Class 7: October 19, 2009

History

Question 1: What is the difference between history 1 and history 2? Which of these is the subject matter of these two chapters?

Lonergan distinguishes the history that is written about (history 1) from the history that is written (history 2).

History 2 aims at expressing knowledge of history 1. These chapters are about history 2 as it attempts to express knowledge of history 1.

Question 2: Do the two chapters have different emphases? Why is the material divided into two chapters?

Chapter 8 treats the procedures that lead to a knowledge (history 2) of history (history 1), the **heuristic structures** involved in moving toward historical knowledge; while chapter 9 treats

(1) various problems connected with the writing of history,
(2) what historians have said about these problems, and
(3) what Lonergan says about what these historians have said.

He begins by insisting that the object of historical inquiry and the nature of historical investigation are matters of some obscurity, 'mainly because historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional theory' (175). In note 1, he notes the interesting observation of Gerhard Ebeling that 'modern historical science is still a long way from being able to offer a theoretically unobjectionable account of the critical historical method, and that it needs the cooperation of philosophy to reach that goal.'

Chapter 8, then, for the most part represents an attempt to apply what Lonergan would regard as a 'satisfactory cognitional theory' to historical investigation, while chapter 9 shows some of the ways in which historical investigation has become obscure due to the lack of such a satisfactory cognitional theory.

Question 3: Lonergan begins the chapter by noting that the object of historical inquiry and the nature of historical investigation are matters of some obscurity. What for him is the object of historical inquiry? Where in the text is evidence for your answer?

178-79: 'The historian envisages a quite different object [from that of interpretation]. He is not content to understand what people meant. He wants to grasp what was going forward in particular groups at particular places and times. By "going forward" I mean to exclude the mere repetition of a routine. I mean the change that originated the routine and its dissemination. I mean process and development but, no less, decline and collapse.

When things turn out unexpectedly, pious people say, "Man proposes but God disposes." The historian is concerned to see how God disposed the matter, not by theological speculation, not by some world-historical dialectic, but through particular human agents. In literary terms history is concerned with the drama of life, with what results through the characters, their decisions, their actions, and not only because of them but also because of their defects, their oversights, their failures to act.'

Question 4: What is Lonergan's overall attitude to the critical historical method? Again, what indications from the text can you provide?

Critical historical method represents a genuine possibility of knowledge, but its practitioners are 'still a long way from being able to offer a theoretically unobjectionable account of the critical historical method, and … it needs the cooperation of philosophy to reach that goal.' Footnote 1 on p. 175.

Section 3, on 'Critical History,' is Lonergan's attempt to offer that philosophical cooperation. Study of that section will further fill out the answer to this question, as will discussion of perspectivism, relativism, and other special questions toward the end of chapter 9.

Question 5: What is the point of the first section of chapter 8, 'Nature and History?' To put the question another way, why are these reflections on time introduced at the beginning of the study of the writing of history?

The point of section 1, with its reflections on time in science and human studies, is to elucidate the field of historical investigation and to distinguish it from the field of natural science. 'Time' here is not the time studied in physics. The historian certainly needs the Aristotelian notion of time as the number or measure determined by successive equal stages of movement, for he has to date his events. But this notion of time is limited to counting, measuring, and relating to one another in a comprehensive view all possible instances of such counting and measuring. This notion also suggests the image of time as a raceway of indivisible instants. That notion is removed by advertence to the identity of the substratum, the identity that is moving, and this clue enables us to advance to our *experience* of time. The time of our lives is really a time *span* that centers around a psychological present, reaches into a past, a tradition that converges psychologically and experientially on this present, and from this present anticipates a future that both carries on and modifies that tradition. Memory is communal as well as individual, and history is concerned with (177) 'the pooled memories of the group, their celebration in song and story, their preservation in written narratives, in coins and monuments and every other trace of the group's words and deeds left to posterity. Such is the field of historical investigation.'

Question 6: What is the field of historical investigation? What differentiates this field from the field of natural-scientific investigation? What is the relevance of chapter 3, on Meaning, for understanding the historical field? How does this introduce a difference between history and natural science? How do historical and scientific expression differ?

