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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAINT THOMAS'S  
THEORY OF FREEDOM**

by

**Robert Michael Doran, S.J., A.B.**

**A Digest Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate  
School of Saint Louis University in Partial  
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
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The Thomistic doctrine of freedom is often presented in a distorted fashion. Saint Thomas gives a major treatment of the problem of freedom in six of his works: the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the De Veritate, the Summa contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae: Prima Pars, the De Malo, and Summa Theologiae: Prima Secundae. Exponents of Saint Thomas's theory of freedom usually appeal to the De Veritate and the Prima Pars for their sources. Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B., has shown conclusively that these are relatively early works of Saint Thomas, and, moreover, that they contain several elements which were adopted by the Latin Averroists, whose doctrine of freedom was condemned by a Catholic Bishop in 1270. Lottin shows that Saint Thomas wrote the De Malo and the Prima Secundae after this condemnation, and that in these two works he unequivocally avoids any doctrine that could be distorted into the positions which were condemned. It is only reasonable to assume that the definitive Thomistic doctrine on freedom should be found in these two later works.

The De Malo and the Prima Secundae presents a doctrine of freedom in which the will assumes a more active aspect than was attributed to it in the earlier works. Freedom is rooted in the will, and the spontaneity of the acting subject is brought out more clearly by the emphasis on the self-determination of the will. A distinction between freedom of

specification and freedom of exercise is emphasized. In addition, God is introduced as an immediate mover of the will in its absolute acts, i.e., in the first of any series of will acts. Because of the emphasis on the subjective root of freedom, the doctrine is far more experientially relevant than the earlier doctrine.

This thesis studies the development of the Thomistic doctrine of freedom through the six works mentioned above. A careful analysis of the important texts is attempted, together with an effort to outline the changes from one work to the next. Some problems still remain to be solved, and these are mentioned in the Conclusion.



#### VITA AUCTORIS

Robert Michael Doran, S.J., was born in New York City on June 20, 1939. He attended Saint Monica Parochial School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Marquette University High School, also in Milwaukee. On August 16, 1956, he entered the Society of Jesus at Oshkosh, Wisconsin. In September, 1958, he began the course of literary studies at Santa Clara University, San Jose, California. Two years later he entered the Division of Philosophy of the College of Philosophy and Letters, Saint Louis University. He received the Bachelor of Arts degree in June, 1962.





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COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF CANDIDACY:

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## INTRODUCTION

The initial inspiration to write a thesis dealing with Saint Thomas's theory of human freedom originated in the persuasion that Saint Thomas's metaphysical framework should be able to sustain a theory of freedom which would be equally as experientially relevant as the contemporary existentialist theories, and ultimately more satisfying because of the metaphysical substructure involved.<sup>1</sup> Systematic philosophy, as opposed to descriptive or phenomenological inquiry, can be justified only if it serves to explain the whole of reality; a system that is not all-inclusive cannot justify its existence. A phenomenological inquiry must take account of all relevant data, but until it claims to be a system, a theory, it is not forced to incorporate its findings into definitions and principles which are internally consistent with one another.

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<sup>1</sup>While we refer to the metaphysical substructure of Saint Thomas's theory of freedom, it should not be thought that this thesis will deal with freedom as a participated perfection, as the highest created realization of the transcendental agere. This thesis is primarily psychological, not metaphysical. But metaphysics can by no means be excluded from any psychological discussion bearing upon the immanent structure of man. For structure is a metaphysical problem. Ultimately as we shall see, it is the structure of the human agent as such that founds the Thomistic theory of freedom; also, as we shall see, a developing metaphysical insight into this structure is responsible for the changes in Saint Thomas's theory of freedom. (A properly metaphysical study of freedom is given in J. de Finance, Existence et Liberte, Paris-Lyon: Vitte, 1955).

A phenomenological inquiry as such does not claim to be definitive.

Now what will determine whether a system is inclusive of all reality or not is its metaphysics. And when a system attempts to discuss such a question as human freedom, it must provide a framework which meets the common experience of men. The metaphysics on which this discussion is founded will determine whether or not the question is handled adequately.

The usual presentation of the Thomistic theory of human freedom is based principally on Saint Thomas's earlier writings on the subject, particularly in the De Veritate and the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae. Don Odon Lottin has shown conclusively that a chronology of Saint Thomas's works can be based on the changes in his doctrine of freedom.<sup>2</sup> I would like to investigate carefully the texts involved and illustrate the changes that take place from one work to the next. A major concern is to show that the Thomistic theory of freedom as found in the De Malo and the Prima Secundae of the Summa

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<sup>2</sup>Odon Lottin, O.S.B., Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siecles, Vol. I, Louvain: Gembloux, 1942, pp. 226-262. Lottin claims that a central factor influencing Saint Thomas's change of doctrine was the condemnation in 1270 by Bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris of the two following propositions: that man's will is determined in its will acts and choices; that free choice is a passive power moved necessarily by its object. P. 252. This condemnation was aimed at the Latin Averroists, who had distorted the text of Saint Thomas's Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate in order to use it as a support for their own theory. Ibid., p. 253.



Theologias is a very experiential theory and one into which the contemporary existentialist themes of "determining one's destiny" or "giving a basic orientation to one's life" can be fit. Fr. Joseph de Finance, a leading exponent of Thomistic psychology and ethics, says that experiences such as these must be used in order to convince a man that he is free.<sup>3</sup>

The early works, on which most presentations of Saint Thomas's thought are based, handle the problem of human freedom very analytically; it is doubtful whether the relationship of these analyses to human experience enters into Saint Thomas's formal treatment. The ordinary awareness that man has of his freedom involves an element of self-determination with regard to the values which will be assumed as meaningful in one's life. The early works of Saint Thomas provide no framework to explain this awareness; in fact, in the Prima Pars, as we shall see, freedom is explicitly restricted to those acts bearing upon non-necessary means to man's ultimate end. The determination of the end itself is not free; the only reason man can reject God is because of his imperfect knowledge of God. This implies that freedom is intermingled with or conditioned by imperfection, that perfect knowledge would provide a deterministic setting, and that God is a means to man's happiness. (Saint Thomas of course would always have denied these consequences, but it is

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<sup>3</sup>Existence et Liberte, pp. 5-12.

difficult to see how he could have systematically worked himself out of them.) The early analyses are for the most part ex parte objecti (the Prima Pars exclusively so); when the analysis is made in the early works ex parte subjecti, the result is something bordering on psychological determinism. My aim is to show that the final theory of human freedom elaborated by Saint Thomas avoids all of these pitfalls by appealing to the vill's more radical self-determination regarding both ends and means.<sup>4</sup> This final theory presents us with a structural account of man-in-his-activities capable of supporting the phenomenological findings which themselves confirm the common human experience of being free; this common experience is one of determining what values will be meaningful in my life, what particular orientation my life, or a given portion of it, will assume.

The condemnation of 1270 mentioned two aspects of human action in particular, velle and eligere. While Saint Thomas deals

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<sup>4</sup> Of the materials listed in the bibliography, the references most directly useful for this thesis were Lottin's book and article, Roniti's book, and Klubertanz's article. Lottin has dealt with the chronological sequence of Saint Thomas's works, basing his findings on the development of the doctrine of freedom. His studies initiated interest in this problem. Roniti has a general study of the development of the doctrine on the human act. His findings are basically the same as those of Lottin, though he covers more areas. Klubertanz has studied the relationship between the early and the later works and has emphasized the metaphysical elements in the later doctrine. In addition, Rosemary Z. Lauer has questioned several of Lottin's theses; her arguments become weaker with each work which she studies.

with other aspects of the human act, these two features occupy his attention to a greater degree. This thesis, consequently, will deal with these two elements and will not be a presentation of the entire human act. Some other features must be introduced, especially deliberation and the practical judgment, but we shall consider these only in so far as they bear upon the act of choice.

## CHAPTER I

### THE COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES

The beginnings of a theory of freedom are presented in St. Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. An integral presentation of the free act is not put forth in any single group of texts; rather, it must be culled from various texts scattered throughout the four volumes of this work.<sup>1</sup> Given such a situation, it seems that the best manner of proceeding is to group the necessary considerations into a number of categories, study each topic separately, and then try to draw together the various categories into a single unit.

The first topic to be considered is St. Thomas's understanding of will. The consideration of will as appetite is present wherever St. Thomas is writing about the nature of will. Therefore, we shall first consider two facts about appetite in general.

First of all, appetite is passive with regard to its object.

Love pertains to appetite, and appetite is a passive power. As the Philosopher says . . . the appetible is an unmoved mover, while appetite moves only insofar as it is moved. Now every passive power is perfected insofar

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<sup>1</sup>There is, however, a central core of texts in the second volume, distinctions 24 and 25.

as it is informed by the form of its active correlative; it is in this that its motion terminates. Just as the intellect, before being informed by the intelligible species, seeks and doubts, and after being informed, ceases to inquire, being now fixed and settled, so too appetite, when it attains the good which is its object, rests in it and adheres to it as if it were fixed in it; and this is love.<sup>2</sup>

The second general consideration with regard to appetite is that it is always somehow connected with knowledge. "Every desire follows upon knowledge."<sup>3</sup> This is the same consideration which St. Thomas uses in his fifth way of proving the existence

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<sup>2</sup>"Dicendum quod amor ad appetitum pertinet. Appetitus autem est virtus passiva. Unde in III De Anima, dicit Philosophus quod appetibile movet sicut movens non motum, appetitus autem sicut movens motum. Omne autem passivum perficitur secundum quod formatur per formam sui activi et in hoc motus ejus terminatur et quiescit. Sicut intellectus, antequam formetur per formam intelligibilem, inquit et dubitat: qua cum informatur fuerit, inquisitio cessat et intellectus in illo figitur; tunc et dicitur intellectus firmiter illi rei inhaerere. Similiter quando affectus vel appetitus omnino inbuitur forma boni quod est sibi objectus; complacet sibi in illo et adhaeret ei quasi fixum in ipso, et tunc dicitur amare ipsum." In III, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>3</sup>I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1. "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, quamvis omne desiderium consequatur cognitionem, desiderium tamen creaturae insensibilis non sequitur cognitionem in ipsa existentem, sed cognitionem motoris primi, quicumque sit ille, ordinantis unusquodque in suum finem."

Also: "Omne autem desiderium finis praecedit aliqua cognitio praestituens finem, et dirigens in finem ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed in quibusdam ista cognitio non est conjuncta ipsi tendenti in finem; unde oportet quod dirigatur per aliquod prius agens, sicut sagitta tendit in determinatum locum per determinationem sagittantis; et ita est in omnibus quae agunt per necessitatem naturae; quia horum operatio est determinata per intellectum aliquem instituentem naturam; unde Philosophus . . . dicit, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae." I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1.

of God. The argument from finality shows that the natural appetites of noncognitive beings demand a creative intellect which has knowledge of the goals toward which these appetites tend. In cognitive beings, appetite and knowledge are, as we shall see, closely connected, and in various ways, depending on the type of knowledge that is had.<sup>4</sup> The difference between the tendential actions which are placed by a knowing being and those found on the noncognitive level is that the cognitive being can represent to itself the end; its desire and its action follow upon this representation.<sup>5</sup>

This framework permits St. Thomas to distinguish the levels of appetite.

There are two ways in which a thing can tend towards a goal. The first is that it direct itself to the goal; this is found only in those beings with a knowledge both of the goal and of its precise ratio as goal. A being can also be directed by another; it is in this way that all beings tend according to their nature toward their own proper and natural goals, directed by the wisdom of the orderer of nature. And so we find these two appetites: a natural appetite, which is the inclination of a thing to its natural goal as directed by God, and a voluntary appetite, which is the appetite of a being who knows both the goal and the steps to be taken to reach the goal. And

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<sup>4</sup>"In aliquibus autem ista cognitio est conjuncta ipsi agenti, ut patet in animalibus." Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>This is not meant to imply that the representation exercises a physical efficient causality on the appetite. We are in the area of final causality, which is never presented by St. Thomas in a physicalist or mechanical manner. See Joseph de Finance, S.J., "La motion du bien," Gregorianum 39 (1958), pp. 6-11; idem, Essai sur L'agir humain, Rome, 1962, pp. 105-108.

between these two appetites there is another kind, which follows upon that kind of knowledge of a goal which however does not include the knowledge of either the ratio of goal or the means-end relationship.<sup>6</sup>

Not only does the presence of appetite demand a knower for its explanation, but knowledge demands the presence of appetite.

In every nature where knowledge is found, there is also found appetite and pleasure. The reason for this is that a knowing being can judge what is fitting for itself and what is not; and what it judges to be fitting it also desires. In us there is a twofold appetite corresponding to our two kinds of knowledge: that which accompanies intellectual knowledge is called will; that which is consequent upon sense knowledge is divided into the irascible appetite and the concupiscible appetite.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>"Sic ergo dupliciter aliquid tendit in fines. Uno modo directum in fines a seipso, quod est tantum in cognoscente fines et rationem finis. Alio modo directum ab alio; et hoc modo omnia secundum suam naturam tendunt in fines proprios et naturales, directi a sapientia instituyente naturam. Et secundum hoc invenimus duos appetitus: scilicet appetitum naturalem qui nihil aliud est quam inclinatio rei in fines suam naturalem qui est ex directione instituentis naturam, et iterum appetitum voluntarium qui est inclinatio cognoscentis fines et ordinem ad fines illum. Et inter hos duos appetitus est medius unus, qui procedit ex cognitione finis sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis et proportio ejus quod est ad fines ipsum; et iste est appetitus sensitivus." III, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>7</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod in omni natura ubi invenitur cognitio, invenitur etiam voluntas et delectatio. Cujus ratio est, quia omne quod habet virtutem cognoscitivam, potest judicare conveniens et repugnans; et quod apprehenditur ut conveniens oportet esse volitum vel appetitum. Et ideo in nobis secundum duplicem cognitionem sensus et intellectus est duplex appetitiva: una quae sequitur apprehensionem intellectus, quae voluntas dicitur; alia quae sequitur apprehensionem sensus, quae dividitur in irascibiles et concupiscibiles." I, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1.

The will, then, is the appetitive faculty of the intellectual part of man. As appetite, the will tends to the good. As intellectual, it tends to the good as known by intellect.

Passive potencies are distinguished according to the distinctions between the active correlatives by which they are moved. That which moves an appetitive power is properly an apprehended good. Therefore appetites are distinguished according to the distinction of the cognitive faculties with which they are associated; thus the rational appetite tends toward the good as known by intellect, that is, the good simply and in general, whereas sense appetite tends toward the particular good, here and now apprehended by sense powers.<sup>8</sup>

The ratio of the good is apprehended intellectually, and it is in terms of this intellectual awareness that the will is to be understood.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the nature and capacity of intellectual knowledge, and because of the nature of the intellectually known good, there are two types of motion toward the good possible for the will. The first is natural and necessary; the second involves a further operation of reason. St. Thomas labels the distinction

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<sup>8</sup>"Dicendum quod potentiae passivae variantur secundum quod sunt natae moveri a diversis activis, per se loquendo. Proprium autem motivum appetitivae virtutis est bonum apprehensum. Unde oportet quod secundum diversas virtutes apprehendentes sint etiam diversi appetitus: scilicet appetitus rationalis qui est de bono apprehenso secundum rationem vel intellectum, unde est de bono apprehenso simpliciter et in universali; et appetitus sensitivus qui est de apprehenso secundum vires sensitivas, unde est de bono particulari et ut nunc." III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>9</sup>"... natura intellectualis, ex qua inest homini inclinatio ad appendum per se desiderabilia et honesta . . ." II, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.



as that obtaining between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut ratio. The will is a particular nature, and as such is determined to particular activities and tendencies. The necessary determination of the will is to the good simply as such, and when an object is presented to the will simply as good, the will must tend to that object, out of a necessity of nature. But if the good presented to the will is a good only in relation, that is, as a means to an ulterior end which is seen as good in itself, then the will which is moved toward the related good or to the end as obtainable through the related good is called voluntas ut ratio or voluntas deliberata. The most complete text on this point is the following:

Since the different grades of appetite are consequent upon different types of apprehension, every appetite is said to tend toward a good according to the way in which the good is known. For example, there is in us a sense appetite which follows upon sense knowledge; sense knowledge can grasp only the good of the body; and so this appetite tends toward that which is desirable by sense, and in no way toward a spiritual good such as knowledge. But there is also in us a natural faculty of willing by which we desire that which in itself is good for man as such; this appetite is consequent upon the absolute consideration of the intellect; and thus man wants knowledge, virtue, and so forth. We also have acts of willing (voluntas deliberata) that follow upon the deliberation of reason concerning the end and the diverse circumstances; by these acts we tend toward that which is good in relation to the end or to some given circumstance.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>"Sciendum tamen quod cum sint diversi gradus appetitus consequentes diversas apprehensiones, nullus appetitus tenetur tendere in illud bonum cuius rationem non apprehendit. Verbi gratia, in nobis est quidam appetitus sensitivus consequens

The other texts which refer to these two notions of the will also seem to classify them according to the will-to-end simply and the will-to-end-as-obtained-through-means or the will-to-means-as-ordered-to-end.<sup>11</sup> The first notion we can refer to as velle, the second as either intentio or electio.<sup>12</sup> The question of the freedom or determination of these acts will be considered later. Right now, we merely want to see what St. Thomas means by the terms that enter into his discussion of the free act.

In the passage quoted above, the naturally willed good is referred to as "that which in itself is good for man as such."

apprehensionem sensus, qui non est nisi de bono convenienti secundum corpus: unde hoc appetitu appetitur delectabile secundum sensum; nullo autem modo aliquod bonum spirituale, ut scientia. Est et quedam voluntas in nobis naturalis qua appetimus id quod secundum se bonum est homini, inquantum est homo; et hoc sequitur apprehensionem rationis, prout est aliquid absolute considerans; sicut vult homo scientiam, virtutes, sanitates et huiusmodi. Est etiam in nobis quedam voluntas deliberata consequens actum rationis deliberantis de fine et diversis circumstantiis, et secundum hanc tendimus in illud quod habet rationem bonitatis ex fine vel ex aliqua circumstantia." I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 4.

<sup>11</sup>See II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1; II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, c; II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, c. and ad 1.

<sup>12</sup>Ad quintum dicendum, quod intentio non est actus voluntatis absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem actum voluntatis ordinantem. Sed ratio potest ordinare actum voluntatis dupliciter: vel secundum quod est de fine, et sic actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem est intentio; vel secundum quod est de his quae sunt ad fines, et sic actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem est electio." II, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5.

The bonum simpliciter is thus further defined in relation to man, and moreover to man as an intellectual being. It would seem that St. Thomas does not here see the will as the proper and principal appetite of man in his totality, but only as the appetite corresponding to that cognitive power which distinguishes man from other animals. The will is not seen as the inner dynamism of the total man.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> An interesting text in this regard is the following:  
 "Ad quartum dicendum, quod eligere non pertinet ad omnes vires, sed ad aliquam determinate, quamvis unaquaque vis in suum conveniens tendat et contrarium refugiat: hoc enim non fit ipsa vi eligente, sed vel propter ordinem naturalem potentiae ad objectum . . . , vel per electionem liberi arbitrii: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, . . . intelligentia non solum sibi intelligit, sed toti animae, et similiter voluntas non sibi soli vult; et similiter de aliis." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4. The interesting point is that the will is not described as naturally desiring, in the first instant, those goods which properly pertain to the lower powers of man. The same point is made explicitly in the following passage: "Appetitus autem rationalis est qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis, et hic dicitur motus rationis, qui est actus voluntatis. Sed rationis apprehensio dupliciter esse potest. Una simplex et absoluta, quando scilicet statim sine discussione apprehensum dijudicat, et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas quae dicitur non deliberata. Alia est inquisitiva, quando scilicet ratiocinando, bonum vel malum, conveniens vel nocivum investigat, et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas deliberata. Ratio ergo inferior quae terrenis disponendis intendit, utroque modo motum voluntatis circa terrena elicere potest: vel quando subito apprehendit hoc esse conveniens vel nocivum corpori; et tunc sequitur motus rationis inferioris, qui dicitur delectatio: quia tunc accipit illud quod corpori delectabile est ut faciendum; vel quando inquirendo deliberat, et tunc non potest sequi appetitus ante deliberationem finitam, et tunc consentire dicitur in delectationem. Ratio autem superior, quia per se rebus terrenis non intendit, sed solum secundum quod regulatur rationibus aeternis, non sequitur ipsam aliquis motus nisi deliberatur respectu horum terrenorum." II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1. For a discussion of the will as naturally desiring the goods of the nonintellectual parts of man, see de Finance, La Motion du bien, pp. 30-36; and Essai sur L'agir humain, pp. 115-117.

With these considerations as a background, we can now proceed to St. Thomas's discussion of human freedom in the Commentary on the Sentences. There is no integral psychological account of the human act given, and it is very difficult to construct a meaningful theory on the complete human act from the material available. From the accounts presented in the Prima Secundae, we can select those factors which are also discussed in the Commentary on the Sentences. The first point, then, is the act of intentio.<sup>14</sup> Intentio is properly an act of the will and not of the intellect, since it means to tend toward something.<sup>15</sup> The notion of tendere in aliquid introduces the question of the distance of that to which the will is tending. If the will tends immediately to something, the act is not referred to as intentio (whether the good be the ultimate end or a means to that end). Intentio is properly that act of the will by which one wishes to gain one thing by means of another thing. Intentio is properly the movement toward the end, but through the means. Since the ordering of means to end is involved, intentio is said to be properly an act of the will, insofar as it contains the

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<sup>14</sup>Strictly speaking the question of liberty of exercise should be discussed first, but since the question arises in this work only in connection with the later act of eligere, it is best left till later.

<sup>15</sup>"Intentio enim dicitur quasi in aliud tendere. Intendere autem in aliquid est illius potentiae ad quam pertinet prosequi vel fugere aliquid. Haec autem est appetitus vel voluntas, non autem intellectus." II, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2.

perfection of the ordering intellect.<sup>16</sup> The motion of the will to the end as obtainable by the means and to the means themselves is one and the same act.<sup>17</sup> The act of intentio follows upon a judgment of the practical intellect, rather than

<sup>16</sup>"Per hoc autem quod dicitur in aliquid tendere, importatur quedam distantia illius in quod aliquid tendit; et ideo quando appetitus fertur immediate in aliquid, non dicitur esse intentio illius, sive hoc sit finis ultimus, sive sit aliquid ad finem ultimum; sed quando per unum quod vult in aliud pervenire nititur, illius in quod pervenire nititur dicitur esse intentio. Hoc autem est finis: propter quod intentio dicitur esse de fine non secundum quod voluntas in finem absolute fertur, sed secundum quod ex eo quod est ad finem, in finem tendit. Unde intentio in ratione sua ordinem quandam unius ad alterum importat. Ordo autem unius ad alterum, non est nisi per intellectum, cuius est ordinare. Sed in quibusdam intellectus ordinans appetitum, in finem est coniunctus ipsi appetitui, sicut in habentibus intellectum, ut in homine et in angelo; in quibusdam autem intellectus ordinans est separatus, sicut in naturalibus, quae diriguntur in finem ab intellectu naturae instituyente, et finem sibi praesignante. Appetitus autem intellectui coniunctus, voluntas dicitur; sed appetitus ab intellectu separatus est appetitus sensibilis et naturalis. Quaecumque autem cujuslibet horum appetituum intentio communis sit, per prius tamen in voluntate invenitur, quae ab intellectu conjuncto in finem dirigitur; et ideo intentio primo et per se actus voluntatis nominat secundum quod in ea est vis intellectus ordinatis." II, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, c.

<sup>17</sup>"Ita etiam dico de eo quod est ad finem: quia quaedam sunt quae quaeruntur propter finem, quae nihilominus habent in se unde desiderantur; et in talia potest voluntas ferri dupliciter: vel secundum quod ea propter finem quaerit, et sic idem est motus voluntatis qui est in finem et in illud quod est ad finem; vel secundum quod ipsa sunt quaedam res per se desiderabiles, et sic alia voluntas de utroque. Sed quaedam sunt quae non desiderantur nisi in relatione ad finem, ut sectio et ustio, et in talibus nunquam differt motus voluntatis, secundum quod voluntas fertur in ista et in finem eorum: quia in eo voluntas non fertur, nisi prout considerantur sub relatione ad finem." II, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, c. (See also ad 1 and ad 2.)

upon a speculative act.<sup>18</sup> This introduces the whole question of the mutual causality of the intellect and will in the human act, but this is a problem better handled after liberum arbitrium and electio have been considered.

The human capacity for freedom is referred to consistently as liberum arbitrium, a traditional term in the psychology with which St. Thomas was familiar.<sup>19</sup>

Liberum arbitrium is not a habit, as some other authors wanted to say.<sup>20</sup> First of all, these authors misused the word "habit," because, in its strict use, this term refers to a principle of activity superadded to an operative power; those who wished to apply the term to liberum arbitrium, however, did not want to use it in this fashion. Rather, they wished it to express a facility toward action within a power, or pertaining to a power by reason of that power's cooperation with another

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18"Intendere autem in aliquid est illius potentiae ad quam pertinet prosequi vel fugere aliquid. Haec autem est voluntas, non autem intellectus. Sed verum est quod intellectus practicus dicit aliquid de fugiendo vel prosequendo . . . : unde iudicium fugae et prosecutionis ad intellectum practicum pertinet, non autem ipsa prosecutio et fuga. Intellectus autem speculativus neque fugit aut prosequitur, neque etiam aliquid de fugiendo et prosequendo dicit." Ibid.

