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PSYCHIC CONVERSION

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PSYCHIC CONVERSION¹

The psychiatrist Claudio Naranjo has offered us both a challenge and a contribution towards meeting it. In his recent book, The One Quest, he speaks of creating "a unified science of human development,"² "a unified science and art of human change."³ He attempts to disengage from the diverse techniques, exercises, and procedures of education, psychotherapy, and religion, an experimental meeting ground based on a unity of concern and a commonality of method. The various ways of growth which he examines--ranging from behavior therapy to Sufism--are, he says, contributions to a single process of human transformation involving:

- (1) shift in identity;
- (2) increased contact with reality;
- (3) simultaneous increase in both participation and detachment;
- (4) simultaneous increase in freedom and the ability to surrender;
- (5) unification--intrapersonal, interpersonal, between body and mind, subject and object, man and God;
- (6) increased self-acceptance; and
- (7) increase in consciousness.⁴

He concludes his book with the following summary of his position:

The end-state sought by the various traditions, schools, or systems under discussion is one that is characterized by the experience of openness to the reality of every moment, freedom from mechanical ties to the past, and surrender to the laws of man's being, one of living in the body and yet in control of the body, in the world and yet in control of circumstances by means of the power of both awareness and independence. It is also an experience of self-acceptance, where "self" does not stand for a preconceived notion

or image but is the experiential self-reality moment after moment. Above all, it is an experience of experiencing. For this is what consciousness means, what openness means, what surrendering leads into, what remains after the veils of conditioned perception are raised, and what the aim of acceptance is.⁵

My argument in this paper is twofold:

a) that Bernard Lonergan's notions of "method" and "intellectual conversion" constitute essential contributions to a unified science and art of human change; in fact, that Lonergan has laid the cognitive foundations of such a theory-praxis; and

b) that the exigence which prompts intellectual conversion does not stop there, but reverts upon empirical consciousness, upon the experience of experiencing both the data of sense and the data of consciousness, in a post-critical moral and religious conversion which I call psychic conversion. By "post-critical," I mean "after and depending upon intellectual conversion." The moral and religious conversions which, according to Lonergan, generally precede intellectual conversion, are quite another matter experientially than psychic conversion, though what Lonergan says about them in his transcendental analysis applies also to psychic conversion.

The experience of psychic conversion can be described in many ways. Certainly the seven characteristics listed by Naranjo as qualifying the change in which he is interested are all featured in the experience of which I speak. But in its essence, psychic conversion is a symbolic transformation, a critically mediated conversion of experiential consciousness through the gaining of a capacity to disengage its symbolic constitution. Because the psychologist most sensitive to and insightful of the role and power of symbolism in human

consciousness to date has been Carl Jung, this paper may be viewed as an attempt to state what happens when the self-appropriation of rational self-consciousness, the objectification of cognitional process aided by Lonergan, on the one hand gives way to, and on the other hand participates in, a self-appropriation of empirical consciousness which might be mediated by Jungian psychotherapy. The paper may in part be viewed, then, as the beginning of another of the "Lonergan and. . ." studies. But it is also an attempt to express a position complementary and, I believe, compensatory to that of either Lonergan or Jung. For it attempts to move Jungian therapy into the epochal movement of the human spirit whose cognitive roots are planted in Lonergan's transcendental method, while at the same time venturing to extend the dynamism of the latter into a further domain of self-appropriation and to argue that this extension is called for by an exigence of this dynamism itself. Beyond the methodical exigence, there lies the therapeutic exigence, intending first a moral, then a religious conversion which are successive sublations of the gains afforded human consciousness by the pioneering work of Lonergan's cognitional analysis.

I. The Therapeutic Exigence

I assume as given an appreciation of the meaning of the term "method" advanced by Lonergan: "method" that has not to do with the Cartesian universal procedure for the attainment of certitude by following fixed rules while neglecting bursts of insight, moral truth, belief, and hypothesis; "method" which takes as its key the subject as subject and thus calls for "a release from

all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself";⁶ "method" as horizon inviting authenticity. I presuppose also that the dialectical-foundational thinking which issues from such a horizon is acknowledged as a movement other than that which occupied Western philosophy from Socrates to Hegel. The latter movement seeks a control of meaning in terms of system. It is the movement of the emergence of logos from mythos, of theoretically differentiated consciousness from what, because undifferentiated, bears some affinities with what is known in psychotherapy as the unconscious. This movement may archetypally be designated "heroic," in that it is the severing in actu exercito of the umbilical cord binding mind to maternal imagination. It achieved its first secure triumph in the Socratic maieutic and pronounced its full coming of age as creative and constitutive in its Hegelian self-recognition as essentially dialectical, in its self-identification with the dialectic of reality itself, and in a Wissenschaft der Logik which would be the thinking of its own essence in and for itself on the part of this dialectical movement of reality as Geist. That Lonergan's articulation of method, with its key being the subject as subject, captures in a radically foundational manner the cognitive structure and dynamism of a new movement of historical mind, of an epochal shift in the control and constitution of meaning, has not gone unnoticed and is not a novel appreciation of his significance.⁷ Thus to propose to complement and even to compensate what can only be denominated an unparalleled achievement surely calls for more than a polite apology.

Perhaps I may be, then, by recalling that Lonergan acknowledges a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning. The first is that which has occupied his attention throughout his career as scholar, teacher, and author, that which occurs "when one objectifies cognitive process in transcendental method." The second occurs "when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."⁸ I take this statement to imply that there are two modes of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. One is cognitive, the other dispositional or affective. These two modes correspond more or less closely to the two primordial constitutive ways of being the "there" according to Martin Heidegger: Verstehen and Befindlichkeit.⁹ They are interlocking modes of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. Lonergan also speaks of "a withdrawal from objectification and a mediated return to immediacy in the mating of lovers and in the prayerful mystic's cloud of unknowing."¹⁰ I take my clue from the second mediation of immediacy and from the hint of a second immediacy. I ask, first, whether a mediated return to immediacy is exhausted by the two instances mentioned by Lonergan and, second, whether it is connected with the second mediation of immediacy by meaning. The answer to the first question is negative, to the second affirmative.

Any human subject whose world is mediated and constituted by meaning is primordially in a condition of cognitive and dispositional second immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. I use the term "second immediacy" to distinguish this condition from that of the infant. The dispositional mode of immediacy, which is our concern here, is accessible to conscious intentionality

by the latter's focusing on the ever-present flow of feeling which is constitutive of one's concomitant awareness of himself in all of his intentional operations. "In every case Dasein always has some mood."¹¹ Second immediacy is immediacy to one's mediated world. Its dispositional mode is an immediacy of feeling, of mood, of "how one is," of "how one finds oneself." It is what we intend when we ask another, "How are you?"--even though we very seldom receive the answer which the question intends. "The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something."¹² We are concerned, then, with a state of immediacy of feeling or mood to the world mediated by our acts of meaning. It is this world of second immediacy that is objectified in the second mediation of immediacy by meaning, the mediation which occurs in psychotherapy. What is insufficiently acknowledged by Heidegger,¹³ more than hinted at by Lonergan, and trumpeted by Jung is that this dispositionally qualified second immediacy is always imaginally constructed, symbolically constituted. But this imaginal constitution is not accessible to conscious intentionality in the same way as is the disposition itself. The symbolic constitution of dispositional second immediacy must be disengaged by such psychotherapeutic techniques as dream interpretation and what Jung calls "active imagination." It is "unconscious," but when disengaged it reveals "how it stands" between the attitude of waking consciousness and what we may call psychic totality.

If psychotherapy is indeed genuine therapy, then the mediation of immediacy which occurs through the objectification of the symbolically constructed

structure of Befindlichkeit has a transformative effect on one's dispositional second immediacy. This transformation is what I call psychic conversion. Its dynamic structure must be elucidated and integrated into the epochal movement of consciousness whose cognitive foundations are laid by Lonergan. As Lonergan has shown the implications of the first mediation of immediacy by meaning for the question of theological method, so we must attempt to indicate the pertinence of the second. In addition, I wish to propose a model of psychotherapy which takes as its clue the twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning, which I believe to be the key to the unified science and art of human transformation envisioned by Naranjo. I would conceive psychotherapy, then, as a transformation of second immediacy through the appropriation of the full sweep of human interiority or through the totality of the mediation of immediacy by meaning (always, of course, asymptotically approached). I conceive it, moreover, as consisting of three stages: an analytic stage, a principal feature of which is intellectual conversion as articulated by Lonergan; a synthetic stage, which would be in effect a post-critical moral conversion; and an agapic stage, the surrender of discriminated spirit and cultivated soul to the mysterium tremendum et fascinans in a post-critical religious conversion. The term, psychic conversion, might of course be used to refer to this entire process, but unless otherwise indicated I will limit its use to what occurs after intellectual conversion. Psychic conversion is the transformation of dispositional second immediacy through the second of the two mediations of immediacy acknowledged by Lonergan.

