

Class 10, November 9 2009, *What Is Systematic Theology?* chapters 5-8

Chapter 5

We have seen **two** areas of expansion on Lonergan's reflections on systematics: the notion of mysteries that do not have dogmatic status, and the notion of theological doctrines. (Review this.) A **third** area has to do with the transposition of categories from past contexts into the present context, a **fourth** with the integration of categories transposed from past contexts with categories developed today, and a **fifth** with the correct way to conceive the relation of general categories to special categories.

Question 1: What is transposition? What suggestions are made in chapter 5 for transposing categories in the doctrine of grace?

I stay with the same examples as were used in the chapter on theological doctrines. So, with regard to grace, I insist that, while the metaphysical categories in which excellent theologies of grace have been proposed are not to be jettisoned, still they must be **grounded in terms and relations derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness**. E.g., **what is a created communication of the divine nature?** What is meant by calling it **absolutely supernatural?** (These are the first two theses of Lonergan's 'De ente supernaturali.') More precisely (43), 'What, *in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness*, is an absolutely supernatural "created communication of the divine nature"? What are the referents, in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, of the metaphysical terms and relations that Lonergan employs to speak about sanctifying grace? In Scholastic metaphysical terms we are talking about an entitative habit rooted in the essence of the soul. But one can accept that Scholastic metaphysical analysis in its entirety and still not have fulfilled the contemporary exigence, for that exigence calls **not only for theory but also for some foundation of theory in corresponding elements in intentional consciousness and/or religious experience**. It is the task of systematic theology to answer on the level of one's own time the question, 'What in the world do these doctrines mean?'

I emphasize the difficulty, which for me has to do with 'finding terms and relations in religious experience that correspond to the distinction of **sanctifying grace and charity**' (43), which I highlight by pointing to the difficulty of interpreting Romans 5.5. 44-45:

Romans 5.5 is not talking about our love for God, except insofar as God's own love is given to us to be our love as well. Ultimately, only an explicit connection with the Trinitarian processions, such as appears in Lonergan's four-point hypothesis that we will speak of below in more detail, will provide the satisfactory conceptualization. That hypothesis gives us an articulation that allows us to speak of sanctifying grace, however haltingly but also, as Lonergan writes, *sine inconvenientia*, not inappropriately, as the created external participation in the actively spirating love of Father and Son. That **created participation in God's own love** is what medieval systematic theology conceived as the entitative habit, rooted in the essence of the soul, known as sanctifying grace. The four-point hypothesis goes on to conceive the habit of charity as what is breathed forth in us from sanctifying grace, and so as a **created participation in the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit**.

As the Holy Spirit is the uncreated internal term of the actively spirating love of Father and Son, so the habit of charity is the created external term of the actively spirating *being-in-love* that is sanctifying grace. This is fundamentally what it means to be *recipients* of the mission of the Holy Spirit. But it is also what it means to say that, when the Holy Spirit is given to us, the Father and the Son come with the Spirit to dwell with us. The mission of the Holy Spirit *is* the eternal procession of the Spirit within the divinity, joined to a created external term, the habit of charity. But the habit of charity flows from the new *being* that is a being in love, and that being in love is a created participation in active spiration, in Father and Son together breathing the Holy Spirit. The dynamic state of being in love gives rise in a habitual fashion to acts of love of God and neighbour, as the *agapē* of the Father and the judgment of value that is the Son together breathe the proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit ... The mystery is that we are given the capacity to love as a created participation in the proceeding love in God. In us that created participation in God's own proceeding love is breathed forth from the created participation in God's actively spirating love, the entitative change in our being that is sanctifying grace. Clearly, of course, if the mystery of sanctifying grace has to do with an entitative habit, it extends beyond consciousness. But it also must have some implications that can be specified in terms of religious *experience*. Such specifications provide **the grounding categories for a theology of grace**, the terms and relations that express an understanding of the doctrine of grace.

All of this has to do with the place of **interiority** in the derivation of categories.

