

Class 3: Chapter 3

## 1 Concluding the Discussion of Chapter 2

We will begin today with a quick overview of the section on **judgments of value** in chapter 2, and complete the discussion of the major points of that chapter. From judgments of value we move to **apprehension of values in feelings**, the difference between horizontal and vertical liberty, the role of beliefs in development, and the notions of progress and decline.

### *1.1 Judgments of value*

Questions for deliberation and evaluation terminate proximately in judgments of value, and ulteriorly in decision and action. Judgments of value may be either simple ('This is good') or comparative ('This is better'). 37: 'Such judgments are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its **criterion** in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being.' The **meaning** of the judgment of value, however, is not the same thing as its criterion. The meaning has to do with what **objectively** is good or better, or not good or better, while the criterion is the authenticity of the **subject**.

What is the difference between a judgment of value and a judgment of fact? 37: 'They differ in **content**, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove if what does. They **do not differ in structure**, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both, the **criterion** is the self-transcendence of the **subject**, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the **meaning** is or claims to be **independent of the subject**: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.'

Judgments of fact bring to a close a particular case of cognitive self-transcendence, but it is not the case that judgments of value bring to a close any cases of moral self-transcendence. That occurs only in **doing**. The judgment of value makes one proximately capable of moral self-transcendence, but one does not achieve that until one not only knows what is right but does it.

### *1.2 The Apprehension of Values in Feelings*

What bridges the gap between judgments of fact and judgments of value? In the mode of decision-making being discussed in this book, the bridge lies in the apprehension of possible values in feelings. In the earlier mode discussed in *Insight*, the bridge is the grasp that the proposed course of action satisfies the criteria of being intelligent and reasonable. Here we are concerned with the affective mode of decision-making. More often than not the apprehension is an apprehension of *possible* values. I think we have to speak of deliberative insights alive with feeling. The feelings are intentional, and so they are response to intelligently apprehended objects, which means they are connected with insights. But just as an insight in the order of knowledge is only possibly true and must be verified, so in this mode of making decisions the grasp of values in feelings is only possibly on target. Discernment is required. There are **further questions**. It is only when there are **no further questions** and one knows, with the peace of a