I am here considering this second mediation as post-critical, as the psychic conversion of a ~~an~~ already intellectually converted consciousness. The demand for a post-critical conversion that is moral and religious arises, I believe, from the experienced impossibility that intellectual conversion be sublated by a moral conversion that is pre-critical and that both be sublated by a religious conversion that is pre-critical, as claimed by Lonergan.¹⁴ The very attempt may be what prompts one to the second mediation of immediacy by meaning. This mediation is conversion, moral and religious conversion, but it is post-critical. The attempt at sublation of intellectual conversion by pre-critical moral and religious conversion will be forever blocked by

. . . the conscious impotence of rage
at human folly, and the laceration¹⁵
of laughter at what ceases to amuse

which may only become more acute and even chronic as a result of the ascent of the mountain of the understanding of understanding. Beyond the methodical exigence, then, as its intrinsic finality, there lies the therapeutic exigence, the dynamism which urges to the second mediation of immediacy and to the transformation which is psychic conversion.

Perhaps the compensatory function of my thesis is best introduced by commenting on the following statement:

I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare.¹⁶

Surely there is no dispute that the three conversions are quite different events. Nor need there be any argument with Lonergan's preferred order of exposition of these events. My difficulty is rather with the overtones of the assertion that, in the general case, intellectual conversion is the last and the rarest of the conversions; that, in the general case, the intellectually converted subject is the fully converted subject.

Although the conversions are said to occur in the order: religious-moral-intellectual, they are also said to be involved in a relation of sublation in the order: intellectual-moral-religious. And sublation is understood not in a Hegelian fashion but along the lines suggested by Karl Rahner, such that "what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."¹⁷ On Lonergan's account, then, intellectual conversion is, in the general case, sublated by a moral conversion which has preceded it in the order of occurrence and thus is pre-critical; and both intellectual and moral conversion are sublated by a religious conversion which has preceded both and is also pre-critical.

But if religious conversion and moral conversion are pre-critical, if they precede intellectual conversion, it would seem that, no matter how genuinely religious and authentically moral, they are infected with cognitional myth. Or, to state my point in another way, pre-critical religious and moral

conversion affect a consciousness which, from the standpoint of the cognitive function of meaning, is either undifferentiated or has achieved a theoretical differentiation. But beyond the common-sense and theoretical differentiations of consciousness there is the exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority, the satisfaction of which is initiated by the elimination of cognitional myth which occurs in intellectual conversion. Now, on Lonergan's account, this would seem to imply that a consciousness in the process of fidelity to the methodical exigence is sublated by a moral and religious consciousness that is at best, from a cognitive standpoint, theoretically differentiated. It seems highly questionable to me whether the sublation can occur without interfering with or destroying the sublated, whether the sublating can include the sublated, preserve all its proper features and properties, and carry them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context. It also seems questionable whether the context of pre-critical moral and religious conversion is indeed richer than that provided by intellectual conversion. I believe rather, and I will argue more fully later, that the exigence to differentiation in terms of interiority results from the psychic inadequacy of pre-critical moral and religious conversion at a certain level of intellectual development, no matter how genuinely moral and religious these may be. Thus I would argue that intellectual conversion sublates pre-critical religious and moral conversion, eliminates from them cognitional myth, and at the same time attempts to preserve the qualities which render them reli-

gious and moral. But what is there to guarantee that anything more survives the elimination of cognitional myth than a wan smile at one's former religious and moral naivete? Intellectual conversion, it seems, is such a radical transformation of horizon, such an about-face, such a repudiation of characteristic features of the old, the beginning of such a new sequence that it might indeed interfere with what it started out to sublate and that it cannot be sublated by the old but, if it is to be sublated at all, must be sublated by something new, by the satisfaction of a further exigence. In short, the movement of consciousness whose cognitive foundations are laid by Lonergan is also a crisis of consciousness, the crisis of our epoch, calling into question all previous modes of apprehending the world, all previous mediations of the world by meaning, all previous response to value and to God. Intellectual conversion, rather than putting a stop to these questions, rather provides some guarantee that they may be asked intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly, in the right order and with a minimum of both rashness and indecision.

Let us assume, though, that intellectual conversion indeed heads toward being sublated by a moral conversion, and that both head toward being sublated by a religious conversion. But then the sublating moral and religious conversions, if they are not to interfere with the relocation of truth, being, and objectivity constituted by intellectual conversion, must be post-critical. They must be different from the religious and moral conversions which occurred prior to intellectual conversion. It may well be that

. . . the end of all our exploring
 Will be to arrive where we started
 And know the place for the first time.¹⁸

In that case, however, the end of all our exploring will not be intellectual conversion but a mediated return to immediacy through the satisfaction of a further exigence toward a second mediation of immediacy by meaning. What, then, would be the experience of post-critical moral and religious consciousness and how would it come to pass?

Many of the needed clues for answering this question are provided in Method in Theology, but they need to be complemented by Jungian psycho-therapeutic insights. The clues are:

1) there is a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, which occurs not when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method but when one negotiates one's feelings in psychotherapy;

2) feelings are the locus for the apprehension of values which mediates between judgments of fact and judgments of value;

3) feelings are in a reciprocal relationship of evocation to symbols;

4) the unified affectivity of the converted religious subject is the fulfilment of the dynamism of conscious intentionality; and

5) with the advance in the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning, the spontaneous reference of religious experience shifts from the exterior, spatial, specific, and human to the interior, temporal, generic, and divine.

In what follows, then, I will attempt to interrelate these clues with Jungian insights in such a way as to support the conclusion that, beyond the methodical exigence, there is the therapeutic exigence, the satisfaction of which is a post-critical moral and religious conversion of one's dispositional second immediacy.

If in addition to the mediation of immediacy by meaning which occurs when one objectifies cognitional process, there is that which occurs when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy, then cognitional self-appropriation must be complemented by psychic self-appropriation. As related to the question of the process and function of theology, this would mean that, whereas Lonergan has developed a method for theology based on the first mediation, we must attempt to show the implications for theology of the second. The principal implication will be a fourth conversion as foundational for theology, psychic conversion, a post-critical moral and religious conversion. Only through this twofold self-appropriation will theological reflection accept the possibilities which now, for the first time in the history of thought, are available to it. For in our age not only are we confronted with the relativity of conceptual schemes of all kinds, in every area, but also, precisely because of this seemingly very uncertain and ambivalent state of affairs, the individual is given "the (often desperate, yet maximally human) opportunity to interpret life and experiencing directly. The historical crossroads of such a time is: either the reimposition of certain set values and schemes, or a task never before attempted: to learn how, in a rational way, to relate concepts to direct experiencing; to investigate the way in which symbolizing affects and is affected by felt experiencing; to devise a social and scientific vocabulary that can interact with experiencing, so that communication about it becomes possible, so that schemes can be considered in relation to experiential meanings, and so that an objective science can be related to and guided by experiencing."¹⁹ What Eugene Gendlin here

envisions for "objective science" can also be the goal of theology and is, in fact, the guiding force behind all contemporary creative theological endeavor, culminating in the revolution in theological foundations proposed by Lonergan. Self-appropriation, of course, vastly expands the domain of what is included under "experiencing." To envision a theology whose schemes are related to and guided by experiencing does not, within the horizon provided by self-appropriation, rule out of court a theology whose concern is with "things as they are related to one another" in favor of a purely common-sense theology preoccupied with "things as they are related to us." Rather, basic terms and relations, as psychological, are also explanatory. Such is the ultimate significance of fidelity to the methodical exigence.

The present essay, then, is the beginning of a project which would be a needed complement to the work of Lonergan, the beginning of a further essay in aid of self-appropriation. For beyond the intellectual conversion which occurs when one answers correctly and in order the questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is this knowing? What do I know when I do this?", there is the self-appropriation which occurs when one attentively, intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, and with a kind of loving devotion, appropriates primordial time by appropriating the symbolic configurations of the immediacy of his mediated world. This latter self-appropriation is effected by the emergence of the existential subject into a post-critical symbolic consciousness, in which cultural and religious symbols are treated-- in what Paul Ricoeur has lucidly displayed to be their archeological-teleological unity-in-tension²⁰ (the condition of the possibility of the recovery of

primordial time as instituted by transcendental imagination or Einbildungskraft)²¹ -- as exploratory and as referring to interiority, time, the generic, and the divine rather than as explanatory and as referring to exteriority, space, the specific, and the human. The instrument of psychic conversion is the recovery of imagination in its transcendental time-structure through the psycho-therapeutic elucidation of the symbols emerging spontaneously from one's unconscious depths.

I share the conviction which led John Dunne to write The Way of All the Earth, the conviction that something like a new religion is coming, must come into being.

Is a religion coming to birth in our time? It could be. What seems to be occurring is a phenomenon we might call "passing over," passing over from one culture to another, from one way of life to another, from one religion to another. Passing over is a shifting of standpoint, a going over to the standpoint of another culture, another way of life, another religion. It is followed by an equal and opposite process we might call "coming back," coming back with new insight to one's own culture, one's own way of life, one's own religion. The holy man of our time, it seems, is not a figure like Gotama or Jesus or Mohammed, a man who could found a world religion, but a figure like Gandhi, a man who passes over by sympathetic understanding from his own religion to other religions and comes back again with new insight to his own. Passing over and coming back, it seems, is the spiritual adventure of our time.²²

The present essay, then, is the beginning of an effort at methodological reflection intended in part to be in aid of this adventure and in aid of the articulation of the truth of this adventure. Such articulation would be the theology appropriate to our age. Dunne says quite correctly, however, that the ultimate starting and ending point is really not one's own religion.

