NAME PAPER THAT BECAME "PAUL RICOEUR: TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF MEANING" | NO D-30

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The philosopher Karl Jaspers recalls that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both prophecied the emergence of an age of infinite reflection, an age in which everything is interpretation and "anything can mean something else."[1] Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were able so to prophecy because they knew themselves as exceptions in their own day, as precursors of this age, as figurae or archetypes concretely anticipating what was to become the widespread experience of their race.

The theologian John Dunne has similarly dubbed our time the age of appropriation, an age in which any journey toward God must be traveled through and ultimately beyond the self.[2]

Philosophy for centuries has been gradually abandoning the study of the natural world around us to the physical and biological sciences only to find itself ever more immersed in the task of interpreting human interiority.[3] The human sciences, at the same time, have developed conflicting approaches and conclusions, some reductive, some holistic. It appears safe to say that, given a prolonged future for our race, we still stand at the very beginning of the process of accumulating knowledge and deepening our understanding of the inner resources, possibilities, and limits of man.

The almost universal influence of various critical techniques and our growing active familiarity with them has

radically affected the state of religious belief in Western society. Our growing capacity for distinguishing the various patterns of our experience and cognitional awareness has had various results. For some it has sharpened the dimension appropriate to religious faith and enabled them to relate religious experience to profane life precisely by being able to distinguish the two more clearly; for others, however, it has removed this dimension altogether and revealed religion as well as such other sediments of the past as conventional moralities and non-pluralistic approaches to knowledge to be culturally determined adolescent human traits now quickly to be disposed of in favor of more mature pursuits. Religious apologists now find themselves not explicating the presuppositions of faith in the terms of a commonly accepted philosophy, but rigorously laying bare the very possibility and pertinence of faith for an educated and sophisticated mind. And such a propadeutic cannot be defensive; that is, it cannot violently condemn the findings of reductive interpretations (e.g., Freddianism) which have too often demonstrated their explanatory value. Nor can it avoid the charge of obscurantism if it fails to face the questions posed by seemingly destructive systems of thought.

One believing man who has attempted to immerse himself in the contemporary intellectual scene and draw from it is the

French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. In this paper I will try to present the problematic which Ricoeur defines and to expose his treatment of our problems of interpretation and religious belief.

I. The Notion of Philosophy

Ricoeur approaches the contemporary intellectual and religious scene not as a theologian nor as a psychologist, but as a philosopher. His treatment of these matters figures as a part of a vast philosophical undertaking concerned with the task of delineating the essential structures of human existence and, more concretely, its limits and possibilities. Very roughly, we might say that the abstract, structural analysis is the work of the earlier sections in his projected three-volume study of the philosophy of the will, i.e., Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary[4] and Fallible Man.[5] The beginnings of a more concrete study can, again rougly, be found in The Symbolism of Evil[6] and Freud and Philosophy[7]. In order to understand the significance of this concrete "turn," we must investigate how Ricoeur understands the philosophical task.

It is commonly agreed that the work of René Descartes, for whom the positing of the existence of the thinking subject is a first truth which cannot and need not be verified or deduced, marks the beginning of a new tradition in philosophy. Ricoeur finds himself standing within this tradition, for which philosophy is primarily a matter of self-knowledge, of the self-appropriation of the subject. But how is the self given up

to philosophical reflection? Ricoeur maintains that the thinking subject is known only through the mediation of its expressions--ideas, actions, works, institutions, monuments. Philosophical reflection is to recover the act of existing, the I am, through reflection on the works of man. The I as such is not concretely given as an immediate datum of experience. Rather, knowledge of the self is given only through a displacement of the home of meaning away from immediate consciousness, only through the understanding of the self's objectifications in knowledge, action, and culture.

The meaning of these objectifications or works, however, is not immediately evident nor is it univocal. Man's self-expressions are capable of being variously interpreted. A privileged instance of this susceptibility to different interpretations is found in man's language. At least at the stage which his own thought had reached when he wrote his work on Freud, Ricoeur distinguished between those linguistic expressions of man which admit of only one interpretation and thus are univocal, and those which contain a double meaning and thus, in this sense, are equivocal or, better, plurivocal.[8] The latter field he designates as the realm of symbolism.

