

## Class 8

October 26, 2009

The material for dialectic was prepared for at the end of chapter 9, in the section on horizons. **Horizons**: Within the same or compatible horizons, then, there may be different perspectives, and these cause no major difficulties. But the historian's development is also a function of basic options, options that can be involved in historical investigations, and that may result in different and irreconcilable histories. The same issue arose in the treatment of interpretation, when Lonergan came to the part about 'understanding oneself.' An example of how it arises in history is given on p. 221: 'When the historian is convinced that an event is impossible, he will always say that the witnesses were self-deceived, whether there were just two or as many as two hundred. In other words, historians have their preconceptions, if not about what must have happened, at least about what could not have happened. Such preconceptions are derived, not from the study of history, but from the climate of opinion in which the historian lives and from which he inadvertently acquires certain fixed convictions about the nature of man and of the world. Once such convictions are established, it is easier for him to believe that any number of witnesses are self-deceived than for him to admit that the impossible has actually occurred.'

Again on 221: 'Each of us lives in a world mediated by meaning, a world constructed over the years by the sum total of our conscious, intentional activities. Such a world is a matter not merely of details but also of basic options. Once such options are taken and built upon, they have to be maintained, or else one must go back, tear down, reconstruct. So radical a procedure is not easily undertaken; it is not comfortably performed; it is not quickly completed. It can be comparable to major surgery, and most of us grasp the knife gingerly and wield it clumsily.' See the discussion of **miracles** on 222 and again 226.

Historical method as such cannot treat these problems. A new set of methods, those of dialectic and foundations, is involved.

### Question 1: What is the aim or function of Dialectic?

235: Dialectic deals with conflicts. They may be overt or latent. They may lie in religious sources, in the religious tradition, in the pronouncements of authorities, or in the writings of theologians. They may regard contrary orientations of research, contrary interpretations, contrary histories, contrary styles of evaluation, contrary horizons, contrary doctrines, contrary systems, contrary policies.

Differences in theology are multiform. Not all are dialectical. Some differences can be eliminated by uncovering fresh data. Some are traced to different perspectives, and are due to the complexity of historical reality or of individual development and questions. But some are **fundamental**, and for Lonergan these stem from an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, ethical stance, and religious outlook. These will profoundly modify one's mentality, and are to be overcome only through an intellectual, moral, religious

conversion. The **function of dialectic** is to bring such conflicts to light and to provide a technique that **objectifies subjective differences** and promotes conversion. The key result of Dialectic lies in the objectification of subjectivity.

A **distinct set of methods** is required to confront these, a set of methods that witnesses to and promotes conversion in these areas of living: distinct from the methods of research, interpretation, and history that we have seen thus far and also from the methods of the other functional specialties. **Only changes in horizon**, and such changes as constitute conversion, can overcome such conflicts. **Dialectic as a functional specialty would uncover such conflicts, eliminate more superficial ones, and promote the articulation of basic stances.**

To posit dialectic as a **distinct set of theological operations** calling for a distinct method is **one of Lonergan's unique contributions**: a method for meeting head-on issues that arise, are crucial, and cannot be dealt with by the methods of interpretation, history, doctrines, or systematics.

There arise, then, issues in the doing of theology that are **existential, intensely personal, and of crucial significance for work in the functional specialties that we have seen as well as in those we are yet to see**. Lonergan's method takes explicit concern for these issues and introduces a distinct set of methods for confronting them. In fact these methods, of dialectic and of foundations, are the **hinge point of the overall method** that Lonergan proposes. 254: 'The **basic idea** of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. It is not an infallible method, for [we] are easily unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for [our] deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.'

This aim is conceived in a positive, **not a polemical** fashion. Engaging in dialectic aims at (129) 'a comprehensive viewpoint,' 'some single base or some single set of related bases' that enable us to understand how the many viewpoints exhibited in Christian history and in the Christian present are to be understood. Later, he switches the emphasis to dialogue.

### **Question 2: What is a horizon?**

A horizon is the limit of what one can see or ask about from a particular standpoint. 237 (not a definition, but a statement): 'Horizons ... are the structured resultant of past achievement and, as well, both the condition and the limitation of further development.' In this sense horizons may be regarded as the ultimate context of all our other contexts, the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained.

### **Question 3: Explain the following statement on p. 236: 'Differences in horizon may be complementary, or genetic, or dialectical.'**

Lonergan finds three types of relations and of differences among horizons.