Question 2: What is the significance of interiorly differentiated consciousness for the psychological analogy and the preferential option for the poor?

Second, then, the relevance of interiority to the psychological analogy is obvious. This kind of analogical understanding of the Trinitarian mystery *must* turn to interiorly and religiously differentiated conscious for its basic terms and relations.

As for the preferential option, I appeal to the scale of values. 45: '...this notion is rooted in Lonergan's intentionality analysis, and so appealing to it satisfies the demands we are making in this third point, namely, that the categories of a systematic theology must be derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.' We will see more of this later.

Question 3: Why, according to Doran, are general as well as special categories required in systematic theology?

The three examples also manifest the presence of both general and special categories. 45: 'Special categories are proper to theology, and their ground is religious experience properly appropriated. General categories are shared with other disciplines, and their ground lies in interiorly differentiated consciousness.' In the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, as contrasted with an Augustinian-Bonaventurian line of thought, I insist on the significance of general categories. 45:

... if systematics shies away from employing the categories that are provided to it by other disciplines, it is also renegeing on its responsibility to provide for the realities affirmed in doctrines the witness of contemporary understanding. A systematic theologian who is wary

of employing general categories supplied by the best scientific opinions of his or her own time is not accepting proper theological responsibility. While we must not deny or minimize the need to guard against correlations that would reduce the realities named in special categories to those named in general categories, we must insist that the danger is not to be avoided by taking refuge in special categories alone. Because systematic understanding is at its core an understanding of divine mystery, it must remain permanently imperfect, hypothetical, analogical, and open to development. But because it is hypothetical, it *can* employ categories derived from contemporary world views without compromising the faith affirmed in the doctrines whose truth it would understand. And because it is a witness to the truth, it *must* employ at least some of these categories, even while at times refining their meaning; for it is an attempt to understand that truth *on the level of one's own time*.

Question 4: How do the three examples being employed (grace, psychological analogy, and preferential option) manifest the integration of categories from the tradition with categories generated in the present? 46:

Categories that are transposed from the theological tradition in which one stands must be integrated with contemporary developments, whether the developments are the work of others or of oneself. The only way to assure such integration, of course, is through the **grounding** of both traditional and contemporary categories in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. Moreover, the integration will itself entail a development, and in fact one that goes **both ways**: the transposed traditional emphases will deepen the appropriation of the contemporary developments, frequently making possible a discovery of their metaphysical equivalents, while contemporary developments will affect the expressions adopted in the transpositions. There will take place not so much a correlation as a **mutual self-mediation** between tradition and contemporary situation.

One example of how this might be done is provided in the interrelation of the three theological doctrines that we have been using as examples. 46-47:

To stay with and expand on the examples we have employed, we can ask, How are the liberation emphases to be integrated with dogmas, church doctrines, and past theological doctrines regarding grace and the Trinity? Operative and cooperative **grace**, both habitual and actual, obviously can be integrated with the psychological **analogy** for understanding Trinitarian processions. But what do operative and cooperative grace, both habitual and actual, and the psychological analogy have to do with the preferential **option** for the poor? As we saw in a more general context in chapter 4, theology is in effect today developing a **social doctrine and systematics of grace**, a theology of grace that would correspond to earlier developments regarding the social constitution of sin. Theology today is also highlighting the **social and historical dimensions of the Trinitarian doctrines**. Theology must integrate the affirmations it accepts from the tradition with developments such as these. A contemporary systematics that would reach a synthetic statement of the community's constitutive meaning must contribute to that development. But such a synthetic integration is impossible unless the theologies of grace and Trinity, on the one hand, and the contemporary preferential option for the poor, on the other, are grounded in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

Question 5: What is the key to the relation of general and special categories?

