All of these are extremely personal, and are
conditioned by the intelligence or lack thereof, the bias, the
education, the specialized training, the cultural milieu, etc.,
of the subjects.  All of them are the matrix from which
judgments issue forth, hearing the cachet of their very personal
origin.[289]

It should be noted that in Insight, before coming to the
problematic of objectivity and truth, Lonergan gives two hundred
and seventy pages to an investigation of the subject's
activity of knowing and the conditions of its occurrence.
Truth for Lonergan is not like some eternal fruit, always fully
ripened, that one merely has to pluck out of some eternal grove.
The subject attains truth through the judgment which is a
virtually unconditioned : a certain number of a certain kind of

---

287. NKG, 63.

288. V,34.

289. For the effects of bias--individual, group, and general--
see In, 218-244.

conditions are fulfilled. And if Lonergan says that "the true statement (concerning objects) intends to state what would be so even if the subject making the statement did not exist,"[290] he hastens to add that one must not think "of truth as so objective as to get along without minds."[291]

## B. Error

True judgment can be further viewed in contrast with error. Lonergan, as might be expected, takes up the question of error in connexion with judgments of fact, since he identifies the level of judgment as the habitat of truth and error.

The level of insight enjoys a wide-ranging liberty. Bright ideas can run on unimpeded. For the simplest of judgments, a whole array of disciplines could be summoned to contribute their expertise. Linguistic analysis, psychology, chemistry, economic, physics could furnish limitless knowledge for every possible judgment, from that of self-affirmation to those about the burnt home and cigarette smoking.

However, the avoidance and elimination of error, Lonergan avers, do not lie in the direction of expanding understanding and of a complete mastery over a sweep of disciplines, but rather in the demarcated area of fulfilling conditions and a virtually unconditioned. The problem recalls the frequently underscored distinction of the levels of understanding and judgment, and of the two-phase questioning relevant to the two levels. Under the rubric of the two types of questions, Lonergan points out that a judgment is a limited commitment. Why ? Because not all the data in the world, nor the exhaustive knowledge of every related aspect are required to make a judgment.

Thus, avers Lonergan,

... it is quite true that I can be mistaken. But that

---

290. FC, 6 (see also NKG, 64).
291. S,5.

truth presupposes that I am not making a further mistake
in acknowledging a past mistake as a mistake. More generally,
judgments of fact are correct of incorrect, not of necessity,
but merely in fact. If this is something, still it might
be nothing at all.[292]

If it is a knower, or a burnt house, or a cancer, or an elliptical
orbit, "still it might be something else."

> Similarly, if I am correct in affirming something to
> be so ... it is not a pure necessity, but merely a fact that
> I am correct. To ask for the evidence that excludes the
> possibility of my being mistaken in affirming this... is to ask
> too much. Such evidence is not available, for if I am correct,
> that is merely fact. But if that evidence is not available,
> still less is there the evidence that will exclude the
> possibility of error in all judgments of fact. Errors are just
> as much facts as are correct judgments.[293]

Is such argumentation hedging and circular? Whether
one is right or wrong in judging is, in Lonergan's view, merely
a fact. It would seem, then, that any original objection brought
against the judgment of fact is still standing. Lonergan
would agree. A person cannot point to the fact of error to
reject facts. A person must move the objection to a different
ground and reject all facts. Then the discussion wheels back
to the judgment of fact in general, and the legitimacy of
Lonergan's views based upon the polymorphic knowing of man and
the levels of objectivity. Then the discussion is about funda-
mentals in cognitional theory.

## C. Verification

An examination of Lonergan's notion of truth and
judgment should include something about verification. But
again, as we have already done several times in this section,
we must refer back to prior chapters of Part II. Verification

---

292. In, 347.
293. In, 347.

318.

came up in Chapter VII in the section on self-affirmation.

Lonergan distinguishes direct and indirect, or cumulative, verification.

> ... what is verification? Vulgarly, verification seems to be conceived as a matter of taking a look, of making an observation. In fact, while verification includes observation, it includes not one but indefinitely many, and it includes them within a very elaborate context. That context divides into two parts, direct and indirect verification. Direct verification is a matter of working out the logical presuppositions and implications of a very carefully formulated hypothesis, devising experiments that will yield data that conform or do not conform with the implications of the hypothesis and, when hypothesis conflict, devising crucial experiments that will resolve the conflict.[294]

Such direct verification is that which one initiates in the case of scientific studies. There is, however, direct verification likewise on the level of descriptive knowledge, though its methods and scope are different.

Direct verification, as we saw in Chapter VII, is essentially a pattern of acts of checking by which there is a reversal from the second and third levels of knowing back to the first level, from formulations and weighing and reflection back to the simply given. The given is of two sorts, the data of consciousness and the data of sense. And so it has been shown how self-affirmation could be verified by returning to the data of consciousness, and how a formula might be verified by examining needless and dials.

As for indirect verification, it is best exemplified in the sciences :

> Indirect verification is more massive and, ultimately, more significant. All hypotheses, theories, systems of a

---

294. NKG, 8-9 ; see also BTI, 4-5. In Insight Lonergan speaks of "cumulative" verification rather than of "indirect" verification (In, 75).

science are linked together proximately or remotely in logical
interdependence. So, for instance, the law of falling
bodies was verified directly by Galileo, but it also has
been verified indirectly every time in the last four centuries
that     it was was among the presuppositions of a
successful experiment or a successful application.
Similarly, another law or principle wins an ever securer
position by the far-flung and almost continuous process of
indirect verification whether in laboratories or in the
applications of science to industry.[295]

Lonergan distinguishes verification from experience.
Once again it is his conception of human cognition as polymorphic
that is the basis for such a distinction. And once again, on
the basis of that conception and this distinction, any tendency
towards extroversion is blocked. Lonergan uses the case of
falling bodies for his exposition :

Yet clearly if the law of falling bodies is verified,
it is not experienced. All that is experienced is a large
aggregate of contents of acts of observing. It is not
experience but understanding that unifies the aggregate
by referring them to a hypothetical law of falling bodies.
It is not experience but critical reflection that asks
whether the data correspond to the law and whether the corres-
pondence suffices for an affirmation of the law. It is not
experience but a reflective grasp of the fulfilment of the
conditions for a probable affirmation that constitutes the
only act of verifying that exists for the law of falling
bodies ; and similarly it is a reflective grasp of the
unconditioned that grounds every other judgment.[296]

In the context of verification, we might make some
remarks about what Lonergan calls the heuristic function of
images (mainly visual).[297] His notion of this heuristic function
is not something entirely new, but rather a variation on the theme
of the interrelationship of the three level of  knowing.  These

---

295. NKG, 61.
296. In, 671.
297. See In, 18, 298, 439-440.

remarks may help to redress a supposed imbalance in his attitude towards sensation and visual images. There might arise the feeling that Lonergan goes beyond the rejection of sensation and imagination as the model for cognition to a minimizing of their importance in general.

Lonergan contrasts the heuristic function of images with their representative function. To claim for an image a representative function is to claim that it represents things as they really are. So one could take a visual image of the heart as the very heart itself,[298] or one could take the Bohr atom as an exact representation of what the atom with its nucleus and electrons looks like. To claim for an image an heuristic function is to claim that it offers clues, hints, and suggestions so that one can not merely imagine but understand a thing. So the visual image of the heart can give clues for understanding the circulatory operation of the heart, while the Bohr atom can give clues for understanding molecular structure. And the same could be said of the images of the spheres of ancient astronomy, the Four Elements, phlogiston, or ether waves.

The heuristic role of images is related to the functionally interlinking structure of cognition. If images were simply representative, then understanding and judgment, as well as the two-phase operator, would be minimized. But if images are recognized to be (sometimes) heuristic, then the interlinking structure of cognition is preserved. Images are heuristic inasmuch as they are subservient to the supervening activity of the two-phase operator. It modifies and juggles the images in order to prepare for understanding and judgment. In that sense are images functional, and offer clues, hints, and suggestions so that one can go beyond imagining to understanding and judging.

---

298. See n.13 in Chapter VII above.

Verification, then, is an activity on the level of reflective understanding whose purpose is to effect a judgment. Verification is cyclic in its movement. It turns back to the data, either of consciousness or of sense, in order to turn forward towards judgment. Its checking, weighing, and marshalling all take place under the exigence of responding to the question-operator, "Is it so?"

It would be entirely incorrect to think that Lonergan considers truth, and consequently verification, as somewhat tag-end affairs in the discussion of human knowing. When he declares that understanding is the "relevant aspect" under which knowing is to be envisaged, he by no means implies that truth and verification are irrelevant. The important thing for him is that one understand understanding. For he believes that then one takes the high ground from which one can have the only meaningful view : first, the polymorphism of human knowing and the two-phase operator ; the correlative three aspects of objectivity ; absolute objectivity and its ground in judgment ; reflective understanding and judgment ; truth. In Lonergan's schema truth fits in where it does, not because it is tag-end, but because it too is more relevant there precisely because understanding is relevant where it is : as the aspect under which to begin a study of human knowing.

## Summary

There are four sections to this chapter. The first concerns reflective understanding and the virtually unconditioned ; inferential reasoning, however, and judgments are excluded from consideration. Next we have considered Lonergan's ideas on the general form of reflective insight which is no formalizable schema, but rather "a procedure in the cognitional field." Then we have taken up the judgment of fact which, though a limited commitment, is "the natural objective of human cognitional process." And finally, we have discussed Lonergan's notions of truth, the subject, error, and verification, not as

some tag-end topics, but from the viewpoint of understanding, for understanding is the relevant aspect under which human knowing is to be envisaged.

PART III


CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE


"Hinter das Sehen kann man nicht zurück, sofern
es das letztlich urmodale, allen anderen, ab-
gewandelten Bewusstseinsweisen sinngebende
Dabeisein der menschlichen Erkenntnis beim
Seienden ist."

(Eugen Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls")

"Konstitution. Damit stossen wir auf den zentra-
len Grundbegriff der phänomenologische Philo-
sophie."

(Eugen Fink, "Die phänomenologische Philoso-
phie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen
Kritik")


"... everything depends in the last resort on
the very delicate balancing of the mind as it
makes what we call an 'act of judgment.'"

(Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and
History)

# PRENOTE : ORIENTATION AND FOCUS

> Husserl begins from relatedness-to-us, not to
> advance to the relatedness of terms to one another,
> but to mount to an abstract looking from which
> the looker and the looked-at have been dropped
> because of their particularity and contingence.
> The vitality of animal extroversion is attenuated
> from sensitive perception to intuition of
> universals and from intuition of universals to
> the more impalpable inspection of formal
> essences.... As objects increase in generality and
> purity, subjects shrink to intentional acts. With
> remarkable acuteness and discrimination there
> are uncovered, described, compared, and classified
> the pure forms of noetic experience terminating
> in noematic contents. But the whole enterprise
> is under the shadow of the principle of immanence,
> and it fails to transcend the crippling influence
> of the extroversion that provides the model for
> the pure ego. In brief, phenomenology is a
> highly purified empiricism, ...
>
> - _Insight_, p. 415.

Only on one occasion-- excluding the notes of his lectures
made by students, "Notes on Existentialism" --does Lonergan give
something of a critique of Husserl, and this in a rapid sketch
in _Insight_, part of which is cited as a heading to this prenote.
Brief though they are, these remarks have an obvious importance
for understanding a confrontation between the two philosophers.
Nevertheless, as accurate and fair as they may be as broad
generalizations, especially concerning extroversion, there are
some necessary refinements, particularly with respect to Husserl's
alleged immanence, which should be made.

Husserl's notion of intentionality comprises two aspects :
intuition and constitution. In the terms of Eugen Fink,

intuition is a "thematic" notion, constitution an "operative"
one.[1]  Intuition is consciously thematized and investigated in
detail ; it has no less a distinction than that of being
designated as "the Principle of Principles" by Husserl himself.
On the other hand, constitution is a notion that he makes use
of throughtout his phenomenology without bringing it to the same
level of direct, reflective examination.  It is understandable,
then, that one can focus on the thematic notion, intuition, at
the expense of the operative notion, constitution.  In a way
Husserl himself has done so.

In this Part III, we will try to allow a confrontation
between Husserl and Lonergan that might be described as a
prior confrontation within Husserl's phenomenology itself
between the claims of intuition and those of constitution to be
normative of objectivity.  The relationship of intuition and
constitution with each other has to be clarified.  Then a series
of questions may be asked : Can intuition and constitution co-
exist in harmony in what Husserl calls "originär gebende An-
schauung" ?  Or are their exigencies incompatible so that they
can not thus co-exist ?  In that case must one of them be
chosen as the norm ?  If so, which one ?  We will try to show
that constitution is the one.

Lonergan's criticism of Husserl is aimed against the
thematic notion of intuition, and does not take into account
the operative notion of constitution.  If however, constitution
and its implications are exposed, then a basic similarity
between Husserl's notion of constitution and Lonergan's notion
of intentionality appears.  The confrontation between Husserl and
Lonergan can be summed up in this way : with respect to intuition

---

1. Eugen Fink, "Les concepts opératoires dans la phénoménologie
   de Husserl," in Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie
   III (Paris : Les Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 214-241.

as the norm of objectivity, there is opposition between them,
but with respect to constitution as the norm, there is agreement
on essential points.

An agreement on essential points, however, still leaves
room for certain refinements. Lonergan's notion of intentionality
as unrestricted questioning that is a two-phase operator brings
a precision to Husserl's notion of intentional constitution.
Questioning is what is normative of objectivity for Lonergan.
Now if one takes intuition as the norm for Husserl, then it is
seeing (the model of all sense perception) for Husserl that is
the normative intentional act. But if one takes constitution as
the norm, then it is the categorial (ideal) object that is the
normative object. And yet, Husserl has what might be called
an implicit operator. (Involved as it is with constitution,
it too is an operative notion.) This implicit operator can
for convenience be designated, as by a general title, by a
term that Husserl uses : Interesse.

By focusing on intentionality as operator--constitution in
Husserl and questioning in Lonergan --we have a guideline by
which to orient our investigation throughout the following
six chapters where we will make a chapter by chapter confrontation
of the previous twelve expository chapters on Husserl and
Lonergan. We will attempt to show that there is an ambiguity
in Husserl's notion of the intuition-constitution relationship,
and even a conflict, without at the same time attempting to
supress either of them. Our effort is : to show the limitations
of intuition, the aptness of constitution, and then the
advantages of questioning taken as operator.

CHAPTER XIII


SELBSTBESINNUNG : EPOCHE AND SELF-AFFIRMATION

(CHAPTERS I AND VII CONFRONTATION)


I. Epoche and Wonder

In Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man and Die
Krisis, wonder is explicitly acknowledged by Husserl as the
motive for performing the Epoche. In his other works, however,
like Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, its motivating
source is not mentioned, but rather the investigations are
confined to the function and results of the Epoche. In any
case, even though explicitly acknowledged, wonder is never
thematized by Husserl. He sees it as the stimulus for the Epoche,
but he does not go further to examine it with respect to the
Ego and the Ego's intentionality-structure that the Epoche un-
covers.

But is it at all necessary not only to see wonder as the
motivator of the Epoche, but also to connect it with intentionality
and objectivity? Lonergan would say yes. Lonergan might not
use the term "Epoche" but his notion of the self-affirmation
of the subject has essentially the same scope as that of
Husserl's Epoche. However, a prior point must be made : the
importance for Lonergan of thematizing questioning. Some
brief remarks on intentionality must be made that anticipate
the discussion of the following chapters.

For Lonergan questioning expresses wonder and intentiona-
lity in such a way that both of them can be defined in terms of
it. Thus wonder is unrestricted questioning. Thus intentionality

is unrestricted questioning taken as the capacity to raise questions and answer them. Questioning occurs in two phases which are two distinct kinds of questions. These two questions are the two-phase operator that constitutes the functional unity, or polymorphism, of human knowing.

Once Husserl sets himself to trace the emergence of the judgment and the categorial object he comes close to explicitly introducing an operator into his notion of intentionality in the shape of Interesse (standing as a general term for the related notions of Reiz, Tendenz, Streben, etc.). Interest functions as an operator in the promotion of cognition from sensation to categorial performance. He even explicitly treats questioning (Fragen) in Erfahrung und Urteil, § 78, where he terms it, "The striving to come to a firm judgmental decision".[2] However, it is presented there as an aspect of Streben, and specifically as a "striving for judgmental decision," and not thematized with respect to the whole context of intentionality.

It should be noted, then, that this context of Interesse, Streben, and Fragen is not that of wonder-Epoche-intentionality, but rather that of the genesis of judgments. Further, Interesse, Streben, and Fragen are an "operative," not a "thematic" operator.

Before the introduction of the way to the Epoche from the Life-world, Husserl avows that the other ways (of Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations) he has taken give the impression of a sudden leap into the world of the transcendental Ego. By beginning with the Life-world, as in Die Krisis, he can assemble the actual transcendental clues that are behind both Galilean mathematized science and cognitional theories insofar as all of them presuppose

---

2. "Fragen, ganz allgemein genommen, ist das Streben, aus der modalen Abwandlung, der Spaltung und Hemmung zu einer festen Urteilsentscheidung zu kommen" (EU, 372) ; see also APS, § 15.

intentionality with subject-object poles.  The return to the
Life-world is the realization of the scope of the radical reflection
(Selbstbesinnung) required to perform the Epoche.

One may start from, properly speaking, nonphilosophic
experiences to undertake the Epoche.  De Waelhens would say
that philosophy is reflection upon a nonphilosophic experience.[3]
Nonetheless, this is not at all to aver that the nonphilosophic
experience is a nonreflective state.  Husserl initiates the
Epoche from the Lebenswelt-sciences-cognitional theory context
where the sciences and the cognitional theories are highly refined
products of human activity.  So, for example, formal logic must
proceed transcendental logic, as Formal and Transcendental Logic
demonstrates at great length.

The Epoche presupposes a certain level of cultural achieve-
ment with a concomitant level of both reflection and self-
reflection.
Only in such accomplishments of culture can sufficiently diverse
position-taking as a meaning constituting activity occur and be
experienced--even though it is anonymously functioning intentionality--
so that subsequently it can be suspended by, and adequately examined
in, the Epoche.  So a ten year old philosopher would be,
and is, a rarity.

Lonergan's attitude toward science is similar in this
respect to Husserl's : science is to the Life-world for Husserl
as the world of theory (exemplified by science) is to the world of
common sense for Lonergan.  Lonergan views the world of theory
as an advance on the world of common sense.  His preference for

---

3. De Waelhens, La philosophie et les expériences naturelles, pp.
   1-3.  For a discussion of "la non-philosophie" and "la philo-
   sophies," and the "chemin" which leads from the one to the
   other, see Georges Van Riet, "Y a-t-il un chemin vers la véri-
   té ?  A propos de l'introduction à la "Phénoménologie de
   l'Esprit' de Hegel, " in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 62
   (1964), 466-476. (Reprinted in Georges Van Riet, Philosophie et
   religion [Louvain : Publications Universitaires de Louvain,
   1970 ], pp. 174-184.)

mathematical and scientific examples is based upon his belief that by doing science and mathematics one heightens one's self-awareness as a knower. The other side of the coin is that he does not tend to see (as Husserl does) the accomplishments of science as a "tissue of ideas" (Ideenkleid) that cloak their origins in the intentional activity of the subject. Further, and in this respect he adds something new, Lonergan claims that the doing of modern science and mathematics has helped to purify the notion of objectivity by making it impossible to equate verification with any kind of empirical looking.

The world of theory is, for Lonergan, like a transcendental clue to lead one into the world of interiority. The structure of Insight points out in striking fashion a parallel between Husserl and Lonergan. Part I, "Insight as Activity," is a phenomenological analysis of just what goes on when one understands. There is explicitly a complete suspension of acceptance with respect to objectivity and reality in a Husserlian manner. True, even this suspension, or "Epoche," of Lonergan is governed by his conception of intentionality as questioning which is a two-phase operator. Yet the structure of Insight is like Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Die Krisis, where the whole problem of objectivity and reality is put off to the second moment of the investigation following upon the Epoche.