First, there are **complementary** relations and differences. E.g., to some extent I live in a different world from a computer scientist, but I recognize the need for him/her and his/her world. **Singly our horizons are not self-sufficient, but together they constitute a shared world.** If that is the case, horizons are related in a complementary fashion. ‘Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests. They live in a sense in different worlds. Each is quite familiar with his own world. But each also knows about the others, and each recognizes the need for the others. So **their many horizons in some measure include one another** and, for the rest, they **complement one another.** Singly they are not self-sufficient, and together they represent **the motivations and the knowledge needed for the functioning of a communal world.**’ Recall the development of skills, in the discussion of the human good.

Second, there are **genetic** relations and differences. Horizons are related as successive stages in a process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them, and partly to transform them. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or history. They are parts, not of a **single** communal world, but of a **single biography or history.** E.g., if I were to learn computer science, then my earlier and my later horizon would be related genetically.

Third, there are **dialectical** relations and differences among horizons. 236-37: ‘What in one is found **intelligible**, in another is unintelligible. What for one is **true**, for another is false. What for one is **good**, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other’s horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God’s grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious. But again rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling, except perhaps a wan smile.’

**Question 4: What is the difference between a horizontal and a vertical exercise of freedom? How is this related to the issue of conversion and breakdown?**

237: ‘A **horizontal** exercise is a decision or choice that occurs within an established horizon. A **vertical** exercise is the set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon to another.’

How is the distinction related to conversion and breakdown? ‘237-38: ‘Now there may be a sequence of such **vertical** exercises of freedom, and in each case the new horizon, though notably deeper and broader and richer, none the less is **consonant** with the old and a development out of its potentialities. (**Learning computer science**) But it is also possible that the movement into a new horizon involves an **about-face**; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a conversion. (Conversely, a breakdown: using my knowledge of computer science to hack into others’ computers!)

**Question 5: What is intellectual conversion? Is there a way of getting to the heart of what Lonergan means by this term?**

The **key** is the acceptance of the **criteria of the world mediated by meaning** as the criteria for the real and the true. The world mediated by meaning is (238) ‘a world known not by the sense experience of an individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief.’

**Question 6: How do naive realism, empiricism, and idealism miss the criteria of intellectual conversion, each in its own way?**

238-29: ‘The **naïve realist** knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking. The **empiricist** restricts objective knowledge to sense experience; for him, understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are merely subjective activities. The **idealist** insists that human knowing always includes understanding as well as sense, but he retains the empiricist’s notion of reality, and so he thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real but ideal. Only the **critical realist** can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world; and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence.’ Illustrations are given on 239. The basic problem at least in Western thought has been that ‘some form of naïve realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to very many ... the assumption that all knowing must be something like looking. To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one’s own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments.’

Again, among the three elements of conversion, Lonergan has made perhaps his **greatest contribution** in the clarification of intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion is the explicit discovery:

(a) **over against naive realism and empiricism** that the real world in which we live is a world mediated and constituted by meaning, and so that the **criteria of truth and objectivity** are quite distinct from those that obtain in the world of immediacy: the real is not already out there now to be known by taking a look; rather, it is what is affirmed on the basis of a grasp of the fulfilment of necessary conditions. Again, full human knowing (238) ‘is not just seeing; it is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of believing. The

reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated in understanding, posited by judgment and belief.’

(b) **over against idealism**, that the world mediated by meaning is **not just a mental construction**, but the real world that can be known as real – the addition of judgment to the idealist’s correct insistence on understanding, and so the overcoming of relativism and cognitive nihilism.

We are not talking here about mere technical disputes in philosophy. 239: ‘Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means.’ The very acts and sources and terms of meaning are transformed. **One means a world totally different from the worlds meant in other horizons.**

**Question 7: What would be some examples of forms of intellectual conversion in the history of theology?**

**Augustine:** the real does not mean the same thing as ‘body,’ but is rather correlated with ‘the true.’

**Athanasius:** ‘consubstantial’ does not mean ‘of the same stuff,’ but ‘Whatever is said of the Father is said of the Son, except that the Father is the Father and the Son is the Son.’

**Question 8: What is moral conversion? How does it differ from moral perfection?**

The central paragraph on 240 takes care of this. In brief, as intellectual conversion entails a shift in the criteria of the true and the real, so moral conversion entails **a shift in the criteria of the good**. There are **existential moments** ‘when we discover for ourselves that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects,’ and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself or herself what one is going to make of oneself. **Then is the time** for the exercise of vertical freedom, and then moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict. Again, a process has begun: there remains the need to uncover and root out one’s biases, develop one’s knowledge of human reality, learn to discriminate progress and decline, etc., always ready to learn from others.

