Introduction to Systematic Theology

Class 2, 14 September 2009

1 Review of Chapter 1

We saw most of the items that I listed under 'preliminary notions,' and a good deal of the key notions of Chapter 1 of *Method in Theology*. Today I want to make sure that all of the key notions of that chapter are clear, and then cover as much of chapter 2 as possible.

An examination of the procedures of natural science would seem to indicate something that perhaps can be generalized to the procedures of the human mind in general, namely, a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise. And if that can be done, then perhaps that pattern can be specified in such a way as to be pertinent to theology. The point is to begin with that generalized set of procedures and then to specify what its relevance might be to the doing of theology.

The result will in fact be what I am calling the first meaning of 'system,' namely, the view of how all the various things that theologians do are related to one another: textual criticism, exegesis, historical scholarship, doctrines, systematics, pastoral communication.

That set of procedures will be called various names: basic method, transcendental method, generalized empirical method. (On 'transcendental' I should have added something to what I said in the last class. I said that the Kantian meaning is partly operative in Lonergan's use of the term, namely, the conditions of the possibility of valid knowing, and I think I said that Lonergan takes a more radical step than Kant by beginning with a cognitional analysis: What am I actually doing when I am knowing? I also said that the medieval meaning of the 'transcendentals' is part of his meaning: intelligibility, truth and being, the good (and beauty), which are distinguished from determinate categories. But I failed to mention that these are called 'transcendentals' in medieval thought because they refer or apply to absolutely everything. They are 'comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change.' (I also mentioned the Husserlian meaning, where 'operation' and 'object' are considered together: There is a footnote on p. 145 of *A Third Collection* which reads: 'Distinguish three meanings of the term, transcendental: the most general and all-pervasive concepts, namely, *ens*, *unum*, *verum*, *bonum*, of the Scholastics; the Kantian conditions of the possibility of knowing an object *a priori*; Husserl's intentionality analysis in which *noēsis* and *noēma*, act and object, are correlative.') Perhaps, too, a brief note on a priori would be helpful.

What I want to make sure we have from the first chapter are: the meaning of 'method,' the basic pattern of operations; the meaning of 'intentional,' the meaning of 'conscious,' and the meaning of the expression 'transcendental notions,' including the distinction of these from 'transcendental concepts,' and the meaning of objectifying intentional consciousness.

The Meaning of 'Method': a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. Distinct operations are related, and as they continue to be exercised we see cumulative and progressive results.

The Basic Pattern of Operations, the meaning of 'intentional, and the meaning of 'conscious': The basic pattern of operations involved in any human cognitional enterprise has the fourfold constitution of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. These are commonly referred to as 'levels.' 9: 'There is the *empirical* level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move [qualify this: in human studies the data are informed by meaning; in theology some of the data are informed by a meaning that is accepted in faith to be true; we will see more of this in *What Is Systematic Theology?*]. There is an *intellectual* level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the *rational* level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the *responsible* level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.'

There is a distinct **mode of self-presence** (self-taste) characteristic of these levels, and a distinct kind of object intended, where 'intended' simply means the operations have objects, and where 'self-presence' is the basic meaning of 'consciousness.' There are qualitatively different modes of being conscious subjects, and qualitatively different modes of intending, and qualitatively different objects.

The meaning of 'transcendental notions': The meaning of the word 'notion' in Lonergan, for the most part, is distinct from the meaning of 'concept' or of 'idea.' 'Idea' for Lonergan means 'the content of an act of understanding.' 'Concept' means the elaborated product of the act of understanding, the inner word that our outer words mean. 'Notion' means the very dynamism of our conscious intending. Why do we move from mere experiencing to understanding? Because we have an anticipation of an intelligibility to be discovered through questioning. Why do we move from understanding to judgment? Because we somehow know that there is a further question about our understanding, namely, Is it true? Why do we move from factual knowledge reached in judgments of fact to responsible action? Because the dynamism of our conscious intending is not satisfied with merely knowing what is. We seek to evaluate it and at times to do something about it. Each of these 'promotions' or 'sublations' is a fruit of a transcendental notion: of intelligibility, truth and being, the good. There will be more to say about this structure later, as it can be complicated and nuanced.

