

Imagine that you had the task of explaining just why Lonergan's philosophy is so significant, perhaps to somebody whose tradition had a very different starting point from Lonergan's. Suppose further that an esteemed representative of that tradition had actually been taught by Lonergan, and indeed, had once owned a copy of *Insight*, and that you had to explain to him how, by missing the point at the very beginning he had found a very 'effective way of missing everything.'ⁱ What would you say? Well, perhaps you would say something about the act of understanding, insight. But what if it was objected that whilst the topic is obviously psychologically significant, such an experience can hardly have far reaching philosophical consequences. Worse still suppose you had just twenty minutes, correction, nineteen minutes to do so! That's gives you some idea of what I have to attempt this morning. Well, perhaps you would start at the beginning. This is what I will do in looking at the topic of Sir Anthony Kenny and substantial form.

SIR ANTHONY KENNY

Sir Anthony Kenny is a distinguished English philosopher, who studied under Lonergan. He was born in 1931, and as a seminarian, he studied at the Gregorian in the early 1950s – he appreciated Lonergan's theology classes more than the philosophy he received. He was ordained a Catholic priest in 1955 but was to leave the priesthood in 1963 and the Catholic Church as related in his autobiography, *A Path From Rome*. He went on to pursue a distinguished academic career and became the Master of Baliol College, Oxford and authored over 40 books which often display great clarity and erudition. He still attends Mass but calls himself an agnostic. On the face of it, Kenny's religious difficulties stem from intellectual difficulty.

Kenny has continued to show a great interest and respect for St. Thomas Aquinas, making his thought accessible for philosophers in the analytic tradition. He speaks highly of Aquinas on mind, and incidentally has spoken of Lonergan's *Verbum* as one of the two most illuminating books on the subject.ⁱⁱ He has also published *Aquinas on Being*. Here he is less complimentary, maintaining his earlier position that Aquinas cannot be acquitted of sophistry and illusion.ⁱⁱⁱ

This is somewhat surprising, for after all, Lonergan's work always demonstrates the closest connection between understanding and being. There are several pertinent issues^{iv} but we can consider the intelligibility of substantial form – 'things' or 'central forms' as Lonergan calls

them. Actually, this is fundamental. As we shall see, when Lonergan first begins to draw on the notion of insight it is in the context of the question of substance, which Aristotle explained was at the heart of the new science he created: metaphysics.

KENNY'S CONCERNS WITH SUBSTANTIAL FORM

Very often it takes an intelligent person to suspect a difficulty where the less intelligent is unsuspecting. This is true of Kenny's difficulties with substantial form. In fact, for Kenny metaphysics is problematic, that is, metaphysics as explanatory, as a science as Lonergan puts it. The problem is one of *method*. For Kenny will attend exclusively to logical, or as Lonergan puts it, 'predicamental' issues. He will miss the point of what we are doing when we do metaphysics.

Why, then, is the idea of 'substantial form' problematic? Very crudely, because logic teaches us that in a sentence, the substance pertains to the subject of the sentence, and the form pertains to the predicate:

The notion of form, in both Aristotle and Aquinas, is that of an entity corresponding to a true predication. The way in which the notion is introduced leaves no room for the notion of a pure form, a form that would correspond to a predicate that was not a predicate of anything.^v

To speak of 'substantial forms,' then, appears to be logically confused. It's true, of course, that we can make predications by way of substance. Suppose we are looking at *this* (Socrates, perhaps, or a house) and we ask 'What is this?' We may wish to use 'man' as a predicate. Here, 'man' is a universal, though. There is no room for concrete substantial forms.^{vi}

Substance – that is, first substance, this thing, the supposit – can be the ultimate subject of predication. This is concrete but Kenny will not allow that this should be called 'form.' Moreover, he has misgivings in speaking of the form as a *cause*. Kenny's logical considerations make him extremely familiar with such notions, but they do not constitute what Lonergan calls metaphysics. To coin a phrase that gets to the heart of the matter, for Kenny, substance is not essence.

At this point, however, we can rather gnomically cite Lonergan. In his Christology classes which Kenny probably attended Lonergan made use of metaphysics:

Substance in the metaphysical sense must not be confused with substance in the predicamental sense. Metaphysically substance is essence simply understood, which is an intrinsic cause of being, whereas the predicament 'substance' refers to a supposit either real or hypothetical.^{vii}

What do we mean then by substance in the metaphysical sense? How does this differ from the logical or predicamental sense? For Lonergan, metaphysics studies causes so that form – that is, substantial, or central form – is not simply a universal but a cause of being. Kenny has noted, but rejected, this usage and Lonergan is all too aware that such an oversight is possible. Both *Insight* and *Verbum* start by providing a correct understanding of the matter.

