

An edited transcription of my oral presentation at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop, 1976, where the paper that was circulated was an early version of 'Subject, Psyche, and Lonergan's Foundations,' which appeared in a more mature form in *Journal of Religion* in 1977. See below,

I would like to say something about the relationship between what I will present here this morning and the paper that I delivered here two years ago, 'Psychic Conversion' When I was in Zürich in the Fall of 1974, completing my dissertation, I found myself at one point obliged to write to Fred Lawrence. At that time we entertained some dreams of publishing our papers from the previous Lonergan Workshop, and I felt that I had to write to Fred and ask him if at all possible to withhold mine from publication if it wasn't too late. Because I did not want to make that paper any more public discourse than it had become. He wrote back and said, 'I wish we had a problem.'

I had come to realize that the 'author' of that paper was not very clear about what he was doing. I had not yet clarified at that time for myself whether I was dealing with the images of the unconscious from within the unconscious or from the standpoint of the fourth level of the intentional consciousness. The paper therefore is very ambiguous on that point. I think that dealing with those images from within the unconscious won out in the balance, and in that sense I'm dealing with what won out in that paper. [Note from RD: This is not the case with the version of 'Psychic Conversion' that was published in *The Thomist* in 1977. The corrections have been made.]

I hope that perhaps I could relate the heart of the discovery of this to you as it occurred to me in a dream. It was called to my attention in a dream, and I hope that I might share that dream with you. This was when I was in Zürich wrestling turbulently and I think perhaps rather conceptualistically with the whole problem as I had posed it in the paper 'Psychic Conversion.' This dream pointed me beyond the problem. I think incidentally, at least this dream might be pointing to the complementarity, the reconciliation if you want, of depth and height psychologies that we have been talking about, or the complementarity of creativity from below and healing from above. At any rate, the dream goes as follows.

In this dream I was walking down a flight of stairs. Descent is going down into the unconscious. For the Jungian, if you are going down a flight of stairs or down in an elevator, you are going down into the unconscious, into the depths. And as I was walking down the stairs who should I meet coming up the stairs but Bernard

Lonergan. So not only, as Lonergan says, does the desire to know invade the very fabric of our dreams, even *he* invades the very fabric of our dreams!

Well, I meet Lonergan coming up the stairs, and he looks at me and smiles, and says, 'If you really want to see some images, come with me!' And we go up the stairs, to the top level of the stairs, the fourth level of intentional consciousness, existential subjectivity. So we go up the stairs and we go into this large room. We sit down together, and a movie begins to appear on a screen in front of us, and we are watching the images, we are engaging in the process of negotiating the images, but from the level of the top, not from down in the basement.

And this dream turns out to be the turning point for me in the writing of the dissertation. It put the thing together. It fit. You are working with these images from the standpoint of existential consciousness, from the standpoint of self-appropriation at the fourth level, not from down in the basement. Look for them down in the basement – you can't look for them, you'll never get them straightened out. They'll never move, as Lonergan said yesterday, from symbolism to art, if you are working down there and if you stay down there.

So the point of the dream was: locate yourself at the level of existential subjectivity, concern yourself with self-appropriation at the fourth level, and then you will discover what all this stuff about symbols and dreams and myths is really all about.

So I hope that my paper this year is less ambiguous about this point. The paper is a summary of the principal points in my dissertation, and it was actually written about ten months ago, and I hope that in my presentation this morning I might also include some more recent developments in my own reflections. Those I'm putting out very much for feedback.

The principal emphasis of my work can be put as follows; that there is a second mediation of the subject as subject, a mediation that is other than the mediation of intelligent, reasonable, responsible intentionality that Fr Lonergan has carried out. The second mediation is psychic, and it affects the self-knowledge of the existential subject. It affects the subject who is concerned with real self-transcendence, with responsibility, decision, love, prayer, living. It is an aspect, then, of self-appropriation at the fourth level, one aspect of that.

The second mediation corresponds in large part to Carl Jung's notion of individuation. But Jung must be monitored critically, as David Burrell says in his

book *Exercises in Religious Understanding*. The theologian can profit greatly from Jung, but must monitor him critically. Jung must be monitored critically in the process, in light of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Now, that is kind of the basic stance from which I'm trying to work. And my further claim in that basic stance would be that this second mediation, the mediation of the psychic aspect of subjectivity, is an intrinsic constituent of the objectification of the subject that constitutes the functional specialty 'foundations.'