If philosophy is the work of recovering in its concrete fullness the I at the heart of the Cogito, and if this retrieval can be accomplished only through the mediation of man's self-

expressions, philosophy must have recourse to symbols; that is, it must take as a distinct field of reflection the whole area of such expressions embracing multiple levels of meaning, and radically the area of symbolic language. Philosophy must thus become a matter of interpretation or hermeneutic. "I have decided to define, i.e. limit, the notions of symbol and interpretation through one another. Thus a symbol is a double-meaning linguistic expression that requires an interpretation, and interpretation is a work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols.[9]

II. The Conflict of Interpretations

The plurivocal nature of symbols consists in a relation of meaning to meaning. "Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality."[10] Such double-meaning expressions are found in the hierophanies which are the object of study for the phenomenology of religion, in dreams, and in poetic images. Yet the power of symbolism, which *may* be rooted somewhere beyond or behind human language (e.g., in the cosmos itself or in the psychic constitution of man), appears *as such* in man's speech. The task of interpretation or hermeneutic is to reveal the richness or overdetermination

of symbols and to demonstrate that symbols play a true role in man's discourse. The manifest meaning of a symbol points beyond itself to a second, latent meaning by a movement which thought can follow but never dominate. For example, the symbols figuring in any of the great religions enable the phenomenologist of religion to be drawn toward a given religion's conception of the sacred and its relation to man. Much of the work of a scholar such as Mircea Eliade is a matter of moving with the symbols and being drawn by them to a universe structured in a particular way and to a God or gods relating in a certain manner to man's world as he experiences it. It is the predominance of certain symbolic types, for example, which enables Eliade to distinguish religions of the "eternal return" from religions of historically oriented "faith."[11] Thus, the primary meaning moves us to a latent, symbolized meaning and intentionally assimilates or draws us on to that second meaning. This takes place by a process identified by Ricoeur as "intentional analogy."

Several very influential recent schools of thought, however, impress upon us very forcibly that there is a second kind of relationship which may exist between manifest and latent meaning. The manifest meaning may stand in a relationship, not of intentional analysis but of "cunning distortion," to the latent meaning, i.e., a relationship of dissimulation, mystification, and illusion. In the case of Freud, for example,

the primary meaning of a symbol is a dissimulation of basic, unsurpassable desire or instinct. The task of psychoanalytic interpretation is not the discovery of a further reality beyond the symbol, a reality toward which the symbol draws us by its own movement, but rather, the reduction of the illusion effected in consciousness by the manifest meaning of such expressions. Religious symbols which would lead a phenomenologist of religion to a particular religion's conception of the sacred would be for psychoanalysis but another manifestation of the "universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" known as religion.

These two possibilities thus give rise to conflicting styles of interpretation, the polar extremes of which are denominated by Ricoeur "the hermeneutics of suspicion" and "the hermeneutics of recovery." If philosophy's task, the concrete understanding of the I at the heart of the Cogito through the mediation of man's self-expressions, is to be possible at all, then the philosopher must not only have recourse to hermeneutics--since many of these expressions are symbolic--but he must also settle the question of whether this hermeneutic conflict can be resolved. Is his only choice to be an option between these two styles, an option seemingly arbitrary and thus perhaps itself determined not by the exigencies of disinterested inquiry or rigorous method, but by the unconscious determinants of his own psychic makeup? Or are there resources available to philosophic reflection itself which will enable a resolution or

mediation of the internal variance within the field of interpretation? Is the alternative of conflicting styles definitive or provisional, real or illusory? Can philosophy discover, within the storehouse of resources properly its own, a means of resolving this tension? If not, the odds would seem to lie with the hermeneutics of suspicion, since either option in itself would appear arbitrary and thus itself an expression of unsurpassable instinct. The task of interpretation, and thus of the philosopher who recognizes the necessity of interpretation for the fulfillment of his reflective task, would be iconoclastic, purely and simply; The philosopher would thus "purify discourse of its excrescences, liquidate the idols, go from drunkenness to sobriety, realize our state of poverty once and for all."[12]

On the other hand, if the conflict can be mediated, the hermeneutics of suspicion would still remain but would be taken up into the task of recovery, which would then become, not a parallel task, exclusive of and opposed to that of demystification, but inclusive of the latter. The philosopher would then "use the most 'nihilistic,' destructive, iconoclastic movement so as to let speak what once, what each time, was said, when meaning appeared anew, when meaning was at its fullest."[13] The full act of recovery would thus be effected, not through a mere phenomenology of the symbol, as in the phenomenology of religion, but by philosophical reflection in its fullest sense

and in reliance upon a process of rigorous dialectic which would include extreme iconoclasm as a moment in the restoration of meaning.

The latter possibility is favored by Ricoeur. By way of an overview of what will be exposed more fully in the remainder of this paper, we can make the following statements:

1. With respect to symbolism and interpretation in general, Ricoeur finds this possibility grounded objectively in the unity of the symbol;

2. As a philosophical act, it will be grounded subjectively in the essential role of dialectic within philosophical reflection. The task of philosophical reflection demands interpretation. But the hermeneutic war itself demands that reflection become also dialectic.

3. The religious and profane spheres of meaning are to be sharply differentiated but the interpretative, dialectical, and reflective tasks imposed by each will be analogous.

4. With respect to the area of symbolism specifically and uniquely designated religious, the possibility of the mediation of the conflict is grounded objectively in the ambiguity of the unified sacred symbol (e.g., the eschatological symbols of Judaism and Christianity).

5. With respect to the same area, this possibility is grounded subjectively in the dialectical process called for by

such ambiguity, a process analogous to the dialectic demanded in the interpretation of profane symbolism. Thus, the reflective thinker concerned with reopening a possibility of being addressed by the kerygmatic Word will take his cue from the philosopher concerned with the dialectical mediation of the hermeneutic conflict in general. The religious thinker must distinguish the expressions with which he is concerned from those other cultural symbols which occupy the philosopher, but his process of interpreting the symbols of faith is analogous. Ultimately he must move beyond the phenomenology of religion to a more inclusive, complex, and dialectical mode of reflection. This process will ground both the validity of the phenomenology of religion and the viability of its implicit intention of hearing a new tidings of the Word. At the same time, however, it will incorporate the equally valid intention of demystifying hermeneutics, that of establishing the rootedness of manifest religious symbolism in the darkness of life and nature which surrounds the light of conscious awareness.

The domain peculiar to the symbolism of faith has not been immune from the attacks of the demystifiers. Nor must the religious thinker regard these attacks either as ultimately destructive intentions to be warded off or avoided at all costs, or as embarrassing revelations disclosing the ever-narrowing scope of his legitimate field of investigation and reflection. Rather,

they can be assumed as invitations to him to appropriate the tension which expresses his modernity, to move beyond an anachronistic mode of reflection and expression constantly plagued by the temptation to obscurantism, to open the possibility to himself and his contemporaries for a post-critical encounter with the event of human speech which God has, for faith, become. He can release the possibility for the twice-born man of modernity to hear the language of a call in which "I leave off all demands and listen."[14]

Before examining the two key notions of the concrete unity of the symbol and of dialectic, we should take a slightly longer look at the hermeneutics of recovery as this is exemplified in the phenomenology of religion, if only to know what it is that we are moving beyond in the more concrete thinking that begins from the dialectical unity of the symbol. We will thus consider The Symbolism of Evil, where Ricoeur attempts to employ the methodology of the phenomenology of religion.

As thinking becomes more concrete, it also bedomes more dependent on symbols and thus more hermeneutical. Thus we may speak of a "hermeneutic turn" in Ricoeur's thought as he moves beyond the abstract analyses of the structures of human existence to an attempt to read man's experience through a study of his expressions.[15] Such hermeneutic phenomenology differs from the structural analyses of his earlier works and

of most other phenomenology in that it intrinsically points beyond itself by means of a "wager" which shatters the descriptive neutrality of most phenomenological work. "I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic thought."[16] This wager is acknowledged again in Freud and Philosophy, with specific reference to the phenomenology of religion. The letter is secretly animated by an intention, a series of philosophical decisions which lie hidden even within its apparent neutrality, a rational faith which employs a phenomenological hermeneutics as an instrument of achieving the restoration of meaning which he refers to as a "second immediacy." Thus, the implicit intention of this hermeneutic phenomenology is "an expectancy of a new Word, of a new tidings of the Word."[17]

It is in The Symbolism of Evil that Ricoeur begins his attempt to read the constitution of the self from the constitution of symbolic language by deciphering expression, language, and text. While he does not yet confront the anti-phenomenology of the hermeneutics of wsuspicion as an alternative route to the understanding of man, his destiny or fate, and his place in the cosmos, The Symbolism of Evil locates for us the broad horizon of this later confrontation, the problem of the unity of human language. It is this horizon that makes phenomenology a matter of interpretation or hermeneutic, because of the insistence on understanding man's experience by understanding his expressions in symbol and myth. The latter rescue man's feeling from silence and confusion. But such

interpretation remains phenomenological because it does not attempt to reach behind the symbols for underlying determinants but rather attempts to follow them forward, to follow their indications. "Symbols alone give what they say."[18] "The symbol gives rise to thought."[19] To interpret symbols phenomenologically is to reenact them in sympathetic imagination, not through an immediate belief but through the recovery of the intentionality of the symbol. To reenact a myth through an immediate belief would be to accept the myth as explanatory of etiological. To reenact it by sympathetically immersing oneself in its implicit intentionality, however, is to accept it as exploratory, as interpretative of man, his destiny, and his place in the cosmos.[20] It is to accept mystery. It is to "elevate the symbols to the rank of existential concepts."[21] This is not to say that the cosmic significance which the symbol intends is actually given in the symbol. If this were the case, the symbol would cease to be a symbol. Symbols are intentions without fulfillments. This limitation will be extremely important when we discuss the more concrete reflection on religious symbols which begins from their dialectical unity-in-tension.

The phenomenology of religion may proceed either by analyzing the inherent structures of symbols and myths, or by relating them to one another either in an evolutionary perspective or by showing relations of transposition. An example of the latter is the way in which Ricoeur shows the relations of opposition and identity between the Adamic myth and the other myths of evil, in the last chapter of The Symbolism of Evil. In

either case three philosophical decisions are made: first, the accent is put on the object of investigation; second, a certain fullness of symbol is emphasized; third, the intention is that one may "finally greet the revealing power of the primal word."[22]

Regarding the first decision, placing the emphasis on the object of investigation, the phenomenology of religion aims at disengaging the object in myth, ritual, and belief rather than discovering psychological and sociological determinants of religious behavior. The second decision, i.e., emphasizing the fullness of symbol, is based on a rational faith that symbols point beyond themselves to a second meaning, giving what they say. This implies that I who interpret am bound up in the relation of immediate meaning to latent meaning, that I participate in what is announced to me through the symbol. Thus the third decision, i.e., the intention to greet the revealing power of the primal word, manifests a new desire to be addressed and renders the phenomenology of religion a preparation for the revelation of meaning.[23]

III. Dialectic and the Concrete Unity of Symbols

The hermeneutic task cannot remain at a phenomenological level, however, because of the mighty invasion into contemporary thought of the hermeneutics of suspicion. This conflicting style of interpretation reverses the three decisions made by the phenomenologist of religion. The focus of concern becomes, not the object, but the underlying deter-

minants of human expression and behavior. The latent meaning behind human expression is not to be discovered by a movement forward from the expression but by a movement back to the realms of unsurpassable instinctual desire (as in Freud) or economic determination (as in Marx) lying behind and determining the mendacious deliverances of consciousness. The intention of the phenomenology of religion to be spoken to anew by the Wholly Other is reversed in such descriptions of religion as "the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" or "the opium of the people." Such a stance, at face value, is radically opposed to the nondialectical restoration of meaning characteristic of the phenomenology of religion. Any attempt at mediation of this controversy must be dialectical. Ultimately, as most dialectic, it must resolve not only differences in standpoint and correlative content, but also differences in underlying decisions which determine one's standpoint. Such dialectic thus will prepare the philosopher or reflective religious thinker to effect another decision which will give him a more inclusive standpoint. If such dialectic is possible, then the radical doubt of the hermeneutics of suspicion may prove to be beneficial and even indispensable for mature, post-critical religious belief. Whereas reflection, the recovery of the I at the heart of the I think, had to have recourse to interpretation, the hermeneutic war can be arbitrated only by a retuen to an expanded, dialectical, reflective critique of interpretations. While such reflection is expanded it is also more concrete for it penetrates more profoundly into the effort to exist and

the desire to be which reflection must appropriate through the expressions of man.

The key to such a concrete reflection is found in the unity of the symbol. Man's symbols reveal a concrete unity-in-tension in which the two apparently diverging lines of interpretation actually intersect. The tension which characterizes our modernity is this unity-in-tension found in our symbols. For us to be able to think in accord with symbols, to follow their indications, we must subject them to a dialectic, discovering the intersection of diverging interpretations. Then we can return to the attitude of listenting, to "the fullness of speech simply heard and understood."[24]

The tension localized in the mixed texture of concrete symbols is a tension of archeology and teleology. The hermeneutics of suspicion is archeological in intention. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, provides us with an archeology of the subject. It displaces meaning away from immediate consciousness,,not ahead toward a fuller meaning analogically bound to the meaning revealed in naive awareness, but behind, toward the unconscious. It is this meaning which Freudian discourse captures in interpretation, the meaning of our ultimately unknowable instincts as these are designated in our psychic lives by ideas and affects that represent them, e.g., by dreams and neuroses, by ideals and illusions. Freud's analyses reveal the archaic, ever prior, ultimately timeless character of desire and instinct. Man is drawn backward, by a detem-

poralizing agency, to a destiny in reverse. The muteness of such desire can be spoken only through mechanistic energy metaphors. Philosophical reflection learns from Freudian analysis that knowledge is rooted in desire and effort, and that an epistemology which studies our representations as correlative to the represented objects, no matter how "critical" such an epistemology may be, must be supplemented by an exegesis of the desires and instincts which conscious intentionality deceptively hides from our view. It is because such desire is not only hidden but also interferes with intelligent inquiry that truth is, not a given, but a task.

But Freud's very pursuit of the truth concerning the mute darkness of desire, the image of his performacnce and of his own acceptance of truth as a task for him as scientist and analyst, itself would be enough to lead the philosopher to ask whether our effort to be does not reveal a further vector, a direction forward toward a goal, a second displacement of meaning away from naive awareness, but in a teleological direction. The inconsistency between Freud's account and his performance leads one to suspect suspicion. The philosopher places the concept of archeology in dialectical opposition to that of teleology. When he does so, his reflection becomes concrete. He will discover this dialectical opposition in man's symbols, myths, and rituals, and when he does so he will realize that the hermeneutic war can be resolved. The reflective thinker, instructed by the demystifying archeology of the Freudian reduction and by the progressive synthesis of the forward movement of man's effort to exist, returns to the spoken word and hears it, not irrationally and precritically,

but as one twice-born, with an informed immediacy.[25] Symbols coordinate in a concrete unity two functions previously assumed to be opposed to one another. They repeat our childhood and the childhood of our race, but they also serve to explore our adult life.[26] Authentic symbols are regressive-progressive, archeological-teleological. Their intentional structure unifes the functions of concealing and showing, disguising and revealing. While they conceal the aims of our instincts, they disclose the process of self-consciousness.

> Disguise, reveal; conceal, show; these two functions are no longer external to one another; they express the two sides of a single symbolic function. . . . Advancement of meaning occurs only in the sphere of the projections of desire, of the derivatives of the unconscious, of the revivals of archaism. . . . The opposed hermeneutics disjoin and decompose what concrete reflection recomposes through a return to speech simply heard and understood.[27]

IV. The Uniqueness of Sacred Symbolism and the Death of the Religious Object

Ricoeur does not allow that his method of philosophical reflection will give us more than a frontier view of the domain of religious symbolism. In a somewhat Barthian manner, he insists that even the very existence of a problematic of faith exceeds the resources of philosophical reflection. Such a problematic occurs in another dimension, that of call, kerygma, word addressed to me.

But the movement of faith toward understanding is a movement of the interpretation of events of speech and thus must encounter a dialectic of reflection. God can be recognized by man only in interpretation of the

event of human speech which He has become. To believe is to listen to the call, but to hear the call we must interpret the message. Thus, in Anselmian fashion, we must believe in order to understand and understand in order to believe.

God thus becomes discernible in and through a dialectic of archeology and teleology. As radical origin, he becomes discernible in the question of my archeology, and as ultimate goal in the question of my teleology.[28] Philosophical reflection itself can never assume creation and eschatology, as acts of the divine, to be any more than the horizon of its explorations of archeology and teleology. They are not fixed possessions of reflective thought, as Hegel tried to maintain. Philosophical reflection can never become absolute knowledge. The reason for this lies in the very fact which gives rise to the problematic of faith, the fact of evil. Evil will never be dissolved in dialectic. As such, it is unsurpassable, inscrutable.

The problematic of faith thus shows God to be discernible in a third way, a way not pointed to specifically by the dialectic of reflection but rather by the impossibility of the progress of reflection to the point of absolute knowledge. God becomes discernible in the question of evil, together with and in the symbols of reconciliation and deliverance, which qualify the manner in which eschatology is the horizon of the question of my teleology and the teleology of the figures of the human spirit in the works of culture.

These symbols of creation, eschatology, and redemption stand today in the same need of a demystifying hermeneutics as do the symbols of culture and ethics, and the dreams, fantasies, and ideals of the individual subject. The phenomenology of religion must enter into a dialectical relationship with the psychoanalysis of religion and other forms of reductive interpretation, and this for the sake of the very authenticity of faith. For the human spirit tends, through a misconception of what it means to know,[29] to reabsorb transcendence in immanence, to transform a horizon into an object which he possesses and uses, and to create idols rather than be content with signs of the sacred. Thus a naive metaphysics, for all its protestations to the contrary, can appear to know more about what God is than what he is not, and religion can treat the sacred as a new sphere of objects, institutions, and powers alongside those of the economic, political, and cultural spheres. Religion becomes the reification and alienation of faith, vulnerable to the blows of a hermeneutics of suspicion, whether the latter be a process of demythologization from within religion or of demystification from without. In either case, the aim is the death of the metaphysical and religious object.

Such a cultural movement, as exemplified in Freudianism, is necessary if we are to hear and read the signs of the approach of the Wholly Other. We are faced with a never-ending task of distinguishing between the faith of religion--faith in the Wholly Other which draws near--

and belief in the religious object. The task is very difficult and demanding, mainly because it calls for such a merciless exegesis of our own reference to the sacred. Do we allow religious symbols to point to the horizon of transcendence and to do only this, or do we make them an idolatrous reality purely immanent to our culture and thus render them ineffective?

V. Conclusion.

The task demanded by Ricoeur is particularly difficult, I believe, for one comm tted to the possibility of authentic sacramentality. For he must admit that many of the ritual practices within his own community reflect indeed at least a "universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" if not a demonic objectifying of the sacred. Sacramental religions probably have even more of a tendency than rel igions of word to reify the sacred and capitulate to man's idolizing tendencies. The combat over the sacred must become much more heated, it would seem, in those religious communities where, because of an insistence on sacramentality, the ambiguity of the sacred is more pronounced.

The task demanded by Ricoeur is very demanding in another realm too, that of creating a sufficiently nuanced relationship between faith and culture, religious communities and public life, authentic religion and profane institutions. Particularly in this area is there a strong tendency to objectify and use the sacred for the pursuit of goals which are not connected with the problematic of faith. The facile use of the word "Christian," to the point of rendering it a meaningless symbol with only a past, is a clear instance of this tendency---"Christian" university,

"Christian" nation, "Christian" political party, even "Christian" culture. Is the word any longer a symbol in which the Wholly Other draws near or has it been turned into an object alongside other cultural objects? "The idols must die so that symbols may live."[30]

The psychoanalysis of religion can be one of the roads toward the death of the religious object. It can aid us in charging the affective dynamism of religious belief to the point where the latter becomes, not simply the consolation of the child in us, but the adult power of loving in the face of hatred and death. It can help us discern that kerygmatic faith excludes a moral God and a penal Christology.[31] It forces us to acknowledge that every symbol of the sacred is also and at the same time a revival of an infantile and archaic symbol, and thus to admit the ambiguity of all religious symbolism and religious experience. It can aid us in moving toward the suspension of the ethical point of view, moving beyond an ethich of righteousness, losting the immediate consolation of our own narcissism. It can purify the hermeneutics of faith to the point where the latter becomes unambiguously the symbolic exploration of ultimate relationships, of the language of a call in which "I leave off all demands and listen."[32] It is indeed true that the faith of the believer cannot emerge intact from such a confrontation.[33] On the other hand, Ricoeur seems to provide a solid basis for claiming that, despite the supposed origin of religious symbols in instinctual impulses, their present meaning cannot be exhausted by presenting their archeology. "The question here

is not whether a given religious symbol is genetically a psychological projection, but rather whether, irrespective of its being such a projection, what it expresses analogically discloses a genuine aspect of reality."[34]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, tr. by William Earle, New York: Noonday Press, p. 31.

[2]John Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, New York: Macmillan, 1967.

[3]See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, New York: Herder and Herder, 1972, p. 95.

[4]Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, tr. by ?Erazim Kohak.

[5]Chicago: Regnery, 1965, tr. by Charles Kelbley.

[6]Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, tr. by Emerson Buchanan. (SE)

[7]New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, tr. by Denis Savage. (FP)

[8]Ricoeur's later development would seem to be moving in the direction of acknowledging all language as symbolic. See Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Evanson, Northwestern University Press, 1971.

[9]FP, p. 9.

[10]Ibid., p. 16.

[11]Cosmos and History, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959.

[12]FP. p. 27.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 551.

[15]This is the approach through which Ihde studies Ricoeur.

[16]SE, p. 335.

[17]FP, p. 31.

[18]Ibid.

[19]SE, p. 347; FP, p. 38.

[20]See SE, p. 5.

[21] Ibid., p. 357.

[22] FP, p. 32.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. 496.

[25] Ibid.

[26] For a detailed presentation of a corroborating theory from a Jungian perspective, see Erich Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, Princeton: Bollingen Series XLII, 1971.

[27] FP, p. 497.

[28] Compare the discussions in the last two chapters of the book of Dunne's cited in footnote 2.

[29] At this point, I am moving beyond Ricoeur, who locates the problem simply in man'soobjectifying tendencies, to Bernard Lonergan, who maintains that the problem is that we misconceive what objectivity is.

[30] FP, p. 531.

[31] That theology is capable of such discernment apparently drawing almost exclusively upon its own resources is clear from Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, Rome: Gregorian, 1964, pp. 486-593.

[32] FP, p. 551.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Stuart C. Hackett, "Philosophical Objectivity and Existential Involvement in the Methodology of Paul Ricoeur," International Philosophical Quarterly, March, 1969, p. 31.