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## PSYCHIC CONVERSION<sup>1</sup>

**I**N A RECENT book symptomatic and expressive of the contemporary drama of existential and religious subjectivity, psychiatrist Claudio Naranjo speaks of creating "a unified science of human development,"<sup>2</sup> "a unified science and art of human change."<sup>3</sup> He attempts to disengage from the diverse techniques, exercises, and procedures of education, psychotherapy, and religion, an experimental meeting ground based on a unity of concern and a commonality of method. The various ways of growth which he examines—ranging from behavior therapy to Sufism—are, he says, contributions to a *single process of human transformation* involving:

- (1) shift in identity;
- (2) increased contact with reality;
- (3) simultaneous increase in both participation and detachment;
- (4) simultaneous increase in freedom and the ability to surrender;
- (5) unification—intrapersonal, interpersonal, between body and mind, subject and object, man and God;
- (6) increased self-acceptance; and
- (7) increase in consciousness.<sup>4</sup>

He concludes his book with the following summary of his position:

The end-state sought by the various traditions, schools, or systems under discussion is one that is characterized by *the experience of*

<sup>1</sup> I wish to acknowledge with gratitude that the term "psychic conversion" was suggested to me by Rev. Vernon Gregson, S.J. My original term was "affective conversion." That Fr. Gregson's suggestion hits things off better should be obvious from the description given in this paper of the transformation referred to by this term.

<sup>2</sup> Claudio Naranjo, *The One Quest* (New York: Ballantine, 1972), p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

openness to the reality of every moment, freedom from mechanical ties to the past, and surrender to the laws of man's being, one of living in the body and yet in control of the body, in the world and yet in control of circumstances by means of the power of both awareness and independence. It is also an experience of self-acceptance, where "self" does not stand for a preconceived notion or image but is the experiential self-reality moment after moment. Above all, it is an *experience of experiencing*. For this is what consciousness means, what openness means, what surrendering leads into, what remains after the veils of conditioned perception are raised, and what the aim of acceptance is.<sup>5</sup>

My argument in this paper is twofold: first, that Bernard Lonergan's analysis of conscious intentionality not only constitutes an essential contribution to the foundational quest of a unified science and art of human change, but also provides the most embracing overall framework offered to date for the development of such a theory-praxis; and second, that the exigence for self-appropriation recognized and heeded by Lonergan, when it extends to the existential subject, to what Lonergan would regard as the fourth level of intentional consciousness, becomes an exigence for psychic self-appropriation, calling for the release of what C. G. Jung calls the transcendent function, the mediation of psyche with intentionality in an intrasubjective collaboration heading toward individuation. The release of the transcendent function is a fourth conversion, beyond the religious, moral, and intellectual conversions specified by Lonergan. I call it psychic conversion. It aids the sublation of intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity, and thus is an intrinsic dimension of the foundational reality whose objectification constitutes the foundations of theology.

The seven characteristics of human transformation listed by Naranjo may be considered as potential effects of psychic conversion. But its immanent intelligibility is something different. It is the gaining of a capacity on the part of the existential subject to disengage the symbolic and archetypal constitution of

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

moral and religious subjectivity. At a given stage in the self-appropriation of intentional consciousness, the intention of value or of the human good must come to participate in an ongoing conspiracy with the psychosymbolic dimensions of human subjectivity. The attempt to objectify this conspiracy will result in a position complementary and compensatory to that of Lonergan and compensatory to that of Jung. First, the kind of psychotherapy inspired can and must be moved into the epochal movement of the human spirit disengaged in Lonergan's transcendental method. Only such a context preserves the genuine intentionality of Jungian psychotherapy. Secondly, however, the dynamism of transcendental method extends to this further domain of psychic self-appropriation. The finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic. I shall begin by explicating this latter claim. Then I shall argue that intellectual conversion as articulated by Lonergan is the beginning of a response to this therapeutic exigence. In the third and fourth sections of this paper, I will speak of the psychic dimensions of the self-appropriation of moral and religious subjectivity. I will conclude with an argument for the constitutive function of the psyche in the existential subjectivity whose self-appropriation constitutes a portion of the foundations of theology.

### I. THE THERAPEUTIC EXIGENCE

I assume as given an appreciation of the meaning of the term "method" advanced by Lonergan: "method" that has not to do with the Cartesian universal procedure for the attainment of certitude by following fixed rules while neglecting bursts of insight, moral truth, belief, and hypothesis; "method" which takes as its key the subject as subject and thus calls for "release from all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself";<sup>6</sup> "method"

<sup>6</sup> Frederick Lawrence, "Self-Knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," in P. McShane, ed., *Language, Truth, and Meaning* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 203.

as horizon inviting authenticity. I presuppose also that the dialectical-foundational thinking which issues from such a horizon is acknowledged as a movement that is qualitatively different from that which occupied the mainstream of western philosophy from Socrates to Hegel. This latter movement seeks a control of meaning in terms of system. It is the movement of the emergence of *logos* from *mythos*, of theoretically differentiated consciousness from what, because undifferentiated and precritically symbolic, bears some affinities with what is known in psychotherapy as the unconscious. This theoretic movement may archetypally be designated heroic, in that it is the severing *in actu exercito* of the umbilical cord binding mind to maternal imagination. It achieved its first secure triumph in the Aristotelian refinement of Socrates's insistence on *omni et soli* definitions. It may have pronounced its full coming of age as creative and constitutive in its Hegelian self-recognition as essentially dialectical, in its self-identification with the dialectic of reality itself, and in a *Wissenschaft der Logik* which would be the thinking of its own essence in and for itself on the part of this dialectical movement of reality as *Geist*. That Lonergan's articulation of method, with its key being the subject as subject, captures in a radically foundational manner the structure and dynamism of a new moment of the historical western mind, of an epochal shift in the control and constitution of meaning, has not gone unnoticed and is not a novel appreciation of his significance.<sup>7</sup> Thus to propose to complement what can only be denominated an unparalleled achievement surely calls for more than a polite apology.

<sup>7</sup> The jacket to the book cited in footnote six, for example, refers to Lonergan's work as "a mode of thinking which some consider axial in Jaspers' sense." The reference is to the notion Jaspers sets forth in *The Origin and Goal of History* that "there is an axis on which the whole of human history turns; that axis lies between the years 800 and 200 B. C.; during that period in Greece, in Israel, in Persia, in India, in China, man became of age; he set aside the dreams and fancies of childhood; he began to face the world as perhaps it is." Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. F. E. Crowe, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 258.

Perhaps I can begin, then, by recalling that Lonergan himself acknowledges a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning. The first is that which has occupied his attention throughout his career as scholar, teacher, and author, that which occurs "when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method." The second occurs "when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."<sup>8</sup> This statement would seem to imply that there are two modes or dimensions to our immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. One mode is cognitional, the other dispositional. These two modes, moreover, would seem to correspond more or less closely to the two primordial constitutive ways of being "there" according to Martin Heidegger: *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit*.<sup>9</sup> They are interlocking modes of immediacy. Lonergan also speaks of "a withdrawal from objectification and a mediated return to immediacy in the mating of lovers and in the prayerful mystic's cloud of unknowing."<sup>10</sup> Is this mediated return to immediacy, this second immediacy, exhausted by these two instances? Is it connected with the second mediation of immediacy by meaning?