**Question 9: What is religious conversion? How does it differ from moral and intellectual conversion?**

Religious conversion is falling in love with God, and being in love with God, as a dynamic state of being in love without conditions, qualifications, and reservations. It was covered in detail in our discussion of chapter 4. It is interpreted differently in different traditions. For Christians it is God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace, the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, quite beyond the horizon of the heart of stone.

Try to unpack 240-41, 'Religious conversion ...' and relate to sanctifying grace and charity. And see 242, 'It is not to be thought ...' What they have in common is that each is a modality of self-transcendence (241). **Lecture on Thursday will be dealing with this.**

**Question 10: Contrast the normal causal relation of the three conversions with the order of their sublation in a single consciousness.**

All three are attainments of **self-transcendence**: to truth (cognitional self-transcendence), values (real self-transcendence), total being-in-love as the efficacious source of all other self-transcendence.

**Causation:** 243: In general 'first there is God's gift of ... love. Next, the eye of this love [faith] reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion. For the word, spoken and heard, proceeds from and penetrates to all four levels of intentional consciousness. Its content is not just a content of experience but a content of experience and understanding and judging and deciding.'

**Sublation:** 241-42: Moral conversion 'sublates the value of truth into a concern for values generally. It promotes the subject from cognitional to moral self-transcendence. It sets him on a new, existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value. But this in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. He still needs truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can deliberately respond to value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness. But now his pursuit of it is all the more secure because he has been armed against bias, and it is all the more meaningful and significant because it occurs within, and plays an essential role in, the far richer context of the pursuit of all values.' (The contrasts here enable us to appreciate Lonergan's and Rahner's sense of sublation, as contrasted with the Hegelian *Aufhebung*.)

242: Religious conversion sublates all pursuit of the true and the good into a cosmic context and purpose, and gives one the empowerment to undo the effects of decline even when this entails suffering. Nonetheless, religious conversion has its own realm of meaning, not just the pursuit of intellectual and moral ends. The capacity for self-transcendence 'meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline.'

**Question 11: What sort of structure does Lonergan create for radical shifts in horizon in the other direction, toward ‘breakdowns?’**

Intellectual, 243: ‘Cognitional self-transcendence is neither an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible datum of consciousness to be verified.’

Moral, 243: ‘Values have a certain esoteric imperiousness, but can they keep outweighing carnal pleasure, wealth, power?’

Religion, 243: ‘Religion undoubtedly had its day, but is not that day over? Is it not illusory comfort for weaker souls [Nietzsche], an opium distributed by the rich to quiet the poor [Marx], a mythical projection of man’s own excellence into the sky [Freud]?’

The process, 243-44: ‘Initially not all but some religion is pronounced illusory, not all but some moral precept is rejected as ineffective and useless, not all truth but some type of metaphysics is dismissed as mere talk. The negations may be true, and then they represent an effort to offset decline. But also they may be false, and then they are the beginning of decline. In the latter case some part of cultural achievement is being destroyed. It will cease being a familiar component in cultural experience. It will recede into a forgotten past for historians, perhaps, to rediscover and reconstruct. Moreover, this elimination of a genuine part of the culture means that a previous whole has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to compensate.’

Introduce **Newman’s theorem** here: *A Second Collection* 141-42 (‘Theology and Man’s Future’), where Lonergan speaks of ‘the basic theorem in Newman’s *Idea of a University*, which definitely is influencing him at this point. It contains two parts, one positive, the other negative. Positively, Newman advanced that human knowing was a whole with its parts organically related, and this accords with the contemporary phenomenological notion of horizon, that one’s perceptions are functions of one’s outlook, that one’s meaning is a function of a context and that context of still broader contexts. On the negative side, Newman asked what would happen if a significant part of knowledge were omitted, overlooked, ignored, not just by some individual but by the cultural community, and he contended that there would be three consequences. First, people in general would be ignorant of that area. Second, the rounded whole of human knowing would be mutilated. Third, the remaining parts would endeavor to round off the whole once more despite the omission of a part and, as a result, they would suffer distortion from their effort to perform a function for which they were not designed.’