Rather, "one's own life is finally the homeland." I wish not only to highlight the contributions of depth psychology to the exploration of this homeland--these are by now quite obvious--but more significantly to highlight the methodological exploitation of these contributions for the experience of and reflection on religious truth.

The most persuasive and complete reflection on theological method to date is surely the extraordinarily sophisticated and subtle work of Lonergan. Lonergan stands out in many ways among those modern and contemporary thinkers responsible for shifting the axis of further human development to interiority, because of the preciseness with which he has articulated one aspect, the cognitional aspect, of this epochal shift in the control and constitution of meaning. But I see the project before us as not only complementary but also compensatory to the work of Lonergan, in the same way as "the unconscious," as it manifests itself in dreams and active imagination, is compensatory to the attitude of waking consciousness. "The relation between consciousness and unconscious is compensatory. This fact, which is easily verifiable, affords a rule for dream interpretation. It is always helpful, when we set out to interpret a dream, to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?"²³

Waking consciousness, particularly as it moves cognitively from directed attention through insight, judgment, and decision, has been the sharp focus of Lonergan's work. Since theology is a matter of knowledge, such a focus has enabled him to articulate the basic rudiments of an appropriate theological method. Since I accept without reservation Lonergan's account of "what I

am doing when I am knowing" and his eightfold differentiation of theological operations, the work I envision is complementary to his. But since I wish to lay emphasis on a different but equally valid source of data--which can still be grouped under Lonergan's notion of "data of consciousness," since they concern interiority--the work would be compensatory to his, just as feeling is compensatory to thinking as a psychological function or as dreams are compensatory to waking consciousness as a psychic state.

If the first step in interpreting a dream is to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?, and if this work is to be understood as compensatory to Lonergan's in a sense analogous to the compensatory effect of dreams, then it is only proper to indicate what attitude or atmosphere the work I envision would compensate. To compensate is not merely to fill out with detail a structure already provided. It is also to provide balance to the structure by purposeful correction. And to account for one's compensatory intention is not primarily to give an aetiology or archeology, but to speak in terms of finality.

Now, Dunne speaks of climbing a mountain in order to discover a vantage point, a fastness of autonomy. The most complete autonomy comes, he says, from the knowledge, not of external things, but of knowledge itself. Thus:

A knowing of knowing would be like a view from a mountaintop. By knowing all about knowing itself one would know in some manner everything there is to know. It would be like seeing everything from a great height. One would see everything near and far, all the way to the horizon, but there would be some loss of detail on account of the distances. The knowing of knowing would mean being

in possession of all the various methods of knowing. It would mean knowing how an artist thinks, putting a thing together; knowing how a scientist thinks, taking a thing apart; knowing how a practical man thinks, sizing up a situation; knowing how a man of understanding thinks, grasping the principle of a thing; knowing how a man of wisdom thinks, reflecting upon human experience. . . . At the top of the mountain, as we have been describing it, there is a kind of madness--not the madness that consists in having lost one's reason, but a madness that consists in having lost everything except one's reason. The knowing of knowing, to be sure, seems worthy of God and worthy of man. The only thing wrong is that man at the top of the mountain, by escaping from love and war, will have lost everything else. He will have withdrawn into that element of his nature which is most characteristic of him and sets him apart from other animals. It is the thing in him which is most human. Perhaps indeed he will never realize what it is to be human unless he does attempt this withdrawal. Even so, the realization that he has lost everything except his reason, that he has found pure humanity but not full humanity, changes his wisdom from a knowledge of knowledge into a knowledge of ignorance. He realizes that he has something yet to learn, something that he cannot learn²⁴ at the top of the mountain but only at the bottom of the valley.

Nobody familiar with Lonergan can read these words about the knowing of knowing without thinking immediately of one of the most daring claims any thinker has ever offered for his own work, true as it is: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."²⁵

Now, to allow one's knowledge of knowledge to be changed into a knowledge of ignorance may well involve the realization that there are many things in heaven and on earth that are not dreamed of in one's philosophy. It may

then lead to the realization, as expressed by Dunne, that much of this dark side of reality, of life in the valley, enters into one's life without necessarily entering into one's consciousness or providing data for one's knowing of knowing. One may become aware of the dark yet potentially creative power at work in the valley and expend his efforts, perhaps first by means of a different kind of withdrawal--into a forest or desert,.in imitation of Gotama or Jesus, rather than up to a mountaintop--at appropriating and transforming this dark power of nature so that it is creative of his own life. If he succeeds in this very risky adventure, he will have undergone a profound conversion.

Conversion, of course, is the central theme in Lonergan's brilliant and revolutionary recasting of the foundations of theology. And such it must be, for nobody who has gone to the top of the mountain can accept as the foundations of his knowledge anything exclusive of what happened to him there. He has achieved an intellectual autonomy as a result of which he will never be the same. But there is a different conversion that happens in the valley or the forest or the desert. It is both complementary and compensatory to the conversion that takes place at the top of the mountain, to intellectual conversion. Experientially, it is not the same as what Lonergan calls religious or moral conversion; rather it is also complementary and compensatory to these. I have called it psychic conversion. Its most obvious immediate conscious result is a critically mediated symbolic consciousness, and its role in theological reflection is foundational as

complementary and compensatory to the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions which specify the foundational reality of theology in Lonergan's method. Psychic conversion surrounds the other three conversions in much the same way as the "unconscious," according to Jung, surrounds the light of conscious awareness. It provides one with an atmosphere or texture which strictly qualifies his experiences of knowing, of ethical decision, and of prayer. This atmosphere is determined by the imaginal or symbolic constitution of the immediacy of one's mediated world. "The imaginal" is a genuine sphere of being, a realm whose contents can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.

As indicated above, then, I believe there are three stages to the appropriation of human interiority. The first, of which the appropriation of rational self-consciousness aided by Lonergan is a principal feature, is archetypally designated as the heroic or Apollonic stage. It is the stage of the individuated ego, which, after severing the umbilical cord to the maternal imagination of man, differentiates this complex relationship. This stage is the analytic stage, the stage of the differentiation and discrimination of spirit. The second stage, archetypally considered, is Dionysian, in that it is a synthetic stage, the stage of eros, of the cultivation of soul. It is a return to maternal imagination as creative imagination, as symbolic function. "The world, like Dionysus, is torn to pieces by pure intellect; but the poet is Zeus; he has swallowed the heart of the world; and he can reproduce it as a living body."²⁶ The third stage

is the agapic stage, the religious stage of the differentiation of interiority, the stage of Gotama, Krsna, Lao-Tse, Confucius, Mohammed, Jesus--the principal figures of the ultimate religious dialectic. Its "goddess" is Sophia, who is justified by all her children.²⁷ Its God is the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, now acknowledged in one way or other as guide and driving power of the whole process. The movement of appropriation must pass through these stages in this order. Dionysus without Apollo is Wotan, undifferentiated chaos; religion without eros is disembodied angelism. While the erotic stage is the re-entry of the hero into the world of the body, the agapic stage is the stage of the offer, "This is my body; take and divide it among you." The erotic, synthetic stage is achieved through a post-critical moral conversion, and the agapic through a post-critical religious conversion.

When I refer with Dunne to a new religion coming into being in our age, what I am indicating is the convergence of insights from the various world religions in the life-story of many individuals who seek religious truth today. As Dunne has indicated, this search will probably be analogous to Gandhi's "experiments with truth." The conversion I call psychic will provide one's criterion for evaluating these experiments and render the subject capable of reflecting on and articulating the truth he has discovered. It will enable him, in Dunne's phrase, to turn poetry into truth and truth into poetry. The latter poetry he may wish to call theology.

One may find that the further steps in self-appropriation reveal the need for a qualification of one's previous intellectual self-appropriation.

While one will not revise the structure of cognitional process which he has learned to articulate for himself through the aid of Lonergan, he will be brought to revise the notion of experience provided by Lonergan.. The latter notion is too thin, too bodiless. Having come back into the valley from Lonergan's mountaintop--or rather from his own mountaintop--he will re-experience or re-cognize that he experiences in a manner for which the atmosphere of the mountaintop was too rarefied.

This, however, will lead to qualifications of the notion of theological method which he has learned from Lonergan. He will accept the basic dynamic and operational notion of method provided by Lonergan on the basis of cognitional structure, but psychic conversion would influence his opinion of what qualifies as data for theology; the base from which he engages in hermeneutic and history; the horizon determining his view of, and influencing his decision about, the tensions of religious and theological dialectic; the bases from which he derives theological categories, positions, and system; and the way in which he regards the mission of religion in the world. The functional specialties will remain, their interrelationship being determined by the structure of cognitional process, but their nature will be modified as a result of one's exploration of the "objective psyche," the home of the imaginal, the transcendental imagination, memoria; the task of the philosopher or theologian educated by and indebted to Lonergan is now to descend the mountain of cognitive self-appropriation so as attentively, intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, and with a loving

devotion to appropriate and articulate the rich psychic bases of human experience. Such an appropriation and articulation will enable the coming-to-pass of that fully awake naiveté of the twice-born adult which Paul Ricoeur calls a second, post-critical immediacy.²⁸

II. The Psychotherapeutic Function of Intellectual Conversion

We need not discuss in detail the nature of intellectual conversion. In its full sweep it is the mediation of immediacy which occurs when one answers correctly and in order the questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do that? The answer to the first question reveals the dynamic structure, promoted by questioning, of human cognitional process. The answer to the second question reveals that structure to be transcendental and in principle not subject to revision. And what I know when I faithfully pursue this process is what I intended to know when I began the process: what is, being, the real. Concomitant with answering these questions is the elimination of the cognitional myth that the real is a subdivision of the already out there now and that it is to be known by looking.

