


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SCHUBERT OGDEN:

THE PROBLEM OF GOD AND THE NATURE OF THEOLOGY

Theology 325
Robert Doran, S.J.
December 5, 1969



INTRODUCTION

Professor Schubert Ogden of the University of Chicago has presented what he regards as a philosophical approach to theology which can serve as an alternative to what he calls "Classical theism." In this paper we shall attempt to discover the structure of this theology and to analyze and criticize its main features. Three positive emphases stand out in Ogden's attempt: his notion on the criteria of theological adequacy, his critical adoption and adaptation of the existentialism of Rudolf Bultmann, and his attempts to ground a neoclassical theism in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The latter two emphases provide what we will regard as the structure of Ogden's theology, which involves a twofold transposition of the Biblical message: from myth to existentialism, and from myth to metaphysics. Before examining the last two themes, however, we will look at Ogden's rejection of "classical theism"--a rejection made on the basis of his position on the norms for adequate theological thinking. Our criticisms will be made largely in the form of footnote remarks and questions; basically they can be reduced to two suggestions: that Ogden's suggested transposition from myth to existentialism is

is Pelagian and that his transposition from myth to metaphysics misses the central question of all metaphysics, that of the intelligibility of contingent being, and thus that this transposition does not take him beyond the realm of cosmological thinking, which is intrinsically incapable of treating the problem of God in an adequate fashion. We will close with the suggestion that Ogden revisit "classical theism", either in the form of an extensive study of the texts of Thomas Aquinas or by coming to terms with the contemporary theism of Bernard Lonergan, which is in essential harmony with the position of Aquinas even while raising and treating the problem of God in a contemporary fashion. Such a study will reveal that many of Ogden's characterizations of "classical theism" are really caricatures.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CRITERIA OF THEOLOGICAL ADEQUACY

A. The Two Criteria

Ogden regards his work--and particularly his treatment of Bultmann--as an attempt to contribute to a more adequate accomplishment of the basic constructive task confronting contemporary Protestant theology. Theology is a communal enterprise.

. . . All authentic theological work must take place within the church's ongoing conversation concerning the ultimate source of its common life. Though the theological task is never done and must constantly be undertaken ab ovo, none of us approaches the task alone, but each stands in the midst of a vast company whose presence is a constant inspiration.¹

A lack of conversation with the past is the principal reason for the failure of liberal theology.² As Karl Barth has reminded us, we may not anticipate which of the voices from the past may speak to us today as we labor at the task of theology.³ At the same time, theology must always be developed anew, as a direct response to the kerygma rather than as a repetition of a previous response. The historicity of theology precludes any identification of a given theological system with the kerygma.⁴

The first criterion of theological adequacy is a result of the fact that theology is always addressed to a present situation. Theology must deal with today's problems in an understandable fashion. The second criterion is faithfulness to Scripture's witness to the God of Jesus Christ.

Because of the first criterion, theology has a properly apologetic role. As we shall see, this is particularly true with regard to the problem of God.

. . . No theology today can be adequate which restricts itself to (the) dogmatic task alone. It is simply not enough to proclaim God's "mighty act in Christ" in a situation whose most characteristic question is whether the word "God" has any reference. Beyond his duty to speak appropriately to the scriptural witness, the theologian must speak understandably to his contemporary hearers by taking full responsibility for the meaning and truth of his assertions.⁵

While Ogden rejects the concept of a Normaldogmatik as untenable, he insists on the distinctive identity of the Christian faith and maintains that the theologian's sole task is to articulate this faith for his present situation. Thus Ogden can state that the proper task of the systematic theologian extends beyond a strictly historical responsibility. He must seek to present a new critico-constructive interpretation of the witness of Christian faith that will enable the church to speak adequately in the present. But his question and his task are formally the same as those of the theologians of

yesterday. He is aware that his own constructions can be taken seriously by the church only if he himself is guided in formulating them by those who have preceded him.⁶

The theologian's attitude of respect toward the past must extend to liberal theology itself, despite its failure, and particularly to its articulation of historical method and its criticism of the Bible's prescientific world view. "The fact that previous formulations of Christian faith have been challenged by the picture of man and his world offered us by modern philosophy and science does not allow us to take for granted the possibility of an appropriate articulation for contemporary man of faith's understanding of reality. The theologian must embrace the criticism of the theological tradition arising out of modern man's picture of himself and his world. Only in this way can he be responsibly obedient to the past and particularly to the New Testament proclamation. The situation to which the theologian must address himself today is essentially the same as that to which liberal theology tried to speak. No preliberal theology will be adequate to the task.⁷ Today's danger is the same as that to which liberal theology gave way: the danger of speaking understandably but not to the witness of Scripture. But this is no reason for avoiding the apologetic task."⁸

The second criterion--that of faithfulness to the Scriptural witness--allows the theologian to assume an offensive as well as a defensive stance toward those who do not share the duty of appropriately interpreting Scripture.

" . . . To exclude from one's theological constructions any element that this witness includes as essential would be to forfeit one's claims to offer an adequate interpretation; and this is true however great our concern that the assertions we make as theologians also be genuinely understandable."⁹

The theologian is not required to conform his claims to the secular thought of his situation, but to establish their validity in terms of the same general standards of experience to which secular thought itself is subject. As we shall see in more detail, for Ogden Jesus Christ decisively re-presents a truth which is of a piece with whatever truth men know any-

where.¹⁰ Thus, with regard to the problem of God, Ogden states:

The only way any conception of God can be made more than a mere idea having nothing to do with reality is to exhibit it as the most adequate reflective account we can give of certain experiences we all inescapably share. . . . No assertions are to be judged true, unless, in addition to being logically consistent, they are somehow warranted by our common experience, broadly and fairly understood. But one thing, it would appear, in which almost all of us today share is just our experience as modern, secular men: our affirmation of life here and now in the world in all its aspects and in its proper autonomy and significance. . . . It is in this secular affirmation that we must discover the reality of God in our time. The adequate response

to secularistic negations . . . will be made . . . by an integral secularity--a secularity which has become fully self-conscious and which therefore makes explicit the faith in God already implied in what it itself affirms.¹¹

We learn from Barth that the Scriptural witness cannot be brought into easy harmony with the modern age. At the same time Barth did not even raise the question of the meaning and truth of Christian faith for modern secular man. It is rather Tillich, Bultmann, and Bonhoeffer who have kept us aware of theology's apologetic task, by their insistence that theological adequacy is measured not only by the faith itself but also by the existence of man. Christian faith must be presented to modern man as his own most proper possibility of existence.¹²

This criterion of contemporary significance is met whenever:

a) theological restatement recognizes the nature of the contemporary constructive problem and is concerned to develop a comprehensive solution to it; and

b) the solution proposed comprehends the major dimensions of the problem and is internally self-consistent.¹³ In fact, logical self-consistency is spoken of as "the final test of adequacy."¹⁴ A fully comprehensive solution, however,

is impossible of achievement, because no theologian can ever be wholly successful in securing suitable concepts.¹⁵

The problem of the adequate conceptuality--or, as Bultmann puts it, of the "right" philosophy--is the perennial problem of any theology aspiring to an adequacy beyond its grasp. Moreover, because the concepts available in a given situation are always a matter of the theologian's historical destiny, he is often forced to express his intentions within limits that make their adequate expression impossible.¹⁶

The problem of God is central to Ogden's notion of the nature of theology. In reaction to certain contemporary trends,¹⁷ Ogden maintains strongly that no theology can lay claim to adequacy which treats assertions about the being and nature of God as inessential. God is necessary for theology first because the witness of Scripture would be entirely different without the affirmation of his reality, and secondly because of what Scripture itself affirms concerning God: namely, that he is the ultimate source and end of all that is and can be.¹⁸ In terms, then, of the second criterion, an adequate theology must be intensely concerned with the reality of God.

Is such concern also dictated by the first criterion? Is the reality of God necessary if we are to explain the experience of men generally? In terms of common human experience, as we shall see, Ogden regards a negative answer to this question as untenable; he will argue that the Christian affir-

mation of God can be made understandable to modern men
precisely in terms of their own reason and experience.¹⁹

B. Theology as Objectifying Thinking

Ogden defines theology as "a more or less distinguishable type or level of thinking and speaking about God as apprehended through the witness of faith of Jesus Christ."²⁰ The God of Jesus Christ is thus the object or referent of all theological thought and speech.

Heinrich Ott has raised the question of whether theology is really a form of objectifying thinking and speaking.²¹ His question is a challenge to Ogden's definition of theology. Ogden admits one sense in which theology may be considered nonobjectifying: namely, theology is distinct from the thinking and speaking proper to science, which thinks and speaks about reality insofar as it can be made the object of particular external perceptions. Theology is neither a perception of reality as the object of ordinary experience nor is it a science built on this perception.²²

But there are other kinds of knowledge besides non-objectifying existential awareness of ourselves in relation to the manifold reality encountering us, and objectifying external sense perception. More specifically, there are other forms of "objectifying" knowledge. The kind of phenomenological analysis

of existence presented by Martin Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is one such form. Even though it is a reflection on nonobjectifying existential self-understanding or awareness, it is "reflection on" and thus is objectifying, relatively disinterested and detached. For Ogden as for Bultmann, theology is objectifying in this second sense. The subjective form of theology is essentially like that of modern science, even though its object is different. With Ott, Ogden insists that there is a continuity between the existential understanding of faith and the more reflective thinking and speaking of witness and theology. But he adds that we must also distinguish between each of these levels and that we can do so only by seeing them as points along the continuum defined by the two poles of faith as existential self-understanding and theology as objectifying knowledge.²³

Just when theology is true to its hermeneutical task of critically interpreting the church's witness in an appropriate and understandable conceptuality, it cannot but involve a more reflective and so more objectifying type of thinking and speaking than is represented either by the various forms of witness or by the still more existential phenomenon of faith itself.²⁴

But does this mean that God is the object of theological reflection? Is not the object rather faith or witness? To deny that one may think and speak of God in an objectifying way is itself, says Ogden, an instance of objective thinking and speaking about God. God is not only the Subject whom I

know by encountering him in faith; he is also the object of theological thinking and speaking.²⁵

For some analytic philosophers, theology is nonobjectifying in a third way, in that theological utterances cannot really be about anything. They are rather expressions of a certain human stance or attitude, of what Paul van Buren calls a "historical perspective." The only way in which they are open to empirical verification or falsification--and thus possess a cognitive status--is that they assert something about a man's conative posture or perspective, which can be verified or proved false.

Ogden states quite forthrightly that van Buren has simply explained away the primary use of language evident in Christian witness, rather than theologically accounting for this language. Christians have always believed they were responding cognitively to a divine reality different from themselves. While the language-usage of faith and theology is not similar to the language-usage of science, there is no reason to claim that religious language is not cognitive in meaning.²⁶ "It is one thing to claim that sentences having the logical form of scientific assertions must prove their cognitive status by reference to the principle of verification as conventionally interpreted. It is quite another thing to claim

with the positivists that this principle determines the only kind of cognitive status there is."²⁷ Furthermore, not even in analytic philosophy itself is there a representative consensus that the scope of cognitive thinking and speaking is such as van Buren would have it to be.²⁸

Ogden distinguishes a fourth and final sense of non-objectifying thinking and speaking, which he finds in Bultmann's statements on the nature of theology. For Bultmann, although theological utterances have a genuine cognitive meaning or use, they cannot be referred to any generally applicable principle of verification or to a clearly specified criterion of truth. But, says Ogden, to claim cognitive status for a statement, one must be ready to support his claim by clearly specifying the principle or criterion for the truth of the statement. This does not mean that faith itself must be directly verifiable but rather that theological statements, which express faith and assert something about God, must be capable of some kind of rational justification.²⁹

More specifically, the kind of rational justification to which theological statements are open is the kind appropriate to all assertions of the logical class of metaphysical statements.

If . . . the primary (although not the only) use of theological statements is to make what are in some sense

meaningful assertions, the only kind of assertions they can logically make is metaphysical assertions. That is, they express assertions which at once have objective reference to "how things are" and yet are not empirically falsifiable as are the hypotheses of the special sciences. Such assertions cannot be thus falsifiable because their specific use or function is to represent not the variable details of our experience of reality, but its constant structure--that which all states of experience, regardless of their empirical contents, necessarily have in common.³⁰

A theological statement could be false, not because it would fail to predict what could be disclosed by particular external perceptions but because it would misrepresent the common structure of all our experiences.³¹

Thus the claims to truth on the part of Christian faith can be conceptually stated and justified only in terms of an adequate metaphysics or philosophical theology.