Lonergan goes on in *Method*: ‘Further, such elimination, mutilation, distortion will, of course, be admired as the forward march of progress, while the evident ills they bring forth are to be remedied, not by a return to a misguided past, but by more elimination, mutilation, distortion. Once a process of dissolution has begun, it is screened by self-deception and it is perpetuated by consistency. But that does not mean that it is confined to some single uniform course. Different nations, different classes of society, different age-groups can select different parts of past achievement for elimination, different mutilations to be effected, different distortions to be provoked. Increasing dissolution will

then be matched by increasing division, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence. The body social is torn apart in many ways, and its cultural soul has been rendered incapable of reasonable convictions and responsible commitments.'

**Question 12: What are the two tasks specific to the functional specialty 'dialectic'?**

Evaluation and encounter. **Evaluation:** 245- 46: '... the functional specialty, history, as we conceived it, was concerned with movements, with what in fact was going forward. It specialized on the end of the third level of intentional consciousness, on what happened. It had nothing to say about **history as primarily concerned with values**, and rightly so, inasmuch as history as primarily concerned with values pertains to a specialization not on the third but on the fourth level of intentional consciousness.

'Similarly, our account of interpretation was matter of understanding the thing, the words, the author, and oneself, of passing judgment on the accuracy of one's understanding, of determining the manner of expressing what one has understood. But besides so intellectual a hermeneutics, there also is an evaluative hermeneutics. Besides potential, formal, and full acts of meaning, there are also constitutive and effective acts of meaning. Now the apprehension of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of intentional response. Such response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings. So **evaluative interpretation** pertains to a specialty, not on the end of the second level of intentional consciousness, but on the end of the fourth level.'

**Encounter:** There are gross differences in histories and interpretations that result from dialectically opposed horizons on the three issues of knowing, morality, and religion. Consequently (247), 'the first phase of theology is incomplete, if it is restricted to research, interpretation, and history. For as we have conceived these functional specialties, they approach but do not achieve **an encounter with the past**. They make the data available, they clarify what was meant, they narrate what occurred. Encounter is more. It is **meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds**. Moreover, such an encounter is not just an optional addition to interpretation and to history. **Interpretation depends on one's self-understanding; the history one writes depends on one's horizon; and encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test.**' Such encounter will result in **horizontal analysis**. If there are three dimensions of conversion, there are eight radically different types of horizon (if four, 16, etc.). The upshot is a Babel, **unless a method includes a way of meeting such issues head-on**. 249: 'Both in the natural and in the human sciences, then, there obtrude issues that are not to be solved by empirical methods. These issues can be skirted or evaded with greater success in the natural sciences and less in the human sciences. But a theology can be methodical only if these issues are met head on. To meet them head on is the problem of our fourth functional specialty, dialectic.'

**Question 13: How does the functional specialty 'dialectic' meet these issues? Is anything of a heuristic structure offered?**



The material here is on pp. 249-50. The method of meeting such issues head-on has an upper blade: **Develop positions, reverse counterpositions.** Positions are statements compatible with the conversions, and they can be constantly developed by being integrated with fresh data and further discovery (ongoing contexts). Counterpositions are statements incompatible with the conversions, and they are reversed by removing the incompatible elements

A lower blade engages in the tasks of

- assembly: gather the data – the researches performed, the interpretations proposed, the histories written, the events, statements, movements to which they refer;
- completion: add evaluative interpretation and history;
- comparison: seek out affinities and oppositions;
- reduction: move to the underlying root;
- classification: determine which of the sources result from dialectically opposed horizons;
- selection: dismiss those that don't, concentrate on those that do; then advance positions and reverse counterpositions.

**Those who do this may be operating from different horizons, and their results will not be uniform.** The source of their differences will become clear as they say what are positions and what are counterpositions, and what view results from developing and reversing.

What is going forward is the dialogical objectification of horizons, and the results of this work also become materials to be assembled, completed, composed, reduced, classified, selected. People are encountering one another, not just the past. And theology is moving into its second phase.

#### **Question 14: How does this procedure yield progressive and cumulative results?**

The **cumulative and progressive results** of dialectic are, then, first light on the dialectical oppositions that existed in the past, and also cumulative evidence for a judgment on the present, 'on the selves that did the research, offered the interpretations, studied the history, passed the judgments of value.'

What is happening is a **cumulative objectification of subjectivity**, making **conversion** an explicit and foundational topic in theology.

251: '... let us see what happens, first, when the dialectic is implemented by a person that has undergone intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, secondly, when it is implemented by a person that has not yet undergone intellectual or moral or religious conversion.