I would choose to emphasize here the distinctively psychic, indeed psychotherapeutic, nature of the event which Lonergan has called intellectual conversion. It is psychic in that it occurs to the subject as subject, in that it is a radical transformation of the subject in his subjectivity. It is psychotherapeutic in that it is a movement toward an expanded consciousness at a moment when such heightened self-awareness is psychically

demanded because of the experienced, understood, and affirmed inadequacy of the subject's previous conscious orientation as an understanding Being-in-the-world. It is a rendering conscious of what had previously been undifferentiated, of the dynamic structure-in-process of the subject's cognitional activity. It is a self-conscious appropriation of what had previously been unappropriated and inarticulate. This expanded consciousness is achieved as a result of answering correctly questions which arise from an experienced exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority. This is a psychic exigence to resolve a certain confusion, in fact to heal a psychic rift cognitively manifested in the incommensurability of theoretically differentiated consciousness and the undifferentiated. The answers to these questions thematize a psychic event of great importance which historically already has occurred in an unthematized fashion, namely, the heroic severing of the umbilical cord to maternal imagination which has resulted in the theoretic control of meaning, the emergence of logos from mythos on the part of Western mind, repeated in the ontogenetic development of the conscious subject who is the heir of Western philosophy and science. The answers to these questions tell us what we have done in insisting on logos in preference to mythos, on science in preference to common sense. They render consciousness present to itself precisely in its heroic achievement by thematizing that achievement which some two thousand years have brought to maturity.

That the raising and answering of these questions is a product of personal decision, that interiorly differentiated cognitional consciousness is never

something one simply happens upon and always something one must decisively pursue, indicates, I believe, that the psychic demand met by heeding the invitation of Insight reflects a profound moral crisis. Intellectual conversion is the beginning of an answer to an ethical question previously unnecessary, one not found in man's historical memory, a new ethical question which man never raised before because he never had to raise it, a moral question unique to a consciousness which has brought to some kind of conclusion the demands of the theoretic or systematic exigence. The questions promoting intellectual conversion are not raised out of mere curiosity but because of a psychic rift which, if left unattended, brings catastrophe to the individual, to the scientific community, to the economy, to the polity, to the nations, to the world. It is the rift manifested cognitively in the split between theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense, but also experienced psychically as the lonely isolation of heroic consciousness from all that has nurtured it, as the self-chosen separation of consciousness from the primal parental ground of its being, as the alienation of the light from the darkness without which it would not be light, even as the guilt of Orestes or Prometheus, whose stories were told at the beginning of the heroic venture of Western mind. What Lonergan has captured in his articulation of intellectual conversion is, in part, a thematizing of the psychically necessary victory of consciousness over the ~~my~~oboric dragon of myth. This thematization is the necessary preliminary step toward healing the psychic rift which threatens civilization with utter destruction. It is a rendering

conscious of the previously undifferentiated structure of a differentiation which has already occurred.

But it is only a beginning. In large part it articulates what we have already done. It clarifies what has happened, thematizes what has occurred. But it does not heal the psychic rift. Consciousness remains isolated, cut off from its roots in the rhythms and processes of nature, separated from its psychic ground, alienated from the original darkness which nourished it at the same time as it threatened to smother it, guilty over the primal murder of an ambiguously life-giving power. The difference is that one now knows what he has done, for to know what I am doing when I am knowing is to know also what I have done in severing the umbilical cord to imagination, in overcoming the gods and claiming a rightful autonomy. But it is not to know how to achieve a conscious reconciliation with the darkness; in fact, it is to suspect that all such reconciliation is regression, a cancelling of the victory of consciousness, a repudiation of a bitterly won autonomy. Yet, we must ask, was it not a cognitively manifested exigence for psychic reconciliation which gave rise to the questions leading to intellectual conversion? Is not this exigence manifest in the confusion experienced over the incommensurability of theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense? Does not Lonergan's overcoming of the Kantian antinomies presage a reconciliation? Does not his decisive destruction of Cartesian subjectism urge one to another journey just as circuitous and demanding the same resolve as the journey

toward intellectual conversion? Is there not a second mediation of immediacy by meaning which might complement the first? If being is isomorphic with knowing, might not the primal archetypal ground of what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed be not only encountered again--for merely to encounter it is the romantic agony--but itself intelligently grasped, reasonably affirmed, and responsibly negotiated, when one descends the mountain of cognitive self-appropriation so as to discover the imaginal roots out of which the powers of intelligent grasping and reasonable affirmation have violently wrested their birthright? Might the hero visit again the realm of the Mothers, now prepared to avoid regression and destruction and to negotiate nourishment? Might the light acknowledge the creative darkness without which it would not be light, and do so without ceasing to be light? The moral crisis of the psychic rift cognitively manifested in the critical and methodical exigencies demands a conscious return to the unconscious. The differentiation of previously undifferentiated cognitional structure is a first step in this return. But the methodical exigence then gives way to the therapeutic exigence. This is the psychic, moral, and religious imperative of the epochal shift in the control of meaning whose cognitive foundations are laid by Lonergan.

III. The Psychic Nature of the Contemporary Ethical Crisis

Since I will wish to argue that Lonergan's transcendental analysis of moral conversion and the Jungian understanding of the ethical crisis of our epoch can be mutually reinforcing, I begin this section by simply listing

the relevant characteristics of Lonergan's notion of moral conversion:

a) his depiction of this event as the shift of the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values;²⁹

b) his characterization of feelings as the locus of the apprehension of values and as mediating between judgments of fact and judgments of value;³⁰

c) his notion of affective response as symbolically certifiable;³¹ and

d) his ascending scale of values based on the criterion of self-transcendence.³²

One possible way of understanding the work of Jung is as an attempt to answer and to aid others in answering the question of meaning in human life. Central, however, to Jung's work is the tenacious insistence that every answer to this question must be unique and individual if it is to have any final validity. Any failure to answer the question in an utterly unique way, any attempt to give an answer in terms of collective identifications, is a failure to understand the question itself. The central notion of Jungian thought is the notion of individuation as an ever ongoing process of individual psychic discrimination and differentiation from everything collective. On the other hand, any charge of individualism, solipsism, sheer relativism, or subjectivism levelled against Jung would completely miss the point, since there are operative in Jung's thought notions which might be called both heuristic and transcendental, in the sense that the discovery of individual meaning universally depends on their employment. These notions, phrased

more or less in cognitional analytic terms, are:

a) Consciousness, whether one is aware of it or not, is always in a process of commerce with an ever available fund of symbolic meanings. This fund is continually in a process of change and development. Jung calls it, somewhat unfortunately, the collective unconscious.

b) Consciousness must attend to this source out of which it continually emerges anew.

c) Consciousness must respect the demands of this source and negotiate them intelligently and reasonably and responsibly.

d) Thereby the whole of subjectivity will be afforded the optimum degree of life and development and will be contributing in a free, responsible, and constructive fashion to the fund of symbolic meanings. Every human life, indeed every action of man, is a contribution to this symbolic fund, but the choice as to the quality of one's own contribution is one's own to make.

The Jungian understanding of the moral crisis of our epoch has been detailed in two books by Erich Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness and Depth Psychology and a New Ethic. Throughout the following exposition of Neumann's position, which Jung affirms in forewords to both books, it should be kept in mind that the incommensurability of theoretically differentiated consciousness and undifferentiated consciousness is the cognitive manifestation of this moral crisis, which Neumann understands in terms of a psychic rift.

The theme of The Origins and History of Consciousness is that psychic ontogenesis is a modified recapitulation of the phylogenetic development of

human consciousness. Neumann argues that "the early history of the collective is determined by inner primordial images whose projections appear outside as powerful factors--gods, spirits, or demons--which become objects of worship. On the other hand, man's collective symbolisms also appear in the individual, and the psychic development, or misdevelopment, of each individual is governed by the same primordial images which determine man's collective history. . . . Only by viewing the collective stratification of human development together with the individual stratification of conscious development can we arrive at an understanding of psychic development in general, and individual development in particular."³³ The history both of mankind and of the individual is governed by certain "symbols, ideal forms, psychic categories, and basic structural patterns"³⁴ which Jung has called archetypes and which operate according to "infinitely varied modes."³⁵ The history of Western philosophy and science represents a series of cognitive manifestations of these archetypal patterns which are the ground of all meaning.

The first part of Neumann's study describes the mythic projections of these archetypal patterns. In the second part, he argues for the psychic ontogenetic recapitulation of these symbolic patterns in the consciousness of the individual, of which the mythic depictions are in fact projections. The mythic projections reflect developmental changes in the relation between the ego (the center of the field of consciousness) and the unconscious. "Just as unconscious contents like dreams and fantasies tell us something about the psychic situation of the dreamer, so myths throw light on the

human stage from which they originate and typify man's unconscious situation at that stage. In neither case is there any conscious knowledge of the situation projected, either in the conscious mind of the dreamer or in that of the mythmaker."³⁶ Moreover, the various archetypal stages of the relation between the ego and the unconscious form elements of the psychic development of modern man. "The constitutive character of these stages unfolds in the historical sequence of individual development, but it is very probable that the individual's psychic structure is itself built up on the historical sequence of human development as a whole."³⁷ That the same stages occurred at different periods in different cultures reflects their archetypal structure rooted in a common psychic substructure identical in all men.

