NAME SEMINAR PAPER ON ST. AUGUSTINE 1963-'64

No. D-4
D6005

D0005

INTRODUCTION

The problem which I intend to investigate deals with the role of interiorism or personal consciousness in the "methodology" or procedure of Saint Augustine as he attempts to arrive at truth. I found that this is by no means an isolated problem in the study of Saint Augustine; it opens up onto a far wider field of investigation than I had first supposed. For interiorism is the basic approach assumed by Saint Augustine in his investigation of intelligible truth. An adequate understanding of the role of inwardness in the thought of Augustine must rest upon an interpretation of the nature of his thought as a totality, an interpretation of the man Augustine as he analyzes the fundamental problems of philosophy and religion. What kind of thinker is Saint Augustine? To what class of intellectual figures does he belong? These questions must be answered before the proper interpretation of Augustine's interiorism can be attained.

If one were to do what is actually impossible and read the texts where Augustine advocates or outlines the procedure of inwardness as a way of arriving at truth, presuming all along that Augustine is a disinterested speculative philosopher, one would perhaps be inclined to term this approach a form of subjectivism. But, as is obvious even in these isolated texts themselves, Augustine is not a disinterested speculative philosopher. First of all, there seems to be no operative distinction between faith and reason in the approach of Saint Augustine. Certainly, he never presumes to investigate reality from a purely "natural" stand-

point.[1] Secondly, there is no distinction between the speculative and practical intellects in St. Augustine,[2] nor, for that matter, is there a doctrine of any "faculties" distinct from the soul and from one another. It is the whole soul which operates in all spiritual activities, and the whole soul is at one and the same time mind, memory, and spiritual affectivity or will. Wisdom is the possession of truth and at the same time is equated with happiness. Most important of all, though, is the fact that Augustine never abandons any of the fundamental existential realities shared in by his own soul in order to take up a disinterested investigation of being. In other words, and in more modern terms, he never brackets the fact of Christianity as the central feature of his own existence, and he never abstracts from his intense involvement in and commitment to the Christian enterprise. Just as it is the whole soul which knows, remembers, and loves, so it is the whole man Augustine, the saint and the intellectual, the theologian and the philosopher, the Christian and the Neo-Platonist, who approaches as one man the whole of reality as he knew it. To isolate even his strictly metaphysical statements from the lived background of a man who has experienced and won a titanic struggle with evil and has finally found the only thing for which he ever sought, is to distort the picture in the worst fashion.[3]

Augustine has much in common with several modern thinkers, among them Kierkegaard, Newman, and Marcel. These men too are more than philosophers and other than theologians. The central fact of existence for them, as for Augustine, is the Christian reality as a lived experience, as a moral-religious, rather than a purely intellectual, confrontation

with the person of the redeeming God.

> . . . the God of Christinaity to whom Augustine was converted and before whom he recorded his confessions is not the absolute being of philosophy, but the holy, living God of the Old and New Testaments. This is the God who "arises, enters into history, there to act; this is the God who selects an individual and draws him into history. And there are as many histories as there are individuals. In each, everything exists for the sake of that particular history, from which everything, the things of the world and of human existence, receives its name and center."[4]

When looked at in this perspective, Augustinian interiorism may take on a different hue. Though he emerges from an entirely different philosophical background, and though this background had some influence on his approach through inwardness, Augustine seems to have the same ability as the three thinkers mentioned above, and especially Newman, to search the depths of his own conscious existence and arrive at universally valid conclusions. I would maintain that this is true of Augstine precisely because he is more than a philosopher. His central concern is the lived reality of Christian existence, the most interior of all lived experiences. Anyone who wishes to attack the approach of Augustine must question the validity of the Saint's personal experience and of his outlook on Christianity.

The first part of this paper will be an attempt to analyze and understand the fundamental Augustinian "take" on reality, the man Augustine as he approaches one problem after another. This section will include a discussion of the intellectual and spiritual coming-of-age of Saint Augustine, along with a few remarks on the roles of faith and reason in his thought and on the Augustinian notion of wisdom. Then we will proceed to look at Augustinian interiorism, first in connection

with the problem of certitude and then in connection with the problem of truth. We will finish with a discussion of the seven levels of the soul, in which Augustine presents both the natural and mystical ways to God.

CHAPTER ONE

INTELLECTUAL AND SPIRITUAL GENESIS

The purpose of this outline of the mental and volitional maturing of Saint Augustine is to serve as an introduction to the man Augustine as he begins his career as a Christian thinker. We will deal with four intellectual factors in addition to the consideration of his moral search for peace and happiness: the reading of Cicero's Hortensius, the commitment to Manicheism, the period of skepticism, and the reading of the Neo-Platonists.[5]

The materials for the first consideration can be found in the third book of the Confessions. If what Augustine tells us of his state of mind and soul at this period can be accepted literally, then Guardini's interpretation seems justified:

> We must think of the Augustine of this period as a young man passionately indulging in worldly pleasures while cultivating himself aesthetically, and at the same time working hard, for he is already "leader in the School of Rhetoric." The work consists in acquiring a general education plus special training in politics and rhetoric. As yet there can be no talk of profounder problems, of a philosophical quest or indeed of any kind of genuinely intellectual existence.[6]

Augustine tells us of a deep spiritual unrest:

> I came to Carthage, where a cauldron of illicit loves leapt and boiled about me. I was not yet in love, but I was in love with love, and from the very depth of my need hated myself for not more keenly feeling the need. I sought some object to love, since I was thus in love with loving; and I hated security and a life with no snares for my feet. For within I was hungry, all for the want of that spiritual food which is Thyself, my God; yet (though I was hungry

> for want of it) I did not hunger for it: I had no desire whatever for incorruptible food, not because I had it in abundance but the emptier I was, the more I hated the thought of it. Because of all this my soul was sick, and broke out in sores, whose itch I agonized to scratch with the rub of carnal things.[7]

Here is what Augustine tells us of his reading of Cicero's Hortensius:

> Following the normal order of study I had come to a book of one Cicero, whose tongue practically every one admires, though not his heart. That particular book is called Hortensius and contains an exhortation to philosophy. Quite definitely it changed the direction of my mind, altered my prayer to You, O Lord, and gave me a new purpose and ambition. Suddenly all the vanity I had hoped in I saw as worthless, and with an incredible intensity of desire I longed after immortal wisdom. I had begun that journey upwards by which I was to return to you. . . .
>
> How did I then burn, my God, how did I burn to wing upwards from earthly delights to You. . . . Now love of wisdom is what is meant by the Greek word philosophy, and it was to philosophy that that book set me so ardently. . . . The one thing that delighted me in Cicero's exhortation was that I should love, and seek, and win, and hold, and embrace, not this or that philosophical school but Wisdom itself, whatever it might be. The book excited and inflamed me; in my ardour the only thing I found lacking was that the name of Christ was not there. For with my mother's milk my infant heart had drunk in, and still held deep down in it, that name according to Your mercy, O Lord, the name of Your Son, my Saviour; and whatever lacked that name, no matter how learned and excellently written and true, could not win me wholly.[8]

It is interesting to compare several interpretations of this text. Bourke says:

> The fragmentary quotations from this work (the Hortensius), now available, are not at all striking, but Augustine was probably just at a point in his intellectual development at which he was ready to begin to think of the more serious problems of life. Hitherto, he had been interested chiefly in questions of form, of elegance in speech. With the reading of the Hortensius, his mind was turned to the quest of truth, of the wisdom of the philosophers.[9]

Guardini also accepts Augustine's words as they stand, but, in accord with the purpose and tone of his study, treats the religious

significance of this occurrence:

> . . . we know only that it (the Hortensius) treated of the "vita beata," the ideal of that life which frees itself from the disturbances of ambition and passion to find its bliss in the search for truth. The impact of the book on Augustine's interior life shakes a deeply buried stratum of his nature to the surface. . . .
>
> The words, written so many years later, still vibrate with the power of that inner upheaval, with sudden diddain for what until then had been highly prized, with passionate hunger for (now suddenly perceptible) reality. . . .
>
> Cicero is trying to teach "philosophia," the philosophical way of life. But Augustine's reaction to the book is not essentially philosophic. Beneath the idealistic-intellectual current in Augustine lies -- lurks is the apter word -- the feligious, specifically, the Christian. This now begins to flow, but unable to find sufficient room in the bed of Cicero's philosophical stream, it pounds against it, upsurging like a high surf. . . .
>
> We have absolutely no right to regard these words as the transposing of a present attitude to the past. Here a past experience is, of course, being interpreted by a man who, with the eyes of resolute faith, now understands the road he once traveled. Nevertheless, the point in question, awareness of his heart's elemental, though still only potentially Christian, outcry, cannot be dismissed as a later pious embellishment, without falsifying the whole portrait of the man. To attribute such crudeness to a man of Augustine's calibre is simply not permissible.[10]

John J. O'Meara is one Augustinian scholar who gives precisely the interpretation which Guardini so roundly castigates.

> Augustine in describing the effect the Hortensius had upon him has imported back into the earlier period his recollection of the later effect of the Platonist books. . . .
>
> The prominence given to the reading of the Hortensius is meant to stress Augustine's awakening to a real interest in truth. The book did not, in fact, directly work any greater change in him: he still pursued his worldly career with restless energy and determined ambition. But its reading in part provoked, and in part coincided with, the true beginning of philosophy in his mind.[11]

O'Meara says later: " . . . the Hortensius is at most a symbol of the dawn of adult reasoning."[12]

It would seem most reasonable to agree with Bourke and Guardini

in accepting Augustine's words as a fairly accurate account of the actual effect of the Hortensius. However, the important point is that a new dimension has been added to Augustine's restlessness, the dimension of the mind seeking wisdom. Guardini's 2 subconscious strata in Augustine

Guardini has been led to focus on the feligious significance of this occurrence because of Augustine's mention of Christ. Augustine tells us that he immediately undertook an investigation of the Scriptures and that this was the result of his reading the Hortensius.[13] He was disappointed with what he found.

> When I first read those Scriptures, I did not feel in the least what I have just said; they seemed to me unworthy to be compared with the majesty of Cicero. My conceit was repelled by their simplicity, and I had not the mind to penetrate into their depths. They were indeed of a nature to grow in Your little ones. But I could not bear to be a little one; I was only swollen with pride, but to myself I seemed a very big man.[14]

It is in this state of moral-intellectual unrest that we find Augustine when he turns to the Manichean religion.

Augustine passes immediately from the account of his reading of the Hortensius and his disillusionment over the apparent simplicity of the Scriptures to relating his association with the Manicheans. It is relatively easy to see the colse connection betwwen his newborn passion for truth and wisdom and his alignment with these religious fanatics, although various interpretations have been given. "They cried out, 'Truth, truth;' they were forever uttering the word to me."[15] They made frequent reference to "the names of God the Father and of the Lord Jesus Christ and of the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, our Comforter."[16]

Bourke cites the following significant text in which Augustine explains his motives for joining the Manicheans:

> Thou knowest, Honoratus, that for this reason alone did we fall into the hands of these men, namely, that they professed to free us from all error and bring us back to God by pure reason alone, without that terrible principle of authority. For, what else induced me to abandon the faith of my childhood and follow these men for almost nine years, except their assertion that we were terrified by superstition into a faith blindly imposed upon our reason, while they urged no one to believe until the truth was fully discussed and proved? Who would not be seduced by such promises; especially if he were a proud, contentious, young man, thirsting for truth, such as they then found me?[17]

Augustine has become fascinated by the powers of reason and has given his allegiance to this sect whose numbers "believed only what they had already understood."[18] As we shall see, Augustine's notion of the interrelation of faith and reason is subsequently to be reversed.

All of the commentators whom we have been quoting agree in general that Augustine's commitment to Manicheism is "chiefly an affair of the intellect."[19] Bourke uses as evidence the fact that "no change was required in his moral life and he made none."[20] Guardini says:

> Here are all the elements that attract him: idealistic thought, aesthetic leanings, a richly developed symbolism, and a carefully nurtured mysticism. With this, for "the initiated," comes the privileged enjoyment of "higher knowledge," And one further point: in Manicheism -- as in every gnosis -- the genuinely ethical is dissolved in the cosmic; evil simply becomes part of world happening, thus mitigating personal responsibility for it.[21]

Augustine tells us that Manicheism is a materialistic doctrine, which taught that the two causal principles, Ormazd, the Principle of

Light, and Ahriman, the Principle of Darkness, were "grandiose infinite bodies."[22] He sought God "not according to the understanding of the mind by which You have set us above the beasts, but according to the sense of the flesh."[23]

> I did not even know that God is a spirit, having no parts extended in length and breadth, to whose being bulk does not belong: for bulk is less in its part than in its whole: and if it be infinite, it is less in the part circumscribed by a certain space than in its infinity: and so could not be wholly itself in every place, as a spirit is, as God is.[24]

Augustine adds a sentence very relevant to the subject of this present study. "Yet all the time You were more inward than the most inward place of my heart and loftier than the highest."[25] To proceed within and then above will be Augustine's directions to one who wishes to find God.

The Principle of Light is both material and finite. He was called "spiritual," but O'Meara says this means only that he "was composed of some tenuous matter, to which were attributed purely immaterial properties."[26] He was finite, because limited in existence and power by the presence of the Principle of Darkness.

Augustine was at this time also unable to attain to the knowledge of his soul as spiritual.

> I did not consider the nature of the soul, but again the false view I had of spiritual things would not let me get at the truth -- although by its sheer force the truth was staring me in the face. I turned my throbbing mind away from the incorporeal to line and colour and bulk, and because I did not see these things in my mind, I concluded that I could not see my mind.[27]

God and his own soul were not understood by him at this time, but they were later to become the sole objects worthy of investigation.

Augustine was probably never fully convinced of this gnostic doctrine of materialism and moral irresponsibility,[28] but, as O'Meara states, "its teachings made his ultimate conversion more difficult and deeply affected his mind and work."[29]

Bourke points out that the problem of certitude is one that bothered Augustine during these nine years.[30] We may distinguish three main areas of difficulty: the nature of evil, the nature of God, and the cosmology of the Manicheans. The last-mentioned problem was probably the strongest. Bourke summarizes one version of the difficulty:

> It will be recalled that the cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil, between God and Hyle, was a cardinal thesis of Manicheism. Another thesis was that God was incapable of being harmed by violence or corruption. Now, as Nebridius argued, why did God fight with the Evil Principle? If God were incorruptible, no adverse force could affect Him. Why, then, should He engage in this constant strife? This was an argument which all the dialectical skill of Augustine had been unable to handle.[31]

After even the renowned Manichean teacher Faustus was woefully unable to answer Augustine's problems, the young man lost confidence in the Manicheans, though he continued to associate with them for want of something better.[32]

Guardini uses the emotionally toned event of the death of a very close friend to point up another feature of the developing Augustine.

> Something has stirred in Augustine, something whose roots go deeper than -- no, differently from -- the old, merely sensual passion, and also differently from the idealistic enthusiasm for truth of the Hortensius experience: the spiritual Eros in which

> the friend is perceived and loved as <u>persona</u>. . . .
> One further point: the heart Augustine is describing . . . is that heart in which not the Eros of Plato but the love of the Johannine Epistles stirs, through which the light of the <u>Logos</u> begins to shine, even though the conscious mind is as yet ignorant of it.[33]

Guardini may be, and probably is, reading too much into this incident; but it is a fact that the reality of love is becoming more and more meaningful for Augustine. And with it, there is ignited perhaps a spark of what will ultimately come to be incorporated into Augustine's concept of spirit. Guardini has a most pointed remark in this regard: "A period of envelopment is essential, so that, when the spirit does break through, it has the necessary roothold of corporeality under it, and the full sanguineness of the senses within it. It is mainly from here that Augustine's mind flames and storms."[34] Even when he is to attain the insights into the lofty reaches of spirit found in Neo-Platonism, Augustine will never become a disinterested speculative thinker. He is too involved in all the elements of the human situation. His main objection against the Neo-Platonists will be their intellectual pride which prevents them from knowing and accepting the Incarnation. And, as we shall see, one meaning of <u>spiritus</u> for Augustine "denotes a level of cognitive consciousness, intermediate between external sense perception and pure intellection."[35] In Augustine's own words, spirit is "a certain power of the soul, inferior to the mind (<u>mens</u>), in which power the images of corporeal things are expressed."[36]

Augustine's growing dissatisfaction with Manicheism was

accompained by two other features: the beginnings of the realization that his criticisms of Christianity and the Scriptures were not totally warranted, and an increasing distrust in the power of reason. The first of these atates began at Carthage, and the second at Rome.