VERBUM: DEFINITION AND UNDERSTANDING

In *Insight*, for example, there is a lengthy development of the notion of *the thing*. Unlike, say, 'event' this notion is especially problematic – it seems unparsimonious.^{viii} The eighth chapter tackles this question explicitly, though the argument is only concluded in the fifteenth chapter in which Lonergan gives an account of the explanatory notion of central form. But what he begins in his very first section of chapter one, entitled *Definition*, is an account of direct insight whereby what is potentially intelligible in a mathematical diagram is grasped by 'insight into phantasm.' Things, too, involve 'direct insight' – a new type, though.^{ix} Lonergan speaks of grasping a concrete unity-identity-whole in the data. The whole point is to see certain similarities between the acts of understanding in chapters one and eight.

Lonergan's first chapter on direct insight is ancillary, then, to the chapter on things which involves what Lonergan also terms 'insight.' This same strategy had been employed in the *Verbum* articles, in the very first section in which Lonergan begins his exposition. Again it is entitled, *Definition*.^x

First of all, Lonergan follows Aristotle in examining questions. To be precise he considers questions that seek definition: What is it? Recall that Kenny astutely attends to such questions as they arise in *logic*, for after all, essence is what is signified by the definition. Then, it seems, Lonergan takes a digression. He considers the phenomenon of insight: it is Plato's account of the act of solving a puzzle in the *Meno*. You have a square and you have to draw another square that is exactly twice as big. How? Very obviously, this account of insight is a lens, for Lonergan. Finally, he returns to Aristotle again, in particular to a passage of pivotal

importance. This is *Metaphysics Zeta 17*. Lonergan discussed this passage many times,^{xi} and he often drew attention to the foundational significance of the text, a significance he thought was forgotten.^{xii} Kenny ignores this text, by the way, although for Aristotle it is integral to what he called a ‘fresh start.’

Our task, then, is to see the significance of the lens. The point of departure is Socratic questioning. What is virtue? What is moderation? Lonergan notes how Aristotle made capital of this formula. He does so by what Lonergan refers to as a catch or trick.^{xiii} This involves transposing the meaning of a question. It involves turning a ‘What?’ into a ‘Why?’ Sometimes we can do this. We can ask ‘What is an eclipse?’ and realise that this question involves a demand for understanding, explanation. We want to know why the moon is thus darkened. The phenomenon is strange to us. We are puzzled by it.

Note here that ‘What?’ seeks definition. In fact, Aristotle had three ways of analysing definition.^{xiv} A first way is that of genus and differentiae. Here we categorise. The kind of thing that this is – house, man - is sorted out extrinsically, that is, this thing is compared with other things that are similar in some respect. This is pre-eminently the *logical* approach. But Aristotle also analyses definition intrinsically. Here we ask what the thing is, even though, paradoxically, we already know the kind of thing that it is. It is not like, say, we ask what the Roc is having never read the *Arabian Nights*, but like asking what a man is, even though we already know how to classify that sort of thing.

Aristotle has two ways of analysing definition intrinsically. The first is by cause and effect, the second by matter and form. As we have just seen, the eclipse, which is an event – or we could say, an ‘accident’ - involves the assignment of a cause: the interposition of the earth causes the darkening. The two events happen simultaneously, but we *understand* the dependence. Cause is not simply constant conjunction! With matter and form, in what is called artificial form, say the creation of a bronze statue according to a specific design, it is clear that the design (which is the form) and the matter used are distinct, indeed separate, and that, provided the designer actually realises the design (efficient causality) the form will be an (exemplary) cause. But, Aristotle’s ‘trick’ is to apply the definitions involving both matter and form and cause and effect to what are natural forms such as man.

To appreciate this we ought to be a bit shocked. We ought to wonder whether Aristotle is confused. For a man is not an event such as an eclipse, for events are accidents, and nor is

man simply an artefact, for it is not clear that matter and form are distinct in natural forms. How then can we 'define' man intrinsically, that is, using both matter and form *and* the idea of cause and effect? For this is what Aristotle does. Faced with this sensible datum (that is Socrates, say) he asks the paradoxical question 'What is this?' meaning not, what sort of thing is this, but, 'Why is this sensible datum what it is?' What is the cause of unity of this thing? His answer, in general, is the substantial form, which in this case is the soul. The form is what causes the thing to be *unum per se* – without it the thing would simply be a coincidental manifold such as a heap. But what warrants Aristotle in making such a move? How did he latch on to the idea? How can he synthesise such diverse analyses?