The relation of general and special categories is grounded in the relation of nature and grace or of the natural and the supernatural. More precisely (48), (1) 'the derivation of the categories takes place by way of expanding and enriching the respective bases,' and so (2) it takes place from an objectification of the [respective] base realities and of the virtualities inherent in them. But (3) the relation of the base for the general categories to the base for the special categories is a relation of that remote essential passive potency that is capable of being moved to receive a form by the omnipotent power of God alone, or obediential potency, so that being-in-love in an unrestricted manner is a real, intrinsic, proper, supernatural fulfilment of our natural capacity for self-transcendence. This means that (4) the relation of the general categories to the special categories shares in the relation of their bases to each other. As a systematic theology employs both general and special categories, its aim is to display the manner in which the realities named in the special categories so transform the realities named in the general categories as to witness to the transformation of the latter realities by the reception of a 'form' or set of intelligibilities that can be given by God alone, however much God may be working through secondary causes. We will see this in great detail when we get to the section on the scale of values in chapter 10. The full intelligibility of history will be seen to be a function not only of progress and decline but also of redemptive grace.

Chapter 6 Mediation

Question 6: Doran writes, '... seldom has the question been faced, What kind of mediation is performed by theology, and especially by systematic theology? ... Let me suggest that the answer is mutual self-mediation.' What does this mean? Do you agree with the suggestion?

What is mutual self-mediation? To quote Lonergan, as I do on p. 56:

One's self-discovery and self-commitment is one's own secret. It is not a natural property that you can predicate of all the individuals in a class. It is an idea conceived, gestated, born, within one. It is known by others if and when one chooses to reveal it, and revealing it is an act of confidence, of intimacy, of letting down one's defenses, of entrusting oneself to another. In the process from extroversion, from being poured out on objects, to existential self-commitment, to fidelity, to a destiny, we are not Leibnizian monads with neither doors nor windows. We are open to the influence of others, and others are open to influence from us.

Mutual self-mediation occurs in a variety of contexts and to a greater or less extent. Meeting, falling in love, getting married is a mutual self-mediation ... There is a mutual self-mediation in the education of children, of the infant, the child, the boy or girl, the adolescent, the young man or woman. There is a mutual self-mediation in the relationships of mother and child, father and son, and brothers and sisters. And there is mutual self-mediation between equals, between brothers and sisters, between father and mother, husband and wife; and between superiors and subjects, parents and children, teachers and pupils, professors and students, professors and staff, fellow students. There are matrices of personal relations in the neighborhood, in industry and commerce, in the professions, in local, national, and international politics.

To explore this field of mutual self-mediation is perhaps the work of the novelist ... Mutual self-mediation provides the inexhaustible theme of dramatists and novelists. It is also the imponderable in education that does not show up in charts and statistics, that lies in the immediate interpersonal situation which vanishes when communication becomes indirect through books, through television programs, through teaching by mail.

Loneragan suggests at the end of his treatment of *self*-mediation that communities as well as individuals perform self-mediation in history. I am suggesting that this can be extended to communities, and that the mediation of religions and culture is a *communal* mutual self-mediation. The key statement is on p. 57:

The mediation of religion and culture that theology performs is not simply a self-mediation of Christian constitutive meaning, *from* the data on revelation *through* their ongoing consequences in history *to* the contemporary faith of the church. For the ongoing consequences of the data on revelation are a function of the *exchange* that takes place between the community grounded in those data and various cultural matrices. The very constitutive meaning of the church in its historical development is a function of that exchange. Theology *does* perform the self-mediating function, but this function does not adequately exhaust the role of theology as mediating *faith and culture*. Rather, as theology performs the latter role, its self-mediating function is sublated into the mutual self-mediation of the church's constitutive meaning with the meanings and values constitutive of a given way of life. Theology is a contribution to the mutual self-mediation of the constitutive meaning of the church with the meanings and values constitutive of contemporary cultural matrices.

I stress the point for several reasons. First, it is easily overlooked that this is what theology has always done. 57: 'The church is, or should be, and willy-nilly has always been, a learning church, a church whose own constitutive meaning is, within the limits imposed by truly dogmatic meanings, changed by interaction with various cultural matrices.' Second, it provides an alternative and preferable way of speaking to talk of a 'method of correlation.' Third, as we will see, the functional specialty 'communications' entails a process of mutual self-mediation that takes theology back through the functional specialties, at times to the articulation of new doctrines and their understanding in systematics, and at times to the modification and even abandonment of former items that the church had been teaching: all of this by way of mutual self-mediation with lines of development in a culture. Fourth, the way Lonergan takes us through the functional specialties in *Method in Theology* would itself suggest a mediation *within a religion* rather than between a religion and a cultural matrix. I use the work of John Courtney Murray on religious liberty as an example of theological operations that perhaps *Method* does not explicate but could, if it conceived the mediation as a mutual self-mediation. Murray was doing more than communications. 59: '... he developed a new *doctrine* regarding religious liberty, and he attempted to express an *understanding* of this new doctrine in a fashion that certainly could be called systematic.' All of this is a fruit of mutual self-mediation.

Question 7: What for Doran is the theological component to the insistence on mutual self-mediation?

I suggest as well that there is a doctrinal component to this insistence, namely, the universal mission of the Holy Spirit. 59-60: ‘The universal mission of the Holy Spirit, and in fact even the invisible dimension of the mission of the Word in whom all things were created, prompt the believing community at its best to *expect* to find meanings and values that are operative in the cultural matrix in ways that have yet to be realized in the church itself. Needless to say, this position is, when correctly understood, anything but accommodationism, which would not be mutual self-mediation at all but simply an abdication of responsibility. There are times when mutual self-mediation is explicit dialectic, where dialectic involves saying no because one’s own position is and must be simply and irrevocably contradictory to the prevailing values. But the initial attitude of the genuine Christian individual or community is not one of suspicion but one of a readiness to learn. The Ignatian presupposition for the director of the Spiritual Exercises says it well and can and should be generalized: ‘[E]very good Christian is to be more ready to save his neighbour’s proposition than to condemn it.’

There arises, though, the question, How can theologians determine which cultural meanings are indeed authentic and which are not? This we will see in the discussion of the scale of values.

Chapter 7: Structure

Question 8: What does Doran mean by a unified field structure for systematic theology? Where would it stand or be located in the composition of a systematic theology? What constitutes the unified field structure in Aquinas’s theology? What are some of the ways in which a contemporary unified field structure differs from Aquinas’s?

A good way to get at what is meant by ‘unified field structure’ is to ask about the essential structural features of Aquinas’s theology. In my estimation, they were twofold: Aristotelian metaphysics and the theorem of the supernatural. Aristotle’s metaphysics gave Aquinas his general categories, and the theorem of the supernatural grounded his appropriation of the categories peculiar to Christian theology. The question of a contemporary unified field structure would have to do with the basic features of the general and special categories today. These for me would be continuous with the grounding features of Aquinas’s theology, even if they represent a development on these. Thus I speak of a unified field structure as (62) ‘**an open and heuristic set of conceptions that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in that discipline or functional specialty of theology whose task it is to give a synthetic understanding of the realities that are and ought to be providing the meaning constitutive of the community called the church.**’

The difference from Aquinas: This unified field structure should be articulated as such, something that never really happened in Aquinas’s work. And when it is articulated, it will occupy a place in a systematic theology **roughly analogous to the position that the periodic table plays in chemistry**. The analogy is rough, since in theology the unified field structure would remain heuristic for future elaborations that can be unfolded only as theologians confront issues that at the present time remain unforeseeable.

Question 9: What constitutes the specifically theological element in the unified field structure that Doran is proposing? What constitutes the unifying framework for the realities named in the general categories?

^ 65-66
The principal **specifically theological element** in the unified field structure now at hand is a four-point hypothesis proposed in Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity. This is a differentiation of the theorem of the supernatural found in Aquinas. From 64-65: The hypothesis differentiates the theorem of the supernatural into a set of connections between the four real divine relations – what the tradition calls paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration – and created supernatural participations in those relations. Thus,

(1) the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation, the assumed humanity of the Incarnate Word, is a created participation in paternity. 'Whoever has seen me has seen the Father' (John 14.9). In the immanent Trinitarian relations, the Word does not speak; the Word is spoken by the Father. But the Incarnate Word speaks. However, he speaks only what he has heard from the Father. Again,

(2) sanctifying grace is a created participation in the active spiration *by* the Father and the Son *of* the Holy Spirit, so that as the Father and the Son together breathe the Holy Spirit as uncreated term, sanctifying grace as a created participation in the active spiration of Father and Son – that active spiration that is really identical with paternity and filiation taken together as one principle – 'breathes' some created participation in the same Holy Spirit.

(3) The habit of charity is that created participation in the passive spiration that *is* the Holy Spirit, a created participation in the third person of the Blessed Trinity. And

(4) the light of glory that is the consequent created contingent condition of the beatific vision is a created participation in the Sonship of the divine Word. And so the hypothesis enables a synthetic understanding of the four mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, and the last things.

There is in Lonergan's hypothesis a coordination of the divine processions with the processions of word and love in authentic human performance. This coordination is only potential in Aquinas; it is spelled out perhaps for the first time in the hypothesis of Lonergan's from which I am taking my lead.

Again, the set of **general categories** that would represent a sublation of the Aristotelian metaphysics that provided Aquinas with his own general categories will be provided, I am arguing, by what Lonergan calls a 'basic and total science.' That basic and total science is no longer limited to metaphysics. It is to be found in the cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics of Lonergan's great book *Insight* and in the existential ethics of both *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, but principally as these are brought to bear on the development of a theory of history. Distribute "Categories of History"

Question 10: Doran writes: 'I propose that, however synthetic the four-point hypothesis may be, and however much it may provide those core categories to which all other categories must be referred, still it does not stand on its own; it is not enough to unify a synthetic contemporary theological understanding. There are two reasons for this.' What are his two reasons?

The first has to do with the **special categories** (70): '... while the four-point hypothesis does provide a specifically theological element in the unified field structure, still there are other specifically theological realities, and so other special theological categories, that a unified field

structure must integrate, and they cannot be mapped adequately onto the four-point hypothesis or reduced to it. They are related to it, and must be configured to it in some way, so that theological reflection that employs them must be enlivened and informed by the hypothesis. But they have a theological reality of their own that is not simply reducible to the realities named in the hypothesis. I have in mind categories regarding creation, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis in the world. While all of these are intimately related to the elements expressed in the four-point hypothesis, still they are not organized by that hypothesis alone. Part of the specifically theological reality is reality on the move, reality in development, reality as history, and that part is not accounted for by the hypothesis alone.'

The second has to do with the **general categories** (70-71): '... the integration of these further theological realities with the four-point hypothesis, their configuration to the hypothesis, will entail locating the divine missions, which are at the heart of the hypothesis, in creation and especially in the history whose dynamics of progress, decline, and redemption are part of the reason for the missions in the first place. If possible, the missions must be located in creation and in history, not vaguely but precisely. And I believe this can be done through the scale of values, which, as a key to the theory of history, will form an additional component in the unified field structure. But this means that these theological realities must be integrated not only with one another but also with the heuristic account of the order of the universe (what Lonergan calls emergent probability) and with other realities constitutive of human history, that is to say, with realities that are known by sciences and scholarly disciplines other than theology. An additional set of sets of categories beyond those rooted in the four-point hypothesis and beyond the other special categories is required for such a theological synthesis to take place. *General* theological categories are required even for the adequate theological understanding of specifically theological realities. As the medieval theorem of the supernatural needed a metaphysical system, in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, if it was to mediate religion and the cultural matrix influenced by Aristotle, so the four-point hypothesis requires general categories shared with other disciplines if the divine missions that are at the core of the hypothesis are to be located in relation to their historical occasions and effects. More precisely, a mission is for a purpose, and the divine missions are for the purpose of establishing and confirming interpersonal relations, first between God and us, and then among ourselves; and interpersonal relations are also the core element in the structure of the human good that is coincident with the immanent intelligibility of history. Thus understanding the divine missions entails understanding the history that the Word was sent to redeem from the alternating cycles of progress and decline and that the Holy Spirit is sent to renew with the outpouring of self-sacrificing love.'

Regarding the general categories, then, Doran writes: ⁷¹ '... the set of sets of general categories will be based in the cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics of *Insight*, in the existential ethics of *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, and in the theory of history proposed by Lonergan over the span of his writings and complemented by the contributions that I have tried to offer in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. My thesis, then, is that, taken together, these two elements – a four-point theological hypothesis and what Lonergan calls the basic and total science, the *Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft*, especially as the latter issues in a theory of history – provide the basic framework, the set of terms and relations, of a unified field structure for systematic theology. The combination of the four-point hypothesis with the grounding base of the general categories will be required even for the discussion of the other *special* theological

realities: creation, revelation, redemption, church, sacraments, and Christian praxis. None of these can be understood solely in the terms provided by the special categories. But with the four-point hypothesis and the philosophical positions that are for the most part already in place in *Insight* and that are complemented where necessary by later developments, we have everything we need to begin constructing a systematic theology. And that “everything we need to begin constructing a systematic theology” is precisely what I mean by a unified field structure.’

Question 11: How does he argue with Monsour on the issue?

Regarding question 11: Monsour suggests, ‘Take some or all of the five sets of special theological categories enumerated by Lonergan in *Foundations* and actually attempt to work out tentatively the categories belonging to each set. Then transfer whatever categories one has derived in *Foundations* into *Systematics* and try to map them onto the proposed unified field structure ... If it is truly a unified field structure for *Systematics*, it would ... provide the organizing principle integrating all the categories of all the five sets. To the extent that one continues to succeed in mapping the categories onto the hypothesis, to that extent one continues to confirm the hypothesis as indeed a unified field structure for *Systematics*’ (quoted 68-69).

In section 5, Doran argues that the hypothesis fails the test. 72: ‘In the chapter on *Foundations in Method in Theology*, Lonergan spells out five sets of special theological categories. The test lies in the question, Can these five sets be mapped without remainder onto the four-point hypothesis? I will argue that the four-point hypothesis will not be able to integrate the second, fourth, and fifth of these sets into an overall systematic exposition unless there is added to it [a] theory of history ...’

The five sets of special categories, then are: (1) categories that provide accounts of religious experience, (2) categories that account for the community, service, and witness in the history of salvation, (3) categories that speak ‘of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face’ (quoting Lonergan on p. 73), (4) categories that speak of authentic and inauthentic humanity and authentic and inauthentic Christianity, and (5) categories that regard progress, decline, and redemption.

Doran writes (73),

In my view only the third set of special categories can be adequately mapped onto the four-point hypothesis ... any attempt to map the other sets onto the four-point hypothesis is really an attempt to reduce the other sets to the third set. And if the other sets cannot be mapped without remainder onto the four-point hypothesis, then clearly more is needed if we are to arrive at a unified field structure for the functional specialty “systematics,” and this on Monsour’s test itself. Not even all the *special* categories can be adequately mapped onto the four-point hypothesis. Now, obviously, the third set matches the four-point hypothesis almost point by point, so that it can safely be said that this set can be mapped without remainder onto the hypothesis. Moreover, I believe the hypothesis provides a key to clarifying religious experience as receiving the love of God and being in love with precisely that love, and so it is relevant to elements of the first set of special categories. But mapping the other three sets onto the hypothesis is not only more difficult; in the last analysis, it is, I

believe, impossible. One can relate the other three sets to the third set, and so to the hypothesis, but any attempt to go further would be an attempt to reduce the other three sets to the third. The other three sets demand a framework that locates within, or in relation to, the dialectical dynamics of history the four created supernatural realities that are the created consequent conditions either of the divine missions (the *esse secundarium* of the Incarnation, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity) or of the beatific vision (the light of glory). The categories that detail the relation of these created supernatural realities to history are required if we are to have a systematics of creation, revelation (which, as Lonergan says, introduces a new meaning into *history*), redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis. And I have already suggested, following Monsour himself, that the basic relation of general to special categories parallels the obediencial potency by which nature and history stand ready to be elevated and transformed by grace.