> . . . the speech of one Elpidius, who had spoken and disputed face to face against the Manichees, had already begun to affect me at Carthage, when he produced arguments from Scripture which were not easy to answer."[37]

> The notion began to grow in me that the philosophers whom they call Academics were wiser than the rest, because they held that everything should be treated as matter of doubt and affirmed that no truth can be understood by men. . . . And I did not neglect to dissuade my host from the excessive confidence that I saw he had in the fables with which the books of Manes are packed.[38]

Augustine describes as follows some of his religious and philosophical difficulties at Rome:

> When I desired to think of my God, I could not think of Him save as a bodily magnitude -- for it seemed to me that what was not such was nothing at all: this indeed was the principal and practically the sole cause of my invincible error.
>
> . . . I thought of Our Savior Himself, Your only-begotten Son, as brought forth for our salvation from the mass of your most luminous substance: and I could believe nothing of him unless I could picture it in my own vain imagination. I argues that such a nature could not possible be born of the Virgin Mary, unless it were mingled with her flesh. And I could not see how that which I had thus figured to myself could be mingled and not defiled. Thus I feared to believe the Word made flesh lest I be forced to believe the Word defiled by flesh.[39]

The opportunity for professional advancement induced Augustine to move from Rome to Milan. At Milan he found the constant presence of a man who was able to expound the Scriptures in a way that satisfied Augustine's rigorous demands. Augustine tells us that, in accord

with his profession, as a teacher of rhetoric, he was first interested only in the oratorical abilities of Saint Ambrose, but that slowly the very matter of the sermons began to catch his attention.

> Thus I did not take great heed to learn what he was saying but only to hear how he said it: that empty interest was all I now had since I despaired of man's finding the way to You. Yet along with the words, which I admired, there also came into my mind the subject-matter, to which I attached no importance. I could not separate them. And while I was opening my heart to learn how eloquently he spoke, I came to feel, though only gradually, how truly he spoke. First I began to realize that there was a case for the things themselves, and I began to see that the Catholic faith, for which I had thought nothing could be said in the face of the Manichean objections, could be maintained on reasonable grounds: this especially after I had heard explained figuratively several passages of the Old Testament which had been a cause of death for me when taken literally. Many passages of these books were expounded in a spiritual sense and I came to blame my own hopeless folly in believing that the law and the prophets could not stand against those who hated and mocked at them. I did not yet feel that the Catholic way was to be followed, merely because it might have some learned men to maintain it and answer objections adequately and not absurdly; nor did I think that what I had so far held was to be condemned because both views were equally defensible. In fact the Catholic side was clearly not vanquished, yet it was not clearly victorious. I then bent my mind to see is I could by any clear proofs convict the Manicheans of error. If only I had been able to conceive of a substance that was spiritual, all their strong points would have been broken down and cast forth from my mind. But I could not.[40]

The combination of Academic influences and inchoate leanings toward the Church led Augustine to leave the Manicheans and become a catechumen in the Catholic Church. He could not entrust his soul to the philosophers, "because they were without the saving name of Christ."[41] He was by no means determined eventually to enter the Church. "Still unable to comprehend the nature of spiritual substance, still bothered by the problem of the origin and nature of evil, still bound by the things of the flesh, he wallowed in the mire of intellectual

uncertainty and moral indecision."[42]

Augustine tells us of his shifting view with regard to the respective roles of faith and reason:

> From this time on I found myself preferring the Catholic doctrine, realising that it acted more modestly and honestly in requiring things to be believed which could not be proved -- whether they were in themselves provable though not by this or that person, or were not provable at all -- than the Manichees who derided credulity and made impossible promises of certain knowledge, and then called upon men to believe so many utterly fabulous and absurd things because they could not be demonstrated. . . . I began to consider the countless things I believed which I had not seen, or which had happened with me not there. . . . Thus You brought me to see that those who believed Your Bible, which You have established among almost all peoples with such authority, were not be be censured, but rather those who did not believe it, and that I must give no heed bo any who might say to me: "How do you know that those Scriptures were given to mankind by the Spirit of the One true and most true God?" For this point above all was to be believed; because no assault of fallacious questions which I had read in such multitude in the philosophers -- who in any event contradicted each other -- could constrain me not bo believe both that You are, though what might be Your nature I did not know, and that the government of human affairs belongs to You.[43]
>
> Thus, since men had not the strength to discover the truth by pure reason, and therefore we needed the authority of Holy Writ, I was coming to believe that You would certainly not have bestowed such eminent authority upon those Scriptures throughout the world, unless it had been Your will that by them men should believe in You and in them seek You.
>
> Now that I heard them expounded so convincingly, I saw that many passages in these books which had at one time struck me as absurdities, must be referred to the profundity of mystery. Indeed the authority of Scripture seemed to be more to be revered and more worthy of devoted faith in that it was at once a book that all could read and read easily, and yet preserved the majesty of its mystery in the deepest part of its meaning: for it offers itself to all in the plainest words and the simplest expressions yet demands the closest attention of the most serious minds.[44]

Augustine mentions an interesting comparison between the skepticism of the Academics and his newfound release from reluctance

to accept the Scriptures as an avenue to truth:

> And those mighty Academics -- is it true that nothing can be grasped with certainty for the directing of life? No: we must search the more closely and not despair. For now the things in the Scriptures which used to seem absurd are no longer absurd, but can be quite properly understood in another sense. I shall set my foot upon that step on which my parents placed me as a child, until I clearly find the truth.[45]

This was the time of great wavering. " . . . the wind blew one way and then another, and tossed my heart this way and that. . . . The plain truth is that I thought I should be impossibly miserable if I had to forego the embraces of a woman: and I did not think of Your mercy as a healing medicine for that weakness, because I had never tried it."[46]

The depths of Saint Augustine's intellectual struggles are apparent in the first chapter of the seventh book of the Confessions, where he speaks of the gradual refinement of his notion of God.

> As a man, though so poor a man, I set myself to think of You as the supreme and sole and true God; and with all my heart I believed You incorruptible and inviolable and immutable, for though I did not see whence or how, yet I saw with utter certainty that what can be corrupted is lower than what cannot be corrupted, that the inviolable is beyond question better than the violable, and that what can suffer no change is better than what can be changed. . . . I could not but think of You as some corporeal substance, occupying all space, whether infused in the world, or else diffused through infinite space beyond the world. Yet even this I thought of You as incorruptible and inviolable and immutable, and I still saw those as better than corruptible and violable and mutable.
>
> . . . my mind was in search of such images as the forms my eye was accustomed to see. . . . I conceived of You, Life of my life, as mighty everywhere and throughout infinite space, piercing through the shole mass of the world, and spread measureless and

> limitless every way beyond the world, so that the earth should have You, and the sky should have You and all things should have You, and that they should be bounded in You but You nowhere bounded.[47]

Later he says:

> And I saw You, Lord, in every part containing and penetrating it, Yourself altogether infinite: as if Your Being were a sea, infinite and immeasurable everywhere, though still only a sea: and within it there were some mighty but not infinite sponge, and that sponge filled in every part with the immeasurable sea.[48]

This brings us to the incident that, together with the later moment of effective conversion, must be regarded as the most important event in the development of Saint Augustine: the reading of the Platonists:

> And first you willed to show me how You resist the proud and give grace to the humble, and with how great mercy You have shown men the way of humility in that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among men. Therefore You brought in my way by means of a certain man -- an incredibly conceited man -- some books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin. In them I found, though not in the very words, yet the thing itself and proved by all sorts of reasons: that in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God: the same was in the beginning with God; all things were made by Him and without Him was made nothing that was made; in Him was life and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it. And I found in those same writings that the soul of man, though it gives testimony of the Light, yet is not itself the light; but the Word, God Himself, is the true light which enlightens every man that comes into the world; and that He was in the world and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not.[49]

In this text we find the two major influences of the Platonic writings on the intellectual development of Augustine: a newfound ability to conceive of a purely intelligible and incorporeal reality, and a new notion of the soul of man.

> Being admonished by all this to return to myself, I entered into my own depths, with You as guide; and I was able to do it because You were my helper. I entered, and with the eye of my soul, such as it was, I saw Your unchangeable Light shining over that same eye of my soul, over my mind. It was not the light of everyday that the eye of flesh can see, nor some greater light of the same order, such as might be if the brightness of our daily light should be seen shining with a more intense brightness and filling all things with its greatness. Your Light was not that, but other, altogether other, than all such lights. Now was it above my mind as oil above the water it floats on, nor as the sky is above the earth; it was above because it made me, and I was below because made by it. He who knows the truth knows that Light, and he that knows that Light knows eternity. Charity knows it. . . . And I said, "Is truth then nothing at all, since it is not extended either through finite spaces or infinite?" And Thou didst cry to me from afar: 'I am who am." and I heard Thee, as one hears in the heart; and there was from that moment no ground of doubt in me; I would more easily have doubted my own life than have doubted that truth it: which is <u>clearly seen</u>, being understood by the things that are made.[50]

> . . . I saw You infinite in a different way; but that sight was not with the eyes of flesh.[51]

We find here also an important text relating to Augustine's theory of knowledge:

> I was now studying the ground of my admiration for the beauty of bodies, whether celestial or of earth, and on what authority I might rightly judge of things mutable and say: "This ought to be so, that not so." Enquiring then what was the source of my judgment, when I did so judge I had discovered the immutable and true eternity of truth above my changing mind. Thus by stages I passed from bodies to the soul which uses the body for its perceiving, and from this to the soul's inner power, to which the body's senses present external things, as indeed the beasts are able; and from there I passed on to the reasoning power, to which is referred for judgment what is received from the body's senses. This too realized that it was mutable in me, and rose to its own understanding. It withdrew my thought from its habitual way, abstracting from the confused crowds of fantasies that it might find what light suffused it, when with utter certainty it cried aloud that the immutable was to be preferred to the mutable, and how it had come to know the immutable itself:

> for if it had not come to some knowledge of the immutable, it could not have known it as certainly preferable to the mutable. Thus in the thrust of a trembling glance my mind arrived at that Which Is.[52]

With his new understanding of the spiritual comes certitude. His days of doubt over the possibility of attaining truth are over. He has personally experienced contact with truth, with the source of all truth, with Him Who is Vere Esse.[53]

What kind of experience was this? Guardini claims that it was religious;[54] Gilson, perhaps more in keeping with the nature of Augustine's thought as a totality, claims that is was "indissolubly philosophical and religious."[55] It is necessary to focus also on the moral features of this experience. "He who knows the truth knows that light, and he that knows the light knows eternity. Charity knows it." Guardini comments: "It is Truth that is simultaneously love-awakened value, goodness, knowledge that flowers only when love's desire for value greens."[56] Augustine tells us that he is not yet ready really to live the truth: "I lacked the strength to hold my gaze fixed, and my weakness was beaten back again so that I returned to my old habits, bearing nothing with me but a memory of delight and a desire as for something of which I had caught the fragrance but which I had not yet the strength to eat."[57]

Gilson summarizes the effects of Augustine's contact with the Platonists on his concept of man:

> . . . the abstract problem of man's metaphysical structure seemed to him an idle one. It is the moral problem of the sovereign good that interests him. Now, that good is of an essentially spiritual nature; it has to be sought beyond the soul but in the

> same intelligible world. That is why the soul's superiority over the body has to be emphasized in his definition of man. Deny this superiority, and it is no longer clear that man should seek his good beyond the sphere of the body. Grant this superiority, and along with the proper ordering of ends, the whole problem of morality is solved.
>
> Saint Augustine's anthropology and psychology, then, are made to depend upon a morality which explains their essential characteristics. Since man is chiefly his soul, certain operations may properly be attributed to man even though only the soul takes part in them. Whence arise a theory of knowledge and a natural theology orientated away from the body and desirous at every turn to direct our attention away from the body in order to lead us back to the soul where our greater good is to be found.[58]

Surprisingly enough, Augustine turns from the Platonists' works to
to the writings of St. Paul. Gilson interprets this as follows:

> The hidden reason for this apparently strange combination was that Augustine was confronted by two pieces of evidence: on the one hand, Christ's admirable life in which he believed through the Scriptures as well as the lives of Saints who had imitated Him; and on the other, the clear evidence of Plotinus's philosophy which he had just discovered. Now the good and the true cannot contradict each other, therefore Christian doctrine must be in essential agreement with the thought of Plotinus. It was to test this hypothesis that he took up, tremblingly, the Epistles of St. Paul. One final illumination awaited him there, namely the doctrine of sin and redemption through the grace of Jesus Christ.[59]

The moral aspect of Saint Augustine's notion of wisdom is apparent. Only the reflections, information on the lives of several holy people, and the decisive miraculous event recorded in Book Eight of the Confessions are now needed to make of Augustine the first Christian philosopher.

If the thought of Augustine is truly a continuous commentary on his life, then this biodoctrinal discussion is justified in a paper such as this, since what Gilson calls "The law of the mind's innerness"[60]

is the secret to Augustine's procedural tactics. Werare now presented with the phenomenon of a deeply penetrating Christian mind greatly influenced by Neo-Platonic philosophy, a mind which approahhes with the totality of its acquired equppment the problems of reality: hence a thinker who does not bracket the revealed nor isolate the speculative from the moral, who insists on the superiority of the spiritual soul over the material body, and who is absolutely convinced of the possibility of the possession of truth. These three basic attitudes regarding the inter-relationships of faath and reason, the notion of wisdom as involving the moral good of man's soul, and the possibility of certitude are essential to the man Augustine as he speculates on the problems which confront him.[61]

CHAPTER TWO

CERTITUDE

> . . . St. Augustine's demonstration simply follows and formulates his own personal experience. If he stressed the usefulness of faith, it was because he recalled the long years of error during which his mind was exhausted in the vain pursuit of a truth that faith had given him at once. And if he insists now on the necessity of refuting scepticism before pressing on further, it is because he remembers his own despair of finding truth. Augustine would clear from our path the stumbling block over which he fell; the former Academician would have us escape the Pyrrhonism from which he suffered.
>
> . . . It is well worth noting that the refutation of scepticism was this new Christian's first preoccupation. The "despair of finding truth," which he had just conquered in himself, is also the first enemy he would overcome in others.[62]

The central topic of Augustine's first Christian work, Contra Academicos, is the refutation of Academic scepticism. In addition to several familiar ad hominem arguments, he will later present a series of considerations very similar to those of Rene Descartes. Because this Cartesian-sounding proof is elaborated in two later works, however, we shall not dwell here on the argumentations of the Contra Academicos but shall proceed to a consideration of Augustine's establishment of the possibility of certitude as presented in De Vera Religione and in De Libero Arbitrio.

It is important, to remember, when attempting to systematize Augustinian thought, that Saint Augustine is not working in the natural order alone. The first step to truth is faith. Then we may

proceed to show the possibility of demonstrated truth.

The bedrock certitude for Saint Augustine, as for Descartes, is the certitude of his own existence, life, and knowledge. In the De Libero Arbitrio, he refers to this as the starting point and the most obvious of truths.

> Augustine. Wherefore, in order that we may take our start from the most obvious things, I ask you whether you yourself exist, or whether you think you may be under an illusion as to that; although surely if you did not exist you could not possibly have an illusion.
>
> Evodius. Go on rather to other matters.
>
> Augustine. It is evident, then, that you exist; and since that could not be evident unless you were living, it is also evident that you live. Do you understand that these two things are very true?
>
> Evodius. I understand thoroughly.
>
> Augustine. Therefore, this third thing is evident: you understand.
>
> Evodius. It is evident.[64]

In De Vera Religione, Saint Augustine mentionesthe certitude involved in the act of doubting, but he does not use this certitude to draw from it an existential truth. "If you do not grasp what I say and doubt whether it is true, at least make up your mind whether you have any doubt about your dobbts. If it is certain that you do indeed have doubts, inquire whence comes that certainty."[65]

Gilson refers us to the fifteenth book of the De Trinitate for the most "Cartesian" of Augustinian refutations of scepticism.

> . . . passing by . . . those things that come into the mind by the bodily senses, how large a proportion is left of things which we thewbon auch manner as we know that we live? In regard to this, indeed we are absolutely without any fear lest perchance we are being deceived by some resemblance of the truth; since it is certain that he who is deceived, yet lives. . . . The knowledge by

> which we know that we live is the most inward of all knowledge, of which even the Academic cannot insinuate: Perhaps you are asleep, and do not know it, and you see things in your sleep. For who does not know that what people see in dreams is precisely like what they see when awake? But he sho is certain of the knowledge of his own life, doesnot therein say, I know I am awake, but, I know I am alive; therefore, whether he be asleep or awake, he is alove. Nor can he be ceceived in that knowledge by dreams; since it belongs to a living man both to sleep and to see in sleep. Nor can the Academic again say, in confutation of this knowledge: Perhaps you are mad, and do not know it: for what madmen see is precisely like what they also see who are sane; but he who is mad is alove. Nor does he answer the Academic by saying, I know I am not mad, but, I know I am alove. Therefore he who says he knows he is alove, can neither be deceived nor lie. Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of sight be presented to him who says, I know I am alove; yet he will fear none of them, for he who is deceived yet is alove.[66]

In the same chapter of the De Trinitate, Augustine puts his finger on the source of the Academics' difficulties:

> For whereas there are two kinds of knowable things -- one, of those things which the mind perceives by the bodily senses; the other, of those which it perceives by itself -- these philosophers have babbled much against the bodily senses, but have never been able to throw doubt upon those most certain perceptions of things true, which the mind knows by itself, such as is that which I have mentioned, I know that I am alove.[67]

Both Augustine and Descartes will censure the skeptics for emphasizing the untrustworthiness of the senses while refusing to recognize the mind's ability to perceive truth. For both there is established a radical division between soul and body and a repeated insistence on the superiority of soul. For both there is a problem of putting soul and body together again so that they form one man.[68]

The following text is very interesting in the suggestions it delovers regarding the similarity between Augustine and Descartes:

I commend your hesitation. For it indicates a mind which is cautious and this is the greatest safeguard to equanimity. It is very difficult not to be perturbed when things we consider easily and readily provable are shaken by contrary arguments and, as it were, are wrenched from our hands. For just as it is proper to assent to things well explored and perused, so it is perilous to consider things known which are not known. Because there is a danger, when those things are often upset which we supposed would stand firmly and endure, blest we fall into such distrust and hatred of reason that it might seem that confidence in evident truth is not warranted.[69]

CHAPTER THREE

THE POSSESSTON OF TRUTH

I. The Acquisition of Truth

It would be well here to specify the meaning of several words used by Saint Augustine to denone functions of man. He uses the word animus to designate man's soul, "a vital principle that is at the same time a rational substance."[70] "The mind, mens, is the higher part of the rational soul (animus). It is the part that clings to things intelligible and to God. . . . The mind naturally contains reason and intelligence."

And:

> Reason (ratio) is the movement whereby the mind (mens) passes from one of its knowledges to another to associate or dissociate them. . . . The two terms intellectus and intelligentia signify a faculty above reason (ratio). Intelligentia is that which is most eminent in man and, consequently, in mens. . . . For this very reason it is often identified with intellectus. . . .
>
> The intellect is a faculty of the soul proper to man and belonging more particularly to mens. It is directly illumined by the divine light. . . . Intellectus is a faculty above reason because it is possible to have reason without having intelligence, but it is impossible to have intelligence without reason, and it is precisely because man has reason that he wants to attain intelligence. . . . In a word, intelligence is an inner sight . . . through which the mind perceives the truth that the divine light reveals to it.[71]

The "faculty" or movement which interests us here is precisely that of intellect or intelligence, in which the truth is seen from within. What does Augustine mean by the truth known through intelligence? The following text suggests an answer to this question:

> It is enough for my purpose that Plato thought that there were two worlds, one intelligible, where truth itself resided, and this sensible world which, it is clear, we apprehend by sight and touch. The first was the true world, while the latter was made like the true world and after its imgge. Truth, bright and serene, shines from the former in the woul which knows herself; but only opinion, and not knowledge, can be generated from the latter in the souls of those who are not wise.[72]

Several paragraphs later, Augustine says:

> . . . there is . . . one system of really true philosophy. For that philosophy is not of this world -- such a philosophy our sacred mysteries most justly detest -- but of the other, intelligible, world. To which intelligible world the most subtle reasoning would never recall sould blinded by the manifold darkness of error and stained deeply by the slime of the body, had not the most high God, because of a certain compassion for the masses, bent and submitted thb authority of the divine intellect even th the human body itself. By the precepts as well as deeds of that intellect souls have been awakened, and are able, without the strife of disputation, to return to themselves and seen once again their fatherland.[73]

Many texts of Saint Augustine tell us that man can find truth by entering into himself and confronting truth within himself. "In the inward man dwells truth."[74]

Augustine writes to Romanianus:

> . . . we can do nothing for you but pray, so that byoour prayers we may win, if we can, the favour from that God who has a care of these things that he bring you back to your true self -- and in so doing He will likewise bring you back to us -- and allow your mind, which for so long has yearned for respite, to emerge at length into the fresh air of true freedom.[75]

He tells Romanianus that the result of this return to self will be the discovery of true philosophy:

> Wake up! Wake up! I beg you. Believe me, you will be heartily glad that this world has scarcely flattered you at all with its gifts and successes by which the unwary are ensnared. I myself had

almost been trapped by these things, preaching them to others, as I did, had not some chest trouble compelled me to give up my profession of windy rhetoric and take refuge in the lap of philosophy. She now nourishes and cherishes me in that leisure which we have so much desired. She has freed me entirely from that heresy into which I had precipitated you with myself. For she teaches, and teaches truly, that nothing whatever that is discerned by mortal eyes, or is the object of any perception, should be worshipped, but that everything wuch should be contemned. She promises tomake known clearly the true and hidden God and is on the very point of deigning to present Him to our view -- as it were, through shinging clouds.[76]

When speaking of the wise man, Augustine says: "If you ask me, where he will find wisdom herself, I shall reply: in his very own self."[77] Wisdom is described in the De Beata Vita as the state of the soul when she ponders herself.[78]

The religious aspect of Augustine's interiorism is pointed to in the following texts:

What honor, what human pomp, what desire for empty fame, when consolations or attractionsof this moral life could move me then (after reading the Platonists)? Swiftly did I begin to return to myself. Actually, all that I did -- let me admit it -- was to look back from the end of a journey, as it were, to that religions which is implanted in us in our childhood days and bound up in the marrow of our bones. But whe indeed was drawing me unknowing to herself. Therefore, stumbling, hastening, yet with hesitation I seized the Apostle Paul.[79]

It seems you do not know that we have been taught to pray in our secret closets, bu which is meant the inmost part of the man, for the sole reason that God does not need to be reminded or taught by our speech in order that He may fulfill our desires. For he who speaks expresses the sign of his will by means of articulate sound. But God should be sought and entreated in the very secret places of the rational soul, which is called the interior man; for He wished this to be His temple. Have You not read in the Apostles: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?" And also: "Christ dwells in the inner man." And have you not observed,

> in the Psalm: "Commune with your own heart upon your bed, and be still. Offer the sacrifices of righteousness and put your trust in the Lord." Where, then, is a sacrifice of righteousness made, unless in the temple of the mind and in the chambers of the heart." And the place for sacrifice is also the place for prayer.[80]

Saint Augustine clearly wished to emphasize that truth is not subjectivistic, that it is <u>discovered</u> within rather than made there.

> Reasoning does not create truth but discovers it. Before it is discovered it abides in itself; and when it is discovered it renews us.[81]

> Just as, therefore, there are true and immutable rules of numbers, the reason and truth of which you have said is immutable present to all perceivers in common; so there are true and immutable rules of wisdom, concerning a few of which, when you were just now asked about them one by one, you answered that they were true and manifest, and conceded that they are present for the common contemplation of all who are able to regard them.[82]

> Wherefore you will certainly not deny that there is an immutable truth, containing all things that are immutable true, which you cannot say is yours or mine or any one man's; but that is some wonderful way a mysterious and universal light, as it were, is present and proffers itself to all in common. But who would say that that which is commonly present to all who reason and understand belongs properly to the nature of any one of them?[83]

> . . . errors and false opinions contaminate life if the rational soul itself is corrupted. So was my soul at that time, for I did not realize that it had to be illumined by another light, if it was to be a partaker of truth, because it is not itself the essence of truth.[84]

These last two texts in particular suggest the Augustinian notion of divine illumination. Before we can discuss this problem, however, we must carefully analyze Saint Augustine's thought on the acquisition or learning of truth. This problem is handled most

in his De Magistro. There is a peculiar dialectic employed in this work, which R. A. Markus notes in his article "St. Augustine on Signs."[85] The dialectic is employed in an effort to eliminate the possibility of learning truth from without. As Gilson points out, the Augustinian active theory of sensation states that bodies cannot act on the soul; sensations are derived from the soul itself; and the question in the De Magistro is whether the soul causes also its own ideas.[86]

In the first part of the De Magistro, Augustine claims that nothing can be learned unless it be communicated through signs, and especially through words. "We have as yet found nothing which can be shown directly by itself except speech, which also signifies itself along with other things. But since speech itself consists of signs, there is still nothing that can be taught without signs."[87] But in the second part of this work, he clearly indicates that we must know the things to which a word or other sign points before we know the meaning of the sign itself. " . . . it is the truest reasoning and most correctly said that when words are uttered we either know already what they signify or we do not know; if we know, then we remember rather than learn, but if we do not know, then we do not even remember, though perhaps we are prompted to ask."[88] Markus comments on this apparent discrepancy:

> The conclusion that we cannot get to know the meaning of signs without knowing the realities they stand for appears to contradict the conclusion of the first part of this work, namely that we require signs in order that we may get to know things. But Augustine means both these positions to be taken quite seriously, and indeed reiterates the conclusions of the first part in the course of this argument. His thesis is precisely

> that no knowledge can either be acquired or communicated on the basis of the account so far given: in order that I may know the meaning of signs I have to know, in the last resort, the things they stand for. On the other hand, I have to rely on the words and signs of teachers to receive the direct experience of these things.[89]

The precise point that Augustine is trying to make is that truth cannot be learned from some teacher external to us.

> But, referring now to all things which we understand, we consult, not the speaker who utters words, but the guarding truth within the mind itself, because we have perhaps been reminded by words to do so. Moreover, He who is consulted teaches; for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ, that is, the unchangeable excellence of God and His everlasting wisdom, which every rational soul does indeed consult. But there is revealed to each one as much as he can apprehend through his will according as it is more perfect or less perfect.[90]

The following lengthy quotation will serve to indicate Augustine's objections against the concept of teaching truth.

> If we consult light concerning color and other things which we sense through the body; if we consult the elements of this world and those bodies which we sense; if we consult the senses themselves which the mind uses as interpreters in recognizing things of this sort; and if we also consult the interior truth by means of reason about things which are understood: what can be said about words indicate that we learn anything by means of words beyond that sound which strikes the ear? For all things which we perceive are perceived either through a sense of the body or by means of the mind. We call the former sensibles, the latter intelligibles. . . .
>
> . . . Indeed when things are discussed which we perceive through the mind, that is, by means of intellect and reason, these are said to be things which we see immediately in that interior light of truth by virtue of which he himself who is called the interior man is illumined, and upon this depends his joy. But then our hearer, if he also himself sees those things with the inner and pure eye, knows that of which I speak by means of his own contemplation but not through my words. Accordingly, even though I speak about true things, I still do

> not teach him who beholds the true things, for he is taught not through my words but by means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul. . . . He who is questioned is able to teach himself through his inner power according to the measure of his own ability. An apt example is found in our recent procedure, for when I aksed you whether anything can be taught by words, the question at first seemed absurd to you, because you did not have an inclusive view of the problem. Thus, it was suitable to formulate my question in such a way that your powers might be brought under the direction of the inner teacher.[91]

And:

> . . . all those sciences which they profess to teach and the science of virtue itself and wisdom, teachers explain through words. Then those who are called pupils consider within themselves whether what has been explained has been said truly; looking of course to that interior truth, according to the measure of which each is able. Thus they learn, and when the interior truth makes known to them that true things have been said, they applaud, but without knowing that instead of applauding the teachers they are applauding learners, if indeed their teachers know what they are saying.[92]

The problem of the truth that swells within us leads naturally to that of memory and reminiscence. Many texts can be found which seem to indicate a theory of reminiscence somewhat analogous to that of Plato. The most Platonic of them is the following:

> Evodius. . . . the soul of a new-born child is altogether untrained and unskilled. Why does it not bring with it some art, if it is eternal?
>
> Augustine. You raise a very important question; in fact, I do not know of one more important in which our views are so diametrically opposed. For, while in your view the soul has brought no art with it, in mine, on the other hand, it has brought every art; for to learn is nothing else than to recall and remember.[93]

Augustine later comments on this text:

> My statement that learning is simply remembering and recalling is not to be taken as if I approved the doctrine that the soul had sometimes existed in another body, here or elsewhere, or in its own body, or out of it . . . . Surely the soul does not bring with it all the arts nor does it possess them in the same way. For, as regards the arts that pertain to the senses of the body -- many branches of medicine and all of astrology -- unless a man learns them, he cannot say that he has them. But, those arts which pertain to the understanding alone, these he masters for the reason I mentioned, when he has been wisely questioned and reminded either by himself or another, and thus brings forth the right answer.[94]

Thus Gilson is led to think that Augustine first thought of the mind's "indomitable spontaneity" in an innatist fashion, but that "in fully developed Augustinism Platonic reminiscence is completely freed from the hypothesis of the soul's pre-existence."[95] The soul must therefore produce its own intelligibilities, just as, in one way, it produces its own sensations. As we have seen, however, knowledge for Augustine is not subjectivistic: the mind does not create truth. Augustine gives us the solution in the De Magistro. We have seen it already:

> . . . He who is consulted teaches; for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ, that is, the unchangeable excellence of God and His everlasting Wisdom, which every rational soul does indeed consult. But there is revealed to each of us as much as he can apprehend through his will according as it is more perfect or less perfect.[96]

Markus shows how Augustine uses this doctrine to solve the above-mentioned dilemma regarding knowledge and truth:

> Human teachers, on the one hand, can only teach us the meanings of words and signs, and experience, on the other hand, only furnishes us with brute givenness. Only the Interior

> Teahher, which is Christ dwelling in the mind, can teach by at once displaying to the mind the reality to be known and providing the language for its understanding. He is the source of both the objects encountered and the light which illuminates them for our understanding. This is the teacher whose activity is presupposed by all learning.[97]

In addition to solving the problem of our knowledge of truth, Augustine has supplied us with the proof for the existence of God which is characteristically his own, a proof which he formulates in strict terms in the De Libero Arbitrio, book II. And we may say also that Platonic reminiscence here gives way to an Augustinian "memory of the present."[98]

Before proceeding to the thorny question of divine illumination, let us look briefly at the famous discussion of memory in the tenth book of the Confessions.[99] Memory contains "the innumerable images of material things brought to it by the senses, . . . the thoughts we think, by adding to or taking away from or otherwise modifying the things that sense has made contact with, and all other things that have been entrusted to and laid up in memory. . . "[100] There are even some realities in my memory, formemory contains truths. But,

> . . . whence and how did they get into my memory? I do not know. For when I first learned them I was not trusting some other man's mind, but recognized them in my own; and I saw them as true and committed them to my mind as if placing them where I could get at them again whenever I desired. Thus they must have been in my mind even before I learned them, though they were not in my memory. Then where were they, or how did it come that when I heard them spoken I recognized them and said: "It is so, it is true," unless they were in my memory already, but so far back, thrust away as it were in such remote recesses, that unless they had been drawn forth by some other man's teaching, I might perhaps never have managed to think of them at all?[101]

Thus memory is not only a memembrance of things past but also a knowledge of present truths. " . . . the mind and the memory are not two separate things. . . ."[102]

> . . . we must extend the conceptof memory to include anything the mind learns from the inner Master, sees in the illuminating light of the Word, or can discover in itself by direct apprehension. Consequently, association with the past ceases to be an essential characteristic of the memory. Since the soul remembers everything present to it even though unaware of it, we can say that there is a memory of the present which is even far more vast than the memory of the past. Everything we know without being aware of it can be ascribed to the memory, so that here too, and with greater reason, the soul finds itself unable to sound its own depths.[103]

Augustine is insistent on the fact that God transcends memory,[104] and yet he claims to find God in memory. "I shall pass beyond memory to find You, O truly good and certain Loveliness, and where shall I find You? If I find You beyond my memory, then shall I be without memory of You. And how shall I find You if I am without memory of You?"[105]

Augustine then tells us that when he is seeking God, he is seeking happiness, which he identifies as joy in truth.[106] All men desire happiness, and all desire joy in truth. But a problem presents itself:

> But wherehhave they come to know happiness, save where they came to know truth likewise? For they love truth, since they do not wish to be deceived; and when they love happiness, which as we have seen is simply joy in truth, they must love truth also: and they could not love it unless there were some knowledge of it in their memory.[107]

One way, then, in which God is found in the memory is in the idea of God as truth.

> See now how great a space I have covered in my memory, in search of Thee, O Lord; and I have not found Thee outside it. For I find nothing concerning Thee but what I have remembered from the time I first learned of Thee. From that time, I have never forgotten Thee. For where do I found truth, there I found my God, and this I have not forgotten from the time I first learned it. Thus from the time I learned of Thee, Thou hast remained in my memory, and there do I find Thee, when I turn my mind to Thee and find delight in Thee.[108]

But it is not only the idea of God that he finds in his memory, but God Himself.

> In what place then did I find You to learn of You? For You were not in my memory before I learned of You. Where then did I find You to learn of You, save in Yourself, above myself? Place there is none, we go this way and that, and place there is none. You, who are Truth, reside everywhere to answer all who ask counsel of You, and in one act reply to all though all seek consel on different matters. . . .
>
> Late have I loved Thee, O Beauty so ancient and so new; late have I loved Thee! For behold Thou wert within me, and I outside; and I sought Thee outside and in my unloveliness fell upon those lovely things that Thou hast made. Thou wert within me and I was not with Thee. . . . Thou didst call and cry to me and break open my deafness: and Thou didst send forth Thy beams and shine upon me and chase away my blindness. . .[109]

Gilson refers to this type of presence of God in memory as metaphysical.

> In order to make this last step, Augustine is led to extend memory beyond the limits of psychology to metaphysics. If we think of the soul as a sort of receptacle where we would have God along with many other hidden objects, it goes without saying that God cannot be found there. God is not in our mind as something contained there nor even as a profound memory which the soul sometimes loses and at other times finds again. In short we find God not in ourselves but only in God. In another sense, however, owing to the fact that we find God in Himself only if we pass through and beyond what is most profound in ourselves, we must allow a sort of metaphysical background to the soul, a retreat more secret than the others, which would in some way be the very abode of God.[110]

This leads us naturally to the problem of divine illumination.

II. Divine Illumination.

The problem of divind illumination is perhaps the most difficult question in the thought of Saint Augustine. Many interpretations have been offered, even that it is completely consonant with the Thomistic theory of the abstraction of intelligible forms.[111] While we do not pretend to offer here a definitive statement on the nature of divine illumination in the thought of Saint Augustine, both Gilson and Pegis seem to offer sufficient evidence that divine illumination and abstraction are not identical or companion doctrines on human knowledge. As both Gilson and Pegis point out, Augustine is not concerned with the origin of knowledge or the content of the concept; his only concern is the necessity and immutability of the truth which he knows.[112]

The first point to be noted with regard to the Augustinian doctrine of illumination is that it refers as well to the order of natural knowledge as to that of mystical vision. The best text on this is the following:

> . . . we ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see things, which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of an unique kind; as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive, and adapted to it.[113]

Thus the following proportion may be established: as the eye of the body is to the physical light in which it sees corporeal things, so the eye of the soul is to the incorporeal light in which

it sees immutable and necessary truths.[114] "In a word, this is a theory of the nature of mind and of the natural conditions for its activity: there is nothing supernatural about this illumination. . . . The mind of man lives as naturally in a world of intelligible light, as does his eye in a world of physical light."[115] Gilson points out the natural quality of this illumination when he indicates that divine illumination does not relieve man of the necessity of having and using his intellect; Gilson says that the mind can be called a natural light.[116]

> The result of divine illumination is not, normally at least, a supernatural illumination; on the contrary, to be the receptive subject of divine illumination belongs by definition to the nature of the human intellect. . . . God does not take the place of our intellect when we think the truth. His illumination is needed only to make our intellects capable of thinking the truth, and this by virtue of a natural order of things expressly established by Him. This doctrine gives a precise meaning to countless texts in which Augustine says that the divine light shines for all men, whether sinners or saints; that it is present in every man who comes into this world, and thatit is never absent from us even if we neglect to turn to it. In as much as man is endowed with an intellect, he is by nature a being illumined by God.[117]

Gilson draws an interesting comparison between Augustine's doctrine of illumination and St. Paul's statement that "in Him we live and move and have our being." Just as our existence in the natural order depends wholly on the power of God, so that if God were to remove his conserving influence, we would cease to exist, so our knowledge in the natural order demands illumination by the

divine ideas, in which we see the truth of things; without this illumination, we could not arrive at necessary and immutable truth.[118]

The role of divine illumination in the order of natural knowledge throws some light on St. Augustine's theory of the three levels of reality and is connected with his doctrine of man.

> St. Augustine does say that the soul naturally desires to be joined to the body, and by this he means that "the soul is created with such a nature as todesire this, in the same way as it is natural to us to desire to live." But in considering the motives in this desire, we find that the soul enters the body as a messenger of light from the divine ideas. The soul is nearer to the divine ideas than isthe body; it is therefore more perfect than the body, and this priority of the soul is as it ought to be. Order and organization and life come down to the body by way of, andthrough the mediation of, the soul. The hierarchy of divine ideas, soul and body has as its fundamental motive the transmission of organization to matter, which can take place only this way. The soul is thus a sort of intermediate nature, with the divine ideas immediately above it and the body immediately below it.[119]

Gilson indicates the same thing, when he says that the soul, in its immediate subjection to God, is subject also to certain "intelligible realities" which are the divine ideas themselves.[120]

Both Gilson and Pegis maintain that the problem of illumination is more than a merely psychological problem; it must be placed into an objective and metaphysical framework. First of all, the comparison of the mind with the eye of the body indicates that, just as the objects of physical sight "participate" in physical light, by which they are made visible, so the objects of the intellect participate in intelligible light and so can be known in a necessary and immutable way.

> The comparison between God and an intelligible sun serves first of all to point out the difference between a thing which is intelligible of its own essence and a thing which must be made intelligible if it is ever to become so. The sun exists, it is bright, and it makes bright the objects it illumines. There is a great difference, then, between something naturally visible, such as the light of the sun, and something visible only because of a borrowed light, such as the earth when illumined by the sun. In the same way, we must distinguish between God considered in His own Being, the intelligibility of God which is independent of everything but itself, and the sciences which derive their intelligibility from that of God. Thus the comparison allows to truths perceived by the soul no more light of their own than that possessed by things when deprived of the sun which illumines them.[121]

The following text from the Soliloquies will serve to illustrate this point:

> . . . God is intelligible, not sensible, intelligible also are those demonstrations of the schools; nevertheless they differ very widely. For as the earth is visible, so is light; but the earth, unless illumined by light, cannot be seen. Therefore those things also which are taught in the schools, which no one who understands them doubts in the least to be absolutely true, we must believe to be incapable of being understood, unless they are illuminated by somewhat else, as it were a sun of their own. Therefore as in this visible sun we may observe three things, that he is, that he shines, that he illuminates; so in that God most far withdrawn whom thou wouldst fain apprehend, there are these three things: that He is, that He is apprehended, and that He makes other things to be apprehended.[122]

Pegis takes great pains to insist on the Platonic method employed by Augustine at this point. In his famous proof for the existence of God in the second book of the De libero arbitrio, Augustine proceeds to show that by an analysis of our interior consciousness, we are able to show that the only thing that is superior to our reason is truth, which is eternal and unchangeable. This truth cannot be inferior to our reason, because then we would judge it; but the fact is that we only discover it and, in a sense, we are judged by

it and judge according to it. And it cannot be equal to our minds in perfection because it is immutable. And bedause it is eternal and immutable, it must be God. Bu going within ourselves, we find the God who is above us.

> But if it were inferior we would judge not according to it, but concerning it; just as we judge of bodies because they are below us, and say commonly not only that they are so or not so, but that they ought to be so or not so. So too of our minds we know not only that the mind is so, but frequently also that it should be so. And of bodies to be sure we judge thus when we say: this is not as white as it should be, or not as square, and many similar things. But of minds: it is less apt than it should be, or less gentle, or less vehement; according as the manner of our character shows itself. And we judge of these things according to those inner rules of truth that we discern in common; but no one judges in any way of the rules themselves. For when anyone says that eternal things are better than temporal, or that seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to be so; but knowing that it is so, he does not correct it as an examiner, but rejoices in it as a discoverer.
>
> If again the truth were equal to our minds, it would be also mutable. For our minds perceive it sometimes more and sometimes less, and thereby acknowledge themselves mutable, while it, continuing in itself, is neither enhanced when we see it more, nor diminished when we see it less, but whole and uncorrupted it makes glad those who turn to it, and punishes with blindness those who turn away. But what, then, if also we judge of those same minds according to that truth, while we can in no way judge of it? For we say of our mind: it understands less than it should or it understand as much as it should. But a mind should understand in the measure that it is able to draw near to and cleave to immutable truth. Wherefore, if that truth be neither inferior nor equal to our minds, it remains that it is higher and more excellent.[123]

But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love anything unchangeable: and each individual man declares his own particular mind by one manner of speech, when he considers what takes place in himself; but defines the human mind abstractly by special or general knowledge. And so, when he speaks to me of his own individual mind, as to whether he understands this or that, or does not understand it, or whether he wishes or does not wish this or that, I believe; but when he

speaks the truth of the mind of man generally or specially, I recognize and approve. Whence it is manifest, that each sees a thing in himself, in such way that another person may believe whathe says of it, yet may not see it; but another (sees a thing) in the truth itself, in such way that another person also can gaze upon it; of thich the former undergoes changes at successive times, the latter consists in an unchangeable eternity. For we do not gather a generic or specific knowledge of the human mind by means of resemblance by seeing many minds with the eyes of the body; but we gaze upon indestructible truth, from which to define perfectly, as far as we can, not of what sort is the mind of anyone particular man, but of what sort it ought to be upon the eternal plan.

Whence, also, even in the case of theimages of things corporeal which are drawn in through the bodily sense, and in some way infused into the memory, from which also those things which have not been seen are thought under a fancied image, whether otherwise than they really are, or even perchance as they are -- even here too, we are proved either to accept or reject, within ourselves, by other rules which remain altogether unchangeable above our mind, when we approve or reject anything rightly. For both when I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and imagine to myself the walls of Alexandria which I have not seen, and, in preferring this to that among forms which in both cases are imaginary, make that preference upon grounds of reason; the judgement of truth from above is still strong and clear, andrests firmly upon the utterly indestributible rules of its own right; and if it is covered as it were by cloudiness of corporeal images, yetis not wrapt up and confounded in them.

. . . Again, when I call back to my mind some arch, thmned beautifully and symmetrically, which, let us say, I saw at Carthage; a certain reality that had been madd known to the mind through the eyes, and transferred to the memory, causes the imaginary view. But I behold in my mind yet another thing according to which that work of art pleases me; and whence also, if it displeased me, I should correct it. We judge therefore of those particular things according to that (form of eternal truth), and discern that from by the intuition of the rational mind. But those things themselves we either touch if present by the bodily sense, of if absent remember their images as fixed in our memory, or picture, in the way of likeness to them, such things as we ourselves also, if we wished or were able, would laboriously build up: figuring in the mind after one fashion the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body; but after another, grasping by simple intelligence what is above the eye of the mind, viz., the reasons and the unspeakably beautiful skill of such forms.[124]

> You conceded, however, that if I should show you something higher than our minds, you would confess that it is God, if there were nothing yet higher. Accepting this concession of yours I said that it would be enough if I should prove this. For if there is something yet more excellent than truth, that rather is God; but if not, then truth itself is God. Whether therefore there is this more excellent thing, or whether there is not, you cannot deny that God is, which was the question set for our discussion and treatment.[125]

The truth which we find is not created by us, for it consists in judgments to which wellwill give their assent. It is truly " a public intelligible light, which yet is present to us in the most secret chambers of our souls."[126] The method, says Pegis, " is a Platonic method, and it consists in seeing and exploring a world of intelligible being present to the mind, and in disengaging its truth, its eternity and its immutability."[127] And the world which we find is "a world of principles which rules our minds. It is an intelligible world, and it is a real world; and it is immediately and intimately present to our minds."[128] As Pegis indicates, the only problem -- and it is quite a problem for us -- is to locate the metaphysical status of this intelligible world.

> That the truths which St. Augustine reports as truths are true and eternal we cannot doubt; that they are real, in the sense that our minds do not make them to be true or pass judgment on them, is again not to be doubted. The problem is rather to know what realities we know when we see and recognize these laws of number, wisdom, etc. Seven and three are ten. Look at it: it is the scandal inour midst. It is, says Augustine, an eternal and immutable truth. Is it God or a divine idea? Clearly, neither the one nor the other, for we see it, but we don't see God or the divine ideas. Does it, then, come from the mutable beings of the world of sense? Here is the rub: how could it, if, as Augustine supposes, it is eternal and immutable, and nothing mutable is eternal?[129]

Augustine never tells us of the mechanism operative in the intellect, nor of the states of the real world of intelligible truths. He does not tell us of the mechanism which enables the mind to arrive at truth, because this is not a problem for him. It is obvious to him that the mind is immediately open to intelligibility; sensation is actually much more of a psychological problem for him that intellection, because man is primarily soul and not body. And to explain intellection, it seems that we must move from psychology to a metaphysics of participation.

What is the metaphysical status of the world which Augustine came to know? Pegis summarizes Augustine's view of the world after his meeting with the works of Plotinus: " . . . we experience the imperfections and the instability of things in a world of number and truth; we explain the meaning of their createdness in the same world of number and truth; and we look upon what they are in terms of number."[130] Number, order, and form are creatures' way of participating in the being (immutability) of the divine ideas. "Formation or information is a decisive moment in creation."[131] Pegis says of the formation of creatures: " . . . here we meet not only the divine ideas, but also the light of the Word -- that very Word Who is our inner teacher, Who by teaching forms us and completes our creation, even as He forms and completes the creation of corporeal substances."[132]

There is, then, a within to all things, that which is most noble in them, because patterned on the divine ideas and illuminated

and informed by the light of the Word. There is also a within in man and it is here that Augustine searches for and finds stable, eternal and immutable truth, the truth of numbers and the rules of wisdom; for this within is also formed and illumined in all men by the light of the interior teacher, Christ.

> . . . the reason and truth of numbers is not related to the bodily sense, and . . . it is established pure and unalterable for all reasoning men to see in common . . . . Not for nothing is number joined to wisdom in the Sacred Books, where it is said: I and my heart have gone round, that I might know, and consider, and inquire the wisdom and the number.[133]

> . . . let us assume that there are just as many supreme goods as there are different things themselves which by different men are sought as their supreme goods; does it thus follow that wisdom itself is not one to all in common, because those goods which men discern and choose in it are many and diverse: from which things each one selects and will that which he would enjoy through his sense of sight; and one man is pleased to look upon the height of some mountain, and rejoices in that sight, another the level surface of a field, another the slopes of the valleys, another the greenness of the woods, another the inconstant evenness of the sea, and another brings together in one view all of these tings, or certain of them that are fair, for the joy of regarding them. Just as, therefore, those things are many and diverse which in the light of the sun men behold and choose for their enjoyment, although that light itself is one in which the gaze of each beholder sees and dwells upon that which rejoices it; even so are the goods many and diverse from which each one chooses what he will, and seeing it and holding it for his enjoyment rightly and truly makes it his supreme good; but it may yet be that the light itself of wisdom, in which these things are seen and held, is one and common to all wise men.[134]

> Just as, therefore, there are true and immutable rules of numbers, the reason and truth of which you have said is immutable present to all perceivers in common, so there are true and immutable rules of wisdom, concerning a few of which, when you were just now asked about them one by one, you said that they are present for the common contemplation of all who are able to regard them.[135]

Man thus seems to have a unique way of participating in the divine ideas; for the within of man is also itself a natural light, capable of discovering and focusing upon the necessary laws of numbers at the interior of reality. When Augustine penetrates to the interior center of his ownmind, he is also penetrating to the interior center of reality; for at the center of him mind, itself a natural light, there dwell the truth of humbers and the rules of wosdom, both taught to Augustine by the Interior Teacher who is at the center of his own soul and of all reality. "The more Augustine learns to listen to the intelligible voice of things, the more he approaches this inner center of the world; and the more he approaches this inner center, the more he is reaching Him Who gives to things a center. For the center of the world is participation in the light of the Word, and this light descends from Wisdom as from a radiating fire."[136] Pegis refers us to a text from De Libero Arbitrio which perfectly incorporates what we have said:

> Wherever you turn Wisdom speaks to youuby certain traces of Himself which He has impressed on His work; and if you should wander towards external things, He calls you back within yourself by the very forms of external things. You are thus driven to see that whatever plaases you in the body and attracts you through the senses of the body is full of number. You then ask whence it is, and you return to yourself and come to understand that whatever you reach with the senses of the body you cannot find attractive or repellent unless you possess within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer whatever beauty in things you perceive outside yourself.[137]

Gilson maintains that the figure of "light" is a metaphor.[138] I would like to maintain that there is some evidence that is is more

than this, that light for Augustine is something ontological, analogous and participated; the things of the material world partiaipate in light in so far as they are ordered according to number.

> Look on earth and sky and sea, and whatsoever things are in them, or shine from above, or creep beneath, or fly, or swim; they have forms because they have numbers: take these away, they will be nothing. From what then are they, if not from number; seeing that they have being only in so far as they have number.[139]

Number renders them intelligible just as physical light renders them visible. The numbers of things lead man to look within himself, where he will discover wisdom. The mind of man participates of light in a much higher fashion, since its sharing is not only ontological or "physical" but reflective and cognitive; that is to say, the mind of man is a light that can focus upon truth; but it is a light only because it shares in the light of the Word Who must be always immediately present to the mind if truth is to be seen. The truths that are seen are the eternal laws, principles, and rules written in the eternal Word Who is the prime analogate of our comparison. The mind shares in this light through Wisdom.

> But because God gave numbers to all things, even to the lowest, and to those placed in the end of things -- for all bodies though they are among things the meanest, have their numbers -- yet to be wose He did not grant to bodies, or even to all souls, but only to rational souls, as if He placed in them a seat for Himself, from which He disposes all those lowest things to which He gave numbers. And so since we judge easily of numbers, as of the things which are ordered beneath us, we therefore hold them of less account. But when we begin to turn back, and as it were upwards, we find that they too transcend our minds, and remain immutable in truth itself. And because few can be wise, whereas to count is granted even to fools, men admire wisdom and despise

> numbers. The learned, however, and the sturious, the more remote they are from earthly blemish, the more they look upon both number and wisdom in truth itself, and hold both dear; and in comparison with its truth, not formthem are gold and silver, but even their own selves grow unimportant. . . .
>
> But just as brightness and heat are perceived consubstantial, so to speak, in one fire, and yet the heat reaches only those things that are brought close, while the brightness is diffused farthar and more widely; in like manner by the power of understanding that is present in wisdom the nearer things, such as the rational souls, grow warm, but the more remote things, such as bodies, are not reached by the heat of being warm, but are suffused by the light of numbers.[140]

And the mind knows these truths in the divine ideas themselves, just as "in Him we live and move and have our being."

> Where therefore are they written, except in the book of that light which is called truth? From it is every just law copied and transferred to the heart of every man who does the work of justice. This transfer does not take place by moving but by impressing itself -- as the shape of a ring is impressed on wax and yet does not leave the ring.[141]

> God is immutably present to all beings: we <u>are</u> in His sustaining power and truth, and all our experience of truth is a revelation that we are and think in His presence.[142]

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATURAL AND MYSTICAL WAYS TO GOD

This last part of the paper will present a brief discussion of the seven levels of the soul as outlined in the De Quantitate Animae. This seems to be as good a way as any of summarizing our findings concerning the interiorism of Saint Augustine. And it will enable us to end ona note consonant with the nature of Saint Augustine's thought as a totality. For Saint Augustine is a mystic and the seventh level of the soul is the mystical vision of the Truth, and not simply of truth in the light of Truth.

The seven levels of the soul can be grouped into three broader classes. The soul's power in the body is manifested in the first three levels, its power in itself in the fourth and fifth levels, and its power before God in the sixth and seventh levels.

The framework in which Augustinian man is placed is obvious from the outset, for even in the first level, that of animation or vitality (animatio), the soul is credited with having power over the body. To the soul life is due.

> The soul by its presence gives life to this mortal and earthly body; it brings the body together into a unity and keeps it in unity; it prevents the body from breaking up and wasting away; it regulates the proper distribution of nourishment throughout the parts of the body, giving each its due share; its preserves the apt arrangement and proportion of the body, not only to delight the eye but to grow and generate.[143]

The second level of the soul is that of sensation (sensus). We have touched on the Augustinian doctrine of sensation already. "The soul applies itself to the sense of touch; through it it feels and distinguishes hod and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light and heavy." The soul watches over and cares for the body by exercising a votal attention. "And in all these it comes to know and seek what suits the nature of its body; it rejects and shuns what is unsuited." This level of the soul, is, of course, found also in the lower animals. A kind of memory is found also at this level. "Through habit it becomes linked to the habitat and environment of the body, and from these it undergoes separation with reluctance as though they were parts of its body; this force of habit is called memory when the link with those places is not dissevered even by separation and the lapse of time."[144]

But there is a kind of memory proper to man, and this is found at the third level. This is the memoryof the tenth book of the Confessions. This level is called by Augustine ratiocinatio.[145]

At the fourth level, we find the first mention of judgments of truth; it is interesting to note that these first judgments, these first inklings of wisdom, are moral in character and involve faith and submissiveness. Augustine refers to this level as virtus, "where moral goodness begins and all true worth resides." The beginnings of wisdom involve a recognition on the soul's part both of its eminent dignity and of its frailty and mutability.

> From this point the soul dares to rank itself not only before its own body, if it is a part of the material world, but even before the whole material world itself, and it dares to think that the good of the world is not its own good and to distinguish and despise the counterfeits of its ownpower and beauty. Hence, the more it becomes the cause of its own delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser things and wholly to cleanse itself and to make itself spotless and stainless; it dares to be strong against every enticement that tries to move it from its resolution and purpose, to esteem human society, to desire for another nothing that it would not wish for itself; to obey authority and the laws of wose men, and to believe that through these God speaks to it. . . . As the soul perceives more and more in proportion to its greater progress how great is the difference between itself purified and itself defiled, so much the more it fears, lest, when this body is put off, God may less endure if than it can endure itself defiled. . . . To (God's) Justice, in the difficult task of purifying itself, the soul entrusts itself with complete filial devotion and trust to be helped and made perfect.[146]

When the soul attains to the fifth level, it is purified of sin and disease, and "possesses itself in all joy and fears nothing whatever for itself and is ot disburbed at all for any reason of its own." This fifth level is tranquillitas. It too is of a primarily moral character and also involves submission to God as a necessary pre-requisite for the contemplation of Truth. "On this plane it conceives in every way how great it is and, when it has grasped that truth, then, with certain unbounded and incredible confidence, it advances toward God, that is, to the contemplation of Truth itself."[147] The moral character of Augustine's notion of wisdom could not be brought out more clearly.

The sixth level of the soul is called ingressio. It too is a moral quality or state, and is described as "the yearning to understand what things are true and best." The soul is actively

engaged in keeping to the way of truth and not going astray. "Such a spirit is not renewed in a man unless his heart first shall have been made clean, that is, unless he restrain his thoughts and draw them off from all mundane attachment and defilement."[148]

Finally, the seventh level of the soul is the culmination of Augustinian man's quest for God. A soul at this level no longer sees the truth of numbers and the rules of wisdom only in the light of God, but it is permitted to gaze upon this light itself, to see God. The natural order of knowledge is transcended in the mystical vision of a soul thoroughly purified from the downward movement toward creatures and things of the body, a soul which has scrupulously kept to the way of the truth which it once saw only in the light of eternal wisdom. This level is not really a step or degree, since it is transcendent; it is a "dwelling place to which the previous steps have brought us."

> These are the wonders that great souls have declared, so far as they brought themselves to speak of these realities, great souls of incomparable greatness, who, we believe, beheld and now behold these things.[149]

The numbers written into the center of the creatures of the material world and giving them form and being have led the soul to penetrate to its own center and with the natural light of its own intellect, illumined by the Interior Teacher, to see these rules of numbers and also the laws of wisdom in which the soul itself participates. Keeping to this way of truth in the midst of temptations to sensuality and pride will lead man to the mystical vision of God Himself.

The interiorism of all things is a participation in eternal truth and wisdom; and man's interiorism culminates in the direct vision of Eternal Truth and Wisdom. But let us allow Augustine to speak for himself:

> This I now dare say to you in all simplicity, that, if we hold with all perseverance to the course that God lays down for us and which we have undertaken to hold, we shall come by God's Power and Wisdom to that highest Cause, or Supreme Author, or Supreme Principle of all things, or whatever name you would deem worthy of so great a Reality. . . .
>
> Moreover, in the contemplation of truth, no matter from what side we study it, so great is the joy, so great the purity, the sincerity, and the certainty of faith that one at length comes to think that the previous knowledge he thought he had is really nothing. Then death, which was an object of fear and an obstacle to the soul's fullest union with the full truth, death, namely, the sheer flight and escape from this body, is now yearned for as the greatest boon."[150]

FOOTNOTES

[1]This must not be misunderstood. Gilson says: "Actually, neither in him nor in any Augustinian have we come upon a single idea whose philosophical truth was demonstrated by an appeal to faith. In genuinely Augustinian doctrine faith points out, it does not prove. It is one thing to begin with something revealed, as the theologian does, so as to define it or rationally to deduce its content, and it is quite another to begin with something revealed, as the Augustinian does when he philosophizes, to see whether and to what extent its content coincides with the contact of reason. . . . What is characteristic of the Augustinian method as such is its refusal to blind reason systematically by closing its eyes to anything faith points out. Whence the corresponding ideal of a Christian philosophy which is true philosophy to the extent that it is Christian; for while allowing each knowledge its proper order, the Christian philosopher considers revelation a source of light for his reason." Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. New York: Raddom House, 1960, p. 227. Emphasis mine.

[2]" . . . it is a contradiction to give the title 'wisdom" to systems incapable of making us attain the very thing wisdom aims to give us. Bent entirely upon the possession of beatitude, Augustinism recognizes as true only that philosophy which is not satisfied to point out the end but provides the means of reaching it." Ibid., p. 243.

[3]This is perhaps best expressed by Gilson: "First of all, this doctrine is obviously quite different from the thing we call 'philosophy,' in the ordinary sense of that word. To the extent that philosophy is defined as a purely rational and theoretical attempt to solve the most general questions raised by man and the universe, Augustine's doctrine proclaims the insufficiency of philosophy on every page. On the one hand he knows from personal experience that when left to his own resources man is incapable of attaining absolute certitude without which there is neither peace nor happiness. On the other hand he wants to find a rule of life rather than the solution to a problem, but such a rule will be efficacious only on condition that peace is established in the will through the mind's control over the senses and order established in the mind through a system of truths which is secure against relapse into doubt. It is characteristic of Augustinism to find the answer to both of these needs in an order which is above the human. Without Christ the Mediator who became flesh to liberate us from the flesh, without the revelation of Scripture which determines with transcendent

authority the body of salutary truths, man can only wandér aimlessly at the whim of concupiscence and vacillate between antagonistic systems. Hence, there is no Augustinism without the fundamental postulate that true philosophy implies an act of adherence to the supernatural order which frees the will from the flesh through grace and the mind from scepticism through revelation." Ibid., p. 235.

[4]Romana Guardini, The Conversion of Augustine. Westminster, Md: Newman, 1960, p. xv. Guardini's study is not properly a philosophical book, and it is hard to distinguish what is Augustine from what is Guardini. But he does endeavor to interpret Augustine's approach as that of a man who is always primarily concerned with the Christian reality, and many of his statements on Augustinian interioriam are quite helpful. He endeavors to ascertain " . . . what Augustine's thought is like at the root, there where he would never dream of a 'purely natural' standpoint stripped of all Christian elements. His thought is anchored in the world and its truth as it breaks in on him through revelation -- the world, hence, in the logic of faith, the only true conception of the world." P. xvii.

[5]On the biodoctrinal question, Gilson says: "There has been much discussion of St. Augustine's intellectual evolution, perhaps because some have wanted to reduce a man's progress in his search for truth to the mere evolution of an intellect. The historian of ideas is not obliged to take a position on this problem of personal psychology, but it is his duty to point out the significance Augustine himself attached to a history on which his doctrine was, in one form or another, a continuous commentary." P. 227.

[6]Guardini, p. 167. Bourke seems to think that Augustine is exaggerating the element of lust: " . . . his later condemnation of this sentimental interlude may well, in fact, overstress the importance of this element of consupiscence in Augustine's early years." Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945, pp. 14-15.

[7]Confessions, III, 1. "Veni Karthaginem, et circumstrepebat me undique sartago flagitiosorum amorum. Nondum amabam, et amare amabam, et secretiore indigentia oderam me minus indigentem. Quaerebam quid amarem, amans amare, et oderam securitatem et viam sine muscipulis, quomiam fames mihi erat intus ab interiore cibo, te ipso, deus meus, et ea fame non esuriebam, sed eram sine desiderior alimentorum incorruptibilium, non quia plenus eis eram, sed quo inanior, fastidiosior. Et ideo non bene balebat anima mea, et ulcerosa proiciebat se foras, miserabiliter scalpi avida contactu sensibilium." The English translation is that of F. J. Sheed, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943.

[8]Conf., III, 4. " . . . et usitato iam discendi ordine perveneram in librum cuiusdam Ciceronis, cuius linguam fere omnes mirantur, pectus non ita. Sed liber ille ipsius exhortationem continet ad philosophiam et vocatur Hortensius. Ille vero liber mutavit affectum meum, et ad te ipsum, domine, mutavit preces meas, et vota ad desideria mea fecit alia. Viluit mihi repente omnis vana spes, et inmortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili, et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem. . . .