The Epoche puts into operation Husserl's principle of principles : intuition, where everything gives itself undistorted. The Epoche is the attempt to establish intuition in an untrammelled state where it is not tainted by any unchallenged positings. But blocking the Epoche is the Natural Attitude which is the comprehensive title for all position-taking that is not subjected to the examination (Besinnung) of the Epoche-viewpoint. It could be said that the Epoche reveals the noetic dimension that is hidden from the Natural Attitude.

The Epoche is based on an intuition that is a reflexive perception directed upon the intuition-intentionality structure

of the Ego. Husserl identifies what he calls the "Detached Observer" as the performer of this reflexive gaze upon the transcendental Ego. The reflexive perception is an intuition to validate all intuition.

Lonergan borrows the Husserlian term Besinnung to describe his Epoche-like self-appropriation of the knower through self-affirmation. [4] The similarity of terminology is matched by a similarity of conception. Husserl's Epoche with its rejection of the Natural Attitude is paralleled by Lonergan's two-stage self-appropriation of the knower with its rejection of biological extroversion. [5] The stages are : the inspection of "insight as activity" and self-affirmation (this latter is the title of the first chapter of Part II of Insight : "Insight as Knowledge"). By performing these two stages, one realizes the polymorphic structure of his knowing and then grasps its relationship to objectivity and reality. One ceases to be a naive realist or idealist and becomes a critical realist.

If one were to pinpoint the essential of Lonergan's self-appropriation, it would be his notion of affirmation (judgment) and its relation to the two-phase operator. Affirmation has a role analogous to intuition in Husserl. The evaluation of Husserl's Epoche and Lonergan's self-appropriation is dependent, then, upon that of intuition and affirmation. But such an evaluation cannot be accomplished by taking intuition in the sense that the notion has for Lonergan. Intuition must be examined in the context of intentionality, evidence, and

---

4   EA, 240. Lonergan translates Besinnung as "a heightening of one's self-appropriation."

5   This interpretation of Husserl's Epoche is in opposition to that of Heelan, HOR, 389-390, n. 24. Although Heelan accurately presents Lonergan's views vis-à-vis Husserl, he misinterprets Husserl's notion of the Epoche : the Epoche does not bracket existence as understood by Heelan, but the "existence," the positing of the Natural Attitude. It could be said that Lonergan likewise brackets such "existence" in Part I of Insight.

constitution, just as affirmation must be taken in the context
of intentionality and questiong as the two-stage operator.  The
evaluation of intuition and affirmation is made in the following
chapter on intentionality and in Chapter XVIII, which is
specifically on intentionality and affirmation.

The final point, a side remark : this might be the suitable
place to sum up the Auseinandersetzung of Husserl and Lonergan
with Kant and his notion of intuition.  Lonergan flatly rejects
intuition as normative for cognition because it cannot account for
the functional unity and interlinking of experience, understand-
ing, and affirmation.  Only questioning can.  For Lonergan intuition
must be restricted entirely to the level of experience.  Husserl,
however, adroitly turns Kant's flank by extending intuition to
cover all cognitional activity, empirical as well as categorial.
Thus there cannot be a noumenon-phenomenon dichtomy.  All
objective reality is phenomenal, for it is all intentionally
constituted.

## II.  Ego and subject

The disclosing of the eidetic structure of the transcenden-
tal Ego is a moment of the Epoche where three Egos are involved.
They are : the "Natural human Ego" unreflectively (anonymously)
engaged in position-taking ; the "Detached Observer," the
"philosophically meditating Ego," who performs the Epoche ; and
the transcendental Ego to whom the natural human Ego is reduced.
If speaking of three Egos is disconcerting, Marvin Farber's
suggestion of three levels of reflextion can be substituted.

The Eidos uncovered by an intuition of the Detached
Observer is the essence existing in every monad, the concrete
subject, who is the point of departure for the eidetic reduction.
This Eidos is not an abstract invariant concept, like that of the
polygon in Geometry or a specific function in trigonometry.  Like
every Eidos--every Eidos is an a priori grasp of what something is--
it antecedes concepts and verbal expressions about the Ego.  The

eidetic intuition (that which constitutes the Eidos) is an
open-ended understanding of the essence of the Ego that can be
cumulatively enriched.  This Eidos-Ego is an invariant structure
in the sense that it is the unity-identity which can always
be progressively understood.

Thus Husserl's incessant demand to perform the Epoche
and remain in the Epoche-attitude.  To discover the Eidos as the
invariant essence is not to reach a term to one's investigations.
Rather it is to arrive at an understanding which is to be
progressively expanded.  The transcendental Ego is not exhaustively
understood at the single act of uncovering his Eidos for the
first time, in the way one might grasp the binomial theorem.
The bulk and detail of Husserl's investigations is proof enough
against such an assumption.

The essential trait of the Eidos-Ego is intentionality :
the intuition-constitution of something transcendent.  Through
a multiplicity of acts, a unity-identity is constituted.  This is
in fact the definition of objectivity for Husserl : something is
transcendant to consciousness, and therefore objective, because
it is a unity-identity vis-à-vis the subjective processes of
the Ego.  Considered eidetically, the conscious-life of the
Ego is an all-embracing cogito, or synthesis, which comprises
all particular conscious processes that emerge.

Conscious acts, besides their noematic orientation,
have a noetic side.  The Ego is conscious of a transcendent
object (noematic side), whereas he has an experiencing (Erlebnis)
of his being-conscious-of an object, that is to say, of his
intending (noetic side).  The universal carrier for his
experiencing, that which makes all experiencing possible in the
first place, is what Husserl called immanent time.  Immanent
time is constituted by the living present (lebendige Gegenwart)
that wells up ceaselessly from the Ego.  It is the self-presence
of the Ego to himself in a non-reflexive way that becomes
differentiated in all his intentional activity (that is to say,

the immanent objects : sensation and intendings). This living
present is what Husserl calls the absolute : it is the very
condition of possibility both for consciousness and for the
Epoche.

There are two aspects of Husserl's notion of the Eidos-
Ego which find counterparts in Lonergan's notion of the subject.
First, the Eidos-Ego exhibits certain characteristics similar
to those belonging to a heuristic notion of the subject. For
there is a grasping of essential traits of the Ego, cumulatively
apprehended in the eidetic variation, that nonetheless is
always aiming at a fuller understanding of the Ego. In this
respect, such knowledge is like that of one who is finding some-
thing out about the subject. He is on the track of something ;
he is following up clues, for example, like the transcendental
clue that Husserl speaks of : or again, like the entity expressed
in the consecrated formula, "the nature of x," that the
mathematician is looking for.

Secondly, the Eidos-Ego as essence finds its counterpart in
Lonergan's knowledge of the essence of the subject. Such a
knowledge is understanding (or insight) that serves as the basis
for the reasoning out of just what a subject is. It is the
mastery of a field that an expert has. Lonergan cites as an
example of this knowledge of essence Aquinas' reasoning out
of the essence of the human soul throughout no less than forty-
five chapters in the Contra Gentes.[6] Taking essential know-
ledge and relating it to the act of understanding, one might
say that Husserl's Eidos belongs more to the term of the act,
that is to say, to what is understood, whereas Lonergan is more
interested in the act of understanding by which an essence is
known. Still, Husserl's investigation of the Eidos-Ego and
Lonergan's of the subject --and Aquinas' of the soul-- can all
be termed eidetic.

----

6. V, 55-56.

The essential structure of the human subject as knowing according to Lonergan is polymorphic, comprising three levels, that are underpinned by unrestricted questioning with its two-phase operator. Corresponding to these three levels is the three tierd consciousness. Lonergan means by "consciousness" what Husserl means by "experiencing" (Erlebnis). Lonergan never says "consciousness of an object." Consciousness for him is knowledge, but it is the knowledge that is the self-presence and awareness accompanying acts of objective cognition. In a play upon the word "presence", Lonergan says that consciousness is the prior presence of the subject to himself by which the object is made present to the subject. [7] This self-presence of the subject is not only what makes the self-transcendence of objective cognition possible, but also the self-affirmation of the subject and his self-appropriation.

According to Lonergan the polymorphic structure of knowing is an invariant structure of which one may have irrevisable knowledge. There can be no revising, because such would pre-suppose the very operation of experience, understanding, and affirmation to demonstrate their non-existence. The invariant three-moment cycle of human cognition means : the presentation of data upon which the two-phase questioning operates to reach understanding and ultimately affirmation. There is always a field into which one inquires ; one grasps an intelligible pattern ; and one affirms it as factually so.

Lonergan determines the essence of the subject by the special judgment he calls "self-affirmation of the knower." This judgment, structured in the same way as all judgments, rests upon the grasp of the unconditioned. In the present case the unconditioned is the subject's affirmation, "Yes, I am a knower."

---

7 CS, 226.

As a judgment, self-affirmation has :
1) a conditioned : I am a knower ;
2) a link between a conditioned and its conditions :
It can be cast in the proposition, I am a knower, if I am
a concrete unity-identity-whole, performing acts of sensing,
inquiring and understanding, and reflecting and judging ;
3) the fulfillment of the conditions ; this is given in
consciousness : of what am I conscious ?  Do I see ?  Do I
try to understand ?  Do I sometimes catch on ?  Am I reflecting,
for I am asking if I am a knower ?  And do I at least grasp
the unconditioned in this case ?

Lonergan avers that this pivotal judgment is a judgment of
fact : it affirms that which just happens to be so.  There is a
grasp of a conditioned necessity.  How many conditions are there ?
How many must be grasped as fulfilled ?  Recognizing fulfilling
conditions is analogous to Husserl's eidetic variation and his
empty intending that is heading for fulfilling intuition.  One
already has an anticipatory grasp of what the subject is : from
the moment that the subject first begins to know in a polymorphic
way and to concomitantly be conscious of this way.

The criteria for deciding upon the relevance of conditions
in questioning is the two-phase operator that probes : What is
this ?  How does it work ? and then, Is this the way it is ?  For
Husserl the criteria for assaying the fulfillment of conditions
is intuition itself with--we would add--its implicit operator,
interest.  Both Husserl and Lonergan would agree that one can know
what the Eidos-Ego and the polymorphic essence of the subject are
without enumerating all the conditions. 8

In the light of fulfilling conditions, one can see why the
subject must have a certain level of human culture : he must
have already experienced to some degree what his sensation,
inquiring and understanding, reflecting and judging are.  Other
judgments deal with empirical data, but the judgment of self-
affirmation deals with the data of his own consciousness : his
sense experience, his inquiring and understanding, his reflecting

---

8 . More on fulfilling intuition and judgment will be found in
   Chapters XIV and XVIII.

and judging.  Evidently one must have some first-hand experience
with the functioning of his polymorphic knowing to affirm it,
just as for Husserl one must have some aquaintance with the Life-
world in order to attempt an acquaintance in the opposite
direction with the subjective performance of the transcendental
Ego who constitutes it and all objectivity.

A final remark might be made on the Epoche in Husserl and
the self-appropriation in Lonergan.  Husserl never ceases to
repeat the necessity of performing the Epoche and of remaining
in its attitude, that of the Detached Observer.  The single
term "Epoche" that Husserl has adopted serves his purposes, since
he can use it over and over again with the hope that it will
recall to his reader that Husserl's whole enterprise is taking
place in the Epoche-attitude.  Lonergan, on the other hand,
speaks of the explanatory account of the self-appropriation of
one's consciousness, or of self-affirmation, that is to say,
he speaks of the type of account he himself is giving.  Lonergan,
however, does not insist as much for his explanatory viewpoint
as Husserl does for the Epoche.  Thus the misleading impression
of simplicity some of his works give, for example, "Functional
Specialties!"  And Husserl has the advantage of a single striking
term whose importance he reinforces by his rhetoric (the "Unbe-
teiligter Zuschauer," "reduction," "Eidos").  Nonetheless,
Lonergan's viewpoint is always the explanatory account, just
as Husserl's attitude is the Epoche, and they expect their
readers to follow suit.

## Summary

Wonder, though acknowledged by Husserl as the motivator
for the Epoche, is not thematized and examined with relation to
intentionality and objectivity.  In Lonergan wonder is identified
as the motivating force for the self-appropriation of the
knower.  Furtehr, Lonergan thematizes wonder as unlimited
questioning, and then defines intentionality and objectivity in

terms of questioning.  Intentionality is the two-phase questioning.
Objectivity is what is intended by questioning and becomes
known as the two-phase questioning is answered.  Husserl, for
his part, has an implicit operator, interest (Interesse), for his
intentional performance as it advances from empirical to categorial
objectivity.

To perform the Epoche, Husserl takes the way from the
Life-world.  This way presupposes a level of reflection with
a wide range of position-taking that is found in science and
cognitional theory so that one may have some experience of
what position-taking is, even though it is anonymously functioning
intentionality.  Lonergan considers the world of theory (as
exemplified in mathematics and science) as an advance on the
world of common sense.  They stand to each other as explanation
stands to description.  The world of theory helps to purify the
notion of objectivity, and from it one can expand into the
world of interiority : the rationally conscious subject.

Both Husserl and Lonergan suspend the question of
objectivity and reality in order that through the Epoche and
self-appropriation respectively they may uncover the validating
ground for positing objectivity and reality.  The suspension
of discussing objectivity and reality in the Epoche and the
phenomenological analysis of "insight as activity" might also
be accurately designated as a "postponement."  For Husserl the
Epoche is based on an intuition that is a reflective perception,
while for Lonergan self-appropriation is based upon the judg-
ment of self-affirmation.

The Eidos-Ego is the invariant essence of the Ego grasped
in eidetic intuition through the eidetic variations.  It is neither
a concept nor the verbal expression dependent upon the concept,
but the essential structure of the Ego grasped anterior to
these as their ground.  Intentionality, or consciousness, is
the essential trait of the Ego.  Intrinsic to consciousness
is immanent-time : the presence of the Ego to himself.  It makes
possible both transcendant knowledge and the Epoche.  Lonergan

would consider the Eidos-Ego as both a heuristic notion and a
known essence.  Lonergan's parallel is the polymorphic subject.
"Consciousness" in Lonergan means "experiencing" (<u>Erlebnis</u>) in
Husserl.  It, too, makes possible transcendent cognition and the
self-affirmation of the knower.  Just as Husserl's eidetic
intuition establishes the Eidos-Ego as invariant, Lonergan's
judgment of self-affirmation determines the polymorphic structure
of the Ego as irrevisable.

# CHAPTER XIV

## INTENTIONALITY

### (Chapters II and VIII Confrontation)

### I. Intuition-Constitution and the Two-Phase Operator

Intentionality in Husserl embraces both individual acts
and their grounding, both the actuality and the potentiality
of consciousness. He specifies intentionality as the property
by which consciousness has a correlate, a unity-identity, that
is synthesized in a manifold of noetic process. "Intending-
beyond-itself" is an essential moment of consciousness.

It must be remarked that Husserl is not as precise about
the potentiality of consciousness as he is about the intention-
ality of individual acts. With respect to the potentiality
of consciousness--the eidetic intentionality-structure of the
Ego--Husserl describes is as conscious life which is an all-
embracing cogito. And the correlate of this all-embracing cogito
is the cogitatum of all constutionable objectivity. Nevertheless,
since his description of intentionality is explicitly stated
as being eidetic, it then has to do with possibility, as he
calls it, that is to say, the very essence of what it
means for subjectivity to be related in an intuition-constitution
manner to objectivity.

Lonergan, besides calling it unlimited questioning and the
pure desire to know, refers to the radical intentionality of the
subject as the notion of being. Being is the objective of
unlimited questioning. It is what is intended in questioning

and what becomes known as answers are reached through the functioning of experience, understanding, and affirmation.  It is all-comprehensive and goes beyond all individual things known.

The "notion" here, first of all, is not a hazy idea, not an insight nor a concept nor a definition, not a reflective grasping nor a judgment, much less the verbal formulation of one of these.  The notion of being means the unlimited questioning that is the prior orientation manifesting itself as the two-phase operator, questioning.  It is the prior orientation that by the functioning of the two operator-questions carries the cognitional process from sense to understanding, from understanding to judgment, and from judgment to the context of correct judgments about what really is.  It goes beyond and embraces, then, every individual insight, concept, and definition, every reflective grasping and judgment.

Husserl's conception of intentionality does not have the precision that Lonergan's does, since he does not thematize it as questioning (or at least explicitly as an operator-like promoting).  Husserl does not give as much attention to the problem of the radical intentionality of the human subject, even though he asserts that intentionality is the essential characteristic of the Ego.  He describes it as consciousness with a correlative transcendent unity-identity offering itself to the intuiting Ego.  This conception is comprehensive enough to take in both essential elements of radical intentionality : the Ego's orientation (noetic side) to making objects give themselves in evidence to his intuition (which is to be specified as empirical and categorial) and the correlative that is intended (noematic side).

The precision of Lonergan's conception lies in his idea of questioning manifesting itself as a two-phase operator.  By thematizing questioning in this manner, he has a neat, comprehensive conception of intentionality : radical intentionality

is unlimited questioning and the three levels of intentional
activity are a function of unlimited questioning manifesting
itself in the operation of the two operator questions. The
movement through these three levels stands to the operator
questions as answers. The advance of cognition through its
three-cycle period of experience, inquiry and understanding,
reflecting and affirmation is already provided for by intentiona-
lity conceived as questioning and answering. The originating
source of intentionality and intentional acts are thus tightly
integrated.

When Husserl undertakes the study of the genesis of the
judgment and categorial objectivity, as in Erfahrung und Urteil
and Formal and Transcendental Logic, he runs into the necessity
of having some operator to promote cognition from sensation to
categorial activity. His self-avowed static analysis (as in
Ideas I) takes up this task : to mark out the different consti-
tutive elements of the intentional act. The noetic-noematic
studies here mainly distinguish the immanent element from the
transcendent in empirical as well as in categorial activity.
Genetic analysis takes up this task : to trace the relationship
of empirical activity and its object with categorial activity
and its object.

The empirical aspect of intentionality is presented as
both sense intuition and passive constitution by Husserl,
while the categorial aspect is presented as both categorial
intuition and active constitution. His notion of "originär
gebende Anschauung" is an attempt to fuse intuition and constitu-
tion. A further attempt to fuse them reveals itself in his
claim that intentionality is the effectuating of the self-
giving of the object to intuition. Eugen Fink, Gaston Berger,
and Paul Ricoeur have all remarked on Husserl's fusing of
constitution in a creative intuition.

There is no doubt that Husserl considers cognition to be
a unity comprising sensation and judgment linked functionally

to each other, whether this unity be regarded as intuition, or constitution, or creative intuition. But right here in the relationship between sensation and judgment, in the passage of cognition from sensation to judgment, Husserl's theory of intentionality begins to strain. The problem lies in the conflict between the notions of intuition and constitution. For one can raise the question : How does the knowing process get from sensation to judgment ? Or to put the question more broadly in order to cover intentionality, what is more in accord with the exigencies of Husserl's notion of intentionality, intuition or constitution?

What is at issue is to determine whether intuition or constitution with some sort of operator), or a fusion of the two, is the norm of objectivity. The situation is this. On the one hand, intuition with visual perfeption as its model is the norm of cognition, and thus the empirical object should be the norm for objectivity. On the other hand, active constitution embraces all of intentionality, and the categorial object is the norm for objectivity. Or, to put it another way, whereas intuition is the normative intentional <u>act</u>, the categorial object is the normative <u>object</u>.

Gaston Berger expresses the caveat that one must learn to unite in a creative intuition two concepts that one is in the habit of contrasting : the passivity of intuition and the activity of constitution.[9] But one might wonder if it really is possible to give up the habit, and even more, if one ought to. Perhaps intuition and constitution are two activities so dissimilar that the most that could be achieved by trying to harmonize them would be an uneasy concordism.

Normative <u>act</u> and normative <u>object</u> can be the convenient headings here for our confrontation. First, then, the normative act : the proto-mode (<u>Urmodus</u>) of intuition is sense

9. Berger, <u>Le cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl</u>, p. 100.

perception which enjoys this pre-eminent role because in
perception the empirical (real) object appears there in its
self-giving presence. This presence is different from that
of the remembered or imagined object which are present only
as called up (presentified). "Visual perception" is the
"paradigm" of human knowing.[10] Thus, all sense perception,
even if it happens to be hearing or feeling, is called
intuition.