. . . The task of philosophical theology (should) in no way conflict with, but rather provide a necessary complement to, the task of a confessional theology grounded in faith in a special revelation. Just as there can be, in principle, no opposition between a philosophical analysis of human existence and a theological explication of the particular self-understanding of Christian faith, so there also could be no incompatibility between a proper philosophical construction of the being of God and a theological witness to God's concrete action as revealed in Jesus Christ. On the contrary such a construction would provide the only possible means for bearing a theological witness to God's action, as distinct from the witness of preaching and personal confession. The prerequisite of any adequate theological statement is a conceptuality which, in the given historical situation, is at once appropriate to faith itself and genuinely understandable. Therefore, if faith as self-understanding is by its very nature also an understanding of God and his gracious action, no theological explication of faith

can be adequate apart from the concepts that a proper philosophical theology alone is in a position to provide.³²

Only a frankly metaphysical theology can meet the challenge of such radical theologians as Paul van Buren.³³ Theology for Ogden is a scientific enterprise, whose statements are most properly assertions concerning God, assertions which can be rationally justified only by metaphysics. Contemporary talk of nonobjectifying thinking and speaking in theology runs the risk of obscuring and even abandoning the objectivity which is of the very essence of theology.³⁴

C. The Question of "Truth"

In attempting to meet the challenge of the positivistic branch of linguistic analysis, which maintains that the meaning of the word "true" is exhausted by the criteria of formal self-consistency and sensible falsifiability, Ogden draws upon the philosophy of the ordinary-language analyst, Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin has argued that our actual usage of language reveals no basis for thus limiting true knowledge. There are many "uses of argument" and questions of truth are as relevant in ethics, aesthetics, and theology as in mathematics and the sciences.³⁵ Nevertheless, there is a single meaning for the word "true"; only the criteria of truth differ, depending on the kind of question which is being raised. The word "true"

as we actually use it is "'the most general adjective of commendation' pertaining to matters of belief."³⁶ "True" is a gerundive, which recommends an assertion as worthy of being believed. Because there are various fields of experience represented by our assertions, the criteria of truth-as-credibility are many, and we are never justified in demanding that an assertion conform to a criterion applicable only to statements of a different type.

Rightly understood, the question whether a certain kind of utterance can be verified is always the question whether there are any criteria and procedures that can be commonly agreed on for testing the claim of such utterances on our attention and belief. If such criteria and procedures can be specified, then, whatever the kind of utterance or however different its standards from those pertaining to other types of assertion, the word "true" unquestionably has a proper use.³⁷

The criterion of the truth of a given type of assertion is determined by establishing the kind of question to which this assertion is a possible answer and by explicating the presuppositions of that type of question. Thus, the question of the truth of myth is formulated by determining the kind of question to which mythical utterances are possible answers and by isolating the presuppositions of that question.³⁸ We will see later how Ogden handles matters such as this. At this point we are concerned only with stating his views on the formal conditions of theological adequacy.

CHAPTER TWO

THE REJECTION OF "CLASSICAL THEISM"

Ogden's attempt to construct a conceptually justifiable philosophical theology includes a negative moment--the rejection of many previous attempts to do the same thing, and especially the criticism of what he calls "classical theism."³⁹ He finds the usual attempts of theologians today to treat the problem of God to fall into one or the other of two general positions. The first is "classical theism," which, he says, "has been present in the church ever since the age of the Fathers, and the union they effected between the faith witnessed to in Holy Scripture and the metaphysics of classical antiquity."⁴⁰ The most characteristic assertions of this theism, he says, involve denials: of temporality in God and of internal relations to the world on his part.⁴¹ Ogden finds echoes of this theism in the work of such contemporary theologians as Ian Ramsey and Paul Tillich, since they too affirm a nontemporalistic theism.

The other representative alternative on the contemporary theological scene is offered by various theologies which, whatever their differences may be, are united by a rejection of "classical theism" and by "a deep conviction as to the reality and significance of time and history that can hardly be reconciled with classical metaphysics."⁴² Included

here are continental existentialism and Anglo-Saxon positivism, both of which in one way or another tend to interpret statements about God as wholly or primarily statements about either human existence or a "historical perspective" or "blik" on the part of the man uttering the statement. The positivistic stance finds expression in Paul van Buren's The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, which for Ogden is a proclamation, not of legitimate secularity, but of secularism.

Secularism is regarded as the most extreme expression of a centuries-long reaction against "classical metaphysics and theology," an outlook which has all but completely dominated our cultural heritage, according to Ogden.⁴³ Ogden regards the experience of modern secular man as sharply opposed to this outlook, but is also insistent that an effort to overcome "classical theism" does not have to involve one in secularism or the denial of all theistic positions.⁴⁴

Ogden presents three major objections to "classical theism:"

a) the attempted synthesis of "the personalistic view" of God of Holy Scripture with "the substance ontology of classical Greek metaphysics" is impossible;⁴⁵

b) the internal logic of "classical metaphysics" is inconsistent;⁴⁶

c) "classical theism" is existentially repugnant to "modern secular man."⁴⁷

Scripture tells us that " . . . the being of God is not that of the metaphysical Absolute, but the being of One who is genuinely and eminently personal."⁴⁸ There is an incoherence between "classical theism's" notion of God as the "metaphysical Absolute," only externally related to the world--i.e., the world is related to him, not vice versa--and Scripture's presentation of "the loving heavenly Father revealed in Jesus, who freely creates the world and guides it toward its fulfillments with tender care."⁴⁹ Scripture affirms a God who is relevant to the life of the world because the world is relevant to his own life; it affirms a God who is really related to the world. "Classical theism's" metaphysical scheme denies this real internal relatedness. Any attempt to combine these two positions is necessarily incoherent.⁵⁰

For "classical theism" an attribute such as "Father" is a mixed perfection, which may rightly be understood only as a metaphor. Only simple perfections--"actuality, immutability, impassivity, aseity, immateriality, etc."--can be properly predicated of God with respect to the thing signified.⁵¹ "Classical theism" is involved in an attempt at

demythologization, but is not an effort to interpret Scriptural myths so much as to eliminate them and substitute something which presents a very different picture of God.⁵² What "classical theism" might regard as a transposition from myth to metaphysics is really an imposition of something very different. " . . . Scripture's most characteristic designations of God (are) completely emptied of meaning."⁵³ The mythical utterances of Scripture have been badly mishandled by being restated in the terms of "classical theism." "The personal God clearly witnessed to by the scriptural myths has been utterly misrepresented in this tradition as the impersonal Absolute of the Greek metaphysics of being."⁵⁴ Finally: "

Recognizing that the God of Holy Scripture is undeniably a God who is related to his creatures, theologians have generally allowed that relational concepts may be predicated of deity, provided they are understood analogically instead of literally. The difficulty, however, is that, on conventional metaphysical premises, to say that God is not literally related to the world could only mean that he is literally not related to it; and so the classical analogia entis, like traditional theism in general, has been continually caught in incoherence and self-contradiction.⁵⁵

This brings us to Ogden's second point of attack. In his view, the internal logic of "classical metaphysics" is inconsistent. His judgment is that 300 years of "careful criticism" have demonstrated the incapacity of "classical

"classical theism" reverses this relationship in the case of divine knowledge. In this case, and in this case alone, the world as known is really related to God as a wholly absolute knower.⁶⁰

Finally, Ogden finds difficulty with the absence of temporality in the God of "classical theism." The classical conception of God's eternity arises from what Heidegger has called "the vulgar understanding of time," according to which time is the endless continuum of extensionless instants in which the "now" is constantly moving as one instant follows upon another. Eternity is thus the "stationary now," sheer timelessness. Yet, says Ogden, "classical theism's" references to divine will and purpose are references to perfections which imply temporal distinctions. With reference to temporality in God, then, not only does "classical theism" work with a "vulgar understanding" of time which has been superceded by Martin Heidegger's analyses in Sein und Zeit, but, even with the conception of time which it does employ, "classical theism" falls into contradiction.⁶¹

Ogden's criticisms of the lack of internal self-consistency in "classical theism" can be summarized in his objections to "the traditional via negationis et eminentiae," which, he says, "can at best provide a questionable theological

method."⁶² In this doctrine, "some of the positive perfections predicated of God by the way of eminence are in reality emptied of meaning by the absolute denials arrived at by the way of negation." The traditional doctrine of analogy is not a middle way between anthropomorphism and agnosticism; rather this doctrine "trades on both of them as occasion may demand."

⁶³ The difficulty lies in the fact that the via negationis denies in God not merely limitations of finitude but also "positive perfections inherent in the meaning of being as such," such as primal temporality and real internal relatedness to others.⁶⁴ Ogden judges that Heidegger's analyses in Sein und Zeit suggest that temporality and real relatedness are not marks of finitude; finitude consists in the limited mode of these positive perfections as they are found in man.⁶⁵

Ogden's third reason for objecting to "classical theism" is that it is "existentially repugnant" to modern secular man, precisely because of its denial of temporality and internal relational structure in God. Since God is neither increased nor diminished by what we do, our actions and sufferings must be wholly indifferent to him. By the inner logic of such a position, God must be conceived as the denial of our life in the world. At best God's perspective

can be only irrelevant to our actual existence. "It can provide no motive for action, no cause to serve, and no comfort in our distress beyond the motives, causes, and comforts already supplied by our various secular undertakings."⁶⁶

Our "typical experience and thought as secular men," however, affirms the importance--even the autonomy and ultimacy--of our secular undertakings. But if these undertakings are such that God, the ultimate Ground of their significance and of our confidence in life's meaning, finds them indifferent to himself and his own being, then God must be a denial of our life and of its meaning.⁶⁷

Ogden has presented a distorting caricature of the God of at least one voice in the classical tradition, Thomas Aquinas. We will reserve until later a presentation of the suggestions regarding God and our knowledge of him offered by a contemporary theologian who relies heavily on Aquinas, Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan presents a doctrine of God consistent with the Thomistic doctrine and is cognizant of contemporary difficulties. Seen against this contemporary re-capturing of much of the Thomist doctrine, Ogden's objections to "classical theism" will prove unnecessary and ineffective.

CHAPTER THREE

FROM MYTH TO EXISTENTIALISM

Rudolf Bultmann is a major source for the constructive theologizing Ogden desires to accomplish. Bultmann's theology, assessed in terms of Ogden's criteria for theological adequacy, is judged to be of immense significance. In fact the best way to begin the contemporary theological task, says Ogden, is by coming to terms with Bultmann's proposal. Bultmann clarifies the problem of contemporary theology and suggests the broad lines of a solution.⁶⁸ On the other hand Ogden shares a common view that Bultmann's thought is not logically self-consistent. But he also feels that no definitive criticism has yet been developed.⁶⁹ A tenable alternative to Bultmann will be the first step in constructing a viable contemporary theology.

Bultmann's theology is a phenomenology of faith which seeks to unfold in a clear and systematic way the existentiell self-understanding implicit in Christian faith. This self-understanding arises out of a response to the word of God encountered in the Church's proclamation. The purpose of every statement of Christian theology is to explicate the self-understanding which is the real content of the New Testament.⁷⁰

The New Testament, however, expresses its own theological propositions in a mythological fashion. Modern man does not share the New Testament's picture of the world. Myth for Bultmann is a manner of representation in which the unworldly or divine appears as the worldly and human, in which the transcendent appears as wholly immanent. Myth objectifies the transcendent and thus makes it disposable. Ogden defines a mythological world-picture as:

. . . one in which (1) the nonobjective reality that man experiences as the ground and limit of himself and his world is "objectified" and thus represented as but another part of the objective world; (2) the origin and goal of the world as a whole, as well as certain happenings within it, are referred to nonnatural, yet "objective" causes; (3) the resulting complex of ideas comprising the picture takes the form of a double history.⁷¹

The "double history" indicates the history of men and the history of the gods.