19For a discussion of the use of the term in twelfth and thirteenth century authors, see Dom Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siecles (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1942), Vol. I, pp. 11-224.

20Lottin says St. Thomas is speaking here of Saint Bonaventure. See p. 208.

power. This, they said, is the meaning of the saying that liberum arbitrium is a facultas voluntatis et rationis.

Moreover, says St. Thomas, the usage employed by these authors is itself deficient. If intellect and will are considered separately, then liberum arbitrium, as a facility (habilitas) for action, if it is not distinct from the power, will be itself a power. If intellect and will are considered as ordered to one another, it does not follow that one is the habit of the other, for a potency cannot be the habit of a potency. Nor is the relation between them properly called a habit.

St. Thomas does not like to call liberum arbitrium habitual potency,<sup>21</sup> for two reasons. First of all, it is of the very nature of the will to have power over its own act; and so the use of the term habitus in any fashion is misleading. In addition, a habit not only renders an act easy but also good (in relation, of course, to the power which it perfects. The point is that the act of the will, being the act of man as such, tends freely at times to what is evil for man, and so its act<sup>g</sup> is not good.)

liberum arbitrium is thus not a habit, but rather is a

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<sup>21</sup>According to Lottin, St. Thomas is here dealing with the teaching of Alexander of Hales. See p. 209. An habitual potency is defined as a potentia per habitum quendam naturalem perfectam.

potency of man, that potency whose proper act is to choose.<sup>22</sup>

A further step is taken in the following article. There

<sup>a</sup> 22 "Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc quidam dicunt liberum arbitrium, secundum quod in usum loquentium venit, nomen habitus esse, quamvis eodem nomine, et potentia, et actus significetur, sicut patet in nomine intellectus quod et potentiam, et habitum, et actum significare potest. Hunc autem habitum quem nomen liberi arbitrii designat, non dicunt esse aliquam qualitatem potentiae supervenientem, sed ipsam habilitatem potentiae ad actum, vel facilitatem quam habet una potentia ex adiutorio alterius: propter quod secundum eos facultas voluntatis et rationis dicitur. Sed haec opinio non recte utitur nomine habitus, quia habitus, secundum proprietatem sui nominis, significat qualitatem quandam quae est principium actus, informantem et perficientem potentiam; unde oportet, si proprie accipiatur, quod sit superveniens potentiae, sicut perfectio perfectibili. Praeterea, si consideretur ratio et voluntas, non potest esse nisi tripliciter: aut quod utrumque secundum se consideratur, et sic constat quod utrumque est potentia, et ita quodcumque eorum ponatur, liberum arbitrium erit potentia; vel quod consideretur unum in respectu alterius, et nec sic potest dici quod unum sit habitus alterius, quia potentia non est habitus potentiae, vel relatio unius ad alterum, nec hoc nomen habitus habere potest. Unde non videtur rationabiliter dictum quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus.

"Et ideo quidam dicunt quod liberum arbitrium nominat potentiam non absolutam, sed habituales, id est prout est per habitus quandam perfectam, non quidem acquisitam vel infusam, sed naturales, per quem habitus facilis est in suum actum, intantum ut dominium sui actus habere dicatur. Istud etiam non videtur conveniens: quia quod voluntas habeat dominium sui actus, ex ipsa natura potentiae habet prout est imperans, et a nullo imperata; unde hanc facilitatem ex se habet, et non ex aliquo alio habitu. Et praeterea unusquisque habitus se habet ad actum ut quo non simpliciter efficitur actus, sed bene efficitur. Liberum autem arbitrium ad electionis actum se habet ut quo talis actus efficitur quandoque quidem bene, quandoque autem male, et indifferenter; unde non videtur habitum aliquem designare, si habitus proprie accipiatur, sed illam potentiam cuius proprie actus est eligere, quia liberum arbitrium est quo eligitur bonum vel malum." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1. <sup>^n</sup>

Also: "3. Praeterea, sicut infra dicitur, philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium liberum de voluntate iudicium. Iudicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed magis habitum. Ergo videtur quod non sit potentia. . . . Ad tertium dicendum, quod iudicium, proprie loquendo non nominat potentiam, nec habitum,



were some who said that liberum arbitrium was like a universal, found in all the rational powers of the soul. St. Thomas rejects this doctrine on the basis that, if the potencies were many, then liberum arbitrium would also be many secundum esse, just as many men are many animals, and not one. Also the intrinsic nature (ratio) of liberum arbitrium would be found in each power. This is impossible, since the proper act of liberum arbitrium proceeds from a single determined power.

Others said that liberum arbitrium is a totum, composed of several powers which serve as its integral parts. This opinion is also rejected, on the grounds that powers cannot function as integral parts of another power if that other power is considered as per se one power. If, of course, it is considered one only in the sense of being an aggregate, then this would be possible. But since one act is explicitly assigned to the power of liberum arbitrium, we must consider it as one power simply and per se.

Finally, the notion of liberum arbitrium as a habit of

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sed actum. Non autem invenitur unus habitus per quem omne iudicium elicitur; cum secundum diversos habitus in diversis iudiciis procedat; nisi forte dicamus habitus illum primorum principiorum quorum cognitio naturaliter est insita nobis secundum quod in omnibus iudiciis dirigimur; quem nullus liberum arbitrium diceret: quia non est proprium et proximum directivum in electione actum. Potest autem ad unam potentiam reduci omne iudicium electionis; et ideo congruentius hoc nomine actus datur intelligi potentia quam habitus." Ibid., 3 and ad 3.

will and intellect together is refuted by St. Thomas, on the grounds that a habit is always attached to a particular power, and relates to the proper activity of that power.<sup>23</sup>

How then is liberum arbitrium to be explained? St.

Thomas allows for another type of composition, i.e., virtual composition. He explains this by presenting the theory of the emanation of powers from the soul.

There is an order of origin; that is, the presence of one power presupposes that of another as mediate between the soul and it. We can see this from a consideration of the acts of these powers. For the act of some powers necessarily presupposes that of some others; for example, the act of an appetitive power demands the act of a cognitive power. Just as a given power acts in virtue of what it has received from the essence of the soul, so one power acts in virtue of what it has received from a preceding power. . . . To choose (which is the proper act of liberum arbitrium), presupposes knowledge and desire; to choose is to opt for one object rather than another. Knowledge and desire, though, are perfected in reason and will. And so liberum arbitrium acts in virtue of the will and reason, and this is why it is referred to as facultas voluntatis et rationis.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>All three of these opinions seem to be those of St. Bonaventure. See Lottin, p. 211.

<sup>24</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt liberum arbitrium non esse determinatam potentiam, sed colligere omnes vires rationalis animae, sicut totum universale suas partes. Hoc autem non videtur conveniens: tum quia oporteret quod, multiplicatis potentiis, liberum arbitrium multiplicaretur secundum esse: multi enim homines sunt multa animalis, et non unum; tum quia oporteret quod ratio liberi arbitrii in singulis potentiis salvaretur: quod non potest esse, quia actus qui libero arbitrio assignatur, non est cujuslibet potentiae, sed alicujus determinatae.

"Et ideo alii dicunt quod liberum arbitrium colligit plures potentias, sicut totum integrale partes suas. Nec hoc interum conveniens videtur: quia potentiae non possunt esse partes

What is this power of liberum arbitrium? Is it a distinct power from intellect and will? There were some<sup>25</sup> who said that liberum arbitrium is a distinct power capable of judging about the acts of all the other powers of man. St. Thomas rejects this notion on the score that the ability to judge

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integrales alicujus unius si accipiat unum simpliciter; nisi forte dicatur unum quod est aggregatione vel ordine unum. Liberum arbitrium non debet sic esse unum, sed simpliciter, cum sibi unus actus attribuantur.

"Quidam autem dicunt quod liberum arbitrium colligit plures potentias, scilicet voluntatem et rationem, sicut habitus utriusque, propter quod facultas voluntatis et rationis dicitur. Sed etiam hoc improprie dicitur: quia si nomen habitus proprie sumatur, non potest esse immediate unus habitus duarum potentiarum, quia unus habitus ad unum actum ordinatur, qui est unius potentiae.

"Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod aliquid dicitur colligere plura dupliciter: uno modo essentialiter, sicut totum colligit partes suas; alio modo virtualiter, sicut quando virtus plurium rerum in uno participatur. Secundum hoc ergo dico quod liberum arbitrium non colligit plures potentias essentialiter, sed virtualiter, quasi una potentia determinata. Sic enim est in potentiis animae, quod cum omnes ab essentia animae orientur, quasi proprietates ab essentialibus rei, est tamen quidam ordo hujusmodi originis, ut scilicet origo unius potentiae originem alterius praesupponat, quae mediante quodammodo ab essentia animae procedat: quod ex actibus considerari potest. Actus enim unius potentiae necessario actum alterius praesupponit; sicut actus appetitivae actum apprehensivae: et inde est quod sicut virtus essentiae animae in potentia relinquitur, ita etiam virtus unius potentiae praecedentis relinquitur in subsequenti; et inde est quod aliqua potentia virtutes plurium potentiarum in se colligit, et sic est in libero arbitrio, quod ex actu ejus patet. Eligere enim, quod actus ejus ponitur, importat discretionem et desiderium; unde eligere est alterum alteri praeoptare. Haec autem duo sine virtute voluntatis et rationis perfici non possunt. Unde patet quod liberum arbitrium virtutem voluntatis et rationis colligit; propter quod facultas utriusque dicitur." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>25</sup>Lottin mentions St. Albert the Great. See p. 213.

about the acts of other powers should belong to that power which has sway over the other powers; and this is the will.

Others<sup>26</sup> said that since choice is a different act from simple willing and from reasoning, it must be the act of a power distinct from will and reason, somehow "between" them, and somehow "after" both of them. Insofar as liberum arbitrium presupposes both reason and will, as we saw above, it comes after both. It also comes after the will in dignity, since its object is the good-in-relation, whereas the object of the will is the good simply. But since it participates equally of intellect (from which it receives the power to judge), and of will (in that it desires), it should be placed between reason and will. St. Thomas feels that this opinion misses the point. The most profound psychologists had not discovered in the intellectual part of man any other powers besides intellect and will. And the act of choice itself is an appetitive act containing an element of reason or intellect, since it is preceded by an act of counsel. Choice is therefore principally an act of the will, but not absolutely, since there remains in it an element of reason. It is called actus praeconsiliati

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<sup>26</sup>Lottin singles out Richard Fishacre. Ibid.

appetitus.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup>"Quidam enim ponunt liberum arbitrium esse unam potentiam habentem iudicium super actus omnium potentiarum: propter quod liberum arbitrium nominatur, quod iudicium importat. Sed hoc non videtur; quia iudicare de actibus omnium potentiarum non potest convenire alicui potentiae quae sit aliud quam voluntas vel ratio; praecipue cum Anselmus dicat . . . quod voluntas est motor omnium virium: oportet enim ut ea quae est liberrima super alias dominium et imperium habeat.

"Alii vero alia via ad hoc adveniunt magis idonea, scilicet ex diversitate actuum. Vident enim eligere, quod est actus liberi arbitrii, esse aliud quam velle simpliciter, et aliud quam rationcinari; et ideo inducunt hunc actum in quandam potentiam a voluntate et ratione distinctam, quam liberum arbitrium nominant, quod ponunt quodammodo medium inter voluntatem et rationem, et quodammodo posterius utraque; secundum enim ordinem naturae et dignitatis oportet quod utramque sequatur, scilicet voluntatem et rationem, cum liberum arbitrium sit ab essentia animae procedens, praesupposita ratione et voluntate; quod etiam ipse actus ostendit, quia eligere non est nisi prius apprehenso fine per rationem, et desiderato per voluntatem. Deficit etiam a dignitate voluntatis, cuius objectum est principale bonum, scilicet finis; liberi autem arbitrii objectum est secundarium bonum, quod est eligibile ad finem; sed quantum ad participationem proprietatis utriusque, naturam medii habet, ut ex ratione habeat iudicium, et ex voluntate desiderium, secundum quod virtutes praecedentium potentiarum in sequentibus relinquuntur, ut dictum est. Sed istud videtur extraneum, etsi probabiliter dicatur: quia philosophi qui potentias animae subtiliter scrutati sunt, nullam potentiam in intellectiva parte praeter voluntatem et rationem, sive intellectus posuerunt; et ideo non videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate et ratione: quod etiam ex suo actu patet. Dicit enim Philosophus, . . . quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus: et hoc magis videntur sua verba sonare, quod electio sit actus appetitus voluntatis, secundum tamen quod manet in ea virtus rationis et intellectus: quod sic patet. Quandoque enim est aliquis actus alicujus potentiae secundum quod manet in ea virtus alterum, semper ille actus illi potentiae attribuitur quae mediante producit. Verbi gratia, intellectus principium est; ratio autem proprie . . . est faciens currere causam in causatum; unde proprie actus rationis est deducere principium in conclusionem. Hoc ergo quod est conclusionem elicere est actus rationis, secundum quod manet in ea virtus intellectus; unde magis proprie attribuitur rationi quam intellectui. Ita etiam electionem praecedit consilium, . . . sicut

The fourth objection to this same article argues that since choice bears upon means, and will upon the end, they must be two distinct powers. St. Thomas responds that a means is also seen as a good, but that it also brings reason into the picture, by reason of its relational aspect. The order of means to end is apprehended by the intellect, and does not serve to distinguish two types of appetitive powers.<sup>28</sup>

To the fifth objection, which argued that a power that can judge about actions must be different from the power from which these judged actions proceed, St. Thomas counters that this would involve us in an infinite regress, (since the acts

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disputatio conclusionem; est enim electio praesensiliati appetitus; et ita eligere erit principaliter actus voluntatis, non tamen absolute, sed secundum quod manet in ea virtute intellectus, vel rationis consiliantis; unde sic consideratam voluntatem nominat liberum arbitrium, et non absolute." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.

<sup>28</sup>Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas ut deliberata et ut naturalis non differunt secundum essentiam potentiae: quia naturalis et deliberativa non sunt differentiae voluntatis secundum se, sed secundum quod sequitur iudicium rationis: quia in ratione est aliquid naturaliter cognitum quasi principium indemonstrabile in operabilibus, quod se habet per modum finis, quia in operabilibus finis habet locum principii. . . . Unde illud quod finis est hominis est naturaliter in ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut naturalis. Aliquid vero est cognitum in ratione per inquisitionem ita in operativis sicut in speculativis; et utroque, scilicet tam in speculativis quam in operativis, contingit inquirentem rationem errare; unde voluntas quae talem cognitionem rationis sequitur, deliberata dicitur, et in bonum et malum tendere potest, sed non ab eodem inclinante, ut dictum est." II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

of liberum arbitrium can also be known). Rather we arrive at those powers in man which are capable of reflection on their own acts, i.e., intellect and will. The judgment made by liberum arbitrium is called the "judgment of choice," or the "free judgment of the will." The freedom of the choice, he says, is rooted in the nature of the will.<sup>29</sup>

Now we should fill in the picture a bit, by considering the acts discussed in the above-mentioned quotations. As we saw above, the movement of the will to the end absolutely (bonum simpliciter, bonum in universali, etc.) is parallel to the movement of natural appetites found on the noncognitive level and to the movement of animal appetite to the good sensibly known. All of these movements are "natural," i.e., determined.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ad quintum dicendum, quod non oportet quod iudicium actus cujuslibet potentiae pertineat ad aliam potentiam, quia sic abiretur in infinitum; sed est devenire ad summas potentias, quae super suos actus reflectuntur, sicut est voluntas et ratio; et ideo non oportet quod sit alia potentia iudicans de actu voluntatis et rationis. Iudicium autem liberi arbitrii intelligitur iudicium electionis; unde quod dicitur liberum de voluntate iudicium, ly "de" non denotat causam materiales, quasi voluntas sit id de quo est iudicium, sed originem libertatis; quia quod electio sit libera, hoc est ex natura voluntatis." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5. The reference to intellect and will as capable of reflection upon their own acts and the acts of one another should not be taken as a constitutive element in St. Thomas's notion of freedom at this early period. The reflective power of intellect and will does not occur in any other text dealing with freedom, and in this text it is peripheral to the freedom problem; it answers a totally different question.

<sup>30</sup>See I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 4; II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1; II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1; II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; III, d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

But what about the movement of voluntas ut ratio?

The discussion of freedom is restricted to the area of liberum arbitrium. Our foregoing considerations have brought us to the point where liberum arbitrium is seen to be the power of the free choice of means, a power residing in a will informed by reason (i.e., a postdeliberative will); the freedom of the power of choice is due to the nature of the intellective faculties of reason and will. (We will see this more in detail.) St. Thomas has stated this much in the first three articles of II, d. 24, q. 1.

In the following distinction, the question is handled with greater precision. The peculiar nature of an intellectual being that allows for freedom is that such a being is capable of determining itself to action. What does this mean? Beginning with the proposition that an agent must be determined to a particular goal before it can act, St. Thomas considers the various types of determination that are possible. Every determination of an agent to an action presupposes, as we saw above, a knowledge of the end of that action. And such a knowledge can either be present in the agent or in the maker of the agent; this is the radical difference between agents, that some determine themselves to a goal and to action, and some do not. But no being can determine itself to a goal unless it have prior knowledge of the goal as such, and of the proper means



to reach the goal. Such a knowledge is intellectual, and founds what St. Thomas refers to as judicium de propria actione. It is in the power of intellectual beings to choose this or that action, and thus to be masters of their own acts. The proper meaning of freedom is thus self-determination to one or another action relative to a goal.<sup>31</sup>

There are some confusing elements in this presentation of the problem, because of the temptation to interpret this passage in terms of St. Thomas's later and much more sophisticated doctrine on freedom. The analysis of the free act in the Commentary on the Sentences relates only vaguely, if at all, to

31<sup>a</sup> Respondeo dicendum, quod nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu; et inde est quod oportet omne agens esse determinatum ad alteram partem; quod enim ad utrumlibet est aequaliter se habens, est quodammodo potentia respectu utriusque; et inde est, quid . . . ab eo quod est ad utrumlibet, nihil sequitur, nisi determinatur. Determinatio autem agentis ad aliquam actionem, oportet quod sit ab aliqua cognitione praestituente finem illi actioni. Sed cognitio determinans actionem et praestituens finem, in quibusdam quidem conjuncta est, sicut homo finem suae actionis sibi praestituit; in quibusdam vero separata est, sicut in his quae agunt per naturam: rerum enim naturalium actiones non sunt frustra . . . , sed ad certos fines ordinatae ab intellectu naturae instituyente, ut sic totum opus naturae sit quodammodo opus intelligentiae. . . . Sic ergo patet quod haec est differentia in agentibus, quia quaedam determinant sibi finem et actum in finem illum, quaedam vero non: nec aliquod agens finem sibi praestituere potest nisi rationem finis cognoscat et ordinem ejus quod est ad finem ipsum quod solum in habentibus intellectum est; et inde est quod judicium de actione propria est solum in habentibus intellectum, quasi in potestate eorum constitutum sit eligere hanc actionem vel illam; unde et dominium sui actus habere dicuntur; et propter hoc in solis intellectum habentibus liberum arbitrium invenitur, non autem in illis quorum actiones non determinantur ab ipsis agentibus, sed quibusdam aliis causis prioribus." II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1.

human experience. The highly personalistic, experiential, and inclusive doctrine of his later writings should not be read into the Commentary on the Sentences.<sup>32</sup> In the light of what we have seen so far, then, the statement, "Quaedam determinant sibi finem," should not be interpreted as referring to freedom with regard to ends, but rather to the knowledge of ends as such. Freedom, in the Commentary on the Sentences, is freedom of choice; and the act of choice (electio) bears only upon means. Freedom of choice is inherent in the will; this freedom is exercised when, after the intellect has presented to the will an end and several possible means to that end, the will chooses one means rather than another (hanc actionem vel illam).

The answer to the first objection to this article serves to clarify this point. The objection argued that liberum arbitrium cannot be in God, because choice is not found in God; the reason is that choice follows upon deliberation, which is a discursive inquiry of reason. St. Thomas responds that, as in all other cases where there is question of predicating a perfection of God, we must negate the deficiencies found at the human level of this perfection

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<sup>32</sup>"The early texts must be forced with regard to the question of experience, unless, as is often the case, the experiential reference is simply neglected by the author." George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works," Gregorianum XLII (1961), p. 716.

(deficiencies not inherent in the perfection itself, but rather in the receiver) and we must predicate of God only the intrinsic ratio of the perfection. In the present case, this means that what must be negated is the deliberative inquiry which precedes free choice at the human level. What we can say of God is that the determination of His action is from Himself and not from another. The intrinsic ratio of liberum arbitrium is thus predicable of God. Thus, while there is no contradiction in the idea of an act of free choice not consequent upon deliberation over means to an apprehended good, such a nondeliberated, nonrelational act of choice is not posited by St. Thomas as occurring at the human level.

The intellectual act of deliberation about means, preceding the act of choice, is called consilium. Consilium is had only when the means to the end are not seen as determinate, absolutely necessary means.<sup>33</sup> The voluntary act of consent to the means follows immediately upon the consilium.<sup>34</sup> As we have seen, electio (the act proper to liberum arbitrium) is formally an act of the will following (in man) an act of

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<sup>33</sup>"Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod secundum Philosophum in III Ethic . . . , consilium est questio de operabilibus a nobis, non tamen de omnibus. Quae enim determinata sunt qualiter fieri debeant, sicut litterarum figurae, in dubitationem non eveniunt neque in quaestionem; et ita de eis non est consilium." III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1.

<sup>34</sup>" . . . consensus, qui deliberationem consequitur." II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4.

deliberation.<sup>35</sup> Electio does not bear upon the end, but only upon the means, and is thus an act of voluntas ut ratio, not voluntas ut natura. The precise sense, then, in which liberum arbitrium is called a potentia is not that it is a faculty (i.e., a qualitative accident of the soul constituting the proximate principle of action), but rather that it is an "ability" of the will to choose freely.<sup>36</sup>

The doctrine of St. Thomas's later works distinguishes the liberty of specification from the liberty of exercise; that is, in general, the liberty from a necessity imposed by the

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<sup>35</sup>See also I, d. 41, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; II, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; II, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2; III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 1; and IV, d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2, c.

<sup>36</sup>"Unde concluditur liberum arbitrium debet esse potentia et eius actus est eligere. Sed bene attendatur ad id quod sequitur in responsionibus ad dubia, nempe quo sensu liberum arbitrium dicatur facultas. Facultas sensu proprio significat accidens illud in genere qualitatis quod constituit principium proximum agendi simpliciter. Hoc autem sensu facultates dum tantum adesse in anima iam ex S. Thomae retulimus ubi praecise hoc sensu intelligi liberum arbitrium esse potentiam negabat. Dicitur igitur hic liberum arbitrium esse potentia sensu analogico secundum communem modum vocandi facultatem, non autem secundum quod nominat illa principia proxima. Et ille sensus ordinarius est qui respondet modo communi quo vocatur facultas etiam potestas qua aliquid habetur ad nutum; unde et divitiae hoc sensu possunt dici facultates. Quia autem ex libero arbitrio ad nutum habetur actus electionis, igitur facultas liberum arbitrium dicitur. Nullo modo igitur S. Doctor, cum nominat liberum arbitrium potentiam, vult significare facultatem ut aliquod principium proximum operandi simpliciter, sed potius aliquam potestatem, quae est in peculio voluntatis, quae scilicet ipsa potest libere eligere." Romiti, De Processu Evolutivo Doctrinae De Actu Humano Completo in Operibus S. Thomae Aquinatis (Milan, 1949), p. 21.

object (velle hoc vel illud) is distinguished from the liberty of the act (velle aut non velle). Is such a distinction to be found in the Commentary on the Sentences? The fact that the words exercitium and specificatio do not occur means nothing; (as we shall see, the distinction is clearly mentioned in the De Veritate even though these terms are not used). It is difficult to find any text in the Commentary on the Sentences which speaks clearly of a liberty of exercise at the human level. Lottin feels that the following passage attributes liberty of exercise to God and to liberum arbitrium in general.

It is not of the nature of liberum arbitrium to be indeterminate with regard to good and evil: for liberum arbitrium per se is ordered to the good, since the good is the object of the will, and liberum arbitrium does not tend to evil, unless through some mistake evil is apprehended as good, since nothing is chosen unless it is good or at least appears good. Therefore where the ratio of liberum arbitrium is most perfectly realized, it cannot tend to evil because this is an imperfection. But it does pertain to the nature of liberum arbitrium that it can do or not do any given action, and this is found in God; the good things which He does He is able to refrain from doing, without doing evil.<sup>37</sup>

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37"Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad rationem liberi arbitrii non pertinet ut indeterminate se habeat ad bonum vel ad malum: quia liberum arbitrium per se in bonum ordinatum est, cum bonum sit objectum voluntatis, nec in malum tendit nisi propter aliquem defectum, quia apprehenditur ut bonum, cum non sit voluntas aut electio nisi boni, aut apparentis boni: et ideo ubi perfectissimum est liberum arbitrium, ibi in malum tendere non potest quia imperfectum esse non potest. Sed hoc ad libertatem arbitrii pertinet convenit; bona enim quae facit potest non facere, nec tamen malum facere potest." II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

This text certainly bears some resemblance to St. Thomas's later statements on liberty of exercise. There is, however, no psychological account given of liberty of exercise. Nor is there mention of such liberty as referring to ends, since he connects this liberty with liberum arbitrium. Certainly the subtleties of St. Thomas's later doctrine are not manifest in the Commentary. The question of specification, is clearly handled in the Commentary, but in a different manner from the presentation given in the later writings. Specification in the Commentary refers to the necessary specification of the will to ends and its indetermination with regard to non-necessary means.

Another problem to be considered is the question of the initial passage of the will from potency to act. "In the early works, there are three possibilities. The first is that the question simply does not occur. The second is that the object, or the intellect, acts efficiently upon the will... . The third possibility would be that the will is moved to act at the moment of the creation of the soul, and that this act remains permanently."<sup>38</sup> The first of these possibilities is the most likely in the case of the Commentary on the Sentences. As for the problem of the Divine Motion, it does not occur in the context of the passage of the will into act or to a new act,

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<sup>38</sup> Klubertanz, "Root . . . ", p. 317.

but only as a particular instance of God's operation in nature.<sup>39</sup>

The type of causality exercised by the intellect is not explicitly treated. Rosemary Z. Lauer has cited possible indications for attributing both final and formal causality to the intellect, or to the object known.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup>"Ad primam ergo dicendum, quod Deus operatur in voluntate et natura, sicut prima causa in causis secundis: et ideo sine ipso adiuvante nec lapis in esse conservaretur, nec deorsum tenderet: similiter etiam nec humana natura sine eo vel consistere potest, vel rectum motum voluntatis habere. Non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod aliquo dono naturalibus superaddito, peccatum vitaret." II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

"Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus operatur in omnibus, ita tamen quod in quoquoque secundum ejus conditionem; unde in rebus naturalibus operatur sicut ministrans virtutes agendi, et sicut determinans naturam ad talem actionem: in libero autem arbitrio hoc modo agit ut virtutes agendi sibi ministret, et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat; sed tamen determinatio actionis et finis in potestate liberi arbitrii constituitur; unde remanet sibi dominium sui actus, licet non ita sicut primo agenti." II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

"Ad primam ergo dicendum, quod Deus operatur in voluntate et in libero arbitrio secundum ejus exigentiam; unde etiam si voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, nihilominus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit ut illud in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit: et ita coactionis ratio tollitur: alias esset contradictionis implicatio, si diceretur nolle illud in quod mutatur, et cogi ad illud: quia necessitas coactionis voluntati contraria est. . ." II, 2. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.

<sup>40</sup>She refers to II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, where electio is referred to as "intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus," i.e., "actus appetitus voluntatis, secundum tamen quod manet in ea virtus rationis et intellectus." The precise qualification from the intellect stems from the act of deliberation. In this sense, the intellect acts somewhat as a formal cause. But in the answer to the third objection, a final causality is hinted at, under the rubric of reason's function of ordering the object to the will's end; i.e., the object of choice is a final cause only because of its relationship to the end. And the ordering to the end is the function of reason.

"In the Prima Pars and the earlier texts, intellect and

Given this much understanding of St. Thomas's doctrine of freedom at the time of the composition of the Commentary on the Sentences, what can we say about the root of freedom?

Despite the unsophisticated treatment of the distinction between subjective determination (exercise) and determination by the object (specification), it is clear from II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2 (utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi) that both of these aspects must be taken into consideration. St. Thomas here treats them separately, a fact which is interpreted by Rosemary Z. Lauer as "More than a mere foreshadowing of the later distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification."<sup>41</sup> The root of freedom from the subject's side seems to be the fact that the will is an inorganic, i.e., spiritual, power. From the side of the object, all means to the ultimate end of man are mixed with certain inconvenient features (even with evil), and thus

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will are treated somewhat after the manner of two supposits. This is not meant to imply that St. Thomas did not know, or even forgot, that man is the agent who knows and wills. But the act, or rather, object of the intellect, is related directly to the act of the will, at the level of the acts themselves." Klubertanz, p. 710.

<sup>41</sup>Lauer, p. 305. St. Thomas's explanation of this distinction, however, differs in several respects from his later position on freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. (See footnote 42).



do not determine the motion of the will.<sup>42</sup>

In summary, the doctrine of the Commentary on the Sentences sees the will as a passive potency endowed with the "facultas" of liberum arbitrium, by which the will, after intellectual deliberation, freely chooses what means it will employ to attain the end; the experiential reference is very

<sup>42</sup>"Sciendum est quod in partibus animae quaedam sunt quae compelli possunt: sed dupliciter. Qaedam enim compelluntur ex subjecto, sicut illae vires quae sunt organis affixae: cum enim sine organis operationes habere non possint, compulsis organis, ipsae virtutes prohibentur vel compelluntur, earum actibus violenter extortis. Qaedam vero sunt quae quidem sub-  
jecto non compelluntur, quia organis affixae non sunt; compellun-  
tur tamen objecto, sicut intellectus: ipse enim non est actus  
alicujus partis corporis . . . , et tamen demonstrationis vi  
cogitur. Voluntas autem neque subjecto cogi potest, cum non sit  
organo affixa, neque objecto; quantumcumque enim aliquid ostē-  
datur esse bonum, in potestate ejus remanet eligere illud vel  
non eligere. Cujus ratio est, quia objectum intellectus est  
verum, objectum autem voluntatis est bonum. Invenitur autem  
aliquod verum in quo nulla falsitatis apparentia admisceri  
potest, ut patet in dignitatibus; unde intellectus non potest  
subterfugere quin illis assentiat. Similiter etiam invenitur  
aliquod falsum quod nullam veri apparentiam habet, ut patet in  
oppositis dignitatibus; unde illi nullatenus intellectus assentire  
potest. Similiter etiam si proponatur voluntati aliquod bonum  
quod completam boni rationem habeat, ut ultimus finis, propter  
quem omnia appetuntur, non potest voluntas hoc non velle; unde  
nullus non potest non velle esse felix, aut velle esse miser.  
In his autem quae ad finem ultimum ordinantur, nihil invenitur  
adeo malum quin aliquod bonum admixtum habeat, nec aliquod adeo  
bonum quod in omnibus sufficiat: unde quantumcumque ostendatur  
bonum vel malum, semper potest adhaerere et fugere in contrarium,  
ratione alterius quod in ipso est, ex quo accipitur, si malum  
est simpliciter, ut apparens bonum, et si bonum est simpliciter,  
ut apparens malum; et inde est quod in omnibus quae sub elec-  
tione cadunt, voluntas libera manet, in hoc solo determinationem  
habens quod felicitatem naturaliter appetit, et non determinate  
in hoc vel illo." II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2.

weak; there is no mention of freedom with regard to ends, no explicit and very meaningful treatment of "freedom of exercise," and no account of the psychological process of the free act, specifying what elements are free and what are determined.<sup>43</sup>

The Divine Motion presents no special problem, as the references to this problem do not touch on the immediate passage of the will from potency to act. There are evidences of a type of formal causality on the part of the intellect and also of telic causality (although the question is never handled in these terms). The root of freedom, finally, is seen to be the spirituality of the will, rendering it independent of any bodily organ, and the nondetermining quality of all non-necessary means to man's final end.

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<sup>43</sup>A point of particular difficulty in this connection is the practical judgment said to be required for choice. Romiti says that the last practical judgment and the act of choice are one and the same act (i.e., in the Commentary). This is as warrantable a position as any. He adds, "Ne autem difficultatem habeamus ex his quae dicta sunt, nempe quod electio est voluntatis, cui non competit iudicium proferre, nos admonet S. Doctor iudicium dici de electione quasi participative. Unde iudicium electionis non ut reliqua iudicia considerari debet, sed modo quasi analogico." He refers to II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2. See pp. 24f.

## CHAPTER II

### DE VERITATE

In this and the remaining chapters, we will follow as closely as possible an order of presentation similar to that observed in the account of freedom given in the Commentary on the Sentences.

There is a twofold discussion of freedom in the De Veritate. First of all, there is an analytic moment, in which St. Thomas establishes, by a careful scrutiny of the levels of appetite, a freedom of the will. Secondly, there is a discussion of free choice or liberum arbitrium; here St. Thomas attempts to show how the will's indetermination is removed in the real order.<sup>1</sup>

Once again, the discussion of the nature of the will centers around the notion of appetite. An appetite is a passive

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<sup>1</sup>"Avec le De Veritate, la question de la liberte est abordee avec une ampleur inconnue jusqu'ici. Et meme, le probleme se dedouble en deux questions differentes: l'homme est-il doue de libre volonte; l'homme est-il doue de libre arbitre? . . .

"On a dit, en effet, que la volonte est indeterminee, et de plusieurs manieres. Mais qu'est-ce qui la fait sortir de son indetermination?" Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, pp. 228, 231.

power.<sup>2</sup> The connection of appetite with knowledge is again a major consideration, whether the knowledge be in the beings themselves or in God.<sup>3</sup> Several accounts are given of the distinction of levels of appetite; these accounts add up to a more sophisticated presentation of this question than is found in the Commentary. Four levels of tendency are distinguished: violence or coercion, natural appetite, sense appetite and intellectual appetite or will. One criterion of distinction

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<sup>2</sup>"Motus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodammodo oritur, quia omnis operatio passivi ab activo originem sumit. Appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili, quod est movens non motum, ut dicitur in III de Anima." *De Ver.*, q. 25, a. 1.

"Similiter appetere, quod quodammodo commune est omnibus, fit quodammodo speciale animatis, scilicet animalibus, inquantum in eis invenitur appetitus, et movens appetitum. Ipsum enim bonum apprehensum est movens appetitum." *Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 3.

<sup>3</sup>"Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod sicut omnibus appetitus naturalis inest, ita et cognitio naturalis. Sed hoc non potest esse verum: quia, cum cognitio sit per assimilationem, similitudo in esse naturae, non facit cognitionem, sed magis impedit; ratione cuius oportet organa sensuum a speciebus sensibilibus esse demodata, ut possint eas recipere secundum esse spirituale, quod cognitionem causat: unde illa quae nullo modo possunt aliquid recipere nisi materiale secundum esse, nullo modo possunt cognoscere; tamen possunt appetere, in quantum ordinantur ad aliquam rem in esse naturae existentem. Appetitus enim non respicit de necessitate esse spirituale, sicut cognitio. Unde potest esse naturalis appetitus, sed non cognitio. Nec tamen hoc prohibetur per hoc quod appetitus in universalibus cognitionem sequitur: quia in rebus naturalibus sequitur apprehensionem vel cognitionem; non tamen ipsorum appetitum, sed illius qui ea in finem ordinat." *Ibid.*, p. 22, a. 1, ad 2.

"Ad novum dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis, . . . patet, in omni dirigente in finem requiritur cognitio finis. Natura autem non dirigit in finem, sed dirigitur. Deus autem, et agens a proposito quodlibet, dirigunt in finem; et ideo oportet quod habeant finis cognitionem, non autem res naturalis." *Ibid.*, ad 9.

which St. Thomas mentions is the proportion of active and passive elements in the appetite, based on its nearness to God.

There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (1) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow.

This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Sometimes what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus he who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne downward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>"Dupliciter autem contingit aliquid ordinari et dirigi in aliquid sicut in finem: uno modo per seipsum, sicut homo qui seipsum dirigit ad locum quo tendit; alio modo ab altero, sicut sagitta quae a sagittante dirigitur ad determinatum locum. Per se quidem in finem dirigi non possunt nisi illa quae finem cognoscunt; oportet enim dirigens habere cognitionem ejus in quod dirigit; sed ab alio possunt dirigi in finem determinatum quae finem non cognoscunt. Sed hoc dupliciter contingit. Quandoque enim id quod dirigitur in finem, solummodo impellitur et movetur a dirigente, sine hoc quod aliquam formam a dirigente consequatur propter quod ei competat talis directio vel inclinatio; et talis inclinatio est violenta, sicut sagitta inclinatur a sagittante ad signum determinatum. Aliquando autem id quod dirigitur vel inclinatur in finem, consequitur a dirigente vel

And:

The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is capable of inclining itself.

An insensible nature, therefore, being by reason of its materiality the farthest removed from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a principle of inclination, as was explained above.

A sensitive nature, however, being closer to God, has within itself something which inclines, i.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of the animal which is inclined but is determined by something else. An animal is not able at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclination. Hence "they do not act but are rather acted upon," as Damascene says. This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move.

But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like inanimate things, has an inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as it were extrinsically, but further so has its inclination within its own power that it does not necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline. And so its inclination is not determined for

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movente aliquam formam per quam sibi talis inclinatio competat: unde et talis inclinatio erit naturalis, quasi habens principium naturale; sicut ille qui dedit lapidi gravitatem, inclinavit ipsum ad hoc quod deorsum naturaliter fertur; per quem modum generans est motor in gravis et levibus." *Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 1. The English translation is that of Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., *Truth*, Volume III, Chicago: Regnery, 1954.

it by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what is moved, it approaches that of what moves and acts. It can come about that something determines for itself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the bearing of the end upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason.<sup>5</sup>

In the first article of Question 23 (Utrum Deo competat voluntatem habere), a similar analysis of the levels of appetite is presented. A distinction is made first of all between knowledge and willing in a spiritual being. Knowledge is a type

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<sup>5</sup>Unde, quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab eo inclinatur, et magis nata est seipsam inclinare. Natura igitur insensibilis, quae ratione suae materialitatis est maxime, a Deo remota, inclinatur quidem in aliquem finem, non tamen est in ea aliquid inclinans, sed solummodo inclinationis principium. . . . Natura autem sensitiva set Deo propinquior, in seipsa habet aliquid inclinans scilicet appetibile apprehensum; sed tamen inclinatio ipsa non est in potestate ipsius animalis quod inclinatur, sed est ei aliunde determinata. Animal enim ad aspectum delectabilis non potest non concupiscere illud; quia illa animalia non habent dominium suae inclinationis; unde non agunt, sed magis aguntur . . . ; et hoc ideo quia vis appetitiva sensibilis habet organum corporale, et ideo vicinatur dispositionibus materiae et rerum corporalium, ut moveatur magis quam moveat. Sed natura rationalis, quae est Deo vicinissima, non solum habet inclinationem in aliquid sicut habent inanimata, nec solum movens hanc inclinationem quasi aliunde eis determinatam, sicut natura sensibilis; sed ultra hoc habet in potestate ipsam inclinationem, ut non sit ei necessarium inclinari ad appetibile apprehensum, sed possit inclinari vel non inclinari; et sic ipsa inclinatio non determinatur ei ab alio, sed a seipsa. Et hoc quidem competit ei in quantum non utitur organo corporali; et sic recedens a natura mobilis, accedit ad naturam moventis et agentis. Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem: quod est tantum rationis. Et ideo talis appetitus non determinatus ex aliquo alio de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationis; unde appetitus rationalis; qui voluntas dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu sensibili." Ibid., q. 22, a. 4.

of relation of the subject to things in which things are present to the subject not according to their own being, but rather according to their proper nature as intelligible (secundum propriam rationem). The grades of knowledge are a function of a being's removal from matter. The most immaterial beings are able to use their own essence as a medium of knowledge, and God is said to know Himself and other things through His own essence. But will and appetite are based on a relation between the subject and other things as existing in themselves. Now all beings are marked by being related in some way or other to other beings. The types of appetite are consequent upon this intrinsic order of one thing to another. The relation of one thing to another is described in terms of one of the most basic characteristics of a thing,<sup>6</sup> its immersion in, or removal from, matter. In a completely material thing, everything is bound up with matter; consequently there is no free orientation to another being, but only a necessary ordering based on the being's natural disposition. The ordering is not self-determined, but

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<sup>6</sup>"Cum enim res habeat ad rem aliam ordinari per aliquid quod in se habet, secundum quod diversimode in se aliquid habet, secundum hoc diversimode ad aliud ordinatur." Ibid., q. 23, a. 1.



is rather imposed by the orderer of nature.<sup>7</sup>

In all immaterial, cognoscitive beings, there is a certain free, self-caused ordering of self to other beings. Because these beings are able to know, there is some freedom from the conditions of brute matter; and the degree of self-determined tendency varies according to the being's immateriality. In beings whose knowledge is limited to the level of sense (where the form of the being known is received without matter, but where the recipient is a bodily organ), there is a type of imitation of freedom, in so far as the inclination is determined from within, i.e., by the apprehension of a good; but it is only an imitation, since the sensitive being is not able to control in any way its motion toward the apprehended good.

An intellectual being, on the other hand, perfectly exemplifies the ratio of free inclination, since the known good is received in a completely immaterial faculty.

A somewhat different approach to the levels of appetito appears in the first article of Question 25 (Utrum sensualitas sit vis cognitiva vel appetitiva tantum). In this article,

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<sup>7</sup>"Res ergo materiales, in quibus est quidquid eis inest, quasi materiae obligatum et concretum, non habent liberam ordinationem ad res alias, sed consequentem ex necessitate naturalis dispositionis; unde hujus ordinationis ipsae res materiales non sunt sibi ipsis causae, quasi ipsae se ordinent in hoc ad quod ordinatur; sed aliunde ordinatur; unde scilicet naturalem dispositionem accipiunt! et ideo competit eis habere tantummodo appetitum naturalem." Ibid.

immateriality is not explicitly mentioned as a distinguishing characteristic, although it is certainly an operative consideration. The argument proceeds in the following manner. Sensuality is the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul; appetite, being passive, must be moved by that which is appetible; this demands that the good be apprehended, and when the good is apprehended by sense, the consequent appetitive movement is called sensual, and the power sensuality. This power is described as occupying a position midway between natural appetite and will. The considerations employed to distinguish these three levels of appetite are the appetible object itself and the reason for its desirability.

Natural appetite tends to the appetible thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for its appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping with it. . . . But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one. Hence there is not required any apprehension by which an appetible thing is distinguished from one that is not appetible on the basis of the reason for its appetibility. But this apprehension is a prerequisite in the one who established the nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination to a thing in keeping with itself.

The higher appetite, the will, however, tends directly to the very reason for appetibility itself in an absolute way. Thus the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, in as much as it shares in the above-mentioned reason. This is because a rational nature has a capacity so great that an inclination to one determinate thing would not be sufficient for it,

but it has need of a number of different things. For that reason its inclination is to something common found in many things; and so by the apprehension of that common aspect it tends to the appetible thing in which it knows that this aspect is to be sought.

The lower appetite of the sensitive part, called sensuality, tends to the appetible thing itself as containing that which constitutes the reason for its appetibility in itself because the lower appetite does not tend to goodness or utility or pleasure itself, but to this particular useful or pleasurable thing. In this respect the sense appetite is lower than the rational appetite. But because it does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>"Appetitus ergo naturalis tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem sine aliqua apprehensione rationis appetibilitatis; nihil enim est aliud appetitus naturalis quam quaedam inclinatio rei, et ordo ad aliquam rem sibi convenientem, sicut lapidem ferri ad locum deorsum. Quia vero res naturalis in suo esse naturali determinata est; et una est eius inclinatio ad aliquam rem determinatam: unde non exigitur aliqua apprehensio, per quam secundum rationem appetibilitatis distinguatur res appetibilis a non appetibili. Sed haec apprehensio praexigitur in instituyente naturam, qui unicuique naturae dedit inclinationem propriam sibi convenientem. Appetitus autem superior, qui est voluntas, tendit directe in rationem appetibilitatis absolute; sicut voluntas ipsam bonitatem appetit primo et principaliter, vel utilitatem, aut aliquid huiusmodi; hanc ergo rem vel illam appetit secundo, in quantum est praedictae rationis particeps; et hoc ideo quia natura rationalis est tantae capacitatis quod non sufficeret ei inclinatio ad unam rem determinatam, sed indiget rebus pluribus et diversis: et ideo inclinatio eius est in aliquid commune, quod in pluribus invenitur; et sic per apprehensionem illius communis tendit in rem appetibilem, in qua huiusmodi rationem appetendam esse cognoscit. Appetitus vero inferior sensitivae partis, qui sensualitas dicitur, tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem prout invenitur in ea id quod est ratio appetibilitatis: non enim tendit in ipsam rationem appetibilitatis, quia appetitus inferior non appetit ipsam bonitatem vel utilitatem aut delectationem, sed hoc utile vel hoc delectabile: et in hoc appetitus sensibilis est infra

This text handles the levels of appetite in terms of the specification of the appetite act by the object. The cognitive levels of appetite are marked by a kind of "openness" to the world of value. Sense appetite is in many respects not open, but it is so to the extent that more than one determined object can move it. The will is so open that no particular object can determine it to act; only the universal good has this power.<sup>9</sup>

There is one single major criterion of distinction of appetite moving through all of these texts. According to Boniti, this criterion is the grade of "freedom" which each

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appetitus rationales; sed quis non tendit tantum in hanc rem aut tantum in illam, sed in omne id quod est sibi utile vel delectabile, ideo est supra appetitum naturalem; et propter hoc apprehensione indiget, per quam delectabile a non delectabili distinguit." *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 1.

<sup>9</sup>"Et hujus distinctionis signum evidens est, quod appetitus naturalis habet necessitatem respectu ipsius rei in quam tendit, sicut grave necessario appetit locum deorsum; appetitus autem sensitivus non habet necessitatem in rem aliquam, antequam apprehendatur sub ratione delectabilis vel utilis; sed apprehenso quod est delectabile, de necessitate fertur, in illud: non enim potest brutum animal inspiciens delectabile, non appetere illud. Sed voluntas habet necessitatem respectu ipsius bonitatis et utilitatis: de necessitate enim vult homo bonum, sed non habet necessitatem respectu hujus vel illius rei quancumque apprehendatur ut bona vel utilis: quod ideo est, quia unaquaeque potentia habet quandam necessariam habitudinem ad suum proprium obiectum. Unde datur intelligi quod obiectum appetitus naturalis est haec res in quantum talis res; appetitus vero sensibilis haec res in quantum est conveniens vel delectabilis; sicut aqua, in quantum est conveniens gustui, et non in quantum est aqua: obiectum vero proprium voluntatis est ipsum bonum absolute." *Ibid.*

being has in its appetitive acts.<sup>10</sup> While this is the immediate criterion, it might be more accurate to say that appetites are distinguished in terms of their grade of immateriality, which is ultimately what determines the relationship which beings have to other beings.

Inasmuch as it is characteristic of any being, whether material or immaterial, to have some reference to something else, it accordingly follows that it pertains to everything whatever to have an appetite, natural or animal or rational (that is, intellectual); but in different beings it is found in different ways. Since a thing has its reference to another being through something which it has within itself, its different ways of being referred to another correspond to the different ways in which it has something within itself.<sup>11</sup>

We may then make the general statement that as a nature is more free from the confining conditions of matter, and thus closer to the purely active nature of God, it is more active in its orientation to other beings. A rational being is said to determine his own inclination and to have power over his appetitive responses to objects. There are

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<sup>10</sup>"Ratio autem hujus distinctionis adhuc ex cognitione repetitur, sed potius quam ex ipsa cognitione, ex gradu libertatis quam praecedens cognitio inducit in unumquodque appetens." *Roniti*, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup>"Et quia cujuslibet rei tam materialis quam immaterialis est ad rem aliam ordinem habere; inde est quod cuilibet rei competit habere appetitum vel naturalem, vel animale, vel rationale seu intellectuale; sed in diversis diversimode inveniuntur. Cum enim res habeat ad rem aliam ordinari per aliquid quod in se habet, secundum quod diversimode in se aliquid habet, secundum hoc diversimode ad aliud ordinatur." *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 1.

many problems connected with this particular point, but we cannot consider them until we have seen more of the elements comprising St. Thomas's theory of human freedom in the De Veritate.

First of all, we must take a closer look at the nature of the will. In the fifth article of question 22, St. Thomas asks whether the will wills anything necessarily. His answer is based on two important distinctions. The first is that which obtains between a necessity of coercion and a necessity of natural inclination; the second is the distinction between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut voluntas.

As can be gathered from the words of Augustine, necessity is of two kinds: (1) the necessity of force; and this can by no means apply to the will; and (2) the necessity of natural inclination, as we say that God necessarily lives; and with such necessity the will necessarily wills something.

The reason for the will's necessary motion toward some good is that the will is a nature, and all natures naturally and necessarily tend to the good proportioned to them. Since the will is rooted in nature, as is every created being, those characteristics proper to nature must be found also in the will.

Among things arranged in an order the first must be included in the second, and in the second must be found not only what belongs to it by its own nature but also what belongs to it according to the nature of the first. . . . Now nature and the will stand in such an order that the will itself is a nature, because whatever is found in reality is called a nature. There must accordingly be found in the will not only what is proper to the will but also what is

proper to nature. It belongs to any created nature, however, to be ordained by God for good, naturally tending to it. Hence even in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good corresponding to it.

This natural appetite, though, is in principle not moved by a necessity of force or coercion, because it is itself an inclination. "But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut potest accipi ex verbis Augustini, V de civitate Dei, duplex est necessitas: necessitas scilicet coactionis, et haec in volentem nullo modo cadere potest; et necessitas naturalis inclinationis, sicut dicimus Deum de necessitate vivere: et tali necessitate voluntas aliquid de necessitate vult.

"Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi completit secundum rationem propriam, sed quod competit secundum rationem primi . . . Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cujuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus sibi convenientis boni . . . Quavis autem quaedam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cujusdam inductio. Violentum autem, secundum Philosophum in III Ethic., est cuius principium est extra, nil conferente via passo; sicut si lapis sursum projiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur. Sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam,

The object which moves the will in this natural and necessary fashion is man's ultimate end, which is termed beatitudo and which includes all those elements that comprise this last end such as knowledge of the truth, etc. "Accordingly what the will necessarily wills, determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end, happiness, and whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the like."<sup>13</sup>

In addition to the natural movement of the will toward the ultimate end, there is another movement which is determined by the will itself. And those objects which are seen as means to the end are the objects of this second movement. Just as the movement of voluntas ut natura is the foundation of the movement of voluntas ut voluntas, so the ultimate end is the foundation of those objects which serve as means to this end.

Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, moreover, a parallel ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the

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ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio ejus non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violenter velit, si aliquid naturali inclinatione velit.

"Patet igitur quod voluntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, vult tamen aliquid necessario aliquid vult naturalis inclinationis." Ibid., q. 22, a. 5.

<sup>13</sup>"Et ideo, quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsam determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut est cognitio veritatis, et alia hujusmodi." Ibid.



principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite. Now among the objects of appetite the end is the foundation and principle of the means to the end, because the latter, being for the sake of the end, are not desired except by reason of the end.<sup>14</sup>

In the next article, where St. Thomas asks whether the will is determined in all of its operations, he considers in more detail the question of voluntas ut voluntas. The ultimate end, as we have seen, is the principle behind the will's inclination to those objects which do not necessitate a tendency. In this article he mentions three areas of indetermination. First of all, the will is not determined with regard to those objects which serve as non-necessary means to the attainment of the ultimate end. "The will, however, necessarily desires the last end in such a way that it is unable not to desire it, but it does not necessarily desire any of the means. In their regard, then, it is within the power of the will to desire this or that."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>"Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis." Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>"Respectu objecti quidem est indeterminata voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsam finem ultimum . . . quod ideo contingit, quia ad finem ultimum multis viis perveniri potest, et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsam. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis

The will is also not necessitated with regard to its act, and it possesses this freedom even with regard to a determinate object in the order of specification. "It can pass or not pass into the act of willing with regard to anything at all."<sup>16</sup>

Finally, the will is not determined to choose only among those means which are truly ordered to the acquisition of man's goal. This indetermination, says St. Thomas, is not really a form of freedom, but rather an indication that man is free.<sup>17</sup>

The first two areas of indetermination definitely suggest the later distinction which St. Thomas will make between freedom

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determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae ad certum finem et determinatum non habent nisi certam et determinatam viam. Et sic patet quod res naturales, sicut de necessitate appetunt finem, ita et ea quae sunt ad finem; ut nihil sit in eis accipere quod possint appetere vel non appetere. Sed voluntas de necessitate appetit finem ultimum, ut non possit ipsum non appetere; sed non de necessitate appetit aliqua eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde respectu huius est in potestate ejus appetere hoc vel illud." Ibid., q. 22, a. 6.

<sup>16</sup>"Secundo est voluntas indeterminata respectu actus; quia circa objectum determinatum potest uti actu suo cum voluerit, vel non uti; potest enim exire in actum volendi respectu cujuslibet, et non exire; quod in rebus naturalibus non contingit; grave enim semper descendit deorsum in actu, nisi aliquod prohibeat. Quod exinde contingit, quod res inanimatae non sunt motae a seipsis, sed ab aliis; unde non est in eis moveri vel non moveri; res autem animatae moventur a seipsis; et inde est quod voluntas potest velle et non velle." Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>"Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velle malum nec est libertas, nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum." Ibid.

of specification and freedom of exercise. It is clear that when he speaks of the indetermination of man's act of willing, he is not referring simply to a freedom from coercion. He is speaking of the power of man to determine himself in his acts. However, this point is barely hinted at in any other place in the De Veritate, and it seems that St. Thomas did not regard it as a central feature in his doctrine of freedom at this point.<sup>18</sup>

This is the end of the purely analytical discussion of human freedom. St. Thomas has arrived at the conclusion that he will is not determined with regard to non-necessary means to man's ultimate end; in this sense the will is free. Now the question that occupies his attention concerns the removal of this indetermination in man's concrete actions.

The will is indetermined in several ways. But what causes this indetermination to be removed? The will's movement does not happen in an arbitrary and haphazard fashion; being a rational appetite, the will ought to perform rational actions and choices. Is there not a necessary connection between the determination of the will and the rational decision which precedes it? Do we not always want what we decide to want, after we have considered the matter thoroughly?

Saint Thomas thinks so, and the twenty-fourth

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<sup>18</sup>. . . la distinction entre liberte d'exercice et liberte de specification qui fournit le cadre a la question 6 du De Malo n'est pas etrangere au De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6, ou saint Thomas parle de l'indetermination de la volonte vis-a-vis de l'acte meme de vouloir et de l'objet de cet acte." Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, p. 258.

question of the De Veritate does not hesitate to underline this determinism.<sup>19</sup>

In the twenty-fourth question, then, St. Thomas takes up the discussion of liberum arbitrium. The first six articles of this question are especially pertinent to our discussion. We will consider articles 4, 5, and 6 before the first three, in order to maintain an order similar to that followed in the chapter on the Commentary on the Sentences. These questions concern the nature of liberum arbitrium.

As in the Commentary on the Sentences, liberum arbitrium is explained not as a habit but as a power. The reason given is that free choice does not exceed the capacity of a power. For reason is able to judge (arbitrari) and the will is the power by which we do something freely. "Free choice accordingly does not designate a habit but the power of will or reason--one as subordinated to the other."<sup>20</sup> The addition of

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<sup>19</sup>"On a dit, en effet, que la volonté est indéterminée, et de plusieurs manières. Mais qu'est-ce qui la fait sortir de son indétermination? Ce mouvement de la volonté a du raisonner son acte et son choix. N'y a-t-il pas une connexion nécessaire entre la détermination de la volonté, et la décision de la raison qui l'a précédée: ne veut-on pas toujours ce que, tout bien pesé, l'on a décidé de vouloir?"

"Saint Thomas le pense, et la question XXIV du De Veritate n'hésite pas à souligner ce déterminisme." Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>20</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium, si vis vocabuli attendatur, nominat actum; sed ex usu loquendi tractum est ut significet id quod est principium actus. Cum enim dicimus esse hominem liberi arbitrii, non intelligimus quod actu libere iudicet, sed quod habeat in se unde possit libere iudicare: unde, si iste actus qui est libere iudicare, habeat in se aliquid quod vim potentiae excedat, tunc liberum arbitrium nominabit habitum

this subordination does not make liberum arbitrium a habit, because subordination of one power to the other is not sufficient to fulfill the ratio of habit. Habit, properly speaking, means a quality by which a power is inclined to act.<sup>21</sup> For similar reasons, liberum arbitrium is not called a "habitual

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vel potentiam per habitum perfectam; sicut moderate irasci dicit aliquid quod vim irascibilis excedit; nam moderari iram passionis non potest irascibilis per seipsam, nisi fuerit aliquo habitu perfecta, secundum quem in ea rationis moderatio imprimatur. Si vero libere iudicare non importet in se aliquid quod vim potentiae excedat, liberum arbitrium non nominabit nisi potentiam absolute; sicut irasci non excedit vim potentiae irascibilis, unde proprium eius principium potentia est, et non habitus.

"Constat autem quod iudicare, si nihil addatur, non excedit vim potentiae, eo quod est alicuius potentiae actus, scilicet rationis, per propriam naturam, sine hoc quod aliquid habitus superadditus requiratur. Hoc autem quod additur libere, similiter vim potentiae non excedit. Nam secundum hoc aliquid libere fieri dicitur quod est in potestate facientis: esse autem aliquid in potestate nostra inest nobis secundum aliquam potentiam, non autem per aliquem habitum, scilicet per voluntatem.

"Et ideo liberum arbitrium habitum non nominat, sed potentiam voluntatis vel rationis, unam siquidem per ordinem ad alteram. Sic enim actus electionis progreditur, ab una scilicet earum per ordinem ad aliam, secundum hoc quod Philosophus dicit . . . quod electio est appetitus intellectivi, vel intellectus appetitivi." De Ver., q. 24, a. 4.

<sup>21</sup>"Patet etiam ex dictis, unde quidam moti sunt ad ponendum liberum arbitrium esse habitum. Quidam enim hoc posuerunt propter id quod superaddit liberum arbitrium super voluntatem et rationem, scilicet ordinem unius ad alteram. Sed hoc non potest rationem habitus habere, nomine habitus proprie accepto: nam habitus est qualitas quaedam, secundum quam inclinatur potentia ad actum." Ibid.

potency."<sup>22</sup>

That liberum arbitrium is one power is proved by two of the considerations which also functioned in the Commentary on the Sentences: that if liberum arbitrium were like a universal, it would be many secundum esse, just as many men are many animals; and that its proper act--eligere--is one.<sup>23</sup>

Once again, liberum arbitrium is formally will, but under the influence of reason. And for this reason it is called

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<sup>22</sup>"Quidam vero dixerunt liberum arbitrium esse habituales potentias, considerantes facilitatem ex qua libere iudicamus. Sed hoc, ut iam dictum est, rationem potentiae non excedit." Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod duplici consideratione fuerunt quidam moti ad ponendum liberum arbitrium esse plures potentias. Una quidem ex hoc quod videbant, per liberum arbitrium, nos posse in actum omnium potentialium: unde ponebant liberum arbitrium esse quasi totum universale respectu omnium potentialium. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia sic sequeretur quod in nobis sint multa libera arbitria propter potentialium multitudinem; multi enim homines sunt multa animalia. Nec hoc ad ponendum cogitur ratione praedicta: omnes enim actus diversarum potentialium non referuntur ad liberum arbitrium nisi mediante uno actu, qui est eligere; secundum hoc enim libero arbitrio movemur, quod libero arbitrio moveri eligimus; et sic de aliis actibus. Unde ex hoc non ostenditur liberum arbitrium esse plures potentias, sed esse unam potentiam moventem sua virtute potentias diversas. Alia vero consideratione movebantur quidam ad ponendum pluralitatem potentialium in libero arbitrio, ex hoc quod videbant in actu liberi arbitrii concurrere aliqua quae ad diversas potentias pertinent; scilicet iudicium, quod est rationis, et appetitum, qui est voluntatis. Unde dixerunt liberum arbitrium colligere in se plures potentias per modum quo totum integrale continet suas partes. Hoc autem esse non potest. Cum enim actus qui libero arbitrio attribuitur, sit unus specialis actus, scilicet eligere, non potest a duabus potentiis immediate progredi; sed progredi; sed progreditur ab una immediate, et ab altera mediate, in quantum scilicet quod est prioris potentiae, in posteriori relinquitur. Unde restat, quod liberum arbitrium sit una potentia." Ibid., a. 5.

facultas voluntatis et rationis. The argument is similar to that of the Commentary. (Bonum utile appears as the object of choice.)<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, liberum arbitrium esse tertiam potentiam a voluntate et ratione, propter hoc quod vident actum liberi arbitrii, qui est eligere, differentem esse et ab actu simplicis voluntatis, et ab actu rationis. Nam rationis quidem actus in solo cognitione consistit; voluntas autem actum suum habet circa bonum quod est finis. Sicut ergo bonum quod est ad finem, egreditur a ratione finis, appetitus vero boni a cognitione; ita dicunt quodammodo naturali ordine ex ratione voluntatem procedere, et ex duabus tertiam potentiam, quae est liberum arbitrium. Sed hoc convenienter stare non potest.

"Obiectum enim et id quod est ratio obiecti, ad eandem potentiam pertinent, sicut color et lumen ad visum. Tota autem ratio appetibilitatis eius quod est ad finem, in quantum huiusmodi, est finis. Unde non potest esse quod ad aliam potentiam pertineat appetere finem et id quod est ad finem. Nec haec differentia, qua finis appetitur absolute, id autem quod est ad finem, in ordine ad alterum, potest appetitivarum potentiarum distinctionem inducere: nam ordinatio unius ad alterum inest appetitui non per se, sed per aliud, scilicet per rationem, cuius est ordinare et conferre: unde non potest esse differentia specifica constituens speciem appetitus. Utrum autem eligere sit actus rationis vel voluntatis, Philosophus sub dubio videtur relinquere in VII Ethic., supponens tamen quod aequaliter sit virtus utriusque; dicens quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivi, vel appetitus intellectivi; sed quod sit appetitus dicit in III Ethic., definiens electionem esse desiderium praeconsilii. Quod quidem verum esse, et ipsum obiectum demonstrat (nam sicut bonum delectabile et honestum, quae habent rationem finis, sunt obiectum appetitivae virtutis, ita et bonum utile, quod proprie eligitur); et patet ex nomine: nam liberum arbitrium, ut dictum est . . . est potentia qua homo libere iudicare potest. Quod autem dicitur esse principium alicuius actus aequaliter fiendi, non oportet quod sit principium illius actus simpliciter, sed aequaliter significatur esse principium illius; sicut grammatica per hoc quod dicitur esse scientia recte loquendi, non dicitur quod sit principium locutionis simpliciter, quia sine grammatica potest homo loqui, sed quod sit principium rectitudinis in locutione: ita et potentia qua libere iudicamus, non intelligitur illa qua iudicamus simpliciter, quod est rationis; sed quae facit libertatem in iudicando, quod est voluntatis. Unde liberum arbitrium est ipsa voluntas; nominat autem eam non absolute, sed in ordine ad aliquem actum eius, qui est eligere." Ibid., a. 6.

How does St. Thomas explain the presence of liberum arbitrium? He uses a process of elimination to establish that a rational nature alone was the power of free choice.

Among things which are moved or which act in any way, this difference is found. Some have within themselves the principle of their motion or operation; and some have it outside themselves, as in the case with those which are being moved violently, "in which the principle is outside and the being subjected to the violence contributes nothing," as the Philosopher teaches. We cannot hold free choice to be in the latter inasmuch as they are not the cause of their own motion, whereas a free being is "that which is for its own sake," as the Philosopher teaches.

Those beings whose principles of action are somehow intrinsic are divided first of all into two classes:

Among the things whose principle of motion is within themselves some are such as to move themselves, as animals; but there are some which do not move themselves even though they do have within themselves some principle of their motion, as heavy and light things. These do not move themselves because they cannot be distinguished into two parts, of which one does the moving and the other is moved. This double principle is verified in animals. Their motion is consequent upon a principle within them, their form. Because they have this from the being which generated them, they are said to be moved essentially by their genitor and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle, according to the Philosopher. These are moved by means of themselves and not by themselves. Hence free choice is not found in these either, because they are not their own cause of acting and moving but are set to acting and moving by something which they have received from another.

A further distinction is then made:

Among those beings which are moved by themselves, the motions of some come from a rational judgment; those of others, from a natural judgment. Men act and are moved by a rational judgment, for they deliberate



about what is to be done. But all brutes act and are moved by a natural judgment. This is evident from the fact that all brutes of the same species work in the same way, as all swallows build their nests alike. It is also evident from the fact that they have judgment in regard to some definite action, but not in regard to all. Thus bees have skill at making nothing but honeycombs; and the same is true of all other animals.

It is accordingly apparent to anyone who considers the matter aright that judgment about what is to be done is attributed to brute animals in the same way as motion and action are attributed to inanimate natural bodies. Just as heavy and light bodies do not move themselves so as to be by that fact the cause of their own motion, so too brutes do not judge about their own judgment but follow the judgment implanted in them by God. Thus they are not the cause of their own decision nor do they have freedom of choice. But man, judging about his course of action by the power of reason, can also judge about his decision inasmuch as he knows the meaning of an end and of a means to an end, and the relationship of the one with reference to the other. Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice--that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod absque omni dubitatione hominem arbitrio liberum ponere oportet. Ad hoc enim fides astrigit, cum sine libero arbitrio non possit esse meritum vel demeritum, iusta poena vel praemium. Ad hoc etiam manifesta indicia inducunt, quibus apparet hominem libere unum eligere, et aliud refutare. Ad hoc etiam evidens ratio cogit, quam quidem ad investigationem liberi arbitrii originem sequentes, hoc modo procedamus.

"In rebus enim quae moventur vel aliquid agunt, haec invenitur differentia: quod quaedam principium sui motus vel operationis in seipsis habent; quaedam vero extra se, sicut ea quae per violentiam moventur, in quibus principium est extra, nil conferente vii passo . . . : in quibus liberum arbitrium ponere non possumus, eo quod non sunt causa sui motus: liberum autem est quod sui causa est . . . . Rursum autem quorum principium motus et operis in ipsis est, quaedam talia sunt quod ipsa seipsa movent, sicut animalia; quaedam autem quae non movent seipsa, quamvis in seipsis sui motus aliquod principium habent, sicut gravia et levia;

All this adds up to the following: choice (eligere) is the proper act of the power of liberum arbitrium, which is essentially the will under the influence of reason; choice is probably meant to be taken as the will act following immediately upon or simultaneous with the last practical judgment bearing upon the selection of a single, concrete, and non-necessary means to man's last end; the root of freedom in the concrete, lived

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non enim ipsa seipsa movent, cum non possint distingui in duas partes, quarum una sit movens et alia mota, sicut in animalibus invenitur; quamvis motus eorum consequatur aliquod principium in seipsis, scilicet formam; quam, quia a generante habent, dicuntur a generante moveri per se, . . . , sed a removente prohibens per accidens: et haec moventur seipsis, sed non a seipsis. Unde nec in his liberum arbitrium invenitur, quia non sunt sibi ipsis causa agendi vel movendi; sed astringuntur ad agendum vel movendum per id quod ab altero receperunt. Eorum autem quae a seipsis moventur, quorundam motus ex iudicio rationis proveniunt, quorundam vero ex iudicio naturali. Ex iudicio rationis homines agunt et moventur; conferunt enim de agendis; sed ex iudicio naturali agunt et moventur omnia bruta. Quod quidem patet tum ex hoc quod omnia quae sunt eiusdem speciei, similiter operantur, sicut omnes hirundines similiter faciunt nidum: tum ex hoc quod habent iudicium ad aliquod opus determinatum et non ad omnia; sicut apes non habent industriam ad faciendum aliquod aliud opus nisi favos mellis; et similiter est de aliis animalibus.

"Unde recte consideranti apparet quod per quem modum attribuitur motus et actio corporibus naturalibus inanimatis, per eundem modum attribuitur brutis animalibus iudicium de agendis; sicut enim gravia et levia non movent seipsa, ut per hoc sint causa sui motus, ita nec bruta iudicant de suo iudicio, sed sequuntur iudicium sibi a Deo inditum; et sic non sunt causa sui arbitrii, nec libertatem arbitrii habent. Homo vero per virtutem rationis iudicans de agendis, potest de suo arbitrio iudicare, in quantum cognoscit rationem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et habitudinem et ordinem unius ad alterum; et ideo non est solum causa sui ipsius in movendo, sed in iudicando; et ideo est liberi arbitrii, ac si diceretur liberi iudicii de agendo vel non agendo." Ibid., a. 1.

order is reason's power to recognize the possibility of different approaches to beatitude. It is in judgment that man is free; there is a necessary connection between the decision or practical judgment and the motion of the will. Quotations from both St. Thomas and his commentators will substantiate this interpretation.

With regard to the relationship between the last practical judgment and the act of choice, St. Thomas is ambiguous. The following quotation would lead us to think that he wishes to identify the two: "Thus man is not said to be free in his actions but free in his choice, which is a judgment about what is to be done."<sup>26</sup> In another place, he leaves open both possibilities: "Since choice is a judgment about what is to be done, or follows such a judgment, there can be choice only about what falls under our judgment."<sup>27</sup> It is probably better to assume that choice is an act following upon or simultaneous with the practical judgment, since choice is definitely intended to be understood as an act of the will:

Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the business of reason but of will; for, however much reason puts one ahead of the other, there is not yet the acceptance of one in preference to the other as something to be done

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<sup>26</sup>"Et ideo homo non dicitur esse liber suarum actionum, sed liber electionis, quae est iudicium de agendis." *Ibid.*, ad. 1.

<sup>27</sup>"Cum electio sit quoddam iudicium de agendis vel iudicium consequatur, de hoc potest esse electio quod sub iudicio nostro cadit." *Ibid.*, ad 20.

until the will inclines to the one rather than to the other.<sup>28</sup>

It is difficult to maintain a straight course through the terminological difficulties of the De Veritate, and perhaps the best procedure is that suggested by Lottin: leave the difficulties stand, and concentrate on the question of whether or not what St. Thomas calls judicium de agendis is free.<sup>29</sup>

As we have seen, this practical judgment is free; that is, man is the master of his judgment in practical matters; and the reasons given are that man, being a rational animal can judge about his own judgment; that he understands the relationship of means to end; and that reason "reflects upon its own act and knows the relationships of the things about which it judges and of those by which it judges."<sup>30</sup> When reason judges about its own decision, in reflecting back on itself and its decision, it relates the concrete good to the good in general. This does not mean that man must always choose a concrete good

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<sup>28</sup>"Electio est ultima acceptio qua accipitur ad prosequendum. Quod quidem non est rationis, sed voluntatis; nam quantumcumque ratio unum alteri praefert, nondum est unum alteri praeacceptatum ad operandum, quousque voluntas inclinatur ad unum magis quam ad aliud." Ibid., q. 22, a. 15.

<sup>29</sup>"On le voit, les formules n'ont pas encore trouve leur precision parfaite; mais il est manifeste que, pour saint Thomas, l'essentiel est de savoir si ce judicium de agendis est libre." Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, p. 232.

<sup>30</sup>"Judicare autem de judicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus judicat, et per quod judicat." Ibid., q. 24, a. 2.

that is objectively conformed to the good in general, but that the capacity to relate the one to the other is required if a being is to be free and morally responsible in its choices. This judgment of relation is not the practical judgment about what is to be done; it is rather a kind of a priori possibility conditioning the appearance of freedom. If this judgment is made (and it need not be made every time) it is a concrete but speculative judgment of conscience.

Question 24, article 2, defines formally the relationship of man's appetitive acts and reason.

. . . since three elements concur in our activity: knowledge, appetite, and the activity itself, the whole formal character of freedom depends upon the manner of knowing. For appetite follows knowledge, since there is appetite only for a good which is proposed to it by a cognitive power. If appetite sometimes seems not to follow knowledge, this is because the appetite and the knowledge are not judged from the same point of view. Appetite is concerned with a particular object of operation, whereas the judgment of reason is sometimes concerned with something universal, and this is at times contrary to our appetite. A man who wishes to fornicate, for instance, although he knows in general that fornication is evil, nevertheless judges this present act of fornication to be good for him and chooses it under the aspect of good. As Dionysius says, no one acts intending evil.

Unless there is something to prevent it, a motion or operation follows the appetite. Thus, if the judgment of the cognitive faculty is not in a person's power but is determined for him extrinsically, neither will his appetite be in his power; and consequently neither will his motion or operation be in his power absolutely. Now judgment is in the power of the one judging in so far as he can judge about his own judgment; for we can pass judgment upon the things which are in our power. But to judge about one's own judgment belongs only to

reason, which reflects upon its own act and knows the relationships of the things about which it judges and of those by which it judges. Hence the whole root of freedom is located in reason. Consequently, a being is related to free choice in the same way as it is related to reason.<sup>31</sup>

Lottin gives the following summary and interpretation of this passage:

Three elements must be distinguished in human actions: knowledge, appetite, and the action itself. Now action follows necessarily from appetite; when

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<sup>31</sup>"Respondeo dicendum, quod bruta nullo modo sunt liberi arbitrii.

"Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum ad operationem nostram tria concurrant, scilicet cognitio, appetitus, et ipsa operatio, tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur. Et quod quandoque appetitus videatur cognitionem non sequi, hoc ideo est, quia non circa idem accipitur appetitus et cognitionis iudicium: est enim appetitus de particulari operabili, iudicium vero rationis quandoque est de aliquo universali, quod est quandoque contrarium appetitui. Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, nunquam potest esse contrarium appetitui. Qui enim vult fornicari, quamvis sciat in universali fornicationem malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut tunc bonum esse fornicationis actum, et sub specie boni ipsum eligit. Nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur . . . Appetitum autem, si non sit aliquid prohibens, sequitur motus vel operatio. Et ideo, si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicujus, sed sit aliunde determinatum, nec appetitus erit in potestate ejus, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio judicare: de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus judicare. Judicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium." Ibid. Emphasis mine.

the will is determined to a certain act, this act inevitably takes place, unless it is prevented by some external force. But in turn, and with an equal necessity, the will is linked with the preceding act of knowledge; when a man judges that a certain act is hic et nunc good for him, and, when all is told, the only good which appeals to him, the will, made for the good, cannot<sup>not</sup> be attracted to it. Undoubtedly, a man can judge speculatively and in abstracto that this good is evil in itself; but if, under the influence of some passion or other force, he judges practically and in concreto that this act is for him hic et nunc good, then his will cannot remain indifferent, but must adhere to it. Thus, if man is free, it is in the judgment which precedes his will act that we must locate his freedom.<sup>32</sup>

Lottin later states that man "has power over the practical judgment which determines his choice; he is the free 'cause' of his decision; and because of the psychological law described above, the freedom of the decision is communicated to the choice made by the will, and in turn, to the act

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<sup>32</sup>"Dans les actions humaines, . . . , il faut distinguer trois choses: la connaissance, l'appetit, l'action elle-meme. Or, l'action derive necessairement de l'appetit: quand la volonte est determinee a tel acte, cet acte en procede fatalement, sauf entrave extrinseque. Mais a son tour, et tout aussi necessairement, l'appetit volontaire est relie a la connaissance prealable: quand l'homme a juge que tel acte est, hic et nunc, son bien et, en fin de compte, le seul bien qui l'interesse, la volonte, faite pour le bien, ne peut pas ne pas s'y porter. Sans doute, l'homme peut juger speculativement et in abstracto que tel bien est in se mauvais; mais si, sous une influence passionnelle ou autre, il juge pratiquement, et in concreto que cet acte est pour lui, hic et nunc, son bien, sa volonte, loin de rester indifferente, ne peut que s'y attacher. Si donc l'homme est libre, c'est dans le jugement prealable a l'acte de volonte qu'il faudra trouver la liberte." Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, p. 231.

which results from this choice."<sup>33</sup>

The central question in this entire discussion, then, concerns the interrelationship of intellect and will in the genesis of a free act. Freedom is found formally in the practical judgment (arbitrium, iudicium de agentis) and is communicated to the will's act of choice. What kind of causality is exercised by the intellect on the will?

This question is raised explicitly in Question 22, article 12 (Utrum voluntas intellectum et ceteras animae vires moveat). St. Thomas is explicit on one fact: no efficient causality is attributed to the intellect with respect to the will. In human action, the efficiency comes entirely from the

<sup>33</sup>"L'homme, au contraire, grace a sa raison, domine le jugement pratique qui dicte son choix: il est 'cause' libre de sa decision: et en vertu de la loi psychologique decretee plus haut, la liberte de la decision se communique au choix de la volonte, et par le choix a l'acte qui en exerce." Ibid., p. 234.

In a later article, Lottin says: "C'est qu'en effet l'homme--et l'homme seul--est maitre de ce jugement, il en est l'auteur responsable; il peut porter sur ce jugement un jugement de valeur, potest de suo iudicio iudicare, potest de suo arbitrio iudicare. Et ainsi l'homme n'est pas seulement maitre de soi, causa sui, comme disait Aristote, in movendo, mais aussi in iudicando. D'une maniere plus abstraite, saint Thomas dit aussi: le fait de pouvoir juger de son propre jugement vient de ce que la raison, et la raison seule, peut se replier sur son acte et connaitre le rapport de choses sur lesquelles se porte son jugement. L'homme est donc doue, non seulement de libre volonte, mais aussi de libre arbitre."

And: "Le jugement pratique n'est donc que la consequence de nos dispositions affectives que dependent de notre libre volonte. . . . Nous sommes donc maitres de notre jugement pratique puisque nous sommes maitres de ce qui l'engendre en nous." Lottin, "La preuve de la liberte humaine chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Mediaevale 23 (1956), pp. 323-330.



will. But the intellect definitely exercises some causality, and St. Thomas says that this causality is final causality.

. . . both an end and an efficient cause are said to move, but in different ways. Two things are to be taken into account in any action, the agent and the reason for acting. In heating, the agent is fire and the reason for acting is heat. Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for moving, but the efficient cause, as the one producing the movement, that is, the one which brings the subject of the motion from potency to act.

The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to receive something by way of an intention) and not according to its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is said to move--by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>" . . . tam finis quam efficiens movere dicuntur, sed diversimode; cum in qualibet actione duo considerentur: scilicet agens, et ratio agendi; ut in calefactione ignis est agens, et ratio agendi calor. In movendo dicitur finis movere sicut ratio movendi: sed efficiens sicut agens motum, hoc est educens mobile de potentia in actum. Ratio autem agendi est forma agentis per quam agit; unde oportet quod insit agenti ad hoc quod agat. Non autem inest secundum esse naturae perfectum, quia hoc habito quiescit motus; sed inest agenti per modum intentionis, nam finis est prior in intentione, sed posterior in esse; et ideo finis praexistit in movente proprie secundum intellectum, cujus est recipere aliquid per modum intentionis, et non secundum esse naturae. Unde intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo finis movere dicitur, in quantum scilicet praekoncipit rationem finis, et eam voluntati proponit." De Ver., q. 22, a. 12.

The mutual causality of intellect and will need not proceed in infinitum, because "we stop at the natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its act."<sup>35</sup> The intellect is the first mover in human action, but only through final causality.

What does the intellect do in order to move the will? It conceives beforehand the reason for acting and presents it to the will. "The intellect rules the will, not by inclining it to that to which it tends, but by showing it that to which it should tend."<sup>36</sup> Thus St. Thomas clearly wishes to avoid any statement that would smack of psychological determinism. While the intellect does not determine the will to its act, there is no account of precisely what does determine the will. And since the psychological law of knowledge--appetite--action is rigid, the impression is definitely left of a determinism. When he was later confronted with the blatant psychological determinism of the Parisian Averroists, St. Thomas was led to change his approach to the question of freedom and to emphasize some aspects that are practically latent in the De Veritate;

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<sup>35</sup>"Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est procedere in infinitum; statur enim in appetitu naturali, quo inclinatur intellectus in suum actum." Ibid., ad 2.

<sup>36</sup>"Intellectus regit voluntatem, non quasi inclinans eam in id in quod tendit, sed sicut ostendens ei quo tendere debeat." Ibid., a. 11, ad 5.

namely, the active character of the will, the efficient motion of God,<sup>37</sup> the distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification, and the consequent freedom with regard to ends. In the later works, also, as we shall see, St. Thomas goes out of his way to insist that the intellect does not determine the will to a particular course of action. While freedom will still be rooted in the reflective power of reason, it will be found formally in the will and not in the act of judicium de agendis.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>As in the Commentary on the Sentences, the role assigned to the divine motion in De Veritate is not that of an efficient cause of every new will act, but rather that of the creator and orderer of all natures concurring in a unique manner in human free actions. See q. 22, a. 8.

<sup>38</sup>Rosemary Z. Lauer, in an article referred to in the first chapter, tries to argue against some of Dom Lottin's findings regarding the developments which took place in St. Thomas's theory of freedom. She holds that the will is just as active and just as passive in the De Veritate account as in that of the De Malo, and that Lottin is mistaken when he says that the later role of intellect as formal cause enables the will to be understood as more active, since formal causality is attributed to the intellect in the De Veritate as well as in the De Malo. The principal text cited is that of question 22, article 12, where St. Thomas states that "ratio autem agendi est forma agentis per quam agit." Lottin makes some concessions in his 1956 article, although he states that "il faut toutefois ajouter que, nulle part avant le De Malo, cette raison, cause formelle de la nature humaine, n'est présentée comme cause formelle d'activité humaine." His concessions are based on the fact that St. Thomas, in the Secunda Secundae states that "in moralibus forma actus attenditur principaliter ex parte finis." (II-II, q. 23, a. 8.) Also, in the De Caritate, charity is taken as the form of the virtues, "form" being understood as "end." He states, too that "c'est pour le même motif que la raison est présentée tantôt comme cause finale, tantôt comme cause formelle. Et ce motif est que c'est la raison

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qui presente l'objet a la volonte: ratio praeconcepit rationem finis et eam voluntati proponit (De Ver., q. 22, a. 12); intellectus movet voluntatem sicut praesentans ei objectum suum (I-II, q. 9, a. 1)." Nevertheless, three facts must be pointed out: in the earlier works, St. Thomas never explicitly assigns to reason the role of formal cause in human activity; in the later works, final causality is always assigned to the will rather than to reason; and in the earlier works the "forma agentis" serves as the ratio agendi, and is identical with the practical judgment, whereas in the later works the "forma" which is operative is the universal, which still leaves the will undetermined. With regard to Lottin's concessions because of St. Thomas's position on charity, Father Klubertanz states: "One could question whether charity is 'form of the virtues' in the same sense as, for example, prudence is; if so, the concessions seem unnecessary." P. 702, footnote 6. Father Klubertanz also says: "In the Prima Pars and the earlier texts, intellect and will are treated somewhat after the manner of two supposita. This is not meant to imply that St. Thomas did not know, or ever forgot, that man is the agent who knows and wills. But the act, or rather, object of the intellect, is related directly to the act of the will, at the level of the acts themselves." He refers to the type of formal causality portrayed in the early works as "the causality of form on matter," and acknowledges "the special meaning which 'formal causality' acquires" in the later works, a matter which we will investigate later. See Klubertanz, pp. 710-712.

## CHAPTER III

### SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

Rather than conclude the previous chapter with a summary of the doctrine of freedom in the De Veritate, we thought it better to study first the doctrine of the Summa Contra Gentiles, since basically the same position is expressed here in a more concise form.<sup>1</sup> Toward the end of this chapter it will be possible to present a somewhat sequential account of the genesis of the free act.

Appetite is again considered to be passive and moved by the appetible object. " . . . the appetible is to appetite as the mover to the moved."<sup>2</sup> " . . . the object of apperition moves the appetite."<sup>3</sup> This holds true of sense appetite and will as well as natural appetite. "The active . . . should be proportionate to the passive, and the moving to the moveable. . . But in things having cognition the apprehending power is related to the appetitive power as mover to movable, for that

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<sup>1</sup>"Veut-on une illustration des vues du De Veritate? Qu'on lise cette page magistrale de la Summa contra Gentiles." Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, p. 236.

<sup>2</sup>" . . . appetibile comparatur ad appetitum, sicut movens ad motum." I, 74.

<sup>3</sup>" . . . appetibile enim movet appetitum." III, 26.

which is apprehended by sense or imagination moves the intellectual or the animal appetite."<sup>4</sup> "Now, in a motion that takes place through apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover."<sup>5</sup> ". . . in every act of the will the object willed is to the one willing as a mover to the moved."<sup>6</sup>

The same distinction of the three levels of appetite is operative here as in the preceding works.

. . . that which accompanies every being belongs to being inasmuch as it is in being. . . . Now, it belongs to every being to seek its perfection and the conservation of its being, and this in the case of each being according to its mode: for intellectual beings through will, for animals through sensible appetite, and to those lacking sense through natural appetite.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>" . . . activum oportet esse proportionatum passivo, et motivum mobili. Sed in habentibus cognitionem, vis apprehensiva se habet ad appetitivam sicut motivum ad mobile; nam apprehensum per sensum, vel imaginationem, vel intellectum movet appetitum intellectualem, vel animale." II, 47.

<sup>5</sup>" . . . in motu autem qui est per appetitum et apprehensionem, appetens et apprehendens est movens motum; appetibile autem et apprehensum est movens non motum." I, 44.

<sup>6</sup>" . . . in omni actu voluntatis volitum comparatur ad volentem, ut movens ad motum." I, 76. See also I, 74.

<sup>7</sup>" . . . illud quod consequitur omne ens, convenit enti, in quantum est ens; quod autem est huiusmodi, oportet quod in eo maxime inveniat, quod est primum ens. Cuilibet autem enti competit appetere suam perfectionem et conservationem sui esse: unicuique tamen secundum suum modum, intellectualibus quidem per voluntatem, animalibus per sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum naturalem." I, 72.

Saint Thomas goes on to mention a criterion of distinction:

Moreover, that which exists through another is referred to that which exists through itself, as being prior to the former. That is why, according to Aristotle, things moved by another are referred to the first self-movers. Likewise, in syllogisms, the conclusions, which are known from other things, are referred to first principles, which are known through themselves. Now, there are some created substances that do not activate themselves, but are by force of nature moved to act; such is the case with inanimate things, plants, and brute animals; for to act or not to act does not lie in their power. It is therefore necessary to go back to some first things that move themselves to action. But, as we have just shown, intellectual substances hold the first rank in created things. These substances, then are self-activating. Now, to move itself to act is the property of the will, and by the will a substance is master of its actions, since within such a substance lies the power of acting or not acting.<sup>8</sup>

The relation of an appetite to knowledge is another criterion of distinction:

Now, appetite, is not peculiar to intellectual nature; instead it is present in all things, though it is in

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<sup>8</sup>"adhuc: id quod est per aliud, reducitur in id quod est per se tanquam in prins: unde et secundum Philosophum in octavo Phys., mota ab alio reducuntur in prima moventia seipsa: in syllogismis etiam conclusiones, quae sunt notae ex aliis, reducuntur in prima principia, quae sunt nota per seipsa. Inveniuntur autem in substantiis creatis quaedam quae non agunt seipsa ad operandum, sed aguntur vi naturae, sicut inanimata, plantae, et animalia bruta. Non enim est in eis agere, et non agere. Oportet igitur quod fiat reductio ad alia prima, quae seipsa agant ad operandum. Prima autem in rebus creatis sunt substantiae intellectuales, ut supra ostensum est. Hae igitur substantiae se agunt ad operandum. Hoc autem est proprium voluntatis, per quam substantia aliqua est domina sui actus, utpote in ipsa existens agere et non agere. Substantiae igitur intellectuales creatae habent voluntatem." II, 47.

different things in different ways. And this diversity arises from the fact that things are differently related to knowledge. For things lacking knowledge entirely have natural appetite only. And things endowed with sensory knowledge have, in addition, sense appetite, under which irascible and concupiscible powers are included. But things possessed of intellectual knowledge also have an appetite proportionate to this knowledge.<sup>9</sup>

Two quotations will demonstrate another principle of distinction, one that recurs constantly in the Summa Contra Gentiles: the relation of appetite to form. These quotations will also introduce the precise nature of the will.

. . . whoever possesses some form is related through that form to things in reality. For example, white wood is through its whiteness like some things and unlike other things. But in one understanding and sensing there is the form of the understood and sensed thing, since all knowledge is through some likeness. There must, therefore, be a relation of of the one understanding and sensing to understood and sensed things according as these are in reality. But this is not because of the fact that these beings understand and sense, not because of the fact that these beings understand and sense, since thereby we rather find a relation of things to the one understanding and sensing; for to understand and sense exist according as things are in the intellect and the sense, following the mode of each. He who senses and understands has a relation to the thing outside the soul through his will and appetite. Hence,

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<sup>9</sup>"Appetitus autem non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed omnibus rebus inest, licet sit diversimode in diversis, quae tamen difersitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimode se habent ad cognitionem: quae enim omnino cognitione carent habent appetitum naturalem tantum; quae vero habent cognitionem sensitivam, et appetitum sensibilem habant, sub quo irascibilis et concupiscibilis continentur; quae vero habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitioni proportionatum habent, scilicet voluntatem." III, 26.



all sensing and understanding beings have appetite and will.<sup>10</sup>

And:

. . . in every intellectual nature a will must be discovered. For an intellect is made to be in act by an intelligible form so far as it is understanding, as a natural thing is made to be in act in its natural being by its proper form. But a natural thing, through the form by which it is perfected in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations and to its proper end, which it achieves by operations, "for as everything is so does it operate," and it tends to what is fitting for itself. Hence, also, from an intelligible form there must follow in one who understands an inclination to his proper operations and his proper end. Of course, this inclination in an intellectual nature is the will, which is the principle of operations in us, those by which he who understands operates for an end. For end and the good are the will's object.<sup>11</sup>

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10". . . cuicumque inest aliqua formarum, habet per illam formam habitudinem ad ea quae sunt in rerum natura, sicut lignum album per suam albedinem est aliquibus simile, et quibusdam dissimile. In intelligente autem et sentiente est forma rei intellectae et sensatae, cum omnis cognitio sit per aliquam similitudinem. Oportet igitur esse habitudinem intelligentis et sentientis ad ea, quae sunt intellecta et sensata, secundum quod sunt in rerum natura: non autem hoc est per hoc, quod intelligent et sentiunt, nam per hoc magis attenderetur habitudo rerum ad intelligentem et sentientem, quia intelligere et sentire est secundum quod res sunt in intellectu et sensu, secundum modum utriusque. Habet autem habitudinem sentiens et intelligens ad rem quae est extra animam per voluntatem et appetitum, unde omnia sentientia et intelligentia appetunt et volunt." I, 72.

11". . . in qualibet intellectualem naturam oportet inveniri voluntatem. Intellectus enim fit in actu per formam intelligibilem, in quantum est intelligens, sicut res naturalis fit actu in esse naturali per propriam formam. Res autem naturalis per formam quam perficitur in sua specie habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per operationes consequitur; quale enim est unumquodque, talia operatur et in sibi convenientia tendit. Unde etiam oportet quod ex forma intelligibili consequatur

The will, then, is the power of inclination of an intellectual being; its act follows upon the knowledge of an intelligible form. Just as a natural being tends to its proper acts by reason of its form, so an intellectual being will tend to his proper acts by reason of the intelligible form which is in his mind.

The object of the will, as is mentioned in the last quotation, is the good. But, since the good is what everything desires, this object must be further specified. The will tends to the good which is presented to it by the intellect. Romiti points out that Saint Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles has contrived a new and more concise expression for the object of the will: bonum intellectum.<sup>12</sup> And because of the nature of intellectual knowledge, this good can be further specified and called bonum secundum rationem boni.<sup>13</sup>

The will has two kinds of acts, corresponding to voluntas

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in intelligente inclinatio ad proprias operationes et proprium finem. Haec autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est, quae est principium operationum quae in nobis sunt, quibus intellectus propter finem operatur; finis etenim et bonus est voluntatis objectum." IV, 19.

<sup>12</sup>"Bonum enim intellectum est objectum voluntatis." I, 74; see also I, 81; I, 95; II, 24. Romiti: ". . . nova formula valde concisa invenitur in Summa contra Gentiles, quae semper recurrit cum dicitur objectum proprium voluntatis esse bonum intellectum." P. 29.

<sup>13</sup>II, 23.

ut natura and voluntas ut ratio. The first act of the will is velle. It follows upon knowledge of the universal good or bonum secundum rationem boni,<sup>14</sup> and is a natural or necessary motion.<sup>15</sup>

As in the *De Veritate*, so too here there is a twofold discussion of freedom. The freedom of a being is defined as its mastery and power over its own actions.<sup>16</sup> In Chapter 47 of Book II, Saint Thomas shows that intellectual substances are endowed with will. This he does in a passage similar to the two quoted above about the relation of form to appetite. At the expense of repeating ourselves, but in order to provide the context for the present discussion, we shall quote this passage.

The principle of every operation, furthermore, is the form by which a thing is in act, since every agent acts so far as it is in act. So, the mode of operation consequent upon a form must be in accordance with the mode of that form. Hence, a form not proceeding from the agent that acts by its causes an operation of which that agent is not master. But, if there be a form which proceeds from the agent acting by it, then the consequent operation also will be in the power of that agent. Now, natural forms, from which natural motions and operations derive, do not proceed from the things whose forms they are, but wholly from extrinsic agents. For by a natural form each thing has being in its own nature, and nothing can be the cause of its own act of being. So it is that

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<sup>14</sup>" . . . ipsam velle transcendit omnem speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsam intelligere. Sicut enim intelligimus universalis, ita et voluntas nostra in aliquod universale fertur." III, 85. See Romiti, p. 31.

<sup>15</sup>" . . . naturaliter creatura rationalis appetit esse beata; unde non potest velle non esse beata." IV, 92.

<sup>16</sup>See Book II, chapters 47 and 48.

things which are moved naturally do not move themselves; a heavy body does not move itself downwards; its generator, which gave it its form, does so. Likewise, in brute animals the forms sensed or imagined, which move them, are not discovered by them, but are received by them from extrinsic sensible things, which act upon their senses and are judged of by their natural estimative faculty. Hence, though brutes are in a sense said to move themselves, inasmuch as one part of them moves and another is moved, yet they are not themselves the source of the actual moving, which, rather, derives partly from external things sensed and partly from nature. For, so far as their appetite moves their members, they are said to move themselves, and in this they surpass inanimate things and plants; but, so far as appetition in them follows necessarily upon the reception of forms through their senses and from the judgment of their natural estimative power, they are not the cause of their own movement; and so they are not master of their own action. On the other hand, the form understood, through which the intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself as a thing conceived, and in a way contrived by it; as we see in the case of the artistic form, which the artificer conceives and contrives, and through which he performs his works. Intellectual substances, then, move themselves to act, as having mastery of their own action. It therefore follows that they are endowed with will.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>"Amplius: principium cujuslibet operationis est forma per quam aliquid est actu, cum omne agens agat in quantum est actu. Oportet igitur quod secundum modum formae sit modus operationis consequentis formam. Forma igitur quae non est ab ipso agente per formam, causat operationem cujus agens non est dominus; si qua vero fuerit forma quae sit ab eo qui per ipsam operatur, operationis etiam consequentis dominium habebit. Formae autem naturales, ex quibus sequuntur motus et operationes naturales, non sunt ab his quorum sunt formae, sed ab exterioribus agentibus totaliter, cum per formam naturalem unumquodque esse habeat in sua natura. Nihil autem potest esse sibi causa essendi; et ideo quae moventur naturaliter, non movent seipsa; non enim grave movet seipsum deorsum, sed generans quod dedit ei formam. In animalibus etiam brutis formae sensatae, vel imaginatae moventes, non sunt adinventae ab ipsis animalibus brutis, sed sunt receptae in eis ab exterioribus sensibilibus, quae agunt in sensum, et dijudicatae per naturalem estimationem: unde licet dicantur quodammodo movere seipsa, in quantum

Thus once again it is by means of an analytic discussion that Saint Thomas establishes the freedom of the will, its independence from one particular and determined course of action. The forms in knowledge correspond to the judgment of the practical intellect which precedes the will's choice. Saint Thomas does not establish in one blow, however, the freedom of the will and the freedom of choice. The freedom of the will is arrived at analytically, from a discussion of the nature of intelligible forms. These forms are conceived and contrived by the intellect itself, and so man is master of his activities.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, this freedom is the first and basic freedom of man.<sup>19</sup>

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eorum una pars est movens, et alia est mota, tamen ipsum movere non est eis ex seipsis, sed partim ex exterioribus sensatis, et partim a natura. In quantum enim appetitus movet membra, dicuntur seipsa movere quod habent supra inanimata et plantas. In quantum vero ipsum appetere de necessitate sequitur in eis ex formis acceptis per sensum, et iudicium naturalis existimationis, non sibi sunt causa quod moveantur, unde non habent dominium sui actus. Forma autem intellecta, per quam substantia intellectualis operatur, est ab ipso intellectu, utpote per ipsum concepta, et quodammodo excogitata, ut patet de forma artis, quam artifex concipit et excogitat, et per eam operatur. Substantiae igitur intellectuales seipsas agunt ad operandum ut habentes suae operationis dominium. Habent igitur voluntates." II, 47.

<sup>18</sup> Lottin says that St. Thomas originally wrote a conclusion for Chapter 47 that touched on liberum arbitrium but that this text was later cut by him. Here is the text that was originally added: "Ex hoc autem apparet quod sunt (substantiae intellectuales) liberi arbitrii. Hoc enim est habere liberum arbitrium, habere dominium sui actus, ita quod in ipso sit agere et non agere. Substantiae autem intellectuales habent dominium sui actus. Sunt igitur liberi arbitrii." Lottin, p. 237.

<sup>19</sup> "Voluntas autem primo habet libertatem in agendo; in quantum enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur libere agere quaecumque actionem." I, 72.

Proceeding in the next chapter to the level of concrete activity, Saint Thomas takes up the question of man's freedom of choice in acting. The argument is similar to that of the De Veritate.

. . . "the free is that which is its own cause." Hence, that which is not the cause of its own acting is not free in acting. But things that do not move nor act unless they are moved by other things are not the cause of their own acting. So, only things that move themselves act freely. And these alone act by judgment. For the thing that moves itself is divided into mover and moved; and the mover is the appetite moved by intellect, imagination, or sense, to which faculties judgment belongs. Among these things, therefore, those alone judge freely which in judging move themselves. But no judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflects on its own action; for if it moves itself to judge, it must know its own judgment; and this only an intellect can do.<sup>20</sup>

Then Saint Thomas explains the characteristics of the judgment (*forma apprehensa*) which allow man's choice to be free.

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20. . . liberum est quod sui causa est; quod ergo non est sibi causa agendi, non est liberum in agendo. Quaecumque autem non moventur, neque agunt nisi ab aliis mota, non sunt sibi ipsis causa agendi. Sola ergo moventia seipsa libertatem in agendo habent: et haec sola iudicio agunt: nam movens seipsum dividitur in movens et motum. Motum autem est appetitus ab intellectu, vel phantasia, aut sensu motus, quorum est iudicare. Horum igitur haec sola libere iudicant, quaecumque in iudicando seipsa movent. Nulla autem potentia iudicans, seipsam ad iudicandum movet, nisi supra actum suum reflectatur. Oportet enim, si se ad iudicandum agit, quod suum iudicium cognoscat quod quidem solius intellectus est." II, 47. Cf. Lottin's remark: "Dans le De Veritate, saint Thomas avit dit: l'homme a le libre arbitre parce qu'il peut 'juger' de son jugement. Ici, serrant de plus pres le texte d'Aristote causa sui, il simplifie son expose en disant: l'homme a le libre arbitre, parce qu'il peut 'se mouvoir' a son jugement." P. 238.

The judgment moves only if it is a judgment of something good or fitting. Now, if the person is to move himself to the very act of judging, "he must do so in the light of a higher form apprehended by him." This is the circuit of operations involved in self-moved activities. The judgment itself moves the being to something good for it. If the being is moved to judge, it must be because of another form, which is "the very intelligible essence of the good or fitting." This form is, however, not a judgment, but a kind of universal. <sup>(14)</sup>

It might be well to return for a moment to a remark made by Saint Thomas in the De Veritate in response to the objection that the interplay of the causalities of intellect and will is infinite. There Saint Thomas said, "There is no necessity of going on to infinity, for we stop at the natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its act."<sup>21</sup> Now, one of the acts to which the intellect is naturally inclined is the apprehension of essences, and so of the intelligible essence of the good. This act is first in the order of nature and, ultimately, in the order of time, when we are dealing with the genesis of the free act. In the

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<sup>21</sup>"Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est procedere in infinitum; statim enim in appetitu naturali, quo inclinatur intellectus in suum actum." De Ver., q. 22, a. 12, ad 2.

light of this natural act of the intellect and the natural willing of the good so apprehended, man moves himself to "judge his own judgment" or, more briefly, he moves himself to judge; and thus he judges freely.<sup>22</sup>

Roniti feels the presence of one rather significant change in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Freedom of choice, he says, is attributed to the will rather than to judgment. He uses the following two short statements to substantiate his interpretation: "Nam secundum voluntatem est homo liberi arbitrii,"<sup>23</sup> and "Voluntas autem primo habet libertatem in

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<sup>22</sup>The relevant text in the Summa Contra Gentiles reads: ". . . forma apprehensa est principiumovens secundum quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni, vel convenientis. Actio enim exterior in moventibus seipsa procedit ex iudicio quo iudicatur aliquid esse bonum, vel conveniens per formam praedictam. Si igitur iudicans ad iudicandum seipsum moveat, oportet quod per aliquam altiorem formam apprehensam se moveat ad iudicandum; quae quidem esse non potest nisi ipsa ratio boni, vel convenientis, per quam de quolibet determinato bono, vel convenienti iudicatur. Illa igitur sola se ad iudicandum movent quae communem boni vel convenientis rationem apprehendunt: haec autem sunt sola intellectualia. Sola igitur intellectualia se non solum ad agendum, sed etiam ad iudicandum movent. Sola igitur ipsa sunt libera in iudicando: quod est liberum arbitrium habere." II, 48. Also: ". . . a conceptione universali non sequitur motus et actio nisi mediante particulari apprehensione, eo quod motus et actio circa particularia est. Intellectus autem est naturaliter universalium apprehensivum. Ad hoc igitur quod ex apprehensione intellectus sequatur motus, aut quaecunque actio, oportet quod universalis intellectus conceptio applicetur ad particularia. Sed universale continet in potentia multa particularia. Potest igitur applicatio conceptionis intellectualis fieri ad plura, et diversa. Iudicium igitur intellectus de agibilibus non est determinatur ad unum tantum. Habent igitur omnia intellectualia liberum arbitrium." II, 48.

<sup>23</sup>II, 23.



agendo: inquantum enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur libere agere quancumque actionem."<sup>24</sup> There are other texts, though, which indicate that there has been no change in doctrine on this point. Chapter 48 of Book II proposes that intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting, and then there proceeds a discussion about the freedom of judgment.

Intellectual beings, on the other hand, enjoy freedom not only of action, but also of judgment; and this is to have free choice.<sup>25</sup>

Hence, none but intellectual beings move themselves not only to act, but also to judge. They alone, therefore, are free in judging; and this is to have free choice.<sup>26</sup>

. . . the judgment of the intellect concerning things to be done is not determined to one thing only. It follows, in short, that all intellectual beings have freedom of choice.<sup>27</sup>

. . . so far as matters of action are concerned, whatever things possess judgment that is not determined to one thing by nature are of necessity endowed with freedom of choice.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>24</sup>I, 72. See Romiti, pp. 34f.

<sup>25</sup>" . . . intellectualia vero non solum actionis, sed etiam liberi iudicii; quod est liberum arbitrium habere."

<sup>26</sup>"Sola igitur intellectualia se non solum ad agendum, sed etiam ad iudicandum movent. Sola igitur ipsa sunt libera in iudicando: quod est liberum arbitrium habere."

<sup>27</sup>"Judicium igitur intellectus de agibilibus non est determinatum ad unum tantum. Habent igitur omnia intellectualia liberum arbitrium."

<sup>28</sup>"Quaecumque igitur habent iudicium de agentis non determinatum a natura ad unum, necesse est liberi arbitrii esse."

Therefore, all intellectual beings have a free will, resulting from the judgment of the intellect. And this means that they have freedom of choice, which is defined as the free judgment of reason.<sup>29</sup>

In another spot, Saint Thomas says,

. . . on this account is man said to have free choice as opposed to the other animals because he is inclined to willing by the judgment of the reason and not by the impulse of nature.<sup>30</sup>

The texts used by Romiti refer to the same fact which Saint Thomas expressed in a different fashion in the two earlier works: that liberum arbitrium is essentially will. They also refer to a fact which we mentioned above; namely, that the freedom or independence of the will demonstrated in Chapter 47 of Book II is the first and radical freedom of man. Despite this fact, freedom of choice is still obviously rooted in the practical judgment.

What kind of cause is the intellect? That it is a cause is clear from the following:

. . . for every agent the principle of its action is either its nature or its intellect. Now, there is no question that intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, because they think ahead of time in their intellects of the things which they achieve through

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<sup>29</sup>"Omnia igitur intellectualia liberam voluntatem habent ex iudicio intellectus venientem; quod est liberum arbitrium habere, quod diffinitur liberum de ratione iudicium."

<sup>30</sup>". . . ex hoc homo dicitur prae ceteris animalibus liberum arbitrium habere, quia ad volendum iudicio rationis inclinatur, non impetu naturae sicut bruta." I, 88.

action; and their action stems from such preconception. This is what it means for intellect to be the principle of action.<sup>31</sup>

Once again it is clear that Saint Thomas intends the intellect to be understood as a final cause.

. . . among moving powers in beings possessing an intellect, the first is found to be the will. For the will sets every power to its act: we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so with the rest. The will has this role because its object is the end; although it is also a fact that the intellect, though not in the manner of an efficient and moving cause, but in that of a final cause, moves the will by proposing to it its object, namely, the end.<sup>32</sup>

And the reason that the intellect is a final cause is the same: it proposes the end to the will.<sup>33</sup>

31". . . *omne agens vel agit per natural vel per intellectum. De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem; agunt enim praeconciptes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum.*" III, 2.

32". . . *in virtutibus motivis in habentibus intellectum prior invenitur voluntas; nam voluntas omnem potentiam applicat ad suum actum. Intelligimus enim quia volumus, imaginamur quia volumus, et sic de aliis; et hoc habet, quia objectum ejus est finis, quamvis intellectum non secundum modum causae efficientis et moventis, sed secundum modum causae finalis moveat voluntatem, proponendo sibi suum objectum, quod est finis.*" I, 72.

33This can also be expressed in the new terminology, "nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis." III, 26. Rosemary Leuer's interpretation should not even be considered as cogent. She concludes by saying, "In summary of what occurs in the Summa Contra Gentiles, it may be said that the intellect's formal causality is emphasized, (and) that final causality is not at all explicitly." The most normal conclusion to draw is that she has omitted reading some texts and has misread others.

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The psychological law of knowledge--will--action is just as rigid and just as immediate as in the De Veritate.

" . . . a form considered by the intellect does not move or cause anything except through the will, whose object is the end and the good, by which someone is moved to act."<sup>34</sup>

" . . . the intellect does not produce an effect except by means of the will, whose object is a good apprehended by the intellect and which moves the agent as an end."<sup>35</sup>

The ultimate root of freedom in acting is the capacity of the intellect to "comprehend a multitude of forms."<sup>36</sup> The proximate root of freedom of choice is, as we have seen, the capacity of reflection whereby a man is enabled to relate his judgment to the intelligible essence of the good and thus to

<sup>34</sup>" . . . forma per intellectum considerata non movet, nec aliquid causat nisi mediante voluntate, cujus objectum est finis, et bonum a quo moveretur aliquis ad agendum." I, 72.

<sup>35</sup>"Intellectus autem non agit aliquem effectum nisi mediante voluntate, cujus objectum est bonum intellectum quod movet agentem ut finis." II, 23. Also: ". . . omnis electio et actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intellectuali causatur. Bonum enim intellectum est objectum voluntatis, ut patet in tertio De anima. Et propter hoc non potest sequi perversitas in eligendo, nisi intellectus iudicium deficiat in particulari eligibili." III, 85.

<sup>36</sup>"Modus autem agendi cujuslibet rei consequitur formam ejus, quae est principium actionis; forma autem per quam agit voluntarie agens non est determinata; agit enim voluntas per formam apprehensam ab intellectu; nam bonum apprehensum movet voluntatem ut ejus objectum; intellectus autem non habet unam formam effectus determinatam, sed de ratione sua est ut multitudinem formarum comprehendat; et propter hoc voluntas multiformes effectus producere potest." III, 73.

move himself to judge.

The major problem in this doctrine of freedom is, of course, its failure to come to grips with determinism. If the root of choice is in the reflective comparison of one form (the practical judgment) with another (the essence of the good or fitting), then man should always choose what he considers reflectively to be most in accord with the universal good. That he does not always do so is admitted by Saint Thomas, but no explanation is given of the free choice of evil. That the doctrine of the De Veritate and of the Summa Contra Gentiles does not square with experience helps to soften the charge of determinism but also to invalidate any claims this doctrine may assume of being a complete philosophical explanation of man's freedom.

The major change in the Summa Contra Gentiles, perhaps anticipating the later role of forma apprehensa in the De Malo, is that the connection between form and appetite is now the major consideration of Saint Thomas.

## CHAPTER IV

### PRIMA PARS OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

The doctrine of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae is unique in that certain elements remind one quite forcefully of the later expositions on human freedom, while other elements are further removed from the doctrine of the De Malo and the Prima Secundae than is the doctrine even of the De Veritate.

Once again, appetite is considered to be passive.<sup>1</sup> The three levels of appetite are again considered, and distinguished in terms of the knowledge involved in each case.

. . . since all things flow from the divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural disposition, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called a natural appetite. Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge. Not that they know the very nature of goodness; they rather apprehend some particular good, as in the case with the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called a sensitive appetite. Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the nature of goodness. This belongs to the intellect. Things so inclined are most perfectly

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<sup>1</sup>"Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso: unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum." Q. 80, a. 2.

inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if they were guided only by another towards the good, like things devoid of knowledge, nor as if they were guided towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards the universal good itself. Such inclination is termed will.<sup>2</sup>

The distinction based on form, introduced in the Summa Contra Gentiles, is also considered here.

It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate in knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is, to the being which is natural to each. Now this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, but in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things. For example, sense

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<sup>2</sup>. . . cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divina, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinatur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinatur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis. Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinatur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscat ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinatur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinatur in bonum; non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent; neque in bonum particulariter tantum, sicut ea in quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio; sed quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas." Q. 59, a. 1. See also Q. 60, a. 1, c.

receives the species of all sensible things, and the intellect, of all intelligible things; so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect. . . .

Therefore, just as in those beings that have knowledge forms exist in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so there must be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.<sup>3</sup>

For as natural things have actual being by their form, so the intellect is actually knowing by its intelligible form. Now everything has this disposition towards its natural form, that when it does not have it, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with

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<sup>3</sup>"Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio: sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum: sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum: in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praexistunt, sicut Dionysius dicit.

"Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad viam animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam." Q. 80, a. 1.



every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This disposition to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like disposition to good as apprehended through an intelligible form, so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it; both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite.<sup>4</sup>

The will, then, is the appetitive faculty of an intellectual being as such. The object of the will is described in various ways,<sup>5</sup> but the term bonum apprehensum or bonum intellectum is as good as any other.

The discussion of freedom is again a twofold one. The

<sup>4</sup>"Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam formam intelligibilem. Quelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam; et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis. Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet: ut scilicet, cum habet ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est appetitus animalis." Q. 19, a. 1.

<sup>5</sup>"... bonum simpliciter est objectum voluntatis." Q. 48, a. 5. "... objectum appetitus intellectivi, qui voluntas dicitur, est bonum secundum communem boni rationem." Q. 59, a. 4. "... appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum." Q. 80, a. 2, ad 2. "Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo." Q. 80, a. 2, ad. 1. "... bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis." Q. 82, a. 4. "... bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem." Q. 82, a. 3, ad 2.

analytic discussion of the will's indetermination again precedes the discussion of free choice. The will is considered both as a nature and as will, i.e., the appetitive faculty of an intellectual being. As a nature, the will has an object to which it tends naturally and necessarily. This object is happiness. "The will itself, as a certain nature, wills something naturally. Thus, man's will naturally ends to happiness."<sup>6</sup> But there are several kinds of necessity, and it is necessary to qualify the statement about the will's desire for happiness.

There is first of all the necessity which arises from an intrinsic principle of a thing, either a formal principle (e.g., that a triangle must have three angles equal to two right angles) or a material one (e.g., all beings composed of contrary principles must eventually corrupt). This necessity is called natural or absolute necessity. But there are also two types of necessity which are imposed from without. One is called the necessity of the end, and refers to the necessity of using those means without which a given end cannot be attained; the other is the necessity of coercion, imposed by an alien efficient cause.

St. Thomas says, of course, that the necessity of coercion cannot in principle be suffered by the will. The will is an inclination, and no inclination can be inclined against itself

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<sup>6</sup>"Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam voluntas, inquantum est natura quaedam, aliquid naturaliter vult; sicut voluntas hominis naturaliter tendit ad beatitudinem." Q. 41, a. 2, ad 3.

from without, and still remain the inclination immanent to a given being. But neither the necessity of the end nor the necessity of natural inclination is contradictory to the notion of will. The latter necessity is that involved in the will's natural ordination to happiness. The comparison is drawn between the natural adherence of the intellect to first principles and the natural desire for happiness. First principles play the same role in speculative judgments as the ultimate end in practical judgments.<sup>7</sup>

This comparison between intellectual adherence to first principles and voluntary appetite of the end is used as the basis for the analytic study of the will's indetermination. Just as the intellect adheres necessarily to first principles, the will necessarily desires the ultimate end; and just as the intellect adheres necessarily to conclusions which it recognizes to be necessarily connected with first principles, so the will adheres necessarily to those means which are recognized as absolutely necessary for the attainment of the ultimate end; but just as the intellect does not have to give its consent to propositions and conclusions which are not seen to be necessarily connected with first principles, so the will is not determined to particular goods which are not thought to be necessary for

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<sup>7</sup>See question 82, a. 1, corpus.

acquiring the end.<sup>8</sup>

It is interesting to note that all of the analytic discussions of the will's indeterminacy are made *ex parte obiecti*; that is, the will is considered free because of the universal nature of its proper and necessitating object and the particularity of its acts. In these discussions, the subjective element of self-determination is not considered. There is one text in this same article which appears to be discussing the subjective root of freedom of the will, but all it is really saying is that the will is free because its object is the universal good.

The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does; but it apprehends simply one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together. Therefore the intellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved by several things, but not of necessity by one thing.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>See question 82, a. 2, corpus. Also: "Et huius ratio est, quia voluntas et natura secundum hoc differunt in causando, quia natura determinata est ad unum; sed voluntas non est determinata ad unum. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus assimilatur formae agentis per quem agit. Manifestum est autem quod unius rei non est nisi una forma naturalis, per quam res habet esse; unde quale ipsum est, tale facit. Sed forma per quam voluntas agit, non est una tantum, sed sunt plures, secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae: unde quod voluntate agitur, non est tale quale est agens, sed quale vult et intelligit illud esse agens. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est." Q. 41, a. 2.

<sup>9</sup>"Ad tertium dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate." Q. 82, a. 2, ad 3.

Another important text in this article will be of use later when we discuss the problem of psychological determinism.

The mover of necessity causes movement in the movable thing only when the power of the mover exceeds the movable thing in such a way that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will is for the universal and perfect good, it is not subjected to any particular good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.<sup>10</sup>

Before proceeding to the question of liberum arbitrium, it would be well to note one feature of freedom in general. Freedom is here explicitly limited to means.

. . . we will our own happiness necessarily. . . . Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will take food to preserve life, or to take a ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not will necessarily those things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a stroll, since we can take a stroll without a horse. The same applies to other means.<sup>11</sup>

We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice

<sup>10</sup>"Ad secundum dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota ejus possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiecitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo." Ibid., ad 2.

<sup>11</sup>. . . voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult beatitudinem. . . . Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes finem, nisi sint tales, sine quibus finis esse non potest; sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes transire. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum: quia sine hoc possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis." Q. 19, a. 3.

regards, not the end, but the means to the end, as the Philosopher says. Consequently, the desire of the ultimate end is not among those actions of which we are masters.<sup>12</sup>

When St. Thomas says, in the answer to the first objection in this same article, that "natural necessity does not take away liberty of the will," he means either that the will is simultaneously necessitated to happiness and free from coercion, or that, despite the will's necessary inclination to the ultimate end, it is free in its choice of means to that end.<sup>13</sup>

In the Prima Pars St. Thomas resumes a question which he took up in the Commentary on the Sentences and the De Veritate, but which he did not study explicitly in the Summa Contra Gentiles: the question of the nature of liberum arbitrium or free choice, not considered in its most proper sense as an act, but rather as the immediate principle of an act. The principle of an act is either a power or a habit or a power with a habit. Now, liberum arbitrium is neither a habit nor a power with a habit; if it were, the habit involved would be a natural habit, for it is natural to man to have free choice; yet free

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<sup>12</sup>"Ad tertium dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus." Q. 82, a. 1, ad 3.

<sup>13</sup>"Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis." Ibid., ad 1. See Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, pp. 240-241.

choice cannot enter into purely natural inclinations. Furthermore, habits make us "well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions," while free choice is indifferent to choosing well or ill. Therefore free choice, as a principle of action, cannot be a habit, but must be a power.<sup>14</sup>

There is one other serious problem regarding the nature of free choice, but it is better handled after the consideration of St. Thomas's proof that man has free choice.

The proof lacks some of the subtleties which appear in the De Veritate and Summa Contra Gentiles. Except for one or two brief texts (e.g., "Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act"),<sup>15</sup> the treatment is very analytical and the procedure is similar to that followed in all of the early works when dealing with the related problem of freedom of the will. In other words, the problem of free choice is considered here ex parte objecti, while the treatment of free choice presented in the De Veritate and the Summa Contra Gentiles emphasizes the subject's self-motion.

. . . some things act without judgment, as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which

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<sup>14</sup>See question 83, a. 2, corpus.

<sup>15</sup>"Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus: quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum." Q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.

lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment; because it judges, not from deliberation, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment in brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And in that man is rational, it is necessary that he have free choice.<sup>16</sup>

There is one text which does handle better the subjective element:

Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to

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16. . . quaedam agunt absque iudicio: sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. -- Quedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero; quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. -- Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia: et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatur ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc quod rationalis est." Q. 83, a. 1.



the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment, but not from free choice, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself. Now such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it knows the universal nature of goodness, from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free choice.<sup>17</sup>

Free choice is of course limited to means. "We have free choice with respect to what we do not will of necessity, or by natural instinct. That we will to be happy does not pertain to free choice but to natural instinct."<sup>18</sup>

The question of the mutual causality of intellect and will is handled in the same way as in the two previous treatments of freedom.

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<sup>17</sup>"Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia: ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum potest agere iudicio libero, inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium." Q. 59, a. 3. This particular text is suggestive of the presentations of the De Veritate and the Summa Contra Gentiles.

<sup>18</sup>"Respondeo dicendum quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum." Q. 19, a. 10.

A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end, as when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the understood good is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul.<sup>19</sup>

But one fairly significant addition is made. To the objection of an infinite regre<sup>ss</sup>, St. Thomas replies:

There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect--namely, God; as Aristotle also says, explaining in this way<sup>20</sup> that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

There is thus introduced the notion of an influence of divine efficient causality on human actions--more precisely on the

<sup>19</sup>"Respondetur dicendum quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem: quia bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis.

"Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteram, et impellens movet impulsam. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires." Q. 82, a. 4.

<sup>20</sup>"Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statim in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio: sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis: sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae eudemicae: et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum." Q. 82, a. 4, ad 3.

intellect. The Commentary on the Sentences and the De Veritate had mentioned briefly the divine concursus.

Another statement regarding divine causality also indicates an influence on the part of God:

Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.<sup>21</sup>

St. Thomas clearly avoids psychological determinism in the Prima Pars. The important text in this regard was quoted above in a different context.<sup>22</sup> Lottin feels that this text is an indication of the evolution of Saint Thomas's thought in this matter and a sign of what is to come.<sup>23</sup> But in so avoiding psychological determinism, the subjective factors in human action are not treated sufficiently; the analysis is ex parte objecti, as

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<sup>21</sup>"Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit; operatur enim in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem." Q. 83, a. 1, ad 3. See also Q. 105, a. 4, 5.

<sup>22</sup>See page 95; "The mover of necessity causes . . ."

<sup>23</sup>Psychologia et Morale, p. 242.

we mentioned above. Besides, there is no indication of precisely what does move the will to its first act. Saint Thomas says that a natural movement of the will must precede a free movement, just as the natural adherence of the intellect to first principles must precede its assent to contingent propositions. Now, in the De Veritate and the Summa Contra Gentiles he explicitly states that the intellect does not move the will per modum causae efficientis; yet, as we have seen, the presentation smacks of psychological determinism. In the Prima Pars, psychological determinism is avoided, but no explanation is given of the first and natural movement of the will. The will is a passive power, and so must be moved to its act by something other than itself; ordinarily what moves an appetite to act is its object, but no particular good can move the will necessarily.

The absence of psychological determinism is one factor which suggests that freedom of choice is the property of the will rather than of the practical judgment. Another indication of this appears in one of the articles which treats of the nature of free choice. Saint Thomas had always maintained that free choice, as a principle of activity, was an appetitive power (more precisely, the will) informed by knowledge. But in the Prima Pars, he almost seems to identify the last practical judgment with the election.

Obj. 2. Further, free choice is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power.

Reply obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptance of the appetite. Hence the Philosopher says that, having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel. And in this sense election itself is a judgment from which free choice takes its name.<sup>24</sup>

That the last practical judgment and the election are not really identical is clear. They probably are meant to be simultaneous. But the difficulty in the formal use of the word liberum arbitrium seems to be more apparent to St. Thomas, since he seems to want to place all freedom precisely in the will. Perhaps this is an indication of the more general meaning which the term liberum arbitrium will assume in the De Malo.

There are many problems with the doctrine of freedom in the Prima Pars: (1) freedom is explicitly limited to acts bearing upon non-necessary means to man's ultimate end; (2) God is presented as a means to man's happiness; (3) the subjective

<sup>24</sup>"2. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva potentia.

"Ad secundum dicendum, quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilio, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus: unde Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic, quod ex consilii iudicantes desideramus secundum consilium. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium." Q. 83, a. 3, ad 2.

root of lived freedom is not handled; (4) consequently, man's experience of being free is not explained philosophically; (5) the term liberum arbitrium seems to be ambiguous and confusing if understood as "free judgment," and (6) no causal explanation is given of the will's first and necessary act.

There are also several indications of future developments: (1) God is introduced as the first cause of human activity; (2) psychological determinism is avoided by appealing to the infinite capacity of the will and the particularity of each concrete object; (3) freedom is clearly found in the will rather than in the intellect (though never explained in terms of self-determination); and (4) the unsatisfactory connotation of the formal meaning of liberum arbitrium is apparent.

## CHAPTER V

### DE MALO

The main commentators on the development of Saint Thomas's theory of freedom agree that the De Malo and the Prima Secundae were both written after the four works discussed in the previous chapters, and after the condemnation of 1270. But there is some divergence of opinion regarding the respective chronology of these two works themselves. Lottin says that the entire Prima Secundae was written after the De Malo, and he regards the treatment of the divine motion in the De Malo as a transitional step toward the final position expressed in the Prima Secundae.<sup>1</sup> Klubertanz seems to hold for the same chronology, stating that "St. Thomas made some significant changes in his treatment of human freedom at the time of the composition of De Malo, quaestio VI, and some additional changes in Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae."<sup>2</sup> But Romiti feels that the De Malo should be placed after not only the Prima Pars but also after the first twenty questions of the Prima Secundae. Throughout his precis of the De Malo, Romiti emphasized the practical method employed in this work,

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<sup>1</sup>Lottin, Psychologie et Morale, pp. 260-1, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup>Klubertanz, p. 701.

stating that Saint Thomas is not as concerned with explaining and defending notiones as with making practical applications in the moral sphere. And since the questions following the first twenty questions of the Prima Secundae are also practical and moral applications, Romiti feels that the first twenty questions of the Prima Secundae put forth the notiones which are applied to moral questions in both the De Malo and the rest of the Prima Secundae.<sup>3</sup> Lottin's arguments seem a bit more probable; the point is, however, of little importance. What does matter is that the doctrine of the De Malo and the Prima Secundae be recognized as the definitive Thomistic theory of

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<sup>3</sup>Methodus quam sequitur S. Doctor in De Malo est eminenter practica: de definitionibus et de notionibus ipsis parva cura est. . . . Sic enim agit S. Doctor ut multa jam praesupponat, sine quibus eius expositio aaepe saepius inintelligibilis foret. Applicationes igitur morales plures effert S. Doctor quasi remittens lectorem, pro notionibus quibus innituntur, ad ea quae alibi sunt exposita: quae methodus applicata elucet in Summa Theologica I-II post primas viginti quaestiones et in Summa Theologica II-II. Remittitur autem lector praes ceteris operibus ad indicatas primas quaestiones Summae Theologicae I-II. Hoc pro De Malo elucet ex altero puncto quod notandum esse diximus, ex puncto nempe quod materiam ipsam respicit. Multas quaestiones non tractat S. Doctor in De Malo; in his vero quae tractantur non pauci loci paralleli cum Summa Theologica inveniuntur, quos conati sumus in lucem ponere, et nunquam, ni fallimur, legitur aliqua sententia in De Malo, saltem relate ad nostram materiam, quae magis cohaereat cum precedentibus operibus quam cum Summa Theologica praesertim I-II. . . .

" . . . dicimus doctrinam thomisticam de actu humano completo et de quaestionibus adnexis suam plenam evolutionem invenire in Summa Theologica I-II et quidem in primis quaestionibus hujus operis, nam postea in ipsa Summa Theologica non inveniuntur nisi plures applicationes de ea. Altera conclusio est quod nostro iudicio quaestiones disputatae De Malo exaratae ponendae sunt saltem post primam partem Summae Theologicae, imo post primas quaestiones Summae Theologicae I-II." Romiti, pp. 69-70.



human freedom.

There are several opinions regarding the precise significance of the changes that have been made.<sup>4</sup> The most thorough analysis I have seen, aside from Romiti's very general work, is that of Fr. Klubertanz, who regards the understanding of appetite found in these later works as the key factor. "If any one single internal factor can be put at the source of these changes, it is the new metaphysical understanding of animal appetite even as rational and free as parallel to natural appetite."<sup>5</sup> Parallels between the levels of appetite, based on their relationship to form, can be found in the Summa Contra Gentiles and in the Prima Pars, as we have seen. But the metaphysical implications of the relationship between form and appetite were not recognized in these two earlier works. These metaphysical aspects are responsible for the famous distinction between the exercise and the specification of a human act, for the extension of freedom so that man is free regarding ends as well as means, and for the introduction of God as mover of the will. The connection between the parallelism of appetite and these other factors is especially obvious in De Malo, question 6, and so this text shall serve as the center of our discussion.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>For a review of the literature, see Klubertanz, pp. 701-5.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 721.

<sup>6</sup>Although the sixth question forms the center of the discussion of freedom, there are, of course, other texts in the De Malo which bear upon our problem, and we shall draw material from these texts.

Form in natural beings serves as a principle of action, for upon every natural form there follow inclinations or natural appetites which serve as the immediate subject of action. These inclinations or natural appetites are the operative potencies of the being. They are produced by a kind of emanation from the informed substance. The substantial form exercises a unique kind of causality in this situation: it is formal cause of the operative potencies, but not in the sense in which it is the formal cause of the substance--that is, its causality is not the causality of form on matter. The form also exercises a kind of final causality, in the sense that the operative potencies of the being are directed toward the perfection of the being secundum formam; and there is even a kind of efficiency implied here.<sup>7</sup>

There is a similarity between this production of operative potencies or natural appetites by the substantial form of a being and the specification of the tendency of a human agent as such by the known form. The difference is that the form of a natural thing is individuated in matter, and therefore the operative potency or natural appetite is determined to one object; but the form known by the intellect is a universal, so that the agent is not determined in his actions, since all actions are particular and refer to a particular

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<sup>7</sup>Klubertanz, pp. 710-1.

object.<sup>8</sup>

The agent, specified in an additional way by the known form, has his tendency specified by that form, and so tends as specified agent. The formal causality of the known form is thus not absolutely immediately upon the act of tending, but immediately upon the agent. In thus specifying the agent, the known form provides him with something to which to tend, provided that the known form is that of something known as good. At the same time, the very limitations which the intellect is capable of recognizing in its object ground the liberty of the agent's response in willing.<sup>9</sup>

The textual basis for this last sentence is also found in De Malo 6. A potency is doubly determined to its act; there is a subjective determination in the order of efficient causality and a formal determination from the object. And since no efficient causality acts without a purpose (omne agens agit propter finem), final causality also enters into the consideration

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8. . . sicut in aliis rebus est aliquod principium priorum actuum, ita etiam in hominibus. Hoc autem activen sive motivum principium in hominibus proprium est intellectus et voluntas. . . . Quod quidem principium partim convenit cum principio activo in rebus naturalibus, partim ab eo differt. Convenit quidem, quia sicut in rebus naturalibus invenitur forma, quae est principium actionis, et inclinatio consequens formam, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex quibus sequitur actio; ita in homine invenitur forma intellectiva, et inclinatio voluntatis consequens formam apprehensam, ex quibus sequitur exterior actio; sed in hoc est differentia, quia forma rei naturalis est forma individuata per materiam; unde et inclinatio ipsam consequens est determinata ad unum, sed forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adequat potentiam universalem, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa." De Malo, q. 6.

<sup>9</sup>Klubertanz, p. 711. The same parallel is presented in De Malo, q. 16, a. 2; the operative metaphysics is more obvious in q. 6.

of the subjective determination of specification. Keeping in mind the parallel between natural form and appetite, and cognitive form and appetite, Saint Thomas remarks that in nature the specification of an act is derived from the form of the natural being, while the exercise of the act is attributed to that agent which causes the motion. And since the final cause is causa causarum, it serves as the first principle in the order of exercise. Switching our consideration to the level of human activity, we find that the good is the object of the will, and being as true is the object of the intellect. Since the good is precisely the end for which an agent acts, and since final causality is the first principle in the order of exercise, the exercise of the act is attributed to the will; on the other hand, all forms apprehended by the intellect are included under the general heading of being as true, and, since the form of the agent is what specifies its act, the intellect is responsible for the specification of human activity. One of its apprehended forms is the good, which, precisely as an apprehended form, is true. (Conversely, one of the goods which serves as an end and thus as a principle of exercise in human activity is truth, which is the

end of intellectual operation.)<sup>10</sup>

We can expand the consideration of formal causality a bit; as we said, the form of the agent specifies its act. In order to grasp fully the specification of human activity, we must consider the entire agent who is acting or tending; thus we must consider more than simply the apprehended form. A human agent is an intellectual being; thus he has a natural tendency to act according to reason. Because of the partial and incomplete nature of human knowledge, our attention is always focused on one aspect of reality more than on others.

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<sup>10</sup>"Secundo considerandum est quod potentia aliqua dupliciter moventur: uno modo ex parte subjecti; alio modo, ex parte objecti. Ex parte subjecti quidem, sicut visus per immutationem dispositionis organi movetur ad clarius vel minus clare videndum; ex parte vero objecti, sicut visus nunc videt album nunc videt nigrum; et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur aut melius vel debilius agatur; secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, nam actus specificatur per objectum. Est autem considerandum, quod in rebus naturalibus specificatio quidem actus est ex forma; ipsum autem exercitium est ab agente, quod causat ipsam motionem. Movens autem agit propter finem. Unde relinquitur quod primum principium motionis quantum ad exercitium actus, sit ex fine. Si autem consideremus objecta voluntatis et intellectus, inveniamus quod objectum intellectus est primum principium in genere causae formalis, est enim ejus objectum ens et verum; sed objectum voluntatis est primum principium in genere causae finalis, nam ejus objectum est bonum, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes fines, sicut sub vero comprehenduntur omnes formae apprehensae. Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum. Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarum animae ex parte objecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu; hoc enim modo bonum intellectum movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motum potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem." Q. 6.

Finally, we must allow for subjective dispositions and habits, which determine the attitudes we take toward reality.<sup>11</sup>

When it is said that the will is the potency responsible for the exercise of the act, Saint Thomas does not mean us to understand that the will moves itself from potency to act with regard to the same object. Rather, just as the intellect moves itself from the knowledge of principles to the acceptance of certain conclusions, so the will moves itself from willing the end to willing the means to that end, or some object connected with the end.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>"Et quod voluntas feratur in id quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam, potest contingere tripliciter. Uno quidem modo in quantum una praeponderat, et tunc movetur voluntas secundum rationem; puta, cum homo praeeligit id quod est utile sanitati, quod est utile voluntati. Alio vero modo in quantum cogitat de una particulari circumstantia et non de alia; et hoc contingit plerumque per aliquam occasionem exhibitam vel ab interiori vel ab exteriori, ut ei talis cogitatio occurrat. Tertio vero modo contingit ex dispositione hominis; quia secundum Philosophum, qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei." *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>"Nec propter hoc sequitur quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu. Sicut enim homo secundum intellectum in via inventionis movet se ipsum ad scientiam, in quantum ex uno noto in actu venit in aliquid ignotum, quod erat solum in potentia notum; ita per hoc quod homo aliquid vult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu; sicut per hoc quod vult sanitatem, movet se ad volendum sumere potionem." *Ibid.* Lottin remarks that the new distribution of causality emphasizes the active nature of the will, and eliminates all danger of psychological determinism. "Car la double causalité, efficiente et finale, qui facilement évoquerait l'idée de déterminisme, est devenue l'apanage exclusif de la volonté elle-même. D'autre part, en ramenant la part de la raison à une causalité formelle, il écarte de la raison toute idée d'influence déterminante." P. 256.

It is precisely in this context that one of the major doctrinal changes is introduced. Saint Thomas presents the example of a man, who desiring health, moves himself to deliberate concerning the means that will procure this end, and finally chooses to use some helpful medicine. He notes that a deliberation preceded the choice of means; he then asks what was the initial efficient cause that moved the man to deliberate. If it was the will alone, then the "choice" to deliberate must have itself been preceded by a deliberation, which must have followed a will act, and so on ad infinitum. Since an infinite regress is impossible, he concludes that the first motion of the will--any motion to which the will did not or could not move itself--must be caused by some being other than the human agent. Since the will is a spiritual faculty, it cannot be moved efficiently by a material being. And so, the only cause who can move the will to its first act in any given series of will acts is God.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>"Sic ergo voluntatem accipiendi potionem praecedit consilium, quod quidem procedit ex voluntate volentis consiliari. Cum ergo voluntas se consilio moveat, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam non demonstrativa, sed ad opposita viam habens, non ex necessitate voluntas seipsam movet. Sed cum voluntas non semper voluerit consiliari, necesse est quod ab aliquo moveatur ad hoc velit consiliari; et si quidem a seipsa, necesse est iterum quod motum voluntatis praecedat consilium, et consilium praecedat actus voluntatis; et cum hoc in infinitum procedere non possit, necesse est ponere, quod quantum ad primum motum voluntatis moveatur voluntas cujuscunque non semper actu volentis ab aliquo exteriori, cujus instinctu voluntas velle incipiat.

"Posuerunt ergo quidem, quod iste instinctu est a corpore caelesti. Sed hoc esse non potest. Cum enim voluntas sit in

The object of the will in this first act (velle)<sup>14</sup>  
is the good considered simply as good.<sup>15</sup> Thus this act bears

ratione . . . ratio corporis caelestis moveat ipsam voluntatem directe. . . .

"Relinquitur ergo . . . quod id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum, sit aliquid supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus; qui cum omnia moveat secundum rationem mobilium, ut levia sursum et gravia deorsum, etiam voluntatem movet secundum ejus conditionem, non ut ex necessitate, sed ut determinate se habentem ad multa." Lottin uses the expression "mover voluntatem et intellectum" to show that the De Malâ is an intermediate work between the Prima Pars (where God moves the intellect) and the Prima Secundae (where God moves the will), see footnote 1.

Lottin also states: "On le verra bientôt, Siger de Brabant disait: pour passer de la puissance à l'acte, la volonté se suffit; mais le premier moteur est nécessaire pour la spécification du vouloir. Or, voici que d'un trait de plume saint Thomas déplace le champ d'action de la motion divine: c'est pour passer de la puissance à l'acte que le premier moteur est indispensable à la volonté. C'est logique d'ailleurs: la subordination de causes s'appelant mutuellement, qui fait la preuve d'un premier moteur nécessaire, se comprend s'il s'agit de causes efficientes et finales, mais point s'il s'agit de causes formelles. Et ainsi, après avoir réduit, la raison au rôle de cause formelle, saint Thomas en arrivait à la nécessité d'un premier moteur pour la volonté dans la liberté d'exercice, mais non pour la raison qui assure la spécification du vouloir humain." P. 257. Cf. Klubertanz's remark: "Dom Lottin has pointed out the simultaneous appearance in St. Thomas's text of the distinction between the liberty of specification and the liberty of exercise and the explicit statement of the necessity of the Divine Motion for willing at all. He argues that the assertion that the agent is the cause of his beginning to will requires, on the 'quidquid movetur' principle, that he be moved previously by God. If my analysis is correct, it would be slightly more accurate to say that the parallel between natural inclination and animal appetite requires both the distinction between the two sorts of liberty and the Divine Motion." P. 716.

<sup>14</sup>Q. 2, a. 2, ad 6.

<sup>15</sup>" . . . appetitus est inclinatio cujuslibet appetentis: substantiis autem intellectualibus, in quantum hujusmodi, inest appetitus respectu boni simpliciter; unde omnis naturalis inclinatio in eis est ad bonum simpliciter." Q. 16, a. 2.

"Appetitus ergo rationalis, qui est voluntas, habet pro propria ratione objecti bonum universale." Q. 8, a. 3.



only upon ends.<sup>16</sup> The distinction between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut voluntas is mentioned, although these words are not used.<sup>17</sup> Voluntas ut voluntas is operative in moral actions, while voluntas ut natura is exercised in the first act of any series.<sup>18</sup> The will is clearly seen as the appetite of the whole man, and thus it naturally desires the objects of the other powers of man.<sup>19</sup> In this first act of the will, man necessarily wills the good presented to him, with a natural necessity. The knowledge which precedes this act is the knowledge of something which appears as a universal good; otherwise the will would not be moved at all. But St. Thomas emphasized that the will does not merely receive passively the influence of God, but,

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<sup>16</sup>Q. 13, a. 2, c.

<sup>17</sup>"Ad quintum dicendum, quod voluntas rationalis creature determinata est ad unum, in quod naturaliter movetur; sicut omnis homo naturaliter vult esse, et vivere, et beatitudinem. Et ista sunt ad quae primo movetur naturaliter creatura vel intelligenda vel volenda; quia semper actio naturalis praesupponitur aliis actionibus." Q. 16, a. 4, ad 5.

<sup>18</sup>"Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas secundum suam naturam est bona, unde et actus ejus naturalis semper est bonus; et dico actum naturalem voluntatis, prout homo vult felicitatem naturaliter, esse vivere, et beatitudinem. Si autem loquimur de bono morali, sic voluntas secundum se considerata nec est bona nec mala: sed se habet in potentia ad bonum vel malum." Q. 2, a. 3, ad 2.

<sup>19</sup>"Manifestum est autem quod omne particulare continetur sub universali, sed non convertitur; unde in quodcumque potest ferri irascibilis vel concupiscibilis, potest etiam ferri voluntas, et in multa alia." Q. 8, a. 3. ". . . ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum." Q. 6.

given this initial impetus, the will begins to move itself.<sup>20</sup>

The natural influence of God is toward and into deliberation, but man can cease to deliberate if he so wills; if he continues to deliberate, the same freedom extends to his act of choice. This is Saint Thomas's way of discussing freedom of exercise, with regard to all objects, in the De Malo. The subtleties of the Prima Secundae are not present here. The following comments of Fr. Klubertanz seem to express what Saint Thomas is saying in the De Malo:

. . . unless a man is precipitated into action by passion or by circumstances, or blocked from further consideration by ignorance or error, it is natural to reflect both on the full particularity of the object and on his own willing of that object. This moment of reflection is also the moment of freedom, for it reveals at least that he need not continue to think about the object, and in the case of most objects it may show some deficiency; in some cases it may completely change the object from good to bad or vice versa.<sup>21</sup>

. . . the point of being put into act concerning something which is good in its absolute consideration is that man should reflect whether in the concrete and all things considered he should absolutely will that act or object, or whether he should

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<sup>20</sup>"Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas aliquid confert cum a Deo movetur; ipsa enim est quae operatur, sed mota a Deo: et ideo motus ejus quavis sit ab extrinseco sicut a primo principio, non tamen est violentus." Q. 6, a. 4.

Lottin says: ". . . apres avoir accentue vis-a-vis des causes immediates le caractere actif de la volonte, voici que, en regard de la cause premiere, saint Thomas peut mettre en son vrin jour le caractere de puissance passive qu'Aristote avait revendique pour toute appetition et toute volonte crees." P. 257.

<sup>21</sup>Klubertanz, p. 716.

not. If, on reflection, he finds that he should absolutely will what he is inclined to, the Divine Motion continues on in all its ontological fullness into the free act itself. If he finds that he should not, but neglects the practical application of the moral rule, all that there is of actuality in his choice is still due to the original Divine Motion, but the sin is his own.<sup>22</sup>

Freedom of specification is present in man's choices, if and when the object is recognized as particular. If, after reflection, the object still appears as bonus conveniens secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, then man does not have freedom of specification. But he still has freedom of exercise, for the act of considering the object is only a particular good and so man can will its contrary, i.e., no longer to consider the object.<sup>23</sup> The personal character of

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 718-9. See also Maritain, Existence and the Existent, chapter 4, esp. pp. 96-99. (New York: Doubleday Image, 1956).

<sup>23</sup>"Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens, apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum. Si ergo apprehendatur aliquid ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, ex necessitate movebit voluntatem; et propter hoc homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem, quae est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum; non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle tunc cogitare de beatitudine; quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt. Si autem sit tale bonum quod non inveniat esse bonum secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, non ex necessitate movebit etiam quantum ad determinationem actus; poterit enim aliquis velle ejus oppositum, etiam de eo cogitans, quia forte est bonum vel conveniens secundum aliquod aliud particulare consideratum; sicut quod est bonum sanitati, non est bonum delectationi, et sic de aliis." Q. 6.

Also: "Ad septimum dicendum, quod activum non ex necessitate

of the act of choice is emphasized.<sup>24</sup>

Boetius outlines the series of "acts" involved in the genesis of a free act:

First of all, the intellect apprehends the universal good and the will naturally tends toward it, prior to any consideration of whether it can possibly be attained or not; then a practical judgment indicates if the good in question can be attained, and shows all the possible means that could be taken; the will now is moved to a good that is possible, and according to all the means which the practical judgment indicated as useful; then reason judges about all these means, each in particular, until it arrives at that means which is judged to be the most useful; this is the act of counsel. The will consents to this means. Then the ultimate practical judgment (iudicium practico-practicum) judges that this means should be chosen here and now, since it is good and fitting for the agent. Then the will proceeds to act.<sup>25</sup>

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movet nisi quando superat virtutem passivi. Cum autem voluntas se habeat in potentia respectu boni universalis, nullum bonum superat virtutem voluntatis quasi ex necessitate ipsam movens, nisi id quod secundum omnes considerationes est bonum: et hoc solus est bonus perfectus, quod est beatitudo, quod voluntas non potest non velle, ita scilicet quod velit ejus oppositum; potest tamen non velle actu, quia potest avertere cogitationem beatitudinis, in quantum movet intellectum ad suum actum; et quantum ad hoc nec ipsam beatitudinem ex necessitate vult; sicut etiam aliquis non ex necessitate calefieret, si possent calidum a se repellere cum vellet." Ibid., ad 7.

Another text with some of the same elements is Q. 3, a. 3. c.

<sup>24</sup> . . . considerandum est, quod objectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; unde si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem ratione convenientie, non movebit voluntatem." (Emphasis mine).

<sup>25</sup> . . . in primo momento habetur intellectus universale bonum apprehendens et voluntas in hoc universale bonum naturaliter tendens absque consideratione num possibile sit an non illud bonum obtineri possit et omnia media quibus obtineri potest, ac voluntas, bona impossibilia relinquens, in aliquod bonum possibile movetur

Romiti and Klubertanz both point out that there is no longer any question of confusing the last practical judgment and the act of choice. For, as Romiti states, the distinction between specification and exercise, indicates the precise role of both intellect and will in the act of choice, and prevents their respective contributions to the total human act from being confused.<sup>26</sup>

The greatest significance of the doctrine of the De Malo, at least for our present purposes, is expressed by Fr. Klubertanz:

This analysis is more metaphysical than the earlier ones, since it works out from the relation of form

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secundum omnia illa media obtinendum quae iudicium proposuit; tunc autem ratio sedet iudex ad crisis faciendam omnium illorum mediorum et inquit super omnes rationes quae ad modum advocatorum unum alterutrum medium commendant, usque dum perveniat ad illud medium quod utilius aestimatur, et hoc fit per consilium, ac voluntas consentit vel approbat hoc medium; subsequens iudicium practica-practicum indicat hoc medium esse hic et nunc eligendum, quia bonum et conveniens agenti, et tunc voluntas ad actionem procedit." Romiti, p. 65.

<sup>26</sup>" . . . notamus in De Malo nullam propositionem inveniri ex qua appareat in unum confundi iudicium electionis et electionem, sed semper ponitur psychologica antea haberi iudicium et deinde electionem. Et in hoc etiam cohaeret De Malo cum Summa Theologica I-II. Quia parallelismus suam explicationem habet ex indicata distinctione inter libertatem specificationis et libertatem exercitii. Per hanc enim distinctionem delimitatur pars intellectus et pars voluntatis in electione elicienda. . . . Ita sive intellectus sive voluntas suam partem habent in electione quae distinctis momentis psychologicis perficitur." Pp. 67-8. See Klubertanz, p. 712. Klubertanz points up one additional and very interesting feature of the doctrine on the mutual causality of intellect and will, but since he uses the Prima Secundae for a textual basis, we will discuss this point in the next chapter.

to tendency in being. It is at the same time more existential and personal, since the being of the agent and the dynamism of his act of existing are involved directly. Thus also the spontaneity of the acting subject is stressed.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Klubertanz, p. 711. Lottin makes the following remarks about the significance of the changes: "Il ne faudrait sans doute pas urger la difference, manifeste d'ailleurs, qui existe entre cet expose du De Malo et celui du De Veritate. Car la distinction entre liberte d'exercice et liberte de specification qui fournit le cadre a la question 6 du De Malo n'est pas etrangere au De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6, ou saint Thomas parle de l'indetermination de la volonte vis-a-vis de l'acte meme de vouloir et de l'objet de cet acte. Et d'autre part la loi psychologique qui relie l'action a la volonte et celle-ci au jugement n'est aucunement repudiee dans le De Malo, puisqu'elle est rappee au debut meme de l'expose. On ne peut donc parler d'opposition, ni meme de diversite de doctrine.

"Le tour de pensee cependant est autre, et l'accent est deplace." P. 258.

## CHAPTER VI

### PRIMA SECUNDAR

The general conclusions regarding the root of human freedom in the Prima Secundae will be quite similar to those discovered in the preceding analysis of the De Malo. Several new and more sophisticated notions appear though, in the Prima Secundae.<sup>1</sup>

The parallelism of intellectual form and appetite with natural form and appetite is presented in q. 8, a. 1 ("Utrum voluntas sit tantum boni").

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellectual or rational appetite, called the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing, so the animal or the voluntary appetite tends to the apprehended good.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Here, as in the preceding chapters, the only vill "acts" which we shall discuss in any detail are vill and al-gere. In the Prima Secundae, Saint Thomas presents a much more elaborate explanation of all facets of the human act, including intento, fructio, consensus, and usus. But these facets are peripheral to our present discussion. For a thorough presentation, see Komtil, pp. 37-59. See also J. de Finance, S.J., Essai sur l'agir humain, pp. 63-4, footnote 20.

<sup>2</sup>"Sed considerandum est quod cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem; appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus

This particular presentation of the parallelism of appetites does not draw out the metaphysical implications which, in the De Malo, immediately follow upon the presentation of cognitive appetite as parallel to natural appetite. But it is clear from the doctrine of the Prima Secundae that the same metaphysics is operative. In the De Malo, Saint Thomas considered the entire problem of freedom in one article. Here, on the other hand, the discussion is spread over several questions, and each element is handled at the opportune moment.

The will, once again, is 'the proper appetitive faculty of an intellectual being. The natural object of the will is called bonum universale<sup>3</sup> or bonum in communi.<sup>4</sup> This

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naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum." Q. 8, a. 1. The translation used in this chapter is that of A. C. Pegis, The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, New York: Random House, 1945, Vol. II.

<sup>3</sup>"Ad tertium. Dicendum quod objectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali." Q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

"Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis." Q. 2, a. 7.

"Objectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum." Q. 2, a. 8.

<sup>4</sup>"Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum; sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quidquid est huiusmodi." Q. 10, a. 1, ad 3.

"Similiter etiam principium motivum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquod naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum objectum." Q. 10, a. 1.



good is, of course, always one that has been apprehended by the intellect,<sup>5</sup> since all appetite follows upon knowledge.<sup>6</sup> Concretely, the will is displayed as the appetite of the whole man and thus tends toward the goods proper to each of man's powers considered in themselves.

For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. Therefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers, such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be and to live and other like things which regard his natural well-being.<sup>7</sup>

The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by the good apprehended by sense. Therefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite.<sup>8</sup>

That there is a natural and necessary movement of the

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<sup>5</sup>Q. 8, a. 1; q. 15, a. 5, ad 2; q. 19, a. 1, ad 3.

<sup>6</sup>"Quis autem motus appetitivus, seu inclinatio consequens apprehensionem, pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum vel sensitivum; nam inclinatio appetitus naturalis non consequitur apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius." Q. 35, a. 1.

<sup>7</sup>"Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis; ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et huiusmodi alia, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem." Q. 10, a. 1.

<sup>8</sup>"Ad tertium. Dicendum quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi." Q. 10, a. 3, ad 3.

will is proved by a consideration which is found also in the earlier works: that nature must provide the foundation for all activity; the principle operative with regard to those things which are the natural objects of a power is called a natural principle, one that operates according to nature, and thus one which is determined in so far as it is a nature.

. . . nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it according to its substance; and this is what is in a thing essentially. Now whatever does not belong to a thing essentially is reduced to something, which belongs to that thing essentially, as to its principle. Therefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner, the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.<sup>9</sup>

The will is thus moved naturally toward "all those things which belong to the one willing according to this nature."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>"Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia vel quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc illud dicitur esse naturale rei quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium voluntariorum oportet esse aliquod naturaliter volitum." Q. 10, a. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

This natural act of the will is determined in the order of specification in the first moment of any new series of will acts. The object is presented instantaneously as bonum in communi, and the will necessarily tends toward it.<sup>11</sup>

The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. . . . As to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, but another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. . . . Therefore, if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all, since it cannot will the opposite.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to the relation of the ultimate end with the means toward attaining this end, Saint Thomas introduces

<sup>11</sup>Regarding the necessity of starting a new series of will acts with something naturally willed, Fr. Klubertanz says: "The analysis must follow this order. First, because, apart from a miraculous intervention, the Divine Motion is given concretely when the creature is disposed proximately to be so moved; otherwise, the two sources of the will's movement (from the part of the object and from God) would be intrinsically unrelated. Second, because . . . there must be a 'priority' (not in time) on the side of the object, since the object is the end, and the end is the first cause and the very reason why the efficient cause acts." P. 718, footnote 6A.

<sup>12</sup>"Dicendum quod voluntas movetur dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex objecto. . . . Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo objecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cujuscumque potentiae a suo objecto, consideranda est ratio per quam objectum movet potentiam. . . . Unde si proponatur aliquod objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit; non enim poterit velle oppositum." Q. 10, a. 2.

the relation between a good which is totaliter bonum and particular, exclusive, and limited goods. The latter consideration is more experiential, since man's will is often put into act with regard to something which is instantaneously seen to be completely good but not considered under the formality of the ultimate end.<sup>13</sup>

The natural act of the will can tend toward a good which cannot be attained in the practical order. If this is the case, this act is referred to as voluntas incompleta or velleitas.<sup>14</sup>

Mention was just made of the distinction between the exercise of a will act and its specification. As in the De Malo, this distinction is responsible for the attribution of formal causality to the intellect, and final and efficient causality to the will. The discussion here is identically the same as in the De Malo.

<sup>13</sup>The consideration of means and end is not abandoned, though: "Ad tertium. Dicendum quod finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem; sicut conclusiones sine quibus principia possunt esse vera, non ex necessitate credit qui principia credit." Q. 10, a. 2, ad 3.

<sup>14</sup>Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur, quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile." Q. 13, a. 5, ad 1.

A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things. For that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is found to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. . . . The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting; while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end. . . the principle of this motion lies in the end. . . . Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the ends and the perfections of every other power are included under the object of the will as particular goods; and the art or power, to which the universal end belongs, always moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal good. . . .

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>"Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa: uno modo, quantum ad agere vel non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subjecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens; aliud autem est ex parte objecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.

"Motio autem ipsius subjecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum

Notice that the parallel with the natural order is maintained. The "natural form" of heat is the formal principle of the action of heating, but in the unique sense of formal causality which we discussed in the last chapter. In the same way, the form known as good by the intellect is the formal principle of the agent in his action.

Another text similar to one found in the De Malo is the following, dealing with the mutual inclusion of transcendental truth and goodness:

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.<sup>16</sup>

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omnes agens agat propter finem, ut supra ostensum est, principium hujus motionis est ex fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet suo imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem . . . Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est objectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus; utitur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentialium comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona. . . .

"Sed objectum movet determinando actum ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio calore. Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est objectum intellectus. Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei subiectum suum." Q. 9, a. 1.

<sup>16</sup>Ad tertium. Dicendum quod voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem; quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri." Q. 9, a. 1, ad 3.

As in the De Malo, however, other elements besides the understood form of the good function as formal causes of the agent as such.

. . . That which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and befitting moves the will as an object. Now that a thing appear to be good and fitting happens from two causes, namely, from the condition of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation, and hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says: According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.

Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Therefore, according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem good when he is calm. It is in this way that the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.<sup>17</sup>

The following text on the distinction between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut voluntas will introduce us to the

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<sup>17</sup>Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti. Quod quidem aliquid videtur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit; scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur, et ejus cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., 'qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei.' Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur ei extra passionem existenti; sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto. Et per hunc modum ex parte objecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem." Q. 9, a. 2.

question of freedom:

The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another, for some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determined to one thing. But since the will is founded in some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent; just as what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a subsequent cause.<sup>18</sup>

Freedom is handled in a manner similar to that found in the *De Malo*, but with a few elaborations. In the order of exercise, the will is not moved necessarily by any object whatsoever, since a man can will to cease considering even those goods which appear to be totally good. In the order of specification, the will is determined if the good presented to it is universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem. But if the good in question is in any way known or considered to be limited, then the will is not moved necessarily.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>"Ad primam ergo. Dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam; quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur a voluntate; sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori." Q. 10, a. 1, ad 1.

<sup>19</sup>"Respondeo. Dicendum quod voluntas movetur dupliciter: uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex objecto. Primo ergo modo voluntas a nullo objecto ex necessitate movetur; potest enim aliquis de quocumque objecto non cogitare, et per consequens actu velle illud.

"Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo



In the order of exercise, the reason that the man can cease to consider even the perfect good is that "the reason can apprehend as good not only this, viz., to will or to act, but also this, viz., not to will and not to act."<sup>20</sup> That is, the acts of considering and willing are themselves particular goods, since they are exclusive of other acts, and thus they do not determine the will. "Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will, namely, in order that it be in one's power to

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objecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo objecto, consideranda est ratio per quam objectum movet potentiam. Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet ipsum, nisi aliquis visum avertat; quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale objectum viderit; posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratus in actu, et sic ipsum non videret. Sicut autem coloratum in actu est objectum visus, ita bonum est objectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquid objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit; non enim poterit velle oppositum. Si autem proponatur sibi aliquid objectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas fertur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscunque boni habet rationem non bini, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle; quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes." Q. 10, a. 2.

<sup>20</sup>"Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere." Q. 13, a. 6.

consider, to will, and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when it is time to will and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider."<sup>21</sup>

This is explained in greater detail in the body of this article:

Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly, in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts: e.g., heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly, in which sense something proceeds from another through the fact that this other does not act. Thus the sinking of a ship is attributed to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. -- But we must take note that the cause of what follows from the failure to act is not always the agent as not acting, but only when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship, or if the ship's helm were not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be attributed to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.

Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to the will as though proceeding from it. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act, and this sometimes without an outward act, but with an interior act, for instance, when one wills not to act, and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>"Ad tertium. Dicendum quod eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis, sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicujus considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare." *Ibid.*, ad 3.

<sup>22</sup>"Respondeo. Dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate. Ab aliquo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo directe, quod scilicet procedit ex aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefactio a calore. Alio modo indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit; sicut submersio navis dicitur esse a

A further characteristic of freedom of specification should also be mentioned. We noted that the specification of the agent as such includes such elements as temperament and disposition. Do these elements necessitate the will or not?

. . . the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will in so far as the will is moved by its object -- in as much as, namely, through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, a man judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason; as happens to those who, through violent anger or concupiscence, become mad or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; for such passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such men the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow of necessity the impulse of their passions; for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.

Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom; and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly, in so far as the

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gubernatore, inquantum desistit a gubernando. Sed sciendum quod non semper id quod dequitur ad defectum actionis, reducitur sicut in causam in agens, ex eo quod non agit; sed solum tunc cum potest et debet agere. Si enim gubernator non posset naves dirigere, vel non esset ei comissa gubernatio navis, non imputeretur ei navis subversio, quae per absentiam gubernatoris contingeret. -- Quia igitur voluntas volendo et agendo potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei, quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu; quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut cum non vult." Q. 6, a. 3.

reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, there is either no movement of the will in man, and the passion alone holds its sway, or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow passion.<sup>23</sup>

Compare the remark of Fr. Klubertanz, ". . . unless a man is precipitated into action by passion or by circumstances, or blocked from further consideration by ignorance or error, it is natural to reflect both on the full particularity of of the object and on his own willing of that object."<sup>24</sup>

Romiti's description of the genesis of the free

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<sup>23</sup>Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab objecto; inquantum scilicet homo aliquantulum dispositus per passionem, indicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non indicaret. Huiusmodi autem immutatio hominis per passiones duobus modis contingit. Uno modo, sic quod totaliter ratio ligatur, ita quod homo usum rationis non habet; sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementem iram vel concupiscentiam furiosi vel amentes fiunt, sicut et propter aliquam aliam perturbationem corporalem; huiusmodi enim passiones non sine corporali transmutatione accidunt. Et de talibus eadem est ratio sicut et de animalibus brutis, quae ex necessitate sequuntur impetum passionis; in his enim non est aliquis rationis motus, et per consequens nec voluntatis. -- Aliquando euten ratio non totaliter absorbetur a passione, sed remanet quantum ad aliquid iudicium rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc remanet aliquid de motu voluntatis. Inquantum ergo ratio manet libera et passioni non subjecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat. Et sic aut motus voluntatis non est in homine, sed sola passio dominatur; aut, si motus voluntatis sit, non ex necessitate sequitur passionem." Q. 10, a. 3. See J. de Finance, S.J., *Existence et Liberte*, pp. 21-26.

<sup>24</sup>Klubertanz, p. 716.

act<sup>25</sup> holds for the Prima Secundae as well as for the De Malo.

Freedom is rooted in the moment of reflective deliberation;

in this moment the will is in complete control of what happens.<sup>26</sup>

This reflection indicates whether or not the object can be

attained and whether or not it should be willed. Romiti

speaks of the specific function of the will as "determinare

formas per intellectum apprehensas."<sup>27</sup>

What moves the will from potency to act? As in the De Malo, once the will is in act with regard to one object, it can move itself from potency to act with regard to associated objects.<sup>28</sup> But some principle other than the will must be introduced as the efficient cause of the will's absolute motion in the first act of a new series of will acts. We have seen that the intellect and the sense appetites, dispositions, and habits, move<sup>29</sup> the agent in the order of formal causality. The

<sup>25</sup>See Chapter 5, footnote 25.

<sup>26</sup>"Ad secundum. Dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus, quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus." Q. 6, a. 2, ad 2.

<sup>27</sup>Romiti, p. 61.

<sup>28</sup>"Manifestus est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum; et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsum ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem." Q. 9, a. 3. See Ibid., ad 1 and ad 3.

<sup>29</sup>On this use of "movere", see Klubertanz, p. 710, footnote 38.

only "efficiency" which they exercise is analogous to the emanation of operative potencies through the "agency" of the substantial form in nature. Thus the principle which moves itself from potency to act with respect to the means to an end, it does this through the mediation of an act of deliberation. The problem of the infinite regress is reintroduced, and the only way to solve it is to posit that some external cause is responsible for the will's first act.

Now the will is moved by the object, but in the order of formal and final causality only.<sup>30</sup> What is needed is some external efficient cause of man's absolute act of willing.<sup>31</sup> This cause cannot be material, because the will

<sup>30</sup>The best discussion I have seen of this point is that of J. de Finance, Essai sur l'agir humain, Ch. I.

<sup>31</sup>Respondio. Dicendum quod secundum quod voluntas movetur ab objecto, manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo quo movetur quantum ad exercitum actus, adhuc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. Quae enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moventur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est, ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante; cum enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit, et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc vult. Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod inciperet velle sanari ab aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveat seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret, ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis. . . ."

Q. 9, a. 4.

is spiritual.<sup>32</sup> Also, the will cannot be moved by any spiritual being other than the cause of the will's nature, because such a movement would be violent; the will is an inclination, and cannot suffer an inclination against itself; and the only being which can move a nature according to its natural inclination is the cause of that nature. Now God is the cause of the will: the will is a faculty of the soul, and the soul is created immediately by God. Besides, the will's capacity is infinite, and so it can be caused only by an infinite being (omne agens agit sibi simile).

"A particular cause does not give a universal inclination."

Therefore, the external principle which moves the will in its absolute acts must be God.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., a. 5.

<sup>33</sup>"... quod motus voluntarius ejus sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile. -- Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia anime rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem. . . . Secundo vero ex hoc, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum; particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem." Q. 9, a. 6.

"ad tertium. Dicendum quod Deus movet hominem ad agenda non solum sicut proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut inartans corpus, sed etiam sicut movens ipsam voluntatem; quia omnis motus tam voluntatis quam naturae ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est contra rationem naturae quod motus naturae sit a Deo sicut a primo movente, inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis; ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo, inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur. Est tamen communiter de ratione naturalis et voluntarii motus quod sint a principio intrinseco." Q. 6, a. 1, ad 3.

It may also be consonant with the thought of Saint Thomas to draw an analogy between sense inclination and willing. There is no mention in the works of Saint Thomas of the mover of sense appetite. If we may assume that the inclination is efficiently moved by the good apprehended through external sense, imagination, and estimative sense, then perhaps the following argumentation is valid. Such a good is particular and moves the sense appetite to itself (i.e., to the particular good in question). The motion of the sense appetite is determined to this one good, which, under two aspects, and two modalities of being (intentional and physical) functions as efficient and final cause respectively of the appetitive act. By analogy, if the good apprehended by intellect, which is de facto a particular good, were to move the will efficiently, the will would be determined to this one particular good. But the will is undetermined with regard to particular goods, since its natural object is the universal good. Therefore it must be moved efficiently by that being who is defacto the Universal good and the object of the will (God), and must be moved in its absolute acts to a particular good apprehended at least momentarily sub ratione boni universalis.

Since God is the cause of nature, he moves each being according to its nature. Since the nature of the will is to



be free, the Divine Motion in no way militates against man's freedom.<sup>34</sup> For the moment of freedom, as we have seen, is the moment of reflective deliberation, consequent upon the initial and absolute movement of the will.<sup>35</sup> We will here repeat a quotation from Fr. Klubertanz's article.

. . . the point of being put into act concerning something which is good in its absolute consideration is that man should reflect whether in the concrete and all things considered he should absolutely will that act or object or whether he should not. If, on reflection, he finds that he should absolutely will what he is inclined to, the Divine Motion continues on in all its ontological fullness into the free act itself. If he finds that he should not, but neglects the practical application of the moral rule, all that is of actuality in his choice is still due to the original Divine Motion, but the sin is his own.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>"Ad tertium. Dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hoc universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. -- Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam." Q. 9, a. 6, ad 3. See q. 10, a. 4, c., and ad 3.

<sup>35</sup>Fr. Klubertanz points out that this doctrine "makes sense of St. Thomas's doctrine that the first free act of an unbaptized person must be either a mortal sin or a morally good act." P. 716. (In fact, he states this even before he has considered the Divine Motion). For the first act of freedom must follow upon an absolute willing of the universal good (or a corresponding absolute aversion). If this good is rejected, then God is rejected; if this good is embraced and willed, then God is accepted. See J. Maritain, "The Immanent Dialectic of the First Act of Freedom," The Range of Reason, pp. 68-85.

<sup>36</sup>Klubertanz, pp. 718, f. Lottin compares the De Malo presentation of the Divine Motion with that of the Prima Secundae: "Comme on peut s'en rendre compte par la confrontation des textes,

The final problem to be discussed is that of free choice (electio). Saint Thomas says that the same elements of exercise and specification enter into the act of choice, but that this act is free in both regards, since choice is precisely an act bearing upon means, which are by definition particular goods.<sup>37</sup> The act of choice is clearly distinguished

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la Prima Secundae apporte l'une ou l'autre précision à l'exposé du De Malo. Ainsi, dans le De Malo, saint Thomas écrit que le premier moteur 'mouet voluntatem et intellectum' (q. 6 circa med.), alors que l'argumentation ne l'amène à parler que de la volonté. Formule de transition, sans doute, après l'exposé de la Prima pars, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3, . . . ou c'est sur l'intelligence qu'agit le premier moteur. Le texte du De Malo se trouve nettoyé dans la I-IIae q. 9, a. 4 où le premier moteur n'agit plus que sur la volonté. -- Dans le De Malo, saint Thomas réserve la motion divine à la liberté d'exercice; toutefois, il ne l'exclut pas expressément dans l'ordre de la spécification. La I-IIae, q. 9, a. 6 ad 3 dit formellement que la motion divine ne va qu'au bien en général; c'est l'homme qui, par sa raison, spécifie l'objet concret, bien vrai ou bien apparent, qu'il poursuit en vue du bien en général; ce n'est que dans certains cas que Dieu veut l'homme à un bien concret, et saint Thomas prend comme exemple la motion surnaturelle de la grâce (q. 9, a. 6, ad 3). Notons aussi que, plus explicitement que le De Malo, la I-IIae réduit, la causalité formelle de l'intelligence sur la volonté à la simple présentation de l'objet à la volonté (q. 9, a. 1)." Pp. 260-1, footnote 4.

<sup>37</sup>Respondeo. Dicendum quod homo non ex necessitate eligit. Et hoc ideo, quia quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse. Quod autem possibile sit non eligere vel eligere, huius ratio ex duplici hominis potestate accipi potest. Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere; potest etiam velle hoc aut illud. Cujus ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere, sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere. Et rursus in omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerare rationem boni alicujus, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali; et secundum hoc

from the last practical judgment, which precedes it at least in nature.<sup>38</sup> The mutual causality of intellect and will in the act of choice is different from what it is in the absolute act of willing (velle), where the known form is analogous to the substantial form of a natural being and the will act analogous to the operative potencies or natural appetites of a non-living thing. In the act of choice, formal causality is still attributed to the intellect, but it is a different kind of formal causality. It is not the causality of substantial form on appetite, nor the causality of substantial form

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potest unusquisque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile. Solus autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser. Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, . . . non est perfecti boni, quod est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non ex necessitate, sed libere eligit." Q. 13, a. 6.

"Dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio . . . Unde finis, inquantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione. . . . Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub electione cadit." Q. 13, a. 3.

"Bona particularia" are also used in place of "media": "Ad secundum. Dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, ultimus finis est unus tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem." Ibid., ad 2.

<sup>38</sup> . . . sententia vel iudicium, quam sequitur electio." Q. 13, a. 1, ad 2. ". . . electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi." Q. 13, a. 3.

on matter, but, as Fr. Klubertanz points out, the causality of accidental form on substance.<sup>39</sup> The problem of psychological determinism is conquered once and for all when it is realized that the will freely determines itself at a level deeper than the level explained in the earlier works. The will still chooses what the last practical judgment reveals to be the best means to the attainment of an end. But the will's freedom is anterior to and penetrating the very act of deliberating, and man is free to halt deliberation at any point, and, moreover, to decide what means will concretely appear and be judged as the best means to a given end.<sup>40</sup> By the time the human action reaches the stage of election, this action is substantially rooted in the will; and the will has been free and self-determining from the very moment of reflective deliberation.

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<sup>39</sup>"Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a superiori potentia. Et ideo electio substantialiter non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis; perficitur enim electio in motu quodam anime ad bonum quod eligitur." Q. 13, a. 1. See Klubertanz, p. 713.

<sup>40</sup>"What we think good is what we wish to thing good. . . . Our motives are what we make them." G. Smith, S.J., "The Nature and Uses of Liberty," New Scholasticism (26), 1952, pp. 314-5.

## CONCLUSION

What are the major conclusions to be drawn from this study of Saint Thomas's theory of human freedom?

First of all, for Saint Thomas himself, the doctrine of freedom proposed in the De Malo and Prima Secundae avoids all danger of being associated with the propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier. The will is free in two regards: in its willing of the end and in its choice of means. Bishop Tempier had condemned the statement that the will is determined in its willing and choosing (quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult et eligit). Saint Thomas had always maintained freedom of choice but his discussions of free will as such were analytical and abstract; they had no experiential relevance, and seem to have functioned as a kind of a priori condition for establishing a concrete and lived freedom in man's acts of choosing. But in the De Malo and Prima Secundae, the concept of liberty of exercise allows Saint Thomas to describe an experienced freedom in the willing or intention of ends; velle in the absolute sense is still necessitated, but the will is immediately put into control when the natural ordination of the will to bonum existens in re carries over into the act of reflective deliberation. The human act is from this moment substantially rooted in the will and its exercise is free. The

act of choice, being a subsequent act, thus participates in this free self-determination (besides, of course, being free in the order of specification).

The second condemned proposition relevant to Saint Thomas's theory of freedom stated that the power of free choice was passive and moved necessarily by the appetible object. Saint Thomas had definitely constructed a schema which presented *liberum arbitrium* as a passive power; and he had placed freedom in the practical judgment. Man always chooses what the practical judgment reveals to be the best means to the ultimate end. Saint Thomas explicitly rejects psychological determinism, but it seems that the earlier works are not capable of supporting a theory of choice which clearly and unequivocally avoids determinism. But when freedom is seen to exist at a deeper level of activity than the choice of means, this problem is overcome; from the moment of deliberation, the will is in control of the progress of the human act.

In our introduction we stated that we would like to show that Saint Thomas's definitive theory of freedom, of the structure of man as human agent, is thoroughly consonant with the common experience of being free and with those phenomenological and existential accounts which are faithful to this common human experience. Now, as we mentioned in the introduction, it seems that any attempt to convince another man that he

is free would ask him to analyze carefully and reflectively the most significant and momentous decisions of his life. These decisions bear upon a man's determination of those values or goods which will be meaningful in his life; they bear upon the basic orientation of a man's existence. Will I be egotistical and selfish or open and receptive to the existence of other persons? Will I maintain a relatively fixed attitude of response to an ideal calling me from beyond my own being, or will I determine that I have no obligations to anyone but myself? Even, I think, will I affirm a Supreme Source of value and goodness, an Ideal at the horizon of every ideal, or will I proclaim my own autonomy and independence in an act of absolute self-affirmation? These are the momentous decisions of a man's life, and in them a man can reflectively grasp the power of his own freedom. Can these significant moments be explained within the context of Saint Thomas's final theory of human freedom?

Obviously, once freedom is recognized as operative from the moment of reflective deliberation, the will of man is conceived as having mastery over all of man's options, even the most radical. In this sense, at the level of voluntas ut voluntas, I make my own values.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This should not be interpreted as a Sartrean statement, for Sartre claims that even at the level of what Thomists call voluntas ut natura (of course, a meaningless expression to Sartre), freedom makes its own values; at the horizon of desire

There are other interesting problems in connection with our findings. It is my impression, though I have done no careful work on this point, that some new elements may appear in the Prima Secundae with reference to the relation between beatitude and God as the ultimate end of man. If this is the case, these changes may well be at least extrinsically related to the changes in the doctrine of freedom, especially to the introduction of the distinction between the bonum universale and created, particular goods. The discussion of freedom as self-determination may also throw new light on the will act of souls in the possession of the Beatific Vision. While these souls are determined in their love, this determination seems to be a consummate self-determination; they cannot turn away from the Vision of God precisely because they do not and cannot want to do so. Such a determination is far removed from the determination of man's will in its absolute act of willing at the beginning of any series of will acts.

Another interesting area of study is suggested by the above remarks on the determination of basic orientations. Fr.

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there is precisely nothing. For a discussion of the subject of voluntas ut natura (i.e., God as the ultimate end of man or the "Horizon of desire), a discussion expanding Saint Thomas's process of eliminating all other objects and thus arriving at God as the last end, see J. de Finance, S.J., Essai sur l'agir humain, ch. 2; Sartre's position is discussed on pp. 130-151.



Klubertanz mentions two types of basic orientations or intentions; one is the intention to the good in general; but this, he says, "is not an act; it is the very ontological essence of the will itself." The other is the intention "to what the individual person has determined to be his last end." These latter are the orientations which we were discussing above. Such an intention "cannot be always at the origin of every free act, certainly not of that free act by which it itself is made to be the first intention of this man, nor of his acts which are prae-ter intentionem finis, nor of any radical change in his over-all orientation."

Fr. Klubertanz continues:

It seems necessary to say (1) that certain over-all intentions of ours do influence a great number of acts, but (2) that often we are not in any way thinking of the objects of those intentions, and so cannot explicitly and distinctly be willing them. How do these free acts, made once and not now actual, continue to influence other acts? To call them 'virtual intentions' does not seem reasonable; they can hardly be called habitus; they might be acquired dispositions which influence volitions, but their nature is still obscure, and has not been well treated by anyone.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Klubertanz, pp. 714-5, footnote 53.

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