It is impossible here even to summarize adequately the details of the development of the relations between ego-consciousness and the unconscious studied by Neumann. All we can do is indicate that there is an original unity which gives way first to a separation (the hero myth) and in these last days of Western civilization to a very dangerous split. (Perhaps too rashly, I submit that the separation has to do with Heidegger's "ontological difference" and that the split is not unconnected with what he calls the forgetfulness of Being, whose apogee is the technicity of the subjectist will to power. The overcoming of the forgetfulness of Being thus would occur through healing a psychic rift. Nor is this suggestion a reflection of the "psychologism" correctly deplored by Heidegger, for in Neumann's subtle and creative development of Jungian insights, the psyche

itself has been "depsychologized," ontologized). After the separation, the ego consolidates and defends its position, strengthens its stability, becomes conscious of its differences and peculiarities, increases its energy. Phylogenetically, such a consolidation is represented cognitively, I believe, by the theoretic or systematic differentiation of consciousness in Western philosophy and science. The ego even succeeds in harnessing for its own interests some of the originally destructive power of the unconscious so that the world continuum is broken down into objects which can be first symbolized, then conceptualized, and finally rearranged. Thus there emerges "the relative autonomy of the ego, of the higher spiritual man who has a will of his own and obeys his reason,"³⁸ and with this, I submit, a gradual unthematized discrimination of the cognitive, constitutive, effective, and communicative functions of meaning. The end of this development is the capacity "to form abstract concepts and to adopt a consistent view of the world"³⁹--that is, in cognitional-analytic terms, the satisfaction of the theoretic or systematic exigence. Physiologically, the process is the supercession of the medullary man by the cortical man, involving a "continuous deflation of the unconscious and the exhaustion of emotional components" linked with the sympathetic nervous system.⁴⁰

This all too brief and simplified presentation of a very sensitive and sophisticated argument must give way, for our present purposes, to Neumann's analysis of the cultural disease to which this altogether necessary separation

of psychic systems has brought us. For the division of the two systems has become perverse. This perversion is manifested in two directions: a sclerosis of consciousness in which the autonomy of the conscious system has become so predominant as to lose the link to the unconscious and in which the ego has lost the striving for psychic wholeness; and a possession of the creative activity of the ego by "the spirit" resulting in the illimitable expansion of the ego, the megalomania, the overexpansion of the conscious system, the spiritual inflation of Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The first direction is the more common. Spirit is identified with intellect, consciousness with thinking; feeling, the body, the instinctual, are suppressed or, even more tragically, repressed; consciousness is sterilized and creativity doomed to frustration in a culture whose institutional structures have become autonomous from the human needs they were originally constituted to meet. The transpersonal is reduced to mere illusion, to personalistic ego data; archetypes become concepts, symbols signs. Not only is ego life emptied of meaning but the deeper layers of the unconscious are activated in a destructive way so as to "devastate the autocratic world of the ego with transpersonal invasions, collective epidemics, and mass psychoses."⁴¹ The affective "collapse of the archetypal canon" is coincident with "the modern decay of values." The alternative courses open to the individual seem to be either regression to the Great Mother in the form of mass recollectivization, or isolation in the form of exaggerated individualism. The contemporary relevance of Neumann's analysis, written a quarter of a century ago, is all too obvious:

Following the collapse of the archetypal canon, single archetypes take possession of men and consume them like malevolent demons. Typical and symptomatic of this transitional phenomenon is the state of affairs in America, though the same holds good for practically the whole Western hemisphere. Every conceivable sort of dominant rules the personality, which is a personality only in name. The grotesque fact that murderers, brigands, gangsters, thieves, forgers, tyrants, and swindlers, in a guise that deceives nobody, have seized control of collective life is characteristic of our time. Their unscrupulousness and double-dealing are recognized--and admired. Their ruthless energy they obtain at best from some archetypal content that has got them in its power. The dynamism of a possessed personality is accordingly very great, because, in its one-track primitivity, it suffers from none of the differentiations that make men human. Worship of the "beast" is by no means confined to Germany; it prevails wherever one-sidedness, push, and moral blindness are applauded, i.e., wherever the aggravating complexities of civilized behavior are swept away in favor of bestial rapacity. One has only to look at the educative ideals now current in the West.⁴²

The ethical consequences of this situation as they affect the individual in his relation to the collective are detailed in Depth Psychology and a New Ethic. Neumann argues strongly and well that the wholeness of personality conceived as the healing of the psychic rift is the ethical goal upon which the fate of humanity depends.

The turning of the mind from the conscious to the unconscious, the possible rapprochement of human consciousness with the powers of the collective psyche, that is the task of the future. No outward tinkering with the world and no social amelioration can give the quietus to the daemon, to the gods or devils of the human soul, or prevent them from tearing down again and again what consciousness has built. Unless they are assigned their place in consciousness and culture they will never leave mankind in peace. But the preparation for the rapprochement lies, as always, with the hero, the individual; he and his transformation are the great human prototypes; he is the testing ground of the collective, just as consciousness is the testing ground of the unconscious.⁴³

The ethic--categorical and ontic--which accompanied the separation of the psychic systems has disintegrated and is now dead. It is an ethic which

"liberated man from his primary condition of unconsciousness and made the individual the bearer of the drive towards consciousness."⁴⁴ To this extent it was not only psychically necessary but constructive. The initial phases of the development of consciousness must be sustained by the demands of the collective and its sanctions, by its juridical structures and dogmas, its imperatives and prohibitions, even its suppressions and attendant sufferings. But soon enough identification with the ethical values of the collective leads to the formation of a façade personality, the persona, and to repression of everything dark, strange, unfamiliar, and unlived, the shadow--almost universally found in Jungian therapy to be the gateway to the unconscious. The ego is cumulatively identified with the façade and the shadow is projected upon various scapegoats. In our time, the distance between the two systems has become so wide that even the pseudo-solution of conscious identification with the collective ethic is manifestly psychically impossible. It is thus that Neumann can say: "Almost without exception, the psychic development of modern man begins with the moral problem and with his own reorientation, which is brought about by means of the assimilation of the shadow and the transformation of the persona."⁴⁵ As the dark and unfamiliar, the "inferior function," is granted freedom and a share in the life of the ego, identification of the ego-persona with the values of the collective as collective--whether the collective be a cultural canon, an academic community, a trade union, or a religious order--ceases. "The individual is driven by his personal crisis into deep waters where he would usually never have entered

if left to his own free will. The old idealized image of the ego has to go, and its place is shaken by a perilous insight into the ambiguity and many-sidedness of one's own nature."⁴⁶ Only the total personality is accepted as the basis of ethical conduct. No longer is St. Augustine's prayer of gratitude to God possible that he is not responsible for his dreams.⁴⁷

Neumann proposes, then, a new ethic whose aim is "the achievement of wholeness, of the totality of the personality." He continues:

In this wholeness, the inherent contrast between the two systems of the conscious mind and the unconscious does not fall apart into a condition of splitness, and the purposive directedness of ego-consciousness is not undermined by the opposite tendencies of unconscious contents of which the ego and the conscious mind are entirely unaware. In the new ethical situation, ego-consciousness becomes the locus of responsibility for a psychological League of Nations, to which various groups of states belong, primitive and prehuman as well as differentiated and modern, and in which atheistic and religious, instinctive and spiritual, destructive and constructive elements are represented in varying degrees and coexist with each other.⁴⁸

Theoretical (I interpret: categorial or ontic, as opposed to transcendental or ontological) prescriptions for ethical conduct are declared impossible⁴⁹ since it is "impossible to predict the psychological form in which evil will appear in the life story of any given individual."⁵⁰ Working through and negotiating our own individual darkness in an independent and responsible manner--becoming more fully conscious--now ranks as an ethical duty, implying that consciousness is regarded as "an authority to create and control the relationship to wholeness of everything psychic;"⁵¹ psychic wholeness takes the place of the sublimation "purchased at the cost of the contagious miasma

which arises out of the repression and suppression of the unconscious elements which are not susceptible to sublimation;" such a sublimation contributes to a "holiness" which is nothing other than a flight from life. In a statement which must be understood against the background of his theory of the origins and destiny of consciousness, Neumann says:

Whatever leads to wholeness is "good"; whatever leads to splitting is "evil." Integration is good, disintegration is evil. Life, constructive tendencies and integration are on the side of good; death, splitting and disintegration are on the side of evil. . . . Our estimate of ethical values is no longer concerned with contents, qualities or actions considered as "entities"; it is related functionally to the whole. Whatever helps that wholeness which is centred on the Self towards integration is "good," irrespective of the nature of this helping factor. And, vice versa, whatever leads to disintegration is "evil"--even if it is "good will," "collectively sanctioned values" or anything else "intrinsically good."⁵²