"Quomodo ardebam, deus meus, quomodo ardebam revolare a terrenis ad te. . . . Amor autem sapientiae nomen graecum habet philosophiam, quo me accendebant illae litterae. . . . Hoc tamen solo delectabar in illa exhortatione, quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed ipsam quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quaererem et adsequerer et tenerem atque amplexarer fortiter, excitabar sermone illo et accendebar et ardebem, et hoc solum me in tanta flagrantia refrangebat, quod nomen Christi non erat ibi, quoniam hoc nomen secundum misericordiam tuam, domine, hoc nomen salvatoris mei, fili tui, in ipso adhuc laete matris tenerum cor meum pie biberat et alte retinebat, et quidquid sine hoc nomine fuisset, quamvis litteratum et expolitum et veridicum, non me totum rapiebat."

[9]Bourke, p. 17.

[10]Guardini, pp. 168-169.

[11]John J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine, London: Longmans, Green, 1954, pp. 59-60.

[12]Ibid., p. 80.

[13]"Itaque institui animum intendere in scripturas sanctas, et videre, quales essent." Conf., III, 5.

Conf [14]Conf., EII, 5. " . . . cum attendi ad illam scripturam, sed visa est mihi indigna, quam Tullianae dignitati comparrarem. Tumor enim meus refugiebat modum eius, et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius. Verum tamen illa erat, quae cresceret cum parvulis, sed ego dedignabar esse parvulus et turgidus fastu mihi grandis videbar."

[15]Conf., III, 6.

[16]Ibid. As we just saw, Augustine's only disappointment with the Hortensius was that Christ's name was missing from it." See Gilson, p. 227. Gilson quotes with approval the following conclusion from Alfaric's L'evolution intellectualle de saint Augustin, p. 73: "Seulement, il sentait desormair le besoin de rencontrer une doctrine qui lui permit d'etre chetien tant en faisant ub libre usage de sa raison. En ce moment-la meme, le Manicheisme vint fort opportunement lui en offrir le moyen." See Gilson, p. 360, note 10.

[17]*De utilitate credendi*, 1, 2. Cited in Bourke, pp. 17-18.

[18]O'Meara, p. 80.

[19]Bourke, p. 18.

[20]*Ibid.*

[21]Guardini, p. 170. For a fairly thorough treatment of the main lines of Manichean doctrine, see O'Meara, pp. 61-79.

[22]*Conf.*, III, 6.

[23]*Ibid.*

[24]*Ibid.*, III, 7. "Non noveram deum esse spiritu, non cui membra essent per longum et latum nec cui esse moles esset, quia moles in parte minor est quam in toto suo, et si infinita sit, minor est in aliqua parte certo spatio definita, quam per infinitum, et non est tota ubique sicut,spiritus, sicut deus."

[25]*Conf.*, III, 6. In IV,15, Augustine tells us that, because he did not think at the time that God was of a higher nature than his own soul and since he knew himself to be mutable, he also "chose rather to think You mutable than to think I was not as You are. . . . I preferred to maintain that Your immutable substance had been constrained to suffer error, rather than admit that my own mutable subatance had gone astray through its own fault and fallen into error for its punishement." Actually, the thesis that God could suffer evil was not accepted by the Manicheans.

[26]O'Meara, p. 70.

[27]*Conf.*, IV, 15. "Et converti me ad animi naturam, et non me sinebat falsa opinio, quam de spiritalibut habebam, verum cernere. Et inruebat in oculos ipsa vis veri, et avertebam palpitantem mentem ab incorporea re ad liniamenta et colores et tumentes magnitudines, et quia non poteram ea videre in animo, putabam me non posse videre animum meum."

[28]He tells us that for none years he listened to the Manichees without a settles mind. *Conf.*, V, 6.

[29]O'Meara, p. 83.

[30]Bourke, p. 36.

[31] Ibid., pp. 36-37. See Conf., VII, 2.

[32] See Conf. V, 6-7.

[33] Guardini, pp. 176-177.

[34] Ibid., p. 179.

[35] Bourke, p. 243.

[36] De Gen. ad lit., XII, 9, 20; cited in Bourke, p. 243.

[37] Conf., V, 11. "Iam enim Elpidii cuiusdam admersus eosdam Manichaeos coram loquentis et disserentis sermones etiam apud Carthaginem movere me coeperant, cum talia de scripturis proferret, quibus resisti non facile posset."

[38] Conf., V, 10. "Etenim suborta est etiam mihi cogitatio, prudentiores illos ceteris fuisse philosophos, quos Academicos appellant, quod de omnibus dubitandum esse censuerant, nec aliquid veri ab homine comprehendi posse decreverant.". . . Nec dissimulavi eundem hospitem meum reprimere a nimia fiducia, quam sensi eum habere de rebus fabulosis, quibus Manichaei libri pleni sunt." Conflicting opinions on Augustine's skepticism are offered by Guardini and O'Meara. Guardini says: "The leaning to skepticism has always been strong in Augustine. . . . His skepticism is not scientific doubt as to the possibility of knowledge, but rather expression of a particular intellectual predisposition, with its leaning to the absolute. It has a strong desire to come to grips with the absolute, to be filled, to be overpowered by it. Simultaneously , it is extremely sensible of the finit's unreality, of the unreality of the finite act, of its inability to experience and fulfill. The result is the dissonance sensed behind every act of perception. Before this type of mind can be truly satisfied, the act of perception must fill and overpower the intellect; then the longed-for repose sets in. But in respect to truth, finite intellectual powers are simply incapable of such a consummation; the power of the thought forever lags behind its own demand for absolute validity. Herein lies the constantly gnawing feeling of inadequacy that is known as skepticism." Guardini, pp. 182-183.

O'Meara, on the contrary, states: "Augustine was quite disturbed by the arguments of the Academins, when he came to consider them. Nevertheless he was never a convinced Academin: his own temperament did not take easily to skepticism; and it was the nature of the skepticism to be skeptical of itself as well as everything else." O'Meara, p. 110.

In view of Augustine's eventual about-face with regard to the respective roles of faith and reason, it might be safe to say that Guardini's interpretation is a bit closer to the truth. A third view is voiced by Gilson, who cites two characteristics of Augustine's skepticism: "We should note first of all that even at the time he

despaired of finding truth, Augustine did not compromise on the notion itself of truth. Moreover, he recognized the existence of one certain science, namely mathematics, and it was owing to the high regadd in which he held its certitude that he despised all other knowledge. A sceptic who does not believe in truth is one thing, a sceptic who is in doubt because he is too exacting about certitude is quite another. What the young Augustine wanted was the possibility of having the certitude of mathematics in the order of metaphysics and physics. His scepticism was a dogmatism momentarily discouraged.

"The second characteristic of Augustine's Academism was this: in addition to his lofty ideal of certitude, we notice in him an impulse whice moves him towards concrete certitudes. He withholds assent but uncertainty is torture. Far from finding his home in scepticism like Montaigne, Augustine impatiently made his way across it as though it were a bridge between two dogmatisms, and a bridge he was eager toburn behind him." Gilson, p. 229.

[39] Conf., V, 10. "Et quoniam cum de deo meo cogitare vellem, cogitare nisi moles corporum non noveram -- neque enim videbatur mihi esse quicquam, quod tale non esset -- ea maxima et prope sola causa erat inevitabilis erroris mei.

" . . . Ipsum quoque salvatorem nostrum, unigenitum tuum, tamquam de massa lucidissimae molis tuae porrectum ad nostram salutem ita putabam, ut aliud de illo non crederen nisi quod possem vanitate imaginari. Telam itaque naturam eius nasci non posse de Maria virgine arbitrabar, nisi carni concerneretur. Concerni qutem et non coinquinari non videbam, quod mihi tale figurabam. Metuebam itaque credere incarnatum, ne credere cogerer ex carne inquinatum."

[40] Conf., V, 14. "Cum enim non satagerem discere quae dicebat, sed tantum quemadmodum dicebat audier -- ea mihi quippe, desperanti ad te viam patere homini, inanis cura remanserat -- veniebant in animum meum simul sum verbis, quae diligebam, res etiam, quas neglegebam. Neque enim ea dirimere poteram. Et dum cor aparirem ad excipiendum, quam diserte diceret, pariter intrabat et quam vera diceret, gradatim quidem. Nam primo etiam ipsa defendi posse mihi iam coeperunt videri, et fidem catholicam, pro qua nihil posse dici adversus oppugnantes Manichaeos putaveram, iam non inpudenter asseri existimabam, maxime audito uno atque altero, et saepius aenigmate soluto de scriptis veteribus, ubi, cum ad litteram acciperem, occidebar. Spiritaliter itaque plerisque illorum librorum locis exposits, iam reprehendebam desperationem mean illam dumtaxat, qua drediderat legem et prophetas detestantibus atque irridentibus resisti omnino non posse. Nec tamen iam ideo mihi catholicam viam tenendam esse sentiebam; quia et ipsa poterat habere doctos adsertores suos, qui copiose et non absurde obiecta refellerent: nec ideo iam damnandum illud, quod tenebam, quia defensionis partes aequabantur. Ita enim cahholica non mihi victa videbatur, ut nondum etiam victrix appareret. Tunc vero fortiter intendi animum, si quo modo possem certis aliquibus documentis Manichaeos convincere falsitatis. Quod si possem spiritalem substantiam cogitare,

statim machinamenta illa omnia solverentur et abicerentur ex animo meo: sed non poteram."

[41] Ibid.

[42] Bourke, p. 54.

[43] Conf., VI, 5. "Ex hoc tamen quoque, iam praeponens doctrinam Catholicam, modestius ibi minimeque fallaciter sentiebam iuberi, ut crederetur quod non demonstrabatur -- sive esset quod, sed cui forte non esset, sive nec quid esset -- quam illic temeraria pollicitatione scientiae credulitatem inrideri, et postea tam multa fabulosissima et absurdissima, quia demonstrari non poterant, credenda imperari. . . . consideranti, quam innumerabilia crederem, quae non viderem neque cum gererentur affuissem . . . Persuasisti mihi, non qui crederent libris tuis, quos tanta inomnibus fere gentibus auctoritate fundasti, sed qui non crederent, esse culpandos; nec audiendos esse, si qui forte mihi dicerent: 'unde scis illos libros unius veri et veracissimi dei spiritu esse homano generi ministratos?' Id ipsum enim maxime credendum erat: quoniam nulla pugnacitas calumniosarum quaestionum, per tam multa quae legeram inter se confligentium philosophorum, extorquere mihi potuit , ut aliquando non crederen te esse quidquid esseg, quod ego nescirem, aut administrationem rerum humanarum ad te pertinere."

[44] Ibid., VI, 11. ""Ideoque cum essemus infirmi ad inveniendam liquida ratione veritatem, et ob hoc nobis opus esset auctoritate sanctarum litterarum, iam credere coeperam nhllo modo te fuisse tributurum tam excellentem illi scripturae per omnes iam terras auctoritatem, nisi et per ipsam tibi credi et per ipsam te quaeri voluisses. Iam enim absurditatem, quae me in illis litteris solebat offendere, cum multa ex eis probabiliter exposita audissem, ad sacramentorum altitudinem referebam; eoque mihi illa venerabilior et sacrosancta fide dignior apparebat auctoritas, quo et omnibus ad legendum esset in promptu, et secreti sui dignitam in intellectu profundiore servaret, verbis apertissimis et humillimo genere loquendi se cunctis praebens, et exercens intentionem eorum, qui non sunt leves corde."

[45] Ibid., VI, 11. "O magni viri Academici! Nihil ad agendam vitam certi conprehendi potest? Immo quaeramus diligentius et non despereums. Ecce iam non sunt absurda in libris ecclesiasticis, quae absurda videbantur, et possunt aliter atque honeste intellegi. Figam pedes in eo gradu, in quo puer a parentibus positus eram, donec inveniatus perspicua veritas."

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., VII, 1. "Et conabar cogitare te homo, et talis homo, summum et solum et verum deum, et te incorruptibilem et inviolabilem et inconmutabilem totis medullis credebam, quia nesciens,unde et quomodo, plane tamen videbam et certus eram, id quod corrumpi potest, deterius esse quam id quod non potest, et quod violari non potest, incunctanter praeponebam violabili, et quod nullam patitur mutationem, melius esse quam id quod mutari potest. . . . corporeum tamen aliquid cogitare cogerer par spatiamlocorum, sive infusum mundo sive etiam extra mundum per infinita

diffusum, etiam ipsum incorruptibile et inviolabile et incouumtabile, quod corruptibili et violabili et commutabili praeponebam.". . per quales enim formas ire solent oculi mei, per tales imagines ibat cor meum, nec videbam hanc eandem intentionem, qua illas ipsas imagines formabam, non esse tale aliquid. . . . Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem, et extra eam quaquaversum per inmensa sine termino, ut haberet te terra, haberet caelum, haberent omnia et illa finirentur in te, tu autem nusquam."

[48] Ibid., VII, 5. " . . . te autem, domine, ex omni parte ambientem et penetrantem eam, sed usquequaque infinitum; tamquqm si mare esset, ubique et undique per inmensa infinitum solum mare, et haberet intra se spongiam quamlibet magnam, sed finitam tamen, plena esset utique spongia illa ex omni sua parte ex inmenso mari."

[49] Ibid., VII, 9. "Et primo volens ostendere mihi, quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem des gratiam, et quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus via humilitatis, quod verbum caro factum est et habitavit inter homines: procurasti mihi per quendam hominem, inmanissimo typho turgidum, quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinum verson; et ibi legi non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbum: hoc erat in principio apud deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil; quod factum est, in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum; et lux in ten bris lucet, et tenebrae eam non conprehenderunt; et quia hominis anima, quamvis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non est tamen ipsa lumen; sed verbum, deus ipse, est lumen verum, quod inluminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; et quia in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit."

[50] Ibid., VII, 10. "Et inde admonitus redire ad memetipsum, intravi in intima mea, duce te, et potui, quoniam factus es adiutor meus. Intravi et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem mean, lucem incommutabilem: non hanc vulgarem et conspicuam omni carni, nec quasi ex eodem genere grandior erat, tamquam si ista multo multoque clarius claresceret totumque occuparet magnitudine. Non hoc illa erat, sed aliud, aliud valde ab istis omnibus. Nec ita erat supra mentem meam, sicut oleum auper aquam, nec sicut caelum super terram; sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea. Qui novit veritatem, novit eam, et qui novit eam, novit aeternitatem. Caritas novit eam. . . . et dixi: 'numquid nihil est veritas, quoniam neque per finita neque per infinita locorum spatis diffusa est?' et clamasti de longinquo: ego sum qui sum. Et audivi, sicut auditur in corde, et non erat prorsus unde dubitarem, facilliusque dubitarem vivere me, quam non esse veritatem, quae per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicitur."

[51]*Ibid.*, VII, 14.

[52]*Ibid.*, VII, 17. "Quaerens enim, unde adprobarem pulchritudinem corporum sive caelestium sive terrestrium, et quid mihi praesto esset integre de mutabilibus, iudicanti et dicenti, 'hoc ita esse debet, illud non ita': hoc ergo quaerens, unde iudicarem, cum ita iudicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem supra mentem meam commutabilem. Atque ita gradatim a corporibus ad sentientem per corpus animam, atque inde ad eius interiorem vim, cui sensus corporis exteriora nuntiaret, et quousque possunt bestiae, atque inde rursus ad ratiocinantem potentiam, ad quam refertur iudicandum, quod sumitur a sensibus corporis. Quae se quoque in me comperiens mutabilem, erexit se ad intellegentiam suam, et abduxit cogitationem a consuetudine, subtrahens se contradicentibus turbis phantasmatum, ut inveniret, quo lumine aspergeretur; cum sine ulla dubitatione clamaret incommutabile praeferendum esse mutabili, unde nosset ipsum inconmutabile -- quod nisi aliquo modo nosset, nullo modo illud mutabili certa praeponeret -- et pervenit ad id, quod est, in ictu trepidantis aspectus."

[53]See *Conf.*, VII, 11.

[54]P. 227.

[55]P. 233.

[56]Guardini, p. 216; see pp. 216-226.

[57]*Conf.*, VII, 17. "". . . aciem figere non evalui, et repercussa infirmitate redditus solitis, non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, quae comedere nondum possem."

[58]Gilson, p. 45.

[59]*Ibid.*, p. 233.

[60]*Ibid.*, p. 71.

[61]"Reduced to its abstract form, Augustine's experience may be said to amount to a discovery of humility. Errors of understanding are bound up with the corruption of the heart through pride, and man only finds the truth which brings happiness by subjecting his intellect to faith and his will to grace, in humility." Gilson, p. 227. See also p. 12.

"Saint Augustine is indeed one of the most striking embodiments of a type which recurs again and again in the history of thought, a type which can be recognized by one chief characteristic. It refuses to allow natural reason the whole field in philosophy. . . . In the Augustinian system reason is not ousted, but abetted, if not led, by love. More

definitely, St. Augustine does not admit the division of labour, the forced neutrality between philosophy and faith, desire and reason, which was adopted, for instance, by St. Thomas, and has become since so widely accepted. He does not cease to be a Christian when he is writing philosophy, and he wants answers to questions, not for their own sake, but for peace of soul." M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," Saint Augustine, Cleveland: World Publishing Company (Meridian), 1961, p. 155.

[62]Gilson, p. 38.

[63]Contra Academicos and De Vera Religione are both addressed to Augustine's friend and patron Romanianus. "The Contra Academicos . . . was meant -- among other things -- to lead Romanianus to take a more serious interest in philosophy and to have greater confidence in it. It had a companion volume, the De vera religione, which was projected at the time of the Contra Academicos and was sent to Romanianus a few years later. It sought to convince him that the Christian faith was the true religion." Ancient Christian Writers, Vol. 12 (St. Augustine: Against the Academics, translated and annotated by John J. O'Meara). Westminster, Md: Newman, 1950, p. 14.

Gilson indicates that any attempt to cull a philosophy in the strict sense of the word out of the writings of Saint Augustine would have to begin with the problem of certitude. P. 266, note2.

[64]Saint Augustine, On Free Will, translated by Carroll Mason Sparrow, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1947, p. 38 (De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, 7).

"A. Quare prius abs te quaero, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium, utrum tu ipse sis; an te fortasse metuis, ne in hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli omnino non posse?

"E. Perge potius ad cetera.

"A. Ergo quoniam manifestum est esse te, nec tibi aliter manifestum esset, nisi viveres, id quoque manifestum est, vivere te, intelligisne ista duo esse verissima?

"E. Prorsus intelligo.

"A. Ergo etiam hoc tertium manifestum est, hoc est, intelligere te.

"E. Manifestum."

[65]Saint Augustine, Of True Religion, tr. by J.H.S. Burleigh. Chicago: Regnery, 1959, p. 69 (De vera religione, XXXIX, 73). "Aut si non cernis quae dico, et an vera sint dubitas, cerne saltem, utrum te de his dubitare non dubites, et si certum est te esse dubitantem, quaere, unde sit certum."

[66]Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. by Whitney J. Oates, New York: Random House, Vol. II, p. 849-850 (De Trinitate, XV, 12). ". . . his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in animum veniunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus, sicut nos vivere scimus? in quo prorsus non metuimus, ne aliqua verisimilitudine forte fallamur, quoniam certum est etiam eum quo fallitur vivere. . . . Intima sciantia est qua nos vivere scimus, ubi ne illud quidem Academicus dicere potest: scimus,

Fortasse dormis, et nescis, et in somnis vides. Visa quippe somniantium simillima esse visis vigilantium quis ignorat? Sed qui certus est de vitae suae scientia, non in ea dicit, Scio me vigilare; sed, Scio me vivere: sive ergo dormiat, sive vigilet, vivit. Nec in ea scientia per somnia falli potest; quia et dormire et in somnis videre, viventis est. Nec illud potest Academicus adversus istam scientiam dicere. Furis fortassis et nescis; quia sanorum visis simillima sunt etiam visa furentium: sed qui furit vivit. Nec contra Academicos dicit, Scio me non furere; sed, Scio me vivere. Nunquam ergo falli nec mentiri potest, qui se vivere dixerit scire. Mille itaque fallacium visorum genera objiciantur ei qui dicit, Scio me vivere; nihil horum timebit, quando et qui fallitur vivit."

Gilson also quotes the following text from The City of God: "Truths like this have nothing to fear from the Academicians' arguments. They may say: Yes, but suppose you were mistaken. Well, if I am mistaken, I exist. Certainly one who does not exist cannot be mistaken; consequently, if I am mistaken, I exist. And since I exist if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken about my ownexistence when it is certain that if I am mi taken, I exist? Even in error, I should have to exist in order to be in error. There can be no doubt, therefore, that I am not mistaken when I know that I exist." De Civitate Dei, XI, 26.

[67] De Trinitate, XV, 12. "Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sensus corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quae per se ipsum: multa illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per se ipsum perceptioned rerum verarum, quale illud est quod dixi, Scio me vivere, nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt."

[68] Gilson adds: "No doubt we shall never know to what extent Descartes may have been influenced directly or indirectly by St. Augustine or the Augustinian tradition. Besides, it would be unwise to overlook the original elements in the Cartesian Cogito. But the similarity of the two doctrines is quite evident even to one who does not compare the texts in detail. For both philosophers, sceptical doubt is a disease which springs from the senses and for which the evidence of pure thought is the remedy; for both men, that primary certitude opens up a path which leads to a demonstration of the soul's spirituality and thence to the proof of God's existence." P. 43.

Gilson points out the following similarities: "In both doctrines the need fororderly thinking is emphasized; the existence of thought is pres nted as the first and most evident of all certitudes and it is the first of all certitudes because it remains evident even when the thought known is an error; and finally, in both doctrines this primary evidence is the basis of the proof of God's existence." P. 42. Although the similarities are more striking than the differences on this point, the following remark by D'Arcy is worth considering:". . . whereas Descartes began with doubt and tried to deduce all else from one sole

indubitable truth, namely, the existence of a thinking self, St. Augustine regardds the self as a primus inter pares, a leader or companion among other truths equally undeniable." D'Arcy, p. 164.

[69] De Magistro, X, 31. "Dubitationem tuam non invitus accipio; significat enim animum minime tererarium: quae custodia tranquillitatis est maxima. Nam difficillimum omnino est non perturbari, cum ea quae prona et procliva approbatione tenebamus contrariis disputationibus labefactantur, et quasi extorquentur e manibus. Quari, ut aequum est bene consideratis perspectisque rationibus cedere, ita incognita pro cognitis habere, periculosum. Metus est enim ne cum saepe subruuntur quae firmissime statura et mansura praesumimus, in tantum odium vel timorem rationis indidamus, ut ne ipsi quidem perspicuae veritati fides habenda videatur."

In De Vera Religione, Saint Augustine presents the following cautions regarding sense knowledge and phantasms: "Phantasms are nothing but figments of corporeal shapes appearing to bodily sense. It is the easiest thing in the world to commit them to memory as they appear or, by thinking about them, divide them or multiply, contract or expand, set in order or disturb, or give them any kind of shape. But when truth is being sought it is difficult to be on one's guard against them and to avoid them." De V. R., 10, 19. ". . . So in the human mind the most excellent part is not t at which p erceives sensible objects but that which judges of sensible things. Many animals see more sharpl, and have a keener sense of corporeal objects than men have. But to judge of bodies belongs not to life thatis merely sentient, but to life that has also the power of reasoning. Where the animals are lacking, there is our excellence. It is easy to see that that which judges is superior to that w ich is judged. For living reason judges not only ofsensible things but also of the senses themselves. It k ows why the oar dipped in water must appear crooked though it is really straight, and why the eyes must see it in that way. Ocular vision can only tell us that it is so but cannot judge. Wherefore it is manifest that as the life of sense excels the body the life of r eason excels both." Ibid., 29, 53.

[70] Gilson, p. 269, note 1. Augustine describes it asQquaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accomodata." De Quantitate Animae, XIII, 22.

[71] Ibid., p. 270. See also the Introduction to the translation of Contra Academicos in the Ancient Christian Writers series (see note 63).

[72] Contra Academicos, III, 17, 37. "Sat est enim ad id quod volo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos: unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autemsensibilem, quem manifestum est nos visu tactuque sentire; itaque illum verum, hunc veri similem et ad illius imaginem factum, et ideo de illo in ea quae se cognoxceret anima velut expoliri et quasi serenari veritatem, de hoc autem in stultorum animis non scientiam, sed opinionem posse generari."

[73]Ibid., III, 19, 42. "Non enim est ista hujus mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intelligibilis, cui animas sultiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas, et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitas, nunquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus populari quadam clementia divini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret, atque submitteret, cujus non solum praeceptis, sed etiam factis excitare animae redire in semetipsas et respicere patriam, etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent."

[74]De Vera Religione, 39,72.

[75]Cont. Acad., I, 1, 1. " . . . nihil pro te nobis aliud quam vota restant, quibus ab illo cui haec curae sunt Deo, si possumus, impetremus ut te tibi reddat (ita enim facile reddet et nobis) sinatque mentem illam tuam, quae respirationem jamdiu parturit, aliquando in auras verae libertatis emergere."

[765]Ibid., I, 1, 3. "Evigila, evigila, oro te; multum, mihi crede, gratulaberis quod pene nullis prosperitatibus quibus tenentur incauti, mindi hujus tibi dona blandita sunt: quae meipsum capere moliebantur quotidie esta cantantem, nisi me pectoris dolor ventosam professionem abjicere et in philosophiae gremium confugere coegisset. Ipsa me nunc in otio, quod vehementer aptavimus, nutrit ac fovet: ipsa me penitus ab illa superstitione, in quam te mecum praecipitem dederam, liberavit. Ipsa enim docet, et vere docet nihil omnino colendum esse, totumque contemni oportere, quidquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quidquid illus sensus attingit. Ipsa verissimum et secretissimum Deum perspicue se demonstraturum promittit, et jam jamque quasi per lucidas nubes ostendere dignatur." See also, II, 2. 3-4.

[77]Ibid., III, 14, 31. "Si quaeres ubi inveniat ipsam sapientiam, respondebo: In semetipso."

[78]"Si autem quaeretur quid sit sapientia (nam et ipsam ratio, quantum in praesentia potuit, evolvit atque erruit) nihil est aliud quam modus animi, hoc est, quo sese animus librat, ut neque excurrat in nimium neque infra quam plenum est coarctetur." De Beata Vita, 4, 33. See Erich Przwara, S.J., "St. Augustine and the Modern World," translated by E. I. Watkin, St. Augustine, p. 254.

[79]Cont. Acad., II, 2, 5. "Quis me tunc honor, quae hominum pompa, quae inanis famae cupiditas, quod denique hujus mortalis vitae fomentum atque retinaculum commovebat? Prorsus totus in me cursim redibam. Respexi tantum,confiteor, quasi de itinere inillam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est, et medullitus implicata: verum autem ipsa me ad se nescientem rapiebat. Itaque titubans, properans, haesitans, arripio apostolum Paulum." Here the return to self is equated with the return to religion.

[80] De Magistro, 1, 2. "Nescire to arbitror non ab aliud nobis praeceptum esse ut in clausis cubiculis oremus, quo nimine significantur mentia penetralia, nisi quod Deus, ut nobis quod cupimus praestet, commemorari aut doceri nostra locutione non quaerit. Qui enim loquitur, suae voluntatis signum foris dat per articulatum sonum: Deus autem in ipsis rationalis animae secretis, quo homi interior vocatur, et quaeendus et deprecandus est; hace enim sua templa esse voluit. An apud Apostolum non legisti, Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et spiritus Dei habitat in vobis; et, In interiore homine habitare Christum? Nec in prhpheta animadvertisti, Dicite in cordibus vestris, et in cubilibus vestris compungimini: sacrificate sacrificium justitiae et sperate in Domino? Ubi putas sacrificium justitiae sacrificari, nisi in remplo mentis et in cubilibus cordis? Ubi autem sacrificandum est, ibi et orandum."

[81] De Vera Religione, 39, 73. "Non enim retiocinatio talia facit, sed invenit. Ergo antequam inveniantur, in se manent, et cum inveniuntur, nos innovant."

[82] De libero arbitrio, II, 10, 29. "Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles sunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus eam cernentibus, praesto esse dixisti; tam sunt verae atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti esse veras atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui haec intueir valent, communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis."

[83] "Quapropter nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter verà sunt continentem; quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujusquem hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, praestò esse ac se praebere communiter: omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus praesto est, ad illius eorum proprie naturam pertinere quis dixerit?" Ibid., II, 12, 33.

[84] ". . . ita errores et falsae opiniones vitam contaminant, si rationalis mens ipsa vitiosa est, qualis in me tunc erat, nèxciente alio lumine illam inlustrandam esse, ut sit particeps veritatis, quia non est ipsa natura beritatis, quoniam tu inluminabus lunernam meam, domine." Conf., IV, 15.

[85] R. A. Markus, "St. Augustine on Signs," Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed. J. Collins. Westminster, Md: Newman, 1960, pp. 156-163. This article first appeared in Phronesis, 1957 (2), pp. 60-83.

[86] See Gilson, p. 66.

[87] De Magistro, X, 30. "Quamobrem nihil adhuc inventum est, quod monstrari per seipsum queat praeter locutionem, quae inter alia se quoque significat: quae tamen cum etiam ipsa signum sit, nondum prorsus exstat quod sine signis doceri posse videatur."

[88] Ibid., XI, 36. "Verissima quippe ratio est et verissime dicitur, cum verba proferuntur, aut scire nos quid significent, aut nescire: si scimus, commemorari potius quam discere; si autem nescimus nec commemorari quidem, sed fortasse ad quaerendum admoneri."

[89] Markus, p. 159.

[90] De Magistro, XI, 38. "De universis autem quae intelligimus non loquentem qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia: quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit; sed tantum cuique panditur, quantum capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem potest."

[91] Ibid., XII, 39-40. "Quod so et de coloribus lucem, et de caeteris quae per corpus sentimus, elementa hujus mundi eademque corpora quae sentimus, elementaque ipsos quibus tanquam interpretibus ad talia noscenda mens utitur; de his autem quae intelliguntur, interiorem veritatem ratione consulimus: quid dici potest unde clareat, verbis nos aliquid discere praeter ipsum qui aures percutit sonum?

"Namque omnia quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis, aut mente percipimus. Illa sensibilia, haec intelligibilia; sive, ut more auctorum nostrorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritualia nominamus.". . .

"Cum vero de iis agitur quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt, novit quod dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis.

"Ergo ne hunc quidem docdo vera dicens, vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente, manifestis: / . . Quo si verbis perducitur ejus qui interrogat, non tamen docentibus verbis, sed eo modo inquirentibus, quomodo est ille a quo quaeritur, intus discere idoneus; velut si abs te quaererem hoc ipsum quod agitur, utrumnam verbis doceri nihil possit, et absurdum tibi primo videretur non valenti totum conspicere: sic ergo quaerer oportui, ut tuae sese vires habent ad audiendum illum intus magistrum, ut dicerem. . . . . "

[92] Ibid., XIV, 45. "At istas omnes disciplinas quas se docere profitentur, ipsiusque virtutis atque sapientiae, cum verbis explicaverint; tum illi qui discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant, interiorem scilicet illam veritatem pro viribus intuentes. Tunc ergo discunt: et cum vera dicta esse intus invenerint, laudant, nescientes non se doctores potius laudare quam doctos; si tamen et illi quod loquuntur sciunt."