For Ogden, all of the ways in which man today understands himself in his world possess a common basis. The world-picture of modern science and man's understanding of himself as a closed inner unity that does not stand open to the incursion of supernatural powers both render the New Testament's mythical world-picture unintelligible and unacceptable to man today.⁷² More specifically, modern man criticizes in the New Testament everything that cannot be established in accord with the general requirements of

scientific research, and everything that violates the unity of man's selfhood by representing him as open to divine or demonic powers whose agency is independent of his own responsible decisions.⁷³

The task of the theologian, which Bultmann has seen clearly, is to determine whether the New Testament proclamation has a truth independent of the mythical world-picture. Does the kerygma allow total demythologization? Bultmann finds two indications that it does. First, the true meaning of myth is not to present an objective world-picture but to express how man understands himself in his world. Along these lines, Ogden, in The Reality of God, works out a definition of myth in close dependence on Bultmann. He here defines myth by means of three closely related statements:

First, "myth" refers to a certain language or form of speaking which, like other languages, functions to represent (to re-present, to present again) some field of human experience in a particular way. Second, the field of human experience that the language of myth represents is our original internal awareness of our selves and the world as included in the circumambient reality within which all things come to be, are what they are, and pass away. Third, the particular way in which the language of myth represents this awareness is in terms and categories based in our derived external perception of reality as the object of our ordinary sense experience.⁷⁴

Thus myth itself contains the motive for its own criticism because its true intention to speak of a transcendent power

to which man and the world are subject is hampered by the objectifying character of myth's assertions.⁷⁵ Basic to the definition of myth which Ogden and Bultmann share is the assumption that human experience has different fields reflected in logically distinct languages. The phenomenon of myth can be understood by distinguishing the "objective" (in the sense of external perception) and the "existential" fields. Myth involves what Gilbert Ryle has called a "category mistake," i.e., "the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another."⁷⁶ Myth speaks of the "facts" of ourselves in the "idioms" appropriate to the world as disclosed through sense perception.

The second indication that the kerygma permits demythologization is that the New Testament itself prepares the way for such a process:

First, many of the mythological assertions in the New Testament either stand beside one another in a loose and unintegrated way or are positively self-contradictory. Second, "criticism is especially demanded by a peculiar contradiction that runs throughout the whole New Testament: On the one hand, man is cosmically determined; on the other hand, he is called to decision. On the one hand, sin is a fate; on the other hand, it is guilt. Alongside of the Pauline indicative stands the imperative, etc. In short, man is understood, on the one hand, as a cosmic being and, on the other hand, as an independent self who can win or lose himself in decision." (Bultmann) . . . Finally . . . "demythologization is to some extent already carried out within the New Testament itself." (Bultmann) One needs only to note how John completely eliminates the futuristic eschatology

of the primitive community to realize that the canonical writers themselves were far from being uncritical of the mythical world-picture.⁷⁷

Thus Bultmann is convinced that the truth of the kerygma can be disclosed through existential interpretation to the man who no longer thinks mythologically. The biblical myths must be interpreted critically in terms of the existentiell understanding of existence which they seek to express. Any written document or instance of oral communication either provides objective information about the world and phenomena within it or presents existentiell statements through which the reader or hearer is confronted with a decision about his possibilities of self-understanding. Thus any attempt to understand an utterance takes place in terms of one or the other of two fundamental questions: "What is?" and "What ought to be?"⁷⁸ Existential interpretation rests on man's preunderstanding of his own existentiell possibilities--i.e., his own possibilities for authentic or inauthentic self-understanding--and therefore is pursued in terms of the second question. The existentiell question concerning the authenticity of human existence provides the necessary preunderstanding for reading the New Testament.

This for Bultmann is the reason for the importance of the "early Heidegger," who, in Sein und Zeit has provided a

conceptually precise, nonmythological statement of the possibilities of human existence.⁷⁹ For Bultmann, as for Ogden, what the New Testament speaks of in mythical terms as life in faith may be appropriately translated by Heidegger's concept of authentic existence. The content of the New Testament message is man's existentiell possibility for authentic self-understanding.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, Bultmann also follows the New Testament in affirming that the possibility of authentic existence is a possibility only as faith in Jesus Christ, as explicit Christianity. But recent philosophical developments indicate the possibility that the New Testament may simply be presenting for the first time in cultural history a significant expression of man's natural possibility for authentic self-understanding. Does not Heidegger's philosophy say what the New Testament says? If the demand for existential interpretation is legitimate, is it not possible that man's authentic self-understanding is better known and realized by philosophy than by theology?⁸¹

Bultmann admits that faith is the attitude of authentic humanity and that love is man's natural mode of relationship to others.⁸² The issue for him between theology and Heidegger's philosophy is over the character of man's fallenness and the conditions of overcoming it. For the New Testament fallenness

can be overcome only by the act of God in Jesus Christ. For philosophy, knowledge of the possibility of authentic existence is the power to realize such existence. For Bultmann, man is completely under the bondage of sin, i.e. of willfulness and self-glorification. His attempts to realize his own existence bear witness to this. Heidegger's philosophy, insofar as it proclaims man's ability to realize authentic existence, is itself an expression of such willfulness.⁸³ For Bultmann man is blind to the full extent of his fallenness and thus looks on theology's talk of "sin" as myth. This is the final expression of man's radical fallenness. Only encounter with the love of God can convince man that talk of sin is not myth, and render freedom possible. The New Testament's witness to Christ is an announcement that God acts and has acted to free man. We are now free to give ourselves to God and to our neighbor only because God has acted in Jesus Christ. Authentic existence has always been a possibility in principle for man, but it becomes a possibility in fact only in consequence of God's saving act in Jesus Christ.⁸⁴

Thus for Bultmann there is nothing mythical about the Christ-occurrence in itself. Its central element is the historical figure, Jesus of Nazareth. Since details concerning this great figure are contradictory their true intention must

must lie, not in their objective contents but in their existential significance. The cross of Christ is a genuinely historical event that takes place either as salvation or as judgment, precisely in the individual's decision for faith or for its absence. To believe in the cross is to accept it as one's own and to allow oneself to be crucified with Christ. The cross is a unique presentation of a possibility for understanding one's existence that is relevant to all men and can be actualized when they decide in its favor. And the significance of the cross depended, for the first disciples, on its being the cross of Christ. For us today its significance depends on the fact that Christ is proclaimed as the crucified one who is also the risen Lord, not on historical reconstruction of the life of Jesus of Nazareth.⁸⁵ When the proclamation asks us to believe in the death-resurrection of Jesus as salvation-event it opens up the possibility for an authentic existentiell self-understanding.⁸⁶

For the first believers, not the word but the reality of the resurrection (which Ogden, with full support from Bultmann's ambiguous statements, interprets as "the gracious action of God whereby we are presented with the factual possibility of authentic existence" through the annihilation of the power of death⁸⁷) preceded the emergence of faith. But

even their faith followed upon a proclamation, i.e., the proclamation of Jesus concerning himself. For the first disciples, as for us, the saving significance of Jesus was a matter of faith, ie, of existentiell decision in the face of proclamation. Thus for Bultmann the event of Christ is not a myth but is endowed with existential significance.⁸⁸

Obviously one condition for saying that talk of the action of God in the Christ-event is not mythological talk is that we can talk of God in a nonmythological way. Bultmann is insistent on this point. At the same time he insists that I cannot speak of God's act as a phenomenon in the world that can be perceived apart from an existentiell encounter with it. This means that all talk of God's act is at the same time talk of my own existence. Bultmann distinguishes between myth and analogy. We can nonmythologically represent God's act as analogous to human action and the communion of God and man as analogous to the communion of men with one another.⁸⁹

Ogden maintains that Bultmann's "theory of analogy, while profoundly suggestive, and even essentially correct, is too fragmentary and undeveloped to secure Bultmann's intention against misunderstanding and to enable one who shares it to make a carefully reasoned defense of his case."⁹⁰

This introduces us to Ogden's criticism of Bultmann.

Ogden shares a general emerging consensus that Bultmann's theology, while resting on a clear grasp of the theological problematic of our day and coming close to providing an adequate solution, is in the last analysis logically inconsistent. It is generally agreed, by right- and left-wing critics of Bultmann, that his theology may be reduced to two fundamental propositions: (1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence, as this is more or less adequately analyzed in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger; (2) Christian faith--and thus authentic existence--is actually realizable as a possibility in fact only because of the historic (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth. It is also generally agreed that these two propositions are mutually incompatible.⁹¹ For Ogden, if Christian faith is to be interpreted solely in existential terms then it must be independent of any historisch event. On the other hand, if it has a necessary connection with a particular historisch event then it may not be interpreted solely as man's original possibility of authentic geschichtlich existence.⁹² If authentic existence is a possibility in fact only because of the event Jesus of Nazareth, then it is not an original possibility of man which

he is always obliged to realize. This is to frustrate one of the motives for identifying Christian faith with authentic self-understanding. Bultmann, if he is to be consistent, must surrender all serious talk of man's responsibility for his own authentic existence.⁹³

But is it not true, argues Ogden, that authentic existence is everywhere factually possible, not because of the event Jesus of Nazareth, but because man is always and everywhere the object of God's love, which is omnipresently efficacious as a source of redemption? All that is required for authentic existence and thus for Christian faith is some event--any event will do--in which God's grace becomes a concrete occurrence and is received by a decision of faith.⁹⁴

Thus, while Ogden maintains that "the sole norm of every legitimate theological assertion is the revealed word of God declared in Jesus Christ, expressed in Holy Scripture, and made concretely present in the proclamation of the Church through its word and sacraments,"⁹⁵ he rejects the position of Bultmann's critics on the "right," e.g. Barth, to the extent that they claim that what is obviously mythology is to be accepted merely because it is in the New Testament.⁹⁶ The demand for demythologization must be accepted without condition.⁹⁷ The mythology which the "right" supposes it

must affirm is irrelevant to the meaning of human existence.⁹⁸

The "right" implies that the reality of God and his saving act is essentially independent of man's possibilities of existence, so that we may speak of one without speaking of the other.

Any theology is mythological which denies that statements about God may be interpreted as statements about man and vice versa.⁹⁹

The left-wing critics of Bultmann--e.g., Fritz Buri--maintain that the possibility of faith in Jesus Christ is one with an ontological possibility belonging to man as such, the possibility of authentic human existence, which "is constantly being made possible by reason of man's inescapable relation to the ultimate source of his existence. To be human means to stand coram deo and, by reason of such standing, to be continually confronted with the gift and demand of authentic human existence."¹⁰⁰

For Ogden, the Christian message itself not only permits but absolutely requires this emphasis on the freedom of God and man. The New Testament affirms, not that in Christ our salvation (authentic human existence) becomes possible, but that what has always been possible becomes manifest, is re-presented definitively in Christ.¹⁰¹ In this exemplaristic view, the only condition of the kingdom¹⁰² is that a man "accept God's love for himself and thereby become free to respond to the concrete needs of his neighbors

as and when they are made known to him in actual encounter."¹⁰³

It is not necessary that one must confess faith in Christ but that he understand himself authentically.¹⁰⁴

Ogden thus accepts the first premise of Bultmann's theology, namely that Christian faith is to be interpreted without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic existence as this is clarified through appropriate philosophical analysis.¹⁰⁵ This is the first condition of a genuine post-liberal theology. He admits with Bultmann a need for analogy, but also a need for regarding God as somehow an "object" of thought as well as a "Subject" in an encounter. God "may be as appropriately considered as man by philosophical analysis."¹⁰⁶ We will analyze Ogden's suggestions along this line in the next chapter.