Again, 'Such is the field of historical investigation.' It is differentiated from the field of natural-scientific investigation by **the constitutive role of meaning** in establishing this communally shared experience of time, or as 178 puts it, 'this constitutive role of meaning in the controlling side of human action.' By the controlling side of human action, Lonergan means 'the flow of conscious and intentional acts' differentiated from each other in accord with the 'manifold meanings of meaning.' 178: 'It is this constitutive side of human action that grounds the peculiarity of the historical field of investigation.'

More precisely, history is concerned with meaning, not so much as it regards the general or the universal, but as it regards the particular and the concrete; not so much the structural and material invariants of meaning, but (178) the 'changes that affect the manner in which the carriers of meaning are employed, the elements of meaning are combined, the functions of meaning are distinguished and developed, the realms of meaning are extended, the stages of meaning blossom forth, meet resistance, compromise, collapse.' And even further, the field has to do with all of this as it affects *common* meaning, where common experience, understanding, judgments, and commitments bind people together, while the lack of these causes common meaning to contract, become confined to banalities, move toward ideological warfare. 'It is in this field of meaningful speech and action that the historian is engaged' (178), in an effort to discover what was 'going forward.'

The expression of historical understanding will differ from the expression of scientific understanding in that (180) 'The discoveries of physics, chemistry, biology are expressed in universal systems and are refuted if they are found to be incompatible with a relevant particular instance. But the discoveries of the historian are expressed in narratives and descriptions that regard particular persons, places, and times. They have no claim to universality; they could, of course, be relevant to the understanding of other persons, places, times; but whether in fact they are relevant, and just how relevant they are, can be settled only by a historical investigation of the other persons, places, and times. Finally, because they have no claim to universality, the discoveries of the historians are not verifiable in the fashion proper to the natural sciences; in history verification is parallel to the procedures by which an interpretation is judged correct.'

Verification of historical discoveries will, therefore, be a function of the self-correcting process of learning heading to the point where there are no further relevant questions. Just as with interpretation. We will see more about historical verification later.

Question 7: What is meant by 'what is going forward'?

'What is going forward' is given sufficient attention in response to question 3. However, we might turn to the material on drama in *Topics in Education* for further elucidation, since Lonergan mentions that history is concerned with the drama of life. I quote from *Topics* 231-32: In drama, 'There is an initial situation from which the drama proceeds through the decisions of the participants. The decisions of individuals will be interdependent, and one will foresee what others might decide and use his foreseeing to guide his present decision. But quite apart from all the characters' thinking, foreseeing, and understanding of one another in the drama, the set of decisions of the participants is not the decision of any one of them. It is a set of decisions that leads from one situation to

the next. Destiny is that linking of successive situations. **There is something in the succession of human choices that is outside the range of human choice.** Though everything in the drama is a product of the decisions, and though the decisions can be made with full consciousness of what the other characters are likely to do in response, still **there cannot be any individual decision that constitutes the situation and the way one situation heads into the next**. That logic between the situations is one way of conceiving destiny, one way of conceiving the manner in which God moves man's will even though man's will is free. This is expressed in the drama. Through the drama man can apprehend concretely his freedom, his capacity to decide, and the limitations upon his freedom. He cannot make other peoples' decisions for them, nor can he control his situation.' So **'what is going forward,' like drama, results from the interlocking, the interdependence, of different exercises of freedom**.

Question 8: What is meant by the claim (179) that 'where exegesis is concerned to determine what a particular person meant, history is concerned to determine what, in most cases, contemporaries do not know?' Why is it the case that contemporaries do not know what is going forward? How is this related to the distinction in section 2 between historical experience and historical knowledge?

179: '… in most cases, contemporaries do not know what is going forward, first, because experience is individual while the data for history lie in the experiences of many, secondly, because the actual course of events results not only from what people intend but also from their oversights, mistakes, failures to act, thirdly, because history does not predict what will happen but reaches its conclusions from what has happened and, fourthly, because history is not merely a matter of gathering and testing all available evidence but also involves a number of interlocking discoveries that bring to light the significant issues and operative factors.'

From Doran notes: The peculiar thing about this 'what was going forward' is that **contemporaries do not know it historically, in the way historians will come to know it**. It can be known historically only from the perspective of the time that constitutes the field of historical inquiry. What is going forward in a communal world is beyond the experience of any contemporaries. It is a function not only of what they intend but also of their oversights, mistakes, failures. We do not know the consequences of major decisions made in this communal world for perhaps fifty or more years later. The writing of history is a matter of discovering relationships that by and large contemporaries could not know. Thus history is correlated with judgment.

Regarding the distinction of historical experience and historical knowledge: Historical experience is the lived experience of the group or community, where our pasts have made us what we are, and so we live on our past and our past lives on in us, where the present functioning of the good of order is what it is mostly because of past functioning, and where we are carried by a tradition that has formed us and brought us to the point where we began forming ourselves. Historical experience includes individual and group memories of the past, stories of exploits and legends about heroes, enough of history for the group to have an identity as a group and for individuals to make their several contributions towards maintaining and promoting the common good of order (182). It is the history that is written about. It is what contemporaries *do* know about and share. It is

based in *the ongoing living tradition or set of traditions that gives us identity and enables us to locate ourselves as individuals in relation to a community*. In history, this all functions **at the level of 'experience'** in a cognitional theory brought to bear on historical data.

Historical knowledge is a matter of *objectifying* the 'ongoingness' of that communal world, in the threefold process of (a) assembling the data, (b) reorganizing and reconstructing the narrative from the retrospective of time, and (c) building up contexts that bear on determinate topics and themes.

Examples of this process occur in composing an autobiography, a biography, and a history.

Autobiography: I have my journal, with its day by day organization. But when I write my autobiography, that day by day organization becomes irrelevant. Much that I may have overlooked becomes restored. *Retrospect lengthens*. What was merely juxtaposed becomes connected. What was dimly felt stands forth in sharp relief within new perspectives. A new organization emerges. I distinguish periods in my life, my concerns, my tasks, and in each period I find contexts, nests of questions and answers bearing on distinct and related topics. Thus the process moves from assembly to reorganization through the discovery of contexts. (**A fuller description emerges on 182-83**.)

Biography: I have to do research, gather evidence, reconstruct in my imagination each successive situation, ask determinate concrete questions, build up a set of periods, each containing a larger or smaller set of related contexts. But I do this now in the third person, rather than the first. (Again, **a fuller description appears on 183-84**.)

History: Here the "times" are more important than any given individual "life," as opposed to biography. 184: 'Attention is centered on the common field that, in part, is explored in each of the biographies that are or might be written. Still this common field is not just an area in which biographies might overlap. There is social and cultural process. It is not just a sum of individual words and deeds. There exists a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by cooperations, by institutions, by personal relations, by a functioning and/or malfunctioning good of order, by a communal realization of originating and terminal values and disvalues. Within such processes we live out our lives. About them each of us ordinarily is content to learn enough to attend to his own affairs and perform his public duties. To seek a view of the actual functioning of the whole or of a notable part over a significant period of time is the task of the historian.'

Continuing from 184: 'As the biographer, so too the historian proceeds (1) from the data made available by research, (2) through imaginative reconstruction and cumulative questioning and answering, (3) towards related sets of limited contexts. But now the material basis is far larger in extent, far more complex, more roundabout in relevance. The center of interest has shifted from the individual to the group, from private to public life, from the course of a single life to the course of the affairs of a community. The range of relevant topics has increased enormously and, on many, specialized knowledge may be a necessary prerequisite to undertaking historical investigation.'

At this point, the discussion of '**context**' offered in the previous chapter becomes important. *Mutatis mutandis*, what he says there about 'context' in interpretation applies to 'context' in history. 163-65: '… context is the interweaving of questions and answers in limited groups. To answer any one question will give rise to further questions. To answer them will give rise to still more. But, while this process can recur a number of times, while it might go on indefinitely if one keeps changing the topic, still it does not go on indefinitely on one and the same topic. So context is a nest of interlocked or interwoven questions and answers; it is limited inasmuch as all the questions and answers have a bearing, direct or indirect, on a single topic; and because it is limited, there comes a point in an investigation when no further relevant questions arise, and then the possibility of judgment has emerged. When there are no further relevant questions, there are no further insights to complement, correct, qualify those that have been reached.

'Still, **what is this single topic** that limits the set of relevant questions and answers? … the single topic is **something to be discovered in the course of the investigation**. By persistence or good luck or both one hits upon some element in the interwoven set of questions and answers. One follows up one's discovery by further questions. Sooner or later one hits upon another element, then several more. There is a period in which insights multiply at a great rate, when one's perspectives are constantly being reviewed, enlarged, qualified, refined. One reaches a point when the overall view emerges, when other components fit into the picture in a subordinate manner, when further questions yield ever diminishing returns, when one can say just what was going forward and back it up with the convergence of multitudinous evidence.

'The single topic, then, is something that can be indicated generally in a phrase or two yet unfolded in an often enormously complex set of subordinate and interconnected questions and answers … But my present point is not merely the significance of questions as well as answers – though, of course, that is in full accord with my cognitional theory – but also the interlocking of questions and answers and the eventual enclosure of the **interrelated multiplicity within a higher limited unity**. For it is the emergence of that enclosure that enables one to recognize the task as completed and to pronounce one's interpretation [here, historical account] as probable, highly probable, in some respects perhaps, certain.'

Question 9: What is the relation between history and the kind of human science that does regard meaning as constitutive of human action?

180: '… there is much psychology and sociology that does recognize meaning as a constitutive and normally controlling element in human action. To their study the historian leaves all that is the repetition of routine in human speech and action and all that is universal in the genesis, development, breakdown of routines. Moreover, the more psychology and sociology the historian knows, the more he will increase his interpretative powers. Conversely, the greater the achievements of historians, the broader will be the field of evidence on human speech and action that has been opened up for psychological and sociological investigation.'

Question 10: Referring back to p. 128 in the chapter on 'Functional Specialties,' what is the substantial concern of history as part of theology? How is this related to basic and general history?

The history that is written (history 2) can be basic, general, or special. Basic: who did what, when, why, with what results, how. Special: specific movements – cultural, institutional, doctrinal. General: attempting a total view or an approximation to it; one's information, understanding, judgment, and evaluation regarding the sum of cultural, institutional, and doctrinal movements in their concrete setting. **The substantial concern of history within theology is the doctrinal history of Christian theology, with its antecedents and consequents in the cultural and institutional histories of the Christian religion.** But it presupposes basic history, and it is related to general history, where Christianity takes its place in world history, establishes relations with other religions, and divides into different churches and sects.

Question 11: What are some of the elements in the series of steps that leads from rudimentary existential or precritical history to scientific or critical history? Again, what is the difference between stringing together credible testimonies and achieving historical knowledge? What constitutes historical evidence? What is the difference between potential, formal, and actual evidence? Why is this process called ecstatic? selective? constructive? critical?

Here we come to the **heart of the chapter. The knowledge conveyed by precritical history becomes just historical experience for the critical historian.** It is described in the first paragraph on p. 185. Critical history, the history envisaged in the third functional specialty, is concerned to set forth what really happened, **what was really going forward in the communal world, mediated and constituted by meaning, of particular groups at particular places and times**, and to do so in detachment, quite apart from political or apologetic aims. Doing this is **more than finding testimonies, checking them for credibility, and stringing together what has been found credible**. That is just re-editing historical experience. Historical knowledge grasps what, for the most part, contemporaries did *not* know. Only a series of discoveries can yield that knowledge. The **data are accepted, not as more or less credible testimonies, but only as potential evidence** for finding what really happened. Critical history is not a matter of believing testimonies, all of which are fragmentary, but of **discovering a more complex set of interrelationships than fell to the purview of any contemporary**, and so was not properly known by contemporaries. Accepting testimonies and stringing them together merely re-edits historical experience.

The evidence, then, has to be discovered, and here we have the distinction between potential, formal, and actual evidence. 186: 'Potential evidence is any datum, here and now perceptible. Formal evidence is such a datum in so far as it is used in asking and answering a question for historical intelligence. Actual evidence is a formal evidence invoked in arriving at a historical judgment. In other words, data as perceptible are potential evidence; data as perceptible and understood are formal evidence; data as perceptible, as understood, and as grounding a reasonable judgment are actual evidence.'

The actual process is laid out from 187-89. Here is displayed precisely what **a critical realist theory of historical knowledge** is, the set of heuristic structures for historical knowledge.