[93] De Quantitate Animae, XX, 34. ""E. . . . imperita omnium rerum et bruta est enima, quam inpuero recens nato quantum licet inspicimus. Cur enim nullam artem secum attulit, si aeterna est?

"A. Magnam omnino, magnam, et qua nescio utrum quidquam majus sit, quaestionem moves, in qua tantum nostrae sibimet opiniones adversantur,

ut tibi anima ullam, mihi contra omnes artes secum attulisse videatur; nec alius quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari." Re

[94]Retractationes, I, 8. "In quo libro illud quod dixi, omnes artes animam secum attulisse mihi videri; nec aliud quodquam esse id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci ac orcordari, non sic accipiendum est, quasi ex hoc approbetur, animam vel hic in alio corpore, vel alibi sive in corpore, sive extra corpus, aliquando vixisse; . . . Nec sane omnes artes eo modo secum attulit, ac secum habet: nam de artibus quae ad sensus corporis pertinent, sicut multa medicinae, sicut astrologiae omnia, nisi quod hic didicerit, non potest dicere. Ea vero quae sola intelligentia capit, propter id quod dixi, cum vel a seipsa vel ab alio fuerit bene interrogata, et recordata respondet."

[95]See Gilson, pp. 71-72.

[96]De Magistro, XI, 38. See footnote 86.

[97]Markus, p. 160.

[98]See Gilson, p. 75.

[99]Many of the characteristic traits of Augustine's thought can be found in this tenth book. It is the inner man, the soul, that knows God. But the soul, "the power by which I am united to my body" (notice the wording here), must be transcended, it must "ascent beyond its topmost point" to find God. First it must mount beyonditself as the principle of life, for this characteristic it shares with the souls of brutes. It must mount beyond itself as that which gives sense perception to the body, for this too is shared by the lower animals. Augustine then enters into "the vast recesses of memory, . . . a spreading, limitless room within me."

[100]Conf., X, 8.

[101]Ibid., X, 10. "Unde et qua haec intraverunt in memoriam meam? Nescio quomodo; man cum ea didici, non dredidi alieno cordi, sed in meo recognovi, ut vera esse approbavi et commendavi ei tamquam reponens, unde proferrem, cum vellem. Ibi ergo erant et antequem ea didicissem, sed in memoria non erant. Ubi ergo, aut quare, cum dicerentur, agnovi et dixi: 'Ita est, verum est,' nisi quia iam erant in memoria, sed tam remota et retrusa quasi in cavis abditioribus, ut, nisi admonente aliquo eruerentur, ea fortasse dogitare non possem?"

[102]Ibid., X, 14. "It is quite clear that . . . the term 'memory' means much more than its modern psychological connotation designates, i.e. memory of the past. In St. Augustine it is applied to everything which is present to the soul (a presence which is evidenced without being explicitly known or perceived). The only modern psychological terms equivalent to Augustinian memoria are 'unconscious' or 'sub conscious,' provided that they too are expanded, as will be seen later, to include the metaphysical presence within the soul of a reality distinct from it

and transcendent, such as God, in addition to the presence to the soul of its own unperceived states." Gilson, p. 299, note 10.

[103] Ibid., p. 102.

[104] What am I to do do now, O my true Life, my God? I shall mount beyond this power of memory, I shall mount beyond it, to come to You, O lovely Light. What have You to say to me? In my ascent by the mind to You who abide above me, I shall mount beyond that power of mine called memory, longing to attain to touch You at the point where that contact is possible and to cleave to You at the point where it is possible to cleave. For the beasts and the birds have memory, or else they could never find their dens or theis nests or all the other things their way of life needs; indeed without memory they would be unable to have a way of life. So I must pass beyond memory to come to Him who separated me from the four-footed beasts and made me wiser than the birds of the air." Conf., X, 17.

[105] "Transibo et memoriam, ut ubi te inveniam, vere bone et secura suavitas, ut ubi te inveniam? Se praeter memoriam meam te invenio, inmemor tui sum. Et quomodo iam invemiam te, si memor non sum tui?" Ibid.

[106] See Conf., X, 20-23.

[107] Ibid., X, 23. "Ubi ergo noverunt hanc vitam beatam, nisi ubi noverunt etiam veritatem? Amant enim et ipsam, quia falli nolunt, et cum amant beatam vitam (quod non est aliud quam de veritate gaudium), utique amant etiam veritatem nec amarent, nisi esse aliqua notitia eius in memoria eorum."

[108] Ibid., X, 24. "Ecce quantum spatiatus sum in memoria mea quaerens te, domine, et non te inveni extra eam. Neque enim aliquid de te invenio, quod non meminissem, ex quo didici te. Nam ex quo didici te, non sum oblitus tui. Ubi enim inveni veritatem, ibi inveni deum meum, ipsam veritatem, quam ex quo didici, non sum oblitus. Itaque ex quo te didici, manes in memoria mea, et illic te invenio, cum reminiscor tui et delector in te."

[109] Ibid., X, 25-26. "Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te? Neque enim iam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem. Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? Et nusquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et nusquam locus. Veritas, utique praesides omnibus consulentibus te simulque respondes omnibus diversa consulentibus. . .

"Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! Et ecce intus eras et ego foris, et ibi te quaerebam, et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram. . . . Vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam: coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam. . ."

[110] Gilson, p. 103.

[111]See Ch. Boyer, L'idee de verite dans la philosophie de saint Augustin, Paris, 1922, pp. 212-213.

[112]See Anton C. Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine," Medieval Studies 6 (1944), p. 32; Gilson, pp. 86-88.

[113]De Trinitate, XII, 15.

[114]Gilson cites these two texts: "mente hoc est intelligere, quod sensui videre." De Ordine II, 3, 10. And: "Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus." Soliloq., I, 6, 12.

[115]Pegis, p. 31.

[116]Gilson, p. 79.

[117]Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[118]See Gilson, p. 81.

[119]Pegis, p. 41.

[120]See Gilson, p. 80.

[121]Gilson, p. 78.

[122]Soliloq., I, 8, 15. "Intelligibilis nempe Deus est, intelligibilia etiam illa disciplinarum spectamina; tamen plurimum differunt, nam et terra visibilis, et lux; sed terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest. Ergo et illa quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisque intelligit, verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est ea non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur. Ergo quomodo in hoc sole tria quaedam licet animadvertere: quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat; ita in illo secretissimo Deo quem vis intelligere, tria quaedam sunt: quod est, quod intelligitur, et quod cetera facit intelligi."

[123]De libero arbitrio, II, 12, 34. "Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de illa judicaremus, sicut judicamus de corporibus, quia infra sunt, et dicimus ea plerumque non tantum ita esse vel non ita, sed ita vel non ita esse debere: sic et de animis nostris non solum ita esse animum novimus, sed plerumque etiam eta esse debere.

"Et de corporibus quidem sic judicamus cum dicimus. Minus candidum est quam debuit aut minus quadrum, et multa similiter. De animis vero -- Minus aptus est quam debet, aut minus lenis, qut minus vehemens, sicut nostrorum morum se datio tulerit.

"Et judicamus haec secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis, quae communiter cernimus: de ipsis vero nullo modo quis judicat: cum enim

quis dixerit aeterna temporalibus esse potiora, aut septem et tria decem esse,nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed tantum ita esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum laetatur inventor.

"Si autem esse aequalis mentibus nostris haec veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae aliquando eam plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc fatentur se esse mutabiles: cum illa in se manens nec proficiat cum plus a nobus videtur, nec deficiat cum minus, sed integra et incorrupta, et conversos laetificet lumine, et aversos punita caecitate.

"Quid quod etiam de ipsis mentibus nostris secundum illam judicamus, cum de illa nullo modo judicare possimus? Dicimus enim -- Minus intelligit quam debet, aut tantum quantum debet intelligit. Tantum autem mens de et intelligere quantum proprius admoveri atque inhaerere potuerit incommutabili veritati. Quare si nec inferior, nec aequalis est, restat ut sit superior atque excellentior."

[123]De libero arbitrio, II, 15, 39.

[124]De Trinitate, IX, 6.

[126]See Pegis, p. 28, and De libero arbitrio, II, 12, 33.

[127]Pegis, p. 29.

[128]Ibid.

[129]Ibid.

[130]Ibid., p. 33.

[131]Ibid., p. 34.

[132]Ibid.

[133]De libero arbitrio, II, 8, 24. " . . . rationem veritatemque numerorum, et ad sensus corporis non pertinere, et invertibilem sinceramque consistere et omnibus ratiocinantibus ad videndum esse communem." . . . non enim frustra in sanctis libris sapientiae conjunctus est numerus ubi dictum est: "circuivi eto et cor meum, ut scirem et considerarem et quaererem sapientiam et numerum."

[134]Ibid., II, 9, 27. " .. .putemus omnini tot summa bona esse, quot sunt ipsae res diversae, quae a diversis tamquam summa bona appetuntur: num ideo sequitur, ut ipsa sapientia etiam non sit una communis omnibus, quae in illa cernunt et iligunt homines, multa et diversa sunt? Si enim hoc putas, potes et de luce solis dubitare quod una sit, quia multa et diversa sunt, quae in ea cernimus. De quibus multis eligit quisque pro voluntate quo fruatur per oculorum sensum: et alius altitudinem montis alicuius intuetur libenter, et eo gaudet adspectu; alius campi planitiem, alius convexa vallium, alius nemorum viridatatem, alius mobilem aequalitatem maris, alius haec omnia, vel quaedam horum simulpulcra confert ad laetitiam videndi.

"Sicut ergo ista multa et diversa sunt, quae in luce solis homines vident et eligunt ad fruendum, lux tamen ipsa una est, in qua videt et

tenet quo fruatur uniuscujusque intuentis adspectus: ita etiamsi multa sunt bona eaque diversa, e quibus eligat quisque quod volen, idque videndo et tenendo ad fruendum summum sibi bonum recte vereque constituat, fieri tamen potest, ut lux ipsa sapientiae, in qua haec videri et teneri possunt, omnibus sapientibus sit una communis."

[135] Ibid., II, 10, 29. "Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles sunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus eam cernentibus, praesto esse dixisti, tam sunt verae atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti esse veras atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui haec intuieri valent, communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis."

[136] Pegis, p. 35.

[137] De libero arbitrio, II, 16, 41. "Quoque enim te verteris, vestigiis quibusdam, quae operibus suis impressit, loquitur tibi, et te inexteriora relabentem, ipsis exteriorum formis intro revocat, ut quidquid te delectat in corpore, et per corporeos illicit sensus, videas esse numerosum, et auqeras unde sit, et in teipsum redeas, atque intelligas te id quod adtnigis sensibus corporis, probare aut improbare non posse, nisi apud te habeas quasdam pulcritudinis leges, ad quas referas quaeque pulcra sentis exterius."

[138] Gilson, p. 90.

[139] De libero arbitrio, II, 16, 42. "Intuere coelum et terram et mare, et quaecumque in eis, vel desuper fulgent, vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel nahant, formas habent, quia numeros habent; adime illis haec, nihil erunt. A quoergo sunt, nisi a quonumerus? Quando quidem in tantum illis est esse, in quantum numerosa esse."

[140] Ibid., II, 11, 31-32. "Sed quia dedit numeros omnibus rebus etiam infirmis, et in fine rerum locatis; et corpora enim omnia quamvis in rebus extrema sint, habent numeros suos: sapere autem non dedit corporibus, neque animis omnibus, sed tantum rationalibus, tamquam in eis sibi sedem locaverit, de qua disponat omnia illa etiam infima quibus numeros dedit: itaque quoniam de corporibus facile judicamus, tamque de rebus quae infra nos ordinatae sunt, quibus impressos numeros infra nos esse cognimus; et eos propterea vilius habenus.

"Sed cum coeperimus tamquam sursum versus recurrere, invenimus nos etiam nostras mentes transcendere, atque incommutabiles in ipsa manere veritate. Et quia sapere pauci possunt, numerare autem etiam stultis concessum est, mirantur homines sapientiam, numerosque contemnunt. Docti sutam et studiosi, quanto remotiores sunt a labe terrena, tanto magis et numerum, et sapientiam in ipsa veritate contuentur et utrumque carum habent: et in ejus veritatis comparatione non eis aurum et argentum, et

cetera de quibus homines dimicant, sed ipsi etiam vilescunt sibi.

"Nec mireris numeros ideo viluisse hominibus, et caram esse sapientiam, quia facilius possunt numerare quam sapere, cum videas carius illos habere aurum quam lumen lucernae, cui comparatum aurum ridetur.

" . . . Sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut ita dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invicem possunt: tamen ad ea calor pervenit, quae prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque diffunditur: sic intelligentiae potentia, quae inest sapientiae, propinquiora fervescunt, sicuti sunt animae rationales; adtingit calore sapiendi sed perfundit lumine numerorum, quod tibi fortassis obscurum est. Non enim ulla visibilis similtudi invisibili rei potest ad omnem convenientiam coaptari."

[141] De Trinitate, XIV, 15, 21; cited in Pegis, p. 47.

[142] Pegis, p. 47.

[143] De quantitate animae, 33, 70

[144] Ibid., 33, 71.

[145] Ibid., 33, 72.

[146] Ibid., 33, 73.

[147] Ibid., 33,74.

[148] Ibid., 33, 75.

[149] Ibid., 33, 76.

[150] Ibid., 33, 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Latin

St. Augustine, Confessiones, 2 vols: London: Wm. Heineman, 1925.

_____, De Beata Vita, Philadelphia: Peter Reilly, 1937.

_____, De Doctrina Christiana; De Vera Religione. Corpus Christianorum:XXXII, 1962.

_____, De Libero Arbitrio. Philadelphia: Peter Reilly, 1937.

_____, De Magistro. Oeuvres de saint Augustin, vol. 6. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1941.

_____, De Trinitate. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, vols. 15, 16. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955.

Oeuvres de saint Augustin, vol. 5. (Soliloquia, De Immortalitate Animae, De Quantitate Animae), ed by Pierre de Labriolle. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1948.

_____, vol. 4 (Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine), ed by R. Jolivet. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1948.

St. Augustine, Retractiones. Sancti Augustini Opera Omnia, Vol. I. Paris, 1841.

B. English

Saint Augustine, Against the Academics. Westminster: Newman, 1950.

Basic Writings of St. Augustine, ed. by Whitney J. Oates, 2 vols., New York: Random House, 1948.

St. Augustine, Concerning the Teacher; On the Immortality of the Soul, tr. by Georg e G. Leckie. New York: Appleton-Century, 1938.

The Confessions of St. Augustine, tr. by F. J. Sheed. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943.

St. Augustine, Of True Religion, tr. by J.H.S. Burleigh. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959.

St. Augustine, On Free Will, tr. by Carroll Mawon Sparrow. Charlottesville, Va: University ofBBirginia Press, 1947.

Writings of Saint Augustine, Fathers of the Church, vol. 2. New York: Cima Publishing Comp., 1947.

II. Secondary Sources

Bourke, Vernon J., Augustine's Quest of Wisdom. Milwaukee, Bruce, 1945.

D'Arcy, Martin C., S.J., "The Philosophy of Saihh Augustine," Saint Augustine. Cleveland: World, 1961, pp. 153-196.

Gilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. New York: Random House, 1960.

_____, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Random House, 1958.

Guardini, Romano, The Conversion of Augustine. Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1960.

Markus, R. A., "St. Augustine on Signs," Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed . James Collins. Westminster, Newman, 1960.

Martindale, C.C., S.J., "A Sketch of the Life and Character of St. Augustine," Saint Augustine. Cleveland: World, 1961, pp. 79-102.

O'Meara, John J., The Young Augustine. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954.

Pegis, Anton C., "The Mind of St. Augustine," Medieval Studies VI (1944), pp. 1-61.

Przywara, Erich, S.J., "St. Augustine and the Modern World," Saint Augustine. Cleveland: World, 1961, pp. 249-286.