It is absolutely crucial to grasp Husserl's pre-occupation
with presence. Presence signifies the two dimensions, so to
speak, of the empirical object. The object is "there," and
it is "there right now," in a presence that is spatial and
temporal. Seeing is non distorting of this presence. It takes
in the object just as it is, adding nothing, subtracting nothing.
It brings one immediately "zu den Sachen."

If there is a sense intuition for empirical objects, there
is likewise a categorial intuition for ideal objects. The
presence of the object is again capital. Husserl speaks of
"empty intendings" and "fulfilled intuitions" with respect to
the object, whether empirical or categorial. If the ideal
object is there, then the intuition is fulfilled, and one
sees the ideal object in a manner analogous to sense intuition.
The other presence of the ideal object is time related. Inas-
much as the ideal object is free from the limiting co-ordinates
of space and time, it is thus always available for the gaze
of the transcendental Ego at any time and any place.

On the other hand, if the intending does not come to
term, it remains empty, unfulfilled. In any case, in its
heading for fulfilling intuition, the intending initiates and
carries on the whole process that can be marked by degrees of
fulfillment (or evidence).

---

10. Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," in
    Collected Papers III, pp. 93, 104, 112.

Concerning empty intendings, one might ask not so much
about their distinction from, as their relation to, fulfilling
intuition.  Why are they designated as being empty, unless
they are considered in their relationship to fulfilling intuition ?
For "empty" and "fulfilling" are correlative notions.  The
empty intendings do not precede their fulfilling intuitions in
a merely temporal way.  They precede in the sense that they
prepare for the fulfilling intuition because they are directed
towards it.

One can ask, then, why there is a movement that heads
from empty intendings for fulfilling intuition.  These
intendings and their fulfilling occur, first of all, upon the
same level, that is to say, there is the empty intending in
(sense) experience or judging that precedes the fulfilling
intuition of the experienced object or the judged object.  Then,
if Husserl's notion of fulfilling were extended, it could be
said that there is likewise fulfilling intuition of the one
act of knowing in the passage from the level of sensation to
that of categorial activity.  The act of judging ends the cycle
that comprises the passage from one level to another, from
sensation to categorial activity.  For inasmuch as judging is the
fulfilment of a certain, specific complete act of knowing it
is likewise the fulfilment of sensation which is an element
of the complete act. Therefore, since properly speaking it is
only the categorial object that possesses the fulness of object-
ivity, sensation with respect to categorial activity could be
said to be an empty intending.

In this context of empty intending and fulfilling intuition,
and the advance in cognition from sensation to categorial
activity, the nature of intuition should be recalled.  Intuition
is essentially passive.  It is a receptivity vis-à-vis an
object that is present.  Where the presence of the object is
conceived upon the model of confrontation and extroversion,
intuition is the acceptance of the object offering itself to

be looked at. Conceiving objectivity in such a manner entails conceiving objects as somehow ready-made and anterior to the act of intuition. For how can intuition do other than gaze upon what is present ? If it does anything else, if falsifies what is there.

If intuition may adequately explain sense perception and its object, it runs into a refractory case when it attempts to cover categorial activity and its objects For to speak of a "categorial intuition" does not essentially modify the nature of intuition and its object. The model of intuition is perception and the empirical object, more precisely, seeing and the seen object. The model of categorial intuition, then, is seeing and the model of the categorial object is the seen object.

Yet Husserl never tires of asserting the difference between the empirical and the categorial object, a difference which points to two different kinds of intentional performances. What, then, does it mean to intuit an affair-complex like the parallelogram of forces or a general essence like a function. Where do these objects come from so that one can intuit them ? And to pose the radical question again, how does knowing get from the intuition of empirical things to the intuition of categorial objects ?

One might sum up the situation like this : there is intending and fulfilling on the level of sensation and on the level of categorial activity. There is likewise an intending and fulfilling in the advance of cognition from sensation to its fulness in categorial activity. One might ask, then, whether intuition _by itself as intuition_ can explain the passage from empty intending to fulfilment upon the same level and the advance from one type of intuition to another, from sense to categorial intuition. The passage from empty intending to fulfilling intuition and the advance from sense to categorial intuition involves something which, though distinct from sense and categorial intuition, is not extraneous to them. For to be

precise, it initiates and carries through the passage and the advance.

Lonergan would deny that intuition is normative in cognition and that through it the knowing subject is immediately related to objective reality. Though taken metaphorically, intuition might acceptably describe some aspect of cognition on the level of categorial activity, of itself alone it neither accounts for nor suggests the passage and advance that occur in knowing.

It is not through sense intuition, or any intuition modelled upon it, that the subject's knowing activities derive their immediate relationship to real objects. That relationship is immediate in the subject's capacity for unlimited questioning-- his notion of being, his intention of being. The relationship is mediate in his sensation inasmuch as unlimited questioning makes use of the data of sense to promote cognition to its term in affirmation. And similarly, the relationship is mediate in understanding and affirmation because these activities stand to the unlimited questioning manifesting itself in the two-phase operator-question as answers.

To make seeing the norm of cognition, avers Lonergan, is to reduce cognition to an activity whose model is "biological extroversion." One overlooks the nature of the performance and achievement of understanding and affirmation. They are reduced to a type of looking though one should no more say that the mind looks and "glances than sight smells."[11] The performance and achievement of the questioning of data and the reflective questioning of understanding are what they are "because they are what ocular vision never is, namely, intelligent and rational." [12]

If one were to take intuition alone as the normative element in cognition for Husserl and basic questioning for Lonergan, one would have two very sharply distinguished notions. But one would have missed the other aspect in Husserl's notion of what

---

11. V, 170.

12. CS, 235.

is normative in cognition, namely constitution. One would have opted for one of the aspects at the expense of the other, something that Husserl himself does not do. And so, although the points that Lonergan could make against Husserl's intuition theory would be valid, one must not leave aside Husserl's own counterbalancing theory of constitution. If, however, one takes the notion of operator as the heading under which to allow Husserl and Lonergan to confront each other, then both intuition and constitution, as well as their fusion in creative intuition, can get their due evaluation.

This brings us to the second heading of the confrontation : the normative object. The categorial object is the normative object for Husserl. The categorial object has been considered as effectuated by categorial intuition. But it must also be considered as effectuated by active constitution. For as soon as the categorial object and its specific characteristics are considered in relation to active constitution, then a new aspect of intentionality reveals itself. This is an operator-like motivating element in the knowing process that carries it from sensation and the sense object up to categorial activity and the categorial object. We have already alluded to a similar element, non-intuitional, in the empty intending-fulfilling intuition duo.

It should be noted immediately that intuition and active constitution are all-comprehensive in their respective domains. Thus intentional performance can be viewed as intuition, and thus there are sense and categorial intuitions ; or it can be viewed as constituion, and thus--as Husserl explicitly states--active constitution englobes passive constitution. For just as the categorial object insofar as it is normative pre-empts the title of object, so does the active constitution by which it is effectuated englobe passive constitution.

The active constitution of the categorial object involves striving (Streben) and interest (Interesse). They are the

operator-like promoters through which cognition advances from
the passive constitution of the empirical object to the active
constitution of the categorial object. Although they are
necessary for the advance of cognition from passive to active
constitution, it must be stressed that they cannot be identified
with either of these two types of constitution (much less with
either of the two types of intuition). They promote cognition
in a transformative manner from passive to active constitution
(just as they do the same with respect to empty intendings and
fulfilling intuition).

Interest and striving (and stimulus, tendency, etc.),
however, cannot be equated with constitution any more than
intentionality can be. Interest and striving are moments found
in intentional performance. They are the property intrinsic to
the intentionality-structure of the Ego because of which
cognition, as a functionally interlocked process, advances from
passive to active constitution.

The notion of operator most appropriately describes this
promotion that takes place in knowing.
Husserl never uses the term "operator" in conjunction with
"interest" and "striving" to explain the relationship of passive
and active constitution. (There is really no reason why he
should have to use the actual term.) Nor does he ever explicitly
present any of these notions as that which promotes cognition
from sensation to the level of active constitution with its
affair-complexes and general essences. Nonetheless it would be
legitimate to say that interest and striving do carry out some
of the functions of an operator. For they are designations for
the general property of intentionality that initiates the process
culminating in the constitution and possession of the unity-
identity of the categorial object.

Lonergan for his part explicitly names the operator :
questioning. The notion of the operator is at one and the same
time the rejection of intuition as normative and the recognition

of the functional interlinking of sensation, understanding, and affirmation. Without the operator there is really no knowing process ; rather there is a series of discrete and juxtaposed stages assimilated (and thus limited) to one kind of intentional operation, for example, visual perception.

Even though Lonergan's notion of the two-phase operator is thematic, whereas Husserl's notion of active constitution comprising striving and interest is operative, the fundamental accord between the two notions can be perceived and evaluated. Husserl's conception of active constitution blunts Lonergan's objections against his theory of intentionality precisely by introducing an operator-like property (striving and interest) that assigns to intuition its correct place.

Really, active constitution should be called the normative act just as its object, the categorial object, is called the normative object. Active constitution is normative since it accounts for the exigencies of intentional performance. These exigencies are the interlocking of sense and categorial activity, and the advance of cognition from the one to the other operated by striving and interest. Husserl's claim that active constitution embraces passive constitution is an acknowledgment of these exigencies. Passive constitution is aligned with active constitution as something that takes its sense from active constitution inasmuch as the advance in cognition must be accounted for, and only can be, by active constitution with the working of striving and interest.

Nevertheless, in spite of the conflict between the claims of intuition and constitution, Husserl does not definitively choose one instead of the other. Rather he attempts a harmony in the originär gebende Anschauung, a type of creative intuition, as Gaston Berger calls it. Further aspects of this conflict and attempted harmony will be pointed out in the following chapters.

## II. <u>Horizon</u>

Similarity in vocabulary when the same term is used to mean different things can be misleading. Such is the case in the use of the term "horizon" by Husserl and Lonergan. Their meanings for horizon are different enough, though Lonergan more than likely takes over the term from Husserl together with some of its Husserlian meanings.[13]

Horizon for Husserl, whether of perception or of every cogito-cogitatum or of consciousness itself, involves both the subjective and objective side of intentionality. The notion evokes the relationship of the intended object and the intending Ego that resides in the Ego's manifold possibilities of constituting. Furthermore, the notion indicates the openness and at the same time the boundary of cognition, that is to say, the openness of constituting possibilities and the boundary of what is constituted or to-be-constituted as the limit of conscious reality. In a word, constitution describes both the openness and the boundary of knowing. Although Husserl never speaks of them in the same context, the notions of striving and interest are most compatible with that of horizon with its boundary which is also the openness to constitution.

There is no parallel in Lonergan of Husserl's use of "horizon" with respect to sense perception. Lonergan's viewpoint is different. The reason is most probably that once again the notion of the operator is involved. Since visual perception is Husserl's model for cognition, he undertakes a meticulous phenomenological analysis of perception. Lonergan for his part, considering perception as just one of the functionally related elements of knowing (recall its heuristic function), sees it more in its relationship to the two-phase operator of questioning.

However, when Lonergan examines the horizon of cognition,

---

13. See E.

he also finds a subjective and an objective dimension which
he designates as subjective and objective poles. Once Lonergan
distinguishes these two poles and employs them as a schema to
explicate intentionality, then to find parallels in Husserl one
has to bring in Husserl's notion of the three Egos.

To the natural human Ego of Husserl roughly corresponds
the subject of Lonergan with the horizons of common sense and
theory. The natural human Ego intends both the world of the
natural attitude and, on a higher level, the world of Galilean
science. The subjective pole of the subject on the level of
common sense is the set of intentional operations at his disposal
to deal with the concrete and the particular, while the
objective pole is the world, or fields, that such operations can
reach. Then the subjective pole of the person on the level of
theory is the set of operations by which he can understand and
define according to the method of science, while the objective
pole is the world, or fields, that such operations reach. Or, to
use Husserlian terms, the subjective pole constitutes the
objective pole as its intentional correlate.

Then to the Epoche-performing Detached Observer and the
Transcendental Ego corresponds the subject whose horizons
embrace the worlds of exteriority and interiority. According to
Husserl, through the Epoche-performing of the Detached Observer,
the natural human ego and his world are reduced to the Transcendental
Ego as to their validating ground. For Lonergan the world of
exteriority is transcendent objectivity ; the correlative
subjective pole is the subject to whom transcendent objectivity
is mediately present through the subject's experience, understand-
ing, and affirmation. The world of interiority, however, is
the subject himself. It is the subject, not as immediately
present to himself in his operations, but as mediately present
through a reflexive act of knowing. In Husserl's phrase, it
would be the Eidos-Ego attained through the Epoche.

Crucial as objectivity reduced to the transcendental Ego

is for Husserl and the world of interiority is for Lonergan,
it should be recalled here (in the context of horizons) that they
do not for all that absorb and subsume objectivity to the extent
that all other objectivity is such merely by courtesy, or as
a species of a supreme genus. Husserl's transcendental shift to
the Eidos-Ego and Lonergan's shift to interiority are rather
the attempt to establish the ultimate validating grounds for
cognition. The situation may be further clarified by noting that
the world of exteriority takes in the worlds of common sense
and theory. (Although the world of interiority does involve the
world of theory ; for example, insofar as it defines specific
cognitional terms, such as experience, understanding, affirmation,
objectivity, etc.)

To draw the parallel, then, between Husserl's and Lonergan's
notions of horizon, one has to bring in other notions as well.
The equivalents might be summed up as follows : the natural
human ego, and the horizons of common sense and theory ; the
Detached Observer and the transcendental Ego, and the horizons
of exteriority (with the world of exteriority embracing those of
common sense and theory) and of interiority.

### III. Transcendence

Husserl resolves the problem of transcendence for himself
in The Idea of Phenomenology through a schema that presents an
intentional immanence which is a real transcendence. The point
we would like to make here is that, although this work of
Husserl emphasizes the capital role of intuition with respect to
objectivity, it does not neglect or minimize the role of
constitution. The importance of intuition may be more palpable
by reason of its more extensive treatment, but the importance of
constitution is in no way lessened. In a nutshell, Husserl's
doctrine in this work is : the transcendent is the intentional
element that is not a really inherent moment of the Ego's immanent
activity.

In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl adds further
precisions by asserting that transcendence consists in the
unity-identity of objects "over against the multiplicities"
of noeses "constituting them."[14]  The property of unity-identity
belongs pre-eminently to the categorial object.  The ideal object
is, then, pre-eminently transcendent.

Once again the points of cardinal importance are intuition
and constitution, their relationship, and the categorial object.
On the one hand, the transcendence of the object is conceived
as consisting in its self-giving to the intuition that is modeled
upon the confrontation of the visible object and the act of
seeing.  The transcendent object is as it were "outside" of the
act of seeing (which is immanent) and one looks at the
transcendent object thus located over against him.  On the other
hand, the transcendence of the object is presented as a unity-
identity vis-à-vis a noetic manifold that constitutes it.
Transcendence, then, resides at the same time in seeing-confrontation
and constitution.

Besides what has been said before concerning the relation
of intuition and constitution, another of its aspects might
be noted here.  This is the problem that arises with the attempt
to distinguish transcendence from immanence on the model of
the clean physical separation of the act of seeing and the object
seen.  But does not the notion of the object confronting an
intuition tend to rehabilitate such a dualism ?  One can ask if
such a model is adequate to explain, or even suggest, the
transcendence of objectivity.  The Epoche has precisely eliminated
any dualism, for transcendence is reduced to intentional immanence.

But when transcendence is considered as grounded in
constitution, then two things are remarked.  First, all transcendence
is constituted in the intending immanence of the Ego.  Secondly,
the intending of the Ego has as its final goal, its culmination,

---

14. FTL, 165 [148] .

the constitution of the unity-identity of the categorial object.
These two aspects are intimately bound up with each other.

Husserl says that an "essential moment" of consciousness
is its "intending-beyond-itself."[15] This intending-beyond-
itself constitutes a unity-identity that is correlative to
the intending composed of noetic multiplicities. In this
correlation of the intending-beyond-itself and the constituted
unity-identity resides the transcendence of cognition. Conscious-
ness gets beyond its own immanent states when it constitutes
its object, a permanent unity-identity pole, accessible to
everyone. Immanence and transcendence are opposed, but as
multiple noeses and unity-identity.

Without doing violence to Husserl's notion of transcendence,
we could introduce striving and interest, and point out their
roles. Husserl speaks of cognition as a striving towards the
"judgmental decisiveness" of the categorial object. Now the
objective unity-identity constituted by consciousness is pre-
eminently the categorial object. Transcendence, however, resides
in the unity-identity of the constituted object. Consequently,
striving and interest, inasmuch as they bring about the advance
of cognition from the empirical object to the categorial object,
can likewise be considered as the specific element of intentional
performance by which transcendence is achieved. In brief, the
striving for the unity-identity of the categorial object is the
striving for transcendence.

For Lonergan the transcendence of the object is conceived
of in terms of the self-transcendence of the subject. There is
no problem of an "inside" or "outside" based upon looking and
spatial metaphors. Self-transcendence rests ultimately upon the
subject's capacity for questioning. There are levels of self-
transcendence : there is the self-transcendence in the dreaming
subject ; in the subject settled in the world of immediacy. Then

---

15. CM, 46 [84] .

the highest level of cognitional self-transcendence is achieved
in the affirmation at the term of the two-phase operator's
functioning.[16]

Self-transcendence means that the subject is not one of
the conditions of the affirmation, that is, he goes beyond
what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, to what is
really so.  When the subject attains what really is so, he
reaches a realm that is nonspatial, nontemporal, and impersonal,
and therefore accessible to all persons.  Also bound up with
self-transcendence, then, is truth.  For just as cognitional
self-transcendence is reached in the grasp of the unconditioned,
the criterion of truth is this grasp of the unconditioned.
To affirm what is really so is to attain the level of self-
transcendence that is likewise the realm of truth.

It is evident that a comparison of the notions of
transcendence of Husserl and Lonergan would more profitably
involve Husserl's conception of constitution than that of
intuition.  Enough has already been said of intuition to know
Husserl's position (and its ambiguity) and Lonergan's tack.
Both Husserl and Lonergan, however, are in agreement that in-
tentionality achieves transcendence insofar as transcendence
is a nonspatial, nontemporal reality characterized by universal
accessibility.  Although both philosophers consider truth in
the same context with transcendence, we will return to it in the
last chapter where we will treat it with respect to its specific
problems.

One might say that, though both Husserl and Lonergan stress
the independence of what is transcendent with respect to the
immanent experiencings of the Ego or to the inquiring subject,

---

16. The highest level of self-transcendence (not just cognitional
    self-transcendence) for Lonergan is love.  In an unexpected
    turn he correlates unrestricted questioning and love :
    "Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-
    transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is
    the proper fulfilment of that capacity" (FB, 10).

Husserl's attention focuses on the <u>achieved</u> transcendence
whereas Lonergan's focuses on the <u>promotion</u> of cognition towards
the achievement. The difference can be attributed to different
concerns (for example, Husserl's polemic with psychologism on
the existential status of categorial objects). But it can also
be attributed to the role that the operator assumes in cognition.

Inasmuch as Lonergan has the explicit operator, question-
ing, he distinguishes levels of cognitional self-transcendence
that are capped by the level of affirmation. Intentionality is
a heading for transcendence that is carried and guided through
by the two-phase operator. For the functional interlinking
of experience, understanding, and affirmation resides in the two-
phase operator. Further, insofar as the three partial aspects
of objectivity (experiential, normative, and absolute) and
the three levels of self-transcendence are specified by experience,
understanding, and affirmation, the interlinking of each aspect and
of each level resides in the operator, too.

In Husserl's case, we have pointed out the relation that
striving and interest bear to transcendence because of their
relation to the categorial object. Husserl in fact explicitly
mentions in the same context transcendence and the "striving"
to produce judgments.[17] Consciousness constitutes transcendence
in its immanent sphere, properly speaking, at the moment it
constitutes the categorial object. But since striving and interest
are operative notions in Husserl, their role in achieving
transcendence is not as clearly defined as is the role of question-
ing in Lonergan. As a consequence, Husserl's analyses are more
of the <u>constituted</u> transcendent object than of the <u>constituting</u>
process initiated and carried through by the operator-like
activity of striving and interest.