In brief, the steps are: (1) the question for historical intelligence: what was going forward in community *X* in the period *a* to *b*? This question is put in the light of previous knowledge and with respect to some particular datum. (2) It may or may not lead to an insight with respect to that datum. If it does not, one moves on to another question. (3) If it does, the insight is expressed in a surmise, the surmise is represented imaginatively, and the image leads to a further related question. If this process is not recurrent, one has come to a dead end. If it is recurrent, and all one attains is a series of surmises, then one is following a false trail and once more must try another approach. (4) But if one's surmises are coincident with further data or approximate to them, one is on the right track. The data are ceasing to be merely potential evidence; they are becoming formal evidence; one is discovering what the evidence might be. (5) If one is on the right track long enough, there occurs a shift in the manner of one's questioning: more and more, the further questions come from the data rather than from images based on surmises. One has moved out of the assumptions and perspectives one had prior to one's investigation. One has attained sufficient insight into the object of one's inquiry to grasp something of the assumptions and perspectives proper to that object. This grasp makes one's approach to further data so much more congenial that the further data suggest the further questions to be put. In this sense, the process is **ecstatic**. But it is also selective, constructive, and critical. **Selective**: not all data are promoted from potential to formal evidence. **Constructive**: the selected data are related to one another through an interconnected set of questions and answers, by a series of insights that complement one another, correct one another, and eventually coalesce into a single view of a while. **Critical**: insights are not only direct but also inverse, realizing one has been on a wrong track and shifting to another track.

Question 12: What is meant by the following statement: 'Now it is the distinguishing mark of critical history that the process occurs twice?' (189)

It occurs (a) in historical criticism, where one establishes one's sources, and (b) in using the sources to know the 'what was going forward' in the community. The two developments are interdependent. See 189.

Question 13: What are historical *discoveries*?

Historical discovery occurs with the **culminating** insight in each cumulative series of insights in the process. 190: '… what gains attention is, not each single insight, but the final insight in each cumulative series. It is such final insights that are called discoveries. With them the full force of the cumulative series breaks forth and, as the cumulation has a specific direction and meaning, discoveries **now are of the new evidence**, now of a **new perspective**, now of **a different selection or critical rejection in the data**, now of **ever more complicated structures**.'

The paragraph on **structuring** is thus relevant to this question. I write my discoveries in a historical narrative. But my narrative undergoes an ever more differentiated organization as I discover dominant and subordinate themes, dominant and subordinate contexts within the themes, greater differentiation of the topics, shifts of the whole structure. 190: 'At first, the narrative is simply the inquirer mumbling his surmises to himself. As surmises less and less are mere surmises, as more and more they lead to the uncovering

of further evidence, there begin to emerge trails, linkages, interconnected wholes. As the spirit of inquiry catches every failure to understand, as it brings to attention what is not yet understood and, as a result, is so easily overlooked, one of the interconnected wholes will advance to the role of a dominant theme running through the other interconnected wholes that thereby become subordinate themes.' Etc. -- ever more inclusive organizations, so that among dominant themes there emerge dominant and subordinate topics, etc., etc., shifting, restructuring.

Question 14: When do historical investigations come to a term? What is the criterion?

The investigation ultimately will come to a term, a moment when the historian says that **as far as I know the question is closed**. This happens when the stream of further questions on a particular theme or topic gradually diminishes and finally dries up. Then the evidence has become actual: it grounds a reasonable judgment. If, in fact, there are no further relevant questions then, in fact, a certain judgment would be true. If, in the light of the historian's knowledge, there are no further questions, then the historian can say that, as far as he knows, the question is closed.

Question 15: What are the sources of historical revision? What are the limits of historical revision?

Historical judgment is **almost always tentative**. The historian knows that **new sources of information** can be uncovered to lead to new understanding and judgment. Furthermore, **later events will place earlier events in a new perspective**, enlarging the context and giving rise to new questions. **Contexts tend to remain open on important issues and figures for a long time**, and the importance of an issue or a figure is in direct proportion, perhaps, to the duration of the context. 192-93, referring to Heussi: '… it is easier to understand Frederick William III of Prussia than to understand Schleiermacher and, while Nero will always be Nero, we cannot as yet say the same for Luther.'

Question 16: What is critical history at the second degree?

193: 'Besides the judgments reached by a historian in his investigation, there are the judgments passed upon his work by his peers and his successors. Such judgments constitute critical history at the second degree. For they are not mere wholesale judgments of belief or disbelief. They are based on an understanding of how the work was done. Just as the historian, first, with respect to his sources and, then, with respect to the object of his inquiry, undergoes a development of understanding that at once is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive and, in the limit, judicial, so the critics of a historical work undergo a similar development with respect to the work itself.' Critical history of the second degree provides the historical knowledge presupposed when asking historical questions. 'It consists basically in the cumulative works of historians. But it consists actually, not in mere belief in those works, but in a critical appreciation of them.'

Question 17: How is it the case that historical procedures effect at least a partial elimination of historical relativism?

These procedures do not entirely eliminate the influence exerted on historical writing by one's presuppositions regarding, for example, what is possible, what is valuable, what are significant questions. The ecstatic aspect that eliminates previously entertained perspectives and opinions to replace them with the perspectives and views that emerge from the cumulative interplay of data, inquiry, insight, surmise, image, evidence, moves to objective knowledge of the past. Some of these issues will be treated in dialectic. This is why **different historians operating from compatible standpoints will arrive at compatible conclusions**. Other things being equal, the procedures of critical history will lead to objective historical knowledge. The 'other things' are treated in dialectic and foundations. Lonergan's point is that is historians begin from compatible standpoints on basic issues and follow the same method, they will write compatible histories.

Question 18: What is the overall point of chapter 9?

The overall point of chapter 9 is to show the significance of cognitional theory in the exposition of what history is and how it proceeds to its goal.

Question 19: What is the difference between historical data and historical facts? How is this distinction related to the fact that the process of critical history occurs twice?

Becker, Droysen, Collingwood, and Marrou have held that facts and interconnections form a single whole. Positivists have maintained that first one has to discover the facts, then work out their interconnections. Lonergan affirms that **the facts emerge out of the interconnections**, and he grounds his affirmation in **the distinction between data and facts**. Historical knowledge is a twofold process from data through imaginative and intelligent reconstruction to facts: first establishing facts regarding sources, then using these facts as data for historical construction of the facts of what was going forward.

From the German historical school to Heidegger and Gadamer, there has occurred a break from positivism, a recognition of the centrality of meaning both in the data and in historical knowledge itself. But it has tended toward a view of history that is idealistic, since it needs also a distinction of judgment from understanding. Thus there are three models of historical knowledge:

Empiricist or positivist: Historian --> Reality (facts)
then interconnections, but why?

Idealist: Historian --> Interconnections//Reality (facts) not attained

Critical realist: Historian proceeds from data
through reconstruction
to facts about sources
These become data
for further construction and reconstruction
leading to judgment about historical facts, which
tell the historian what was going forward)

Question 20: What is perspectivism? How does it differ from relativism?

The question of objectivity remains a problem even for the critical realist, because there are different histories of the same 'what was going forward.' This problem is complex, and only the first step in meeting it is treated here. It is to distinguish perspectives from horizons.

Perspectives: Historical reality is far too complicated for an exhaustively complete description to occur. Historians start with different standpoints, because of the historical process itself and their own personal development. The different standpoints give rise to different selective processes. These give rise to different histories. But the different histories may not be contradictory, may claim to be only incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality.

Horizons: Within the same or compatible horizons, then, there may be different perspectives. But the historian's development is also a function of basic options, that can be involved in historical investigations, and may result in different and irreconcilable histories. 221: 'When the historian is convinced that an event is impossible, he will always say that the witnesses were self-deceived, whether there were just two or as many as two hundred. In other words, historians have their preconceptions, if not about what must have happened, at least about what could not have happened. Such preconceptions are derived, not from the study of history, but from the climate of opinion in which the historian lives and from which he inadvertently acquires certain fixed convictions about the nature of man and of the world. Once such convictions are established, it is easier for him to believe that any number of witnesses are self-deceived than for him to admit that the impossible has actually occurred.'

221: 'Each of us lives in a world mediated by meaning, a world constructed over the years by the sum total of our conscious, intentional activities. Such a world is a matter not merely of details but also of basic options. Once such options are taken and built upon, they have to be maintained, or else one must go back, tear down, reconstruct. So radical a procedure is not easily undertaken; it is not comfortably performed; it is not quickly completed. It can be comparable to major surgery, and most of us grasp the knife gingerly and wield it clumsily.' See the discussion of **miracles** on 222 and again 226.

Historical method as such cannot treat these problems. A new set of methods, those of dialectic and foundations, is involved.