The four-point hypothesis, then, has to be placed in history. Speaking as it does of the divine missions certainly does locate it in history, but it has to function within a conception of history that will enable the integration of the second, fourth, and fifth sets of special categories into the overall systematic conception. The created contingent external terms that make possible that there are divine missions are not enough to allow for this integration. The divine missions have to be related in a thematic and explicit manner to the dynamics of history, and the dynamics of history have to be configured in a thematic and explicit manner to the divine missions. That can be done only by developing a theological theory of history. The four-point hypothesis does not in itself tell us anything about what the Incarnation and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit have to do with historical progress and decline, whereas creation, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis cannot be understood theologically apart from historical progress and decline. As Lonergan himself wrote at the time of his breakthrough to the notion of functional specialization, a contemporary systematic theology in its entirety must be a theological theory of history; or again, the mediated object of systematics is *Geschichte*. We may conclude, then, that the basic organizing systematic conception must contain, in addition to the four-point hypothesis, the fundamental elements of a theological theory of history.

This would be analogous to the way in which the basic organizing systematic conception in Aquinas contained the theorem of the supernatural and the metaphysics of Aristotle.

Question 12: What difference does Doran's addition of a theory of history make with regard to the psychological analogy?

Basically, it elevates it, and history along with it. 77: 'The theory of history based on the interrelations of the levels of value – from above, religious, personal, cultural, social, vital – proposes that the recurrent intelligent emanation of the word of authentic value judgments and of acts of love in human consciousness (personal value) is due to the grace of the mission of the Holy Spirit (religious value) and is also the source of the making of history, of historical progress through schemes of recurrence in the realms of cultural, social, and vital values. But the mission of the Holy Spirit *is* the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit linked to a created, contingent external term that is the consequent condition of the procession being also a mission, or of the proceeding Holy Spirit being also sent. Thus the intelligent emanation in God of the Holy Spirit, the eternal procession in God of the Holy Spirit, joined to the created, contingent, consequent

external terms that are sanctifying grace and the habit of charity (as well as to the operative movements that are known as *auxilium divinum* or actual grace), the eternal intelligent emanation of the Spirit in God as also Gift in history, is the ultimate condition of possibility of any consistent or recurrent intelligent emanation of authentic judgments of value and schemes of recurrence rooted in acts of love in human beings. This collaboration of intelligent processions, divine and human, is, then, the condition of the possibility of the consistent authentic performance of what Lonergan calls the normative source of meaning in history. And if such personal value conditions the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the realms of cultural, and then social, and then vital values, if that normative source, functioning communally, is the origin of progress in history, then the mission of the Holy Spirit, which is identical with the eternal procession of the Spirit linked to the created, contingent, consequent term of charity, and so the Spirit as Gift, is the very source of progress in history. Conversely, wherever genuine progress (measured by fidelity to the scale of values) takes place, the Spirit is present and active. The combination of the four-point hypothesis with the theory of history thus enables us to relate Trinitarian theology, and even the theology of the immanent Trinity, directly to the processes not only of individual sanctification but also of human historical unfolding. The discernment of the mission of the Holy Spirit thus becomes the most important ingredient in humankind's taking responsibility for the guidance of history.'

Chapter 8

Question 13: What is the first of the three anticipations or expectations placed on systematic theology mentioned in chapter 8? How is it grounded in the integration of historical consciousness and foundational methodology?