---

17. Transcendence : FTL, 165 [148] ; striving : FTL, 167 [149] .

## Summary

There are three sections in this chapter. First, there is the confrontation of intuition-constitution and the operator questioning that involves the prior confrontation of intuition and constitution at the interior of Husserl's thinking. The ambiguity of their relationship is drawn out under the headings of the normative act and the normative object. The normative act for Husserl is intuition modeled on visual perception, whereas the normative object is the categorial object. The upshot of contrasting intuition and constitution is the revelation of the similarity between Husserl's notion of constitution and Lonergan's of intentionality as a two-phase operator. The notions of an operator--operative (implicit) in Husserl and thematic (explicit) in Lonergan--is seen as a heading under which to compare Husserl's and Lonergan's notions of intentionality.

The second section is on horizon. Going beyond just the similarity of terms, we have established a parallel between the Ego in Husserl and horizon in Lonergan. The natural human Ego parallels the horizons of common sense and theory, while the Detached Observer and the transcendental Ego parallel the horizons of exteriority and interiority.

The third section is on transcendence. The characteristics of transcendence grounded on intuition and constitution are noted as a further manifestation of the ambiguous relationship in Husserl between intuition and constitution. The comparison with Lonergan, therefore, is made on the basis of constitution. The similarity between the transcendence of the categorial object for Husserl and the self-transcendence achieved in affirmation for Lonergan is remarked. The categorial object and absolute objectivity (attained in the self-transcendence of affirmation) are nonspatial, nontemporal, and impersonal, and therefore, for every person. Lonergan's focus is on the

promotion of knowing towards the <u>achieving</u> of transcendence, while Husserl's is on the <u>achieved</u> transcendent object. The difference of focus can be attributed to the different role that the operator assumes for the two philosophers.

CHAPTER XV


VOCABULARIES

(Chapters III and IX Confrontation)


The two chapters on Epoche and Ego, self-appropriation and
subject, and then the two on intentionality are necessary back-
ground for situating objectivity in the thought of Husserl and
Lonergan. The vocabulary and definitions for objectivity and related
terms are then presented in order that the main points of the
objectivity problematic might be thus specified by clarifying what
Husserl and Lonergan mean when they use the term "object" and
certain other terms. And so, before taking up the question of the
general and principal notions of objectivity, the kinds and aspects,
and finally objective validity, it is logical to identify some
of the meanings that "object" and "objectivity," and some other
related terms have for Husserl and Lonergan.

The caution already expressed concerning similarity of
vocabulary and the equivalence of notions should be kept in mind.
One must be mindful that for comparing Husserl's and Lonergan's
notions of objectivity, it is necessary to find not only the
meanings of identical terms, such as "sense object," "ideal object,"
or "transcendence," but also equivalent notions, such as the three
Egos and horizon.

With regard to Husserl's vocabulary, three things are to
be recalled. First, Husserl introduces the broader term Gegen-
ständlichkeit to contrast it with Gegenstand which, he claims,
is tinctured with empiricism. He introduces Gegenständlichkeit
in order to eliminate the identification of objectivity with

empirical objects. For the two kinds of objects, then he has a term comprehensive enough to take them both in.

Secondly, Objektivität (and its cognates Objekt and objektiv) often denotes the transcendent dimension of the intended correlate of subjectivity in contradistinction to the immanent side of cognition. Thus it is used in conjunction with Erkenntnis, Wahrheit, Welt, and Geltung. Speaking generally, one could say that Gegenstand and Objekt are often contrasted with Objektivität in this manner : the first pair refers to the intended correlate of a specific intentional act or of consciousness, while Objektivität refers to the property of the intending act or of consciousness by which these transcend pure immanence. And then sometimes, as in The Idea of Phenomenology, Gegenständlichkeit is used in a manner similar to Objektivität.

Thirdly, the definition of objectivity and of the object is, to be exact, that of ideal (categorial) objectivity and the ideal (categorial) object.

Besides Gegenstand, Gegenständlichkeit, Objekt, and Objektivität, Husserl employs other related terms, depending upon the aspect of intentionality he is inspecting. Thus he uses Transzendenz and irreell which denote the noninherence of the object to the immanent element of the intentional act. Thus he uses Gebilde to underscore the active element in the production of the ideal object.

Something should be said here about the significance of a vocabulary cluster in Husserl. A vocabulary cluster is the multiple occurrence in a specific context of a certain term. An important cluster (besides those noted in Chapter III) is the appearance of Streben, Interesse, Reiz, and Tendenz in the context of the constitution of the categorial object. Their clustering indicates that a specific problem is being treated with is specific vocabulary even though they do not benefit from the explicit endorsement that Husserl gives Gegenständlichkeit.

As for Lonergan, he defines objectivity in terms of questioning : it is what is intended in questions and becomes known

as the questions are answered. He defines a principal notion
and the three partial aspect of objectivity in relation to question-
ing conceived as a two-phase operator. "Operator" is thus a term
as important as "objectivity."

Then, what is capital for his notion of objectivity,
Lonergan proposes a definition of "body" which he denies
coincides with that of objectivity. A body is what is extroverted
to ; an object is what is intended in questioning. But it does
not follow then that body and experiential objectivity are to
be simply identified. For a body can be involved in an affirmation,
and then it entails absolute objectivity. For example, one can
judge that a certain body is a typewriter, or that a body falls
with a certain acceleration. The hallmark of objectivity is found
in the absolute objectivity of affirmation, not in biological
extroversion.

The "cognitional self-transcendence of the subject" is another
term in Lonergan related to objectivity. Its definition is
matched up with the definition of objectivity, and this in its turn
is matched up with the definition of the three levels of
knowing. And then all of these definitions are ultimately
presented in terms of the questioning-operator.

Husserl's introduction of Gegenständlichkeit is paralleled
by Lonergan's distinction "body" and "object."" Husserl makes it
clear that his notion of objectivity takes in, so to speak,
empirical Gegenstände and ideal Gegenständlichkeiten. Lonergan,
for his part, distinguishes three aspects of objectivity, none of
which can be identified with body. The introduction of Gegenständ-
lichkeit and the definition of body, though they are matters of
vocabulary, have a great importance for a Husserl-Lonergan
comparison. For they reveal a basic agreement between Husserl
and Lonergan with respect to what the two of them believe is an
absolutely essential aspect of objectivity : objectivity cannot
be limited to just empirical objects.

Next, Objektivität ʿGegenständlichkeit, too, sometimes)

for Husserl and "objectivity" for Lonergan mean the transcendent dimension of human cognition by which it gets beyond its immanence. This transcendence is what is meant in the phrase "the objectivity of knowledge." This transcendence, the objectivity of knowledge, is the specific topic of this work.

Finally, both Husserl and Lonergan, in defining objectivity, give what for them are its essential notes. Husserl's definition of objectivity is, properly speaking, that of the categorial object. For Lonergan the clincher for determining objectivity is absolute objectivity, inasmuch as the two-phase operator comes to a term there. These two definitions, then, are capital for the following chapters.

## Summary

This chapter has three points. First, both Husserl and Lonergan reject the identification of object with empirical object : Husserl, by introducing Gegenständlichkeit ; Lonergan, by explicit definition of objectivity and exclusion of body. Secondly, objectivity can said to be for both Husserl and Lonergan the cognitional transcendence achieved in intentionality. Thirdly, the paradigm of objectivity for Husserl is categorial objectivity whereas for Lonergan it is absolute objectivity.

CHAPTER XVI


THE GENERAL AND THE PRINCIPAL NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY

(Chapters IV and X Confrontation)


Husserl's definition of objectivity reveals what his
general notion of objectivity is.  The general notion--in the
sense of a normative notion--contains the specifically determinent
elements of objectivity by which objectivity can be said to be
the transcendence of the intended correlate and its validation.
Thus it is not the purely formal notion of objectivity-in-
general of formal logic.  According to the general notion, there
are four determinants element of objectivity.  However, these
are the properties of ideal objectivity.  And so, objectivity
is pre-eminently ideal objectivity.

These essential notes are : unity-identity, the object's
fixation in writing, its permanent accessibility as an _Erwerb_,
and finally its validation by fulfilling intuition.  The ideal
object, possessing as it does these traits, is the normative
object.  The empirical object possesses them proleptically.

We have already mentioned the problem that exists with
regard to the normative _act_ and the normative _object_ for
Husserl's notion of objectivity.  The problem surfaces here again
inasmuch as the empirical object's relationship to the categorial
object must be explained.  The categorial object is the norm
for the empirical object, not because the empirical object is
transformed into it, nor because the empirical object resembles
it, somewhat in the way that humming resembles an orchestra playing.

The categorial object is normative insofar as knowing advances from the empirical object to its term in the categorial object. The empirical object is not reduced to the categorial object. They cannot be compared to each other as if their relationship were that of two equal, independent, and finished realities. Their relationship exists within the knowing process, where the empirical object takes its meaning from the categorial object towards whose constitution the knowing process orders itself.

Consequently, the question of the operator also surfaces once more. For the operator is the basis of the relationship between the empirical object and the categorial object since it accounts for the advance in cognition form the one to the other. And if the question of the operator reappears, then so does the question of the relationships of intuition, constitution, and the categorial object. The question in that case, then, is what better explains the four essential characteristics of objectivity, intuition or constitution ? A further discussion of the operator, and of intuition and constitution in this context is made in the following two chapters where the different kinds of objects are distinguished and their validity is examined. We can confine ourselves here to an ennumeration of the traits of objectivity compared with the essential traits of objectivity according to Lonergan.

Another point, though not raised explicitly by Husserl, might be mentioned here for good reasons other than just an arbitrary desire for symetrical neatness in comparing Husserl and Lonergan. It is that the notion of objectivity arises in the context of the Epoche and several kinds of intentional acts. The Epoche discloses the intending of the Ego and distinguishes immanence from transcendence with respect to the Ego's intending. Whence it is seen that the Ego is not the object, that immanence is not transcendence. And further, two diverse intentional acts effectuate diverse objects, that is, empirical and categorial objects. The categorial object is the locus of transcendence.

Husserl's main point in correlating subjectivity and objectivity is seen, then, in a different perspective : the precise notion of objectivity arises in connexion with precisely defined aspects of subjectivity, that is, with the Eidos-Ego. The Eidos-Ego is the key to the Eidos object.

For Lonergan the principal notion of objectivity is based immediately on the absolute objectivity of affirmation. The principal notion only arises in a context of judgments. In formalizing to a certain extent these judgments (A is, B is, C is ; A is not B....), Lonergan makes it clear that his analyses of the subject's structure are on the explanatory level-- the parallel of Husserl's eidetic level.

The principal notion contains these essential elements : a context of three judgments (evidently presupposing an accumulated intentional experience by a subject who has attained a certain level of culture, and not just three simple judgments that appear fully fashioned like a printed page. The first judgment is about something transcendent to consciousness (consciousness taken in Lonergan's sense), A is ; the second is about the subject, "I am a knower," B is. This is the pivotal judgment of self-affirmation. The third judgment is that the something judged in judgment number one is not the subject, that is, A is not B.

Because it is based on affirmation, it would be accurate to isolate the quintessence of Lonergan's principal notion of objectivity in the two-phase operator. The two-phase operator of questioning comes to term in the affirmation. A unit of question-ing comes to term in the affirmation. A unit of questioning is rounded. One unit of questioning aims at the transcendent object. The other is turned by the subject upon himself to reach the self-affirmation.

It is essential to keep in mind the importance of self-affirmation for the notion of object. In Lonergan's mind, one phase of the two-phase operator must head for self-affirmation

in a judgment so that the notion of objectivity (and not just
subjectivity can emerge). And the core of Lonergan's thinking
again is the rejection of any type of looking to determine
either the subject himself or anything but one aspect of objecti-
vity. Thus, besides the establishment of absolute object-
ivity in the case of individual judgments, the two-phase operator
can be said to determine in the most basic context of cognition
both the object and the subject.

With regards to Husserl and Lonergan vis-à-vis the traits
and partial aspects of objectivity, for the sake of clarity we
can take the four traits of objectivity according to Husserl as
the heading for comparing the general notion of objectivity of
Husserl and the principal notion of Lonergan. First of all,
the validation by categorial intuition-active constitution and
its counterpart, affirmation, are the specific topics of
Chapter XVIII. The question of the operators involved comes up
there again.

The second characteristic : unity-identity. Upon the
unity-identity of the object is founded the transcendence of the
object for Husserl (as we saw in Chapter XII). This sameness,
identifiable through all the diverse noeses, makes the object
independent of and detatchable from them. The counterpart in
Lonergan is the partial aspect, absolute objectivity, that
rests upon the virtually unconditioned of affirmation. There is
a unity-identity here : the object is intended and it is
judged to be in such a way. But for Lonergan the pivotal issue
is the grasp of the unconditioned. The object is an unconditioned.
Therefore it is detachable as a unit from the psychological
conditions in which it is grasped. It is an unconditioned, for
the subject himself is not one of the conditions constituting
it in its essence.

The fourth characteristic, then : the permanence of the
object as an acquisition. If the object is an unity-identity,
always the same, it is acceptable to everyone. "Everyone" is the

"für jedermann" which we have said could be taken to mean that
the object is constituted by the transcendental Ego for the
transcendental Ego. That is to say, the unity-identity of the
object pertains to the eidetic structures of the constituted
object and the constituting Ego. Consequently, it is in a
common domain of accessibility ; this domain is nonspatial and non-
temporal.

Lonergan is in essential accord with Husserl concerning
accessibility and objectivity. Lonergan describes the objectivity
of knowledge and its accessibility as its "publicity." However,
once again, the absolute objectivity of the virtually unconditioned
has the principal role for Lonergan. The virtually unconditioned
is not limited to place or time, or even to the individual knowing
subject ; it transcends them. It is consequently accessible to
others, and belongs to the public domain.

In speaking of a permanent acquisition and a virtually
unconditioned, both Husserl and Lonergan bring in the question of
truth and reality. The collaboration essential to the cultural
existence and survival of the human community is based upon what
insures the objectivity and accessibility of knowledge. Neither
Husserl nor Lonergan excludes the importance of the hypothetical,
the supposed, the probable, as though some day everything would
be intuited in adequate evidence or grasped as virtually unconndiioned.

What they are asserting is that intuition-constitution or
the grasp of at least some fulfilled conditions is involved in
knowing. Intuition-constitution for Husserl and grasping of
conditions for Lonergan are normative for objectivity. That is
to say, there is objectivity insofar as they are present and
operative in the cognitional process. Intuition-constitution or
grasping conditions, and the movement intrinsic to the cognitional
process towards them as to the culmination, belong to the eidetic
structure of the Ego or to the polymorphic knowing of the subject,
and are not limited to just a particular individual person.

Finally, the fourth note of objectivity : the fixation in

writing. Though dependent on the unity-identity of the object, the fixation in writing for Husserl is just as much an essential characteristic as this unity-identity. Writing down is not, as it were, an optional accessory for objectivity. It is the _actual_ accessability of the object(s). Up to its writing down, the object is disembodied, and thus not obtainable _für jedermann_. Furthermore, if it is not fixed in writing, the object faces the possibility of extinction with the extinction of the individual.

There is no paralell in Lonergan for the fixation in writing of human knowledge and in essential characteristic of objectivity. Compared to Husserl Lonergan could be said to be more interested in what makes the writing down possible, namely, the grasp of the unconditioned, than the actual writing down it itself. It is not through indifference to human collaboration. The Epilogue to _Insight_ and the Lonergan Congress of 1970 are ready proof-texts to gainsay such a reproach.

Nevertheless, even though Lonergan has done specific work on hermeneutics in _Insight_[18] and lectures,[19] and has dedicated a whole chapter of his forthcoming book, _Method in Theology_, to "Meaning" (not limited just to language), there is no exact counterpart either to the linguistic studies in _Logical Investigations_ or the conception of language in "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie." When Husserl and Lonergan are analysing the intentional structure by which objectivity is attained (that is, when constitution is taken as normative in Husserl--and not intuition--and made the basis of comparison), there exists similarity enough. But the fixation in writing is not an essential note of objectivity for Lonergan the way it is

18. In, 562-586.

19. See "Hermeneutics," Notes for lectures during Theology Institute, Regis College, Toronto, July, 1962 (Toronto : Regis College, 1962).

for Husserl.

Lonergan's concern is with the cognitional operations by which objectivity is achieved (and shared with others by the same cognitional operations) and the motivation by which the subject might wish to communicate, and thus collaborate with others. Language is rather treated in the context of meaning, for which Lonergan distinguishes carriers of meaning (intersubjectivity, art, symbols, language, incarnate meaning of the person), and elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning.[20]  To pursue the comparison between Husserl's conception of language and that of Lonergan would require and extensive study that would lead us from the precise problem we have chosen : the roles of the operator, and of intuition-constitution and of affirmation.  The main features for a comparison of Husserl's and Lonergan's notions of objectivity can be found here.

## Summary

Husserl's general notion of objectivity, which is not the formal notion of objectivity, has four essential notes.  These notes are the properties of categorial objectivity.  Therefore the relation of the empirical and categorial object is again relevant. Further, the notion of objectivity rest implicitly upon the clarification of the eidetic structure of the Ego in which immanence and transcendence are distinguished.  The eidetic reduction of the Ego is necessary to determine objectivity.  For Lonergan the principal notion resides in three judgments, one of which is the pivotal self-affirmation of the knower that matches the eidetic reduction of the Ego.  Then the four notes of objectivity according to Husserl are used as the four points on which both Husserl's and Lonergan's notions are compared.  There is accord with respect to the unity-identity of the object and its permanent accessibility

---

20. Lectures on Method in Theology, Regis College, July, 1969 ; Milltown Institute, August, 1971.  The lectures are based upon "Meaning," a chapter in Lonergan's forthcoming book, Method in Theology.

based on its transcendence.  For Husserl's notion of language as the fixation of objectivity, there is no exact equivalent in Lonergan.  The consideration of the validity of objectivity, whether by intuition-constitution or affirmation, is put off to Chapter XVIII.

CHAPTER XVII


KINDS AND ASPECTS OF OBJECTIVITY

(Chapters V and XI Confrontation)


After the chapter on the general notion of objectivity in
Husserl and the principal notion in Lonergan, we take up the
particular elements, that is, different kinds of objectivity for
Husserl and partial aspects for Lonergan. First of all, a
distinction must be made between immanence and transcendence.
Husserl speaks of both "immanent" and "transcendent" objects.
Lonergan,however, reserves the term "object" exclusively for
transcendent objectivity. For "immanent objects," Lonergan
speaks rather of "consciousness" (or "self-presence"). The
distinction that Husserl makes with the notion of immanent and
transcendent objects, Lonergan makes with the notion of two
kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the subject and his acts (which
is consciousness), and knowledge of the object of these acts.
The comparison in this chapter is between the kinds of transcendent
objects in Husserl and the aspects of objectivity in Lonergan.

In line with the orientation of this work, the comparison
can be further specified by focusing attention on particular
points. The orientation, once again, is on the function of the
operator. The particular focal points in this chapter are Interesse-
Type in Husserl and normative-absolute objectivity in Lonergan,
since it is in these contexts that Husserl's quasi operator,
Interesse, and Lonergan's operator, questioning, function. In fact,
it is in the context of Interesse and similarity-Type that
Husserl most explicitly describes the workings of a quasi operator.

As for the Eidos, the traits essential for its comparison with the Lonerganian equivalent have already been sketched in Chapter XIII.

We should recall that for Husserl there is distinction, not isolation, between empirical and categorial objectivity. There is the advance in cognition from the one to the other. Furthermore, within categorial objectivity itself, there is an advance from the recognition of similarity (Assoziation), to the Type, and then to the Eidos.

