

NAME
NOM

No. D-36




Re-Order No. GL-210R

D 0055

PSYCHIC CONVERSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEOLOGY: A PROPOSAL

Robert M. Doran, S.J.



A. Introduction.

In this essay, I wish to begin to argue for an expansion of the foundations of theology beyond the triple conversion (religious, moral, and intellectual) specified by Bernard Lonergan.¹ More precisely, I wish to suggest a fourth conversion which I will call psychic or imaginative conversion, as also foundational for theology in the same way as religious, moral, and intellectual conversion in Lonergan's proposed method. I am not arguing that there is any deficiency either in Lonergan's basic notion of the foundations of theology as located in the authentic subject or in his insistence on the three conversions with which he deals as qualifying human authenticity. I am stating, rather, that a fourth conversion should be added to the three delineated and described by Lonergan and that this fourth is equally foundational in the derivation of theological categories, positions, system, and in the prosecution of the Christian mission.

In this paper I will detail the personal and intellectual journey which has led to this conclusion and suggest the lines of future research which I wish to follow in order to elaborate its significance and explicate its details. The journey has been guided by a question, a very involved and foundational question, whose contours can perhaps best be indicated by stating that for the last five years I have been persuaded of the foundational significance, both for reflection on human living and for theological thought, of the writings of both Martin Heidegger and Lonergan. Thus I have been trying to walk a path whose direction is

determined by both the mysterious and elusive figure of Heidegger and the towering, formidable, and sometimes imperious (even imperialistic) intellect of Lenergan—er, far better, by my own stumbling, hesitant, and often forgetful attempt to know from within and to live by a meaning which would reflect in its embodiment the results of their meeting one another, qualifying one another, and taking a profound interest in one another. I have now become convinced that they meet one another, at least for me, at the point of circling in upon what Edmund Husserl calls "the system of the concrete a priori."² But, because this system is easily disturbed, they both give way at this point to another type of exploration than is carried on by either, to what, for want of a better term, I will call depth psychology. The latter embraces for me the following elements: first, it is a delineation of the various figures which, with a meaningful contingency, show themselves in this system of the concrete a priori, through dreams, fantasy, symbol, and myth; second, it is a delineation of "the unity of the race of man, not only in its biology but also in its spiritual history," an exploration of the structures and dynamic tendencies within the human psychosomatic system to which the origins of myth and ritual are to be referred; third, it is the archeological digging of "the deep, very deep well of the past," so as to lay bare the foundations of a science of the human roots of revelation.³ The matter is indeed very complicated and future work will have to proceed very carefully through an exegesis of these two thinkers along with other philosophers, particularly in the phenomenological school, whose concern is the transcendental structure of

this "system of the concrete a priori" and with psychologists who have opened up avenues through dreams, fantasy, symbol, and myth to enable us to detail the figures of the system.

The previous sentence enables us to establish some functional differentiations. The philosopher, in such an investigation as this, is concerned with transcendental structure--in this case, especially with the transcendental structure of the imagination. The depth psychologist's concern is with the various figures elaborated in dreams, fantasy, symbol, and myth by the human imagination and with their functioning in support of or to the detriment of the concrete well-being of the human subject or society. The methodologist will be interested in the contribution of these first two to "the framework for collaborative creativity"⁴ which is his concern. The theologian will decide the pertinence of the structure and figures of the imagination for his theological categories, positions, system, and efforts at communication.

B. A Bit of Autobiography

I first became enthused about the challenge presented by Lonergan about six years ago when, on my fifth attempt, I finally managed to read Insight from cover to cover and tried to do what he asks of his reader.⁵ I became quite convinced, and am still convinced to this day, that his delineation of human knowledge, of what happens when a man knows, is very sharp and accurate and that the paths he asks one to travel through his own knowing mind lead to a great deal of truth about oneself and one's world.