But **it will not be radically revised**. 19: '… for it to be possible for a revision to take place certain conditions must be fulfilled. For, in the first place, any possible revision will appeal to data which the opinion under review either overlooked or misapprehended, and so any possible revision must presuppose at least an empirical level of operations. Secondly, any possible revision will offer a better explanation of the data, and so any possible revision must presuppose an intellectual level of operations. Thirdly, any possible revision will claim that the better explanation is more probable, and so any possible revision must presuppose a rational level of

operations. Fourthly, a revision is not a mere possibility but an accomplished fact only as the result of a judgment of value and a decision.' So it gives, in a sense, a 'rock on which one can build' (19). Every clarification and extension of our knowledge will result from the basic pattern that is transcendental or basic or generalized empirical method.

The distinction of transcendental notions from transcendental concepts: The transcendental concept of the 'intelligible' results from objectifying in words the content of intelligent intending. But prior to objectifying that content in words, there is the prior transcendental 'notion' that leads us to ask the question for intelligence in the first place. So too with the distinction of concept and notion at the level of the reasonable and the responsible.

Objectifying intentional consciousness: Everyone knows and observes this method insofar as they are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. What L is doing is 'objectifying' it. How? By 'applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.' See 14-15.

2 Chapter 2. *The Twofold Question of Chapter 2*. There are two central questions addressed in chapter 2: What is authentic intending at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, that is, *what is the notion of value*? And, What is the objective of that intending? The answer to the second question is 'the human good.'

2.1 The place of chapters 2, 3, and 4

I mentioned at the end of the last class one of the reasons for location chapters 2, 3, and 4 where the book does, namely, the relation of religion and culture. 'A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix.' And culture is the set of meanings and values that informs a way of life (xi). So chapter 2 discusses values, chapter 3 meaning, and chapter 4 religion.

There are further reasons. For Christians religion is a function of *God's* entry into the human world, a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. God enters that world through meaning and value, *God's* meaning and value, in Christ God's incarnate meaning (Logos) and value judgment. Revelation is the disclosure of God's meanings and God's values.

It can also be said that these chapters represent significant developments beyond *Insight*, and so if *Insight* is considered as a definite background to *Method in Theology*, a background summarized in chapter 1, then these chapters that advance on *Insight* must also be included in the 'background' part of the book.

While chapter 1 mentioned all four levels of intentional consciousness – experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding – still, the main thrust of that chapter was with the first 3 levels. On those three levels, in a very definite sense *Insight* is Lonergan's basic text. There are only incidental advances beyond it in his later works *as far as cognitional theory is concerned.* The question, What am I doing when I am knowing? has basically been answered. But there is

considerable development with regard to the fourth level in *Method in Theology*, and that development is spelled out in chapter 2.

2.2 The Two Approaches to Decision

What, then, is the difference between the two presentations of decision? In a 1977 paper entitled '*Insight* Revisited,' Lonergan says the following: 'In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.'

I have suggested in several lectures and articles an interpretation of these two presentations, and it has been accepted generally by some Lonergan scholars, especially Fred Lawrence at Boston College and John Dadosky at Regis College. I will share that interpretation with you to get us started in chapter 2.

What does he mean when he says that in *Insight* the good is 'the intelligent and reasonable.' He means that a good decision is good because it is consistent with what one *knows* to be true and good. The decision-making process is very similar to the cognitional process of E-U-J, adding only the further element of free choice. If there is a fourth level of consciousness in *Insight* – and there is no explicit mention of one – it would consist only of this further element of free choice. There is not a complicated process of discernment involved in arriving at a decision, a process distinct from E-U-J. One assembles the data (E), one has a practical insight into what can be done and should be done (U), one grasps that the evidence supports the practical insight (J), one freely chooses to do it (D). There is no mention in *Insight* either of apprehensions of value or of judgments of value in the context of making decisions.