An examination of the general notion of objectivity reveals four properties. It reveals further that the categorial objects possesses these properties normatively. Although the proper characteristics of the empirical object, then, are listed, they are to be seen with the categorial object in view. These specific characteristics are the empirical object's location in an individual place and its situation at a particular time. Still, though each co-ordinate of space and time is unique, and though the empirical object is constituted through profiles (Abschattungen), it is perceived as a unity-identity. It has its own fulfilling, validating intuition that constitutes it in its individual unity. For Husserl, the passive constituting of empirical objectivity is already a moment in a larger movement that is heading for the categorial object where the unity of the empirical object may be made accessible through the unity of the categorial object.

In the schema of the categorial object that we presented in Chapter V, the Type is of major importance because of its relationship with Interesse. It is while treating the constitution of the Type that Husserl explicitly discusses Interesse. The Type becomes in a way the pivotal point where the advance of cognition from empirical to categorial objectivity reveals very clearly its essential mechanism. Moreover, the vocabulary cluster that makes it appearance in this context is a further indication of the specific movement of intentionality at work here. Terms in this vocabulary cluster are : Ähnlichkeit, Interesse, Affektion,

Reiz, Tendenz, Weckung and Streben.

There is no gradual transition by which the empirical object merges into the categorial object,like one color shading off into another. The operator Interesse (and the others) does not measure the increments by which the empirical object slips into the categorial object. The categorial object has its specifying properties : it is the unity-identity, nonspatial and nontemporal, accessible to everyone. The Type as an ideal object with these properties is essentially different from the empirical object. But what Interesse can be said to measure is the passage of cognition from passive constitution to active constitution. Elements in this process that could be said, to be measured are : the awakening of interest, the noting of similarity (Ähnlichkeit) in empirical objects, and then the interest feed-back by which interest awakens itself and zeroes in one some particular characteristic.

This passage of cognition from the empirical object to the Type involves a greater transformation than the advance from the Type to the Eidos. For the empirical object and the Type are essentially different. With respect to ideality, however, the type is already an ideal object ; it is the categorial object, with an ideality which is proper to the Lebenswelt. And the Eidos, is too, an ideal object ; it is the ideal object effectuated from the Type as from its starting-point, even though Husserl calls it an ideality of a completely "new order."

It is worthy of note that Lonergan speaks of partial aspects of objectivity. Concerning partial aspects : if there are partial aspects, then the reason is that they are interrelated, with one aspect complementing another. And concerning objectivity : Lonergan is occupied with the intrinsic relationship of knowing to its intended correlate rather than with the correlate in itself, that is, with objectivity rather than with the object. It is the three-tiered objectivity of human knowing in the sense that Husserl speaks of the Objektivität, or the

Gegenständlichkeit, of knowledge.

Lonergan does speak of bodies and things as objects, but they both involve the three partial aspects and are measured by absolute objectivity, that is, according to their status with respect to affirmation as the term of the cognitional process. Thus a body or a thing is not simply an object by reason of possessing experiential objectivity. Both must be aligned with absolute objectivity in a way analogous to that in which the empirical object is aligned with the categorial object in Husserl. Then, if the body or the thing is affirmed, they have not just empirical objectivity but also absolute objectivity.

The normative and the absolute aspects of objectivity are the area in which the operator makes its appearance. The normative aspect rests upon the exigencies of questioning. This aspect is normative inasmuch as the objectivity of human knowing is determined by what questioning is, what is questioned, what kinds of questions there are with their correlative answers, and what the goal of questioning is.

Normative objectivity is opposed to the subjectivity of wishful thinking, of rash or overly cautious judgments, of allowing joy or sadness, hope of fear, love or hate, to block the proper vector of the knowing process. It is the objectivity that is opposed to allowing subjectivity to become a "counter-condition" interferring with the grasp of the unconditioned. Its ground lies in the unfolding of unrestricted questioning as this heads towards affirmation. The operator moves cognition towards the unconditioned in such a way to make the subject realize that he is not one of the conditions.

Normative objectivity, then, is to be complemented by absolute objectivity where the two-phase questioning comes to a term, namely, to that which is so. That which is judged is an absolute : it is withdrawn from relativity to the subject who effectuates it, the place where he effectuates it, and the time when he effectuates it. The absolute objectivity of a correct

affirmation is not to be equated with the invariance proper to universal judgment. Both particular and universaljudgment, if correct, are absolutely objective.

Absolute objectivity is the basis for the principal notion of objectivity inasmuch as the principal notion is constituted by a constellation of judgments that are needed to posit, then to distinguish, and finally to relate, the subject and the object. The individual judgment taken separately, the constellation of the judgments taken together, and the resulting principal notion at no point involve any confrontational type of opposition between a looking subject and a looked at object. Absolute objectivity--it might also be called complete, or terminal, objectivity--belongs only to the grasp of a virtually unconditioned that comes about at the end of a structured questioning cycle.

The local point of the comparison here is between Interesse-Type and normative-absolute objectivity. Empirical objectivity in Husserl and experiential objectivity in Lonergan can be compared in the light of their relationship to this pair. For Interesse-Type and normative-absolute objectivity are the point where the normative element of objectivity is introduced by the supervening operator. Empirical objectivity and experiential objectivity are the boundary conditions for the activity of these supervening operators, Interesse and questioning.

Husserl attends to the Type because it is the first appearance of the categorial (ideal) object. Lonergan attends to the absolute object of affirmation because it is an unconditioned that is grasped in any kind of correct judgment whatsoever. There is really no equivalent role in Lonergan for the Type as distinguished from the Eidos.[21] Husserl, however

---

21. It could be said, however, that the relationship of common sense (descriptive knowledge) to theory (explanatory knowledge), or the relationship of the heuristic function of images to understanding and judgment, bear some points of resemblance.

is occupied directly with the nontemporal and nonspatial invarience of the ideality constituted in the judgment, and indirectly with its correctness, or truth. For his part Lonergan is occupied directly with the absoluteness of each and every correct judgment. To this point concerning the Type and the absoluteness residing in the correct (true) judgment we will return in the next chapter.

Even a cursory acquaintance with Husserl's notion of the Type reveals how far it is from the vague ressemblance detected by any sort of association bearing an empirical stamp. A real quantum jump occurs between the empirical object and the Type. A unity-identity is constituted that is not a mere, hazily imagined similarity. The Type is the first proof that cognition and its object are a structure of interlinking elements, for there is the empirical object and then the founded, categorial object.

The empirical object and the categorial object can be said to be related insofar as Interesse supplies the link between them as an operator. The eidetic structure of cognition entails the advance from empirical to categorial objectivity. Interesse, however, is the operator that makes the advance possible. The conclusion, then, is that Interesse belongs to the eidetic structure of cognition as much as empirical and categorial objectivity. To present Interesse in this way is not to put words in Husserl's mouth, but to put explicity what is contained implicitly in such notions as Streben, Tendenz, Interesse, etc. If categorial objectivity and categorial intuition-active constitution are central to cognition, then the operator that effectuates its advance to their realization has to be central also.

If the operator is taken into account, then empirical objectivity can be said to stand to categorial as experiential objectivity stands to normative-absolute. That is to say, the

relationship is based upon functional complementarity, not degrees of resemblance. When Husserl avers that properly speaking the empirical object is not objective in the full sense, he does not mean it only partially resembles the categorial object, as the partially finished sketch resembles the completed portrait, or a wagon resembles a car. The notion of intuition does the disservice of implying some kind of similarity between empirical and categorial objectivity. The notion of constitution, on the other hand, minimizes a supposed resemblance attributable to perception and underscores the functional complementarity of the categorial object with respect to the empirical. The categorial object--with the Type as the paradigm--functionally complements the empirical object, just as the bloom of the flower complements the root.

Lonergan is clear on the functional complementarity of the three aspects of objectivity. Normative objectivity complements experiental, and absolute complements normative. Their interrelationship is not based on degrees of resemblance. In fact, normative and absolute objectivity are what they are because they are what experiential objectivity is not, namely, the resultant operated by questioning. The same could be said concerning empirical and categorial objectivity in Husserl : categorial objectivity is what it is because it is what empirical objectivity is not, namely, the resultant of an intervening and transforming moment of intentionality that we have designated under the generic term Interesse. If the difference, yet complementarity, of categorial objectivity with respect to empirical objectivity is obscured in Husserl's notion of intuition, it is highlighted in that of constitution.

## Summary

This chapter is concerned with the kinds of transcendant objectivity according to Husserl and the aspects according to Lonergan. The focal points of the investigation are the

contexts Interesse-Type in Husserl and normative-absolute
objectivity in Lonergan.  Integral to these contexts are the
functions of the respective operators, Interesse and question-
ing.  The Type is examined because it is the pivotal point
where the categorial object appears with the properties
that distinguish it from the empirical object.  Lonergan, by
speaking of partial aspects, asserts the functional complemen-
tarity of the aspects that resides in the operator questioning.
The functional complementarity is contrasted with an objecti-
vity  that is conceived as existing in degrees of increasing
resemblance.  The disservice of intuition and the service of
constitution in Husserl are alluded to again.  Objectivity
cannot be reduced to any one kind or aspect of objectivity.
And yet, categorial objectivity and absolute objectivity
have their privileged positions inasmuch as they are the
terminal objectivity of cognition.

CHAPTER XVIII


INTUITION-CONSTITUTION AND AFFIRMATION

(Chapters VI and XII Confrontation)

The point of this chapter might be expressed in a
Heideggerian question something like this : Why is there a
judgment at all ? The topics of the present chapter are con-
tained in this question : categorial intuition-active constitu-
tion and affirmation ; the objective validity of knowing ; the
operator ; evidence and the fulfilling of conditions ; truth.
Categorial intuition-active constitution and affirmation,
and the operator have already been examined in other contexts.
Here the effort will be to compare the notions of Husserl and
Lonergan concerning the objective validity of cognition on
the level of the judgment. But attendant upon these notions
are evidence and fulfilling conditions ; truth ; and the
operator. In this chapter, intuition and constitution will
make, so to speak, their final confrontation at the interior
of Husserl's conception of intentionality anterior to a
comparison with Lonergan's notion of affirmation. And for the
final time, the advantage of constitution over intuition will
be brought forward.

I.   Objective Validity of Cognition

The validity of cognition has as its correlative, object-
ive reality. For Husserl the validity of cognition, be it
empirical or categorial, resides in the fulfilling intuition
of an empty intending. Through fulfilling intuition the

reality of an object is determined. For in the intuition the object is present in its self-giving. The self-giving object is the real object. Upon the self-giving object rests the validity of cognition.

Yet, besides being thus described in terms of intuition, the validity of cognition can be likewise expressed as a matter of passive and active constitution. Then the objective reality of the empirical object is constituted by prepredicative experience while that of the categorial object is constituted by the judgment. Furthermore, the objectivity of cognition depends upon the interrelationship of passive and active constitution insofar as passive constitution is the first level of active constitution, and categorial objectivity is, with respect to empirical objectivity, a founded objectivity.

The validity of knowing, then, can be described in terms of either intuition or constitution. But the discussion of validity, however, takes in not only the two kinds of objects as distinct but also the advance in knowing from the one to theother, from empirical to categorial objectivity. For this advance to, and termination in, categorial objectivity defines cognition for Husserl. Insofar as categorial objectivity is pre-eminently objectivity for Husserl, therefore, one can ask the question, Why is there the judgment at all ? What has it achieved ? And, as a variation on a constant theme throughout this work, what better accounts for the categorial objectivity achieved there, intuition or constitution ?

We will focus upon the validity of the judgment itself, rather than upon that of the Type or the Eidos. Two reasons for this procedure may be adduced. First, the judgment is prior to the Type and the Eidos (insofar as they are constituted in the judgment). Second, what has been said of the key role of the Type in the cognitional process applies to the Type precisely as it is related to the judgment. As for the Eidos, its main characteristics have already been noted and compared

with the Lonerganian counterpart in Chapter XIII.

There are two situations where intuition and constitution
confront each other, and where the exigencies of one can be
said to dominate. The first situation is Husserl's rejection
in the second edition of the Logical Investigation of a
representation-content for categorial intuition. Such
representation-content is necessary for sense intuition. It
is the sense-data (in the terminology of Logical Investigation ;
or hyle, in the terms of Ideas) inherent (reelle) to the sense
intuition which is correlative to the objective element, that
is to say, the color sensation, or the subjective color moment
which is correlative to the objectively sensed color. But
such a representation-content, being a specific component and
determinant of the empirical intuition, cannot at the same
time enter as an essential component of the categorial act.
For what sense-datum could serve as the representant of the
formal elements of categorial activity ? What would the sense-
datum of the categorial form S is p be ? There can be sense-
data for each individual empirical element involved in a
judgment, but there is no sense-data, or representation-content,
for their joining together as a new unit. The unity of the
individual elements taken separately, like red and tile, is
not the unity of the affair-complex, "The tile is red." Nor
is this unity the sum of the individual elements bound together
by another sense component. The categorial object is precisely
a categorial object insofar as it is not determined by any
empirical element, even something like a "psychic bond"
experienced during categorial activity.

This rejection by Husserl can be viewed as a setback for
the notion of cognition based upon the model of sense perception,
and more precisely, visual perception. Though functionally
interlinked, empirical and categorial activities are diverse.
There is a passage in the unified act of cognition from the
one to the other, but it cannot be explained by something

that is essentially and completely limited to one level, in this case, the empirical level.

In the second situation, however, intuition recoups its loss. There are objects of passive and active constitution. Nonetheless, constitution requires intuition. For the object to be constituted, whether it be empirical or categorial, it must be present in its self-giving, and therewith to a fulfilling intuition. If the object were constituted without its self-giving and apart from fulfilling intuition, then it would not be a real object, an objectively valid correlative of consciousness. An object must be intuited in its evidence, or self-giving. Then it is present ; then it is real. And so intuition seems to have the last word over constitution.

For Lonergan, the final validity of objective knowing rests upon the affirmation. The validity is final, not because it is independent from the validity of sensation and understanding, but because it presupposes them, just as absolute objectivity is final because it presupposes experiential and normative objectivity. Just as there are, in the sense of complementarity, levels of cognitional acts and objectivity, there are levels of validity of knowing.

The affirmation holds it privileged position with respect to objective validity because in the affirmation the subject reaches objective reality. He grasps that something really is so. The condition of possibility, however, for the affirmation, and thus for the objective validity of knowing, is questioning as operator. It is the two-phase operator that moves cognition through hunches, partial understanding, bright ideas, and hypotheses to the limited, but unshakable, validity of the correct judgment.

The second phase of the operator is the question that puts understanding to the test by asking, Is this the way it really is ? It is the question of Archimedes or Kepler. Does a solid really weigh differently in a fluid than it does outside

alone ? Do the planets really describe elliptical orbits ? If this is the way it really is, then one is in possession of an objectively valid knowledge that is neither conditioned by, nor relative to, subjective circumstances.

Under the impetus of this question, one marshals, sifts, and assays evidence to arrive at a judgment on the correctness of one's understanding. One tries to sort out the correct ideas from the merely bright ones. Each relevant step in the procedure marks both a stage of advancement and a point of departure for successive inquiries, with the whole undertaking under the direction of questioning.

There is a term to the questioning when one reaches the affirmation. The second phase of the operator, the question for reflexion, has promoted the process from the level of thinking and tentative hypotheses to the concreteness of a Yes or No answer. The affirmation of Archimedes and the First Law of Kepler round very definite questions. The second phase of the operator in a sense also rounds the first phase, and thus the whole process. There are two stages, intermediate and final, closing down the circle upon a definite affirmation to be made. Then the relevant questioning stops. The affirmation is made. And in relation to the two phases of the operator, the affirmation is the circle closed.

Lonergan customarily speaks of affirmation as issuing from the grasp of a virtually unconditioned that presupposes a field of conditions and then their fulfilment. The fulfilment occurs on the level of sense data, not through some sort of looking, but through answering the specific questions that submit data to their probing. The affirmation emerges as the conclusion to an if-then reasoning process : if the conditions are fulfilled, then such and such is so. Affirmation is the grasp precisely that such and such is so. It is the grasp of something whose conditions are fulfilled, the grasp therefore of an unconditioned.

The quarrel in Husserl between intuition and constitution arises here again. Objective validity is split between the act and the object. The _act_ that determines objective validity is intuition, but the _object_ that is the model of objective validity is the categorial object. Just as one must ask. what better accounts for the acts and objects in cognition, intuition or constitution, one must ask the same question here. What better explains the objective validity of cognition, intuition or constitution ?

Is an objectivity based upon seeing adequate ? Can objective reality be defined by a type of seeing and a type of seen object ? Is objective reality, empirical and categorial, essentially to be intuited ?

One can counter intuition with constitution's account of the cognitional process : the diverse objectivity of the two diverse intentional activities, empirical and categorial, and the advance in the cognitional process from the one to the other. If it be granted that intuition explains the validity of the two diverse kinds of objectivity, still on constitution's side it can be asked whether intuition explains the _advance_ of cognition from the one objectivity to the other. This is constitution's strong ground.

But cognition's advance in objectivity is likewise an advance in validity. Just as categorial objectivity is determined in relation to empirical objectivity, so is its validity. There is a new objectivity, validity, and reality reached on the level of categorial operating. And they are new to the extent that they are _essentially different_ from the objectivity, validity, and reality reached on the level of empirical activity. As a consequence, the operator that effectuates this rising to the new level of validity is essential to the explanation of this validity. But since constitution takes into account the operator better than intuition, it can be said that it accounts

for the diversity and the advance of the knowing process better
than intuition.

Husserl and Lonergan are both agreed that the terminal
validity of knowing, just as terminal objectivity, resides in
the judgment.  The differences in their notions with respect to
terminal objectivity have been the subject of the two preceeding
chapters.  The examination of the objective validity of knowing,
however, involves further the criterion for such validity.
Husserl's and Lonergan's criteria of validity will add greater
clarification to their notions of validity, as well as to those
of objectivity.  We will, then, pass on to our examination of
the criteria of objective validity.  From it we will have the
suitable context to make some precisions on Lonergan's notion
of the fulfilment of conditions, a notion which is essential to
the objective validity of knowing as Lonergan conceives it, and
compare it with its counterpart in Husserl.

## II.   Criteria : Evidence and Reflective Understanding

For Husserl evidence is the criterion for the objective
validity of knowing.  For Lonergan reflective understanding with
the questioning-operator is the criterion.  At first blush
evidence and reflective understanding would seem to be antipodal.
Evidence suggests the intuition that Lonergan rejects.  And yet
evidence and the fulfilling of conditions have points of
similarity.

First of all, for Husserl evidence resides instrinsically
in the knowing process.  There is no criterion external to the
knowing process itself by which knowing might be validated, or
validate itself.  The criterion is not something extraneous,
like a yardstick that one brings over to measure a board.
Evidence is the self-giving of the object, but the self-giving
is effectuated _in_ cognition _by_ cognition according to the condi-
tions and structure _of_ cognition.  The criterion of cognition--no
more than its object--is not something ready-made outside, extrin-
sic to the intending Ego.

The intentional structure determines what evidence is
essentially and whether it exists in certain cases.  There is
evidence for immanent and transcendent objects, adequate and
apodictic evidence.  When, therefore, Husserl speaks of intention-
ality as evidence-making, he means that the intending Ego
constitutes the object in its evidence by constituting it accord-
ing to the built-in norm of the Ego's own intentional structure.
What the evidence may be, and whether it is given for such
and such an object or not, is determined by the intentional
structure of the Ego.  Evidence as criterion means the boundary
and range of intentional performance within which an object can
alone exist, give itself, be constituted as such.  The attempt
to find any criterion outside of this range and boundary is
meaningless ; one would be at one and the same time abandoning
the domain of cognition and objectivity in order to search for
that domain.  The only objective reality, then, which exists for
the Ego is the one which he himself constitutes from his own
resources according to the intrinsic built-in range and boundary
of his intentional performance.

Lonergan is in foursquare agreement with Husserl that the
criterion of objective knowing is found intrinsic to knowing itself.
For Lonergan the criterion is reflective understanding.  Reflective
understanding is, to be exact, the second phase of the two-phase
operator.  It pertains directly to affirmation, and thus absolute
objectivity.  This is why it precisely is the criterion.  But
taken more broadly, the criterion is ultimately the essential
questioning that underpins the whole intentional performance ;
then more immediately it is the two-phase questioning.