'In the first case, the investigator will know from personal experience just what intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is. He will have no great difficulty in distinguishing positions from counter-positions. When he develops positions and reverses

counter-positions, he will be presenting an idealized version of the past, something better than was the reality. Moreover, all such investigators will tend to agree and, as well, they will be supported in part by other investigators that have been converted in one or two of the areas but not in all three.

‘In the second case, the investigator may have only what Newman would call a notional apprehension of conversion, and so he might complain that dialectic is a very foggy procedure. But at least he would recognize radically opposed statements. In the area or areas, however, in which he lacked conversion, he would be mistaking counter-positions for positions and positions for counter-positions. When he proceeded to develop what he thought were positions and to reverse what he thought were counter-positions, in reality he would be developing counter-positions and reversing positions. While the implementation of dialectic in the first case led to an idealized version of the past, its implementation in the second case does just the opposite; it presents the past as worse than it really was. Finally, there are seven different ways in which this may be achieved, for the second case includes (1) those without any experience of conversion, (2) those with the experience of only intellectual or only moral or only religious conversion, and (3) those that lack only intellectual or only moral or only religious conversion.’

This means there is **at least a theoretical possibility that this functional specialty will be carried out in eight quite different manners**. And this will **bring into the open the question of conversion and authenticity**, since basic conflicts have been defined by the opposition of positions and counterpositions. This leads to a **discernment** in which (252-53) one (1) ‘appreciate[s] all that has been intelligent, true, and good in the past even in the lives and the thought of opponents,’ (2) acknowledge[s] all that was misinformed, misunderstood, mistaken, evil even in those with whom he is allied.’ And this helps us to ‘know ourselves and to fill out and refine our apprehension of values.’ **The result of dialectic, then, is an objectification of subjectivity** that ‘will provide the open-minded, the serious, the sincere with the occasion to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others but eventually, even about themselves. It will make conversion a topic and thereby promote it. Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of maturation. It is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to love. Dialectic contributes to that end by pointing out ultimate differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one’s destiny.’

**Question 15: What is the central issue at stake in Lonergan’s conversation with MacKinnon and, through MacKinnon, Wittgenstein?**

If we don’t get to this, OK, since it will come up in WIST. Linguistic analysis à la the later Wittgenstein, tends to reverse the order ‘insight-concept-formulation,’ because of its distrust of talking about ‘mental acts.’ For Lonergan **the outer word means the inner word, and the inner word means what is or might be, the object intended**.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy insists that the meaning of a word is to be determined only by its ordinary usage in the language.

Lonergan first advances what is not counterpositional in Wittgenstein's view, namely, **that mental acts do not occur without a sustaining flow of expression, and that the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is essentially public and only derivatively private.** However, 'what is true of the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is not true of the original meaningfulness of any language, ordinary, literary, or technical.' Language develops, and 'developments consist in discovering new uses for existing words, in inventing new words, and in diffusing the discoveries and inventions. All three are a matter of expressed mental acts.' 'Unlike ordinary meaningfulness, then, unqualified meaningfulness originates in expressed mental acts, is communicated and perfected through expressed mental acts, and attains ordinariness when the perfected communication is extended to a large enough number of individuals.' **255-56:** 'The discovery of a new usage is a mental act expressed by the new usage. The invention of a new word is a mental act expressed by the new word.'

This means, however, that a language that refers to mental acts has to be developed, and once it is developed, the capacities of ordinary language are vastly enlarged: see what Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, and Newman have contributed to our understanding of ourselves. Linguistic analysts will not enter the world of interiority. They insist on remaining in the world of common sense and ordinary language, or on confining themselves to common sense and theory. 262: '... such decisions ... are hardly binding on the rest of [humankind.]'

**Question 17: In what would an idealist rejection of Lonergan's approach consist, and how would he answer it?**

The Kantian form of idealism as it lingers on in Jaspers and others would also dismiss Lonergan's approach a priori. It would hold that what Lonergan provides in his accounts of self-appropriation may indeed be a clarification of the subject, but can hardly be called objective knowledge. In general the idealist context would hold that **objective knowledge** might be attainable in such areas as mathematics and science, since in these areas **investigators commonly agree**, but in areas such as philosophy, ethics, and religion, where such agreement commonly is lacking, views are explained just by the **subjectivity** of philosophers, moralists, and religious people. Some – e.g., behaviorists, positivists – would tend to say such an intrusion of subjectivity is always mistaken, wrong. Others, like Jaspers, would distinguish **authentic and inauthentic subjectivity**, would say that what results from authentic subjectivity is not mistaken, wrong, or evil, but also it is **not the objective knowledge** attainable in mathematics and science. For Lonergan, however, **objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, and that is possible in philosophy, ethics, and religion/theology as much as it is in mathematics and science.**