In *Method in Theology*, on the other hand, the good is a distinct notion from the intelligent and the reasonable, that is to say, it is intended in a kind of question that is distinct from the question for intelligence, What is it? and the question for reflection, Is it? Is it so? The question that intends the good is rather something like, Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? Moreover, the good is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. Possible values are apprehended in feelings (strictly speaking, in feelings that accompany deliberative insights). The process is what makes the difference between the two accounts: the judgment of value that knows the good proceeds from a **discernment of these feelings** in which possible values are apprehended, in order to determine which are the possible values that are apprehended by love (the criterion, ultimately) and which are ambiguous from the standpoint of performative self-transcendence. When these judgments of value are made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience, or even better by a person in love in an unqualified fashion, what is good is clearly known. The good is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. And all of this belongs to a fourth level of consciousness, quite explicitly, a level where quite a bit takes place that is beyond E-U-J.

In my interpretation I have argued that the two treatments are not mutually exclusive, that it is not the case that the treatment in *Method* replaces the treatment in *Insight*. Each treatment has its own limited validity. They mark *distinct times of making decisions*, where the difference is determined by the state of the subject making the decision.

The basis for my position is found in St Ignatius Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*, with which Lonergan as a Jesuit was surely familiar. Ignatius proposes *three* times, *in each of which a sound and good election may be made*, and the distinction of the three times depends on the interior state of the subject making the decision.

In Ignatius' terms, in the first time 'God our Lord so moves and attracts the will, that, without doubt or the power of doubting, such a devoted soul follows what has been pointed out to it, as St Paul and St Matthew did when they followed Christ our Lord.' Notice the criterion here: '**without doubt or the power of doubting**.'

In the second time, 'much light and knowledge is obtained by experiencing consolations and desolations, and by experience of the discernment of various spirits.' That is to say, one is agitated by various 'pulls and counterpulls' that are *felt*, where the apprehension of possible values occurs in such feelings, or in feeling-laden deliberative insights.

In the third time, one is tranquil. There is the possibility of using one's 'natural powers' freely and quietly to consider and reflect, judge and decide.

In my interpretation, I have suggested that in this third time the criterion of decision is found in what Lonergan would call the constituents of *rational* choice. Thus the third time corresponds to the general form of decision-making that Lonergan presents in *Insight*, where the good is the intelligent and reasonable, where those characteristics are the criterion of the decision. But in the second time, one is agitated by various pulls and counterpulls of affect apprehending various possible values or being repelled by possible anti-values. Feeling is paramount. One has to discern where the feelings and their apprehended objects are taking one. So we have something very much like the general form of decision-making presented in *Method in Theology*. The first time on the other hand is a time when the love of God so takes over the orientation of the heart and mind that there are no further questions. In both the first and the second times, it is **self-transcendent affectivity** that provides the criterion for the decision. That self-transcendence is clear in the first time but must be discerned in the second.

I could go more into detail here, but if you want more detail fairly soon you could look at two papers that will appear on my website, www.robertmdoran.com, under 'Essays in Systematic Theology,' numbers 18 and 19. I can send PDF files of these to anyone who wishes.

3 The Structure of the Human Good

3.1 The Threefold Constitution of the Human Good (48)

What corresponds to that structure of decision, the relevant object of such a set of operations, is disengaged by unpacking the structure of the human good. So I find it best to begin with the second question, and so to look at the structure of the human good presented on p. 48. (Distribute my page, with that structure along with a quotation from p. 52). **The generalized objective of the fourth level of intentional consciousness is this ordered set of relations that constitutes the human good. To say that theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion is to say that theology has something to do with promoting the human good. Just what that will be is specified in more detail in the chapter on communications.**

The closest Lonergan gets to a definition of the human good occurs in this quotation from p. 52, and it is with reference to the threefold constitution of the human good presented on p. 48:

'The human good then is at once individual and social. Individuals do not just operate to meet their needs but cooperate to meet one another's needs. As the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so individuals develop skills to fulfil the roles and performs the tasks set by the institutional framework. Though the roles are fulfilled and the tasks are performed that the needs be met, still all is done not blindly but knowingly, not necessarily but freely. The process is not merely the service of [humankind]; it is above all the making of [humankind], [peoples'] advance in authenticity, the fulfilment of [their] affectivity, and the direction of [their] work to the particular goods and a good of order that are worth while.'