On the other hand, about a year after these convictions had had some time to develop and ripen, I participated in a seminar on the "later Heidegger" directed by William Richardson at Fordham University. This experience led to a similar conviction concerning the immense value and importance of Heidegger's work, despite (or perhaps because of) its vastly different "atmosphere" from anything I had previously studied. The effect of the two is different, of course. Many of the conclusions of Lonergan seem to strike one with a note of finality, whereas Heidegger's approach is much more meditative and its positive result much more one of belief than of certainty. Nonetheless, since I have somehow managed to maintain the belief that truth and value cannot be self-contradictory, I have been fascinated ever since--and at times plagued--by the question of the relation, at least in my own thinking mind, between the respective challenges offered by these two thinkers and personally experienced in my own life. The task is extremely difficult and ultimately must be very much more highly nuanced than this introductory essay, which is nothing more than a projection and exploration of possible paths of thinking and self-reflection.

Several other influences, however, must be mentioned for their pertinence both to this task and to the full understanding of the paths which led to the central conclusion here proposed. Principal among these are the understanding of the hermeneutic task opened up by Paul Ricoeur, for whom hermeneutics is correlative with the exploration of symbols or double-meaning linguistic expressions. Ricoeur thus delineates the meeting-

point of three related enterprises: a philosophy of self-reflection, hermeneutics, and depth psychology.⁶ The main lines of Ricoeur's analysis of the contemporary crisis of interpretation and his thoughtful suggestions for a dialectical resolution of the crisis will probably serve as the opening statement of any future detailed attempt to justify the positing of a fourth conversion as foundational for theology.

Also of major significance has been the process, now a year old, of undergoing psychoanalysis in a Jungian vein. This experience has opened up for me in a way no study of philosophy could the details of the world of the figures of the system of the concrete a priori; it has allowed in a singular way "the explication of a meaningful contingency,"⁷ an experience of the "passive genesis of meaning" and of its active appropriation,⁸ a laying bare of "the Cogito that founds in proportion as it lets be,"⁹ the realization of the possibilities of a post-critical immediacy¹⁰ or of "living the dream forward" and en fleshing its logos.

Through the following steps, then, I wish to argue for the foundational significance in theology of psychic or imaginative conversion:

1. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutical Conflict and the Problem of a New Immediacy. In particular, I wish to draw upon the benefit of aligning the hermeneutical task with the problem of the response to symbols and myth as this has been pointed to by Ricoeur, and to utilize his delineation of the symbol's concrete unity-in-tension along a time-scale, the tension being the present balance of the archeological (past) and teleological (future) directions opened up for interpretative thought by the symbol.

2. Martin Heidegger: Imagination as Instituting Primordial Time.

I wish then to exegete Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and to retain from Heidegger the discovery of the transcendental time-structure of human imagination and its identification with human Dasein; to argue that this time-structure is the condition of the possibility of the time-scale of all immediacy and especially of the second, post-critical immediacy to symbol delineated by Ricoeur; and to suggest that the recovery of the time-bound structure of human imagination is a task and can serve to define the function of psychotherapy as effecting psychic conversion, which in turn renders possible the second immediacy to symbol and myth as constitutively meaningful for one's own living.

3. Bernard Lonergan and the Problem of Immediacy. Since my interpretation of Heidegger will have proceeded mainly from the latter's study of Kant, I will utilize here, in addition to Lonergan's own work, a study of Lonergan vis-a-vis Kant done by Giovanni Sala.¹¹ Here I wish to relate Lonergan dialectically to Heidegger, thereby correcting what I regard as mistakes in the latter's notion of human knowledge; but I wish also to apply a corrective to a tendency in Lonergan's thought to undertake a premature flight from immediacy; I wish to embody Lonergan's method by insisting on the originating and correcting function of the time-bound imagination, when the latter has been freed by psychic conversion; the imagination functions in this way at every level of consciousness or self-presence delineated by Lonergan; it also functions in a verifying

way at the level of judgment and in a confirming or "disapproving" way at the level of decision. I thus hope to show that Lonergan is indeed correct when he says, "I see no difficulty in finding room in my position for symbolic consciousness,"¹² Indeed, we must find this room or, in my opinion, suffer the consequences of a disembodied intellectualism.