My own interest, then, or my obsession, is Foundations, and like Phil McShane I have a rather broad or expanded notion of Foundations. Some people tell me they think it is too broad, and that I'm trying to put too much into Foundations, and that may very well be. But at the present moment that's where I'm at. And my interest particularly in Foundations is with the objectification of existential subjectivity, moral and religious conversion. I came up with the following definition of foundations, and it appears in the paper almost in these words, that foundations consists in a patterned set of judgments of cognitional fact and of existential fact cumulatively heading towards the full position on the human subject.

These judgments of cognitional fact and and existential fact constitute an explanatory objectification of human interiority. Now this is one of my more recent thoughts, and I'm just going to throw it out as a feeler more than anything else. But at the present moment I see Foundations, I see this objectification, as consisting of four moments. The first moment is cognitional analysis, *Insight*. Cognitional analysis is where the first three levels of intentionality are brought to bear on their own data, brought to bear on themselves. The result of this first moment, cognitional analysis, consists in the positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity, chapters 11, 12, and 13 of *Insight*. The proximate result of cognitional analysis is the set of basic positions.

The second moment in Foundations is what I call imaginal analysis. In imaginal analysis the first three levels – experience, understanding, and judgment – are brought to bear on the data of the fourth level, existential subjectivity. The proximate result of imaginal analysis is to discriminate symbols and myths and so on which further the position from symbolic expressions which further the counterpositions – mystery and myth, in the terms of chapter 17 of *Insight*, but Lonergan in '*Insight Revisited*' has rephrased that: symbols that further the positions and symbols that further the counterpositions. This second moment, imaginal analysis – something that is close to this is Paul Ricoeur's *Symbolism of Evil*; it is kind of working in that area of imaginal analysis. Also a lot of what Jung does in trying to work out a phenomenology of the psyche.

The third moment in Foundations I call moral and religious discernment. In this third moment all four levels are brought to bear on the data of the fourth level. All four levels reflect on and evaluate symbolic consciousness and evaluate existential consciousness. I think this third moment, moral and religious discernment, would result in something like what Ricoeur is envisioning in speaking of the poetics of the will. But I think you would get at that in another way than the way in which Ricoeur is going at it.

The fourth moment I call evaluative hermeneutic, for lack of a better word at the present time. In evaluative hermeneutic all four levels are brought to bear on the results of Dialectic, what has been sorted out in Dialectic. The result of that is the general and special theological categories and the functional specialties of Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications.

Now if I am correct in this analysis of Foundations there is no exhaustive mediation of Foundations, and that's why I you to change in the paper, page 4, from 'critically ground' to 'aid moral and religious self-appropriation. There is no exhaustive critical mediation of the functional specialty 'Foundations.' There is a critical mediation of its first two moments, cognitional analysis and imaginal analysis. But the mediation of the third and fourth moments, that is, discernment and evaluative hermeneutic, is an aesthetic mediation, not critical in the sense that we use 'critical' when we talk about critically mediating. What this mediation mediates is aesthetic subjectivity, the subjectivity of which it is said that 'the heart has reasons that reason does not know.' That is what I'm trying to develop, the mediation of aesthetic subjectivity, the mediation of the heart that has reasons that reason does not know.

Joseph Flanagan nicely outlined for us on Tuesday the relation of the aesthetic to the moral and religious, and I think that this alignment is very much in keeping with Lonergan's analysis of the existential subject and of the role of affectivity in existential subjectivity. I think you can argue from that analysis of Lonergan's that aesthetic subjectivity is the ground of moral and religious subjectivity. Aesthetics is the basis of ethics. And it is an intrinsic constituent of religion.

So how to we get at this aesthetic subject? How do we discover and change ourselves as aesthetic subjects? Well, what I'm trying to suggest is one way of getting at it. And here I go into the material that is I the paper. One way of understanding what Lonergan is all about and what we are all about when we are studying Lonergan is to conceive what he is calling us to do as the mediation of immediacy by meaning. In *Method in Theology*, p. 77, Lonergan uses that

expression. He says that in addition to the mediation of immediacy by meaning that occurs when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method there is also the mediation of immediacy by meaning that occurs when one discovers one's submerged feelings, when one discovers, identifies, and accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy. So he uses that expression, 'the mediation of immediacy by meaning.' Obviously he is not referring there to the immediacy of the infant. It is not the immediacy of the infant that is mediated when we read *Insight*. It is the immediacy of the subject in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. That is the immediacy that is mediated by *Insight*, and it is also the immediacy that is mediated in psychotherapy: the mediation of the adult consciousness, of the subject who is in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value.

Now if we can understand – if I'm right in this, in what Lonergan's work is all about, i.e., the mediation of immediacy by meaning – then I would like to distinguish, as I do in the paper, between primordial immediacy and second immediacy. Primordial immediacy is that infrastructure of the subject as subject, present to the world as *Verstehen* in Heidegger's sense, as *Dasein*, that infrastructure of the subject as subject. Primordial experience is the experience of experiencing, the experience of understanding, the experience of judging, the experience of deciding, of loving, of acting.

Second immediacy would be the recovery of primordial immediacy through intentionality analysis, imaginal analysis, and discernment. In those moments we recover our immediacy, we mediate our immediacy. The second immediacy is a mediated immediacy.

Heidegger also speaks of *Verstehen*, understanding, and *Befindlichkeit*, the way one finds oneself, disposition, mood, as two interlocking aspects of *Dasein*, of immediacy. They are interlocking. There is always a drama to insight and yet the drama is not elucidated until one understands insight as activity and as knowledge. They are interlocking, and the mediations of them must also interlock, must be brought together. And that is what I'm trying to do with the mediation of intentionality and the mediation of psyche, how they can join in some kind of conjunction.

There is a basis in *Method* for what I'm trying to do, and I spell that out in the early part of the paper. I'll just go through that very quickly. Lonergan speaks in *Method* of the role of feelings for the existential subject. He speaks of the reciprocal relationship of symbols and feelings. And particularly that relationship

between symbols and feelings has led me to focus on imagination, on the role of the imagination in the constitution of our immediacy to the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value [RD: later – should be our immediacy to the mediating carriers of meaning]. The imagination's role in this sort of thing, in our being-in-the-world. But the world that we are in is always structured, imaginal. And one of the ways of uncovering that imaginal construction of the world is by negotiating my imagination in its most spontaneous manifestations. Its most spontaneous manifestations are the dreams, my dreaming consciousness. I can by befriending that lowest level of consciousness, dreaming consciousness, I can begin to recover the imaginal ways in which I construct the world, the imaginal configurations of the world in which I am being-in-the-world.

Dreams release from muteness and confusion the themes, the plots, that are operative in my structuring of the world, that dreaming moment – me going down, Lonergan coming up – that's all a plot, it's the drama of insight that is the point of that dream. Dreams provide to consciousness an accessibility to the implicit intentionality of myself as *Dasein*, as being-in-the-world. Usually dreams have the following significance. Dreams are hermeneutic. They interpret the dreaming subject. They interpret the dreaming subject's interiority, the dreaming subject's place in time. And also Lonergan uses the distinction of interiority, time, and the generic rather than exteriority, space, and the specific – around p. 90 of *Method*. Dreams do that. They interpret the subject in terms of interiority, time, and the generic. The generic: Lonergan mentioned a dream yesterday. If you dream about a lion and you are not afraid of it, well, that's not specific, that's generic because it has some other kind of meaning. As a matter of fact, that dream may very well be – if you dream about a lion and you're not afraid of it, for Jung it is a symbol of the self. It is generic. It is a displacement. The dreams interpret the dreaming subjects' interiority, the dreaming subject's time, and the dreaming subject in terms of the generic.

Dreams do not explain exteriority, space, and the specific, but naive consciousness would tend to take them that way. If someone from your life appears in your dream, your spontaneous inclination is to regard that figure as that figure in your life, and it is not. It is the complex in you which that figure awakens. The generic meaning of that figure for you is not that person. It is that person as awakening a complex of psychic factors in you. So dreams then interpret the dreaming subject.