First, then, the human good is a process that is at once individual and social and that involves a simultaneous intending of **particular goods** and a **good of order**. These constitute the first two horizontal lines in the structure of the human good. But the question recurs, **Are these particular goods or this good of order really worth while?** And so there arises the dimension of the good that Lonergan calls **value**, the third horizontal line in the structure.

3.2 Analysis of this process. Fourth-level intending in its integrity or authenticity is located within this entire structured process. No decision would be made outside or independently of this structure. Every decision would somehow involve all of these elements. But they can be involved also in a biased way. So we need to break the structure down into its constituent elements.

3.2.1 Capacity, operation, particular good, need – i.e., individual and end on the first horizontal line. 52: 'Individuals operate to meet their needs.' 48: 'Individuals … have capacities for operating. By operating they procure themselves instances of the particular good. By such an instance is meant any entity, whether object or action, that meets a need of a particular individual at a given place and time. Needs are to be understood in the broadest sense; they are not to be restricted to necessities but rather to be stretched to include wants of every kind.'

3.2.2 Cooperation, institution, role, task – i.e., the first and second horizontal lines in the column called 'social.' 48: 'Individuals … live in groups. To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It follows some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional framework.' Such frameworks are the family, the educational system, the state, the law, the economy, the technological infrastructure, the Church, and increasingly the global network of human relations. These frameworks 'constitute the commonly understood and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They tend to change only slowly for change, as distinct from breakdown, involves a new common understanding and a new common consent.' Witness the health-care debate in the US today: it is a debate about changing institutional frameworks for the delivery of particular goods; it is a struggle for a common understanding and a common consent. (It also involves the third horizontal line in the structure, but we will see that line momentarily.)

3.2.3 Plasticity, perfectibility, development, skill, the good of order – i.e., the rest of the elements in the second horizontal line. 48-49: 'The capacities of individuals … for the performance of operations, because they are plastic and perfectible, admit the development of skills and, indeed, of the very skills demanded by institutional roles and tasks. But besides the institutional basis of cooperation, there is also the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out': the economic setup, constitutional and legal arrangements, customs regarding marriage and the family, etc. **This concrete manner in which cooperation is working out is the good of order**. The good of order is the actually functioning or malfunctioning set of 'if-then' relationships guiding operators and coordinating operations, so that instances of the particular good either recur or fail to recur. The basis of the good of order resides in institutions, but it is itself a product (49-50) 'of all the skill and know-how, all the industry and resourcefulness, all the ambition and fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency to disorder.' The good of order can break down rather thoroughly, as is clear from the following passage from *Insight* 235: 'A population can decline, dwindle, vanish. A vast technological expansion, robbed of its technicians, would become a monument more intricate but no more useful than the pyramids. An economy can falter, though resources and capital equipment abound, though skill cries for its opportunity and desire for skill's product, though labor asks for work and industry is eager to employ it; then one can prime the pumps and make *X* occur; but because the schemes are not functioning properly, *X* fails to recur. As the economy, so too the polity can fall apart. In a revolution violence goes unchecked; laws lose their meaning; governments issue unheeded decrees; until from sheer weariness with disorder men are ready to accept any authority that can assert itself effectively. Yet a revolution is merely a passing stroke of paralysis in the state. There are deeper ills that show themselves in the long-sustained decline of nations, and in the limit in the disintegration and decay of whole civilizations. Schemes that once flourished lose their efficacy and cease to function; in an ever more rapid succession, as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced; feverish effort is followed by listlessness; the situation becomes regarded as hopeless; in a twilight of straitened but gracious living men await the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day.'

3.2.4 Liberty, orientation, conversion, personal relations, terminal values – i.e., the entire third horizontal line.

Liberty: 50: the process of operation and cooperation is pursued knowingly and freely, where freedom is self-determination. People are aware of alternatives, limitations, risks, drawbacks; with this awareness, a subject and a group settle on a course of action and proceed to execute it.