Reflective understanding determines what objective validity
is.  It does so, not extrinsically, like the yardstick brough over
to measure, but intrinsically, from within.  It functions in a
set pattern, namely through the two-phase questiong.  Objective
validity is dependent upon this set pattern of functioning, not

upon some extraneous criterion that is always to be consulted
after the act. The very operating of reflective understanding in
its set pattern is the effectuation of objectively valid knowings.

Reflective understanding is a procedure in cognition. It
is the way in which the subject assays evidence prior to affirming.
No more than the categorial object is evidence, is reflective
understanding absolute objectivity. If one wishes, reflective
understanding is the way to get to absolute objectivity. But it
is the <u>only</u> procedure to get there and to stay there. The two-
phase questioning aims at an intelligent understanding and then
a reasonable affirmation. Nothing could be more intrinsic to
subject.[22] This, in a nutshell, is the criterion of the objective
validity of knowing for Lonergan.

The next point, after Husserl's and Lonergan's agreement
that the criterion of cognition is intrinsic to cognition,
will be to compare the notions of evidence and the fulfilling of
conditions in reflective understanding. To repeat a caution :
the vocabularies--similar or dissimilar--of Husserl and Lonergan
cannot be the decisive locus for comparing notions. Thus Husserl's
notion of evidence, though obviously suggesting this theory of
intuition, is not at all the evidence of simple extroversion
that Lonergan would reject. On the other hand, the caution
would also hold against the temptation to claim that Husserl and
Lonergan are, after all, saying the same thing. Nevertheless,
evidence and fulfilling conditions do have something in common.

We can take apodictic evidence as the point for inspection
in Husserl. We can further narrow the discussion down to the
evidence necessary for the categorial object. Because of its
privileged position for Husserl, the categorial object is most
appropriate.

---

22. "For if one has, in fact accepted Lonergan's philosophical
    'position' one must stand by one's own intelligence and
    reasonableness as <u>the criteria</u> for <u>all</u> reality" (ABL, 172).

The final evidence in which the categorial object gives itself is preceeded by an advance from one degree of evidence to another. The simplest categorial object--The tile is red-- might be thought to be given instantaneously and effortlessly. Perhaps it is now, but that is only after some preliminary cognitional activity.

We might take for an example the parallegram of forces that Husserl identifies as a categorial object.[23] To understand it requires an advance to different levels of evidence. Empty intending is heading for fulfilling intuition. Certain elements must be grasped as preliminary : some are arithmetical, some are geometric. The evidence expands as one understands the elements and then their interrelationship. The evidence expands because of the effort of the knowing subject. For evidence is an intentional performance in which every component, empirical and categorial, makes its contribution. Finally arrives the moment when one has fulfilling intuition of the object because the evidence-building is complete and the object gives itself.

When the object gives itself as it is, then it must be accepted. It is accepted, not as something imposed from the outside, but as the correlate of the Ego's intentional performing. If there is a compulsion to accept the evident object, it is the compulsion that arises from the very structure of intentionality itself. It is the relationship of empty intending to fulfilling intuition. In a sense, the Ego's intentional performance aims at a sort of self-compulsion, the self-compulsion of accepting the object it has made possible for the Ego to intuit.

This compusion and necessity have been related to Interesse and Streben which we have termed Husserl's quasi operators. Inasmuch as they operate the advance of cognition, they are involved with the expansion of evidence, since the advance of cognition is the expansion of evidence. They are the impulse

---

23. LU, I [II/1] , 330 [101] .

that focuses on one aspect of a field, problem, or data ; that
sifts out what is relevant to the task the Ego sets for himself
that weighs it ; that examines it -- all in mounting evidence ;
that finally achieves the object's giving of itself.

Husserl characterizes the achievement of the categorial
object's giving of itself in fulfilling intuition in two ways :
as an Entscheidung and a Befriedirng. Husserl means that there
is repose after the tension of the intending. The repose is in
the possession of the categorial object in its evidence. This
Entscheidung and Befriedigung are characteristics of the act of
grasping of categorial objects, whether this grasping is described
as active constitution or categorial intuition.

When Lonergan speaks of the fulfilment of conditions and
reflective understanding, he numbers this fulfilment with the
other two elements essential to the grasp of the virtually
unconditioned. The three elements can be recalled in their scheme :
1) a conditioned,
2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and
3) the fulfilment of the conditions.
Reflective understanding is the grasp of the virtually unconditioned ;
thus it is the criterion of objectively valid knowing.

Between the conditions and the grasp of the unconditioned
is a link. The field of conditions is a diffuse manifold,like
the experience of overflowing water, or the mass of accumulated
astronomical observations. In itself it is indifferent to any
sort of supervening usage, and of itself it is like a body at
rest in an inertial framework that does not move until operated
upon from the outside.

As soon as one begins to sort and marshal conditions that
must be fulfilled, then the knowing process is initiated. A
movement takes place. There is a heading towards a very definite
goal, namely the grasp of a certain number of conditions as ful-
filled. But there can be movement and the heading of the knowing
process only because of questions ; only because the question for

reflective assaying of the conditions is an operator vis-à-vis
the field of conditions ; only because it is the link between
the conditions and the grasp of the unconditioned.

The grasp of the unconditioned is determined, not only by the
nature of the field of conditions in themselves, but by the inter-
vening questioning. Questioning works on data to arrive, out of
a vast number of possibilities, at a very particular grasping,
like the principle of the displacement of liquids, or the law
describing the planetary orbits. In fact, properly speaking, data
can be termed conditions only in view of their eventual fulfil-
ment. They are conditions only because there is the possibility
of the grasp of an unconditioned, of that which has its
conditions completed.

The conception of knowing as an if-then structure brings
out clearly the importance of the question as operator. It
clarifies how there is a relationship between "if" and "then" ;
how there is a link to be supplied between them ; how there is
needed an operator to supply the link ; how the question is the
operator. It clarifies how knowing is a functional process where
sensation, understanding, and affirmation are interlinked by the
two orientations of the operator. And it clarifies how, once
the grasp of the unconditioned has occurred, the operator, having
thus brought forth the final relevant question, stops.

At what specific point can Husserl's and Lonergan's criteria
be said to match ? Lonergan speaks of evidence which he qualifies
as "evidence sufficient" for a judgment. It is in the context of
the question-operator, fulfilling conditions, and the grasp of a
virtually unconditioned that he describes this evidence. To
grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to
grasp the prospective judgment as a virtually unconditioned.
However, since it is in terms of the three elements of the
virtually unconditioned thus cited above that Lonergan expounds
the criterion of cognition, we would do better to mark out a
comparison between these three elements and Husserl's notion of

evidence rather than between similarities of the term, "evidence."
Nevertheless, we have already disclosed a basic consensus lying
behind the identical term by giving Lonergan's equation : the
grasp of sufficient evidence is the grasp of the virtually un-
conditioned.

We can set out the lines of similarity in three points.
First of all, the goal of empty intending and the conditioned can
be matched.  The empty intending ..as a definite goal which it
reaches as the intentional performance advances through degrees
of evidence until the object appears in its self-giving.  The
object can be said to be defined in terms of the empty intending.
For the object in its fulfilling evidence is fulfilling precisely
in relationship to the empty intending.  For Lonergan a prospective
affirmation is a conditioned because it depends upon answering the
question or questions that reflective understanding poses.  If
the questions are answered, then it is no longer a conditioned
but an unconditioned, that is to say, its conditions are fulfilled.
Conditioned and unconditioned are conjugates.

May we go on to the second point and match the giving of
the object in fulfilling intuition with the grasp of the un-
conditioned ?  When one has the categorial object in its self-
giving, the empty intending is terminated.  One is compelled to
make a "judgmental decision" (Entscheidung) before and in the
presence of the evident object.  Then consequent upon the judgmental
decision is the "reposeful possession" (Befriedigung) in the object.

The questions of reflective understanding are the link
between the conditioned and the grasp of the unconditioned.  When
reflective understanding recognizes that its questions are answered,
that the conditions are fulfilled, it recognizes at the same time
that it is compelled to grasp the fulfilment  of the conditioned.
There is a decisiveness to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned,
for one affirms that something is so.  At a certain moment, hesitation
is no longer possible.

The third point recalls again the operator.  How does one
get from and through empty intending  to fulfilling intuition,and

from the conditioned to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned
respectfully ?  The answer is : the operator.  Husserl speaks
of _Interesse_ and _Streben_, and _Entscheidung_ in reference to the
formation of the categorial object, and then the _Befriedigung_ when
it is attained.  Lonergan speaks of the questioning of reflective
understanding, the answering of this questioning _by reflective_
_understanding_ itself, the compulsion to grasp the unconditioned.
The roles,then, of Husserl's _impl_`cit_ operator(s) and of Lonergan's
_explicit_ operator are capital for the criterion of objective
knowing.

It is not enough to merely state that evidence and the
grasp of the virtually unconditioned are the criteria for Husserl
and Lonergan, and seek to list points of similarity without find-
ing the ground of similarity.  The function of the operator is
the ground for comparing evidence and the unconditioned.  An
understanding of how the operator--implicit or explicit--works
reveals behind their distinct vocabularies an accord between
Husserl and Lonergan.

It is important to note here that this accord between
Husserl and Lonergan is found where one might least expect it :
in the comparison of evidence and the virtually unconditioned.
Given Lonergan's rejection of intuition and the obvious affinity
between intuition and evidence in Husserl, one might anticipate
an irreconcilable difference of views.  But two remarks can be
made.  First of all, the _prima facie_ meaning of vocabulary
("evidence" and "grasp of the unconditioned") cannot be the
norm for distinguishing philosophical opinions.  Secondly, Husserl's
notion of evidence involves the operator even though it is expressed
in terms of intuition : for the increase of evidence, the heading
of empty intending towards fulfilling intuition is an advance in
cognition operated in and by the intentional structure of the
Ego.  One might make this summary conclusion then : even intuition
needs an operator in order to advance through its degrees of
evidence.  Then, with that conclusion, one has again the

recrudescence of the intuition-constitution ambiguity. Intuition has assumed a constituting role, such that to speak of evidence is not to immediately eliminate constitution and confine the whole discussion to intuition.

### III. Truth

Husserl and Lonergan both consider truth in relation to the criteria for objectively valid knowledge : evidence for Husserl and the grasp of the virtually ur..onditioned for Lonergan. For both philosophers, in order to determine truth, there must be the prior clarification of these criteria upon which truth depends. Lonergan, in fact, explicitly asserts the priority of reflective understanding and the virtually unconditioned.

Though Husserl extends the notion of truth beyond the judgment and the categorial object, we have confined our attention to them because of their pre-eminence. Truth can be taken in two senses in Husserl's opinion. According to the first sense, on the subjective side, truth is a judgment where the categorial object gives itself. According to the second sense, which is "at bottom the intrinsically first," on the objective side, truth means actuality (Wirklichkeit).

There are several notion we have highlighted in connexion with the categorial object and truth : the Streben nach Wahrheit ; the judgment aims (hinzielt) at **truth** ; the Entscheidung to make the judgment ; the true judgment adds no "real moment," no new content, to the categorial object ; and the "reposeful possession" (Befriedigung) in the presence of the categorial object. We can narrow down the comparison with Lonergan to Husserl's notion that the judgment adds no new content to the affir-complex.

We can frame the following question : What happens when one judges and intuits an affair-complex as true ? There occurs an "'is'-positing," claims Husserl. This is more than just the formal linking of subjects and predicates with the copulative verb. It is not the adding together, as if with logical building

blocks, of two concepts that have been identified beforehand. The unity-identity of the affair-complex preceeds that of its elements. The affair-complex is intuited, or constituted, as a unity with its complex evidence, possibly comprising many elements. But the unity-identity of the categorial object . is what is posited. If the categorial object is "The tile is red," then it is the whole affair-complex that is posited, not just the tile, and then the red.

The truth of the categorial object resides in this "'is'-positing." The object gives itself in evidence. There is a compulsion to recognize the object and posit it as being such and such. The instant that the object is present in its evidence there is not the final detection of some new, intrinsically real moment in the categorial object which makes it true. There is most certainly a difference between knowing the actuality (<u>Wirklichkeit</u>) of something and not knowing it, but the difference between them is not the addition of a new property. The difference is between the absence and then the presence of the object in its evidence.

If we focus on the truth and the positing of the categorial object, we have a close counterpart in Lonergan. For Lonergan, it should be emphasized, truth is found formally only on the level of affirmation. And why ? The question-operator is the reason. Only on this level is the reality of the object the issue. One can draw the parallel between Husserl's idea of the judgment's "striving for truth" and Lonergan's question-operator compelling an affirmation.

The true judgment adds no new content to understanding. <u>What</u> the object is, is determined on the level of understanding <u>whether</u> it is, is decided on the level of reflective understanding and affirmation. Kepler's hypotheses preceeding his three laws are rich in speculation and reveal his comprehension of conic sections, but none of them stand up to the scrutiny of

his questioning, "Is this the way the planetary orbits really are ?" This questioning proffered no new moment, quality, or property lacking in the anterior hypotheses which Kepler grasped and therewith had the truth.

Truth resides in the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. In light of the virtually unconditioned, one can understand in what sense Lonergan appropriates the classical definition of truth : the conformity of the judgment with reality. The conformity rests in the grasp of fulfilling conditions where one judges the way things are. With Husserl, Lonergan would say that such a grasping is a positing. Again with Husserl, he would deny that it is the joining together of previously understood concepts. Lonergan speaks of the true judgment as a limited commitment : namely, that this is so. Husserl speaks of the judgmental decision. And finally, Lonergan would consider Husserl's phrase, "copulative 'is'-positing," as a happy description of the true judgment.

Lonergan's remote criterion of truth, unlimited questioning, lines up closely with Husserl's notion of the basic intentionality of the Ego. And his proximate criterion, reflective understanding, lines up closely with evidence. But we have seen that in both these cases the operator is the pivotal element for the comparison. In the present case--the determination what truth is for Husserl and Lonergan-- its role is again pivotal. Thus it is the point where precise differences between Husserl and Lonergan can be specified.

Lonergan is explicit about the role of the operator : when one attains a true judgment, one closes the ring upon the two phases of the question-operator. The operator pinpoints the location of truth in affirmation. Affirmation, absolute object-ivity, and truth are together. Husserl's operator is implicit. Though there is an ambiguity about the priority of intuition or constitution, of visual perception as the normative act or the categorial object as the normative object, the implicit operator

cuts through some of the ambiguity by asserting itself, as we saw in the case of evidence.

Since the categorial object is pre-eminent, its truth is likewise pre-eminent. The implicit operator--expressed as Streben nach Wahrheit--is the impulse that brings the knowing process to its term in the categorial object. It is not an intrinsic part of the judgment, as the conditions or the grasping of their fulfilment are, nor is it the truth itself. It is the property of intentionality that effectuates the advance in cognition from the empirical object with its truth to the categorial object with its truth.

But how does the implicit operator stand to Husserl's notion that truth is not confined only to the judgment ? The answer lies in the relationship of empirical to categorial objectivity : categorial objectivity is the completed objectivity of cognition. Or again, one can find the answer in the relationship of empirical to categorial evidence. The latter in both of these cases--categorial objectivity and evidence--do not eliminate the empirical elements. The latter complete within the knowing process the former.

The truth of empirical objectivity, then, cannot be taken in isolation. It should be recalled that for Husserl all positing acts involve truth. And acts of presentation are positing. Because Ideas I concentrates so much on perception, the truth-status of perception vis-à-vis categorial activity is not as clear as it might be. It is difficult to tell exactly what perception's positing means : whether perception has its own objectivity and truth, but in relation to categorial objectivity and thereby to the whole knowing process; or whether the positing (especially if one takes Husserl's illustrations in Ideas I, for example, the blooming tree) is a judgment with an empirical affair-complex. However, Formal and Transcendental Logic, which introduces the notion of prepredicative evidence,[24] and Erfahrung

---

24. FTL, 209 [186] .

und Urteil clarify in detail the relationship of the empirical
and categorial elements in cognition, and thus the relationship
of the truth of perception and that of categorial activity.
Part of the reason that these works clarify the nature of
truth is that they make use of the implicit operator.

In spite of first appearances, the main difference between
Husserl and Lonergan with regard to truth is not that Husserl's
notion allows both prepredicative and predicative truth.  Insofar
as this notion allows the proleptic truth of perception and the
completed truth of judgment by reason of an at least implicit
operator, Lonergan would fundamentally agree with Husserl.
The difference between them lies elsewhere.  Lonergan would hold
that Husserl does not give adequate attention to the distinction
between understanding (insights) and affirmation.  He would find
that Husserl does not give enough treatment to the provisional,
hypothetical, supposed, and postulated elements in cognition.
These elements Lonergan would correlate with the level of
understanding in contradistinction to the level of affirmation.

Lonergan does not put the hunches, bright ideas, and
hypotheses of understanding on the same footing with the
certitude of the true affirmation.  (Nor, obviously, does
Husserl.)  The point Lonergan is making is that the level of
understanding exists, that it is a valid type of knowing, that
it can often be a half-way house to affirmation, and that it
can often be the only kind of knowledge which is actually
attained in a certain area.  To substantiate his assertion,
Lonergan turns to modern science and dogmatic theology.  In
science the provisional, the supposed, the postulated, and the
hypothetical can be found in the theories about the origin of
the universe or the nature of quasars.  As for theology, one
could take the self-avowed hypothetical status of Aquinas's
trinitarian theory that Lonergan cites.[25]

---

25. Summa Theologiae, I, 32, 1 ad 2m, cited in V, 196 and 211.

In barest summary, it must be acknowledged that Husserl likewise distinguishes the provisional and the hypothetical from the certain and true, the partial grasp from the certitude of complete comprehension. It must be recalled that his noetic-noematic investigations in Ideas I identify the doxic modalities of the "possible" and the "probable," and measure these by, and distinguish them from, the "certain."[26] Furthermore, in Formal and Transcendental Logic and Erfahrung und Urteil, Husserl inspects the expansion of evidence, objectivity, and truth. In Die Krisis and "Die Frage n⁻ch dem Ursprung der Geometrie," he describes comprehensive truth as the goal toward which human knowing aims and which it approaches asymptotically. These last two works take the whole scope of human knowing : the conditions of its origin and its teleology.

But the difference between Husserl and Lonergan can be pinpointed in the role they assign the operator. Because his operator is explicit, Lonergan always has the normative (in Lonergan's sense) element in cognition front and center. Empirical data or matter for investigation are clearly distinguished from the two phases of questioning. In turn, the two phases of questioning are distinguished from each other at the interior of the triad : the conditioned, the conditions, and the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

The first phases ends with the understanding of something ; the second with the judgment that something is so, and therewith the judgment is ture. Kepler had a vast understanding of conic sections, but his judgment about elliptical orbits went beyond this understanding to affirming. The two phases of the operator are like benchmarks that always indicate at what point cognition is : whether it is understanding with its theories, hypotheses, and definitions ; or affirmation with its grasp of the unconditioned that constitutes truth.

---

26. IdI, §§ 103-104.

Because his operator is implicit, Husserl does not spell out as well as Lonergan the two elements of categorial knowing with their distinction and yet their interrelatedness.  Concerning Ideas I we could cite Husserl's own evaluation : intentionality is presented there as a static structure.  Ideas I lists doxic modalities in their relation to certitude, but does not explain their genesis, the advance from  prepredicative to predicative evidence.  The implicit operators of Erfahrung und Urteil and Formal and Transcendental Logic illuminate the genesis of the categorial object.  They focus mainly, however, on the second aspect of the categorial object, its truth, and leave to the side the first aspect, the provisional and hypothetical.  In a word, Husserl's implicit operator shows more of the second phase of Lonergan's operator than of the first.  In Lonergan's terminology, Husserl is occupied more with the level of affirmation  that with that of understanding, more with absolute objectivity  that with normative:

### Final  Summary

This final summary has two parts : in the first there is a résumé of the main points of this chapter ; and in the second, insofar as this chapter is climactic both for Part III and thus the whole work, there is an attempt to bring together in a summary fashion their main themes and conclusions.