The issue has to do with the **two meanings of the term 'object.'** There is the object in the world mediated by meaning, and there is the object in the world of immediacy. The latter is already, out, there, now, real. These two meanings yield two meanings of the word 'objectivity.' 263, in a statement that needs unpacking: 'In the world of immediacy the necessary and sufficient condition of objectivity is to be a successfully functioning animal. But in the world mediated by meaning objectivity has three components. There is

the experiential objectivity constituted by the givenness of the data of sense and the data of consciousness. There is the normative objectivity constituted by the exigencies of intelligence and reasonableness. There is the absolute objectivity that results from combining the results of experiential and normative objectivity so that through experiential objectivity conditions are fulfilled while through normative objectivity conditions are linked to what they condition. The combination, then, yields a conditioned with its conditions fulfilled and that, in knowledge, is a fact and, in reality, it is a contingent being or event.'

Next, Lonergan presents an **overview of the course of modern philosophy**, which is extremely important for getting hold of Lonergan's entire position. He says: '... when these distinctions are not drawn, there results a number of typical confusions. The **naive realist** knows the world mediated by meaning, but he fancies that he know it by taking a god look at what is going out there now. The **naive idealist**, Berkeley, concludes that *esse est percipi*. But *esse* is reality affirmed in the world mediated by meaning, while *percipi* is the givenness of an object in the world of immediacy. The rigorous **empiricist**, Hume, eliminates from the world mediated by meaning everything that is not given in the world of immediacy. The **critical idealist**, Kant, sees that a Copernican revolution is overdue. But, so far from drawing the needed distinctions, he only finds another more complicated manner of confusing things. He combines the operations of understanding and reason, not with the data of sense, but with sensitive intuitions of phenomena, where the phenomena are the appearing, if not of nothing, then of the things themselves which, while unknowable, manage to get talked about through the device of the limiting concept. The **absolute idealist**, Hegel, brilliantly explores whole realms of meaning; he gives poor marks to naive realists; but he fails to advance to a critical realism, so that Kierkegaard can complain that what is logical also is static, that movement cannot be inserted into a logic, that Hegel's system has room not for existence (self-determining freedom) but only for the idea of existence.'

'Kierkegaard marks a trend. Where he was concerned with faith, Nietzsche was with power, Dilthey with concrete human living, Husserl with the constitution of our intending, Bergson with his *élan vital*, Blondel with action, American pragmatists with results, European existentialists with authentic subjectivity. While the mathematicians were discovering that their axioms were not self-evident truths, while the physicists were discovering that their laws were not inevitable necessities but verifiable possibilities, the philosophers ceased to think of themselves as the voice of pure reason and began to be the representatives of something far more concrete and human. Or if they still stressed objective evidence and necessity, as did Husserl, they also were performing reductions that bracketed reality out of the question and concentrated on essence to ignore contingency.'

The point of all this is a **shift in the meanings of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective.'** 'There are areas in which investigators commonly agree, such as mathematics and science; in such fields objective knowledge is obtainable. There are other areas, such as philosophy, ethics, religion, in which agreement commonly is lacking; such disagreement is explained by the subjectivity of philosophers, moralists,

religious people. But whether subjectivity is always mistaken, wrong, evil, is a further question. Positivists, behaviorists, naturalists would tend to say that it is. Others, however, would insist on distinguishing between an authentic and an unauthentic subjectivity. What results from the former is neither mistaken nor wrong nor evil. It just is something quite different from the objective knowledge attainable in mathematics and in science.

‘In some such context as the foregoing one would have to agree with Jasper's view that a clarification of subjectivity, however authentic, is not objective knowledge. Still that context survives only as long as there survive the ambiguities underlying naive realism, naive idealism, empiricism, critical idealism, absolute idealism. Once those ambiguities are removed, once an adequate self-appropriation is effected, once one distinguishes between object and objectivity in the world of immediacy and, on the other hand, object and objectivity in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, then a totally different context arises. For it is now apparent that **in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility.** Mathematics, science, philosophy, ethics, theology differ in many manners; but they have the common feature that their objectivity is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.’