Orientation and conversion: If the person or group regularly opts, not for the merely apparent good but for the true good – we will return to the question of what constitutes the difference – the person or group is achieving **moral self-transcendence**, is existing **authentically**, is constituting oneself or the group as an originating value, and is bringing about terminal values, a good of order and instances of the particular good that are really worthwhile. If the regular options of the person or group are not for the true good, 'insofar as one's decisions have their principal motives, not in the values at stake, but in a calculus of the pleasures and pains involved' (50), then there is a failure in self-transcendence, in authenticity, in the origination of value in self and in society, and there is the need for conversion.

Personal relations: Freedom is always exercised in a matrix of personal relations. People are bound together not only by their needs, and by the common good of order that meets their needs but also by the commitments that they have freely undertaken and the expectations that these arouse, by their roles and tasks within the social fabric in which these expectations are met, and by the feelings that arise in our spontaneous intersubjectivity and that are developed as personal relations unfold. Personal relations are alive with feelings, and these feelings include feelings about values, about scales of preference, and about each other; and these feelings may be common or opposed. And people are joined as **community** by common experiences, by common or complementary insights, by similar judgments of fact and value, by parallel orientations in life, and they are separated, estranged, rendered hostile, by the absence of common experiences, understandings, judgments, and goals.

Terminal values: the values that are chosen, when they are truly worthwhile, **including the originating values** that are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence in their good choices, constitute what Lonergan means by terminal values.

Summary of this third row: The summary of this third row is given on pp. 51-52: '… for the moment our concern is with the orientation of the individual within the orientated community [he will return to the orientation of the community itself, which is an even more radical matter]. At its root this consists in the transcendental notions that both enable us and require us to advance in understanding, to judge truthfully, to respond to values. Still, this possibility and exigence become effective only through development. One has to acquire the skills and learning of a competent human being in some walk of life. One has to grow in sensitivity and responsiveness to values if one's humanity is to be authentic. But development is not inevitable, and so results vary. There are human failures. There are mediocrities. There are those that keep developing and growing throughout a long lifetime, and their achievement varies with their initial background, with their opportunities, with their luck in avoiding pitfalls and setbacks, and with the pace of their advance.

'As orientation is, so to speak, the direction of development, so conversion is a change of direction and, indeed, a change for the better. One frees oneself from the unauthentic. One grows in authenticity. Harmful, dangerous, misleading satisfactions are dropped. Fears of discomfort, pain, privation have less power to deflect one from one's course. Values are apprehended where before they were overlooked. Scales of preference shift. Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and shatter to leave one open to things as they are and to [people] as [they] should be.'

4 Elements of Development for the Human Good

4.1 Skills

Lonergan will turn to Piaget, who establishes that each element in the acquisition of a skill consists in an **adaptation** to some new object or situation. In each adaptation there are two parts, assimilation and adjustment. **Assimilation**: bring into play spontaneous or previously learned operations employed in somewhat similar situations; **adjustment**: by trial and error gradually modify and supplement previously learned operations. This Piagetian analysis of the development of skills seems to apply across the board, from physical skills like walking to artistic skills like playing musical instruments to intellectual skills like mathematics and theology. E.g., 'Insofar as the mathematical scientist draws upon his knowledge of mathematics, he is **assimilating** preexisting schemes of operations; and insofar as he carries out experiments and observations and fits his mathematics onto the results obtained by the experiments and observations, he is **adjusting**.' Adaptation to new objects and situations brings an increasing differentiation of operations and an ever greater multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations. 27: 'So the baby gradually develops oral, visual, manual, bodily skills, and … increasingly combines them in ever varying manners.' Mastery of any group of operations is achieved when one can always return to the starting point unhesitatingly. More can be found on Piaget in chapter 8 of *Topics in Education* (CWL 10).

Lonergan distinguishes three kinds of skills, and this distinction enables him to introduce several other key notions.

4.1.1 Skills in the world of immediacy.

See p. 28, paragraphs 'Finally' and 'This distinction,' for the distinction of the **world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning**.

First, then, there are skills in the world of immediacy: visual, manual, bodily skills such as are studied in Piaget's research.