Dreams play various functions in our lives. Some dreams are merely ego-transcendent in their origins and in their meanings. I think this is what Jung is getting at when he speaks of the personal unconscious. They come from a

dimension of myself that transcends my ego. Other dreams are self-transcendent in their origin and in their meaning. I think this is what Jung is getting at when he speaks of the collective unconscious. They come from beyond me either as ego or as total self, and their meaning is broader than that; their meaning is archetypal. And some dreams, I believe, are ciphers of absolute transcendence, of vertical transcendence, of the divine.

Colin Maloney, of Regis College, Toronto, has done a great deal of work in directing retreats. He told me, when he found out I was interested in Jung, that in the ten most transformative thirty-day retreats where he has been director, the significant moment occurred in a dream and in the interpretation of that dream, in insight into the dream.

I think it is appropriate, then, that Jung refers to the capacity for getting in touch with this dimension of ourselves as the transcendent function. That is his word for it: the transcendent function. What I'm talking about when I speak of psychic conversion is the release of the transcendent function in us as subjects. It is gaining that ability to receive, understand, affirm, evaluate, and negotiate my most spontaneous symbolizing capacities, my way of telling and living the story, the drama of the emergence of the authentic subject. What is my story? The transcendent function brings me into radical contact with that story. That story may have been going forward for years without my being able to tell it. If that is the case that's when therapy is needed, when I can't tell the story. If I can tell the story I don't need therapy. If I can't tell the story, and it gets increasingly more confused, if every time someone asks me 'How are you?' I feel less and less able to answer that question, I'm in trouble. I can't tell the story.

Now I think this transcendent function, the release of the transcendent function, is conditioned by a conversion. I think that it meets every specification that Lonergan uses in his description of conversion. There is this radical change in the subject. It is ever precarious. It does affect every statement, every proposition that I read, and so on and so forth. And that is what I call psychic conversion. It does meet all those specifications, but it is not intellectual conversion. It is not falling in love with God. It is not changing my orientation from satisfactions to values. It is something different from each one of those.

In the paper I try to show how Lonergan's specifications for conversion are satisfied by psychic conversion, and also how it is different from religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. What psychic conversion does in terms of Lonergan's notion of subjectivity is that it enables an additional sublation on the part of

conscious intentionality. In Lonergan's structure of the subject we have the sublation of empirical consciousness by intelligent consciousness, and empirical and intelligent consciousness by reasonable consciousness, and empirical, intelligent, and reasonable consciousness by existential consciousness.

Dreaming consciousness is where we first begin to become conscious, and the transcendent function, psychic conversion, enables the sublation of dreaming consciousness by empirical, intelligent, reasonable, and existential consciousness. It extends the sublation of subjectivity. In a paper I wrote, after after the one you have, I tried to suggest at least that perhaps this additional sublation might reveal a general meaning to the imperative 'Be attentive.' For at least in this case attentiveness is contemplation. Attentiveness is Heidegger's *Gelassenheit*, letting be. Attentiveness is listening. It is an act of receptivity. I wonder if that isn't what 'Be attentive' means. Certainly in many instances that's exactly what it does mean.

So dream interpretation consists in the attentive reception of dreams as themselves already interpreting me; and then in insight into what has been received and in the reflective judgment that the insight is correct, and finally in the responsible negotiation of this self-knowledge that is given me in this kind of way.

I would like to say something about terminology here. We had a discussion yesterday with Fr Lonergan about the meaning of the term 'the unconscious.' And what he was calling the unconscious yesterday, the way he was describing it, for the sake of clarity I'd like to call that the undifferentiated. It is consciousness, and to call it the unconscious confuses things. It is the subject as conscious but not the subject as objectified.

Dreaming consciousness, the psyche of the dreaming subject, is frequently called the unconscious but I think that dreaming consciousness is really the beginning of consciousness. The psyche of the dreaming subject is the beginning of consciousness. But what is the unconscious is all energy in the universe that is not present to itself, that is unconscious. All energy in the universe and all energy in me as subject that is not present to itself is literally the unconscious. Energy becomes present to itself in the dream, in psychic energy, and when it becomes psychic energy it begins to become conscious, it begins to become present to itself.

If this energy is mere physiological process in the body, it corresponds to the personal unconscious. If this energy is a more extensive or a more transcendental emergence of energy into consciousness, it corresponds to the collective

unconscious. That is what renders possible dreams that are archetypal, dreams that are synchronistic, dreams that are prophetic.

I first became interested in dreams here in Boston College in 1968. Lonergan was presenting *Method* to us, and it was the first time I had heard this, and there was a dream I had in which a former student of mine in high school was trying to get ahold of me, trying to reach me on the telephone. He called a Jesuit house in Milwaukee and couldn't find me there, and he called my mother's home and she told him that I was in Boston College and would be back the following Saturday, or something like that. And when I got home my mother told me this fellow had called the very night on which I had the dream and was looking for me. This type of synchronistic phenomenon can happen sometimes. It is a more extensive energy than the energy that is simply at play in my neurophysiological process. That is the collective energy that renders possible a like that. God only knows how you interpret a dream like that. These things do happen.

Edmond Whitmont relates a dream that was had by a bishop in Hungary in 1914. He had been the teacher of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. The bishop dreamt of receiving a postcard from the Archduke saying that at 3:30 pm this afternoon I'm sorry to inform you that I will be assassinated. The picture on the postcard that appeared in the dream was an exact representation of the scene of the assassination of the Archduke. The dream occurred about twelve hours before the assassination. How do you explain these things? These prophetic dreams have something to do with energy, with an energy that extends beyond the neurophysiological process of the dreaming subject.

These dreams – archetypal, synchronistic, and prophetic – are not merely ego-transcendent but self-transcendent in their origins, and such dreams are gifts. But these kinds of dreams are gifts not merely of the self to the ego but of the universe to the self. And I'm sure that in some instances that can be interpreted only by what St Ignatius has called the discernment of spirits. I think that some of them come from beyond proportionate being.

I find many correspondences between the imaginal sphere of being that is opened up by this transcendent function or what I'm calling psychic conversion. There are many correspondences between that and the transcendental imagination that was spoken about by Kant and particularly by Heidegger in his first book on Kant. The transcendental imagination as Heidegger interprets it is what institutes time, primordial time, the time of the subject. And it institutes this time as the very constitution of the subject in his or her immediacy to the world.

Now this gives me a way to explain neurosis. This time structure is fragile, and it is disproportionate: future, past, present. I think neurosis is the victory of the disproportionate, of the time structure, over the subject. Anxiety is the victory of a disproportionate past over the future. And in either case of anxiety or guilt I can't be what Jung calls the 'just so' person, the individuated person, the one who is now.

At the extremes I am either the 'I am nothing' person of depression or the 'I am everything' person of inflation and schizophrenia but not the 'I am this' of individuation. I am just this. That is what Jung means by the individuated person: just this, this is what I am. So healing, then, is in a sense a recovery of this kind of structure, so that the disproportion and fragility of it do not assume the victory over the subject.

Now future, past, present: future and past become opposites. And I think that psychic well-being comes about through a progressive reconciliation of opposites. Future and past, intentionality and body, spirit and matter, archetype and instinct, project and possibility, destiny and origin, consciousness and the unconscious, and in Lonergan's terms transcendence and limitation. These opposites are progressively and cumulatively reconciled with each other. What operates this reconciliation is the psyche. The psyche is the operator of the reconciliation of opposites. This is an important dimension to Jung's psychology, that we are threefold, that we are not self and body, that we are spirit, matter (those are the opposites), and psyche. And the psyche's task is to integrate the opposites cumulatively and progressively to the point of individuation. Psyche does this integration by releasing images, and the images are the conjunction of spirit and matter. The images are spirit in that they have meaning, and they are matter in their concreteness. The progressive integration of the subject is the progressive reconciliation of these opposites.

I think it is also important – and here Jung sometimes misses the point – the reconciliation of opposites cannot overcome the disproportion that is built into the subject. Paul Ricoeur in *Fallible Man* insists that the disproportion of the human subject with the ontological – is the disproportion of infinitude and finitude in the subject, and that cannot ever be overcome. I think Lonergan would say the same thing. He speaks of disproportionate infinitude and finitude. But the disproportion can be kept from becoming victorious over the subject. That is the point.

Now that is the structure of the kind of thing I'm trying to work out. Let's speak a little bit about the psyche. How can the psyche do this task of reconciling the opposites? The psyche itself has to be made, it has to be cultivated or it can't

perform its task of reconciling the opposites. It has to be differentiated, and undifferentiated psyche, as we all know, is not an operator of harmony but an operator of disintegration. So the psyche has to be cultivated, made, differentiated.

James Hillman, a Jungian analyst, refers to this process of the differentiation of psyche as soul-making. If soul-making could be integrated with intentionality analysis and self-appropriation, I think we would have a kind of conjunction in the human subject. There would be a kind of a marriage, a marriage of the archetypal feminine – and psyche is archetypal feminine – with intentionality – and intentionality is archetypal masculine. A marriage of these is the marriage that Jung describes in his imagery of the sacred marriage, the *hieros gamos*, the marriage of the archetypal masculine and the archetypal feminine within each of us.

Soul-making, then, is the process of the self-owning of the subject at the fourth level. Soul-making is what would ground the objectification of moral and religious conversion, moral and religious subjectivity, within Foundations.

I will finish with a final point. I recently have come to understand, I think, that soul-making is not necessarily limited to or identified with psychotherapy. It may begin there. But soul-making is life. It is not therapy. Its place is the dramatic stage of life, in the relations, institutional roles, the passage of the subject from childhood to youth, youth to maturity, maturity to age, life through death to life. That is soul-making. We live beyond psychology, as Otto Rank says over and over again in his criticism of the psychoanalytic movement. We live beyond psychology. We are born beyond it, we die beyond it, and we must learn to live beyond it. Therapy has to give way to the soul beyond psychology, in Rank's terms.

So it is in this sense that I've come to understand soul-making as a matter of aesthetics. I was very illuminated yesterday by Lonergan's by Lonergan's talk about the movement from symbolism to art, from the bizarre to the artistic. Soul-making is aesthetic. Values are apprehended in feelings, and it is aesthetics that founds existential subjectivity. That's the way I'm trying to go with this. Soul-making is a kind of recovery of taste. It is the differentiation and cultivation of the aesthetic dimension of the subject.

Lonergan is opening up to us this distinct level of consciousness that has to do with value and Dialectic and Foundations, as something that is distinct from and including much more than meaning and truth. It is an opening upon aesthetic consciousness that is distinct from and including and more than, subsuming,

cognitional consciousness. Ethics then becomes radically aesthetics, and the existential subject that is concerned with character as his or her issue is primordially the aesthetic subject. soul-making, in the sense in which I'm using it. Beyond intelligence and reasonableness there is soul that is the key to character.

I will just conclude with a brief comment on Jung. Jung was concerned with character, but ambiguously so. His ambiguity was very similar to the ambiguity that appeared in my paper 'Psychic Conversion.' He didn't have the maieutic for distinguishing dealing with the soul down in the basement and dealing with soul from the level of existential subjectivity. But he *was* concerned with character. I think there are some romantic interpretations of his thought. I think Hillman falls into this, and also Marie-Louise von Franz in her book *C.G. Jung's Myth in Our Time*. They seem to prescind from Jung's concern with character in favor of his love of soul. But the two are for him inseparable, and I think what makes his work so difficult to understand here is that character is beyond the judgmental discrimination of right and wrong, which is often called Ethics. Jung doesn't aid us, he doesn't help us, to understand this conjunction of character and soul in his very ambiguous treatment of evil.

If Ricoeur is correct that the disproportion of the opposites is the basis, the condition, of evil, of sin, in us, then good and evil can't be among the opposites that are reconciled through soul-making. They are not. But Jung has them among those opposites.

So I think character and soul are bedfellows. I understand character as a dance step that one works out with soul. And the rhythm of that dance step is what I call aesthetics. Character, if I might quote Eliot, emerges from what Eliot calls that refining fire where you must move in measure with the dancer. It is the rhythm of that movement that is what I mean by aesthetics, or art. Its emergence has to pass through Dialectic. That is part of the refining fire. And Dialectic, as we have been emphasizing this week, is a matter of the heart. The dialectic of the heart moves toward what Eliot calls the condition of complete simplicity, where the fire and the rose are one, where the opposites have been joined, where the fire of spirit and the rose of the earth are one. Eliot reminds us that this conjunction costs not less than everything.