For Lonergan the answer, rarely appreciated, and often forgotten, is the act he calls insight. He sees the affinity between the Eureka moment of solving a puzzle and grasping the Aristotelian idea of the soul. But, it might be replied, we know what it is like to solve a puzzle, but we don't look at men as if they were mathematical diagrams and wait for inspiration. Why do we properly call both the insights of puzzles and the insight of a concrete unity-identity-whole by the same name – apart from the say so of Bernard Lonergan? What do we mean by 'insight' that legitimates the use of the same word in both cases? A quick answer is that in both instances an insight involves the grasp of unity in empirical multiplicity.^{xv} Strangely, despite his admiration for his teacher, Kenny never explores this idea.

CONCLUSION

At this point I have to conclude. I have tried to pinpoint the parting of the ways between Kenny and Lonergan. The logician and the metaphysician both stand in front of Socrates and ask: What is this? But there is an ambiguity in the 'this.'^{xvi} For this can refer to the supposit, substance in a logical sense, and then attention is drawn outside, to the sort of thing a thing is. But 'this' can also stand for the sensible datum, which presents itself to us as a puzzle in search of a solution, for some cause must make it *one*. To follow this lead – this apparently confused lead – takes us to metaphysics and many other things follow. Lonergan has shown us why we should follow Aristotle. The clue is that at the basis of Aristotle's hylomorphism is an understanding of insight into phantasm. Oversight of insight, it seems, is an effective way of missing everything.

APPENDIX: JEAN-MARIE LE BLOND ON DEFINITION IN ARISTOTLE

Some brief notes are attached based on *Le Blond, J. M., "Aristotle on Definition," in Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji 1979, Articles on Aristotle, Vol 3. Metaphysics, London: Duckworth pp. 63–79.* Published originally in *Gregorianum*, Vol. 20 (1939).

OUTLINE

1. Nature of Definition
 - 1.1. Not just to assign another name but to grasp essence
 - 1.2. Not just to grasp essence but analyse it
 - 1.3. Not just to analyse it into a list but as a unified whole
 - 1.4. This involves three kinds of analysis: matter/form; cause/effect; genus/difference
 - 1.5. In each case, analysis is in terms of potency and act - the parts are potential, and so unity saved. In this way definition is explanatory.
 - 1.6. Genus/difference works by classification and is extrinsic; others work by intrinsic principles. We ask, of both man and house, why is this matter so formed?
 - 1.7. Cause/effect appropriate for events, i.e. accidents; matter/form for substances.
 - 1.8. Moreover, matter/form appropriate for artefacts principally. Aristotle conflates two forms of analysis, and this leads to the chasm of being and knowing.
 - 1.9. A paradox: Although the cause/effect analysis is proper to events, it is this analysis that is used to explain matter/and form, the analysis proper to objects.
2. Method of Definition
 - 2.1. Definition is reached not intuitively, for it is complex, abstract and discursive.
 - 2.2. There is a gap between intuition and definition.
 - 2.3. Induction searches for the common element in a group of things.
 - 2.4. As does Platonic division. These methods are extrinsic.
 - 2.5. The logical syllogism of essence is intrinsic. It artificially treats substance as if it were an event.
 - 2.6. This method is more appropriate for artefacts, and so this raises epistemological issues – is to know to make?
3. The Role of Definition
 - 3.1. So, we see the difficulties for Aristotle. Do we start with nominal definitions, and move to existence, or vice versa?
 - 3.2. Definitions are principles (they cannot be demonstrated) and they are not (for they are won with hard labour).
 - 3.3. The definition is science as finished product.
4. Conclusion
 - 4.1. Definitions can be doubted.
 - 4.2. We should work towards definitions as with the circle example.

SUMMARY

Aristotle wrestled with the difficulties of definition – its nature, of the method of arriving at it, and of the role it plays in the sciences. Regarding the nature of definition:

(1) The definition of a thing is not merely another name for it – to identify Homer’s poem as the *Iliad* is not to define it. This would be to deny the importance of abstract concepts: to define involves a commitment to the reality of essences. That is to say, the doctrine that there is no intermediary between material objects and their name is to be rejected. Definition is more than simply designating something we perceive with our senses.