Any human subject whose world is mediated and constituted by meaning is primordially in a condition of cognitional and dispositional immediacy to that world: an immediacy of understanding and of mood. The second mode of immediacy is accessible to conscious intentionality in the ever present flow of feeling which is part and parcel of one's concomitant awareness of oneself in all of one's intentional operations. "In every case Dasein always has some mood."<sup>11</sup> This dispositional immediacy is what we intend when we ask another, "How are you?" "The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself to-

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 77. (Henceforth *MIT*).

<sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 171 f.

<sup>10</sup> *MIT*, p. 77.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

wards something."<sup>12</sup> It is this mode of immediacy that is objectified in the second mediation of immediacy by meaning, that which occurs in psychotherapy. What is insufficiently acknowledged by Heidegger,<sup>13</sup> hinted at by Lonergan, and trumpeted by Jung, is that this dispositionally qualified immediacy is always imaginally constructed, symbolically constituted. In every case it has an archetypal significance. But this imaginal constitution is not accessible to conscious intentionality in the same way as is the disposition itself. The symbolic constitution of immediacy must be disengaged by such psychotherapeutic techniques as dream interpretation and what Jung calls "active imagination." It is "unconscious," i. e., undifferentiated. But when disengaged it reveals how it stands between the attitude of waking consciousness and the totality of subjectivity. This disengagement is effected by the release of the transcendent function, by psychic conversion.<sup>14</sup> The dynamic structure of the transformation of *Befindlichkeit* issuing from this release must be integrated into the epochal movement of consciousness effected in Lonergan's objectification of the structure of human intentionality. Its implications for theological method must be stated. Furthermore, its complementary function with respect to the objectification of intentionality will allow for the construction of a model of self-appropriation as a mediation of both the intentional and psychic dimensions of human interiority. Self-appropriation heads toward a second immediacy, which is always only asymptotically approached. It consists of three stages: intentional self-appropriation as articulated by Lonergan; psychic self-appropriation through the release of the

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>13</sup> What the Jungian analyst, Marie-Louise von Franz, says of the existentialists is also true of Heidegger: "They go only as far as stripping off the illusions of consciousness: They go right up to the door of the unconscious and then fail to open it." "The Process of Individuation," in C. G. Jung, ed., *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Dell Paperback, 1964), p. 164.

<sup>14</sup> C. G. Jung, "The Transcendent Function," in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Vol. 8: *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, tr. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XX, 1969), pp. 67-91.

transcendent function, facilitating the sublation of intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral subjectivity; and religious self-appropriation and self-surrender of both discriminated intentionality and cultivated psyche to the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* in the sublation of both intellectual and moral self-consciousness by religious subjectivity.<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps the complementary function of this model with respect to Lonergan's may be illustrated by commenting on the following statement:

I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare.<sup>16</sup>

Surely there is no dispute that the three conversions are quite different events. Nor need there be any argument with Lonergan's preferred order of exposition of these events. But there are very serious difficulties, I believe, with the overtones of the assertion that, in the general case, intellectual conversion is the last and the rarest of the conversions; that, in the general case, the intellectually converted subject is the fully converted subject.

<sup>15</sup> Lonergan establishes this relation of sublation among the three conversions which qualify authentic subjectivity in his thought. I agree with this order, but suggest that psychic conversion is an enabling factor, perhaps even a necessary aid to the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious conversion. Without the release of the transcendent function, the sublation may be forever blocked by

... the conscious impotence of rage  
at human folly, and the laceration  
of laughter at what ceases to amuse (T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding")

which may only become more acute and even chronic as a result of the ascent of the mountain of the understanding of understanding. The intrinsic finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic, and thus demands the second mediation of immediacy as constitutive of self-appropriation at the level of existential subjectivity.

<sup>16</sup> "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in *Foundations of Theology*, ed. P. McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 221 f.

The assertion is modified considerably, though, by a further statement of the relations of sublation obtaining among the three conversions in a single consciousness. For the sublations occur in a reverse order. And sublation is understood, not in a Hegelian fashion with its intrinsic element of negativity, but along the lines suggested by Karl Rahner. "What sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."<sup>17</sup> On Lonergan's account, then, intellectual conversion is, in the general case, sublated by a moral conversion which has preceded it in the order of occurrence and to this extent is pre-critical; and both intellectual and moral conversion are sublated by a religious conversion which has preceded them and is also to this extent pre-critical.

But if religious conversion and moral conversion precede intellectual conversion, it would seem that, no matter how genuinely religious and authentically moral, they are infected with the cognitional myth that the real is a subdivision of what is known by extroverted looking. More precisely, pre-critical religious and moral conversion affect a consciousness which, from the standpoint of the cognitive function of meaning, is either undifferentiated or has achieved at best a theoretical differentiation. But beyond the common sense and theoretical differentiations of consciousness there is the exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority, the satisfaction of which is initiated by the elimination of cognitional myth which occurs in intellectual conversion. Lonergan's account would seem to imply, then, that a consciousness in the process of fidelity to this critical and methodological exigence is then sublated by a moral and religious consciousness that is at best, from a cognitive standpoint, theoretically differentiated. Can the sub-

<sup>17</sup> MIT, p. 241.

lating then include the sublated, preserve all its proper features and properties, and carry them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context? Is it not rather the case that the exigence to differentiation in terms of interiority results in part from the existential inadequacy of pre-critical moral and religious conversion at a certain level of intellectual development, no matter how genuinely moral and religious these may be? What is there to guarantee that anything more survives the elimination of cognitional myth than a wan smile at one's former religious and moral naiveté? Intellectual conversion, it seems, is such a radical transformation of horizon, such an about-face, such a repudiation of characteristic features of the old, the beginning of such a new sequence, that it cannot be sublated by the old, but, if it is to be sublated at all, demands the satisfaction of a further exigence, the extension of the gains of intellectual conversion into the moral and religious domains. The sublating moral and religious consciousness must be not merely converted consciousness, but self-appropriating consciousness: existential subjectivity in the realm of differentiated interiority, and religious subjectivity in the realm of the discernment of spirits, the realm of differentiated transcendence. Neither moral nor religious conversion is identical with self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness. But a moral and religious consciousness that can sublating intellectual conversion must be a morally and religiously self-appropriating consciousness. It may well be that

... the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.<sup>18</sup>

But then the end of all our exploring will not be intellectual conversion alone, but a mediated return to immediacy through the satisfaction of a further exigence to a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, a mediation which facilitates the self-appropriation of moral and religious consciousness and the sub-

<sup>18</sup> T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding."

lation of the cognitional subject by the existential and religious subject.

There are five clues provided in *Method in Theology* which I shall use to help me discuss the experience of this sublating moral and religious consciousness and the nature of its coming to pass. The clues are:

(1) there is a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, which occurs not when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method, but when one negotiates one's feelings in psychotherapy;

(2) feelings are the locus for the apprehension of values which mediates between judgments of fact and judgments of value;

(3) feelings are in a reciprocal relationship of evocation to symbols;

(4) the unified affectivity or wholeness of the converted religious subject is the fulfilment of the dynamism of conscious intentionality; and

(5) with the advance in the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning, the spontaneous reference of religious experience shifts from the exterior, spatial, specific, and human to the interior, temporal, generic, and transcendent.

The relating of these clues with Jungian psychotherapeutic insights will form the web of an argument, then, that the finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic, and thus that this exigence intends a second immediacy, an informed naiveté, the transformation of intentionality into kerygma, the deliverance of critically self-appropriating subjectivity into a condition where "I leave off all demands and listen."<sup>19</sup>

## II. THE THERAPEUTIC FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION

Intellectual conversion is not the end of all our exploring, but the beginning of an answer to a therapeutic exigence.

<sup>19</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, trans. by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale, 1970), pp. 406, 551. For a rudimentary suggestion of an attempt to relate Ricoeur's project to Lonergan's, see my article, "Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning," *Anglican Theological Review*, October, 1973, pp. 443-453.

We need not discuss in detail the nature of intellectual conversion. In its full sweep it is the mediation of immediacy which occurs when one answers correctly and in order the questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do that? The answer to the first question reveals the dynamic structure, promoted by questioning, of human cognitional process. The answer to the second question reveals that this process terminates in an affirmation of the real. What I know when I faithfully pursue the process is what I intended to know when I began it: what is, being, the real. The answer to the third question reveals the structure of the real. Concomitant with answering these questions is the elimination of the cognitional myth that the real is a subdivision of the already out there now and that it is to be known by looking.

There is a distinctively therapeutic function to this event. Not only is it a radical transformation of the subject in his subjectivity, but it is a movement toward an expanded or heightened self-knowledge precisely at a moment when such an increment is demanded because of the inadequacy of the subject's previous conscious orientation as an understanding Being-in-the-world. It is a knowing of what had previously been unknown, of the dynamic structure-in-process of the subject's cognitional activity. It is a self-conscious appropriation of what had previously been unappropriated and inarticulate, "unconscious."<sup>20</sup> The exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority has a cognitive dimension, located in the incommensurability

<sup>20</sup> The term, "the unconscious," is ambiguous. Sometimes it means "the psyche" and sometimes "the unknown." Jung seems to have consistently overlooked the fact that consciousness and knowledge are not the same thing. That he was kept from this insight by language—the German language and *Bewusstsein* in particular—at least partially excuses him, if not his English translators. Both Freudians and Jungians would aid their cause by clarifying the term, the unconscious, and at times choosing the appropriate substitute. Jungians could also rename "the collective unconscious" as "the archetypal function." This suggestion is not offered simply to please Wittgensteinians—as if anything could—but to correct a potential error of consequence for the dialogue of philosophy and depth psychology.

of theoretically differentiated consciousness and the undifferentiated consciousness of common sense. But the answers to the critical questions also help to thematize an event of archetypal significance in human history; namely, the heroic severing of the umbilical cord to maternal imagination which resulted in the theoretic control of meaning, the emergence of *logos* from *mythos* on the part of the western mind. This archetypally significant event is repeated in the ontogenetic development of the contemporary conscious subject who achieves a theoretic differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning. The answers to the critical questions tell us what we have done in insisting on *logos* in preference to *mythos* and on science in addition to common sense. They render consciousness present to itself in its heroic achievement, by thematizing that achievement which some two thousand years have brought to maturity.

That the raising and answering of these questions, however, is a matter of personal decision, that interiorly differentiated cognitional consciousness is never something one simply happens upon and always something one must decisively pursue, indicates, I believe, that the psychic demand met by heeding the invitation of *Insight* reflects a profound *moral* crisis. Intellectual conversion may be viewed, then, also as an answer to an ethical question, a question perhaps previously unnecessary, one not found in man's historical memory, a new ethical question which man never raised before because he never had to raise it, a moral question unique to a consciousness which has brought to some kind of conclusion the demands of the theoretic or systematic exigence. The questions promoting intellectual conversion are not raised out of mere curiosity, but because of a rift in subjectivity, which, if left unattended, will bring catastrophe to the individual, to the scientific community, to the economy, to the polity, to the nations, to the world. It is the rift manifested cognitively in the split between theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense, but also experienced psychically as the lonely isolation of heroic consciousness from all that has nurtured it, as the self-chosen separation of

the knower from the primal parental ground of his being, as the alienation of the light from the darkness without which it would not be light, even as the guilt of Orestes or Prometheus, whose stories were told at the beginning of the heroic venture of western mind. What Lonergan has captured in his articulation of intellectual conversion is, in part, a cognitional thematizing of the psychically necessary victory of the knower over the uroboric dragon of myth, of the desire to know over the desire not to know, of the intention of being over the flight from understanding. This thematization is a help toward healing the rift in subjectivity which threatens civilization with utter destruction. It is a rendering known of the previously undifferentiated structure of a differentiation which itself had already occurred.

But it is only a beginning. In large part it articulates what we have already done, clarifies what has happened, thematizes what has occurred. But it does not heal the rift in subjectivity. The knower remains isolated, cut off from his roots in the rhythms and processes of nature, separated from his psychic ground, alienated from the original darkness which nourished him at the same time as it threatened to smother him, guilty over the primal murder of an ambiguously life-giving power. The difference is that he now knows what he has done, for to know what I am doing when I am knowing is also to know what the knower has done in overcoming the gods and claiming a rightful autonomy. But it is not to know the way toward wholeness, which can only come from a conscious reconciliation with the darkness; in fact, the knowledge of knowledge may even be the suspicion that all such reconciliation with the darkness is purely and simply regression, a cancelling of the victory of the knower, a repudiation of a bitterly won autonomy. Yet, we must ask, was not the cognitively manifested exigence for such reconciliation what gave rise to the questions leading to intellectual conversion? And is there not a second mediation of immediacy by meaning which might complement this first one? Being and knowing are isomorphic, says the self-affirming

knower. If so, is it not possible that the discovery of the imaginal roots out of which the powers of intelligent grasping and reasonable affirmation have violently wrested their birthright might disclose a sphere of being which itself can not only be encountered again—for merely to re-encounter it is the romantic agony—but intelligently grasped, reasonably affirmed, and delicately negotiated? Might the hero not revisit the realm of the Mothers without regression and self-destruction? Faustian, you say. Perhaps, but not necessarily so. Much, indeed all, depends on the nature of the pact agreed on before the descent, and on the character of its signers. If religious conversion has preceded intellectual conversion, the descent need not be Faustian. Faust's is not the only kenosis buried in the memory of man.

### III. THE PSYCHE AND AN ETHIC OF WHOLENESS

Central to the work of C. G. Jung is the tenacious insistence that every answer to the question of the meaning of human life must be uniquely individual if it is to have any final significance. Any answer to the question in terms of collective identifications is a failure to understand the question itself. The central notion of Jungian thought is the notion of individuation as an ongoing process of self-discrimination and self-differentiation from everything collective, external and internal. Nonetheless, any facile charge of individualism, solipsism, sheer relativism or subjectivism levelled against Jung would miss the point. There are operative in Jung's thought certain directives for the process of individuation which might be called both heuristic and transcendental. The discovery of individual meaning universally depends on their employment. These directives, phrased in a language influenced by my own attempts at restatement of Jungian psychology,<sup>21</sup> are:

(1) conscious intentionality is always in a process of commerce with an available fund of symbolic meanings constitu-

<sup>21</sup> Robert M. Doran, *Subject and Psyche: A Study in the Foundations of Theology* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975).

tive of its dispositional immediacy; this fund is constituted by both personal and archetypal factors;

(2) conscious intentionality must attend to this source out of which it continually emerges anew;

(3) it must also negotiate its demands intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly;

(4) thereby the whole of subjectivity will be afforded an optimum degree of life and development, as the subject continues on the journey to individuation.