4. Functions of the Imagination and Psychic Conversion. Here I wish, first, to relate the work of Ray L. Hart to the preceding three sections.¹³ Hart has opened up the place of imagination in human life in a way not out of tune with Heidegger, in fact with many more details, and has accompanied his exposition with a cognitional theory which seems basically sound. But I wish to argue further that the structure of imagination as sketched by Heidegger and filled in by Hart is frequently prey to aberrations which are the root of psychic disturbance and that such disturbance is a matter of the operative failure of the time-dimension of the imagination, so that time no longer can "temporalize itself" out of the future by calling the past into the present. The therapeutic correction of this aberration in the constitution of time is what I mean by psychic conversion. The latter affects one's spontaneous self-presence, whether one is experiencing, understanding, judging, deliberating, or deciding. Thus it is related to intellectual and moral life and plays a constitutive role in safeguarding the consistency of religious conversion, insofar as this can be safeguarded by anything human. Psychic conversion is important in permitting free rein to the desire to know and the desire for value,

both of which are, for Lonergan, constitutive of human authenticity. In this way, furthermore, the latter's notion of authenticity can be related to that of Heidegger.

5. Finally, I wish to indicate the significance of psychic conversion as foundational for theological categories, doctrines, system, and the mission of the Christian Church in the world. Some of the indications of detail will be mentioned in the course of this brief introductory essay. In addition to what will be mentioned here, however, I would point to the significance of psychic conversion in liturgical studies and sacramental theology, in the word-sacrament relationship, and in the dialogue of Christian theology with the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. It also functions in the contacts between Christianity and other world religions.

Each of the five points mentioned above will form a chapter in the subsequent projected work. For the moment, however, I wish to continue to describe the personal background out of which this idea arose and to explore some of the contours of the problem.

The immediate context which touched off the insight, the Eureka! which provided some resolution of a half-decade old question, consisted in starting what was to be a relatively simple and prosaic unpacking of the Heideggerian roots of Rudolf Bultmann's theological categories and a further try at arguing the insufficiency of these categories to mediate the relationship between theory and praxis. The final product of this attempt was, quite frankly, projected as another Lonerganian tour de force.

But my avenue into Heidegger this time was through Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.¹⁴ My intention was simply to read this book as an introduction to the main work of the "early Heidegger," Being and Time.¹⁵ Instead, the Kant-study proved to be my Archimedes' bath and, while I did not run naked from my desk screaming with the excitement of discovery, I knew something had happened to change the course of my immediate research and to enable me to resume and now at last to befriend an old question. For I was sharply arrested by the central facet of Heidegger's controversial interpretation of Kant and I realized that his retrieve of the lost imagination from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason was the starting-point for the Heidegger-Lonergan study I had been wanting to attempt for some time. Let me explain.

I began the soon to be aborted research into the Heidegger-Bultmann question with the awareness that, if one considers Bultmann to be an existentialist theologian, one can say that theology, in moving beyond Bultmann, has in a sense moved beyond a kind of existentialism. But it is important how theology moves beyond any of its truly significant moments. Theology "exists" only in the minds of theologians. As the mind of any given theologian grows in its awareness and understanding of the complexities of the theological task, he must exercise what we may call canons of selectivity with regard to past achievements. How are these canons derived?

To speak of "canons of selectivity" means that, just as any theologian must expect that others will qualify his achievements, so he must

accept the responsibility for judgment and decision, and not just dialogue, with regard to other theologians. Theological truth is not a matter solely of hermeneutics and history, but of one's own theological positions and their systematic arrangement. Mediating between any theologian's attempts to interpret another man's thought or to relate it to its ongoing historical context and his attempt to articulate his own positions and systematically to order the latter is a moment of personal decision, not only regarding the nature and method of the theological task but also with respect to what elements from the material he has interpreted and placed in a historical context are open to further development and what are not, and even what elements are worth further development and what are not. One is on one's own.