4.1.2 Mediating skills

Next, there are mediating skills: skills through which a far larger world, mediated by meaning, becomes the world in which we live: skills of imagination, language, symbols, art, and so on. By these (28) 'we come to operate not only with respect to the present and actual but also with respect to the absent, the past, the future, the merely possible or ideal or normative or fantastic. As the child learns to speak [he/she] moves out of the world of [his/her] immediate surroundings towards the far larger world revealed through the memories of other [people], through the common sense of community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.' Each of these involves a skill set.

4.1.3 Reflexive skills

Finally, there are the reflexive skills by which we operate on the mediating operations themselves: we develop alphabets, dictionaries, grammars, logics, hermeneutics, philosophies. Classical and modern culture differ according to whether these controls are regarded as permanent and universal or involved in an ongoing process of change.

4.1.4 Differentiations of consciousness

The crucial notion of differentiations of consciousness arises in the discussion of 'different degrees of development and different worlds mediated by meaning.' See p. 29, where theory, art, and transcendence are introduced for the first time as differentiations of consciousness.

4.2 Feelings

4.2.1 Nonintentional and intentional feelings

Lonergan distinguishes nonintentional and intentional feelings. In **nonintentional** feelings a state exists that has a cause – fatigue, irritability, bad humor, anxiety – or a trend exists that has a goal – hunger, thirst, sexual tension. (Clarify the first paragraph on p. 30, so that in part it reads, '… and distinguish non-intentional states and trends from intentional responses. Non-intentional states may be illustrated by such states as fatigue, irritability, bad humor, anxiety, and non-intentional trends by such trends or urges as hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort.') But the feeling does not arise out of perceiving or imagining or representing the cause or goal. **Intentional** feelings are affective responses to what is apprehended or represented. They relate us not just to a cause or goal but to an object. These feelings give intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without them our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. But because of them we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning.

4.2.2 Two main classes of objects

This all has to do with the discernment of feelings as they are involved in the apprehension of possible values.

Intentional feelings regard two main classes of objects: the agreeable or disagreeable, and values. The two can and often do overlap: what is agreeable may very well be a true good. But they can also conflict: what is a true good may, for whatever reason, be disagreeable. What constitutes a response as a response to value is that it carries one to **self-transcendence**.

4.2.3 The scale of values

On the basis of the criterion of self-transcendence Lonergan proposes a normative scale of values, normative precisely for affective response: vital, social, cultural, personal, religious (31-32). We will see this in much greater detail as we proceed, since it is a core idea in my own

work. See *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, chapter 4, and *What Is Systematic Theology?* in the index, under 'Scale of values.'

4.2.4 Development and decline of feelings

The development of feelings is treated on pp. 32-34. Feelings can be reinforced by advertence and approval, or curtailed by disapproval and distraction. In this way one's spontaneous scale of preferences can be modified. The enrichment and refinement that comes with attentive study of the wealth and variety of the objects that arouse feelings is notable. There can be in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life. Loving would be the chief positive illustration, and it is helpful to read what he says about it, 32-33: 'A man or woman that falls in love is engaged in loving not only when attending to the beloved but at all times. Besides particular acts of loving, there is the prior state of being in love, and that prior state is, as it were, the found of all one's actions. So mutual love is the intertwining of two lives. It transforms an "I" and "thou" into a "we" so intimate, so secure, so permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both.' This will become Lonergan's fifth level of consciousness, where the love can be the love of intimacy, the love in the civil community, and the love of God.

The principal negative instance is what Scheler calls resentimment (very closely connected with Girard's mimetic rivalry). See 33.

And in the final paragraph of the section (33-34) there is introduced the very important distinction of the unconscious and the conscious but not objectified. We should look at that.

I suspect this is about as far as will get, but …

5 The Notion of Value

Skills of all kinds and feelings are not enough to constitute the human good. There is an innate dynamism that spontaneously leads us to ask regarding any object or course of action, Is this worthwhile? Is it really good? Value is what is intended in such questions, which themselves reveal the transcendental notion of value. More is said on the transcendental notions, on their relation to the levels of consciousness, and on self-transcendence, on 34-35. We should look at that.