The Jungian understanding of the moral crisis of the rift in subjectivity is detailed in two books by Erich Neumann: *The Origins and History of Consciousness* and *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*. Throughout the following exposition of Neumann's position, which Jung affirms in forewords to both books, it should be kept in mind that the incommensurability of theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense is the cognitive manifestation of the rift in subjectivity which Neumann understands in terms of a specifically psychic rift.

The theme of *The Origins and History of Consciousness* is that psychic ontogenesis is a modified recapitulation of the phylogenetic development of human consciousness. Thus:

... the early history of the collective is determined by inner primordial images whose projections appear outside as powerful factors—gods, spirits, or demons—which become objects of worship. On the other hand, man's collective symbolisms also appear in the individual, and the psychic development, or misdevelopment, of each individual is governed by the same primordial images which determine man's collective history. . . . Only by viewing the collective stratification of human development together with the individual stratification of conscious development can we arrive at an understanding of psychic development in general, and individual development in particular.<sup>22</sup>

Thus the history both of mankind and of the individual is governed by certain "symbols, ideal forms, psychic categories,

<sup>22</sup> Erich Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XLII, 1971), pp. xxf.

and basic structural patterns"<sup>23</sup> which Jung has called archetypes and which operate according to "infinitely varied modes."<sup>24</sup> The history even of western philosophy and science represents a series of cognitive manifestations of these archetypal patterns, which are the ground of all meaning.

The first part of Neumann's study describes the mythic projections of these archetypal patterns. Then he goes on to argue for the psychic ontogenetic recapitulation of these symbolic patterns in the consciousness of the individual. Mythic projections reflect developmental changes in the relation between the ego—the center of the field of differentiated consciousness—and the realm of the unknown and undifferentiated archetypal base out of which differentiated consciousness arises.

Just as unconscious contents like dreams and fantasies tell us something about the psychic situation of the dreamer, so myths throw light on the human stage from which they originate and typify man's unconscious situation at that stage. In neither case is there any conscious knowledge of the situation projected, either in the conscious mind of the dreamer or in that of the mythmaker.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, the various archetypal stages of the relation between the ego and its collective psychic base form elements of the subjective development of modern man. "The constitutive character of these stages unfolds in the historical sequence of individual development, but it is very probable that the individual's psychic structure is itself built up on the historical sequence of human development as a whole."<sup>26</sup> That the same stages occurred at different periods in different cultures reflects their archetypal structure rooted in a common and universal psychic substructure identical in all human beings.

The developmental process begins with an original undifferentiated unity which gives way first to a separation of ego from base—the hero myth—and in these latter days of western civilization to a very dangerous split, a rift in subjectivity. After the separation, the ego consolidates and defends its newly

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264.

won position, strengthens its stability, becomes conscious of its differences and peculiarities, and increases its energy. Phylogenetically, such a consolidation is represented cognitively, I believe, by the theoretic or systematic differentiation of consciousness in western philosophy and science. The ego even succeeds in harnessing for its own interests some of the originally destructive power of the unconscious so that the world continuum is broken down into objects which can be first symbolized, then conceptualized, and finally rearranged. Thus there emerges "the relative autonomy of the ego, of the higher spiritual man who has a will of his own and obeys his reason,"<sup>27</sup> and with this, I submit, a gradual unthematized discrimination of the cognitive, constitutive, effective, and communicative functions of meaning. The end of this development is the capacity "to form abstract concepts and to adopt a consistent view of the world"<sup>28</sup>—that is, the satisfaction of the theoretic or systematic exigence. Physiologically, Neumann posits, the process involves the supersession of the medullary man by the cortical man, involving a "continuous deflation of the unconscious and the exhaustion of emotional components" linked with the sympathetic nervous system.<sup>29</sup>

My present interest is in Neumann's analysis of the cultural disease to which this altogether necessary separation of psychic systems has brought us. For the division of the two systems has become perverse. The perversion is manifested in two directions: a sclerosis of the ego, in which the autonomy of the conscious system has become so predominant as to lose the link to the archetypal base, and in which the ego has lost the striving for the wholeness of subjectivity; and a possession of the creative activity of the ego by "the spirit," resulting in the illimitable expansion of the ego, the megalomania, the overexpansion of the conscious system, the spiritual inflation of Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The first direction is the more common.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 328.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

Here, spirit is identified with instrumental intellect, consciousness with manipulative thinking. Feeling, the body, the instinctual, are suppressed or, more tragically, repressed. Consciousness is sterilized and creativity doomed to frustration in a culture whose institutional structures have become autonomous from the human needs they were originally constituted to meet. The transpersonal is reduced to mere illusion, to personalistic ego data; archetypes become concepts, symbols signs. Not only is ego life emptied of meaning, but the deeper layers of the psyche are activated in a destructive way so as to "devastate the autocratic world of the ego with transpersonal invasions, collective epidemics, and mass psychoses."<sup>30</sup> The affective collapse of the archetypal canon is coincident with the modern decay of values. The alternative courses open to the individual seem to be either regression to the Great Mother through external or internal recollectivization, or isolation in the form of exaggerated individualism. The contemporary relevance of Neumann's analysis for the American way of life is all too obvious in the light of our recent and still too gradual awareness of the real character of our political life.

Following the collapse of the archetypal canon, single archetypes take possession of men and consume them like malevolent demons. Typical and symptomatic of this transitional phenomenon is the state of affairs in America, though the same holds good for practically the whole Western hemisphere. Every conceivable sort of dominant rules the personality, which is a personality only in name. The grotesque fact that murderers, brigands, gangsters, thieves, forgers, tyrants, and swindlers, in a guise that deceives nobody, have seized control of collective life is characteristic of our time. Their unscrupulousness and double-dealing are recognized—and admired. Their ruthless energy they obtain at best from some archetypal content that has got them in its power. The dynamism of a possessed personality is accordingly very great, because, in its one-track primitivity, it suffers from none of the differentiations that make men human. Worship of the "beast" is by no means confined to Germany; it prevails wherever one-sidedness, push, and moral blindness are applauded, i. e., where-

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 389.

ever the aggravating complexities of civilized behavior are swept away in favor of bestial rapacity. One has only to look at the educative ideals now current in the West.<sup>81</sup>

The ethical consequences of this situation as they affect the individual in his relation to the collective are detailed in *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*. Neumann argues strongly and well that the wholeness of subjectivity, conceived as the consequence of healing the rift described above, is the ethical goal upon which the fate of humanity depends.

The turning of the mind from the conscious to the unconscious, the possible *rapprochement* of human consciousness with the powers of the collective psyche, that is the task of the future. No outward tinkering with the world and no social amelioration can give the quietus to the daemon, to the gods or devils of the human soul, or prevent them from tearing down again and again what consciousness has built. Unless they are assigned their place in consciousness and culture they will never leave mankind in peace. But the preparation for the *rapprochement* lies, as always, with the hero, the individual; he and his transformation are the great human prototypes; he is the testing ground of the collective, just as consciousness is the testing ground of the unconscious.<sup>82</sup>

The categorial and ontic ethic which accompanied the separation of the psychic systems has disintegrated and is now dead. It is an ethic which "liberated man from his primary condition of unconsciousness and made the individual the bearer of the drive towards consciousness."<sup>83</sup> To this extent it was not only psychically necessary but constructive. The initial phases of the development of an autonomous ego must be sustained by the demands of the collective and its sanctions, by its juridical structures and dogmas, its imperatives and prohibitions, even its suppressions and attendant sufferings. But soon enough identification with the ethical values of the collective leads to the formation of a façade personality, the *persona*, and to re-

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 391.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 394.

<sup>83</sup> Erich Neumann, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, trans. by Eugene Rolfe, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1969), p. 63.

pression of everything dark, strange, unfamiliar, and un-lived, the *shadow*. The ego is cumulatively identified with the façade and the shadow is projected upon various scapegoats. In our time, the distance between the two systems has become so wide that even the pseudo-solution of conscious identification with the collective ethic is subtly but publicly acknowledged as impossible. Thus Neumann can claim: "Almost without exception, the psychic development of modern man begins with the moral problem and with his own reorientation, which is brought about by means of the assimilation of the shadow and the transformation of the persona."<sup>84</sup> As the dark and unfamiliar, the "inferior function," is granted freedom and a share in the life of the ego, identification of the ego-persona with collective value orientation ceases. "The individual is driven by his personal crisis into deep waters where he would usually never have entered if left to his own free will. The old idealized image of the ego has to go, and its place is taken by a perilous insight into the ambiguity and many-sidedness of one's own nature."<sup>85</sup> Only the total personality is accepted as the basis of ethical conduct. No longer is St. Augustine's prayer of gratitude to God possible that he is not responsible for his dreams.<sup>86</sup>

Neumann proposes, then, the foundations of a new ethic whose aim is "the achievement of wholeness, of the totality of the personality." He continues:

In this wholeness, the inherent contrast between the two systems of the conscious mind and the unconscious does not fall apart into a condition of splitness, and the purposive directedness of ego-consciousness is not undermined by the opposite tendencies of unconscious contents of which the ego and the conscious mind are entirely unaware. In the new ethical situation, ego-consciousness becomes the locus of responsibility for a psychological League of Nations, to which various groups of states belong, primitive and prehuman as well as differentiated and modern, and in which atheistic and religious, instinctive and spiritual, destructive and constructive ele-

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

ments are represented in varying degrees and coexist with each other.<sup>37</sup>

Theoretical—I interpret: categorial or ontic, as opposed to transcendental-heuristic or ontological—prescriptions for ethical conduct are declared impossible,<sup>38</sup> since it is “impossible to predict the psychological form in which evil will appear in the life story of any given individual.”<sup>39</sup> Working through and negotiating our own individual darkness in an independent and responsible manner—becoming more fully conscious, in Jungian terms—now ranks as an ethical duty, implying that ego-consciousness is regarded as “an authority to create and control the relationship to wholeness of everything psychic.”<sup>40</sup> Psychic wholeness takes the place of sublimation. The latter is always “purchased at the cost of the contagious miasma which arises out of the repression and suppression of the unconscious elements which are not susceptible to sublimation.”<sup>41</sup> Sublimation thus contributes to a “holiness” which is nothing other than a flight from life. The heart of the ethical implications of the Jungian myth are contained in the following formulation of principles of value:

Whatever leads to wholeness is “good”; whatever leads to splitting is “evil.” Integration is good, disintegration is evil. Life, constructive tendencies and integration are on the side of good; death, splitting and disintegration are on the side of evil. . . . Our estimate of ethical values is no longer concerned with contents, qualities or actions considered as “entities”; it is related functionally to the whole. Whatever helps that wholeness which is centred on the Self towards integration is “good,” irrespective of the nature of this helping factor. And, vice versa, whatever leads to disintegration is “evil”—even if it is “good will,” “collectively sanctioned values” or anything else “intrinsically good.”<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 107 f.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120 f.

In my lengthier study of the theologically foundational role of psychic self-appropriation,<sup>43</sup> I have argued that it is precisely at this point that the Jungian myth collapses. Neumann's (and Jung's) campaign against the collective ethic is strikingly reminiscent of St. Paul's difficulties with the Law. But the outcome is in each instance just as strikingly different. It is worthy of note that, as Jung's thinking advanced, he came more to view the individuation process on the analogy of alchemy.<sup>44</sup> The latter is even viewed, perhaps quite correctly, as a mistaken projection onto matter of a striving for the *aurum non vulgi* of psychic wholeness. What Jung and, to my knowledge, all commentators on Jungian psychology, have missed, however, is that alchemy must be considered as one of the most remarkable failures in the history of human inquiry, a sustained insistence on asking the wrong question. And the question is wrong, not only in its projected form, but in its very origins, if indeed its origins lie where Jung placed them. The self-achievement of a differentiated wholeness, while it may be the deepest desire of the human heart, is also a useless passion, completely beyond the capacity of human endeavor to achieve. The bitterness of Jung's *Answer to Job* is expressive of this very frustration. This is a very interesting book on Wotan, but Jung called him Yahweh.

This is not at all to deny that one must take seriously to heart everything prescribed by Neumann except his fundamental ethical principle. We have indeed entered a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness. It is an epoch marked by a new control of meaning in terms of interiority. It is ethically imperative on a world-historical scale that ego-consciousness engage in a conscious confrontation with the forces of darkness buried in the human psyche, come to terms with these forces in truthful acknowledgment, and cooperate in their transformation through acceptance and negotiation. But at this

<sup>43</sup> Doran, *Subject and Psyche*, *passim*.

<sup>44</sup> Jung's alchemical researches are reported in Vols. 12, 13, and 14 of his *Collected Works*.

point Lonergan's transcendental analysis of moral conversion becomes equally imperative. For it is only at the summit of moral self-transcendence in the love of God that wholeness becomes something of a possibility for man. There alone, "values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates," because there alone "affectivity is of a single piece."<sup>45</sup> The problems raised by Neumann, moreover, bring to light an element that is unfortunately all but missing in Lonergan's analysis of this summit: the experience of the forgiveness of sin. Only this experience, issuing from the realm of transcendence, is enough to render possible the embracing of the darkness called for by Neumann as ethically imperative for our age. The darkness has already been embraced in a kenosis quite different from Faust's, and in that divine embrace has been rendered powerless. Its very spontaneous tendency to separate man from the love of God has been transformed into a beneficent factor by the healing embrace of that love. Thus it is not only the hero's descent into the psychic depths that can save the world from suicide, but also the restoration in our troubled times of the genuine contemplative spirit.

#### IV. RELIGIOUS SELF-APPROPRIATION AND THE PSYCHE

Lonergan employs various phrases, some borrowed from other authors, to describe religious conversion. With Paul Tillich, he speaks of "being grasped by ultimate concern."<sup>46</sup> With St. Paul, he speaks of God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.<sup>47</sup> In terms of the theoretical stage of meaning represented by Aquinas, religious conversion is operative grace as distinct from cooperative grace.