(2) Thus we must speak, say, of ‘humanity.’ Nevertheless, simply to grasp an essence is not enough. We must also analyse it. Whereas the intuitive grasp of *nous* can penetrate to the essence, it is the discursive work of *dianoia* that characterises scientific knowledge.

(3) Definition, the function of *dianoia*, is discursive – a definition involves a formula, made up of parts, in which a unitary concept or whole is broken up into parts. For example, we discern animality and rationality in the definition of man. ‘Man’ is thus clarified by resolving the concept into constitutive principles. Compare *Physics I 1*. Some things are clearer ‘in themselves’ but not ‘for us.’ Thus definition involves analysis – but always the definer is aware that he or she is dealing with a unitary concept. The definer is not simply giving a list; a whole is not a heap. The definition gives the cause of this whole.

(4) Thus definition is both analytic and synthetic, and these two are related. In the *Topics*, Aristotle stresses the importance of investigating similarities so as to discover the genus. However, as regards analysis there are three forms: matter and form (this is proper to the definition of substances); cause and effect (this is proper to events); genus and difference (a more abstract form than the other two). We single out, first the common aspect, and secondly, the aspect proper to that thing. This mode of defining is attributed to Socrates.

(5) In all three kinds a relation of potency to act is discerned. It is this that allows the unity of the substance to be represented by the definition: For the substance is both non-complex, and yet definable – the parts into which the substance are defined are not beings ‘in actuality.’ The parts are complementary – and are related by an internal necessity that is understood. Definition is complex. Thus there is unity in duality, a mutual linking of two factors. And this is explanatory.

(6) In the analysis of genus and difference the notion of extension plays a role. Defining is classifying. Objects are explained with reference to other objects. The analysis is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. Classification is foreign to the other two kinds. With matter/form and cause/effect the analysis concerns intrinsic principles. *Zeta 17*, ‘What is it?’ contains the question, ‘Why?’ I ask what a house is, though not as I ask what the Roc is if I have never read the *Arabian Nights*. Rather, knowing what a house is, I seek the determinable elements, or seeing an eclipse I ask for the reason for the absence of light. We cast the question: why are these materials a house?

(7) Definition by cause/effect is not, strictly speaking, appropriate for substance, that is, beings in the primary sense of the word; rather, such is for facts or events. The efficient cause (interposition of earth) is distinct in place from the effect (darkness on the moon). But

eclipses are not substances. Definition by matter/form is appropriate to substances. Here, Aristotle often conflates efficient cause with the reason why.

(8) Matter/form, which is appropriate for substances, is really only so for artefacts. With a house, we can clearly distinguish the product of human skill as involving idea and determinable matter. This is 'secondary' matter. With natural forms the form directly determines the prime matter. Soul and body are not already constituted as actual, but are principles. Because prime matter is indeterminate, it is not so useful as a tool of analysis. In the definition of humanity there is also matter taken universally. This only appears in virtue of a confusion between two types of analysis and of an analogy that is not clearly drawn. The genus, is so to speak, the matter of the definition. This pertains to the mind of the definer.

Note, the proper use of the matter/form analysis is for artefacts, and natural forms are read through this lens. Thus, Aristotle's treatment of artefacts is fundamental, and it is this that brings him to the chasm – the duality of being and knowing.

(9) So, in a primary sense, definition pertains to objects. Paradoxically, causal definition is not properly definition, for this pertains to events, yet substances have been analysed precisely according to the analogy with events. When we ask about accidents, (What is it?) we treat them as substances; when we ask about substances we treat them as events.

In conclusion, Aristotle has brought light and darkness:

- Definition involves unity and multiplicity combined
- Definitions are first principles of scientific knowledge
- Mental atomism is avoided, but rather, necessary facts are pregnant principles teeming with scientific theorems

However:

- How does definition relate to non-discursive thought? An intellectual intuition or a confused perceptual datum?
- The various types of analysis are muddled.
- Are the parts of the definition parts of the thing?

Regarding the method of definition:

This involves the passage from intuition to discursive thought. How do we analyse, and so make clearer our initial notions? This is the problem of method.

(1) We do not reach definition simply by intuition, which is simple, individual and unarticulated. Definition is complex, abstract, discursive. Intuition arises from accumulating images or unconscious action of active intellect. Nor does induction lead to definition.

Knowledge of essence and definition are both principles of science, but not in the same way. Perception of essence precedes the labour of methodical research that is realised in definition. However, definition is a principle of demonstration. Here the tool of science is the syllogism.