With respect to the résumé of this chapter, it has three sections : the objective validity of cognition, its criteria, and truth.  First, then, objective validity : for Husserl the validity  of cognition is described both in terms of intuition and constitution.  Intuition appears to receive a set-back with the abandonment of the representation-content for the categorial form.  But on the other hand, it recoups its loss insofar as intuition must accompany the constitution of the object for the object to be real.  For Lonergan the validity of knowing rests upon the affirmation.  Then the role of the operator is recalled : explicit in Lonergan, implicit in Husserl.  When the operator

is acknowledged in Husserl, then the primacy of intuition is
threatened.

Secondly, we have the criteria of objectively valid
cognition. For Husserl evidence is the criterion. As such,
evidence resides intrinsically in the cognitional process. Next,
though it is indissolubly kindred with intuition, evidence still
allows for the working of the operator. For Lonergan it is
reflective understanding that is the criterion. He is in
foursquare agreement with Husserl that the criterion of objective
knowing resides intrinsically in the knowing process itself.
Then the function of the operator is once more examined : this
time Husserl's implicit operator in the expansion of evidence
for the categorial object and Lonergan's explicit operator in
its relation to the three elements involved in the fulfilling of
conditions. The ambiguities of the intuition-constitution relation-
ship then emerge again where it might have been expected
that intuition would have exclusive supremacy : in the context
of evidence and intuition.

Thirdly, there is the question of truth. Both Husserl
and Lonergan take up truth after the prior, necessary clarifica-
tion of the criteria of knowledge. The comparison between them
is narrowed down to the judgment in Husserl and the grasp of the
virtually unconditioned in Lonergan. Their notion that the judg-
ment adds no new content to knowing is compared. Once again
the operator is cardinal. Husserl's operator explains the
striving towards truth, the decisiveness of the judgment, and
then the consequent Befriedigung. Lonergan's two-phase operator
aims at bringing the cognitional process to the point where
there is a compulsion to grasp the virtually unconditioned, and
there upon attain the limited truth of affirmation.

The main difference between Husserl and Lonergan exists,
not because of Husserl's notion of intuition since the implicit
operator counterbalances it, nor because of Husserl's prepredi-
cative truth since it is preparative of predicative truth.

The main difference between them is that Lonergan gives more attention to the provisional and hypothetical than Husserl does. In Lonergan's language, Lonergan gives more attention to the first phase of the operator and to understanding that Husserl does. And yet, the shadow of the ambiguity of the intuition-constitution relation still falls across the comparison of their notions of truth.

Thus far the résumé of this chapter. We can now draw together in final review the leitmotifs which run through this work and culminate in this final chapter. They are in Husserl : the ambiguity of the intuition constitution relationship where for the determination of objectivity seeing is the normative act while the categorial object is the normative object ; the role of the implicit operator designated as Interesse. They are in Lonergan : the unrestricted questioning by which objectivity is defined ; the three levels of knowing that are functionally interlinked because of the two-phase question-operator.

As a further aspect of the intuition-constitution ambiguity, it might be noted that Lonergan's own critique of Husserl (cited at the beginning of the Prenote to this Part III) is one-sided insofar as it highlights intuition while saying nothing of constitution. This is not to deny that the pre-eminence which Husserl accords intuition is not adequate grounds for such an evaluation by Lonergan and others, for example, Berger and Ricoeur. But the ambiguity of the case means precisely that there is a second element besides intuition, and that is constitution with the implicit operator. Attention may then be drawn here to the fact that Lonergan's criticism has entered into our comparison of Husserl and Lonergan, but is limited to the points it raises against intuition. In fact, on the basis of Husserl's implicit operator, important similarities between Husserl and Lonergan are disclosed : intentionality, the criteria of objectively valid knowing, and truth. And furthermore, in keeping with our intention of setting up a kind of Rosetta stone

table of equivalents, we have lined up other points of close
resemblance : the Epoche and self-affirmation ; the Eidos-Ego
and the polymorphic subject ; immanent objects and experiencing
(Erlebnis), and consciousness ; the three Egos and horizon.

The touchstone we have continually brought in to assess
the different aspects of the comparison-confrontation of the
objectivity problematic in Husserl and Lonergan has been the
operator : implicit for Husserl, explicit for Lonergan.  We have
maintained that because of the implicit operator Husserl's
notion of constitution counterweighs his notion of intuition ;
that there is then the ambiguity of the intuition-constitution
relationship ; and that finally, if the operator is taken as the
heading under which Husserl's and Lonergan's notions of object-
ivity are compared, then both intuition and constitution, as
well as their fusion in "creative intuition," can receive their
due evaluation with respect to objectivity.

Whether one considers intuition or constitution in
Husserl, the notion of the operator is pivotal.  In the case
of intuition, there are sense and categorial intuition ; in the
case of constitution, there are passive and active constitution.
In both cases the cardinal issue is : what promotes the cogni-
tional process from the first to the second level ?

Intuition, whether termed sense or categorial, is essential-
ly nondynamic.  It is ultimately based upon the model of look-
ing.  Even if intuition adequately accounts for knowing on the
level of perception, and, taken metaphorically, acceptably
describes knowing on the level of categorial activity, of itself
alone it does not explain or suggest the relationship between
sense and categorial intuition, and how the advance from the
one to the other is possible.  Within the framework of intuition,
Husserl can note similarities and distinctions between perception
and judgment, and the progression from the one to the other.
Intuition by itself can state but not explain their relationship.

As far as actual usage goes, Husserl never employs the

term "operator" in conjunction with "striving," "tendency," and "interest" to expound the relation of passive and active constitution. Nor does he ever explicitly propose any of these notions as the element that promotes knowing from sensation to the level of active constitution. And yet striving, tendency, and interest do perform some of the functions of an operator. They are diverse titles for the general property of intentionality that starts the cycle which ends with the constitution and possession of the categorial object. They are Husserl's implicit operator.

Lonergan explicitly designates questioning with its two phases as the operator. The notion of the operator is at one and the same time the rejection of intuition as normative and the recognition of the functional interlinking of sensation, understanding, and affirmation. If the operator is left aside, then there is really no cognitional process. There is a series of discrete and juxtaposed stages that are assimilated, and thereby limited, to one kind of intentional activity, namely seeing.

But if it be averred that the operator is at the very most a marginal notion in Husserl, one can rejoin that Husserl's conception of constitution requires the operator. Husserl acknowledges the unity of the two components, empirical and categorial, in the one act of knowing. To account for this unity, he proposes that active constitution ultimately englobes passive constitution. For if he were to allow them to be absolutely distinguished from each other, there would be no possibility of a unity in knowing. But if constitution is essentially one, that is to say, if it is essentially active, then the unity of the cognitional structure is preserved. The unity of constitution effected by active constitution, then, is a sort of substitute for an absent operator.

And then in an odd turnabout, Husserl's notion of intuition can be viewed as a surrogate for the operator. For

if sensation and categorial performance were essentially disparate, then there would be no possibility for any interrelationship, and thus no possibility of a unity in the knowing process. If, however, sense and categorial intuition are similar, then the unity of knowing can be saved. But they are both essentially similar, since they are a kind of seeing. Therefore the unity of knowing is preserved. The unity of cognition thus consists in the fact that intuition is all-comprehensive and embraces both sensation as well as categorial activity. And thus the unity of similar intuitions is the basis of the unity of cognition and a surrogate for the absent operator.

To conclude, then, one can understand the significance of the operator for cognition, both in its presence as explicit in Lonergan or as implicit in Husserl, as well as in its absence. The explicit notion of operator as used by Lonergan would help to eliminate the ambiguous situation in Husserl where, for determining the objectivity of cognition, seeing is the normative act while the ideal object constituted by categorial activity is the normative object. It would end the uneasy alliance of constitution and intuition in a "creative intuition." It would come down on the side of constitution and give constitution free rein to work with the implicit operator, Interesse, it already has. If Husserl's notion of intuition by itself cannot account for the exigencies of objectivity by which knowing is a process that is promoted from sensation to categorial performance, his notion of constitution comes within an ace of doing so through the working of its implicit operator.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY


I. <u>HUSSERL</u>


A. <u>Bibliographies of Husserl's Works</u>

Kern, Iso and Gerhard Maschke, "Husserl.--Bibliographie," in
    <u>Revue internationale de philosophie</u>, 71-72 (1965), 156-160.

Van Breda, Herman L., "Bibliographie," in <u>Edmund Husserl</u> :
    <u>1859-1959</u>, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague :
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 289-306.


B. <u>Husserl's Works</u>

<u>Analysen zur passiven Synthesis</u>, Hrsg. Margot Fleischer,
    Husserliana XI (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 532 pp.

<u>Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge</u>, Hrsg. S.
    Strasser, 2, Aufl., Husserliana I (The Hague : Martinus
    Nijhoff, 1963), 249 pp.

    <u>Cartesian Meditations : An Introduction to Phenomenology</u>,
    trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1960),
    157 pp.

    <u>The Paris Lectures</u>, trans. Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague :
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 39 pp.

<u>Erfahrung und Urteil : Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik</u>,
    Hrsg. Ludwig Landgrebe, 3. unveränderte Aufl. (Hamburg :
    Claassen, 1964), 478 pp.

<u>Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil : Kritische Ideenge-
    schichte</u>, Hrsg. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VII (The Hague :
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 468 pp.

<u>Zweiter Teil : Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion</u>, Hrsg.
    Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VIII (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff,
    1959), 594 pp.

Formale und transendentale Logik : Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Halle a. Saale : Max Niemeyer, 1929), 298 pp.

Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 340pp.

Logique formelle et logique transcendentale, trans. Suzanne Bachelard, 2e ed. (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), 447 pp.

"Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem," in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie as Beilage III, pp. 365-386. (Originally appeared, edited by Eugen Fink, in Revue internationale de philosophie, 1 [1938-1939] , 203-225).

L'origine de la géometrie, translation and introd. by Jacques Derrida (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 220pp.

Die Idee der Phänomenologie : Fünf Vorlesungen, Hrsg. Walter Biemel, 2. Aufl., Husserliana II (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 95 pp.

The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff ; 1964), 60 pp.

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Phänomenologie. Erstes Buch : Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Hrsg. Walter Biemel, Husserliana III (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 483pp.

Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, 3rd impression (London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), 466pp. (This translation is of the 3rd unchanged edition  Halle a. S. : Max Niemeyer, 1928  , 360pp, not of Husserliana III.)

Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, trans. Paul Ricoeur (Paris : Gallimard, 1950), 567pp. (This translation is also of the 1928 German edition.)

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie. Zweites Buch : Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Hrsg. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 426pp.

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie. Drittes Buch : Die Phänomenologie und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften, Hrsg. Marly Biemel, Husserliana
V (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 167pp.

Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie : Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische
Philosophie, Hrsg. Walter Biemel, 2. Aufl., Husserliana VI
(The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 559pp.

Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band, 1. Aufl. (Halle a.S. :
Max Niemeyer, 1900), 258pp.

Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 1. Aufl. (Halle a.S. :
Max Niemeyer, 1901), 718pp.

Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band : Prolegomena zur reinen
Logik, 5. Aufl. (Tübingen : Max Niemeyer, 1968), 257pp.
(This is a reprint of 4th edition of 1928 which was a reprint
of the 2nd, revised edition of 1913.)

Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, in two parts, with the
following subtitles :
1. Teil : Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der
Erkenntnis, 5. Aufl. (Tübingen : Max Niemeyer, 1968), 508pp.
(Reprint of 4th edition of 1928 which was a reprint of the
2nd, revised edition of 1913.)
2. Teil : Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der
Erkenntnis, 4. Aufl. (Tübingen : Max Niemeyer, 1968), 244pp.
(Reprint of 3rd edition of 1922 which was a reprint of the
2nd, revised edition of 1921.)

Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, 2 vols. (London :
Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1970.)

Recherches logiques, trans. Hubert Elie, I (Paris : Presses
Universitaires de France, 1959), 285 pp.

Recherches logiques, trans. Hubert Elie, Lothar Kelkel et
René Schérer, II, 1ère Partie (Paris : Presses Universitaires
de France, 1961), 284 pp.

Recherches logiques, trans. Hubert Elie, Lothar Kelkel et
René Schérer, II, 2e Partie (Paris : Presses Universitaires
de France, 1962), 378 pp.

Recherches logiques, trans. Hubert Elie, Lothar Kelkel et
René Schérer, III (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France,
1963), 308 pp.

"Nachwort" zu den Ideen I, in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, ed. Marly Biemel (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), pp. 138-162.

(Originally appeared as "Nachwort zu meinen 'Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie," in "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 11 (1930), 549-570.

"Author's Preface to the English Edition," in Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), pp. 11-30 (Slightly different from German edition in Ideen III.)

"Phänomenologie und Anthropologie," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2 (1941), 1-14. (A lecture originally given in Berlin, June 10, 1931.)

Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitwusstseins (1893-1917), Hrsg. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 484pp.

The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 188pp. (This is a translation of the 1928 edition by Heidegger ([Halle a.S.i Max Niemeyer, 1928] , 132pp, not of Husserliana X.)

Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Hrsg. Wilhelm Szilasi (Frankfurt : Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), 107pp.

Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy : Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man, trans. Quentin Lauer, Harper Torchbook (New York : Harper & Row, Inc., 1965), 192 pp.

Philosophie der Arithmetik, Hrsg. Lothar Eley, Husserliana XII (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 585pp.


## 2. Unpublished Works

(These works have been consulted, and are available, at the Husserl Archives, Louvain.)

Ms. K. III 6 (1934-1936), 400pp. typewritten transcription [254 sheets in original ms.] . On Die Krisis problematic.

Ms. K III 10 (July, 1935), 38 pp. typewritten transcription [20 sheets in original ms.] . "Die historische Welt."

II. LONERGAN

A. Bibliographies of Lonergan's Works

"The Bibliography of the Writings of Bernard Lonergan," S.J.
    (July, 1969)." 124 items ; does not include tape-recordings.
    (Available at the Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College,
    Toronto.)
Crowe, S.J., Frederick E., "Bibliography of the Writings of
    Bernard Lonergan," in Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor
    of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J.
    (Chicago : St. Xavier College, 1964), pp. 243-249. 99 items ;
    does not include tape-recordings.

Mathews, S.J., William, "The Bibliography of the Writings of
    Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (July, 1971)," 6pp. mimeographed.
    This is the most comprehensive bibliography of Lonergan's
    works. 148 items (4 addenda included) ; tape-recordings are
    included. (Available at the Centre for Lonergan Studies,
    Regis College, Toronto.)

Tracy, David, "Bibliography," in The Achievement of Bernard
    Lonergan (New York : Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 270-278.
    Apart from the omission of some minor semi-popular articles,
    the order of this bibliography follows that of F.E. Crowe in
    Spirit as Inquiry. Tracy has likewise cited six sets of
    tape-recordings. 105 items.

B. Lonergan's Works

1. Published Works

"The Absence of God in Modern Culture," in The Presence and
Absence of God, ed. Christopher F. Mooney (New York : Fordham
University Press, 1968), pp. 164-178. (To be published in a
volume entitled Collection II.)

"Belief : Today's Issue," A Paper Prepared for the Pax
Romana Symposium on Faith, Synod Hall, Pittsburgh, March 16,
1968 (printed as a booklet, May 16, 1968, 12 pp. ; to be
published in Collection II).

"Bernard Londergan Responds," in Foundations of Theology :
Papers from the International Lonergan Congress, 1970, ed.
Philip McShane, S.J. (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, Ltd., 1971),
pp. 223-234.

Collection : Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. F.E. Crowe, S.J.
    (New York : Herder and Herder, 1967), 280pp.

"The Form of Inference," in Collection, pp. 1-15. (Originally
    appeared in Thought, 18 [1943] , 277-292.)

"A Note on Geometrical Possibility," in Collection, pp.96-113. (Originally appeared in The Modern Schoolman, 27 [1949-1950] , 124-138.)

"Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in Collection, pp. 142-151. (Originally appeared in Sapientia Aquinatis, vol. I [Communicationes IV Congressus Thomistici Internationalis, Romae, 1955] , pp. 119-127.)

"Insight : Preface to a Discussion," in Collection, pp. 152-163. (Originally appeared in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 32 [1958] , 71-81.)

"Christ as Subject : A Reply," in Collection, pp. 164-197. (Originally appeared in Gregorianum, 40 [1959], 242-270.)

"Openness and Religious Experience," in Collection, pp. 198-201. (Originally appeared in II Problema dell'esperienza religiosa [Atti del XV Convegno del Centro di Studi Filosofici tra Professori Universitari, Gallarate, 1960] , Brescia, 1961, pp. 460-462.)

"Metaphysics as Horizon," in Collection, pp. 202-220. (Originally appeared in Gregorianum, 44 [1963] , 307-318.)

"Cognitional Structure," in Collection, pp. 221-239. (Originally appeared in Continuum, 2 [1964] , 530-542 ; and in the separate printing of that issue, Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.)

"Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection, pp. 240-251. (An address given to the faculty and study body at Regis College, Toronto, September 14, 1964, and subsequently published in Focus : A Theological Journal [student publication at Regis College] , 2 [1965] , 5-14.)

"Dimensions of Meaning," in Collection, pp. 252-267. (An address given in the Distinguished Lecture Series to the faculty and student body of Marquette University, Milwaukee, May 12, 1965. Previously unpublished.)

"The Dehellenization of Dogma," in Theological Studies, 28 (1967), 336-351. (To be published in Collection II.)

Doctrinal Pluralism, The 1971 Pere Marquette Theology Lecture (Milwaukee : Marquette University Press, 1971), 75pp.

"Functional Specialties in Theology," in Gregorianum, 50
(1969), 485-505. (This article will form Chap. V of Lonergan's
forthcoming book, Method in Theology. See Bernard Lonergan, S.J.,
"An Interview with Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," ed. Philip
McShane, S.J., in The Clergy Review, 56 [1971] , 413.)

"The Future of Christianity," in The Holy Cross Quarterly
(Worcester, Mass.), Winter (1969), pp. 5-10. (To be published
in Collection II.)

Grace and Freedom : Operative Grace in the Thought of St.
Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns, S.J. (London : Darton,
Longman, & Todd ; 1971), 187pp. (Originally appeared in
Theological Studies, 2 [1941] , 289-324 ; 3 [1942] , 69-
88 ; 375-402 ; 533-578.)

Insight : A Study of Human Understanding, revised students
edition 1958 (London : Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961),
785pp.

"An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," ed. Philip
McShane, S.J. in The Clergy Review, 56 (1971), 412-431.
(An edited version of an interview taped at the Lonergan
Congress, Tampa, April, 1970. "The editing left Fr Lonergan's
statements virtually unchanged but cut down the questions for
brevity's sake" [ p. 412] . To be published in Collection II.)

"The Natural Knowledge of God," in Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America, 23 (1968), 54-69. (To be
published in Collection II.)

"Philosophy and Theology," Medalist's Address, in Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Association, 44 (1970), 26-39.
(To be published in Collection II.)

'Response," in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association, 59 (1967), 254-259. (To be published in
Collection II.)

The Subject, The Aquinas Lecture, 1968, at Marquette University
(Milwaukee : Marquette University Press, 1968), 35pp.

"Theology in Its New Context," in Theology of Renewal, Vol. I,
ed. L.K. Shook (New York : Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 34-46.
(To be published in Collection II.)

"Theology and Man's Future," in Theology in the City of Man,
Cross Currents Paperback, Fall, 1969 and Winter, pp. 452-461.

"The transition from a Classicist World View to
Historical Mindedness," in Law for Liberty, ed. James E.
Biechler (Baltimore : Helicon, 1967), pp. 126-136. (To
be published in Collection II.)

Verbum : Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell,
C.S.C. (Notre Dame : [Indiana ]: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1967), 300pp. (Originally appeared in Theological
Studies, 7 [1946] , 349-392 ; 8 [1947 ], 35-79 ; 404-444 ;
10 [1949] , 3-40 , 3-40 ; 359-393.)

La notion de Verbe dans les écrits de saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Paris : Beauchesne, 1966), 257pp. Slight modifications
of Verbum (e.g., p. 44, n. 196, which does not appear in
Verbum.)


2. Unpublished Works

(Unless otherwise indicated, all of these works are available
at the Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College, Toronto.
Some of these works are likewise in the possession of the
present writer.)