<sup>45</sup> Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 39. Lonergan has thus introduced an important and necessary qualification to an ethic of wholeness: wholeness is related to the realm of transcendence, not to that of interiority. It is a gift of God's grace, and in a Christian context is conditioned by the experience of the forgiveness of sin. The absence of this distinction is what traps Jungian analysis in an endless treadmill of self-scrutiny leading only to a perpetually recurring psychic stillbirth.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

But these theoretic categories are also reinterpreted in scriptural imagery. "Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom."<sup>48</sup> In Lonergan's own terminology, suited more to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority becomes the ground of theory, religious conversion is "otherworldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations."<sup>49</sup> As such it is "being in love with God," which is "the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the Kingdom of God on this earth."<sup>50</sup>

The experience of this love is that of "being in love in an unrestricted fashion" and as such is the proper fulfilment of the capacity for self-transcendence revealed in our unrestricted questioning. But it is not the product of our knowledge and choice. "On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing."<sup>51</sup> As conscious but not known, the experience of this love is an experience of mystery, of the holy. It belongs to the level of consciousness where deliberation, judgment of value, decision, and free and responsible activity take place. "But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the *apex animae*."<sup>52</sup>

For Lonergan, there is a twofold expression of religious conversion. Spontaneously it is manifested in changed attitudes, for which Galatians 5.22 f. provides a descriptive enumeration: "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control." But another kind of expression is directly concerned with the base and focus of this experience, the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* itself. There is an enormous variation to be discovered in the investigation of such expression and Lonergan correlates this variety with the predominant stages of meaning operative in self-understanding and in the spontaneously assumed stance toward reality—i. e., with the manner in which one's world is mediated by meaning. He constructs a series of stages of meaning based on a cumulative differentiation of consciousness. In the western tradition there have been three such stages of meaning, and they can be ontogenetically reproduced in the life-history of a contemporary individual.

The first stage of meaning is governed by a common sense differentiation of consciousness. The second is familiar also with theory, system, logic, and science, but is troubled because the difference of this from common sense is not adequately grasped. The third stage is prepared by all those modern philosophies governed by the turn to the subject, which thus take their stand on human interiority. Here consciousness becomes differentiated into the various realms of meaning—common sense, theory, interiority, transcendence, scholarship, and art—and these realms are consciously related to one another. One

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107. With the needed emphasis on the forgiveness of sin, the love of God may also be qualified as taking over the *depths* of the soul.

consciously moves from one to the other by consciously changing his procedures.

In all three stages, meaning fulfills four functions. First, it is cognitive in that it mediates the real world in which we live out our lives. Secondly, it is efficient in that it governs our intention of what we do. Thirdly, it is constitutive in that it is an intrinsic component of culture and institutions. And fourthly, it is communicative in that, through its various carriers—spontaneous intersubjectivity, art, symbol, language, and incarnation in the lives and deeds of persons—individual meaning becomes common meaning, and, through the transmission of training and education, generates history.

In the first stage, these functions are not clearly recognized and accurately differentiated. So the blend of the cognitive and constitutive functions, for example, brings about the constitution not only of cultures and institutions but also the story of the world's origins in myth. And just as the constitutive function of meaning pretends to speculative capacities beyond its range, so the efficient function of meaning pretends to practical powers which a more differentiated consciousness denominates as magic. Religious expression at this stage is a result of the projective association or identification of religious experience with its outward occasion. The focus of such expression is on what we, by hindsight, would call *the external, the spatial, the specific, and the human*, as contrasted with *the internal, the temporal, the generic, and the divine*. What is indeed temporal, generic, internal, and in the realm of transcendence is identified as spatial, specific, external, and occurring in a realm other than that of transcendence. Thus there result the gods of the moment, the god of this or that place, of this or that person, of Abraham or Laban, of this or that group, of the Canaanites, the Philistines, the Israelites.

The key to the movement from the first stage of meaning to the second is located in the differentiation of the functions of meaning. The advance of technique will enable the association of the efficient function with *poiesis* and *praxis* and reveal

the inefficacy of magic. But more far-reaching in its implications is the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning from the other three functions. As the key to the religious expression of undifferentiated consciousness lies in insight into sensible presentations and representations, so the limitations of such consciousness to the spatial, the specific, the external, and the human will recede to the extent that the sensible presentations and representations are linguistic.<sup>53</sup> This does not mean, however, that a self-conscious transposition to interiority, time, the generic, and the divine occurs. Rather we have a movement away from all immediacy in favor of objectification: The return to immediacy in terms of interiority, time, the generic, and the divine must await the emergence of the third stage of meaning.

The second stage of meaning, then, is characterized by a twofold mediation of the world by meaning: in the realm of common sense and in that of theory. The split is troubling. It was interpreted by Plato in such a way that there seem to be two really distinct worlds, the transcendent world of eternal Forms and the transient world of appearance. In Aristotle, it led to the distinction, not between theory and common sense, but between necessity and contingency. The basic concepts of genuine—i. e., universal and necessary—science were metaphysical, and so the sciences were conceived as continuous with philosophy.

The introduction of the theoretical capacity into religious living is represented in the dogmas, theology, and juridical structures of Western religion. But just as the two tables of Eddington—“the bulky, solid, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless ‘wavicles’ so minute that the desk was mostly empty space”<sup>54</sup>—reveal the presence of a conflict between common sense and science, so in the realm of religion, “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is set against the God of the philosophers and theologians. Honoring the Trinity and feeling compunction are set against learned

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

discourse on the Trinity and against defining compunction. Nor can this contrast be understood or the tension removed within the realms of common sense and of theory.”<sup>55</sup> And so, religiously as well as scientifically, there is demanded a movement to a third stage of meaning, the stage of the differentiation of consciousness through the appropriation of human interiority.

The sciences then come to be regarded, not as prolongations of philosophy, but as autonomous, ongoing processes; not as the demonstration of universal and necessary truths but as hypothetical and ever better approximations to truth through an ever more exact and comprehensive understanding of data. Philosophy is no longer a theory in the manner of science but the self-appropriation of intentional consciousness and the consequent distinguishing, relating, and grounding of the various realms of meaning, the grounding of the methods of the sciences, and the ongoing promotion of their unity. Theology then becomes, in ever larger part, an understanding of the diversity of religious utterance on the basis of the differentiation and interrelation of the realms of common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.

The third stage of meaning, then, is the stage of the appropriation of human interiority. The cognitive dimensions of the exigence for this appropriation have been more than satisfactorily treated by Lonergan. The result of the cognitive step in this process is intellectual conversion. I have begun to suggest what the moral dimensions would entail. That the self-appropriation of the existential subject is something quite other than that of the cognitional subject is not at all obvious from *Insight*, but the work of Lonergan from 1965 to the present reveals a notable development in this regard, one perhaps best capsulized in “*Insight Revisited*.”

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for de-

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

liberation, Is this worth while? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.<sup>66</sup>

Not only, then, is there a fourth level of intentional consciousness quite distinct from the first three, but the primordial entry of the subject onto this fourth level is affective, "the intentional response of feelings to values." Furthermore, affective response for Lonergan is symbolically certifiable, in that a symbol is "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."<sup>67</sup> Thus moral self-appropriation will be to a large extent the negotiation of the symbols interlocked with one's affective responses to values. It will be psychic self-appropriation. Neumann discusses the moral dimensions of this movement, while sharing in the Jungian failure to differentiate wholeness as human achievement from wholeness as God's gift. At the point in psychic self-appropriation where the issue becomes one of good and evil, the movement of appropriation shifts from the realm of interiority to the realm of transcendence, where God is known and loved. The initial move into psychic self-appropriation at the religious level, when the direction is as here indicated, occurs in the experience of the forgiveness of one's sins, the only genuine—in fact, the only possible—*complexio oppositorum* of good and evil. This experience is of wholeness, of the affective integrity of subjectivity. With this experience, religious conversion can begin to sublimate moral and intellectual conversion in the movement of self-appropriation, i. e., at the third stage of meaning.

It is not only religious expression, but religious experience itself, which is affected by the movement into the third stage of

<sup>66</sup> Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in Bernard Tyrrell and William Ryan, eds., *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), p. 277.

<sup>67</sup> MIT. p. 64.

meaning. Prior to this major breakthrough, one's religious living is pre-critical, and so will involve the projection characteristic of the first stage of meaning. It will be in terms of what interiorly differentiated consciousness, by hindsight, is able to denominate as spatial, specific, external, and human as opposed to what is temporal, generic, internal, and transcendent. To the extent that one's appropriation of interiority proceeds from intellectual conversion to self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the spontaneous reference of religious experience will be to what is temporal, generic, internal, and transcendent. It will proceed as discernment of spirits. Such discernment has the same archetypal manifestations in dreams and other symbolic productions as has any other expression of the evaluative capacity of the existential subject. That these expressions are not specifically acknowledged in Jungian phenomenologies of individuation is due to a deficiency in Jung's understanding of existential subjectivity and the conspiracy it can engage in with the psyche.

#### V. PSYCHIC CONVERSION AS FOUNDATIONAL

If in addition to the mediation of immediacy by meaning which occurs when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method, there is that which occurs when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy, then intentional self-appropriation must be complemented by psychic self-appropriation. As related to the question of the process and function of theology, this would mean that, whereas Lonergan has developed a method for theology based on the mediation of intentional consciousness, we must attempt to show the implications for theology of the psychic mediation. The principal implication will be a fourth conversion foundational for theology, psychic conversion, aiding the relations of sublation among the three conversions specified by Lonergan. Through the twofold mediation of immediacy theological reflection will be able to accept the possibilities which now, perhaps for the first time in its history, are available to

it. For in our age not only are we confronted with the relativity of conceptual schemes of all kinds, in every area, but also, precisely because of this seemingly very uncertain and ambivalent state of affairs, the individual is given "the (often desperate, yet maximally human) opportunity to interpret life and experiencing directly. The historical crossroads of such a time is: either the reimposition of certain set values and schemes, or a task never before attempted: to learn how, in a rational way, to relate concepts to direct experiencing; to investigate the way in which symbolizing affects and is affected by felt experiencing; to devise a social and scientific vocabulary that can interact with experiencing, so that communication about it becomes possible, so that schemes can be considered in relation to experiential meanings, and so that an objective science can be related to and guided by experiencing."<sup>58</sup> What Eugene Gendlin here envisions for "objective science" can also be the goal of theology. To envision a theology whose schemes are related to and guided by experiencing, however, does not, within the horizon provided by self-appropriation, rule out of court a theology whose concern is with "things as they are related to one another" in favor of a theology preoccupied with "things as they are related to us." Rather, basic terms and relations, as psychological, are also explanatory. Such is the ultimate significance of fidelity to the methodical exigence.

The present essay, then, reflects an ongoing project to complement the work of Lonergan; it initiates a further essay in aid of self-appropriation. For beyond the intellectual conversion which occurs in self-conscious fashion when one answers correctly and in order the questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do that?", there is the self-appropriation which begins when one attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly learns to negotiate the symbolic configurations of dispositional immediacy. This latter self-appropriation is effected by the emer-

<sup>58</sup> Eugene Gendlin, *Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning* (Toronto: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 4.

gence of the existential subject into a mediated symbolic consciousness, in which individual, cultural, and religious symbols are treated—in what Paul Ricoeur has lucidly displayed as their archeological-teleological unity-in-tension<sup>59</sup>—as *exploratory* of existential subjectivity and as referring to interiority, time, the generic, and the realm of transcendence rather than as *explanatory* or aetiological and as referring to exteriority, space, the specific, and the human. Psychic conversion is the recovery of imagination in its transcendental time-structure<sup>60</sup> through the psychotherapeutic elucidation of the symbols emerging spontaneously from one's psychic depths.

I share the conviction which led John Dunne to write *The Way of All the Earth*, the conviction that something like a new religion is coming into being.

Is a religion coming to birth in our time? It could be. What seems to be occurring is a phenomenon we might call "passing over," passing over from one culture to another, from one way of life to another, from one religion to another. Passing over is a shifting of standpoint, a going over to the standpoint of another culture, another way of life, another religion. It is followed by an equal and opposite process we might call "coming back," coming back with new insight to one's own culture, one's own way of life, one's own religion. The holy man of our time, it seems, is not a figure like Gotama or Jesus or Mohammed, a man who could found a world religion, but a figure like Gandhi, a man who passes over by sympathetic understanding from his own religion to other religions and comes back again with new insight to his own. Passing over and coming back, it seems, is the spiritual adventure of our time.<sup>61</sup>

The present essay reflects an effort to aid this adventure and the articulation of its truth. If theology is reflection on religion, then such articulation would be the theology appropriate to our age. Dunne says quite correctly, however, that the ultimate starting and ending point is really not one's own religion, but

<sup>59</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

<sup>61</sup> John S. Dunne, *The Way of All the Earth* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. ix.

one's life. At present I am attempting to highlight the contributions of depth psychology to the exploration of this homeland and the significance of these contributions for religious experience and for the reflection on this experience which is theology. The project here reported on is not only complementary to the work of Lonergan, however, but in some sense compensatory, in the same way as the psyche, as it manifests itself in dreams, is compensatory to the attitude of waking consciousness. "The relation between consciousness and unconscious is compensatory. This fact, which is easily verifiable, affords a rule for dream interpretation. It is always helpful, when we set out to interpret a dream, to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?"<sup>62</sup>

Waking consciousness, as it moves from directed attention through insight, judgment, and decision, has been the sharp focus of Lonergan's work. Since theology is a matter of knowledge and decision, such a focus has enabled him to articulate the structure of theological method. Since I accept without reservation Lonergan's account of "what I am doing when I am knowing" and his eightfold differentiation of theological operations, the work I envision is complementary to his. But since I wish to lay emphasis on a different but equally valid source of data—which can still be grouped under Lonergan's notion of data of consciousness, since they concern interiority—the work would be compensatory to his, just as feeling is compensatory to thinking as a psychological function or as dreams are compensatory to waking consciousness as a psychic state.

If the first step in interpreting a dream is to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?, and if the work I envision is to be understood as compensatory to Lonergan's in a sense analogous to the compensatory effect of dreams, then it is only proper to indicate what attitude or atmosphere this work would compensate.

Thus Dunne speaks of climbing a mountain in order to discover a vantage point, a fastness of autonomy. The most com-

<sup>62</sup> C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1933), p. 17.

plete autonomy comes, he says, from the knowledge, not of external things, but of knowledge itself.

A knowing of knowing would be like a view from a mountaintop. By knowing all about knowing itself one would know in some manner everything there is to know. It would be like seeing everything from a great height. One would see everything near and far, all the way to the horizon, but there would be some loss of detail on account of the distances. The knowing of knowing would mean being in possession of all the various methods of knowing. It would mean knowing how an artist thinks, putting a thing together; knowing how a scientist thinks, taking a thing apart; knowing how a practical man thinks, sizing up a situation; knowing how a man of understanding thinks, grasping the principle of a thing; knowing how a man of wisdom thinks, reflecting upon human experience.

... At the top of the mountain, as we have been describing it, there is a kind of madness—not the madness that consists in having lost one's reason. The knowing of knowing, to be sure, seems worthy of man. The only thing wrong is that man at the top of the mountain, by escaping from love and war, will have lost everything else. He will have withdrawn into that element of his nature which is most characteristic of him and sets him apart from other animals. It is the thing in him which is most human. Perhaps indeed he will never realize what it is to be human unless he does attempt this withdrawal. Even so, the realization that he has lost everything except his reason, that he has found pure humanity but not full humanity, changes his wisdom from a knowledge of knowledge into a knowledge of ignorance. He realizes that he has something yet to learn, something that he cannot learn at the top of the mountain but only at the bottom of the valley.<sup>63</sup>

Nobody familiar with Lonergan can read these words about the knowing of knowing without thinking immediately of one of the most daring claims any thinker has ever offered for his own work, true as it is: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."<sup>64</sup> Nonetheless, Lonergan is seeking

<sup>63</sup> John S. Dunne, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

<sup>64</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. xxviii.

greater *concreteness* on the side of the subject, in the domain of "the pulsing flow of life."<sup>65</sup> To the extent that his work aids this greater concreteness, one escapes the madness of having lost everything but one's reason. Nonetheless, there is much in the pulsing flow of life that enters into one's life without providing data for one's knowing of knowing. One may become aware of the dark yet potentially creative power at work in the valley and expend his efforts, perhaps first by means of a different kind of withdrawal—into a forest or desert, in imitation of Gotama or Jesus, rather than up to a mountaintop—at the negotiation and transformation of this dark power of nature so that it is creative of his own life. If he succeeds in this very risky adventure, it will be only because he will have undergone a profound conversion.

Conversion is the central theme in Lonergan's brilliant and, I believe, revolutionary recasting of the foundations of theology. And such it must be, for nobody who has gone to the top of the mountain can accept as the foundations of his knowledge anything exclusive of what happened to him there. He has achieved an intellectual autonomy as a result of which he will never be the same. But there is a different conversion that occurs in the valley or the forest or the desert. It is both complementary and compensatory to the conversion that takes place at the top of the mountain, to intellectual conversion. Nor is it the same as what Lonergan calls religious or moral conversion. I have called it psychic conversion. Its effect is a mediated symbolic consciousness, and its role in theological reflection is foundational as aiding the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious conversion. Psychic conversion surrounds the other three conversions in much the same way as the "unconscious," according to Jung, surrounds the light of conscious waking life. More precisely, it permeates these conversions in much the same way as psyche permeates intentionality or as dispositional immediacy is interlocked with cognitional immediacy. It provides one with an atmosphere or texture which qualifies one's experiences of knowing, of ethi-

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xix.

cal decision, and of prayer. This atmosphere is determined by the imaginal or symbolic constitution of the immediacy of one's mediated world. "The imaginal" is a genuine sphere of being, a realm whose contents can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.

The complementary aspect of psychic conversion with respect to intellectual conversion appears in its role as facilitator of the working unity of intellectual conversion with moral and religious conversion. Its compensatory aspect appears primarily in its function within a *second* mediation of immediacy by meaning, and thus in the disclosure it provides that the mediation of immediacy is twofold. Second immediacy can only be approached through the complementarity of the two mediations. Psychic conversion thus corrects what I believe to be a possible implicit intellectualist bias in Lonergan's thought, especially in *Insight*. According to this implicit bias, the intellectual pattern of experience would be the privileged pattern of experience. While the emergence of a fourth level of intentional consciousness and thus of a notion of the good as distinct from the intelligent and reasonable in *Method in Theology* implicitly corrects this bias, the explicit compensation comes from highlighting the psychic dimensions of this fourth level, the level of existential subjectivity.

When I refer with Dunne to a new religion coming into being in our age, what I am indicating is in part the convergence of insights from the various world religions in the life-story of many individuals who seek religious truth today. As Dunne has indicated, this search will probably be analogous to Gandhi's experiments with truth. The conversion I call psychic may provide one's criterion for evaluating these experiments and render the subject capable of reflecting on and articulating the truth he has discovered. It may enable him, in Dunne's phrase, to turn poetry into truth and truth into poetry. The latter poetry he may wish to include in his theology.

One may find that the further steps in self-appropriation reveal the need for a qualification of one's previous intellectual self-appropriation. While one will not revise the structure of

cognitive process which he has learned to articulate for himself through the work of Lonergan, he may be brought to revise his formulation of the notion of *experience* provided by Lonergan. The latter notion may be too thin, too bodiless. Having come back into the valley from Lonergan's mountaintop—or rather from his own mountaintop—he may re-experience, or re-cognize that he experiences, in a manner for which the atmosphere of the mountaintop was too rarefied.

This, however, may also lead to further specifications of the notion of theological method which he has learned from Lonergan. He will accept the basic dynamic and operational notion of method provided by Lonergan on the basis of the structure of intentionality and of the two phases of theology as mediating and mediated; but psychic conversion may influence his choice as to what qualifies as data for theology; the base from which he engages in hermeneutic and history; the horizon determining his view of, and influencing his decision about, the tensions of religious and theological dialectic; the bases from which he derives theological categories, positions, and system; and the way in which he regards the mission of religion in the world. The functional specialties will remain, their interrelationship being determined by the structure of intentional consciousness, but their nature may be modified as a result of one's exploration of the "objective psyche," the home of the imaginal, the transcendental imagination, *memoria*. The task of the philosopher or theologian educated by and indebted to Lonergan may now be to descend the mountain of cognitive self-appropriation so as attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly to appropriate and articulate the rich psychic bases of human experience. Such an appropriation and articulation will make possible the advent of that fully awake naiveté of the twice-born adult which Paul Ricoeur calls a second, post-critical immediacy.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 496.

## FAITH AND SILENCE IN PLATO'S *GORGIAS*

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AT THE CLIMAX of his dispute with Socrates over the nature of man Callicles refuses to go on answering Socrates's questions and stands silent while Socrates recapitulates and finishes the argument alone (*Gorgias*, 506c-509). Throughout the rest of the dialogue Callicles remains recalcitrant, breaking his silence only to sneer at Socrates or continue perfunctorily a conversation in which he has obviously little interest. At first glance Callicles's silence seems to represent the stubborn embarrassment of a man who knows he is defeated, but is refusing to admit it. He had maintained the profligate's thesis that the good for man is identical with states of pleasure but has been led by Socrates to admit the need for self-control guided by knowledge of the difference between good and evil pleasures and pains (499b). Now, with Callicles silent, and at the urging of Gorgias himself, Socrates goes on to complete the argument by supplying the ultimate standard by which men are to distinguish good from evil pleasures and pains—the wisdom which has guided his every word in his three conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles: "Wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by the principles of sharing, by friendship and order, by self-control and justice" (508). But clearly this conclusion goes beyond the premise Callicles has agreed to; Callicles could grant the need for self-control while logically refusing to place it at the service of friendship, the particular standard announced by Socrates: the tyrant too knows self-discipline. This insight that Callicles stands on firm ground in his silence can help to interpret this dramatic incident in Plato's *Gorgias*. By making a point of Callicles's silence during Socrates's declaration of his ultimate wisdom Plato provides, not a signal of