The first expectation is that systematics will be able to anticipate in a conscious manner an ongoing genetic sequence of interrelated systematic positions. 78: 'Systems are inevitably open. Every system eventually will give rise to questions that the resources of the system cannot answer. Nonetheless, the inevitable sequence of systems can be what I am calling an ongoing genetic sequence, where each later effort builds on those that have preceded and preserves all that is lasting in them.' The unified field structure makes this possible.

By 'foundational methodology' is meant the explicit awareness that (78-79) '[g]enuine foundational reality is simply *inevitable pragmatic engagement* in certain operations and certain states or dispositions, along with the discovery that there are *norms* for authentic performance of the relevant operations, and *criteria* for discerning authentic and inauthentic states and dispositions.' Historical consciousness enables such methodology to allow (79) 'successive systematic expressions of theological understanding, with the later building on and transposing the earlier, and with all of them building on the same engagement in the operations constitutive of cognitive, moral, religious, and affective integrity, and so of the *imago Dei* that we are.'

Question 14: What is the second anticipation or expectation, and how is it related to what Doran calls the ontology of meaning? What is explanatory history? The theology of theologies?

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The second expectation is that systematic theology will be able to construct an account of its own evolution, which it would include in a systematic presentation that we might call a theology of theologies. More generally, it will be possible to develop a systematic 'take' on the history of salvation, the history of the church, and the history of theology itself, and all of these in relation to 'general history.' The 'take' would be systematic in that each element in the account would be related genetically or dialectically to all the others. This is what is meant by both the ontology of meaning and explanatory history. It would establish (80) 'the *genetic and dialectical relations* that obtain among various stages in the evolution of Christian constitutive meaning.' This would include the genetic and dialectical relations among various systematic theologies. It will yield (80) '...a more concrete explanatory presentation of the emergent meanings that have come to constitute not only the Christian community but also the entire religious history of humankind.'

Question 15: Doran writes, 'There are at least three permanently valid but still largely unrelated tendencies that emerged in the Catholic theology of the twentieth century and that await the discovery, articulation, or successful application of the principle or principles that will enable them to be intelligibly ordered to one another. The first two of these are similar, respectively, to the Aristotelian and Augustinian emphases that contended so mightily in the medieval period. The third is distinctly contemporary.' What are the three anticipations of systematic content that Doran proposes? What dangers does he want to avoid?

The three anticipations of systematic content are (1) Lonergan's appropriation of the methods and categories of contemporary natural and human science and historical scholarship, and his recognition of the central role that is to be attributed to the act of insight, and from there his development of the 'basic and total science'; (2) Balthasar's presentation of the aesthetic and dramatic character of many of the specifically theological categories, and (3) the praxis component that comes from the preferential option for the poor in church ministry and in our retrieval of the gospel. Doran's wager is that (87-88) '[t]heology, at least Catholic theology, will be able to go forward confidently into the future, with some hope of generating a sequence of interrelated systematic positions, to the extent that some principle or set of principles can be expressed that will relate these three emphases to one another and integrate them. On the other hand, no Catholic systematic statement of Christian constitutive meaning on the level of our own time and in harmony with the principal theological achievements of the twentieth century will be possible until such an integrating focus is discovered and exploited.' The dangers he wishes to avoid are expressed in the final paragraph of the chapter, 'But as yet these three developments have not been consistently and intelligibly related to one another. Until they are, theology will remain in a position that bears some resemblance to the state of the discipline at the end of the twelfth century, with all the promise and all the danger inherent in such an unfinished position. The integration of Lonergan, Balthasar, and central liberation insights is the way forward for Catholic systematic theology, the most fruitful way to proceed at the current juncture in the history of Catholic systematics. There is, in fact, a certain urgency for the sake of the church that exists around the tasks (1) of integrating what Lonergan and Balthasar stand for and represent, (2) of drawing out the implications of their respective emphases for the concerns of liberation theology, and (3) of highlighting the balance that the latter concerns bring to the work of these two great theologians. These three major twentieth-century developments must be allowed to

complement and, where necessary, correct one another. It is in this mutual reciprocity and correction that Catholic systematic theology will find its way forward.’