(2) As definition is not perceived intuitively, so it is not demonstrated apodeictically. Rather, demonstration presupposes definition, and leads to knowledge of existence.

There is a gap between intuition and definition. Definition poses the problem of method.

(3) Induction, as a conscious, controlled method to search for the common element in a group of things.

(4) The Platonic method of division involves finding the highest genus and then descending to find differentiae. These methods are extrinsic. However, an intrinsic method is the logical syllogism of essence.

(5) The logical syllogism of essence: in *Post. An.* II 8. It treats substance as if it were an event, man in a manner appropriate to an eclipse. In the eclipse there is a duality of cause and effect. This syllogism is logical, that is, artificial. The method employs the analogy of the dynamic structure of cause and effect and the intrinsic structure of substance.

(6) The analysis by way of matter/form relies on the separation of matter and form in artefacts. Before casting there is bronze; before building there is rubble. Here, the idea or form is chronologically prior. But applying this to natural forms does not fit exactly. The soul does not supervene on a body already constituted.

This is of importance for epistemology. Knowledge no longer seems to be the totally objective analysis of intuitive data; it appears rather to be an attempt to initiate or to reconstruct in our own fashion those objects which we are unable to understand in themselves. To know is to make. Aristotle did not hypostatise Platonic species and genus. He was aware of the chasm between being and knowing.

He gropes awkwardly (he would say, 'dialectically') – especially in *De Anima* – for nature of the soul.

Regarding the role of definition for Aristotle:

(1) So, we see the difficulties for Aristotle. Are nominal definitions the principles of demonstration? Do we end with existence? That is, we start with a hypothesis. Or do we have to know something exists before we can define? Here, a definition is not hypothetical. Rather, it is the goal of science. Instead of passing from meaning to existence, we go from existence to meaning.

(2) Definitions are and are not principles. They are because they cannot be demonstrated, they are first. They are not because they are won only by hard labour. We move from confused to a clear concept; from the unscientific to the scientific. Demonstration moves from certainty to certainty.

(3) Thus definition is both the principle and result of scientific labour. Definition is science itself, *considered as finished product*. Aristotle hesitates between science as research and science as demonstration: as a chain of facts or a hierarchy of ideas.

Here, 'cause' is ambiguous. Sometimes it is antecedent, and explains existence; sometimes as intrinsic reason that manifests essence. There is an ambiguity in 'to be,' in the existential and copulative senses of the verb.

Conclusion:

(1) Definitions are not indubitable – we need faith. Recall, that the conclusions cannot be more certain than the premises. Recall too, the distinction between dialectic and science.

(2) Aristotle has misconceived science. It is necessary to explain the transition from intuitions to judgements and verify the validity of such intuitions. Intuition, really, is the goal, the transcendental ideal of science. So, the scientist ought to begin from perception, confident that the world can be understood in universal terms (this is the foundation for the scientific drive). We begin with a grasp, but not an understanding. We then progress to knowledge of essence.

This approach is intimated in *Physics* II. He cites the definition of the circle, first as anyone can grasp it, then as the mathematician understands. But this is not how he articulates the official theory.

ABBREVIATIONS

I have used the following abbreviations for the following works of Bernard Lonergan published by the University of Toronto Press. The date refers to publication by UTP.

CWL2: *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 1997.

CWL3: *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 1992.

CWL 4: *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, 1988.

CWL5: *Understanding and Being*, 1990.

CWL7: *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 2002.

CWL10: *Topics In Education The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, 1993.

CWL12: *The Triune God: Systematics*, 2007.

CWL18: Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, 2001.

Published in Geoffrey Chapman in Great Britain, 1985, there is:

A Third Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.

ⁱ The allusion is to CWL2, 28 n. 58.

ⁱⁱ Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993) vii.

ⁱⁱⁱ Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 60.

^{iv} These include Lonergan's notion of being (his treatment of God as 'being by essence' and as well, the 'real distinction' between essence and existence); the idea of angels, or that of the subsistent human soul (the possibility that it can exist without a body is deeply confused for Kenny). Kenny frequently charges Aquinas with confusing abstract and concrete. Although he does not quite put it this way, we can say that since first substance (this man) is concrete and second substance (man the species) is universal, Kenny's concern seems to be that Aquinas is confused over substance. From Lonergan's point of view the key is to distinguish the logical from the metaphysical senses of substance, and this will entail a grasp of insight which Lonergan tells us pivots between abstract and concrete. This paper is not intended to 'refute' Kenny, but rather to suggest a line of inquiry that he may have missed.

^v Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Being* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) 193; 29-30.

^{vi} Aristotle spoke of ten kinds of predication, the first of which was substance. When we say 'Socrates is a man' we are saying what kind of thing Socrates is. Here, incidentally, the word 'man' is what Aristotle calls 'second substance.' The word denotes a universal. If I were to say, 'this man is in front of me' then, 'man' here refers to first substance. First substance pertains to the concrete particular, this thing – we might think of an artificial or natural form, house or man. The point is that we can predicate second substance of first substance 'Socrates is a man' but we cannot use first substance to predicate. We cannot say, 'Wittgenstein is a Socrates' except metaphorically. First substance is the ultimate subject of predication. We

can point to first substance and call this a name – and maybe say something about this thing. The thing we are talking about, we can also call the ‘supposit.’ Kenny is extremely familiar with these ideas.

^{vii} CWL7, 51. Lonergan will also claim that: ‘A substance is an essence simply understood. Let us forget the commonly held idea that substance is some unknown reality lying hidden under accidents. Just as substance exists per se, so too it is understood and defined per se.’ CWL7, 47. See also CWL12, 269-71, 401.

^{viii} CWL3, 162; 460-1.

^{ix} CWL3, 270.

^x This is actually the second section, CWL2, 24-9.

^{xi} CWL2, 26-29, 195 nn. 12 & 13; CW L3, 390-1; CWL18, 103-5 and n. 135-8, 158; CWL10, 170-2; CWL12, 579-87, 723; CWL4, 96-7, 134-5, 144 n. 4, 175 n. 39; CWL5, 50-2; A Third Collection, 206.

^{xii} Lonergan stated ‘This became forgotten’ in a question and answer session, June 17 1980. <http://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/97400DTE080.pdf>

^{xiii} CWL5, 51.

^{xiv} Here I am drawing on Jean-Marie Le Blond S.J., *Aristotle on Definition*. This was first published in the *Gregorianum*, Vol. 20, 1939. Although Lonergan never cites this work, he must have read it because: 1) he was a friend of Le Blond, having, as he tells us, travelled to Jersey with him before the war; 2) he admired Le Blond’s work, in general, drawing on him for his insights in structuralism – as he relates in *What is Claude Levi-Strauss up to?* (unpublished material) in which he gives the pre-war reminiscence; 3) the article presumably drew on Le Blond’s doctoral research that Lonergan called ‘seminal’ (A Third Collection, 222); 4) he had a copy of this volume in his hand – he took notes from an article in the same volume by Hoenen, see [bernardlonergan.com](http://www.bernardlonergan.com) search for ‘1939’ and note CWL2, 39 n.126; 5) internal evidence shows many points of convergence with Lonergan’s account of Aristotle and Le Blond’s so that it would have been very interesting to Lonergan. Why does he not cite it? Presumably, Lonergan regarded the scholarship as giving the state of the question regarding Aristotelian definition. However, what is unique to Lonergan is the significance of insight as meeting questions so that whilst Le Blond highlights the tensions between the three aspects of definition (genus/difference; cause/effect; matter/form) and the epistemological problems that result. Lonergan can show how his notion of insight, which he already knew

from experience and which brought to a reading of the text, can provide a key that resolves the tensions in Zeta 17.

^{xv} CWL4, 102. Strangely, in *Insight*, Lonergan never gets round to telling us that the direct insights of the first chapter of insight involve an ‘intelligible unity of empirical multiplicity’ – though the idea is clearly in Lonergan’s mind, for he speaks of the non-systematic as an empirical unity despite intelligible multiplicity, (CWL3, 73) having just told us that the systematic involves an ‘intelligible unity of the whole process’ (CWL3, 71). He notes that to the best of his knowledge it is he alone who has articulated the notion of the thing as a ‘grasp of unity and identity in data as individual’ (CWL3, 760) – that is, as grasped by insight. Lonergan speaks of material intelligibility consisting in ‘empirical multiplicity’ (CWL3, 544) and in the section on self-affirmation explains that this is not a grasp of ‘multiplicity nor the diversity of contents and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them’ (CWL3, 352).

^{xvi} ‘[T]he ‘this’ is ambiguous. For, ‘this’ may refer to the supposit that is a man, and the reason why a supposit is of such a kind is an essence or quiddity. However, ‘this’ may refer simply to a set of sensitively apprehended materials, and the reason why materials have the being of man is a *causa essendi* or form.’ CWL4, 135.