Ogden rejects the second premise of Bultmann's theology, that authentic human existence is actually realizable as a possibility in fact only because of the event Jesus of Nazareth. The second condition of a genuine post-liberal theology is that Christian faith (as authentic existence) is always a possibility in fact because of the constant gift and demand of God's love, the ground and end of all created things. Such a theology must continue to maintain, however, that the decisive manifestation of this love is the

event Jesus of Nazareth, which "fulfills and corrects" all other manifestations.¹⁰⁷ He interprets Romans 1, 18 ff. as indicating that authentic existence, or faith in Christ, can be realized apart from faith in Jesus or in the church's proclamation. For Ogden, Paul does not affirm that what is presented in God's original self-disclosure is any different from what is given in his final manifestation in Jesus of Nazareth. To deny that the content of these revelations is the same is to contradict the claim that men are without excuse for their estrangement from God.¹⁰⁸ Thus, " . . . the responsibility of contemporary theology is to make clear that the hidden power, the inner meaning, the real substance, of all human happenings is the event of Christ," i.e., the "eternal word of God's unconditioned love, which is the ground and end of all historical events whatever."¹⁰⁹

Thus contemporary theology needs a more adequate expression of the "objective" reality of the event Jesus of Nazareth than Bultmann offers. This presentation will take the form of interpreting Jesus as a re-presentation of man's original possibility of existence coram deo. Jesus' office as the Christ consists in his being the bearer of the eternal word of God's love, which is the transcendent meaning of all created things and the final event before which man must

decide his existence. What has taken place in Jesus of Nazareth is nothing more and nothing less than a definitive re-presentation of man's existence before God that has all the force of final revelation. The event of Jesus is something more than merely a human life and a human word of witness, since Jesus does not merely speak about God's forgiveness but bestows it as an existentiell possibility.¹¹⁰

. . . To affirm that Jesus Christ is Lord is to affirm that the final promise in which we place our confidence is none of the many promises of the so-called gods of heaven and earth, but solely the promise of God's unending love to all who will but receive it. Likewise to affirm that Jesus Christ is Lord is to affirm that no demand may ultimately claim us except the one demand that we accept God's love for us and thereby be freed to fulfill his command to love all the others whom he also already loves. To affirm this promise and this demand is the real meaning of affirming the lordship of Jesus Christ.^{111, 112}

CHAPTER FOUR
FROM MYTH TO "METAPHYSICS"

Bultmann's "existential interpretation" can be properly carried out not only by first subjecting it to an immanent critique, such as we have just seen, but also by viewing the Heideggerian analysis of human existence in the perspective of a general ontology which includes an analysis of divine existence. For this task, process philosophy is just as important as the phenomenology of Heidegger.¹¹³ Existentialism and process philosophy must be integrated. Process philosophy lacks an explicit anthropology and existentialism a general ontology.¹¹⁴ But they can complement one another, Ogden believes, in an integral manner. Thus Ogden's call for a correction of Bultmann by Hartshorne's philosophical theology is not a denial of the position that all theological statements are existential statements.¹¹⁵ Rather, "Hartshorne's dipolar view of God provides a virtually exact counterpart to Heidegger's existentialist analysis of man."¹¹⁶ As we shall see Hartshorne and Ogden attempt to work out a doctrine of God in strict analogy to personal existence, and thus to present in its fullness a position on analogy which is barely more than suggested by Bultmann.¹¹⁷

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 Ogden finds the problem of God to be central in contemporary theology because of modern man's secularistic--not merely secular--outlook. The principal manifestation of secularism is the opinion that knowledge according to the method of science is the only knowledge there is. Secularism is evident also in those moral theories which maintain that human action realizes ~~to~~ will ~~to~~ good beyond the merely human and neither requires nor admits of any transcendent justification.

Secularism is the negation of God's reality, especially insofar as it holds that theology can make no meaningful assertions. Theology today must proceed with full awareness that its affirmation of God's reality is made in a situation in which that reality is expressly denied.¹¹⁸

The secularists, such as Paul van Buren, support their position by constant reference to the mentality of modern secular man. But, like the liberal theologians before him, van Buren is indiscriminating in his assessment of our cultural situation. In addition, there are good reasons to doubt the logical consistency of van Buren's position. The positivistic denial of the cognitive validity of all statements except those which are scientific or analytic does not itself meet its own criteria. The secularist's unqualified

denials are not required by his positive affirmations of the autonomy and significance of secular life.¹¹⁹

As we have seen, Ogden regards secularism as an extreme expression of reaction, not against all theism, but against the supernaturalistic theism of the "metaphysical-theological tradition of the Western world."¹²⁰ For him the best way of saving theism is, first, to recognize the validity of this reaction against "classical theism" and then to attend to and appropriate the "neo-classical" alternative now being offered.¹²¹

The existential significance of the neo-classical theism of Whitehead and Hartshorne is closely linked with Ogden's notion of faith and religious truth. As we have seen, "true" has a single meaning for Ogden but there are nevertheless various criteria whereby one may know whether the word ought to be used or not in the case of different assertions. The criterion to be accepted in a given case depends on the kind of question to which the statement under investigation is supposed to give an answer. In the case of religious or theological questions, the question is that of faith. "Faith" for Ogden means "the confidence or assurance that life as such is worth living."¹²² Our global experience of ourselves in the world is a religious experience,

since we can be selves only because of our trust that our own existence is justified and made meaningful by the whole to which we belong. But this confidence is continually called in question by such "limit situations" as death, guilt, and inescapable freedom. Our lives can never be made wholly secure.¹²³ These limit situations can only be problems for us, however, because we first have a confidence in life's meaning which permits them to be problems. The problem they pose is that of somehow making sense of this inevitable confidence. This for Ogden is the religious question! All the religions of the world are efforts to provide an answer to this question.¹²⁴ Religious assertions come to grips with the constant structure of our experience and find it to be such as to warrant this confidence.

Thus the claim to truth on the part of such assertions must be supported by "a prodigious philosophical undertaking."¹²⁵ Theologians must find the "right" philosophy which is the essential prerequisite of any adequate theological construction. Neither "classical" metaphysics nor Heideggerian existentialism will do.

Because of the unique--indeed strange--meaning which Ogden gives to "faith," he maintains that faith in God is unavoidable. Indeed, Christian faith itself "so understands

God that everyone must in some sense believe in him and no one can in every sense deny him."¹²⁶

For Ogden the Scriptural affirmation of God's reality implies that any secular or philosophical account of our experience which tries wholly to deny God cannot be entirely consistent. The God of Scripture is the necessary ground of all actual and possible being. Thus the reality of God must be essential to the common faith or experience of all men. To experience anything at all is to experience it together with God as its ultimate ground. And any adequate reflective account of our common human experience must somehow bear witness to God's reality.¹²⁷

What then of atheism? Ogden distinguishes two atheisms: an atheism in the bottom of the heart and an atheism at the top of the mind. The first is the more serious. It is an existential--or existentiell--denial of God, identical with a misunderstanding of one's existence as a person; it is, says Ogden, compatible with a flawless orthodoxy in one's reflective beliefs. "One may affirm God's reality with one's mind as well as one's lips, and yet deny his reality by actually existing as a godless man."¹²⁸ Ogden regards this unfaith not as an absence of faith but as the presence of faith in a deficient or distorted mode, in the perverted form

of idolatry. In Ogden's interpretation of idolatry, the idolater does not regard the non-divine thing as God but as having a unique significance as a symbol or sacrament of God's presence. Thus,

. . . the real issue of faith at the deepest, existential level is never whether we are to believe in God, or even, as is sometimes said, what God we are to believe in; the issue, instead, is how we are to believe in the only God in whom anyone ¹²⁹ can believe and in whom each of us somehow must believe.

There are only two possibilities: to believe in God in such a way that we place our trust in him alone or to believe in him in such a way that we divide our trust between him and an idol.

With regard to the atheism of the mind, Ogden makes three assertions:

a) no correlation need exist between the reflective denial of God and the existential affirmations by which the person lives;

b) one can explicitly deny God even while implicitly affirming him in his other reflective affirmations;

c) faith in God can be consciously present only in terms of some theistic scheme, which must be judged in terms of Christian faith, logical self-consistency, and congruence with experience. A particular scheme may be rejected without denying the faith for which it claims to account. It is in this sense that the real force of the secularistic denial of

God is to explicitate the incompatibility between our secular experience and "the supernaturalistic theism of our intellectual tradition."¹³⁰

Ogden supports his position on the inevitability of religious faith by appealing to the analysis of religious language presented by the non-positivistic linguistic analyst, Stephen Toulmin. For Toulmin, religious questions are valid questions arising at the limits of scientific explanation or moral reasoning. Religious language and reasoning answer the questions arising at the limits of man's activities as moral actor and scientific knower. They are natural questions because they involve accepting ourselves and the world, pursuing scientific knowledge and embracing moral imperatives, in spite of conditions that make the future uncertain. Religion is an attempt to provide reassurance.

But to reassure someone is to restore to him an awareness of a confidence which has somehow been lost. Religious assertions re-present an original confidence concerning the nature of the ground of our confidence in the future. They do not cause this confidence, for there is a deeper faith preceding all religion. All moral decisions, for example, can be made only because we believe that they somehow make a difference which cannot be annulled.

The word "God" refers to the objective ground of our confidence in the final worth of our existence. Secularity is a clear witness to God, for it consistently and emphatically affirms the final worth, autonomy, and significance of our existence and of our life in the world. The God whose reality is implied in secular affirmations is a God who grounds this confidence. Thus theology today must so conceive God as to render intelligible this ground of confidence. Such a God must be a reality genuinely related to our life in the world, so that we and our actions make a difference as to his actual being; and he must be a reality whose real relatedness to our life is itself relative to nothing and to whom our being and actions do not make a difference as to his existence.¹³¹ Thus "classical supernaturalistic theism" will not do; it is, in fact, an enemy of secularity.

Ogden thus makes a distinction between existence and actuality. "Existence" is a constant whereas "actuality" is a variable, referring to the actual state of present existence. The "mere" attribution of existence to something--even to God--in no way specifies its actuality.

✓ God's existence must be conceived--sic Ogden--as nonrelative or absolute, or else the significance of our own life would be neither ultimate nor permanent and so could not

be the object of our unshakable confidence.¹³² But God's actuality is changeable. Thus a secular affirmation implies an intrinsically dipolar conception of God, a conception according to which God is both supremely relative and supremely absolute.¹³³

The starting-point for working out this new theistic conception must be what Whitehead speaks of as "the reformed subjectivist principle," according to which an adequate answer to the question as to the meaning of "reality" can be given only by imaginatively generalizing elements disclosed in the analysis of subjects. The experiential basis of our theistic concepts must be our own existence as experiencing selves. "Classical philosophy" derives from an orientation away from selfhood and toward the sensibly experienced world. Its fundamental categories are derived from "such things as tables and chairs, and persons as we may know them by observing their behavior." Thus the chief category is "being or substance," i.e., "that which is essentially non-temporal and lacking in real internal relations to anything beyond itself." The human self is interpreted as a special kind of substance. But, says Ogden, the self is hardly the Cartesian thinking subject who requires nothing but itself in order to exist.¹³⁴ The self is rather relational or social,

a process of change involving past, present and future. I am a self only because of my real relatedness. Temporality is also constitutive of my selfhood; each occasion of experience is the present integration of remembered past and anticipated future into an ordered whole of significance. In each moment of decision I must select from the heritage of the "already" and the wealth of the "not yet" and thus freely fashion myself in creative interaction with others.¹³⁵

The assumption of the self as paradigmatic for reality as such will result in a revolution in metaphysics. Real internal relations and intrinsic temporality will be seen to be, not mixed perfections peculiar to finite beings but simple perfections inherent in the meaning of "reality" as such.¹³⁶ The chief category for the interpretation of all reality must be, not "substance" or "being," but "process" or "creative becoming." Whatever is is to be conceived as an element in creative becoming and so as analogous to our own existence as selves.¹³⁷

In this type of "analogy of being"¹³⁸ God must be conceived as temporal and social, and thus as radically different from the "barren Absolute" of traditional theism.

The eminence of God must follow from, not contradict, the positive meaning of our fundamental concepts. God is the uniquely perfect instance of creative becoming and is immediately related to everything else that is, just as we are related to our bodies. God is "continually in process of self-creation, synthesizing in each new moment of his experience the whole of achieved actuality with the plenitude of possibility as yet unrealized."¹³⁹ He is a living and growing God, but as such the truly eminent or perfect reality. Growing is not a mixed perfection but a wholly positive conception. "That he is ever-changing is itself the product or effect of no change whatever, but is in the strictest sense changeless, the immutable ground of change as such, both his own and all others."¹⁴⁰ God is also the eminently incarnate One whose "body-sphere" is the entire universe. And his relatedness is the absolute ground of all relationships, his own and those of others.

Thus, for neo-classical theism, God is as eternal, immutable, impassive, immaterial as in classical theism. But he is not simply identical with the Absolute. He is the supremely relative Thou who includes the Absolute as "the abstract principle of his own concrete identity."¹⁴¹ Again an analogy with our own selves is employed. "Just as in our

case, our defining characteristics are but abstract elements in our concrete experiences, so in the case of God, his attributes are really only abstractions."¹⁴² But the whole of his perfection is an ever-new synthesis into his own life of all that has been and shall be.¹⁴³

Ogden does not think his neo-classical conception of God destroys the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This is his way of reacting against any possible charge of pantheism. The point of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is to deny that any being save God can be the necessary ground of whatever exists. In neo-classicism one cannot affirm that God was ever without some actual world of creatures; and yet any such world was created out of nothing, since there was a time when it was not, when its potentiality lay in the conjoint actuality of God and the precedent world.¹⁴⁴ This is not a denial, says Ogden, of creatio ex nihilo. An assertion to the contrary cannot appeal to any theological warrant and is absurd. "After all, children do have parents; and classical theism itself has always been insistent (however incoherently) on the real agency of 'secondary causes.'"¹⁴⁵

More important for Ogden than that neo-classicism is genuinely theistic is the fact that it is able to do justice to "modern secularity."¹⁴⁶ Only this dipolar God can ground

the ultimate significance of our life in the world. Only the eminently relative One can make possible a general confidence about the future. He can do this because he is immediately affected by all that we are and do; the future for which we live is his unending future, his self-creation, which is advanced or retarded by our causes and their issue. Our secular decisions are truly the stuff of the "really real" and of permanent significance because they can increase the concrete perfection of God's everlasting life. Thus we have a motive to inspire us to maximize the being and joy of the world and to endure our sufferings.¹⁴⁷

With regard to the Scriptural witness, this God of neo-classical theism renders the words "God is love" no longer foolishness but the sum of wisdom. His all-embracing love is his absolute relativity and the beginning and end of all that is.¹⁴⁸ The points at which Whitehead and Hartshorne^h have revised classical metaphysics are the very points at which evangelical Christianity took issue with "classical theism."¹⁴⁹

In an essay on "The Temporality of God,"¹⁵⁰ Ogden further develops his theistic position by way of commenting on an obscure footnote hidden in Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit:

It requires no extensive discussion to show that the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the "stationary now" (nunc stans), is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and is limited by an orientation to the idea of "constant" presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being "construed" philosophically, it could be understood only as a more primal temporality. Whether the via negationis et eminentiae could offer a possible way to this goal would remain undertain.¹⁵¹

Since Heidegger's philosophy aims at a completely general ontology or understanding of the meaning of being as such (das Sein)--so Ogden--and since the first and provisional task of this philosophy is an analysis of human existence because of its ontin and ontological priority of access to being, a philosophical theology conceived along Heideggerian lines would, argues Ogden, offer a formal ontological analysis of the being of God. Its object would not be God's existence but his actuality or existentiality, i.e. the basic structure or essence that determines the godness of God.¹⁵² A strict analogy between the being of man and the being of God is pre-supposed. In contrast to the Thomistic analogy, neo-classicism's analogy affirms the same distinction of essence and existence in God as in man¹⁵³, though of course for Ogden Existence is abstract and essence is concrete!

The theism which Ogden sees to be possible on the basis of Heidegger's footnote would imply that God, like man, is a

"being-in-the-world," i.e., essentially related to a world of others by reason of a structure of "care" similar to man's.¹⁵⁴

Like man, God would have a past and a future, as well as a present, and a relation to his own past through memory and his own future through anticipation. God's eternity would thus be conceived as "infinite" (unendlich) temporality. In this way the analogy with human existentiality is thought to be preserved.¹⁵⁵

This means that God's temporality is such as not to be temporally determined, in the sense that there would be a "time" when God was not and a "time" when he shall be no more. God's past and future are literally limitless. God is not an utter negation of temporality but its eminent and infinite exemplification.¹⁵⁶

Similarly, man is finite not only in time but also in space. Thus his relatedness to others is limited. But God is infinite in respect to space and thus is related immediately to everything else that is. This is why he can be called the absolutely relative one.

His "world" embraces all beings other than himself; his environment is described as "the wholly internal environment encompassed by his not merely finite but infinite care."¹⁵⁷

Thus God's encounter with the world constitutes not some relative truth¹⁵⁸ but absolute and definitive truth.¹⁵⁹

The analogy between God and the human self implies, of course, that God's action must be conceived in analogy to man's action. Now human action, says Ogden, is the action whereby the self as such is constituted. My outer acts of word and deed express and implement the inner decisions whereby I constitute myself as a self. Basically there are only two possibilities of selfhood: selfhood as open or closed, as loving or hating. The primary meaning of God's action lies in the fact that God, in his actuality, constitutes himself in each new present as God by participating completely in the world of his creatures.¹⁶⁰ It is in these terms that we are to understand God as creator and redeemer. This conception takes us beyond a Bultmannian (even corrected Bultmannian) existentialism.

On this conception, to say that God acts as the Creator is not merely to say that both I and my world are utterly dependent on his power and love and that I am bound to be obedient to his will as it pertains to myself and my world. That this existential meaning is the indirect meaning of the statement is to be readily granted. But what it directly says is that the ultimate ground of every actual state of the world is not just the individual decisions of the creatures who constitute its antecedent states, but rather these decisions as responded to by God's own decision of pure unbounded love. In a similar way, to say that God acts as Redeemer is to say more than that I now have the possibility of that radical freedom from myself and openness to the world that constitutes the authentic existence of love. It is also to say--and that directly--that the final destiny both of myself and of all my fellow creatures is to contribute ourselves

not only to the self-creation of the subsequent worlds of creatures, but also to the self-creation of God, who accepts us without condition into his own everlasting life, where we have a final standing or security that can nevermore be lost.¹⁶¹

If every one of our bodily actions is an action of our selves, then every creature must in a sense be God's action. But, says Ogden, there are still certain happenings which may be said to be God's action in a special sense, i.e., wherever an event in history manifests God as creator and redeemer. This is particularly true of human actions in which man expresses his understanding of the ultimate meaning of his existence through symbolic speech and action. Man's words and deeds always carry within themselves a possibility of becoming an act of God. But, in the last analysis, this can be true of any event which is received by someone as a symbol of God's creative and redemptive action. Insofar as it is thus received, it is God's act in history.¹⁶² When we say that Jesus Christ is the decisive act of God, we mean that in this event, in distinction from all others, the ultimate truth about our existence is normatively re-presented. This event has the power to decide all other claims to reveal the divine meaning. In this (purely exemplaristic) sense the decisive act of God in Jesus can be called with Tillich the final revelation.¹⁶³

Our presentation of Ogden's doctrine of God will close with a brief outline of this doctrine's implications for "the promise of faith." For Ogden, our final destiny as men is to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, to whom we make a difference which is of everlasting significance, in that the present moment for God never slips into the past as it does for us but is caught up in an ever-new synthesis. God knows all things for what they are and will continue to know and love them forever. Because he is affected by all things, they are forever resurrected in his own everlasting life. "This, I believe, is the promise of faith."¹⁶⁴

Such an interpretation leaves completely open the question of whether we somehow "manage" to survive death as conscious subjects. Ogden feels that to regard such a belief as integral to Christian faith is mistaken. The demythologization of the New Testament leaves little to justify such a supposition. " . . . belief in subjective immortality is not to be numbered" among the "beliefs that have their basis and warrants in Christian faith itself."¹⁶⁵

This is not the place to go into the arguments which have been given in Christian tradition for the immortality of the soul or the exegesis of Scriptural texts dealing with resurrection and eternal life. It would seem fairly well

agreed by Scriptural exegetes that the interpretation Ogden here gives, which smacks of a new variation of the theme of "exhaustively realized eschatology", is quite well discredited among Scripture scholars. His forthright position on this matter, and its obvious connection with the rest of his thought, should provide sufficient warrant for raising and pursuing the question of whether his doctrine of God can be accepted as an adequate expression of Christian belief.

Throughout this paper we have offered criticisms of Ogden's theology which we will not attempt to summarize here. Let us simply say that his transposition from myth to existentialism is exemplaristic with regard to the person of Jesus Christ and runs the risk of Pelagianism in regard to the doctrine of divine grace; and that his transposition from myth to "metaphysics" completely overlooks the real starting-point and problematic of the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, who is presumably for Ogden the main voice in the tradition of "classical theism." With regard to the first difficulty, his criticisms of contemporary secularism are not adequate enough to prevent his own theology from succumbing to the greatest defect of secularism, which is not logical inconsistency or historical inaccuracy, but the attempt of man by himself to achieve his own salvation. Ogden is as

much a victim of the myth of the world come of age as any of the secularists whom he criticizes. With regard to the second point, our concluding chapter on the theism of Bernard Lonergan's Insight should demonstrate that Ogden's criticisms of "classical theism" are aimed at a caricature and that there is no need to go the route of a process philosophy of God. In this final chapter we will attempt to deal with the main metaphysical points missed by Ogden.

Ogden has presented clearly many of the problems which confront contemporary theology. He has, I fear, resolved none of them, at least if theology is to remain Christian theology, fides quaerens intellectum.

CHAPTER FIVE
"CLASSICAL THEISM" REVISITED

In this chapter we will look briefly at several elements of the theism of Bernard Lonergan. Although a study of the texts of Thomas Aquinas would serve to point up the inaccuracy of Ogden's reading of Thomist metaphysics, Lonergan's theistic scheme not only is in essential harmony with that of Aquinas but also deals with the problem in answer to contemporary difficulties and demonstrates that Thomist metaphysics cannot be legitimately accused either of logical inconsistency or existential irrelevance. Thus we turn our attention now to this contemporary theologian.

Although Lonergan admits that the question of God can be raised in many contexts his treatment in Insight arises out of the problem of evil, the recognition of man's incapacity for sustained development and integration of his relations with other men in society. He is concerned with an integration of human living through a knowledge that goes beyond or transcends the knowledge of the sciences, common sense, and the treatment of metaphysics limited to proportionate being. Thus he is concerned with a development in man's knowledge relevant to a development in man's being.¹⁶⁶

Any argument that such a theism is "existentially repugnant" will have to come to terms with this underlying intention.

An understanding and a critical affirmation of Lonergan's argumentation on the problem of God demand the self-appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness which is the goal of the first eighteen chapters of Insight. Here we can simply disengage several important features of this intricate analysis which are pertinent to the present discussion of the problem of God.

Lonergan distinguishes between a heuristic structure and its determination. "The simple fact that man knows through intelligent inquiry and rational reflection, enables him to determine in advance certain general attributes of the object under investigation."² In this case, then, he is concerned with delineating what we can and do know about transcendent being before the attainment of an act of understanding that enables us to grasp what any transcendent being is. He is concerned with the knowledge of God that consists in knowing that he is but not what he is.

This knowledge is transcendent knowledge. "Transcendence" is used here in the general sense of "going beyond." Lonergan defines being heuristically as "whatever can be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably." But in human

knowledge there is a realm which precedes intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, the realm of sensible and imaginative experience. Being is proportionate or transcendent according as it lies within or without this domain of experience. Transcendent knowledge would be knowledge which goes beyond knowledge of proportionate being. The possibility of transcendent knowledge is the possibility of grasping intelligently and affirming reasonably a transcendent being, a being which does not fall within the domain of sensible and imaginative experience.

Prior to the reasonable affirmation of transcendent being there must be an intelligent grasp. An intelligent grasp of transcendent being can occur only on the basis of an extrapolation from proportionate being. The question enabling us to extrapolate is, "What is being?" This question can be answered only by an unrestricted act of understanding, an act of understanding everything about everything. "For being is completely universal and completely concrete; apart from it, there is nothing; and so knowledge of what being is cannot be had in anything less than an act of understanding everything about everything."¹⁶⁸ No indefinite process of development, no ever-new synthesis of past achievements and future possibilities will do. The content of developing

understanding never is the idea of being, for there are always further questions to be answered. Only the content of an unrestricted act of understanding can be the idea of being. The idea of being is absolutely transcendent, in that it assigns the ultimate limit to the whole process of going beyond.

Now man cannot answer the question, "What is being?" since he cannot enjoy an unrestricted act of understanding. But he can determine a number of features of the answer "by proceeding on the side of the subject from restricted to unrestricted understanding and on the side of the object from the structure of proportionate being to the transcendent idea of being."¹⁶⁹

What is the idea of being? It is, first, the content of an unrestricted act of understanding, and is thus absolutely transcendent. Since an unrestricted act of understanding leaves no questions to be asked, no part of its content can be implicit or obscure or indistinct. This idea of being is an idea of the total range of intelligibility and consequently of the good. It must be one idea, "for if it were many, then either the many would be related intelligibly or not. If they were related intelligibly, the alleged many would be intelligibly one, and so there would be one idea. If they were not related intelligibly, then either there

would not be one act of the one act would not be an act of understanding."¹⁷⁰ Thus no multiplicity and, a fortiori, no succession of ideas will answer the question, "What is being?" But it is an idea of many, for it understands everything that is in all aspects and details.

The idea of being is itself immaterial, non-temporal, and non-spatial. Now even our own restricted acts of understanding are immaterial for they abstract from the "empirical residue," i.e. individuality, the space-time continuum, particular times and places, constant velocity, non-systematic divergence of actual frequencies. Understanding is not constituted by the empirical residue, for inasmuch as we are understanding, we are abstracting from that residue. Nor is understanding intrinsically dependent upon the empirical residue, since, again, it abstracts from it. Our own restricted acts of understanding are nontemporal at least in the sense that our understanding is not involved in the continuous time of local motion, even though it does develop and so is involved in ordinal time. Our own restricted understanding is also non-spatial for it deals with the non-countable multiplicity of space through invariants independent of particular spatial standpoints.

Now, because the idea of being is the content of an

unrestricted act of understanding and because understanding is intrinsically independent of the empirical residue, the idea of being must be immaterial, non-temporal, and non-spatial, precisely as intrinsically independent of the empirical residue. But since the act of understanding in question is unrestricted it understands perfectly beings that are material, temporal, and spatial.

If the idea of being is one but of the many, immaterial but of the material, non-temporal but of the temporal, non-spatial but of the spatial, there must be in the idea of being a primary component grasped inasmuch as there is a single act of understanding and a secondary component grasped inasmuch as the primary component is grasped. "For just as the infinite series of positive integers is understood inasmuch as the generative principle of the series is grasped, so the total range of beings is understood inasmuch as the one idea of being is grasped."¹⁷¹ The primary component is the unrestricted act's understanding of itself; the secondary component is the unrestricted act's understanding of everything else because it understands itself. The primary component in the idea of being--the unrestricted act's understanding of itself--is one, immaterial, non-temporal, and non-spatial. The secondary component in the idea of being--the unrestricted

act's understanding of everything else because it understands itself--is many and includes the material, the temporal, and the spatial.

The primary component in the idea of being is the unrestricted act of understanding.

For if an act of understanding is unrestricted, it understands understanding; it understands not only restricted acts but also the unrestricted act; understanding the unrestricted act it must understand its content, otherwise the understanding of the unrestricted act would be restricted; but the content of the unrestricted act is the idea of being, and so if the unrestricted act understands itself, it thereby also understands everything else.¹⁷²

Thus the unrestricted act of understanding is the primary intelligible in the idea of being, an intelligible that is identical with intelligence in act. What are grasped inasmuch as the unrestricted act understands itself are the secondary intelligibles, everything that is to be understood about everything else, including the concrete patterns of diverging series of scattering conditions which form for us the non-systematic yet concretely intelligible domain understood by statistical laws.

For the unrestricted act of understanding proceeds, not from a grasp of abstract systems of laws, but from a grasp of itself; it does not attempt the impossible task of relating through an abstract system the concrete patterns but grasps the lot of them in a single view inasmuch as it understands itself. It does not offer either to deduce or to predict events, for it has neither need nor use for deduction or prediction since in a

single view it grasps the totality of concrete patterns and in each pattern the totality of its relevant events.¹⁷³

Deduction and prediction are unnecessary and impossible for the unrestricted act of understanding. Such an act could deduce only if it advanced in knowledge; but it already knows everything. Such an act could predict if some events were present relative to it and other events were future relative to it; but such an act is non-temporal, outside the totality of temporal sequences which is part of the everything about everything else that it grasps in understanding itself.

Is there such an unrestricted act of understanding?

In order to answer this we must ask about causality. Causes are the objective and real counterpart of the questions raised by the desire to know. Different kinds of questions seek different kinds of causes. Causes can be external or internal; internal causes are the central and conjugate potency, form, and act which constitute the ontological structure of proportionate being isomorphic to human experiencing, understanding, and judging. External causes may be efficient, final, or exemplary. If these principles are of general validity, then we will be led to affirm a first agent, a last end, and a primary exemplar of the universe of proportionate being.

Now, if being is intelligible,¹⁷⁴ then what is ^aaprt from intelligibility is nothing. Thus to talk about mere matters of fact that admit no explanation is to talk about nothing. But one cannot confine human knowledge within the domain of proportionate being without condemning it to mere matters of fact without explanation and so stripping it even of knowledge of proportionate being itself. That is, one cannot confine human knowledge to proportionate being without rendering it impossible as knowledge of anything. For knowledge is in judgment and judgment rests on a grasp of a conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled, a grasp of a "hypothetical necessity." Every proportionate being is contingent in its every aspect; as a matter of fact it is, but only because it happens to have its conditions fulfilled. If this happening is ultimate it is a mere matter of fact without explanation; it is unintelligible; it is nothing.

The most fundamental of all questions asks about existence (not Existenz), but existence cannot be accounted for within the limits of proportionate being. Knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded if there is proportionate being and if being is intelligible. Transcendent being cannot be contingent in any respect for if it were it would be a mere

matter of fact without explanation. Its existence--which is not "abstract identity" (whatever that is!)--must be necessary and self-explanatory. And as such it must ground the intelligibility (and thus the being and value) of everything about everything else that is. (Thus no Janus-like dipolar God is needed to ground the "significance and worthwhileness of our life in the world"). For reasons that we will not go into in greater detail here this "grounding" is efficient, exemplary, and final causality. Now this ultimate necessary ground cannot be necessitated in grounding a contingent universe nor can it be arbitrary in grounding an intelligible and thus good universe; thus the universe must proceed freely from the reasonable choice of a rational consciousness. Ogden's argument (see above, p. 20) that "classical theism" ends up in "the hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary creation of a wholly contingent world" is specious and uninformed. For this wholly contingent world is precisely what requires a necessarily existing, self-explanatory transcendent being who is an unrestricted act of understanding as as such is free. A necessarily existing, free being is not a "hopeless contradiction."

For Lonergan it is one and the same thing to understand what being is and to understand what God is. Now, in order to understand what being is one would have to enjoy an unre-

stricted act of understanding, which of course lies beyond the capacity of human intelligence. Thus there is this sense in which we do not know what God^s. But certain implications of our extrapolation to an unrestricted act of understanding and to transcendent being can help us to formulate a notion of God in a heuristic fashion. We will mention some of the elements in this heuristic notion.

The unrestricted act of understanding would be by identity a primary intelligible. This act, as unrestricted, would be invulnerable as understanding and would know that it was invulnerable. Knowing itself as invulnerable it would be a reflective act of understanding which would grasp itself as unconditioned and therefore true. Thus the primary intelligible, by identity, would be the primary truth. As known by true understanding, the primary truth would be the primary being. As identically intelligent and intelligible it would be spiritual.

The primary being would be without defect, lack, or imperfection. Otherwise the unrestricted act of understanding would grasp what was missing, i.e. it would grasp a restriction in the unrestricted act. In addition, as self-explanatory, the primary intelligible must be unconditional and thus not dependent on anything else. The primary being is simple (not

dipolar), for it is a single act that is at once unrestricted understanding, perfect affirming, perfect loving, the primary intelligible, the primary truth, and the primary good. As perfect, it is beyond all development; thus it is timeless and eternal.

The secondary intelligibles, or the secondary component in the idea of being, which is the content of the unrestricted act of understanding which the primary being is, are conditioned, since they are what is to be understood if the primary intelligible is understood. Thus they are distinct from the primary intelligible, the primary being. But they are not necessarily distinct realities; they may be mere objects of thought.

As perfect the primary being must be the omnipotent efficient cause, capable of grounding any possible universe and originating any instance of the good. As the unrestricted act of understanding, the primary being is the omniscient exemplary cause, grasping in itself the intelligible order of every possible universe of beings.

Since the secondary intelligibles need not be distinct realities, they are not unconditioned in being, intelligibility, and goodness. Thus they are contingent. But if they exist, then as contingent they cannot be necessary and as being they cannot be arbitrary. Thus they must exist as

freely caused by the primary being. Thus, once again, the primary being is free, and this is no contradiction to its necessary existence.

Lonergan's notion of God as Creator is different from Ogden's, which, despite his protestations to the contrary, does not allow for creatio ex nihilo. On Ogden's account God's efficient causality is limited to fashioning and ordering pre-existent matter. If this were the case, says Lonergan, the existence of this matter would be unexplained, and thus the matter would be nothing.

God's conserving causal activity is also different for Lonergan. Causality can be affirmed wherever there is a relation of dependence of effect on cause. Causality is not "an imaginable 'influence' occupying the space" between cause and effect. Nor is it a change in the cause, "for the fire does not change when it ceases to cook the potatoes and begins to cook the steak."¹⁷⁵

Lonergan and Ogden both consider God as personal. But they define "person" differently. For Ogden, "the very meaning of 'person' is to be related to others. If it doesn't mean that, it doesn't mean anything."¹⁷⁶ For Lonergan, "person" means "rational self-consciousness." " . . . an unrestricted act of rational self-consciousness . . . clearly satisfies

all that is meant by the subject, the person, the other with an intelligence and a reasonableness and a willing that is his own."¹⁷⁷ The difference hinges upon what is intrinsic to knowing and loving. For Ogden, knowing must be dependent upon what it knows, not vice versa. For Lonergan knowing, intrinsically, is intentional union with the known. Nothing else is necessarily required for an act to be an act of knowing. On this view, loving would be also a matter of union, which does not intrinsically involve reciprocation and dependence. Thus God's love for us would not have to be tied up with his being affected by us in his "actual state of being"; it would not be an "implemental love."¹⁷⁸ There is no reason to claim that such a God is "existentially repugnant." That this is the case is amply demonstrated by the final chapter in Insight where Lonergan presents the heuristic structure of a solution to the problem of evil on the basis of the notion of God which he has developed. The solution whose structure he proposes is entirely consonant with the full Biblical message.

FOOTNOTES

¹Schubert M. Ogden, Christ Without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. New York: Harper, 1961, p. 7. (Henceforth CM). The fact that Ogden's later book, The Reality of God, attempts in places to draw upon and criticize such Catholic theologians as Henri de Lubac and John Courtney Murray would seem to indicate that the vast company attempting theological construction today now extends for him beyond Protestant theologians.

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Ibid., p. 15.

⁴Ibid., p. 14.

⁵Ogden, The Reality of God and Other Essays (henceforth RG), New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 120.

⁶Ibid., p. 189; cf. CM, p. 15.

⁷Ibid., pp. 16 f.

⁸RG, pp. 120 f. It will be obvious that our view is that Ogden has given way to the same danger.

⁹Ibid., p. 122. It is significant, I believe, that in his essay on eschatology ("The Promise of Faith," RG, pp. 206-230), which, from a dogmatic point of view, is probably the most questionable of all his positions, Ogden seems to contradict this insistence on including all elements regarded as essential to the Scriptural witness: "The seriousness of our own systematic concern must be evidenced by gratefully receiving whatever guidance may be available to us from the New Testament. Our answer to the common question must indeed be our own, and it may even be that we will find it necessary to depart from some of the things said by the New Testament theologians." (Emphasis added). While it is true that Ogden does not think he is leaving out anything essential to the Scriptural witness by regarding the question of subjective survival of death as an open question, it is at least worthy of note that in the very essay in which he thus treats the question of death he finds it legitimate at times to depart from what is said in the New Testament.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 121.

¹¹Ibid., p. 20. The question must be raised whether Ogden has not fallen victim to the myth of the "world come of age," the propagation of which is perhaps contemporary theology's greatest sin. His confidence in the secular affirmation of the autonomy and significance of life here and now not only smacks of the new Pelagianism which especially characterizes American culture, philosophy, and theology, but also involves him in a denial that resurrection, in the sense of self-conscious survival of the individual--including the individual, Jesus Christ--is integral to Christian faith: a highly dubious example of fidelity to the Scriptural witness (1 Cor 15, 19: "If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied.")

¹²Ibid., pp. 1-6.

¹³CM, pp. 17 f.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 18. Our most serious criticisms of Ogden's theology will not have to do with the logical self-consistency of his thought. The difficulties lie rather in his lack of faithfulness to and reliance on Scripture for some of his affirmations and in his metaphysics of process. The theologian can take neither logical self-consistency nor relevance as any "final test of adequacy."

¹⁵RG, p. 56. If one accepts the distinction which Bernard Lonergan makes between conceptualists and intellectualists, Ogden is surely a conceptualist. He is more concerned with suitable and clear concepts than with true judgments. His scanty analyses of human experience's structure in no way differentiate the moment of judgment from that of conception. It is perhaps for this reason, more than any other, that, despite his talk of contingency, he never realizes the implications for an existential metaphysics of a judgmental recognition of proportionate being as contingent. In addition, for Ogden it seems equally important to say that God is the ground of all possible being as to say that he grounds all actual being.