Lonergan has contributed to the process of selection, probably more than any other theologian, by his talk of "conversion," and more specifically of the triple conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. And yet Heidegger's emphasis on the imagination in the Kant study, along with the further personal and intellectual background detailed above, led me to ask whether there is not yet another kind of conversion, yet another source of selectivity, yet another foundation of theology. This was the beginning, then, of the attempt to work out the Heidegger-Lonergan relation, by exploring the implications of positing psychic conversion as an additional foundation of theology and by viewing "the therapeutic," a general term used to designate any instrument or environment facilitating psychic con-

version, as contributing both to the foundations of theology in a constitutive way and to the imaginative mediation of theory and praxis. By the realm of "the imaginal," I mean the whole of the "system of the concrete a priori," including feeling, and the whole realm of the symbolic, of the world of the figures of our dreams, myths, and symbols.

From Lonergan, then, I accept and have learned the notion of theology as reflection on religion, as mediating between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix.¹⁶ From him, too, I accept the division of theology-as-operation into eight interrelated functional specialties and the notion of the foundations of theology as located in the subject himself. Scripture is not a foundation, nor is doctrine, nor is the teaching of one's confessional communion. These are all data and they may be given various levels or degrees of worth or value as data, according to the decision of the individual theologian. The categories and doctrines of any theologian are, according to Lonergan, directly dependent on his subjectivity as a religious, moral, and intelligent human being. In Lonergan's terminology, a man's doctrines will be positions to the extent that, in judging, he is a religiously, morally, and intellectually converted subject; they will be counterpositions to the extent that he is not such a subject. The basic terms and relations of systematic theology will be, not metaphysical, but psychological.

Now, what I wish to suggest is that, in addition to religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, there is a psychic conversion, a correcting

of the time-structure of the human imagination, experienced as a healing of affect, which plays a central role in laying the foundations of any theology whose basic terms and relations are psychological. Such a suggestion, no doubt, alters Lonergan's notions of what would qualify as theological doctrines and systematics. If one says that the therapeutic is instrumental in laying the foundations for theology, then what follows from the foundations will be not only those theological positions which tend to transcend the realm of the symbolic, to sever the umbilical cord to the maternal imagination of man. Rather, such foundations leave open the possibility that one's theological positions may, as positions, i.e., as consistent with conversion, be expressed in highly symbolic terms. They also leave open the possibility for what Hart calls a "systematic symbolics."¹⁷ In terms of Lonergan's recent retractatio concerning the notions of mystery and myth as, respectively, symbols or images that further or do not further the positions,¹⁸ I would want to move one step further and maintain that the notion of the therapeutic here developed provides us with a method of discerning mystery from "myth" (in Lonergan's sense of the term) directly and leaves open the possibility of a doctrinal and systematic theology that would be a poetics, an aesthetics.

C. Some Indications of the Theological Pertinence of This Conclusion

Let us examine, then, some of the central categories of the theology of Bultmann, the object of our original research, in order to indicate something of the pertinence of this conclusion. Our thesis here will

be that, in Bultmann and the post-Bultmannians, the word (of proclamation) never really becomes flesh, that there is a psychosomatic vacuum between the proclamation and the response, and that the response is thus voluntaristic. Because of the connection between the imagination and decision or practical reason, we might say that the Bultmannian rejection of a tertius usus legis is an indication of this vacuum.

For the sake of convenience, we shall rely here on André Malet's study of Bultmann for the categories we shall examine.¹⁹ We shall use these categories as a means of raising the question with which we are centrally concerned. Let me indicate that I began my original research by drawing upon Malet's description of these categories and, in attempting to deal with the "category" of Verstehen, decided to move to Heidegger's identification of Verstehen with human Dasein and his notion of the universality of hermeneutic structure. It was then that I was brought up short by Heidegger's Kant-study. This has led me into a detour from this original research, one which I suspect will take a long time to walk; in fact, it may become the main highway. For, even if one does a dialectical critique of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and thus even if one finds a great deal that is counterpositional in Heidegger with regard to the question of the objectivity of human knowledge, there is, to put it mildly, enough that warrants salvaging in Heidegger's insistence (be it faithful to Kant or not) about the position, function, centrality, and foundational nature of imagination in human reality. Even if one correctly criticizes what Heidegger says about knowledge, I find the material on imagination as

instituting primordial time to be extremely significant, not only for an understanding of Heidegger but for an understanding of ourselves. More specifically, I wish to maintain that the time-bound structure of the imagination affects us at every level of the experience of the data of consciousness and that Heidegger has disclosed the time-structure which should be operative in human conscious performance; when it is not operative, the therapeutic conversion of imagination is called for. My suggestion or question, then, can be put in this way: if the appropriation of one's own understanding and judgment is significant for theology, and if moral and religious conversion are foundational realities for theology, is not also the appropriation of what one spontaneously is foundational for theology? Is not the appropriation of imagination in its time-bound structure foundational for theology? May not the therapeutic be foundational for theology?

1. Knowledge and Freedom

We move, then, to some of Bultmann's categories, as a way of allowing us to frame the question more precisely. First we shall discuss Bultmann's familiar distinction between objective knowledge, from the outside, and the existentiell knowledge which I would have, e.g., of another person if I loved him or her. The distinction is between a knowledge which makes a claim and the kind which surrenders a claim, the kind that is concerned with a Was and the kind that is concerned with a Dass.²⁰ The subject of objective knowledge is a kind of res cogitans

which need not go forth from itself to know the other's intelligible essence. It can reduce the other to a familiar element of its own territory, which, at best, it only expands but never leaves. The subject of existentiell knowledge, on the other hand, is a freedom, a capacity to become other while yet remaining what it is.

The following description from Malet will serve to characterize this second kind of knowing and also will give us some material to work with by way of moving around our central question.

Since by definition the other, as other, is to the core what I am not in any way, then if I am to reach it I must wholly forsake myself, become what I am not, without losing my identity--that is, my otherness with respect to the thing which calls me. Such a feat is possible only if I am constituted by freedom, freedom to abandon what I am and become what I am not while remaining what I am.²¹

Now, first, it seems that such a description, while graphic, is still abstract. For there is the question as to how such freedom is effectively possible. In the ontological or essential (existential) order, man is this aptitude (even if the description, as given, is replete with cognitional-theoretical difficulties, which are legion in this type of thinking). But what concretely can release him into this liberation?

We think here, perhaps, of the discussion in Insight of essential freedom and effective freedom, of the difference between "a dynamic structure and its operational range."²² The winning of effective freedom--the image is Lonergan's, and it is characteristically Promethean!--con-

sists "not in the adoption of an affective attitude that would desire but not perform but in the adoption of an effective attitude in which performance matches aspiration."²³ But is the problem not much more radically one of affect than Lonergan here displays it to be?

Lonergan refers to the restriction of effective freedom due to psychic abnormality as "superficial" compared with the "profound" restriction that follows upon an incomplete intellectual and volitional development.²⁴ It is to the latter alone that "moral impotence" is due. Lonergan is continually emphasizing the tension between the unrestricted desire to know and "narrow" sensitivity and intersubjectivity. It is true that the root of the problem of man's need for liberation is the problem of evil or sin, which is ultimately what he is aiming at, but the role played by affect and symbol in man's very capacity to be intelligent, reasonable, and willing seems to be very much downplayed. The general bias of common sense, he says, "consists in the notion that ideas are negligible unless they are reinforced by sensitive desires and fears."²⁵ But there is a way, is there not, through the healing of affect, to reinforce intelligence and willingness? Lonergan does not deny this, of course, and in Method in Theology pays it more than lip service in several places, yet it really ought to have been more emphasized all along. New "conjugate forms" in man's very sensitivity—is sensitivity purely potency?—are, I maintain, extremely important, and

can lead to new "conjugate forms" in intelligent and decisive behavior. And it is through the therapeutic, through the healing of imagination, that these new conjugate forms, determined by an operative time-structure, arise.

Perhaps the problem ultimately consists in the meaning of the first of the transcendental imperatives of Lonergan. What does it mean to be attentive, both to the data of sense and to the data of consciousness? Our particular emphasis here is on the attentiveness to the data of consciousness themselves and we are maintaining that this first imperative is fulfilled when one's affect-laden internal time-consciousness is functioning in a way called for by its transcendental (but fragile) structure. The freeing of the time-bound imagination is the key to the difference in dealing with another person, the difference between laying a claim on him or surrendering all claims over him. Might it not also be a key to a difference in dealing with God? Might it not have something to do with being able to hear the word, being able to be addressed through symbols which point to the transcendent? Could there even be a sense in which we could say that psychic conversion is even more foundational in the general case than religious conversion? At least, it would seem that psychic conversion would render the state of being converted religiously, a more consistent affair. Lonergan says correctly that religious conversion usually precedes moral and intellectual conversion.²⁶ While I would not want to say that psychic conversion necessarily pre-

cedes religious conversion, I raise the question whether it does not render religious conversion a more consistent possibility in man's life. This, at least, is another way of coming at what I am attempting to deal with.

Now, the description which Bultmann gives of the difference in personal relationships between objective knowledge and existentiell knowledge easily reminds one of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. We might say that the subject of objective knowledge is the master in this dialectic, in which one self-consciousness is independent and its essential nature is to be "for itself," whereas the other self-consciousness is dependent and its existence is existence-for-another. For Hegel, ". . . only when self-consciousness reaches that stage when it is fully recognized, acknowledged, and reflected in another self-consciousness will it complete its journey, attain satisfaction and fulfilment by being actually free and self-determined."²⁷ But, given the priority of liberation at the level of affect, could we not reverse this and say that only when self-consciousness is satisfied and free will it be capable of being fully recognized, acknowledged, and reflected in another self-consciousness? Only when it has completed its journey will it have completed its journey! (Of course, this journey may never be completed, but dialoguing with an absolute idealist does have its difficulties!) The point is that the solution of the mutual pain of the master-slave dialectic may well be a therapeutic solution, not a philosophic one. Philosophy,

perhaps, can do no more than indicate the possibility of a solution and the structure this solution will take.

2. Time and Personal History

Moving on to further Bultmannian categories, we find that it is these two kinds of knowledge which give rise to the distinction between Historie and Geschichte. Historie, materially speaking, designates the evolution of things or of man as a determinate being, while Geschichte again materially speaking, would designate the history of freedom. Man as freedom is temporality in that his future is not present to him now, even germinally. Thus, Geschichte opens us upon a notion of discontinuous time. Freedom's privilege is to be what it has never been before while still remaining what it is. Malet takes this to be Bultmann's notion of the perpetual openness of man.²⁸

We may seriously question at this point whether openness really demands a discontinuous notion of time. Not only is it preferable to speak, in Lonergan's terms, of higher integrations or more richly differentiated consciousness, but also we are here confronted head-on with a problem fundamental to Bultmann's notion of objectivity. The descriptions of objective and existential knowledge seemed accurate enough as descriptions, but suddenly we find ourselves caught in a dualistic ontology of time! Can we really say, though, that the history of our freedom is discontinuous? And once again, is the problem at least partly not one of Bultmann's neglect of the complexity of affect

and imagination? Is the Was to be so clearly separated from the Dass? And if so, how is it freedom's privilege to be what it has never been before while still remaining what it is? Is not Jean-Paul Sartre's utterance of similar logical inconsistencies made the basis of a philosophy suspected of nihilistic tendencies? There are contradictions here which cannot be overcome consistently unless Bultmann's categories themselves are overcome. Now, if we push to the level of the symbolic, of the imaginative, of feeling, of depth psychology, I believe we are provided with a basis for a continuity which allows us to overcome these difficulties.

It is especially with the notion of decision that the acuteness of the problem becomes particularly obvious. For Bultmann, decision is not active, at least in the sense of rule or mastery. Rather, in decision, I decide to submit to the moment, in which the "Wholly Other" discloses itself to me as an unforeseeable summons. Particularly in the event of proclamation does this notion of decision become important for Bultmann.

Now, there is no question that, in significant moments, I can be delivered from my past and opened to the future, summoned to answer, offered a new self-understanding in an entirely unforeseeable way. But is this really discontinuous with anything else in the time that is mine? If I can have several simultaneous "how's"---e.g., if I can be an artist, an economist, and a politician at the same time---, cannot my response to the unforeseeable significance of a claim made upon me by what I

experience as Wholly Other be intimately related to these simultaneous "how's" and radically transform their meaning and interrelationship? Might not this transformation of meaning or of interrelationship within my consciousness be the very matter of the decision I make when I accept the new offer of life? Can we really say that this decision has no matter other than itself?

This, then, is the problem arising out of a discontinuous ontology of time. It is thus that Bultmann's theology is "decisionistic," voluntaristic, even arbitrary. But one will not overcome this simply by philosophy, no more than religious and moral conversion are the result of philosophy. Philosophical notions can certainly be brought to bear here, especially with regard to the differentiations of consciousness, which, after all, really have to do with the interrelationships of the various "how's" within my conscious awareness. But what is the connection of my conscious awareness with the time-bound imagination of Heidegger? And what is the connection of the latter with the "unconscious" of Freud and Jung, with the psyche? Does a conversion or healing which allows the "self" to be the basis of the "ego," which allows that "it" become "I" (Freud), a conversion through the therapeutic, render possible an integrated interrelationship of the various "how's" of conscious awareness? Again, and even more important, I raise the question of a conversion at this level as basic to the foundational reality of theology, and not simply as permitting us to advance beyond a decisionistic or voluntaristic

theology, or allowing perhaps a more consistent mediation of theory and praxis than Bultmann's categories would furnish. I am thus attempting not only to apply canons of selectivity to a dialectical reading of Bultmann but to utilize problems arising out of Bultmann to help us focus on the question of a fourth conversion as foundational for theology.

FOOTNOTES

¹Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), ch. 11.

²The phrase is taken from Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Derion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), par. 39, and is discussed by Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, tr. Denis Savage, (New Haven: Yale, 1970), pp. 381 f.

³The phrases are from Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God, vol. I: Primitive Mythology (New York: Viking Press, 1970), pp. v, 5, and 7.

⁴The phrase is from Lonergan, op. cit., p. xi.

⁵Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

⁶The main works of Ricoeur pertinent to this paper are Freud and Philosophy (see footnote 2) and The Symbolism of Evil, tr. Emerson Buchanan, (New York: Beacon, 1969).

⁷Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 381.

⁸Ibid., p. 380.

⁹Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁰Ibid., passim.

¹¹Giovanni Sala, "The A Priori in Human Knowledge according to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight," to be published in the third volume of papers from the 1970 Lonergan Congress in Boca Raton, Florida.

¹²Philip McShane, ed., Language, Truth, and Meaning (South Bend: Notre Dame, 1973), p. 309.

¹³Ray L. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968).

¹⁴Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

¹⁵Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robnison, (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

¹⁶Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. xi.

¹⁷Hart, op. cit., esp. pp. 305-311.

¹⁸Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," unpublished lecture, p. 13.

¹⁹ Andre Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, tr. Richard Strachan, (New York: Doubleday, 1971). Bultmann himself has written a highly laudatory preface to this work.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 5-9. See also Rudolf Bultmann, "What Does It Mean to Speak of God?" in Faith and Understanding, tr. Louise Pettibone Smith, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 53-65.

²¹ Malet, p. 9.

²² Insight, p. 619.

²³ Ibid., p. 624.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 627.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 632.

²⁶ Philip McShane, ed., Foundations of Theology, (South Bend: Notre Dame, 1971), pp. 233f.

²⁷ Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 25.

²⁸ Malet, p. 10.

²⁹