Lonergan's description of egoistic, class, and general bias and of moral conversion is complementary and, I believe, correctly compensatory to the position of Neumann. The compensatory aspect lies in the notion of self-transcendence, which, however, is far from absent in the Jungian theory of the relations between the ego and the Self. Of particular significance, again, in Lonergan's position are his depiction of moral conversion as the shift of the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values, his characterization of feelings as the locus of the apprehension of values and as mediating between judgments of fact and judgments of value, and his ascending scale of values based on the criterion of self-transcendence. What I wish to emphasize is that psychic wholeness in Neumann and the self-transcendence of authentic subjectivity in Lonergan are correlative and

mutually reinforcing. This is implicit in Lonergan's qualifications of the summit of moral self-transcendence in the love of God, where "values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates" and where--may we say, because?--"affectivity is of a single piece;"⁵³ in his discussion of psychotherapy within the context of authenticity; and in his qualification of affective development and aberration as symbolically certifiable. I conclude: if psychotherapy is a matter of the differentiation and appropriation of feelings through the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible negotiation of the symbolic function from which consciousness today finds itself disastrously split; if this psychic rift is the root of our contemporary individual and social ethical crisis; if the feelings discovered and negotiated in psychotherapy are the locus of the apprehension of value; if our apprehension of value is crippled by the psychic rift between consciousness and the symbolic function constitutive of feeling; and if psychotherapy, by healing this rift and promoting psychic wholeness, reinstitutes on a new level of conscious awareness the ethically necessary commerce of consciousness with symbolically charged feeling; then psychotherapy is in quest of something bearing remarkable resemblances to what Lonergan calls moral conversion. Such a moral conversion, given the psychic rift qualifying man's contemporary status, must be therapeutically mediated.

But the most significant clue to the nature of this symbolic transformation is offered in Lonergan's account of religion, a clue which enables us to understand this transformation as post-critical.

IV. Religious Conversion as Psychic

Lonergan employs various phrases, some borrowed from other authors, to describe religious conversion. With Paul Tillich, he speaks of "being grasped by ultimate concern."^{53a} With St. Paul, he speaks of "God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us."⁵⁴ In terms of the theoretical stage of meaning represented by Augustine and Aquinas, religious conversion is operative grace as distinct from cooperative grace. But these are now described in scriptural imagery. "Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom."⁵⁵ In his own terminology, suited more to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority becomes the ground of theory, religious conversion is "otherworldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations."⁵⁶ As such it is "being in love with God," which is "the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth."⁵⁷

The experience of this love is that of "being in love in an unrestricted fashion" and as such is the proper fulfilment of the capacity for self-

transcendence revealed in our unrestricted questioning. But it is not the product of our knowledge and choice. "On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing."⁵⁸ As conscious but not known, the experience of this love is an experience of mystery, of the holy. It belongs to the level of consciousness where deliberation, judgment of value, decision, and free and responsible activity take place. "But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the apex animae."⁵⁹

For Lonergan, there is a twofold expression of religious conversion. Spontaneously it is manifested in changed attitudes, for which Galatians 5.22f. provides something of a descriptive enumeration: "The fruit of the Spirit ^{is} ~~of~~ love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control." But another kind of expression is directly concerned with the base and focus of this experience, the mysterium tremendum et fascinans itself. There is an enormous variation to be discovered in the investigation of such expression and Lonergan correlates this variety with

the predominant stages of meaning operative in one's self-understanding and in one's spontaneously assumed stance toward reality--i.e., with the manner in which one's world is mediated by meaning. He constructs a series of stages of meaning based on a cumulative differentiation of consciousness. In the Western tradition there have been three such stages of meaning, and they can be ontogenetically reproduced in the life-history of a contemporary individual. This ontogenetic reproduction is the key to our thesis of a post-critical religious conversion which is other--even more so in experience than in expression--than whatever religion may precede intellectual conversion.

The first stage of meaning is governed by a common sense differentiation of consciousness, or, what amounts to the same thing, by undifferentiated consciousness. The second stage is familiar also with theory, system, logic, and science, but is troubled because the difference of this from common sense is not adequately grasped. The third stage is prepared by all those modern philosophies governed by the turn to the subject, which thus take their stand on human interiority. Here consciousness is adequately differentiated into the various realms of meaning--common sense, theory, interiority, transcendence, scholarship, and art--and these realms are consciously related to one another. One consciously moves from one to the other by consciously changing his procedures.

In all three stages, meaning fulfills four functions. First, it is cognitive in that it mediates the real world in which we live out our lives. Secondly it is efficient in that it governs our intention of what we do.

Thirdly it is constitutive in that it is an intrinsic component of human cultures and social institutions. And fourthly it is communicative in that, through its various carriers--spontaneous intersubjectivity, art, symbol, language, and incarnation in the lives and deeds of persons--individual meaning becomes common meaning, and, through the transmission of training and education, generates history. But in the first stage these functions are not clearly recognized and accurately articulated. So the blend of the cognitive and constitutive functions, for example, brings about the constitution not only of cultures and institutions but also the story of the world's origins in myth. And just as the constitutive function of meaning pretends to speculative capacities beyond its genuine range, so the efficient function of meaning pretends to practical powers which a more differentiated consciousness denominates as magic. Religious expression at this stage is a result of the projective association or identification of religious experience with its outward occasion. The focus--and here is the most significant clue to the symbolic transformation operated in post-critical psychic conversion--is on what we would call the external, the spatial, the specific, and the human, as contrasted with the internal, the temporal, the generic, and the divine. What is indeed temporal, generic, internal, divine is associated with or projected upon what is spatial, specific, external, human, and so there result the gods of the moment, the god of this or that place, of this or that person, of Abraham or Laban, of this or that group, of the Canaanites, the Philistines, the Israelites.

The key to the movement from the first stage of meaning to the second and to the religious development consequent upon this movement is to be located, however, not in the shift from exteriority, space, the specific, and the human, to interiority, time, the generic, and the divine, but in the differentiation of the functions of meaning. The advance of technique will enable the association of the efficient function with poiesis and praxis and reveal the inefficacy of magic. But more far-reaching in its implications will be the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning from the other three functions. As the key to the religious expression of an undifferentiated consciousness lies in insight into sensible presentations and representations, so the limitations of such consciousness to the spatial, the specific, the external, and the human will recede to the extent that the sensible presentations and representations are provided by language itself.⁶⁰ This does not mean, however, that a self-conscious transposition to interiority, time, the generic, and the divine occurs; what occurs, rather, is, I believe, a movement away from all immediacy. The return to immediacy in terms of interiority, time, the generic, and the divine must await the emergence of the third stage of meaning.

The second stage of meaning, then, is characterized by a twofold mediation of the world by meaning: in the realm of common sense and in that of theory. This split is troubling. It was interpreted by Plato in such a way that, at a certain stage in his thought, there seem to be two really distinct worlds, the transcendent world of eternal Forms and the transient world of appearance. In Aristotle, it led to the distinction, not between

theory and common sense, but between necessity and contingency. The basic concepts of genuine--i.e., universal and necessary--science were metaphysical, and so the sciences were conceived as continuous with philosophy.

The introduction of the theoretical capacity into religious living is represented in the dogmas, theology, and juridical structures of Western religion. But just as the two tables of Eddington--"the bulky, solid, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless 'wavicles' so minute that the desk was mostly empty space"⁶¹--reveal the presence of a conflict between common sense and science, so in the realm of religion, "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is set against the God of the philosophers and theologians. Honoring the Trinity and feeling compunction are set against learned discourse on the Trinity and against defining compunction. Nor can this contrast be understood or the tension removed within the realms of common sense and of theory."⁶² So there is demanded a movement to a third stage of meaning, the stage of the differentiation of consciousness through the appropriation of human interiority.

The sciences then come to be regarded, not as prolongations of philosophy, but as autonomous, ongoing processes; not as the demonstration of universal and necessary truths but as hypothetical and ever better approximations to truth through an ever more exact and comprehensive understanding of data. Philosophy is no longer a theory in the manner of science but the self-appropriation of intentional consciousness and the consequent distinguishing, relating, and grounding of the various realms of meaning, the

grounding of the methods of the sciences, and the ongoing promotion of their unification. Theology then becomes, in ever larger part, the understanding of the diversity of religious utterance on the basis of the differentiation and interrelation of the realms of common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.

This exposition contains in germ the development I hope will be the contribution of this essay. For it is not only religious expression that differs according to the various stages of meaning, but religious experience itself. The third stage of meaning is achieved through the appropriation of interiority, whose initial step is intellectual conversion. Prior to this major breakthrough, one's religious living is pre-critical. To the extent that it is pre-critical, one's religious experience (and not simply one's religious expression) will involve the projection characteristic of the first stage of meaning. And so it will be in terms of what interiorly differentiated consciousness, by hindsight, is able to denominate as spatial, specific, external, and human as opposed to what is temporal, generic, internal, and divine. To the extent that one's appropriation of interiority proceeds beyond intellectual conversion to psychic conversion, however, his spontaneous reference to his immediate experience will come to focus on what is temporal, generic, internal, and, in the context of the discernment of spirits, divine; his spontaneously lived experience will be thus centered, rather than scattered in what is spatial, specific, external, and human. By speaking of religion within the third stage of meaning, Lonergan already implies or

at least provides room for a religious conversion which is post-critical. The very logic of his exposition would imply not only that the religion of interiorly differentiated consciousness is not, in fact, the unaltered product of the religious conversion which generally precedes pre-critical moral conversion and intellectual conversion but also that it is the fruit of an additional converted orientation achieved through the negotiation and appropriation of a differentiated symbolic consciousness. It is able to differentiate in concrete experience what is temporal from what is spatial, what is generic from what is specific, what is internal from what is external, and what, in the context of the discernment of spirits, is divine from what is human. To this extent, then, Lonergan's articulation of what he means by religious conversion needs further differentiation, and the grounds for this are provided in his eminently satisfactory theory of meaning.

V. Conversion as Foundational Reality

It is my contention, then, that the order of occurrence and the order of sublation of the conversions as foundational reality are not inverse but identical. If pre-critical religious and moral living precede intellectual conversion, they are sublated by it; it in turn is sublated by a post-critical moral conversion shifting the criteria for decision to a differentiated sense of values apprehended by differentiated feeling through the aid of a differentiated imagination whose appropriation achieves the restoration of Dasein to its primordial but now self-conscious temporality, which restoration is psychic wholeness. The basic dynamics of this post-critical moral conversion have

been discovered by Jung and are elaborated by Neumann. Its initial feature is the acceptance and negotiation of the shadow; the dark side of one's psyche, the unfamiliar, the strange, the body, the chthonic. And all these conversions are sublated by a post-critical religious conversion through the shifting of the reference of immediate experience not only from what is exterior to what is interior, from what is spatial to what is temporal, from what is specific to what is generic, but also from what is human to what is divine. What I am expressing here is nothing other than what Jung expressed in his memoirs, in reflecting on the distinctively religious significance of his life's work:

We are in the deepest sense the victims and the instrument of cosmogonic "love." I put the word in quotation marks to indicate that I do not use it in its connotations of desiring, preferring, favoring, wishing, and similar feelings, but as something superior to the individual, a unified and unifying whole. Being a part, man cannot grasp the whole. He is at its mercy. He may assent to it, or rebel against it; but he is always caught up by it and enclosed within it. He is dependent upon it and is sustained by it. Love is his light and his darkness, whose end he cannot see. "Love ceases not"--whether he speaks with the "tongues of angels," or with scientific exactitude traces the life of the cell down to its uttermost source. Man can try to name love, showering upon it all the names at his command, and still he will involve himself in endless self-deceptions. If he possesses a grain of wisdom, he will lay down his arms and name the unknown by the more unknown, ignotum per ignotius--that is, by the name of God. That is a confession of his subjection, his imperfection, and his dependence; but at the same time a testimony to his freedom to choose between truth and error.⁶³

The method of psychotherapy discovered and created by Jung is, for the differentiated consciousness of Western man, a path to the discovery of the cosmogonic love that is God. It was only at the end of his life that Jung could so declare its meaning. His notions of religion and of God underwent a very complicated process ^{of development,} and it is quite possible that he never

fully succeeded in articulating the relations between God and the "God-image" hidden in the depths of the human psyche, the Self. Nonetheless, there is no valid way of speaking of the relation of Jungian thought and practice to religion that does not speak of the Jungian contribution to religious living. Not only did Jung maintain that the general neurosis of our time consists in an increasingly pervasive sense of futility which goes hand in hand with a sense of religious emptiness, and that no genuine healing occurs which does not involve a reinstitution, on a new level, of the religious attitude, but he also represented this restoration in terms of the key notions of his psychotherapeutic practice, and particularly in terms of the tension between the two poles of personal consciousness and the realm of symbolic meaning transcendent of personal consciousness which he called the "collective unconscious." The latter term is unfortunate, since it is reifying. Also unfortunate is the accompanying discussion of the archetypes as if they were contents of the collective unconscious. While Jung's terminology reflects at times an interiorly directed naive realism, a modification of his terminology in terms of cognitional analysis--a modification that remains entirely faithful to his insights--is quite possible. Thus the experienced images released in dreams and guided fantasy promote neural-physiological process to conscious experience. If these experienced imaginal patterns are interpreted, and if the interpretation is affirmed to be correct, then the images released have functioned in aid of genuine self-knowledge. They throw light on my experience, on the felt meaning accompanying all of my conscious awareness. They arti-

culate this felt meaning, providing not only symptoms which can be analyzed but also possibilities which can be actualized in responsible freedom. In this way they are creative of meaning. There is no situation of conscious human experience which does not have an archetypal meaning. Jungian psychotherapy is intended to provide one with the capacity to discover this archetypal meaning through the ongoing interpretation of dreams and guided fantasy or active imagination.

The Jungian contribution to religious living is directly related to the hypothesis of the collective unconscious. Phrased in other terms, we may say that religious experience dramatically affects the available fund of symbolic meanings, and, conversely, that every modification of this fund is religiously significant. Genuine religious experience amounts to a major transformation of this symbolic fund, experienced individually but passed on to the community and through the community into history--a transformation in the direction of heightened tension between consciousness and the suprapersonal realm of symbolic meaning, in the direction of more complete integration of the totality of the psyche, in the direction of heightened and expanded self-consciousness, and finally in the direction of liberation not only from slavery to unconscious forces within oneself but also from domination by collective massification, ossification, and domestication in the world of what Heidegger calls das Man, the world of the façade personality, of the ego-persona.

I would hypothetically extend this analysis: strictly speaking, all genuine religious experience is similar in kind to what we call revelatory

experience. The great religions of the world are the result of major symbolic transformations in the experience of individuals, resulting in a heightened tension between the two poles of psychic totality, in the fuller integration, expanded consciousness, and liberation from the collective which provide life with the intensity required if it is to be lived in the atmosphere of mystery. This tension, consciousness, and liberation are the exponent of the complete man. The insights and techniques of Jungian therapy provide us with a way into receptivity to revelatory experience. Such experience, like all experience, must be interpreted; the interpretation must be affirmed to be true; and the truth must be negotiated freely and responsibly in the ongoing constitution and creation of the world, a world always and in each instance symbolically charged, archetypally constructed. The failure to interpret, affirm, and negotiate the imaginally constituted world of one's dispositional second immediacy leaves one a prey to being overpowered and overcome by the numinous. Such failure on the part of intentional consciousness is the gateway, not to neurosis, but to psychotic upheaval. It is no accident that the delusions of the insane were as important to Jung in his investigations of the "collective unconscious" as were the dreams of patients consciously and responsibly striving toward psychic wholeness. The only difference between the two is the strength and resolve of intentional consciousness. The psychic background is identical.

Thus what precedes intellectual conversion may be pre-critical religious and moral living; but these are psychically inadequate for our epoch. What also precedes intellectual conversion is what is so eloquently expressed in

Insight: "the hopeless tangle of the social surd, of the impotence of common sense, of the endlessly multiplied philosophies", which is "not merely a cul-de-sac for human progress" but also "a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness."⁶⁴ There is "the profound disillusionment of modern man" who "had hoped through knowledge to ensure a development that was always progress and never decline" but who "has discovered that the advance of human knowledge is ambivalent, that it places in man's hands stupendous power without necessarily adding proportionate wisdom and virtue, that the fact of advance and the evidence of power are not guarantees of truth, that myth is the permanent alternative to mystery and mystery is what his hybris rejected."⁶⁵ There is "the native bewilderment of the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease and even insanity."⁶⁶ There is, in short, the polymorphism of human consciousness, whose patterns may be "biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical" and in such a way that they alternate, blend or mix, and can interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down.⁶⁷ There is the discovery that the philosophies and psychologies and theologies are many, contradictory, and disparate and that the mind "has to master its own manifold before it can determine what utterance is, or what is uttered, or the difference between the two." There may be the discovery that the mind's own manifold is at the root of antithetical solutions. But there may also be the suspicion,

drawing support from "the welter of conflicting philosophic definitions, and from the Babel of endless philosophic arguments" that "the object of philosophy either does not exist or cannot be attained." Then there is the corresponding belief that "the philosophers have been men of exceptional acumen and profundity" and there may even be the hope that the "many, contradictory, disparate philosophies can all be contributions to the clarification of some basic but polymorphic fact."⁶⁸ This hope, however sanguine it may sometimes seem, may move one to cognitional self-analysis, to raising and answering the questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do it?" The cognitional self-appropriation resulting from answering these questions correctly, however, is but the first step in the mind's mastery of its own manifold. For it is discovered that even the advance of the human knowledge of human knowledge is ambivalent and that this gnosis is not yet wisdom, for there is a further manifold to be appropriated, a second mediation of immediacy by meaning.

I am in no sense denying that the gift of God's love, religious living, and the moral self-transcendence of persons as originating values can and do occur before intellectual conversion. The religion may be holiness and the unified affectivity of an otherworldly love. But such religion and morality are even more rare and more difficult to sustain in our modern Western context than intellectual conversion. In addition, most pre-critical religion and morality will be rather of the variety studied by sociologists of religion and of knowledge. Pre-critical religion gives rise to representations constitutive of pre-critical society. It is a control system linking meaning

and motivation by providing the individual or the group with its most general model of the world.⁶⁹ This pre-critical symbolic system is what the individual is born into; it nourishes him, provides for his education, offers him an alternative array of functions which are the directions his life may take, and guarantees him the satisfaction of his vital needs in return for his contribution to the maintenance of the system. Any change in the system calls for a corresponding change in the individual. But in this control system tolerated, sustained, and even promoted and validated by pre-critical religion and mores the existential subject may discover a despotism of darkness and a hegemony of myth, a reign of sin and more than a faint hint of madness. He may come to suspect that the God that is generally believed in is no God at all, and in this he may be quite correct. The insufficiency of pre-critical religion and pre-critical morality at a certain level of intellectual and psychic development--in fact, not far into the theoretic consolidation of the hard-won autonomy of consciousness--is the catalyst for the initiation of the process of self-appropriation or individuation of which intellectual conversion is the first, not the last, step. The moral and religious conversions as described by Lonergan can consciously and consistently sublate intellectual conversion only if they are further steps in the process of the appropriation of human interiority, only if they are post-critical, only if they heal the psychic split tolerated and promoted by pre-critical religion and the "old ethic." The instrument mediating this further self-appropriation is the therapeutic, and its first stage is a moral conversion

based on an ethic of psychic totality.

As the process develops, one will confirm the suspicion, I believe, that the gift of God's love has been responsible for initiating and sustaining the whole process, that one's own responsibility has been a cooperation with a fated call to a dreaded holiness, with a "charged field of love and meaning, which at times has reached "a notable intensity," but more often has been "ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join."⁷⁰ He will discover that he has been in love all along, experiencing something analogous to the ups and downs, the misunderstandings and reconciliations, of every love relationship. While he may suspect and affirm this relationship all along or at least at intervals, the eye of faith becomes sharpened and its interpretations more sensitive as one learns to confess the extent to which he is loved with an otherworldly, all-embracing, completely gratuitous, and severely jealous love and to experience the extent to which this avowal enables him to make his resources available to others, expecting no return because needing none, or, in Paul Ricoeur's phrase, to "leave off all demands and listen."⁷¹ What is so frequently missed in speaking of such an experience, however, is that it is intensely psychic and can be therapeutically mediated.

If conversion is self-conscious sublation, then the fully converted subject is first intellectually converted, then morally converted, and finally religiously converted. His commitment to truth is sublated into a commitment to all value, and both are sublated into a state of surrender leaving only the unified affectivity of love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness,

faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control, concerning which there is no law. Such a subject not only can distinguish positions from counter-positions in philosophy, and mystery from myth in the affective apprehension of value, but, I believe, can learn, in a new and therapeutically mediated self-conscious way, St. Paul's secret in any and all circumstances of facing plenty and hunger, abundance and want, the secret, in whatever state he is, of being content--and this not because of his own heroism or through cynical resignation but by reason of the otherworldly love which strengthens him,⁷² and which is acknowledged as his psychic Ground. Such religion, as subsuming a critical commitment to truth and a discerning devotion to value, is post-critical religious consciousness, habitually focused in its immediacy on interiority, time, the generic, and the divine, rather than on exteriority, space, the specific, and the human. The clearing of the possibility of such consciousness and the elucidation of its experienced reality are the first task of a theology which would mediate a post-critical, historically conscious cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion within that matrix.⁷³

For the sake of dialogue with Jungian psychotherapists, I propose to call the first stage of the appropriation of interiority, of which intellectual conversion is a principal feature, the analytic or heroic stage, the stage of Apollo, of the discrimination of spirit. The second stage, that of moral conversion as the post-critical apprehension of value, is the synthetic or erotic stage, the stage of a converted Dionysus, of the cultivation of soul. The third stage, religious conversion as the therapeutically mediated freedom

to leave off all demands and listen, is the agapic stage, the stage of Gotama or Jesus, the stage of the self-surrender to the undertow on the part of discriminated spirit and cultivated soul. Then, in the language of the concerns of the new hermeneutic, "if theology is understood as language about God, it is to be asked whether and to what extent its language is from God."⁷⁴ God and ourselves will be together in the one sentence, for God will be thought and affirmed in strict relation to "real life," i.e., to the world mediated by meaning in its experienced immediacy. The ultimate theological dialectic will occur in the dialogue of world religions, and it will revolve about the concrete figures of this ultimate dialectic: Gotama, Krsna, Lao-Tse, Confucius, Mohammed, Jesus. Through this dialogue, perhaps as nowhere else, the common rootedness of all religion and philosophy in the "collective unconscious" will be recognized. As Neumann says, "It is becoming clear that, although different archetypal constellations may be dominant or recessive among different nations and races and at different times, the human species is nevertheless one and indivisible in the basic structure of its mind." We will come to withdraw "the psychic projections by means of which (we) had peopled the emptiness of the world with hierarchies of gods and spirits, heavens and hells" and will come to experience, for the first time, "the creative fullness of (the) primal psychic ground." The same creative Godhead who previously filled the heavens and the spheres of the universe around us will emerge within the human mind.⁷⁵

Systematic theology will then become, in John Macquarrie's phrase, "a kind of phenomenology of faith."⁷⁶ But its basic terms and relations

will not be purely descriptive; rather they will be psychological and explanatory, because derived from the most thoroughgoing fidelity to the exigence for the appropriation of interiority, the methodical exigence become the therapeutic exigence. Such fidelity, pursued to its limits, turns truth into poetry. As Vico declared all to begin with poetry, so we affirm that all ends with poetry: we end where we began, but we see the place as if for the first time.

The full sweep of the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving appropriation of interiority is psychic conversion as foundational reality. Its asymptotically approached finality is a converted second immediacy, which would be the poetic enjoyment of the truth about God and man and whose full realization would be eschatological. Perhaps even of the theologian, it may be said with Hölderlin (and Heidegger):

Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells
Man on this earth.

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FOOTNOTES

¹I wish to acknowledge with gratitude that the term "psychic conversion" for the disposition and transformation described in this paper was suggested to me by Rev. Vernon Gregson, S.J. My original name for the subject matter of this paper was "affective conversion." That Fr. Gregson's suggestion hits things off better should be obvious, I hope, from the description of the transformation covered by this term.

²Claudio Naranjo, The One Quest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 15.

³Ibid., p. 28.

⁴Ibid., p. 122.

⁵Ibid., p. 224.

⁶Frederick Lawrence, "Self-Knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," in P. McShane, ed., Language, Truth, and Meaning (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 203.

⁷The jacket to this same book, for example, refers to Lonergan's work as "a mode of thinking which some consider axial in Jaspers' sense." The reference is to the notion Jaspers sets forth in The Origin and Goal of History that "there is an axis on which the whole of human history turns; that axis lies between the years 800 and 200 B.C.; during that period in Greece, in Israel, in Persia, in India, in China, man became of age; he set aside the dreams and fancies of childhood; he began to face the world as perhaps it is." Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, ed. F. E. Crowe, S.J., p. 258.

⁸Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 77. (Henceforth MIT)

⁹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 171 f.

¹⁰MIT, p. 77.

¹¹Heidegger, op. cit., p. 173.

¹²Ibid., p. 176.

¹³What the Jungian analyst, Marie-Louise von Franz, says of the existentialists is particularly true of Heidegger: "They go only as far as stripping off the illusions of consciousness: They go right up to the door of the unconscious and then fail to open it." "The Process of Individuation," in Carl Jung, ed., Man and His Symbols, (New York: Dell, 1964, p. 164).

Footnotes, 2

¹⁴MIT, p. 241.

¹⁵T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding."

¹⁶"Bernard Lonergan Responds," in Foundations of Theology, ed. Philip McShane, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 221f.

¹⁷MIT, p. 241.

¹⁸T. S. Eliot, Ibid.

¹⁹Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (Toronto: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 4.

²⁰See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. by Denis Savage, (New Haven: Yale, 1970). See also my article, "Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning," Anglican Theological Review (October 1973), pp. 443-458.

²¹See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by James Churchill, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

²²John S. Dunne, The Way of All the Earth (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. ix.

²³C.G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1933,) p. 17.

²⁴Dunne, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

²⁵Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. xxviii.

²⁶Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 88.

²⁷Luke 7:35.

²⁸Cf. Freud and Philosophy, p. 496.

²⁹MIT, p. 240.

³⁰Ibid., p. 31.

³¹Ibid., pp. 64 ff.

³²Ibid., pp. 31 f.

Footnotes. 3

³³Erich Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, Bollingen Series XLII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. xx f.

³⁴Ibid., p. xxii.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 263.

³⁷Ibid., p. 264.

³⁸Ibid., p. 318.

³⁹Ibid., p. 328.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 331.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 389.

⁴²Ibid., p. 391.

⁴³Ibid., p. 394.

⁴⁴Erich Neumann, Depth Psychology and a New Ethic, trans. by Eugene Rolfe, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1969), p. 63.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 77. Emphasis added.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 79.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 74.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 107.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 107 f.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 113.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 126 f.

⁵³MIT, p. 39.

^{53a}Ibid., p. 240.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 241.

Footnotes, 4

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 240.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 105.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 106.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 107.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 92.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 84.

⁶²Ibid., p. 115.

⁶³C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 354.

⁶⁴Insight, p. 692.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 549.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 385.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 386 f.

⁶⁹See Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 8.

⁷⁰MIT, p. 290.

⁷¹Freud and Philosophy, p. 551.

⁷²Philippians 4. 11-13.

⁷³See MIT, p. xi.

⁷⁴Robert W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 68.

⁷⁵Depth Psychology and a New Ethic, p. 135

⁷⁶John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 6.