¹⁶Ibid. Here we see an echo of the contemporary existentialist insistence on historicity or historicality. This emphasis is valuable. On the other hand, it is not exhaustive of what can be said about the possibility of true knowledge. If it were, the only issue would be complete relativism. Again, the absence of a theory of judgment is determinative.

The limited character of concepts does not rule out the possibility of true affirmations. If it were so, every sentence in Ogden's books would be false. The absence of a theory of judgment is also responsible for Ogden's statement that a Normaldogmatik is untenable. If one's analysis of knowledge stops with a theory of concepts, then all dogmas of the Church would have to be only cultural approximations at best.

¹⁷"However absurd talking about God might be, it could never be so obviously absurd as talking of Christian faith without God. If theology is possible today only on secularistic terms, the more candid way to say this is to admit that theology is not possible today at all.

" . . . Faith in God of a certain kind is not merely an element in Christian faith along with certain others; it simply is Christian faith, the heart of the matter itself. . . . All talk of a Christian theology post mortem dei is, in the last analysis, neither hyperbole nor evidence of originality but merely nonsense." Ibid., pp. 114 f.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 123.

²⁰Ibid., p. 72.

²¹For material on Ott, see James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Later Heidegger and Theology, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, especially Ott's own contribution, "What is Systematic Theology?", pp. 77-111 and Ogden's, "The Understanding of Theology in Ott and Bultmann," pp. 157-173.

²²RG, pp. 74-77.

²³Ibid., pp. 78-81. For a fuller treatment see Ogden's essay in The Later Heidegger and Theology.

²⁴RG, p. 82.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 82 f.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 84-87.

²⁷Ibid., p. 89.

²⁸Ibid., p. 88.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 91-93.

³⁰Ibid., p. 93. Ogden never seems to tell us exactly what the constant structure of our experience of reality is. He assumes elements from Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit which presumably for him would be the details of the constant structure of our experience. But is it not true that Heidegger is concerned to lay out prereflective, existentiell awareness only? Are there not further levels to our experience of reality? I would agree that one method--though not the only method--of arriving at an explicit metaphysics is by conceiving metaphysics, with Lonergan, as the "integral heuristic structure of proportionate being," and thus to work toward an explicit metaphysics by taking being to be isomorphic with knowing. But such a working-out of explicit metaphysics begins with a detailed account of the structure of human cognitional performance and takes being as isomorphic to that entire structure, i.e., as proportionate being. It is simply not clear what Ogden means by metaphysics and metaphysical assertions.

I should add that I have one reservation with Lonergan's cognitional analysis. I believe that he overlooks the intellectual element in experience, the first level of his cognitional structure. I believe that judgments are made at the level of experience, though they are not what Lonergan calls "reasonable affirmations," i.e., judgments based on the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned and thus containing their own criterion of adequacy. Now, if being is isomorphic with knowing, and if experience, as the first level of knowing, itself contains an intellectual element distinguishing it from animal awareness, this also leaves open the possibility that potency, the ontological element proportionate to experience in Lonergan's metaphysics, can be given a somewhat "richer" treatment than Lonergan gives it, a treatment which might be more consonant with the treatment of Aquinas.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., pp. 148 f.

³³Ibid., p. 97. It is questionable how urgent it now is to meet the challenges of a van Buren, since the radical theology which he represents seems to have invited reversal with amazing rapidity. The death-of-God theology is dead. On the other hand, we cannot but agree with Ogden that the theological elaboration of Christian faith must employ metaphysics. Our only question will concern the adequacy of the metaphysics of Ogden; indeed, we will have to ask whether it can be called metaphysics at all.

³⁴Ibid., p. 98.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 27 f.

³⁶Ibid., p. 111. Ogden quotes from Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 32.

³⁷RG, p. 113. Ogden thus seems to identify assent with belief. It is difficult to see: a) how he can speak of metaphysics as having something to say about "how things are" and yet not use conformity with "how things are" as his criterion of metaphysical and theological truth, in fact of all truth; and b) how he can speak of a true metaphysics at all when he takes credibility as his criterion of truth. Certainly this is not the view of the truth of metaphysics which most metaphysicians have used--and Ogden is so insistent on paying respect to usage!

³⁸Ibid., pp. 113 f.

³⁹Ogden rejects also the attempts of idealism and of the positivistic branch of linguistic analysis. We have already seen something of his objection to the latter attempt to deal with theological assertions. His criticisms of idealism are not spelled out in much detail.

⁴⁰RG, p. 158.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 158 f.

⁴³Ibid., p. 17. How many adherents of a metaphysical position based on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas would say they are heirs of a tradition which has been dominant and influential in Western culture?

Never once does Ogden distinguish the work of Aquinas from the long line of "classical theism" which, supposedly has been with us since the "age of the Fathers" and even from the time of "Greek metaphysics." In addition, never once does he tell us exactly what "Greek metaphysics" is--or rather whose it is. Arguments over the relevance and accuracy of the popular distinction between Greek and Hebrew thought often end up as shouting matches; but someone must be there to shout, "Which Greeks and which Hebrews are you talking about?"

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 174.

⁴⁶See, e.g., ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁷See, e.g., ibid., p. 51.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 163.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 18.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 49.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., p. 50.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 118. It is hardly necessary to state that anyone familiar with Aquinas' doctrine of God would say that this God has been utterly misrepresented by Ogden as the "impersonal Absolute of the Greek metaphysics of being." Further questions may also be asked: what other metaphysics can there be than a metaphysics of being? Which Greek metaphysics is Ogden referring to? Which Greek metaphysics speaks of an impersonal Absolute? Which Christian philosophy identifies God with such an impersonal Absolute? Where is the evidence?

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 150 f. Ogden has really said nothing about "the classical analogia entis." What is a relational concept? Where in the works of Aquinas is it said that relational concepts are predicated analogously of God? Is Ogden speaking of a concept such as "Father"? Does Aquinas predicate "Father" analogously of God? What kind of perfections does Aquinas predicate analogously of God? See Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, passim.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 17.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid. On p. 60, actus purus is defined as "the simultaneous actualization of all (even impossible) possibilities of being and value." Really!

theism" to satisfy modern man's insistence on logical self-consistency.⁵⁶ One of the difficulties is with the doctrine of creation. "Classical theism" tells us that God creates the world freely, as the contingent world our experience shows it to be. But we are also told that God's act of creation is one with his own eternal essence, which is in every respect necessary. Thus we are given "the hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary creation of a wholly contingent world."⁵⁷ Another difficulty regards the end of man. For "classical theism" the end of man is to serve or glorify God through obedience to his will and commandments. And yet the God of "classical theism" can be affected by neither our good actions nor our bad actions. He is actus purus, i.e., "a statically complete perfection incapable in any respect of further self-realization."⁵⁸ As such, he can be neither increased nor diminished by what we do, and so our action and suffering must be wholly indifferent to him.⁵⁹ A further difficulty concerns God's knowledge and love. For Scripture God is an eminent Person who knows and loves the world; for "classical theism" God knows and loves the world only if "know" and "love" are given meanings opposite to those we ordinarily assign these words. For in knowledge as we know it, the subject is really related to the object and not vice versa. But

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 17 f.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 49 f.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 152 f.

⁶²Ibid., p. 156.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴The context of these remarks would indicate that the "meaning of being as such" is provided in the writings of Martin Heidegger. Many difficulties are connected with Heidegger's use of the word Sein. I work here on a twofold assumption regarding Heidegger which can be substantiated only by further research: first, that Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, never deals with "being as such" in the sense in which Ogden wants to use the phrase here; "being" for Heidegger does not mean "the real." Secondly, Sein for Heidegger, and increasingly for the later Heidegger would seem to be more or less adequately equated with "the coming-to-be of meaning or significance."

If this is the case, and if a theology can be developed along Heideggerian lines only in conformity with Heidegger's own suggestion, "As philosophical thinking is related to being, when being speaks to thinking, so faith's thinking is related to God, when God is revealed in his word," then such a theology will be a phenomenology of faith; it will deal with God in his revelation-in-word, as he has revealed himself; it will deal with God quoad nos, with God as "economic." Such a theology will be a phenomenological thinking of revelation-in-word, not a metaphysics. It will speak neither of positive perfections inherent in the real nor of positive perfections in God as he is in himself, nor of how we can make statements about the latter perfections, nor of any analogy between proportionate being and transcendent being. If being for Heidegger is "the coming-to-be of meaning" and if primal temporality and real internal relatedness to "others" are intrinsic to being thus understood, and if Heidegger's analogy between philosophical thinking and theological thinking suggests the only valid way of utilizing Heidegger's thought in theology, then the most that can be said is that temporality and real internal relatedness are intrinsic to revelation, to the revealing word of God, to the coming-to-be of the word of God for man, in man, and through man--which no theologian has ever denied.

See James M. Robinson and John Cobb, Jr., eds., The Later Heidegger and Theology, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, esp. p. 43 and p. 35.

I am not here arguing against the use of Heidegger in theology; on the contrary, I believe that a phenomenology of faith's encounter with God's word, developed according to Heidegger's phenomenological method, would be very valuable. I am simply saying that Heidegger's thought is not metaphysics and is not intended to be metaphysics, and consequently that it cannot be put to the uses suggested by Ogden. Whether Heidegger would allow of the legitimacy of a properly metaphysical treatment of God is another question; the point is that it is precisely this kind of treatment of God that Ogden intends, and that such a metaphysical treatment of God is not Heidegger's interest.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 156 f.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 18. See also p. 51.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 18 f.

⁶⁸CM, pp. 18 f.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 21.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 23 f.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 27. As we have seen, Ogden's later book, The Reality of God, further refines the first of these characteristics. There are definite senses in which statements concerning God and his action can be "objectifying" but not "mythological," i.e. when they are metaphysical statements. Mythological objectifying employs the terms and categories based in our external perception of reality as the object of our ordinary sense experience. RG, p. 104.

⁷²CM, pp. 31 f. How faith can be possible when one accepts such a self-understanding is a problem Ogden does not consider as such. Ogden is far from being sufficiently critical of "modern man," who, as we have seen, seems in his opinion to have "come of age." Is it not true that one who feels he has to boast that he has come of age is himself at best an adolescent?

⁷³Ibid., p. 37.

⁷⁴RG, p. 104.

⁷⁵CM, p. 40. How man can be subject to this transcendent power without being open to the same power is a point which Ogden does not clarify.

⁷⁶RG, p. 105. Ogden quotes from Ryle's The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1949, p. 8.

⁷⁷CM, pp. 40 f. This interpretation of John is, of course, debatable.

⁷⁸See ibid., pp. 43-53.

⁷⁹See ibid., pp. 53-56.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 64.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 64-71.

⁸²A question for Heidegger, Bultmann, and Ogden: what of hope?

⁸³This interpretation of Heidegger is perhaps most justified in regard to his Introduction to Metaphysics, which establishes a mood of violent Promethean contentiousness. Heidegger's most recent writings, however, establish a very different atmosphere. See especially Was heisst Denken?

⁸⁴CM, pp. 71-75.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 76-83. The resurrection does not have a merely symbolic significance for Bultmann, though he is often understood as interpreting it in this limited way--largely through his own fault. James M. Robinson indicates that Bultmann's "talk of the Lord Jesus being encountered in the kerygma has perhaps been taken as more figurative than he really intends." Robinson quotes Bultmann in a discussion with von Campenhausen: "You are correct that 'the all-embracing effectiveness of the preaching of Christ is brought into question in so far as it does not give as its basis the real Christ event and as its goal the living fellowship with Christ.' We agree also 'that eternal life through the presence and future of Christ has a concrete eschatological dimension even beyond death.' And I agree when you characterize the hope as a real hope for a final victory over death

and the fulfillment of the gift of fellowship and the new existence out of grace alone. This is no mythological speculation." Quoted from McCormick Quarterly, XXVII (1964), p. 37, by Robinson in "Revelation as Word and History," Theology as History, vol. III of New Frontiers in Theology, Robinson and Cobb, eds.

Bultmann could have prevented a great deal of confusion had he uttered similar words on more occasions. Ogden, for example, shows no evidence of regarding this as the Bultmannian position on resurrection. Ogden interprets Bultmann as regarding the New Testament's statements on the resurrection as its attempt to express the decisive meaning of the cross for human existence, i.e., that Jesus' death is not merely a human death but God's redemptive judgment of the world, which frees man from himself. Resurrected life in Christ is seen only as an existentiell possibility that must be continually realized anew on the part of the believer.

Bultmann's ambiguity is bound up with his somewhat forced distinction between Historie and Geschichte, which itself is at least partly rooted in Kantian notions of space, time, and objectivity. A satisfactory alternative position on objectivity is offered by Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 375-384, where objectivity is connected with judgment.

⁸⁶ CM, pp. 83 f.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 87. Can the power of death be annihilated if death itself is not overcome?

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 88-90

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

⁹⁰ RG, pp. 90 f.

⁹¹ See CM, pp. 95-112.

⁹² Ibid., p. 117.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 118 f.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 123 f.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 138.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 134.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 127.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 136.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 140.

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 141 ff. Here we see, I believe, the difficulties involved in identifying Christian faith, salvation, and authentic human existence, and in a transposition from myth to existentialism. I would suggest that a non-Pelagian and non-exemplaristic transposition to an existentialist theology of man, in terms of an identification of salvation with authentic human existence, is possible and is in keeping with the teaching of the New Testament, provided that authenticity is defined, not with Heidegger as an unspecified "resolve," but with Bernard Lonergan, as self-transcendence, and provided that it is seen to be dependent on the grace and power of God. Such a definition permits us to maintain the necessary (for explicit Christian faith) connection between salvation (even as authentic human existence) and resurrection-as-fact. In this sense, until resurrection, we are always on the way towards authenticity as self-transcendence, which will be made possible only by the death-destroying power of God. In this way, hope can be restored to its rightful place in the triad of "theological virtues." (See, for the faint beginnings of such speculation by Lonergan--which he will develop in his Method in Theology--the short piece, "Openness as Religious Experience," in Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, New York: Herder and Herder, 1967, pp. 198-201). Obviously many other theological problems must be dealt with in a development such as this--problems which we cannot go into here.

¹⁰²Mythological?

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁰⁴Ibid. Ogden's Scriptural "proof text" is Matthew 25: 31-46. What does he do with Luke 12: 8f., another text referring to the "Last Judgment"? And what does he do with the "Last Judgment" motif even of his text, Matthew 25:31-46?

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 154. Ogden does not support this exegesis by appealing to any studies on Romans 1, 18 ff. Scriptural exegetes would be anything but unanimous in concurring with Ogden's interpretation.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 156.

¹¹⁰Ibid., pp. 156-162.

¹¹¹RG, pp. 203 f.

¹¹²The theological speculation of Karl Rahner on "anonymous Christianity" seems to be very pertinent to the discussion. It is also important in that, while it attempts to deal with much the same problem which here concerns Ogden, it avoids what must be regarded as an unwarranted "devaluation" of the person and significance of Jesus of Nazareth. I refer the reader to Klaus Riesenhuber, S.J., "The Anonymous Christian according to Karl Rahner," in Anita Roper, The Anonymous Christian, tr. by J. Donceel, S.J., New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966, pp. 145-179. The article draws on a very large selection of essays by Rahner and is an accurate summary of his thought on this subject. The question which Rahner wishes to deal with is: "Shall we, in our pastoral message to modern man, present Christianity as a new exigency added on, one which strikes him, in the depths of his self-understanding, as something foreign and inaccessible? Or may Christian preaching rightfully start from the personal experience of a human being who is simply concerned with his own threatened existence? In the last analysis, isn't its goal simply to explain and interpret what every man has personally experienced, as 'a theological depth-analysis' of human consciousness, as it really is?" Ibid., p. 145. Certainly, this question is close to, if not identical with, that of Professor Ogden.

Rahner, of course, takes as his starting-point a doctrine of the Church which Ogden does not recognize as integral to Christian faith: " . . . the end towards which mankind, in its supernatural finality, hence anonymous Christianity too, is directed on earth" (p. 147). The starting-point for an explanation of this end is the self-understanding, the existentiell self-understanding of faith,

which is different at least on this point for Rahner from what it is for Ogden. He then proceeds to reduce this doctrine to its prerequisites or conditions of possibility--when God wills the end, he also wills the means required for the end. The major difference is in the meaning of salvation, which for Rahner and the Christian tradition, is not exhausted by Ogden's authentic existence here and now (which is really a kind of exhaustively realized eschatology). The problem for Rahner is to discover the nature and requirements of a possibility of salvation which might be found in a non-official and incomplete way of belonging to the Church. The possibility of anonymous Christianity for Rahner can be established only if it can be shown that man can assume a certain position, through free decision, toward Christ and his Church, even in a visible manner, although he may never have heard of salvation in Christ and of the Church.

For Rahner a complete, self-contained anthropology is impossible without Christology. It cannot be developed along purely philosophical lines, even in terms of the (admittedly, for Rahner) acute analyses of Martin Heidegger. The Incarnation tells us that "human nature as such is the possible self-expression of the self-emptying God" (p. 154). The original possibility of man before God is to be the possible externalization of God in his self-emptying and thus the possible brother of Jesus Christ, God incarnate. " . . . the ultimate, distant goal of human nature is its fulfillment as the otherness of God" (p. 155). The Incarnation is a condition and constitutive element of the reception of the grace of God. Without Christ, there is no grace of God. Christ is not merely a definitive re-presentation of man's original possibility of authentic existence. He is, in many ways, the condition and foundation of this possibility. He is that possibility and his grace is our share in it.

¹¹³CM, p. 151.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 152.

¹¹⁵RG, p. 172.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid. For Ogden, the question of analogy is "perhaps the most complex and difficult question the theologian faces." Ibid., p. 174. He judges that Hartshorne's logic of

analogy resolves the "dilemma of anthropomorphism and agnosticism" in the classic theory of analogy by working out a frankly anthropomorphic view of God, conceiving God in strict analogy with the human self or person. "Thus, for example, if to be a self is possible only by being related to and dependent on others, and most directly on the others that constitute one's body, then God also can be conceived only as related to and dependent on the others that constitute his body, which is to say, the whole world of created beings. On the other hand, the word 'analogy' reminds us that God is not a self in univocally the same sense as man--that, as Whitehead puts it, God is not simply an exemplification of metaphysical principles, but is their 'chief' exemplification. So, whereas the human self is effectively related only to a very few others--indeed, only to a very few others within the intimate world of its own body--the divine Self is effectively related to all others in such a way that there are no gradations of intimacy of the various creatures to it." Ibid., pp. 175 f.

It must be asked if the notion of the whole world as God's body is not a supreme instance of mythical thinking. Rahner provides an interesting and satisfactory alternative in terms of Christology. The cosmos has its purpose in man, who is a potentia obedientialis for the hypostatic union, for the Incarnation of God. Human nature as such is the possible self-expression of the self-emptying God, the possible "em-body-ment" of God.

118 RG, p. 14.

119 Ibid., pp. 15 f.

120 Ibid., p. 16.

121 Ibid., p. 20.

122 Ibid., p. 114. There are times when Ogden sounds like Norman Vincent Peale!

123 Ibid., pp. 114 f. Ogden does not seem to have faced the fact that a God who fulfills the function of providing security is just as existentially repugnant to some as his caricature of "classical theism's" God is to him. Moreover, such a God is not the God and Father of Jesus Christ.

124 Ibid., pp. 115 f. This seems to conflict with earlier suggestions that only "modern secular man" has such a confidence.

125 Ibid., p. 118.

126 Ibid., p. 21. "Unless God is somehow real for every man, he is not genuinely real for any man. To take exception to this statement is . . . to call in question the very meaning of faith in God as attested down through the Christian tradition." Ibid., p. 22. While this is in a way true, there certainly are other points on which Ogden does not seem to object to calling the entire Christian tradition in question.

127 Ibid., pp. 123-126.

128 Ibid., p. 23.

129 Ibid., p. 24.

130 Ibid., pp. 24 f.

131 For the preceding, see ibid., pp. 27-47.

132 Ibid., pp. 47 f.

133 Ibid., p. 48.

134 Now Descartes has been added to the pile of "classical theists" who have formed our Western intellectual heritage!

135 Ibid., pp. 57 f.

136 Without proposing that metaphysics begin with "such things as tables and chairs," I ask simply why, according to Ogden's logic, such a starting-point could not lead to this same conclusion. Are tables and chairs any less affected by real relatedness and temporality than human selves? (Does Ogden think that tables and chairs would be "substances" in Thomistic metaphysics? Apparently!)

137 Ibid., p. 58.

138 So it is called on ibid., p. 58.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid., p. 60.

141 Ibid., p. 61.

142
Ibid.

143 Ibid. Ogden conceives this as a solution to what John Courtney Murray has called "the central problem of Christian philosophy--the problem of the coexistence and coagency of the infinite and the finite, the necessary and the contingent, the eternal and the temporal, the absolute and the relative." God's abstract identity is independent of the actual world but his concrete existence includes this world. Ibid., p. 62.

144 Ibid., p. 62. Ogden does not mention--indeed he seems to deny--that for "classical theism" also, one cannot deny that God ever existed in isolation from a world, for one does not properly use the word "ever" in this way to refer to God. The use of the word "ever" properly implies a "world" of creatures.

145 Ibid., p. 63. This is to miss the whole point of the contingency-in-existence of the world of being which is proportionate to human knowing. To miss this point is to deny another point which Ogden wishes to affirm--that God is the sole ultimate "ground" of all creaturely existence.

146 See ibid., p. 63. " . . . considerably more important . . . " We must take issue with Ogden's hierarchy of priorities.

147 Ibid., p. 64.

148 Ibid., pp. 68 f.

149 Ibid., p. 96.

150 Ibid., pp. 144-163.

151 Quoted in ibid., p. 145, from Sein und Zeit, Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1927, p. 427, n. 1.

152 Ibid., pp. 147 f. If this is the case the uncertainty concerning the applicability of the classical via negationis et eminentiae can be removed. The point of this via is that such an analysis of the divine essence is impossible. (It must be added that there is really no such thing as a via negationis et eminentiae; there is a via affirmationis, negationis, et eminentiae. All three aspects of this single via must be included).

153 Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁵⁴Has Ogden properly understood the meaning of Heidegger's Sorge?

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 153. It would seem that this notion is similar to the Biblical notion of "eternity," which, however, a "classical metaphysics" would claim to be anthropomorphic and mythical. It is true that Heidegger has arrived at a unique and original analysis of human temporality to which the Christian doctrine of God must address itself. But it is also probable that the Christian doctrine of God would properly find Heidegger's analysis helpful only for a phenomenological unfolding of the coming-to-be of God's word for man.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 154. " . . . Heidegger's implied reformulation of the analogia entis is not, like the classical precedent, involved in essential incoherence. Perfections entailing temporal distinctions may be predicated of God without being emptied of meaning by contradictory negations; and the assertion of God's qualitative distinction from finite beings does not exclude, but positively implies, the meaningfulness of such predication." Ibid.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁵⁸Is there such a thing? Only for the relativist, who overlooks the function and nature of judgment and declares that, unless one knows everything about everything, one really knows nothing at all.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 177 f.

¹⁶¹Ibid., pp. 178 f. Which of the voices of the past is Ogden listening to on these points? Is he not rather reversing essential elements of New Testament and Christian tradition? Particularly regarding redemption, Ogden is not offering simply a re-statement or even a re-interpretation. It simply must be said that here theology has ceased being fides quaerens intellectum--unless, of course, fides is understood in the strange way in which Ogden understands it. This may be a form of "faith;" it is not Christian faith.

¹⁶²Ibid., pp. 180-184.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 184. "To say with the Christian community . . . that Jesus is the decisive word and deed of God is to say that in him, in his outer acts of symbolic word and deed, there is expressed that understanding of human existence which is, in fact, the ultimate truth about our life before God; that the ultimate reality with which we and all men have

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to do is God the sovereign Creator and Redeemer, and that in understanding ourselves in terms of the gift and demand of his love, we realize our authentic existence as men." Ibid., pp. 185 f. This is certainly exemplarism with regard to the person of Christ; it is very close to Pelagianism.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 230.

166 Insight, p. 636.

167 Ibid., p. 634.

168 Ibid., p. 643.

169 Ibid., p. 644.

170 Ibid., p. 645.

171 Ibid., p. 646.

172 Ibid., p. 648.

173 Ibid., p. 650.

174 And such it must be if it is the objective of the pure desire to know, the goal of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, the object of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, what is known by understanding correctly, what is known completely when there are no further questions to be asked.

175 Ibid., p. 663.

176 Albert Outler, Schubert Ogden, John Deschner, Tri-
logue on the "Death of God." Perkins School of Theology,
Southern Methodist University, 1966, p. 16.

177 Insight, p.p 668 f.

178 See Jules Toner, The Experience of Love, Washington:
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