"Dublin Lectures," six lectures on Insight at University
College, Dublin, May 23-25, 1961. (Text from tape-
recording ; in Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College,
Toronto.)

"Faith and Beliefs," lecture delivered at the American
Academy of Religion, Boston, October 23, 1969. (Type-
written ms. of 23pp. ; available at Centre for Lonergan
Studies, .Regis College, Toronto. To be published in
Collection II.)

"The Future of Thomism," lecture given in Pittsburgh,
March 17, 1968. (Typewritten ms. of 13pp. ; available
at Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College, Toronto.)
To be published in Collection II.)

"Hermeneutics,"notes for lectures during Theology Institute
Regis College, Toronto, July 20, 1962. (Mimeographed copy
available at Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College,
Toronto.)

"Method in Theology," lecture notes made by the present
writer at Toronto, 1962 ; Toronto, 1969 ; Dublin, 1971.

"Notes on Existentialism," notes on lectures given at Boston College, Summer, 1957, 28pp. (28pp. altogether ; four different paginations used ; mimeographed ; available at Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College, Toronto.)

"Notes from the Introductory Lecture in the Philosophy of History," given at the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, September 23, 1960. (Two texts from tape-recording, not corrected by Lonergan ; one text of 14pp., the other of 16pp. ; both mimeographed. Both texts available at Centre for Lonergan Studies, RRegis College, Toronto.)

"The Origins of Christian Realism," a lecture given at Regis College, Toronto, September 8, 1961. (Text from tape-recording ; text not corrected by Lonergan ; 8pp. ; Available at Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College, Toronto ; to be published in Collection II.)

"Schematic Supplement on the Knowledge and Will of God," lecture notes, Regis College, Toronto, 1969, 110pp. (Translation by students at Regis College of "Supplementum Schematicum de Predestinatione," Regis College, Toronto, 1950, 48pp. Copies of both texts available at Centre for Lonergan Studies, Regis College, Toronto.)


## III. OTHER WORKS

Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, 19th printing (New York : Random House, 1941), 1487pp.

Asemissen, Hermann, Strukturanalytische Probleme der Wahrnehmung der Phänomenologie Husserls, Kantstudien : Ergänzungshefte, Nr. 73 (Köln : Kölner Universitäts-Verlat, 1957), 100pp.

Bachelard, Suzanne, La logique de Husserl (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), 316pp.

Barden, Garrett and Philip McShane, S.J., Towards Self-Meaning, Logos Books (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, 1969), 139pp.

Becker, Carl L., Everyman His Own Historian : Essays on History and Politics, reprint of ed. of 1935, Quadrangle Paperbacks (Chicago : Quadrangle Books, 1966), 1966.

Berger, Gaston, Le cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl (Paris : Aubier, 1941), 157pp.

Berger, Gaston, "Husserl et Hume," in Phénoménologie du temps et prospective (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), pp. 2-12. (This article originally appeared in Revue internationale de philosophie, 1 [1938-1939], 342-353.)

Berger, Peter L., Invitation to Sociology : A Humanistic Perspective (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday Anchor, 1963), 191pp.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City : Doubleday Anchor, 1967), 219 pp.

Biemel, Walter, "Les phases décisives dans le développement de la philosophie de Husserl," in Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 33-71.

Boehm, Rudolf, Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 266pp.

- "Das Absolute und die Realität," in Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 72-105.
  (Originally appeared as "Zum Begriff des 'Absoluten' bei Husserl," in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 13 [1959] , 214-242.)

- "Les ambiguïtés des concepts husserliens d' 'immanence' et de 'transcendence,' " in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 84 (1959), 481-526.
  (German trans., "Immanenz und Transzendenz," by Boehm in Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 141-185.)

- "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction," International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (1965), 183-202.
  (German trans., "Die phänomenologische Reduktion," by Boehm in Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 119-140.)

- "Deux points de vue : Husserl et Nietzsche," in Archivio di Filosofia, (1962) fasc. 3, 167-181.
  (German trans., Husserl und Nietzsche," by Boehm in Vom Gesischtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 217-236.)

- "Husserl et l'idéalisme classique," in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 57 (1959), 351-396.
  (German trans., "Husserl und der klassische Idealismus," by Boehm in Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 18-71.)

- "La phénoménologie de l'histoire," in Revue internationale de philosophie, 71-72 (1965), 55-73.
  (German trans., "Die Phänomenologie der Geschichte," by Boehm in Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie, pp. 237-256.)

Boehm, Rudolf, "Les sciences exactes et l'idéal husserlien d'une savoir rigoureux," in Archives de Philosophie, 27 (1964), 424-438.
(German trans., "Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," by Boehm in Vom Gesischtspunkt der Phänomenologie,) pp.1-17.)

Brand, Gerd, Welt, Ich und Zeit (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), 147pp.

Broekman, Jan M., Phänomenologie und Egologie : Faktisches und transzendentales Ego bei Edmund Husserl (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 224pp.

Butterfield, Herbert, Christianity and History, Fontana Books (Glasgow : William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1957), 189pp.

- The Origins of Modern Science : 1300-1800, reprint of new ed. of 1957 (London : G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1968), 242pp.

Cavaillès, Jean, Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, 2e ed. (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 79pp.

Copleston, S.J., Frederick, A History of Philosophy : Vol. 6, Modern Philosophy, Part I - The French Enlightenment to Kant ; Part II-Kant, Image Books (Garden City : Doubleday & Co., 1960).

Crowe, S.J., Frederick E., "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," in Foundations of Theology : Papers from the International Lonergan Congress, 1970, ed. Philip McShane, S.J. (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, Ltd., 1971), pp. 22-40.
(Also appeared in Theological Studies, 31[ 1970], 605-624.)

- "The Exigent Mind : Bernard Lonergan's Intellectualism," in Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (Chicago : St. Xavier College, 1964), pp. 16-33. This book originally appeared as the issue of Continuum 2 (1964) 305-552.

- Introduction, to Collection, ed. F.E. Crowe, S.J. (New York : Herder and Herder, 1967), 280pp.

"The Origin and Scope of Bernard Lonergan's 'Insight,' " in Sciences ecclésiastiques, 9 (1957), 263-295.

- A Time of Change : Guidelines for the Perplexed Catholic (Milwaukee : The Bruce Publishing Col, 1968), 168pp.

de Muralt, André, L'idée de la phénoménologie : l'exemplarisme husserlien, éd. augmentée d'un index (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), 398pp.

Derrida, La voix et le phénomène : Introduction au problème de signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 119pp.

De Waelhens, Alphonse, "Commentaire sur l'Idée de la phénoménologie," in Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 143-169.

-    Existence et signification (Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1958), 291pp.

-    "L'idée phénoménologique d'intentionnalité," in Husserl et la pensée moderne, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus -Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 115-129.

-    Phénoménologie et vérité, 2e édition (Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1965), 160pp.

-    La philosophie et les expériences naturelles (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 211pp.

-    "Réflexions sur une problématique husserlienne de l'inconscient, Husserl et Hegel," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959),

Dewart, Leslie, The Foundations of Belief (London : Burns & Oates/ Herder and Herder, 1969), 526pp.
        Appendix 2 : "On Transcendental Thomism," pp. 499-522.

-    "Lonerganamania," book review of The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan by David Tracy, in The Critic, Sept.-Oct., 1970, pp. 76-78

Diemer, Alwin, Edmund Husserl : Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie, 2. verbesserte Aufl. (Meisenheim : Anton Hain, 1965), 337pp.

Donceel, S.J., Joseph, "On Transcendental Thomism," in Continuum, 7 (1969), 164-168.

Eisler, Rudolf, Kant-Lexikon (Hildesheim : Georg Olms, 1964), 642pp.

Eley, Lothar, Die Krise des Apriori in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 146pp.

Farber, Marvin, The Aims of Phenomenology : The Motives, Methods, and Impact of Husserl's Thought, Torchbook (New York : Harper & Row, 1966), 240pp.

- The Foundation of Phenomenology : Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York : Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1962), 585pp.

- "On the Meaning of Radical Reflection," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 154-166.

- Phenomenology and Existence : Toward a Philosophy within Nature, Torchbook (New York : Harper & Row, 1967), 244pp.

Fink, Eugen, Studien zur Phänomenologie : 1930-1939, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 223pp.

- "Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik," in Studien zur Phänomenologie, pp. 77-156.
  (Originally appeared with a Vorwort by Husserl formally endorsing it in Kant-Studien, 38[ 1933] 321-383.)

- "Was Will die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls ? (Die phäno-menologische Grundlegungsidee)," in Studien zur Phänomenolo-gie, pp. 157-178.
  (Originally appeared in Die Tatwelt, 10 [1934] , 15-32.)

- "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls," in Studien zur Phänomenologie, pp. 179-223.
  (Originally appeared in Revue internationale de philosophie, 1[ 1939] , 226-270.)

  "L'analyse intentionnelle et le problème de la pensée spé-culative," Problème actuels de la phénoménologie, ed. H.L. Van Breda, O.F.M. (Paris : Desclée de Brouwer, 1952), 53-88. (The French trans. was not read at the Colloque, but was made afterwards by W. Biemel and J. Ladrière.)

- "Les concepts opératoires dans la phénoménologie de Husserl," in Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 214-241.

- "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 99-115.

- "Welt und Geschichte," in Husserl et la pensée moderne, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 143-159.

Frankl, Viktor E., Man's Search for Meaning : An Introduction
    to Logotherapy (New York : Washington Square Press, 1969),
    224pp.

Gauthier, Yvon, "Herméneutique philosophique et heuristique
    métaphysique," in Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses
    für Philosophie Wien : 2.-9. September 1968, I (Wien :
    Herder, 1968), pp. 327-332.

Gurwitsch, Aron, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh : Duquesne
    University Press, 1964), 427pp.

- Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston :
    Northwestern University Press, 1966), 452pp.

- "The Problem of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology,"
    in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, pp. 116-123.
    (Originally appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, 58 [1961],
    625-632.)

- "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," in Studies in
    Phenomenology and Psychology, pp. 124-140.
    (Originally appeared in Philosophical Essays in Memory of
    Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Fraber (Cambridge : Harvard
    University Press, 1941), pp. 65-83.)

- "On the Object of Thought," in Studies in Phenomenology and
    Psychology, pp. 141-147.
    (Originally appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological
    Research, 7 [1947], 347-353.)

- "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," in Studies in Phenomenology
    and Psychology, pp. 397-447.
    (Originally appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological
    Research, 16 [1955-1956], 380-399 ; 17 [1957], 370-398.)

Hanson, Norwood, Patterns of Discovery : An Inquiry into the
    Conceptual Foundations of Science (Cambridge : Cambridge
    University Press, 1965), 241pp.

Heelan, S.J., Patrick A., "Epistemological Realism in Contemporary
    Physics," in Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention
    of the Jesuit Philosophical Association, ed. Walter E. Stokes,
    S.J. (Shrub Oak, N.Y. : Loyola Seminary, 1967), pp. 9-65.

- "Horizon, Objectivity and Reality in the Physcial Science,"
    in International Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1967), 375-412.

- Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity : A Study of the Physical
    Philosophy of Werner Heisenberg (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff,
    1965), 207pp.

Heidegger, Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City : Doubleday Anchor, 1961), 182pp.

-      "What is Metaphysics," trans. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being (collection of four essays of Heidegger), ed. Stefan Schimanski and Werner Brock, Gateway Edition, 4th ed. (Chicago : Henry Regnery, Co., 1965), pp. 325-361.

Held, Klaus, Lebendige Gegenwart (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 190pp.

Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, abridged and edited by John Plamenatz, 3rd impression, The Fontana Library (London : William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1967), 409pp.

Ingarden, Roman, "Le problème de la constitution et le sens de la réflexion constitutive chez Edmond Husserl," in Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris : Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 242-270.

Janssen, Paul, Geschichte und Lebenswelt (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 218pp.

Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg : Felix Meiner, 1967), 766pp. (plus a Namenregister).

-      Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London : Macmillan & Co., 1964), 681pp.

-      Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York : Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), 136pp.

Kern, Iso, Husserl und Kant (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 448pp.

Koestler, Arthur, The Sleepwalkers : A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), 623pp.

Körner, S., Kant (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1967), 230pp.

Kuhn, H., "The Phenomenological Concept of 'Horizon'," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1941), 106-123.

Ladrière, Jean, L'articulation du sens : Discours scientifique et parole de la foi (Paris : Aubier Montaigne, 1970), 108pp.

Landau, E.D., and G.B. Rumer, What is Relativity ? trans. N. Kemmer (Greenwich Conn. : Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1966), 127pp.

Landgrebe, Ludwig, Phänomenologie und Geschichte (Gütersloh :
    Gerd Mohn, 1967), 207pp.

-   "Von der Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrung," in Edmund Husserl :
    1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague :
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 238-259.

-   Der Weg der Phänomenologie (Gütersloh : Gerd Mohn, 1963),
    208pp.

-   "The World as a Phenomenological Problem," in Philosophy and
    Phenomenological Research, 1 (1940), 38-58.

Laporte, S.J., Jean-Marc, "Husserl's Critique of Descartes,"
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 23 (1962-1963),
    335-352.

Lauer, Quentin, Phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris : Presses
    Universitaires de France, 1955), 444pp.

-   Phenomenology : Its Genesis and Prospect, Harper Torchbook
    (New York : Harper & Row, 1965), 185pp.

-   "The Subjectivity of Objectivity," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-
    1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague :
    Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 167-174.

Levin, David M., Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology
    (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1970), 232pp.

Levinas, Emmanuel, En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et
    Heidegger, 2nd unchanged ed. with other articles added (Paris :
    Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,1967), 237pp.

-   "Intentionalité et sensation," in Revue internationale de
    philosophie, 71-72 (1965), 34-54.

-   "Réflexions sur la 'technique' phénoménologique," in Husserl :
    Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris : Editions de
    Minuit, 1959), pp. 95-118.

-   "La ruine de la représentation," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-
    1959 (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 73-85.

-   Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl,
    2e ed. (Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1963), 223pp.

McMullin, Ernan, "Insight and the Meno," in Spirit as Inquiry :
    Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick
    E. Crowe, S.J. (Chicago : St. Xavier College, 1964), pp. 69-
    73.

McShane, S.J., Philip, ed., Foundations of Theology : Papers from the International Lonergan Congress, 1970 (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, Ltd., 1971), 257pp.

- "Insight and the Strategy of Biology," in Spirit as Inquiry : Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (Chicago : St. Xavier Collége, 1964), pp. 74-88.

- Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 268pp.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "Sur la Phénoménologie du langage", Eloge de la philosophie et autres essais (Paris : Gallimard, 1965), pp. 83-111.

- Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, 3rd ed. (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 466pp.

- "Le philosophe et son ombre," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 195-220.

Mohanty, J.N., Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 148pp.

- "The 'Object' in Husserl's Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14 (1953-1954), 343-353.

Muck, S.J., Otto, The Transcendental Method, trans. William D. Seidensticker (New York : Herder and Herder, 1968), 347pp.

Newman, John Henry, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 2nd printing, Image Books (Garden City : Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958), 396pp.

Paton, H.J., Kant's Metaphysic of Experience : A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols. (London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1965).

Patocka, Jean, "La Doctrine de l'intuition eidétique et ses critique récentes," Revue internationale de Philosophie, 71-72 (1965), 17-33.

Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, 17th printing, 2 vols. (New York : Random House, 1937).

Popper, Karl, "On the Theory of the Objective Mind," in Akten
    des XIV. internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, Wien,
    2.-9. September 1968, I (Wien : Herder [Universität Wien] ,
    1968), pp. 25-53.

Pos, H.J., "Phénoménologie et linguistique," in Revue interna-
    tionale de philosophie, 1 (1938-1939), 354-365.

Richardson, William J., "Being for Lonergan :
    A Heideggerian View," a paper submitted at "Ongoing Col-
    laboration : The First International Lonergan Congress,"
    31 March -3 April 1970, St. Leo (Tampa), Fla.  This paper
    will be published in Vol. III of the Congress papers
    entitled Essays in Methodology (Dublin : Gill and
    Macmillan).

Ricoeur, Paul, Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology,
    trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston :
    Northwestern University Press, 1967), 238pp.

-   Ricoeur, Paul, "An Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," in
    Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology, pp. 3-34.
    (Originally appeared as "Introduction à 'Ideen I' de
    Edmund Husserl," in Idées directrices pour une phénoménolo-
    gie pure, pp. xix-xxxix.)

-   "A Study of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, I-IV," in
    Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology, pp. 82-114.
    (Originally appeared as "Etudes sur les 'Méditationes
    Cartésiennes' de Husserl, in Revue philosophique de Louvain,
    52 [1954], 75-109.)

-   "Husserl and the Sense of History," in Husserl : An Analysis
    of His Phenomenology, pp. 143-174.
    (Originally appeared as "Husserl et le sens de l'histoire,"
    in Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 54 [1949], 280-316.)

-   "Kant and Husserl," in Husserl : An Analysis of His Pheno-
    menology, pp. 175-212.
    (Originally appeared as "Kant et Husserl," Kantstudien, 46
    [1950], 44-67.)

Sala, Giovanni, "The Apriori in Human Knowledge according to
    Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight," a
    paper submitted at "Ongoing Collaboration : The First
    International Lonergan Congress," 31 March-3 April 1970,
    St. Leo (Tampa), Fla.  This paper will be published in
    Vol. III of the Congress papers entitled Essays in
    Methodology (Dublin : Gill and Macmillan).

Saraiva, Maria Manuela, L'imagination selon Husserl (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 281pp.

Schérer, René, La phénoménologie des "Recherches logiques" de Husserl (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 370pp.

Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers I : The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson, 2nd unchanged ed. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 361pp.

-   Collected Papers III : Studies in Phenomenological Philoso-phy, ed. I Schutz (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 191pp.

-   "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences," in Edmund Husserl : 1859-1959, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 86-98.

-   The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1967), 255pp.

-   "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," Collected Papers III, ed. I Schutz (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 92-115.

Snell, Bruno, The Discovery of Mind : The Origins of European Thought, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer, Torchbook (New York : Harper & Row, 1960), 323pp.

Sokolowski, Robert, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 250pp.

Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomenological Movement : A Historical Introduction, 2 vols. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

Strasser, Stephan, "Intuition und Dialektik in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls," Edmund Husserl : 1858-1959 (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 148-153pp.

Tracy, David, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York : Herder and Herder, 1970), 302pp.

Tugendhat, Ernst, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, 2. unveränderte Aufl. (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970), 415pp.

The Universal Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Mentor Book (New York : New American Library, 1965), 715pp.

Van Breda, Herman L., "La réduction phénoménologique," in
Husserl : Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie III (Paris :
Les Editions de Minuit, 1959), pp. 307-333.

Van Riet, Georges, Problèmes d'épistémologie (Louvain : Publica-
tions Universitaires de Louvain, 1960), 425pp.

-    "Réalisme thomiste et phénoménologie husserlienne," in
Problèmes d'épistémologie, (Louvain : Publications Univer-
sitaires de Louvain, 1960), pp. 170-206.

-    Thomistic Epistemology : Studies concerning the Problem of
Cognition in the Contemporary Thomistic School, trans.
Gabriel Franks (Vol. I), and Donald G. McCarthy and George
E. Hertrich (Vol. II), 2 vols. (St. Louis : B. Herder Book
Co., 1963 [Vol. I] ; 1965 [Vol. II ] ).

-    "Y a-t-il un chemin vers la vérité ?  A propos de l'introduc-
tion à la 'Phénoménologie de l'Esprit' de Hegel," in
Revue philosophique de Louvain, 62 (1964), 466-476.
(Reprinted in Georges Van Riet, Philosophie et religion
[Louvain : Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1970] ,
pp. 174-184.)

Volkmann-Schluck, K.H., "Husserls Lehre von der Idealität der
Bedeutung als metaphysiches Problem," in Husserl et la pen-
sée moderne, ed. H.L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague :
Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 230-241.

Wahl, Jean, "Notes sur la première partie de Erfahrung und Urteil
de Husserl," in Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 57 (1952),
6-34.

Winance, E., "Intention and Nature of Husserl's Logic,"
Philosophia Mathematica, 2 (1965), 69-85.