And on the notion of value, see 35: '… by deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but what truly is good, worthwhile. Then we can be principles of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true love. But it is one thing to do this occasionally, by fits and starts. It is another to do it regularly, easily, spontaneously. It is, finally, only by **reaching the sustained self-transcendence** of the virtuous [person] that one becomes a good judge, not on this or that human act, but on the whole range of human goodness.' The notion of value, like the notion of being, is unrestricted: there is no limit to its exigence. See 36, 'Similarly …'

6 Judgments of value

Questions for deliberation and evaluation terminate proximately in judgments of value, and ulteriorly in decision and action.

Judgments of value may be either simple ('This is good') or comparative ('This is better').

How do we know whether a judgment of value is true or not? 37: 'Such judgments are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. **Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being**.' But the criterion differs from the meaning. The meaning has to do with what **objectively** is good or better, or not good or better, while the criterion is the authenticity of the **subject**.

They differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact. 37: 'They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove if what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.'

Judgments of fact bring to a close a particular case of cognitive self-transcendence, but it is not the case that judgments of value bring to a close any cases of moral self-transcendence. That occurs only in **doing**. The judgment of value makes one proximately capable of moral self-transcendence, but one does not achieve that until one not only knows what is right but does it.

In a much disputed set of sentences on pp. 37-38, Lonergan writes: 'Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings,' etc. The very fact that he shortly thereafter speaks of the need to cultivate, enlighten, strengthen, refine, and criticize such feelings indicates to me that the initial apprehension of values in feelings is more often than **an apprehension of possible values, which occurs in deliberative insights that are alive with feeling**. There are **further questions**. It is only when there are **no further questions** and one knows, with the peace of a good conscience, that there are no further questions does one's judgment of value have something in the moral order analogous to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in the order of judgments of fact.

Another important notion emerges in this discussion on p. 38: '… the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the **existential discovery**, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also **thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one**. With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance of **personal value** and the meaning of

personal responsibility. One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfillment or to one's loss. Experience, especially repeated experience, of one's frailty or wickedness raises the question of one's salvation and, on a more fundamental level, there arises the question of God.'

There follows a discussion of the **contexts** in which judgments of value occur. They are the contexts of personal development and decline. These contexts are studied in 39 and 40, and we should look at these two paragraphs.

But the foundations of our judgments of value lie in what Lonergan, following Joseph de Finance, calls vertical liberty. De Finance distinguishes between horizontal and vertical exercises of liberty. A horizontal exercise of freedom is accomplished within the particular horizon that is one's own. A vertical exercise of freedom entails the choice of a new horizon. Some vertical exercises of freedom entail conversion.

This needs unpacking. And the unpacking occurs on pp. **235-38**.

7 Beliefs

These personal matters of growth and development and judgments of value 'attain their proper context, their clarity and refinement, only through [our] historical development and the individual's personal appropriation of [one's] social, cultural, and religious heritage' (40-41). That appropriation occurs through beliefs. Section 7 presents Lonergan's approach to belief, which is much more common than we might sometimes suspect. It occurs in science itself. It can be analyzed into five steps: (1) one person reports what he/she has come to know by experience, understanding, and judgment; (2) I accept in general the value of believing; (3) I make the particular judgment of value that this witness is trustworthy; (4) I decide to believe this witness; (5) I believe.

8 Progress and decline

After his presentation of the structure of the human good, Lonergan indicates that it is compatible with any stage of technological, economic, political, cultural, religious development. But development is not the only thing that occurs in these realms. There also is decline, and so he concludes the chapter with a sketch of social progress and of social decline.

53: 'Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible … Progress … is not some single improvement but a continuous flow of them … But precepts may be violated' because of egoistic bias, group bias, general bias, and the greater the aberration, the more rapidly it will distort the process of cumulative change and bring to birth a host of social and cultural problems. See 54-55 for his description of the course of decline and the role of religion. Also the notions of ideology and alienation, p. 54.

Note that the criterion of progress is found in answering the question, Does this course of action result from, and encourage, human beings being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible.